Are you saying human consciousness is not dependent on the brain? — jgill

Nope, not saying that. You and I and Kant knew everything from a human perspective has to do with the brain. Nevertheless, if nobody knows exactly the how of a thing, he is allowed to speculate on it as long and as deep as he likes. And we acknowledge that as physical science supplies facts, speculative philosophy looses power. The question remains, nonetheless, will science ever supply enough facts to negate all speculation. Even if it does, will Everydayman accept them? I rather doubt it, myself. The “I”, the Kantian representation for the transcendental object of pure reason called consciousness, is not going away merely because science says there is no such thing.

“...Besides, when we get beyond the bounds of experience, we are of course safe from opposition in that quarter; and the charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so great that, unless we are brought to a standstill by some evident contradiction, we hurry on undoubtingly in our course. This, however, may be avoided, if we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account....”

Here he tacitly admits that pure speculative philosophy has no possibility of empirical proofs. But we don’t care, all we want to do is satisfy ourselves with some rational, logically consistent method sufficient to explain what we want to know about those of which Nature, and by association, experience, has nothing to tell us.
——————

I see metaphysics in parts of mathematics. — jgill

As well you should, although I would go even further, and say metaphysics is in, or the ground for, all mathematics. Mathematics proofs are empirical, of course, but mathematical constructions to be proven, are not empirical at all. If not empirical, then rational, and if rational then given from reason, and if given from reason, in this case not purely speculative but purely theoretical, then metaphysical.

Eazy-peasy.

Wha....we went from the conflict of consciousness being explainable by materialists or unexplainable by idealists, the fallacy in support of the latter being “science has not explained consciousness --> science cannot explain consciousness --> consciousness is unphysical”, to.......(gasp).....morality?? Can I get a great big fat.....HUH?!?!?

Truth be told, I don’t understand what you mean by fell foul, unless it is that The Good Professor neglected his own premises in forming a conclusion which required them. If so, in context, he fell foul by giving the aforementioned fallacy daylight. But he never correlated consciousness to science one way or the other, because he didn’t think it within the purview of science to examine. No transcendental object is susceptible to phenomenal predicates, so claiming science can explain it, or not explain it, are illegitimate propositions.

So....why would Kant run afoul of something by not allowing knowledge to justify morality? Under what conditions does knowledge justify morality? What if Kant never considered that morality needed any justification at all? All of which is necessarily predicated on what Kant thought morality actually is. Without that, all the above is utterly moot.
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I think the extent to which a moral claim can be justified at all, it can be justified by knowledge. — Kenosha Kid

Justifying morality is not the same as justifying moral claims. Moral claims are justified by their projection into the world by the subject in possession of them. Morality itself, being considered as nothing but a fundamental human condition, is justified by our very nature. Knowledge has nothing to do with either one.

My fault, of course — Kenosha Kid

Nahhh....perhaps I’m too much the literalist, not being too much for subtleties. Or, perhaps the more one searches for them, the more likely he is to overlook their meaning.

We are in accord with respect to the science vs consciousness dilemma and the fallacy associated with it.

I wasn't strictly saying that Kant fell foul of this fallacy (although I think he did), — Kenosha Kid

When the site went dark I lost my comment on this fallacy thing, which I’ve since quite forgotten. Perhaps if you’re so inclined, you’d elaborate on how you think he did.

It is a non-starter, for the excruciatingly simple reason that Kantian metaphysics isn’t as much concerned with the knowable/unknowable, that being an empirical condition either given or possible, as he is with how knowledge is obtained, which is a strictly metaphysical condition, whether given or possible. Hence, what science can or cannot lawfully explain is irrelevant, in juxtaposition to what we can or cannot logically think.

This should be quite obvious, insofar as no science is ever done, that isn’t first thought. And anything that all-encompassing, cannot have any gaps.
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It is that science cannot explain consciousness, therefore dualism. — Kenosha Kid

Science can explain consciousness, if science discovers empirical principles under which an iteration of consciousness manifests empirically. The only way for science to be necessarily unable to explain consciousness is for consciousness to be proven with apodeitic certainty NOT to be an empirical condition, which, to date, has not been accomplished, at least with peer review.

Be that as it may, for Kant the unknown is contingently so, possibly reducible by experience, the unknowable is necessarily so, regardless of experience. But the unknowable can still be thought, which tends to make “metaphysics of the gaps” a Kantian non-starter.

Nothing to do with Kant, other than a misreading.
— Wayfarer

It has everything to do with Kant, no misreading required. — Kenosha Kid

Put me in the “nothing” column. Kant wasn’t concerned with the unknown, as much as the unknowable, and the ultimate unknowable, the unconditioned, this alone being the backdrop for pure reason, the speculative, the theoretical or the practical.

And while Kant is still referenced, either pro or con, to this day in serious philosophical discourse, it is more because of his proof for the validity of synthetic a priori cognitions, and all that follows from that proof.

Metaphysics of the gaps, if there is one, would have more to do with human thought and the unthinkable, rather than human knowledge, and relying on the unknown.

Big deal. When those losers have been arguing amongst themselves for the bulk of millennia as we metaphysicians.....and getting the same nowhere as we....then perhaps PERHAPS, I say, they’ll warrant some modicum of attention.

Just not from us.

I am not the “unguarded listener”, so I have nothing more to say about this.

Good luck.

(maybe I recognize it doesn't make any sense) — Eric Souza

Or, create an argument showing that it does. The history of metaphysical dialectic is against you, but then, paradigm shifts have happened before, so.....

can the existence of others be used to prove my non-existence? — Eric Souza

If it is proven you don’t exist, how did you ask whether or not your existence was disprovable? And if it was proven you didn’t exist, how would you know whether or not it was other people’s existence used to prove it?

“....For if a question be in itself absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer, it is attended with the danger—not to mention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes it—of seducing the unguarded listener into making absurd answers, and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one (as the ancients said), milking the he-goat, and the other holding a sieve....”

(Sigh)

how one can even begin the process of legitimate metaphysics? — Shawn

Reason. Think logically.

It seems to me impossible that while you are conscious of beauty you are unaware of beauty. — Pantagruel

Simple, really: I’m unaware of beauty when I don’t think a thing I’m aware of is beautiful. What right would I have to think that, if I didn’t already have an understanding of how beauty is represented in me? Being unaware of beauty just means the thing I’m aware of doesn’t meet some personal standard for it.
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You are begging your own question. — Pantagruel

It would seem that way, yes, if being aware and being conscious are taken to mean the same thing. The logical error disappears if they are considered to stand as separate and very distinct theoretical domains.
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I'll happily stipulate that we do have such background knowledge and awareness, — Pantagruel

Cool. “Background” tacitly understood to indicate that of which one is not immediately aware. So you’ve kindasorta acquiesced to the validity of two separate and distinct domains. YEA!!!

If the laws we see in the universe are the only laws that a universe can have.... — Benj96

What right do we have to say that? We see the laws because we put them there, in order to understand the operation of the universe according to our kind of intelligence. Anything else is anthropomophism.

I think I’ll restrict attention to the province of awareness, rather than consciousness. While it is possible to be aware of a plurality of things at once, attention is usually thought as being a focus on some part of that general awareness. And I may not even have the object of awareness as a content of my consciousness if I never had any experience with it on the one hand, and never even gave a thought to its possibility, on the other. Yet, there is is, right in front of me, being perfectly aware of it. Whatever it is.

But then, anything I think, whether aware of it or not as a sensed object, cannot be other than at my attention. So there is that.

you can't simultaneously be conscious and unaware of the same thing. — Pantagruel

For things to be the same, or even synonymous to a significant reduction, they should really be so under any condition. But they are not, to wit: I am conscious of beauty when I see it, I am aware of things that are beautiful, but beautiful things are not themselves beauty. They merely represent my consciousness of what beauty should be. They are nothing but relative examples of it.

How would I be aware of a thing’s beauty if I didn’t already possess the standard by which to judge it? It follows necessarily that, while I am always conscious of beauty, I am often times completely unaware that a thing is beautiful. To put a split hair on it, I am conscious of beauty, but aware of its negation if a thing is ugly, which makes explicit the beauty of which I am conscious does not belong to the thing of which I am aware.

But that’s not what you’re talking about. You’re talking about not being able to be conscious of and unaware of the same thing at the same time, which presupposes a real object of sense. While this may indeed seem to be the case, it is so only if one thinks being conscious of and being aware of, is the same thing. But, alas....I am always conscious of that of which I am aware, but I am not always aware of that of which I am conscious.

Philosophy is the science of hair-splitting.

But if one wishes to think being aware and being conscious are the same thing
— Mww

I personally do think awareness and consciousness are synonymous. — Pantagruel

Synonymous, yes, insofar as awareness is taken to be the quality of being aware just as consciousness is taken to be the quality of being conscious, so synonymity is in the category to which they both equally belong. Or even if you want to call it a state of being, or a condition as such, in as much as redness is the state of being red, fitness the state of being fit, so too awareness and consciousness are the respective states of being of each.

But you just informed Harry that you think awareness and consciousness are the same, which is much more than merely synonymous. Case in point, I can be quite conscious, and still be unaware of something....
(How many times have you been so thoroughly engrossed in something that the sound the person beside you made with his speech, left no impression on your ears?)
.....whereas whenever I am aware of anything whatsoever, I absolutely must be conscious simultaneously with it. Therefore, the two would seem to be different in some measurable respect. And if those two are different, then it follows that awareness and consciousness must also be measurably different in a corresponding respect. Perhaps still synonymous by singular category, but significantly disparate in use, occurrence, condition, or something else. Whatever is sufficient to explain such possible difference.

Parsimony suggests awareness is a function of sensibility, consciousness is a function of rationality. With these hypotheticals, the construction of a theory in cognitive science becomes much more internally consistent, hence more efficient.

While I agree consciousness is its content, and would certainly seem to be variable in degree, do you see that the link you gave doesn’t address that idea? All the table in the link gives, is the relative states of being aware, which has nothing to do with the manifold of representations of which one may or may not be aware. All it details is the relative ability to employ the contents of consciousness, not with whether or not the content is available to employ. I think the title of the link is a misnomer.

But if one wishes to think being aware and being conscious are the same thing, or arise from the same conditions, the table might hold. But they do not, necessarily, so.........

Ok.

Thanks.

You expressed your certainty that all bodies have extension in space. Certainty is a feeling. — Asif

I expressed a cognition, a judgement in the form of a language proposition, which represents my knowledge of bodies. How, then, would you explain to me the absence of something, is also the feeling about it? In other words, if you say my certainty is itself a feeling, what would having no doubt, which is the same as being certain, feel like? What is the profit in saying I feel certain that I have no doubt? I don’t understand why I have to feel certain about that of which I already have no doubt. And I find it absurd to have a feeling about that of which I am not even in possession.

Why can’t certainty just be a rational state of affairs derived under the most stringent of conditions, rather than a feeling, which is just as often self-wrought as it is derived from mere inclination, neither of which is even conceivably derivable from necessity?

I understand what you’re saying, and it does hold some water in a ultra-modern, rapsidasical way; I just don’t see any good reason to accept it.

Is induction a theory? — Asif

There is a theory of induction; the principle of induction conditions empirical theories, or theories the objects of which ascend from the particular to the general.
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Is there really a difference between verifying empirically and rationally? — Asif

Verifying empirically is a ambiguity, in that verifying empirical events is still a rational activity. Sticking voltmeter probes in the wall socket only indicates something, and still needs some rational judgement relating the subject’s extant knowledge to the indication.
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But the intellect and intuition are different words for a psychological expression a feeling. — Asif

I reject that out of hand, but if you want to run with it, fine by me.
————-

Human language is an expressed feeling. — Asif

All bodies are extended in space. What feeling did I express with that language?

Intuitions are not feelings.

No theory is verified, for they all operate under the principle of induction; they merely stand as unfalsified....until they are. That which is verified empirically are called facts, or we could use data if you like, and in addition, that which is verified rationally are called truths.

I can claim anything I want, “A-HA!!!” the bejesus out of it, no matter how I feel about it. And no matter whether I am right or wrong about it.

Agreed:
.....all truth and knowledge needs a subject to which each relates, and,
.....verification is by intellect alone.

The arbiter of logic Is the subjects coherent feelings. Logic is the science of successful Prediction. — Asif

The thesis:
The judgements of science are determined by how one feels about it.

The antithesis:
A subject’s feelings, generally, even if coherent, are always contingent, being sufficiently predicted on nothing but mere desire.
Anything contingent is susceptible to contradiction.
A successful prediction is necessary, or, which is the same thing, non-contradictory, insofar as some apodeictic consequent is given from antecedent conditions relative to it.
Therefore, feelings can never judge that which is a logically necessary conclusion.

The conditional:
There may be the case a successful prediction does follow from a desire, but such is accidental, and the accidental, in and of itself, is hardly amendable to a logical science.
A rational exception would be a successful prediction morally, for which a coherent feeling is fundamentally responsible. But that feeling is predicated on an obligation, not a mere desire, and is not a logically arbitrated judgement.

discursively reasoning, "about reasoning" is (TLP-like) nonsense? — 180 Proof

It is nonsense in a way. Understanding, which is what discursive reasoning actually entails, only becomes relevant when we want to know the how of a thing, the what of it already given to us a posteriori.

“...In Wittgenstein’s theoretical logical language, names are only given to simples. We do not give two names to one thing, or one name to two things...”
(Russell, Introduction to TLP, 1922)

Right/wrong; right/left. No matter how differentiated, “right” is still the same name. The only way out is to call names the schema of the concept under which it is subsumed, but if one is oblivious to the concept, even if exposed to the experience from which the concept arises, he only has the contradiction to the principle. And any principle so easily falsified cannot be necessary.

Or......how to open oneself up to the ridicule of the modern analytic types. (Grin)

Or if your favorite philosopher does likewise...... — Pfhorrest

.....likewise taken to mean “have their own core principles that they think entail all of their positions on all of the different philosophical sub-questions.”

“...Of all the a priori sciences of reason, therefore, mathematics alone can be learned. Philosophy—unless it be in an historical manner—cannot be learned; we can at most learn to philosophize....”

“...We can only learn to philosophize; in other words, we can only exercise our powers of reasoning in accordance with general principles, retaining at the same time, the right of investigating the sources of these principles, of testing, and even of rejecting them....”

“...Philosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition (and) is the idea of a possible science ...”

These are the core principles, or, the essential characteristics of a system, by which learning to philosophize becomes meaningful with respect to the human condition. The system itself, based upon these or some other principles, determines the possibility of uniting all the philosophical sub-questions under one legislative idea.

“....By the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system. Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science; it will be an aggregate, and not a system. Thus architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in cognition, and therefore necessarily forms part of (a necessary) methodology.

Problem being, of course, the event of human reason doesn’t use the very principles employed in the understanding of its use. The operation of reason is not the same as talking about the operation of reason. Talking about it requires the architectonic, the functioning itself, does not. If this were not the case, philosophy in general, and epistemological metaphysics in particular, would not be speculative, which is to say, how we think, and therefore how we philosophize, would be demonstrable with apodeictic certainty by means of the parameters of physical science, which, of course, is very far from being the case, to date.

If we knew all this stuff for sure, we’d have that much less interesting stuff to talk about.

“....merely a lame appeal to a logical condition...”

What does it mean to be conscious, such that more of less of it makes sense? According to one speculative metaphysic, in humans, being conscious is the irreducible necessary condition for the generation of conceptions. That being given, if there is something more conscious than we, it follows that something merely has a greater capacity for generating conceptions, indicating the possibility that something of greater conscious can generate conceptions the lesser conscious cannot, irrespective of congruent experiences. Such being the case, we would never know whether there is something more capable of generating conceptions than we, because the only means to know it, is by the very capacity of which we have the lesser.

Hence, the appeal to a logical condition being “lame”. Not necessarily false but altogether worthless, because its ground is in the fact we already understand there are things seemingly less conscious than we, but that in itself gives us no warrant to quantify the more of something under the same conditions as we warrant the less of it.

The common rejoinder usually takes the form of, say, in the case of an otherwise similar rational entity but one whose sensory input for vision is in the infrared spectrum, will certainly be capable of generating conceptions humans cannot. But this has to do with quality of conscious generations, not the relative quantity of them, which is what the question asks. He is not necessarily more conscious than we, but merely in possession the conscious conceptual capabilities of a different kind. But even that is another lame appeal, insofar as a presupposition of conceptions is granted but not necessarily warranted.

Anyway.....thanks for the interesting question.

“...—a science containing the systematic presentation of the whole body of philosophical knowledge, true as well as illusory, given by pure reason—is called metaphysic...”

Best start at the beginning, I would think.

“...The laws of physics are the decrees of fate...”

Much better: referring me to something I didn’t know.

OK.

Thanks.

And as Hume points out, they are statements of a different nature. — Wayfarer

Of a different nature to be sure, as Kant elaborates: “....The philosophy of nature relates to that which is, that of ethics to that which ought to be....”

Why do you suppose, if the difference is “....of the last [i.e. most important] consequence.”, he didn’t carry his investigations further, rather than demur to a personal opinion (“...nor is perceived by reason.”)?

A product of his time, I suppose; he just didn’t see any benefit in venturing further from his empiricist roots, then his basic inquiry into human understanding would allow, to wit:

“....And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, ’tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical....”

“....the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects...”
(So close.....)
“....nor is perceived by reason.”
(Yet, so far away)

How is this possible?!?! — Eugen

Easy: brain states. Make of that what you wish.

lend oversight — tim wood

Nahhh......you’re doing alright.

Answered already.

an answer exists for all existing questions — Daniel

I don’t agree with that.

Do not tell me that this "deduction" can be false. It would be chaos. — David Mo

Momentary lapse of reason (thanks, David!! Not you...the other David) on my part. That which is inconceivable is unknowable, not necessarily impossible.

My bad.

I understand you are saying that the question, the unknown which causes the question, and its response are all logically (causally?) related. — Daniel

Not necessarily; it is possible for a question not to have an answer, in which case the question seeking an unknown remains unsatisfied, and logical relation becomes moot. But to be a legitimate question, that is, one for which the answer is both possible and rational, then the one must directly relate to the other.

But a finer point might be that unknowns don’t cause questions necessarily, merely from being an unknown in general. Such is the strictly minor fallacy cum hoc ergo propter hoc, which says because there are unknowns therefore there are questions, which is not always the case. Being coincident with is very far from being causality for.
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If it is, what is it that judges the quality of their relationship? — Daniel

As my ol’ buddy Connor MacLeod....you know...the Highlander, says.....there can be only one. In this case, only the inquirer may be the judge.

So you've defined 'the immaterial' out of consideration! — Wayfarer

Yeah, pretty much, which just goes to show that while materialism alone isn’t false, it alone is insufficient as a explanatory device in all cases.

The Kid is technically correct, but his contemporary restrictions are self-defeating, insofar as neither, e.g., the home twin nor the traveling twin have any use whatsoever for reference frames, until or unless they ask why their clocks don’t match.

Modern formal logic contradicts him. — David Mo

It is not a question of contradicting — David Mo

Make up your mind.
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The inconceivable is not the impossible. — David Mo

Under what conditions would this not be true?
— Mww

It's not about conditions. It's an analytical statement. — David Mo

An analytic judgement can be false. Because “the inconceivable is not the impossible” is false, it is not true under any condition.

how would you say the unknown relates to the question? — Daniel

I guess....in the most basic sense, the query presupposes the conception in the subject of the response relates directly to the conception in the subject in the query. The response “the color of the dining room is 14ft”, is incoherent with respect to the question “what color is the dining room?”.

What's necessary for a question to exist? — Daniel

What’s necessary for a question, is an unknown that relates to it. What’s necessary for a question to exist, I suppose, is just the expression of it.

Nope, not offended. I cherrypicked from your criteria and conditions, so rapidly exhausted my potential argument.