I think Corvus and Mww argue that the idea of the self is not an element of the set of ideas. — Daniel

Not what I’m arguing; THE self is a valid general idea, having a myriad of representative conceptualizations from various ways of being understood. MY self is a particular, and as such, is more a logical deduction represented as an object of MY reason, given the name transcendental object in order to distinguish its origin, rather than a conception of the understanding.

the exercise is concerned with the idea of the self. — Daniel

This concern is different from your “The self I am trying to explore is that which is the object of thought when you think of yourself”, insofar as me thinking of myself is incomprehensible. Nothing contradictory in examining the self in general as an object of thought, but to think myself as an object of my own thought, invites the anathema of Cartesian theater.

From my perspective it seems fairly obvious that we affect ourselves — wonderer1

And from mine, I find much more parsimony in the notion my self is affected, or, which is the same thing, I am affected. To be affected by my thoughts, it does not follow that because all my thoughts belong to me, I thereby affect myself.

The argument derives from antiquity, in that the conception contained in the subject of a proposition or statement cannot be at the same time the conception contained in the object, in the same proposition.

Perdurantist. New one on me.

….about things affecting themselves… — wonderer1

I wasn’t being so general, meaning only the self by my comment. See below, if you like.
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I guess Im trying to separate the idea of the self from the self itself. — Daniel

Which gives rise to my comment. That which is trying to separate is the self, which implies the attempt to separate self from self. Even to separate the idea of self is merely once-removed, and still requires that to which the idea belongs, so you end up with an idea you’ve created about yourself, you then wish to remove from yourself.

Why does self need to be something to separate, or separable? I fail to understand what could be gained by attempting to conceptualize something, when the device for constructing conceptions, or to which conceptions are spontaneously given, is just….well….me.

There is a Enlightenment- era philosophy addressing this exact dilemma, however much it has subsequently fallen from favor. The argument therein is, the self can be conceptualized in the somewhat normal method, but there’s no separability connected to such conception.

Anyway….my two or three ha’pennies.

…..one might say that one needs to form a concept of shape before having a concept of self since it might be very difficult to reference/contemplate/visualize/imagine something if one does not comprehend or has the capacity to comprehend that there are shapes…. — Daniel

It’s almost incomprehensible that there must be that which is affected by itself. How can it be asked about a thing, when the very thing asked about, is doing the asking?

Nature of the metaphysical human beast: look for answers whether or not there are any.

Oh. My fault then. Sometimes I get too analytical. Preferred implies intentionality, but there’s only one way to think, within the confines of the legislation intrinsic to the three logical laws, which eliminates a preferred way of thinking. What is thought about may or may not be a conscious choice, but we can’t choose what to think of what we end up thinking about.

They do indeed 'structure' experience, but they're not derived from experience. That's what makes them 'transcendental'. — Wayfarer

Hume’s dilemma, and a logical snafu: it is impossible to both structure, and be derived from that which is structured. Build a house with boards, and the house gives you the boards? Say wha..!?!?

I jest, but the principle holds.
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I could just as easily have said "preferred way of thinking" as I have little doubt that our preferred ways of talking reflect that. — Janus

I might argue that point. Ya know….we cannot think a thing then think we have thought otherwise, but we can think a thing and talk about it as if we thought of it otherwise. You cannot fake your thoughts but you can fake your language regarding your thoughts.

…..it's just my own take. — Janus

Cool.

You'll probably disagree with me (we all have different ways of thinking about these things, apparently) but I see space and time as being for us, just as objects are, appearances. — Janus

Oh, I certainly do, but there’s no damage done by it. Different strokes and all that, right?

Is it a precept or some kind of general rule of phenomenology that space and time are appearances in the same way as objects? Say, as in Kant for instance, appearance mandates sensation relating specifically to it, what sensation could we expect of space from its appearance? Or is it that the precept or rule doesn’t demand sensation from appearance?
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I think there is a real cosmos….. — Janus

As do I, and grant the rest of that paragraph, given your perspective.

Lemme ask you this: there is in the text the condition that space is allowed “empirical reality in regard to all possible external experience”. Would you accept that his empirical reality is your appearance?
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I think many of these disagreements come down to preferred ways of talking — Janus

Yeah, could be. But you know me….I shun language predication like the plague: rather kill it than put up with it. But you’re right, insofar as there must be something that grounds disagreements, so I vote for disparity in subjective presuppositions. How one thinks about stuff depends exclusively on where he starts with it.

'the eye cannot see itself' — Wayfarer

(Sigh)

Overlooked, or outright dismissed, is our brief exchange on pg. 14, re: brain/appearance.

Pretty common knowledge the brain has no nerve endings as pain receptors, hence we cannot feel our own brain. Hardly likely we’ll ever smell it or taste it, and seeing as how there’s something drastically wrong if it ever makes a sound we can hear, and the implication we’ll actually see it carries some serious consequences as well, it becomes absurd to then suppose our own brain, in which resides all our mental goings-on, can be an appearance to our own sensibility.

The brain sitting on the bench? Sure, there can be a valid phenomenal representation of that. And the comment expressing Locke’s qualities? Of which Kant deems it reasonable to admit the totality, concerns “actual existence of external things”, which…..DUH!!!!…..cannot be my own brain.

What’s really cool, is the converse. The brain on the bench can be an appearance without contradiction, but it cannot contain my thoughts without being one.

Kant didn’t saw off his own branch. He made it so you can take it home and make a killer table out of it, when his peers and successors burn down the tree.

The argument from authority is a weak form of doing philosophy in my view; we need to learn to think for ourselves. — Janus

Absolutely. Concur 100%. You’ve considered a certain authority’s philosophy as wrong in at least a particular instance, which makes explicit you’ve thought in opposition to it.

I have always thought that Kant is wrong about space and time: if there can be things in themselves, then why not space and time in themselves? — Janus

So….he was mistaken in that he didn’t attribute real existence to space and time? Or, you think he should have? The theory holds that things-in-themselves possess real existence, and are the origin-in-kind of that which appears to sensibility. From which follows that to attribute the same conditions to, e.g., space, originating from space-in-itself, we should be able to represent the constituency of it, which is merely the arrangement of its matter according to form residing a priori in intuition (A20/B34), which is what is done with any other sensation. But the matter of space, according the antecedent conception of it, can be nothing other than an infinite aggregate of greater or lesser spaces, from which follows there is no determinable object possible to intuit at all. In common parlance, no phenomenal representation is at all possible for that which has infinite composition, but equally without any substance whatsoever. And here arises the requisite concreteness of that which appears, insofar as without it, we are presented with “…. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd.…” (Bxxvii)

On the other hand…..there’s always an other hand…..the thing-in-itself is never that which appears, or is always that which could never appear, and, space is never that which appears, and, never could be, so perhaps they are a sort of in-themselves after all.

All that being said, and speaking without recourse to relevant authority, how do you think space-in-itself to be conceivable? How was Kant wrong with respect to his treatment of it?

My reticence re indirect realism (is) more a dissatisfaction with current theories of perception. — Count Timothy von Icarus

D’accord. The analytic dudes got ahold of it, sent it off into the metaphysical puckerbrush.

I do, however, tend towards the "direct," in some key ways. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As do I, re: perception. Every perception is directly real, from which follows every sensation given from any one of them, is directly real.

I fear we end up in dualism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ehhhhh…I’m a staunch, dyed-in-the-wool, card-carryin’ dualist, so my position is we can’t really end up where we always were to begin with.

…..doomed to end up very blurry. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yeah, but that’s a qualitative judgement describing a subject that holds those representations. Just as the representations change in correspondence to the conception of the entity, usually via experience, so too will the subject’s judgement change in correspondence to his representations. Blurry may then, if not become clear, then at least become different, in which case, what was formally i.e., a recession, becomes merely (a-HEM) a historically precedented temporary downward trend.

But I get your point.

I don't agree with 'indirect realism' because it posits two separate things - the reality and its representation. As if we could compare them. — Wayfarer

Might I rest assured you’re familiar with the so-called “dual aspect’ vs “dual object” theory, regarding transcendental philosophy, or theories of perception in general? If you are, and hold with the dual object scenario, which seems to be the case, re: “…posits two separate things…”, then your objection to indirect realism may be valid. But for he who holds with the dual aspect scenario, in which there are not two separate things, but merely two methods for examining the one thing**, the objection can be overruled.

So saying, transcendental theory, as epistemologically grounded as it is, makes explicit there are not two separate things, the real and the representation of the real, a seemingly ontological consideration to be sure, insofar as the representation is not a thing in the same sense as the thing which appears, is. This denominates representation to a speculative procedural constituent, logically concluded or rationally presupposed, rather than empirically given. It also makes the determination as to necessity vs contingency a mitigating condition in itself, the logic being necessary, the empirical, contingent.

And, while I agree we do not compare them, per se, the real against the representation, there are judgements which follow in due course. It is the judgements on the synthesis of representations, or, which is the same thing, our cognitions, that are compared, and those by reason for their mutual consistency, and to which Nature informs of the correctness, either of the one in particular, or of the one over the other in a series.

(** two methods: thought, and experience)

Is there another reason you do not agree with indirect realism? Or is it simply that I’m misconstruing what you meant by it?

The brain doesn't appear at all. Not unless you're someone who is studying brains. — Wayfarer

No brain has ever been a phenomenon to the subject to which it belongs. The only brain that will ever appear to me, is someone else’s, and even if I intuit it as such, I will still never apprehend its internal machinations.

To the extent I have a problem with indirect realism, it's the fact that it tends to lead to this sort of soft dualism and hidden humonculi who are there to view the "representations" of the world. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To the extent I have a problem with indirect realism, is reconciled by distinguishing the operation of the cognitive system, in and of itself, on its own accord, from talking about the constituent parts that enable its function. The talking about it is that which creates the very Cartesian theater alledged to subsist in it. It is absurd to suppose reason has a partner, or intuition has a twin.

Consider time. At one point the subject thinks, feels, knows….whatever. It is at another time he reconsiders the content of former time, and whether sufficiently identical to it or not, it is still the same system belonging to the same subject in operation for both times. For any times, in fact.

From here, it follows the soft dualism in question doesn’t reside within the system, but dualism proper is the condition resident between the system in which representations are the effects, and that which is given to it, by which representations are caused. There is no “view”; there is merely relation.

I suspect….I’d like to think…..the extent to which you have a problem with indirect realism, isn’t so great.

Somehow, "self-knowledge" tends to be about thinking of yourself the way someone else wants you to think of yourself. — baker

Yeah…hence the closing comment I made to Wayfarer, re: the intrusion of clinical psychology.

No such thing as self-knowledge. It’s a catch-phrase meant to indicate one has an intelligence that gets along with itself more than not. Actually, brought up an excellent point regarding conscience, integrating well with intelligence, which gives….a catch-phrase meant to indicate one has an intelligence and a conscience that get along with each other more than not.

Being able to discern delusions and false hopes is not a tall order, is it? — Wayfarer

Humans are naturally endowed with a relational intellect, for which the capacity, as function, for discernment is integrated necessarily, but in doing so, in enacting, as operation, the functional capacity, re: being able to discern, there must already be that which serves as ideal against which the content under discernment is complementary. Herein, then, against being able to discern delusion there stands extant truth; against being able to discern false hope there stands practical reason**.
(**sidebar: practical reason justified under the assumption “false hope” is an illegitimate cognition, insofar as the attainment of its object is considered given but under false pretenses, which practical reason would expose. The common euphemistic proof being….you can’t get blood out of a turnip)

So it is that these ideals against which discernment directs itself, are purely subjective conditions, dependent only on the aesthetic judgement of he who holds them. Reduce it yet another step, and it happens that even if the subject in the act of discerning isn’t immediately aware of the ideal against which he is relating the particular occasion, there must be one, for otherwise he wouldn’t be in the relational situation in the first place, he being satisfied with whatever happens to have been the status quo. And here is the appropriateness of the Socratic, “know thyself”, and the systemic Enlightenment sapere aude, wherein being able to discern, and, having the capacity for discernment, while two very different functional parameters, insofar as the former presupposes the latter but is not necessarily a manifestation of it, in which it occurs that the subject actually does comprehend a delusion for what it is, and does recognize a hope as having an unattainable object.

So…..before the digression becomes uninteresting, or perhaps any more uninteresting, yes, being able to discern can be a tall order, iff the subject has no immediate awareness….no immediate knowledge a priori…..of the ideals against which his reason directs its functional capacity. On the other hand, Everdayman, who only under the most extreme occasions asks himself to consider any of this, has to think ever-more to determine the ideals against which he is relating his internal controversy, and is apt to just leave it at….as is wont to say…..damned if I know, but it sure don’t feel right.

Being able to discern shouldn’t be a tall order, because we come naturally equipped to deal with it. Speculative metaphysics describes why it nevertheless sometimes is, and, what to do about it using that equipment. But descriptions themselves don’t fix stuff, so now we have clinical psychology. (Sigh)

I always thought the maxim 'know thyself' was simply about seeing through your own delusions and false hopes. — Wayfarer

…..which, of course, presupposes knowing what they are, by the subject, or self, effected by them.

Anyway, just a thought, probably best left aside out of respect for the OP.

Whatever experience we have or knowledge we possess, it always occurs to a subject — a subject which only ever appears as us, as subject, not to us, as object.' — Wayfarer

Paradox resolved. Self-knowledge is a transcendental paralogism, a logical misstep of pure reason, re: knowledge of self treats that to which knowledge belongs, as object the knowledge is about. (B411)
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It's not just me then.…. — Tom Storm

Reason: the source of both wondrous insight and debilitating confusion.

It is really difficult to tell if I'm actually learning something or progressing or whether I'm chasing rainbows — Wayfarer

Cool. Cuz I can’t make heads or tails out of self-knowledge.

I got a notification of mention, by Banno, but I wasn’t even aware of this thread. Dunno how that happens, but anyway…..

Interesting thesis, and well-spoken.

I think (@Mww might confirm)…..that it was a pragmatic moral necessity to assume a transcendent moral order, even if it could not be proven by reason alone. — Wayfarer

Not sure how moral necessity can be pragmatic. Moral necessity by itself, says enough, with respect to assuming a higher order.

As for such higher moral order, true enough; what Leibniz called the Kingdom of Grace Kant calls the summum bonum.

“…. Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings (whereby they are made worthy of happiness), constitutes alone the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely must transport ourselves according to the commands of pure but practical reason. This world is, it is true, only an intelligible world; for of such a systematic unity of ends as it requires, the world of sense gives us no hint. Its reality can be based on nothing else but the hypothesis of a supreme original good. In it independent reason, equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme cause, founds, maintains, and fulfils the universal order of things, with the most perfect teleological harmony, however much this order may be hidden from us in the world of sense….”

I think, for him, pure reason is quite different from imagination. For me, not so much. — Bob Ross

So be it.

metaphysics explains only concepts (….) and does not explain any facts of the matter. — 180 Proof

I have no problem with this, since it isn't metaphysics in the more traditional sense — Bob Ross

I am using the traditional term going back to leibniz, Kant, etc. — Bob Ross

“…..We come now to metaphysics, a purely speculative science, which occupies a completely isolated position and is entirely independent of the teachings of experience. It deals with mere conceptions….and in it, reason is the pupil of itself alone…..” (Bxiv)

If the watershed for the traditional sense of metaphysics is Kant and Enlightenment philosophy in general, and metaphysics in such traditional sense has only to do with conceptions, it follows that to combine metaphysics with, juxtaposition it to, or ground it in, imagination, is very far from the traditional sense.

While it is true metaphysics is not a legitimate source of knowledge, it isn’t so because of the synthesis of it in whatever shape or form, to imagination.

…..how can one distinguish (metaphysics) from the human imagination…. — Bob Ross

Metaphysics is a discipline; imagination is a faculty.

Even if one chooses to deny to imagination the denomination of faculty, metaphysics is still a discipline, and in which case, the distinction remains that imagination is not.

Kant takes some starting points that are not tenable. For example….that moral behavior and inclination-behavior are conceptually separable. — Leontiskos

Observation proves that is the case, either in ourselves or in our observing others. It sometimes happens that even knowing what is to be done, isn’t.

I take an Aristotelian-Thomistic approach and I haven't seen a need to leave it behind — Leontiskos

I can certainly can sympathize with that.

Quite right — Leontiskos

So Descartes was wrong, re: when he said the one thing he couldn’t doubt was his doubting yet you affirm doubting is an act one can be uncertain about.
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Of course to have knowledge of a proposition involves having knowledge of the terms of the proposition, but the knowledge of the proposition is not mediated by the terms. — Leontiskos

Correct, but irrelevant and beside the point. When I’m walking to the kitchen I’m not concerned with the construction of propositions. To inform you of my activities it may be necessary to construct speech acts with words and in a fashion you can understand, but it is certainty not necessary to inform myself.

…..the knowledge that you are walking into a kitchen presupposes knowledge of the kitchen. I think it would be quite odd to call this mediation, particularly in the sense of the "appearances" of the OP. — Leontiskos

The presupposition JUST IS the mediation, with respect to the major in the OP. All that’s required is an exposition of the origin of the presupposition in order to justify mediation as properly obtainable from it. Which is the bone of contention overall, insofar as mediation via presupposition cannot be justified in the minor without stipulation that the act the individual knows is itself an appearance, which is the condition met by walking into that which appears as “kitchen”. But, on the one hand, if he knows his act as appearance, the minor contradicts the major, and on the other, it is not necessary an individual knows his act by appearance, insofar as he can know what his act will be without it ever manifesting in the world, which makes explicit his act is necessarily mediated by something other than experience, in which case the minor contradicts itself.

It’s really not that difficult, is it?
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…..consciously thinking (….) consciously walking…. — Leontiskos

Consider that for a second.

An error in reason perfectly congruent with the syllogism in the OP.

Now, while it is true Everydayman doesn’t give even half a hoot about such seemingly innocuous rationality, the philosopher should recognize it for what it is.

I’ll leave you to it. Or not.

…..are you saying that the world-in-itself (1) has causality and (2) that our representations of it are (for the most part) accurate? — Bob Ross

I’m saying we have to grant that the things in the world are caused. Even if we don’t know what causes things, if there’s some thing right in front of my face, I’m further along accepting something else caused it to be there, than I would be if I denied it.

Granting the fact we are not conscious of that which transpires from the output of the sensory apparatus and the input to the brain, and supposing the Enlightenment metaphysicians figured this out as well, we cannot say anything about the accuracy of our phenomenal representations. As every Kantian worth his salt can recite verbatim, “….intuitions without conceptions are blind…”.

Otherwise, I don’t know why you would appeal to scientific investigations of the brain…. — Bob Ross

The brain is just another thing, right? I’m just saying there’s some degree of correspondence between scientific and metaphysical knowledge claims. Or, lack of them.

…..would you say you believe that the world-in-itself has relations — Bob Ross

I wouldn’t word it that way. I’d say everything in the world appears related to something else.
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I think you have developed (or adhere to) a model of reality, which is extracted from the trusting of one’s experiences, whereof we represent the world to ourselves and our representations are somewhat accurate of the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

I’m ok with that. And because you and I will agree on many more things than not, it is more than probable our cognitive systems are congruent in their respective matter, but merely similar in their respective operational parameters.

What would you say is the main reason you’ve read Groundwork a few times, but you’re not a Kantian? Would it be that you weren’t persuaded by it enough to investigate other works, or you weren’t impressed with it at all?

Some questions:…. — Leontiskos

Oh cool. Socratic dialectics. I’ll play along. Briefly.

Do you act? — Leontiskos

Yes.

When you act do you know you are acting…. — Leontiskos

Not always.

…..or are you not sure whether you are acting? — Leontiskos

Yes, I’m sure I’m acting, iff I’m in the act of doing something and aware of it.

Do you disagree with L'éléphant about his knowledge of walking over to the kitchen? — Leontiskos

Yes.

Finally, if you think this knowledge is mediate, then what is it mediated by? — Leontiskos

Why, the knowledge that I have walked to the kitchen, is mediated by my understanding of what a kitchen is. How else would it be determinable that I didn’t walk to the bathroom? If I say I did a particular thing, I must already know what that thing was before I did it. If that was not the case, all I’m justified in saying is that I walked into a different space.

And yes, you actually do need a kitchen-type object to hit your eyes, or, possibly but not as definitively, some particular kitchen-like perception, in order to KNOW you’ve arrived in the kitchen. No stoves in the office, no toilets in the pantry.
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Do you think people without "systems" are also capable of knowledge? — Leontiskos

No. But still, if ALL people have a system, regardless of what kind of system it may be, then to ask about people without one, is unintelligible.

.

I was not intending by “affected” that you were aware of it (as the ego). — Bob Ross

Yeah…that’s dialectical inconsistency on my part. Properly spoken, it should have been, there is awareness of it, rather than I am aware of it. There’s no I (as the ego) in the senses, to be sure. Recall as well, I’ve said we are not conscious of the machinations of the faculty of intuition, and it is true there is a blind spot between the senses and the brain, but there needs to be something like intuition and with it phenomenal representation, in order to intelligibly explain that of which we are conscious, even if only from a metaphysical point of view.

Let it be resolved that to be affected is to grant the necessity of real external objects effecting the senses. Now it may be clear I cannot notice from the effects of the ticking clock right in front of me, that another identical clock, in some significantly different place and under certain conditions in that place, is ticking at a rate different.
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But if it isn’t accounted for within Kant’s view, then doesn’t it pertain to the things-in-themselves; which Kant say we cannot know? — Bob Ross

It could, sure. That’s what Schopenhauer did with his theory of world as will and idea, made it so the Kantian thing-in-itself just goes away. Still, Kant’s view is quite broad, so it’s possible to account for some things within that view using a different method, while discounting others. We know this, because some of his ideas are still in force today. Or, I suppose, to be accurate, some of his ideas haven’t been sufficiently refuted.
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It sounds like you are claiming to know something about the world-in-itself: that it has causality. Am I correct in that? — Bob Ross

It does sound like that, but adhering to the theory shows the sound to be just conventional simplicity. You said it yourself, the chain of mental events for knowledge. For me to know the causality of Nature, I’d have to be affected by causality, intuit causality and represent it as a phenomenon, understand causality and represent it as a conception, synthesize each representation into a cognition of causality. Right off the bat it is impossible to represent causality as a phenomenon because causality is not conditioned by space and time. Causality does not have extension in space; things do. So given the interrupted chain of mental events, I cannot KNOW causality, but I can still think it as a conception. Which it is, in transcendental philosophy, being termed a category, and is entirely a function of logic alone.

Just as space and time are the necessary conditions a priori for experience, the categories are the necessary conditions a priori for the understanding of conceptions. So it is in thinking alone, that logically Nature must be causal, because it is absurd, and eventually contradictory, to suppose it is me….or you or Bob or Julie or Sir Charles……that is necessary cause of the things both by which all of us are affected, and at the same time, the things only some of us and possibly none of us, are.

So no, I cannot say I know the world has causality. All I can say is that logically, it must. If a logical system combines with a transcendental philosophy, and if there is a non-contradictory truth given from it, such is a tacit authorization of reason, to call that truth pure a priori knowledge, insofar as given a certain set of conditions, the conclusion could not be otherwise.
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”the representations in us presuppose corresponding things external to us, and, Nature is causal in itself, but that doesn’t mean we have to know anything about either of those two things

(…) the first I have a hard time justifying, since all we know is conditioned by are possible forms of experience. — Bob Ross

Yeah, but we don’t know either the representations of things or those real things corresponding to them. What we know, knowledge proper, emerges as the culmination of a procedural methodology. The conditioning of a procedure, then, indicates that which relates the components in it to each other in order for it to be methodological.
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I am uncertain as to what it could be in-itself nor as this ‘thing’ that you mentioned. — Bob Ross

Exactly right. To be uncertain is to not know, precisely relevant to the point. It follows that there is uncertainty simply because the means for it has not been called into play by mere appearance. Not that certainty will occur upon such means, but it absolutely never will without it.

Such is metaphysics, which is, after all, what we’re talking about.

….we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions, and if you disagree then you will have to provide an argument. — Leontiskos

That was never a contention simply from the fact it was never submitted as such, in the original syllogism, which doesn’t even suggest community as a determinant condition. The contention remains, that no one, as individual subject to whom the syllogism is properly addressed, knows anything at all that isn’t mediated by the system by which knowledge itself is possible. Give that system any name you wish, determine its methodology by whatever means…..whatever it is, if knowledge is impossible without it it is necessarily the case knowledge is mediated by it, and consequently, no knowledge is at all possible non-mediately.

That’s my argument, and if it is true, the minor in the original syllogism is demonstrably false because of it, while there being nothing wrong with its form.

So, yes, we know our own actions in a more immediate way that we know others’ actions, but that says nothing about the mediacy/non-mediacy of the our own knowledge of our own actions, which is the implication the syllogism carries.
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There are two questions here: first, whether the mediation of the knowledge of appearances and the mediation of the knowledge of first-person acts are different kinds of mediation; and second, whether the knowledge of first-person acts are mediated. — Leontiskos

Absolutely, different kinds of mediation, and thereby, the second question is redundant.
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It is an attempt to explain what has already occurred. — Leontiskos

Ever tied to explain what hasn’t occurred? That isn’t, instead, a prediction?

Fun talkin’ to ya, but let’s not get too carried away, huh?

Not that either of us would have noticed…..
-Mww

But this concedes that it does affect you! — Bob Ross

How do you figure I’m affected by the very thing I didn’t notice? I concede a thing happens, an effect on me, but from that I don’t have to concede I am aware that it happens, an affect in me. The food I eat has an effect on me, but I’m not aware of it.

the whole the point is that it is relative to other inertial frames; and if it affects you, then it must be explained (or accounted for) in Kantianism — Bob Ross

Nothing in a different inertial frame affects me in mine. My watch ticking at its rate at 450mph has no effect on your watch at 0mph. The only affect on me when returning from 5 years in space, is DAMN, you got OLD!! It is absolutely impossible for me to justify, given only the account determinable from my frame of reference, that I simply didn’t age as fast as you. It is the case, therefore, there is no way to explain the relativity of inertial frames from a purely metaphysical Kantian point of view.
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I have a hard time with this, because there is no ‘thing’ and this denotes the thing-in-itself as completely irrelevant to what we are representing: so, in your view, the ‘things’ becomes effectively what the ‘things-in-themselves’ were supposed to be. Now the ‘things-in-themselves’ are just imaginative, unprovably existent, “objects” of the world. — Bob Ross

But there is a “thing” iff there is a sensation. Or, technically, there is the appearance of a thing iff there is a sensation. Which does make the thing-in-itself completely irrelevant to what we’re representing, yes.

Yes, things effectively represent what things-in-themselves SHOULD be, iff intellect doesn’t conflict with Nature.

Yes, things-in-themselves are existent in the world, necessarily presupposed by our phenomenal representations.
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I would say that this entails that we do not reverse engineer, ever, the things-in-themselves but, rather, only the best guess based off of the limitations of our senses and understanding; for we cannot start anywhere else but the representation in “front” of us. — Bob Ross

Reverse off our best guess presupposes we’ve already made it. If we’ve already made our best guess, we’re way past representation, which is the starting point for what the best guess is going to be. Reverse means backwards. Backwards from best guess, that which we’ve already done, gets us to representation. To say we start from representation when in reverse, contradicts the method by which we arrived at the best guess.

What do you mean by “start with knowledge”? — Bob Ross

Because knowledge is the systemic epitome of best guess!!! You had a chain of mental events ending in representation, but that’s wrong. The chain of mental events ends with knowledge, so in reversing, THAT is the start. But still, reversing from mere sensation does not involve the whole series of mental events, in which case, reversing does not start from knowledge. But it cannot start from representation either, insofar as, at the point of sensation, there isn’t any representation to reverse from.
———-

I think the root of the problem, as I noted before, is that Kant is presupposes a causal kind of relationship when transcendentally determining our a priori faculties and then using them to say that causality is only valid within those representations: kind of self-undermining. — Bob Ross

This is kinda hard to unpack, but here goes…..

Ok, causal kind of relationship: in determining our faculties, he presupposes they work together. Nothing wrong with that.

Then he uses the faculties as he has determined them to be, to make it so causality only works within them. But that can’t be right, because if it is, there is no way in which there can be any other kind of causality working outside those faculties, in which case, it becomes impossible to explain the ontology of natural objects. Even if there is a limit on our knowledge of what they are, there is no uncertainty in the fact that they are. If we deny or even doubt the appearance of objects because Nature is not itself causal, we destroy the very notion of an internal cognitive system, relying on pure subjective idealism.

…..why think, if Kant is right, that there are things-in-themselves? — Bob Ross

Two reasons: the representations in us presuppose corresponding things external to us, and, Nature is causal in itself, but that doesn’t mean we have to know anything about either of those two things. In fact, whatever it is that we do know about, comes from us, and there is nothing whatsoever that qualifies what we know, except what we know. No wonder we’re such a bunch of potentially confused creatures.
————

”Hence, you don’t have knowledge of the thing to which the object of the sensation belongs, repeating the fallacy of knowledge production.
-Mww

This just circles back to the major problem that Kant demonstrates, but adamantly tried to dogmatically refute: that we cannot know a priori that we sense, intuit, nor cognize: we are stuck with being conditioned, ultimately, by the two pure forms of experience and they shape how we understand ourselves after that. — Bob Ross

We cannot know a priori what we sense or intuit, but we can certainly cognize a priori.

There not two forms of experience; there are two forms by which experience is possible, which indeed we are stuck with. Theoretically.

The two forms by which experience is possible do not condition or shape how we understand our-SELVES, but only how we understand real objects external to us. Our-SELF is a subject, and no subject can at the same time be an object, therefore our-SELF, as mere subject of which can only be thought as conception, has no need of phenomenal representation, hence is not conditioned by that which makes them possible. And this, among others, we cognize a priori, or technically, transcendentally.
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”Ask yourself whether, right here, right now, it can be said what that thing is.
-Mww

No. Because this test is still dependent on your sense of site (at a minimum); take that away, and the mosquito returns back to a giant question mark: something insensible. — Bob Ross

Correct: no. But if no, where the does “mosquito” come from? The reversing doesn’t turn back into a giant question mark; it never was anything but that, an undetermined something, from which you have no warrant to label it as a named thing. It was always and only just a thing. What…..you think that sensation came ready-equipped with a name? And we knew of it just from the sensation given by it? If that’s the case, why is there a cognitive system, and by association, an intellect, at all? What’s the brain for, if “mosquito” is given immediately from a sensation? I know you don’t think that’s how it works, so….where did “mosquito” come from in your view?

Truth be told, I don’t have Metaphysics of Morals as a completed volume, so am not qualified to compare it with the Groundwork, which I do have. I have the first division of Metaphysics, The Science of Right found in the Philosophy of Law, Hastie, 1887, but not the second division, The Science of Virtue.

From what I do know, I say my position on the relation between the two is….the Groundwork is personal, the rest is anthropological, or perhaps more precisely, the rest shows distinctions between the personal and the anthropological. You know…..Kant and his incessant dualism: whatever this is, there is always going to be that. All that, in juxtaposition to The Metaphysics of Ethics, which I also have, tends to keep ‘em separated.

As to the development of his thought, there is the mention in the secondary literature that it isn’t so much a development, but an elaboration, re: Palmquist, 1990. Development carries the implication of significant change, as you say, being superseded, whereas mere elaboration doesn’t necessarily. But still, just the conceptions themselves, Groundwork for morals on the one hand and Morals themselves on the other, is highly suggestive of at least a progression, which is a sort of development.

My primary interest has always been reason itself, and always my reason. Not yours, not anybody’s; just lil’ ol’ me. As such, I don’t care about your knowledge, or your morals, or your ethics, but leave them to you or them, to do with as you, or they, wish. Because of that, Groundwork has always held the most sway for me, which probably explains why I haven’t bothered to examine Metaphysics with the same zeal.

Sound about right to you? You see it differently?

If it is the case no knowledge is at all possible that is not mediated...
— Mww

If this were the case then the minor would simply be false. But it is not false, because we do have knowledge of our own actions in a non-mediated manner. — Leontiskos

Which is the whole point, as far back as your metabasis eis allo genos in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, in which there is found in the minor a “change into some other genus” other than the major, which doesn’t affect the form of the syllogism itself, which remains unexceptional, but renders the argument invalid at the level of individual instances.

Aristotle calls this an error in scientific reasoning, meaning it only shows up in demonstrations of the premises. Here, the major premise, that appearances are known mediately, is true as demonstrated by means of some theory, but the minor, an individual knows his actions non-mediately, is demonstrated as false by that same theory. Or, upon demonstration by a different theory, contradicts the major, which is like using geometry to prove arithmetic propositions. Or, the judgement relating the price of gas going up/down in the major, is judged in the minor as a function of butterfly migration. Either is an example of turning a legitimate syllogism into a mere sophism.
(Ever listened to speeches on the floor of the U.S. House? Yikes, I tell ya; one instance of illegitimate reasoning right after another. The more serious the topic, potentially the more silly the logic)

And perhaps this is why the OP references Kant via Allison, in that Kant posits that this kind of logical error is the fault of reason itself, and not the thinking subject, who is seldom conscious of his mistake.

Bottom line….knowledge of any kind, is necessarily mediated by the system which makes knowledge possible. There is no such thing as immediate or non-mediate knowledge, or, that knowledge given to a subject without the intervention of his own systemic intellectual methodology. And if one wishes to sharpen to a finer point, even in the case of sheer accident or pure reflex, a subject’s knowledge, without methodological intervention, and thereby merely a harmless post hoc ergo propter hoc deduction, is still mediated by time.

Again I’ll ask….how do you think it is possible to have knowledge of our own actions in a non-mediated manner?

I don't think the syllogism is "just a hot mess." — Leontiskos

What do we wish, by means of proper reason, to extract from a syllogism? If it is truth, the syllogism at hand contains a true conclusion, but that conclusion is not possible from the premises constructed to obtain it. Hence…the hot mess.

As to equivocation, I was thinking more regarding mediate/non-mediate, rather than distortions of the singular conception, knowledge. If it is the case no knowledge is at all possible that is not mediated, the term non-mediate cannot serve as ground for a judgement concerning knowledge.

It follows that while the major is true in its use of “mediately”, the minor remains equivocal insofar as “non-mediately” has a different relation to knowledge than the relation in the major, hence is a fallacious sophisma figurae dictionis, especially if “non-mediately” doesn’t relate to knowledge at all.

As to demonstration, if we exchange “non-mediate” for “immediate”, as one might reasonably expect, the minor transforms to, “an individual knows his acts immediately”, in which case the error….errors, there are two…..becomes quite clear.

Having said all that, what do you think “non-mediately” means, and do you think knowledge is possible by it?

I didn't understand that this was a Kantian discussion. — Ludwig V

Ehhhhh…..the discussion begins with, “saw the following in a Kant book”, so makes sense to relate the following to what was actually in the Kant book. Not to mention, what’s wrong with the following, is specified in the Kant book. And from there, the best answer to the query implied in the OP, is given from the Kant book, which is….the stated syllogism is indeed invalid.

There are other ways to prove the error, sure; I just gave the one I knew about.

it does affect you in the sense that your time is ‘sped up’ or ‘slowed down’ relative to another person. — Bob Ross

Again, not if that person and I are in the same inertial frame. As I said before, it is true there would have been a ~12 x 10-8sec (dunno how to type exponents, sorry) discrepancy in elapsed time in my age upon flying to Rome, and yours, if you didn’t. Not that either of us would have noticed…..
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I know you think we are saying different things, but hear me out… — Bob Ross

Bob: ‘thing-in-itself’ > sensations > intuitions > understanding > representation
Mww: ‘thing-in-itself’ > sensations* > intuitions > understanding > representation
*The reverse engineering of what was sensed does not produce knowledge of the thing-in-itself but, rather, the mere ‘thing’.

If your asterisk holds, mine should read, thing > sensation > intuition > understanding > representation, which would then be right if, in addition, representation is exchanged for knowledge. It’s a methodological sequence, start here, end there. In either case, the production of knowledge doesn’t belong here, re: the proposition, “reverse engineering of what was sensed produces knowledge of the mere thing”, is false.

Where do you start when you reverse engineer what was sensed? If in the series as you’ve given it, starting at representation and working backwards is inconclusive, in that which of the two kinds of representation, phenomenon or conception, is not determined. If the start is knowledge, on the other hand, working backwards arrives at understanding represented by conception, then intuition represented by phenomenon, then sensation, then the appearance of the thing, and the sequence is upheld.

Nevertheless, the experiment doesn’t work as stated by the totality of the sequence, insofar as reversing the sequence eliminates the possibility of knowledge of the thing, effectively reversing the system to its inception, to wit, the occasion for its use, which is the mere appearance of some undetermined thing, hence the fallacy of knowledge production.

Furthermore, metaphysically, if we adhere to the conditional as written, reverse engineering what was sensed, under the implication the reversal begins with the sensation itself irrespective of the remainder of the methodological system, we haven’t accomplished anything at all. The ol’…..you can’t unring that bell. Now reverse engineering isn’t engineering, but reversing time, which gives, say, in the case of the mosquito bite, that time before the mosquito bite. It should be clear we cannot say, after the sensation of being bitten, we were not bitten, but only that there was a time before being bitten.
(Easy to see where this could go, given sufficient interest)

So….switching to science, surround yourself with all sorts of test equipment. The experiment is restricted to the reversal of sensation, again, say, of the mosquito bite, which focuses the equipment right down to the pores and little tiny hairs on the skin, at the epidermal level and the nerves at the posterior epidermal level. The sensation empirically manifests as an object having penetrated the skin and affecting the nerve endings, so reverse engineering that, is backing that object out of the skin, removing the affect on nerves, insofar as the non-penetration of the skin is exactly the same physical condition as not even having the particular sensation the experiment is meant to depose.

Do you see you have to stop right there? And because you have to stop right there in order to conform to the demands of the experiment you prescribed, you STILL don’t know to what the object that penetrated the skin belongs. You wanted to reverse what was sensed….that’s what you stipulated….which does not give you the initial cause of it. Hence, you don’t have knowledge of the thing to which the object of the sensation belongs, repeating the fallacy of knowledge production.

And you think we’re done here? Oh HELL no, we’re not!!! Expand the test equipment focus to include the immediate surrounding space. Now you got proof of the initial cause, now you perceive the thing to which the reverse-engineered, skin-penetrating, sensation-giving object belongs. Ask yourself whether, right here, right now, it can be said what that thing is.

Perhaps other people have recognized what seems to me to be obviously wrong, but I haven't picked it up. — Ludwig V

Perhaps because the OP stipulates a Kantian source indirectly through Allison, which means it should for all intents and purposes be “picked up” in Kantian terms.

A syllogism suffering premises with no relation to each other, is a paralogism;
The conceptions in the premises of a paralogism determine the subset of it, here it is a transcendental paralogism, that is, a remarkable error in content-kind while its form is unexceptional.
A paralogism is an error in reason, a systemic flaw which manifests when the minor treats of its conceptions differently then does the major, and this is called sophisma figurae dictionis, re: ’s equivocation.
It follows that in any case where the conclusion is true but is not derivable from either of the premises because they do not relate to each other, whether the syllogism is valid/invalid, sound/unsound, is completely irrelevant. The whole thing is just a hot mess, but is usually passed over in the everyday use of reason.

The source in Kant for this, is B411, with the explanation in the footnote at B412. Allison uses a different syllogism, but it contains exactly the same error of equivocation.

…..time dilates even at the scale of our normal lives. — Bob Ross

Not in my inertial frame it doesn’t, hence, it is not an effect on me, hence I am not affected by it.
————

…..it seems like, to me, we are saying the same thing. — Bob Ross

For what you said, I said “Nope”, which makes explicit we said very different things.

You seem to be (saying)…..sensations are what comprise the ‘thing’; whereas I am saying that the sensations are what comprise our limited knowledge of the thing-in-itself. Aren’t we saying the same thing? — Bob Ross

No thing is comprised of the sensation caused in another thing by its appearance. That’s like saying a mosquito is comprised of an itch on my arm.

You’re probably trying to say the itch tells me there’s some thing on my arm, and of that thing at the very least I will know its capacity for biting me. That’s all well and good, but not what I want to know. By sensation alone, an effect, I still don’t know what exactly the thing is that bit me, a cause necessarily related to the effect. All I can say at this point is that there is the appearance of an unknown thing, but not a thing-in-itself, insofar as the thing-in-itself is that unknown which would never have bit me in the first place. I mean….how does it make sense that the thing-in-itself has my blood in it?

This sounds like the same thing I said….. — Bob Ross

It is. Exactly what you wrote. You quoted yourself.

…..why postulate a ‘thing’ then (on top of a thing-in-itself)? — Bob Ross

Bottom line…..to affirm the methodology of a representational cognitive system.

How do you even know there are two different faculties doing it? — Bob Ross

Because there are two kinds of knowledge, that which involves things, that which does not. For the one there must be things to know about that do not belong to me, that are external to me; for the other there is that which does belong to me, is internal to me, that which I create or construct myself. I have no need of sensations for that what I only think, even if I do need sensation to prove there is a real thing that corresponds to it.

Think of the science. For every bee sting or sweet taste there is a difference between what the senses do and what the brain does. But the brain can do stuff even if the senses don’t, and, the senses can do stuff the brain doesn’t recognize.

I don’t understand how this isn’t pure speculation…. — Bob Ross

It is pure speculation. Even given certain observations upon which the speculation is based, it remains speculation because there are no empirical proofs for any of it. Even SR and GR were speculative upon their respective initial composition….I mean, c’mon man….riding a light beam????……and subsequently obtained in experience.

We just love to say we KNOW the car is in the garage for no other reason than that’s where we left it. But it is an illegitimate claim, lacking any empirical warrant whatsoever. And THAT, my friend, is NOT speculative.
—————

how do you go about explaining that? — Bob Ross

Schopenhauer’s theory works well if one hasn’t already been exposed to how Kant’s theory works.

From my personal, well-worn armchair, this makes no sense at all…..

“….. Every true, genuine, immediate act of will is also, at once and immediately, a visible act of the body. And, corresponding to this, every impression upon the body is also, on the other hand, at once and immediately an impression upon the will. As such it is called pain when it is opposed to the will; gratification or pleasure when it is in accordance with it.…”

…..in that there are a whole bucketful of impressions on my body that are neither pain nor pleasure. And although S acknowledges this circumstance here…..

“….. There are only a few impressions of the body which do not touch the will (…). These impressions are, therefore, to be treated directly as mere ideas, and excepted from what has been said. The impressions we refer to are the affections of the purely objective senses of sight, hearing, and touch, though only so far as these organs are affected in the way which is specially peculiar to their specific nature. This affection of them is so excessively weak an excitement of the heightened and specifically modified sensibility of these parts that it does not affect the will, but only furnishes the understanding with the data out of which the perception arises, undisturbed by any excitement of the will….”

….which is indeed unfortunate, should I will that stupid fence to be a different color, in order to remove the necessity of driving by it in order to experience the change.

Not only that, but he’s incorporated exceptions to his own rules, anathema to any theory meant to be taken seriously. And while Kant says the same thing….

“….We may especially remark that all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations. (The feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will, which are not cognitions, are excepted)….”

…..he goes on to say what the reason for the exceptions are, that being an entirely different rational methodology given in an entirely separate critical exposition, but S merely says those impressions are just conditions of relative degree.

I know, huh?!! If S wanted to refute K, or at least forward a different brand of transcendental philosophy, why didn’t he start by falsifying the claim “the feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will, are not cognitions”, perhaps by somehow showing that they are???? If he had done that successfully, which means with sufficient logical integrity, K’s second critique on pure practical reason and thereby his entire moral philosophy would have been destroyed.

Simplest explanation which says it all….if one likes K he won’t like S and if he likes S he won’t like K.
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This doesn't make sense to me: for the reason that you perceived it differently is exactly because someone did something to it. — Bob Ross

Which was the point: I perceive it differently, regardless of why it is different, therefore it is a different experience. There is the purely logical argument that because I perceive the same thing at different times the experiences are correspondingly different. Nevertheless, with respect to the content of experience, for there to be a difference the content must be different.

(for that case where the fence was repainted but I didn’t drive by) You didn't have a new experience of it that was different than your previous experience because you haven't experienced it again. Once you do, then it will have a different color. Are you talking about memories? — Bob Ross

Yes. Memory would be a mere recollection of an antecedent experience, the recall of a cognition already given. Throw enough metaphysical reductionism at “memory” you arrive at “consciousness”, right?

Different color, new knowledge, new experience, consciousness not memory.

‘Til next time…..

…..how do you accept general/special relativity as a Kantian? — Bob Ross

As I wrote a few days ago, I’m not directly affected by, therefore care very little for, e.g., gravitational lensing and assorted SR/GR relations. It is true the world acts the way it does, but only under those conditions which are not available to me or you as general experiences.

The world as the manifold of all real objects operates under a wide set of laws in merely possible relations to me, re: I will be taller than I am now iff I am ever under the effect of a much greater mass; I as an individual subject operate under a narrow set of rules in necessary relations to my world, re: if I kick a rock I will suffer a broken toe. While both conditions are true in relation to me, they remain apples and oranges in relation to each other.
—————

quote="Bob Ross;838190"]You said the things-in-themselves are “NOT a thing of which we have a sensation”; but, as far as I understood, the sensations (the raw input) are a approximate of the thing-in-itself.[/quote]

Yeah, it’s been a bone of contention ever since its conceptual creation. Technically, phenomena are approximations of things, whereas sensation just informs there is something for which an approximation is determinable.

It’s just logic, man. Just logic. Why should it be, that even though you look at a thing and learn what it is, that it must be the same thing next time you look at it? On the one hand you’d expect it to be the same, but on the other there’s no reason why it absolutely must. Hell, driving by a fence one day is one thing, driving by the next day somebody repainted it. Even if it’s the same fence, your experience of it is different, which reduces to the fact all your experience is ever going to be, regarding that fence, is predicated on your perception of it, no matter who does what to it.

So….say the fence is a different color but you don’t drive by. How you gonna get an impression from the fence you didn’t drive by? Now it is that the condition of the fence changed but your experience of it didn’t. You know that fence in one way, but the fence isn’t the way you know it. Why don’t we just say there is a fence you know about and a fence you do not. The fence you know about you’ve perceived, the fence you do not you have not. Back up to the point where you never perceived anything and everything is unknown to you. But there are still things nonetheless. So for every single thing that becomes a perception for you, is one less thing that doesn’t. Of all the remaining things that haven’t yet been perceived by you, are still things you may possibly perceive, but until you do, you will know nothing of them, and they are thereby called things-in-themselves, and conversely, that which you do perceive is not longer a thing you have not, or, which is the same thing, the thing you perceive is no longer the thing-in-itself.

Now, it is true you may infer the bejesus outta all sorts of stuff….never having been there, you still know the moon exhibits shapes of illumination hence it is likely spherical…..but need I remind you that inference, a purely logical enterprise, is not experience, which is entirely predicated on the necessity of phenomena, which is turn is a strictly empirical perception?

The fence is a particular example, but the particular holds in general. For any object, your experience of it, how it is known/what it is know as by you, is predicated on your intelligence alone, the state or condition of the thing itself be as it may.
—————

My exposition of Kantianism with regards to this representational process would be as follows:

1. The thing-in-itself “impacts” us. — Bob Ross

(Nope. The thing impacts us)

2. The “impact” trigger our receptivity and sensibility to receive and produce raw input of, within the limits of what it is capable of, the thing-in-itself.
(Nope. The impact triggers our receptivity to produce representations of the raw input of whatever sensation the thing gives us, depending on the mode of sensibility affected, re: which sense is affected by that thing, the representation herein we call phenomenon. The key here is to realize not even memory is established yet. Receptivity and thereby sensibility in general is singular and successive, which is to say, receptivity works the very same way whether the received raw input is already an experience or it is not.)

3. The intuition and the understanding both process the raw input.
(Nope. Intuition processes the raw input, understanding processes the representations of the raw input. Intuition informs of the raw material of the thing; understanding informs that intuitions can or cannot have conceptions related to them.)

4. A representation is the aftermath of the aforesaid process.
(Nope. Judgement is the immediate, cognition is the subsequent, experience is the consequential, aftermath of the antecedent intuition/understanding process.)

2a.) We are not conscious of the process of receptivity; phenomena are generated without any intellectual activity. Sensibility is merely the faculty by which that out there becomes this in here the system can work with. Understanding must be capable of coping with five different kinds of intuited phenomenal representations determinable within the confines of five different kinds of sensory devices. The only way….or at least the most parsimonious way, theoretically….in which one kind of understanding can cope with five different kinds of phenomena, is to have the means for it arise spontaneously in accordance with the form the phenomena present to it, AND, to have contained in it a set of rules by which the phenomenon from one sense is to be judged differently than the phenomenon of another.

3a.) Simply put, intuition says how things are, given some raw input, understanding says how things are to be thought because of some raw input. Intuition is concerned with the thing, understanding is concerned with what is done with the thing. Judgement is that by which the relation of the two coincide, that is to say, if the validity of what is to be done coincides with the possibilities contained in the raw input. At the lowest level, this is what prevents us from cognizing a ham ‘n’ cheese sandwich as heavy, or, cognizing the moon as combustible.

4a.) There are but two kinds of representation, phenomenon and conception. It is possible to have a conception with no phenomenon conjoined to it, but it is impossible for a phenomenon to have no conception belonging to it. This is because phenomena are representations of that which is given to us and hence cannot be dismissed….you cannot un-see what you’ve seen…..but conceptions can and often do spontaneously manifest in mere thought without connection to a phenomenon, re: imagination. Like….all that contained in metaphysical speculation.
———-

Yep, him. Although, upon closer inspection, it turns out $9.8M was the asking price, not the sale price. It was for “A Walk in the Woods”, 1971, currently held by a museum gallery, purchased from a legitimate former owner for….(gasp) $1000.

Your namesake. The one I asked about awhile ago? One of his pieces just sold…….$9.8M.