……but not everyone can….. — Moliere

I don’t get it.

Why can’t everyone do it? What’s the catch?

…..the ‘desire’ is just the want for something; whereas the ‘accomplishment’ is the happiness it may bring us upon achieving it—correct? — Bob Ross

Close enough. If anything, the primary consideration is worthiness, not happiness. It is possible, and often the case, happiness occurs but worthiness for it does not. To accomplish a gain, say, in paying less than market value for a thing, has denied its worth, insofar as the gain on the one hand has cost the seller his profit on the other.

consequently acquire happiness, when we have performed something worthy or perhaps have a character that is worthy (virtuous). Correct? — Bob Ross

Yes, in a moral sense. One is always worthy of his happiness iff he acts in accordance with his virtuous character. Still, it is incumbent upon him, to determine only that act which justifies both his virtuous character, and the happiness he obtains from it.

this is predicated on the assumption that everyone would subjectively agree to this, and I don’t think most would. — Bob Ross

Yeah, that is the common argument. Still, the real point is only to profess that moral condition which is both irreducible and irrefutable. If this and this and this occur, one is morally secure, without equivocation. Seeing as how all this and this and this is an approach to perfection, and no human being ever was an example of perfection, the system it itself an “as if” kinda exposition. Or, “if only”.

Easy to see why folks favor a more practical moral philosophy, one which accommodates less-than-optimum human inclinations. The possibility remains nonetheless, insofar as there is historical precedent for, e.g. categorical imperatives, in the form of galvanizing communities into an objective like-mindedness, re: Pearl Harbor, the Magna Carta, even the Inquisition. Getting a community all together is very far from getting the entire species all together, but maybe it’s merely a matter of the degree of necessity. Alien invasion, global catastrophe….whatever.

Anyway….fun to think about.

….critique of speculative realism….. — Wayfarer

Oh dear. Correlationism. Yet another “Kantian catastrophe”!!!!

Fascinating, innit? To save ourselves from ourselves, we should understand it’s “…entirely appropriate to ask “What’s it like to be a computer, or a microprocessor, or a ribbon cable?”….”

Sounds an awful lot like the seepage “from the rot of Kantianism” explicitly being denied, to even suggest that question has any relevance. I mean….from whence should one expect to be answered?

Thanks for the interesting read. Small wonder, methinks, that I voluntarily neglect modern thought.

….an end cannot be a desired goal, as you say, but is instead a necessary accomplishment.
-Mww

I didn’t understand the distinction here between “desired goal” and “necessary accomplishment”: could you please elaborate? — Bob Ross

After all the metaphysical reductionism, desire is a mere want, the satisfaction of which is anything sufficient for it, hence, contingent. A desired goal may be specific in itself, but makes no allowance for its satisfaction, which may still, then, remain contingent. An accomplishment indicates a satisfaction in itself, a particular goal, but a necessary accomplishment manifests as a satisfaction of a specific goal achievable only under a certain condition, hence not contingent.

This relates to the topic at hand iff the adherence to a subjective principle from which an act according to a categorical imperative the principles prescribes follows, is the one and only permissible means leading to a necessary accomplishment, re: worthiness of being happy.
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Notwithstanding my quibble with happiness being necessarily the core of moral agency, I think this makes sense; but my issue is, although it is very practical, that it isn’t a commitment one has simply by being committed to being rational — Bob Ross

Happiness isn’t the core of moral agency; the worthiness for being happy, is. A guy understandably feels happy for having done the moral thing which justifies it, but he can just as well feel morally worthy of being happy by doing that from which he receives no pleasure at all.

The worthiness of being happy is the core of moral agency; the rationality with which you’ve taken issue I think, comes into play in the injunction of the subjective principle, by means of pure practical reason, from which the worthiness manifests. In this way, a guy may be worthy of being happy, even if the prescription from his own principles cause him to act in such a way he feels no happiness at all.

Happy and happiness are just words, those alledged “fuzzy concepts”, that represent a specific kind of feeling. One could use righteousness, positive well-being, or the like. The word as used here is meant to indicate a fundamental human aesthetic condition. Call that whatever you like, I suppose.
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….why should I care about being a member of a kingdom of ends? — Bob Ross

If there were such a thing, and it was a universal condition, there would be no need to, e.g., turn the other cheek, or, engage in the ol’ eye-for-an-eye routine. And that would make everybody happy, or if not so much happy, then at least to release them from having to worry about being a target of them.
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Instead, I think, it would be much more convincing (especially to the layman) if it followed from the avoidance of a logical contradiction — Bob Ross

In a system where the agent is a causality, contradiction is impossible. The ground of pure practical reason is the construction of its own objects, re: all things moral. Once given, or technically by being given, there is no contradiction possible. If there were such possibility, the agent could not have been his own causal nexus, in which case the entire morally prescriptive methodology is destroyed.

Takes an awful lot of presuppositions for this all to work, but none of them are particularly far-fetched.

I am rethinking this normative theory; because I don’t think it works anymore. — Bob Ross

Right off the bat, maybe I shouldn’t comment, being more a subjective moralist than a normative ethicist, but one thing that stands out in my mind, as a possible clue to rethinking what you’ve done here already, is this…..

What if I also treat myself as a means to an end? — Philosophim

You can’t: it violates FET. — Bob Ross

…..in which is violated the fundamental moral condition, re: the worthiness of being happy. The argument is that he who is a moral agent in the strictest sense of the idea is thereby worthy of his being happy, which is the same as his happiness being given by his accordance with his own moral law. So it is that, not the being of happy, but the worthiness, the deservedness, the righteous acquisition, of it, as end, is always and only given by the self-determined moral law, re: the autonomous “command of reason”, as its means.

It follows that anything violated by acting in accordance with the worthiness of being happy, is an illegitimate moral condition, so if you claim I should not treat myself as a means to an end because it violates the FET, there’s something wrong with the FET.

The something wrong might be as little as….. an end cannot be a desired goal, as you say, but is instead a necessary accomplishment. It is that which determines the morality, the moral constitution, of such agent naturally imbued with it.

Now, ethically speaking, or, speaking from the perspective of a community predicated on moral agency, which just is a kingdom of ends in its strictest sense, putting the pieces of this particular puzzle together, you get to the conclusion that, if all members of the community are worthy of the happiness they each have, they must have all acted in accordance with a subjective moral principle. And if they are all happy within the community, which is the same as all happy with each other, they must have all acted in accordance with a subjective moral principle common to each member. Another name for a principle common to all which abide by it, is a universal law. And that subjective command which adheres to such law, is a categorical imperative, the formula for which in a community would be, then, treat each member as an end in himself, just as I treat myself.

These are the irreducible conditions, the means, for a necessary result, a moral end. Humans, on he one hand, being human, are hardly likely to all adhere to a common principle, such that it is impossible that all members of a community are not worthy of whatever happiness they each may have. Some, on the other, consider themselves happy in their disregard of such common principle, but should the less consider themselves worthy of it in the same sense as the other members, because they are not in accord with the community to which they belong, the ulterior witness herein being the administrative code of conduct, which relays to the offender the fact of his immorality and the related condition that his happiness, in whatever form it may have taken, is underserved.

Disclaimer: without “happiness” as the fundamental human aesthetic condition, re: what everybody wishes he had, and without “worthiness of being happy” as the fundamental human moral condition, re: what everybody ought to have, and a method for relating one to the other, none of the above is of any use and can be disregarded without fault.

Anyway….some thoughts, for whatever good they may be.

What does 'mental substance' mean? — Wayfarer

Descartes, however infamously, wanted mental substance to be that to which certain attributes are known to belong, in order to distinguish from extended substances to which very different kinds of attributes are known to belong.

See P.P. 1. #51-55 or so. You know….philosophy done in an orderly way. In 1644. Which is some cause for concern in itself.

The why’s and wherefore’s don’t matter, but if he’d thought a little more about it, he might have said attributes known to belong to a certain thing are themselves mental substances.

Six of one, half dozen of the other: attributes of a certain kind are mental substances, or, mental substance is that to which certain attributes belong.

Ok. Thanks.

these comments seem to ignore the importance of the empirical in the nature of Kant's Transcendental Deductions. — RussellA

They in fact do ignore, because there is none. Might you be confusing, or co-mingling, the nature of, which can ignore the empirical, with the application to, which cannot?

He says, in clear print, for the categories there isn’t technically a deduction, but an explanation for the possession of them. An explanation for, under certain conditions, merely serves the same purpose as, does the same job as, obtains the same results as, and in effect, just is, a transcendental deduction.
————-

My position is along the lines of the SEP article…. — RussellA

….and mine is along the lines of reading CPR. I wouldn’t begrudge you your position, but I wouldn’t allow that it be at the same time a Kantian position.
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As I see it, the transcendental deduction of either a priori pure intuitions of space and time….. — RussellA

These are not transcendental deductions.

“…. Section 1 Of Space;
#3 Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space.

By a transcendental exposition, I mean the explanation of a conception, as a principle, whence can be discerned the possibility of other synthetical à priori cognitions….”

I’ve been over this. To treat as a deduction properly is to relate premises in a syllogism. The content of the judgments which are the premises in a syllogism regarding space and time would necessarily be conditioned by the infinite, and any conclusion derived from relations conditioned by the infinite is useless for human knowledge. Hence the reduction from the general impossible to know, re: space in its infinite capacity, to the particular, re: the space of only that capacity which limits the extension or shape of a possible appearance, which is thereby possible knowledge.
————

I am reasonably sure that Kant's position is that it is not possible to abstract these ideas and principles just from empirical experiences, but rather, transcendentally deduce them from empirical experiences. — RussellA

In Kant, the appearance of a thing does not give us that it is, e.g., a circle, but only that such thing has a certain shape. Circle, is a quality of the shape of the space into which that appearance extends, the quantity of the shape of the space is its extension. Both of these are preconditions for representing the given appearance under a certain set of empirical conceptions, and from which knowledge of it follows. These preconditions reside in pure understanding, technically they are explained as belonging to pure understanding, therefore are antecedent to any experience hence cannot be derived from them.

Guy’s wife has looked the same for so long, he just takes the relation of this appearance and that experience as apodeitically affirmed. He doesn’t need the recognition, the methodological understanding, that his intellectual system works exactly the same way for the first instance as each and every subsequent instance, for the effect this single thing he knows as “wife” has on his senses.

If the very first time you saw the moon it appeared as an illuminated circle, but some other time you saw some object in the sky that didn’t appear as an illuminated circle but merely as some partially illuminated shape….. how would you ever justify calling it the moon?

Don’t make a big deal out of it; all you have here is two perceptions, two appearances, and nothing else. These demonstrate the conclusion that the appearance to the senses alone of a thing, does not contain the means for judging what it is. And furthermore, that the successive appearances of the same thing under different conditions does not in itself justify remembering what it is. Your wife, regarding congruent experiences, and the moon, regarding non-congruent experiences, both sustain the proposition that experience itself cannot be a condition by which experience occurs.

Inference to a best explanation is nothing if not a metaphysical process, right?
— Mww
It's an epistemological process. — Relativist

I’ll grant the “best explanation” is a condition of the epistemological process, in that some knowledge is either affirmed or denied by it. But the query asks about the inference to, not the explanation for.

…..just the grounding for your worldview, right?
— frank

I agree with Mww, but add that it's grounded by the fact that (IMO) physicalism is an inference to the best explanation for the known facts of the world. — Relativist

Inference to a best explanation is nothing if not a metaphysical process, right?

Whoa. There’s some serious paralogisms you got goin’ on right there.

Well done, I must say.

Not so sure about what the conclusions might be, but that’s ok.

Consider me as one of those physicalists that won’t deny that the world might contain, as you say, many items that at first glance don’t seem physical.

Can I be a metaphysical physicalist? At least until convinced I can’t be?

The problem is with Kant. How can he discover what is necessary and universal just from experiences….

He can’t, and doesn’t try, denying the very possibility. Discovery just from experience is always contingent through the principle of induction.

…..using transcendental deduction? — RussellA

That deduction is for necessity and universality, rather than that which is either or both. The application of these is to experience, but not the derivation of them from it.

The key: transcendental is not cognition by conceptions, which arise spontaneously in understanding and condition experience, but cognition by means of the construction of conceptions, which arise through reason and find their proofs through experience.

How does Kant justify that transcendental deduction is possible? — RussellA

The possibility is given by showing how an empirical deduction doesn’t work. The justification is given by the demonstration of their place and purpose in a method, and that they are in no way self-contradictory.

In logic generally, deduction is top-down, re: from the general to the particular. Transcendental logic, then, is nothing but the kind of deduction it is, or, which is the same thing, nothing but the conditions under which the deduction is accomplished.

Transcendental, in Kantian philosophy, is that by which pure a priori is the determining condition.

Also in Kantian philosophy, a priori is meant to indicate the absence of any and all empirical conditions, hence, the denomination “pure”.

A deduction in Kantian philosophy follows the general rule of logic, in which a minor premise is subsumed under a major, for which a conclusion exhibits the relation of them to each other.

From all that, it follows that a transcendental deduction, first, must be purely a priori therefore can have no empirical predication whatsoever, insofar as it is transcendental, and second, it must exhibit reduction from the general to the particular, insofar as it is that certain type of logical operation.

Now, with respect to a transcendental deduction of the categories, which is in fact the title of a subsection dedicated to just that, this kind of argument cannot have to do with representations of objects, because, being purely a priori, there are no phenomena hence no representations of objects, but still must be a reduction from the general to the particular in order to qualify as a deduction. It follows that without representations of objects, but requiring the general as a major premise, it must be a conception relating to the representation of any object, or, which is the same thing all objects.

So, first, that which makes cognition of all objects possible, is the “diversity in pure intuition”, which serves as the major in a deductive syllogism. But the major subsumes under itself the minor, which is said to be the synthesis of the diversity, which has already been termed the synthesis of matter of objects to their form, from which arise phenomena, a conception which represents all objects in general, or, which is the same thing, phenomena are that which are subsumed under the diversity in pure intuitions a priori.

All that being the case, with respect to the pure conceptions of the understanding, re: the categories, it is quite clear there is no experience, and no examination of the nature of experience, insofar as experience, being defined as….

“…. an empirical cognition; that is to say, a cognition which determines an object by means of perceptions. It is therefore a synthesis of perceptions, a synthesis which is not itself contained in perception, but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of perception.…”

…..and given only a diversity in general, and a synthesis of it, there is as yet no determination of a particular object, hence no cognition of an object at all, and by which experience is impossible, which immediately removes experience from any consideration regarding the origin and purpose of the categories.

“….. The first thing which must be given to us for the sake of the à priori cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition; the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second; but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the third requisite for the cognition of an object, and these conceptions are given by the understanding….”
(A79/B104)
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Now…..why is this the case. Hmmmm, let’s find out, shall we?

1.) If Kant deduces the categories in accordance with logical syllogisms having empirical content, he loses the capacity to enounce the conditions for pure thought of possible objects. All cognitions must be of appearances alone, and no object that is not an appearance can ever be thought;
2.) It is in this way that noumena are impossible for this kind of intelligence, in that, while noumena are indeed objects of pure thought, they are not and cannot be appearances to which alone the categories apply, and therefore by which noumena are termed “the limitation on sensibility”;
3.) There is no transcendental conditions that are determinable by sensibility. All conceptions as representation, whether empirical or a priori, belong to understanding alone, but confining the categories, which are pure conceptions a prior only, having no representation belonging to them**, and the expositions related to them, to understanding and reason respectively, Kant removes the possibility of cognizing objects from the mere affect they have on the senses. In so doing, he justifies the ding an sich as that which is real but for which experience is impossible, along with noumena which isn’t even real, insofar as they are never to meet the criteria of being phenomena.
(**the schema of the categories are not representations; they are merely conceptions subsumed under and modifying the conception of the category itself of which they are members)
4.) If Kant deduces the categories in strict accordance with logical method, even a priori, he must limit himself to form only, pure logic being devoid of content by definition. Any conception devoid of content is empty, any empty conception cannot be ground for determining the cognition of objects. If this is the case, the third requisite remains missing, and the transcendental predication falls apart. But it doesn’t, in that there is the cognition of objects, and because that is the case the methodology stands, the third requisite must be present. All that’s left, having already denied innateness given by mere birth, and failing the non-contradiction of a pure deduction on transcendental ground, Kant’s position is simply to grant the validity of the categories as “given by the understanding”, which he then calls the exposition of the possession of them, rather than the syllogistic conclusion making them absolutely true.
5.) In which is found the subtelty behind the mention, “ so long as we are careful in the construction of our fictions, which are no less fictions on that account…”
6.) A transcendental deduction can never follow from an observation, by definition. B276 is rife with pure a priori conceptions, hardly to be amendable to empirical conditions. “My existence in time” is a presupposition, not an observation.

Bet none of that is in your secondary literature!!!!!!

WOOHOO!!!

The greatest danger to pure reason is reification, the blaming of reason for doing, or the blaming for failure in not doing, this or that merely because reason is or is not the kind of thing suited to meet expectations. To express reason, or any metaphysical faculty, as a conception, merely in order to forge an exposition of the methodological system to which they all are necessary constituents, does not carry any implication whatsoever these are things in themselves, or are existents of any kind.

“…. This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure of metaphysics, after the example of the geometricians and natural philosophers, constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason. It is a treatise on the method to be followed, not a system of the science itself. But, at the same time, it marks out and defines both the external boundaries and the internal structure of this science. For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity, that, in choosing the various objects of thought, it is able to define the limits of its own faculties, and even to give a complete enumeration of the possible modes of proposing problems to itself, and thus to sketch out the entire system of metaphysics. For, on the one hand, in cognition à priori, nothing must be attributed to the objects but what the thinking subject derives from itself; and, on the other hand, reason is, in regard to the principles of cognition, a perfectly distinct, independent unity, in which, as in an organized body, every member exists for the sake of the others, and all for the sake of each, so that no principle can be viewed, with safety, in one relationship, unless it is, at the same time, viewed in relation to the total use of pure reason…”

“…. Reason is present and the same in all human actions and at all times; but it does not itself exist in time, and therefore does not enter upon any state in which it did not formerly exist. It is, relatively to new states or conditions, determining, but not determinable….

……Hence we cannot ask: “Why did not reason determine itself in a different manner?” The question ought to be thus stated: “Why did not reason employ its power of causality to determine certain phenomena in a different manner?”….

……But this is a question which admits of no answer. For a different intelligible character would have exhibited a different empirical character; and, when we say that, in spite of the course which his whole former life has taken, the offender could have refrained from uttering the falsehood, this means merely that the act was subject to the power and authority—permissive or prohibitive—of reason…..

……Now, reason is not subject in its causality to any conditions of phenomena or of time; and a difference in time may produce a difference in the relation of phenomena to each other—for these are not things and therefore not causes in themselves—but it cannot produce any difference in the relation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason…..

……Thus, then, in our investigation into free actions and the causal power which produced them, we arrive at an intelligible cause, beyond which, however, we cannot go; although we can recognize that it is free, that is, independent of all sensuous conditions, and that, in this way, it may be the sensuously unconditioned condition of phenomena. But for what reason the intelligible character generates such and such phenomena and exhibits such and such an empirical character under certain circumstances, it is beyond the power of our reason to decide. The question is as much above the power and the sphere of reason as the following would be: “Why does the transcendental object of our external sensuous intuition allow of no other form than that of intuition in space?” But the problem, which we were called upon to solve, does not require us to entertain any such questions….”

Sometimes, it’s more foolish to ask the question, then to expect a satisfactory answer.

How does Kant justify that transcendental deduction is possible? — RussellA

“….if a deduction of these conceptions is necessary….”
“….an explanation of the possession of a pure cognition….”

He doesn’t. There’s no need, no reason a justification be required. It may not even be possible to deduce the categories without eventually running into contradictions; maybe it’s just simpler to grant the possession of something which satisfies a specific requirement.

If the categories, or whatever serves the purpose of them, seem to have a justifiable purpose, then it is the requirement of reason to discover them, and determine the domain of their employment from a purely logical ground or precondition, in order to support a speculative metaphysical theory of human knowledge.

“…. Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, and moreover the duty, of searching for its conceptions according to a principle; because these conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the understanding as an absolute unity, and therefore must be connected with each other according to one conception or idea. A connection of this kind, however, furnishes us with a ready prepared rule, by which its proper place may be assigned to every pure conception of the understanding, and the completeness of the system of all be determined à priori—both which would otherwise have been dependent on mere choice or chance.…”

Kant is merely calling the discovery of the categories a transcendental deduction of them.

“…. General logic (…) expects to receive representations from some other quarter, in order, by means of analysis, to convert them into conceptions….

….. On the contrary, transcendental logic has lying before it the manifold content of à priori sensibility….

…. Now space and time contain an infinite diversity of determinations of pure à priori intuition, but are nevertheless the condition of the mind’s receptivity, under which alone it can obtain representations of objects, and which, consequently, must always affect the conception of these objects. But the spontaneity of thought requires that this diversity be examined after a certain manner, received into the mind, and connected, in order afterwards to form a cognition out of it. This process I call synthesis….

…..By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I understand the process of joining different representations to each other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition….

….the duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions, not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations….

…..The first thing which must be given to us for the sake of the à priori cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition; the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second; but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the third requisite for the cognition of an object, and these conceptions are given by the understanding….”
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Thus, the explanation for possession as given, rather than a logical deduction from antecedents, of the categories, re: “those conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis”, as merely a constituent in a methodological procedure, all in accordance with a very specific, albeit entirely theoretical, system.
————
————

we use the Categories to make sense of experiences. — RussellA

No, we don’t. Not technically, and not with respect to CPR, which is what concerns this discussion overall. The categories make empirical cognition possible from which experience follows, regardless of whether or not such experience makes sense.

how does Kant justify the possibility… — RussellA

Justifying possibility makes no sense.

“…. Among the many conceptions, which make up the very variegated web of human cognition, some are destined for pure use à priori, independent of all experience; and their title to be so employed always requires a deduction, inasmuch as, to justify such use of them, proofs from experience are not sufficient; but it is necessary to know how these conceptions can apply to objects without being derived from experience. I term, therefore, an examination of the manner in which conceptions can apply à priori to objects, the transcendental deduction of conceptions, and I distinguish it from empirical deduction, which indicates the mode in which conception is obtained through experience and reflection thereon; consequently, does not concern itself with the right, but only with the fact of our obtaining conceptions in such and such a manner. We have already seen that we are in possession of two perfectly different kinds of conceptions, which nevertheless agree with each other in this, that they both apply to objects completely à priori. These are the conceptions of space and time as forms of sensibility, and the categories as pure conceptions of the understanding. To attempt an empirical deduction of either of these classes would be labour in vain, because the distinguishing characteristic of their nature consists in this, that they apply to their objects, without having borrowed anything from experience towards the representation of them. Consequently, if a deduction of these conceptions is necessary, it must always be transcendental.

Meanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all our cognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the principle of their possibility, yet the occasioning causes of their production. It will be found that the impressions of sense give the first occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of cognition, and for the production of experience, which contains two very dissimilar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, given by the senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter, arising out of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought; and these, on occasion given by sensuous impressions, are called into exercise and produce conceptions. Such an investigation into the first efforts of our faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to general conceptions is undoubtedly of great utility; and we have to thank the celebrated Locke for having first opened the way for this inquiry.

But a deduction of the pure à priori conceptions of course never can be made in this way, seeing that, in regard to their future employment, which must be entirely independent of experience, they must have a far different certificate of birth to show from that of a descent from experience. This attempted physiological derivation, which cannot properly be called deduction, because it relates merely to a quaestio facti, I shall entitle an explanation of the possession of a pure cognition. It is therefore manifest that there can only be a transcendental deduction of these conceptions and by no means an empirical one; also, that….

….all attempts at an empirical deduction, in regard to pure à priori conceptions, are vain, and can only be made by one who does not understand the altogether peculiar nature of these cognitions…”
(My emphasis)

I'm sure Mww will have a lot to say — Bob Ross

Not a whole lot, truth be told. You’ve presented a worthy argument for a specific theory, blessed it with a Kantian foundation, but…..

….basing metaethics on F.P.M.M, 1785, isn’t what that treatise is about. For ethical systems, you’d probably want Metaphysics of Ethics,1797, especially considering your sections on rights and virtue, each having a book of their own in that work as a whole;
….the exchange of rational beings for minds either leaves out, or at least makes no account for the fundamental predicates of Kantian moral/ethical philosophy, re: will, autonomy and pure practical reason belonging necessarily to the former as a rational being, or person, but these need methodological justification in the latter as a simple mind;
….the conceptions means and ends, as they relate to moral/ethical philosophy, need to be determined before a FET with them as its ground, makes sense;
….you say, “FET, no matter how useful it is itself for ethics, cannot be enough for good moral discernment”, but I rather think the intent of it was precisely for moral discernment, of the pure subjectivist account.
….lastly, if one thinks ethics relates to a community of persons/minds, wouldn’t each mind need a moral disposition of his own? Otherwise, they become a hive rather than a community. And if that’s the case, shouldn’t there be some necessary condition similar to a categorical imperative somewhere in this current theory? Seems like a community must come to grips with a potentially universal law of some sort, by some method, else why consider themselves members of a community in the first place, such imperative for which there is no reason to suppose belongs to a mere hive or herd.

Anyway, I like the work that’s been done here, but it seems a little incomplete to me. I can’t help but think that upon more substance amended to the conditions, it may be found they don’t work as they are now.

True, the passage is in quotation marks and we know it is somewhere within an 800 page book….. — RussellA

I shall consider myself vindicated.

….but to locate it requires quite a lot of reading. — RussellA

So on the one hand you’re offput cuz you gotta do some reading, and on the other you’re missing the point that the quote is usually meant to indicate a relation to only that to which it is a response. You don’t need to look it up, if it is understood to be either a correction to or an elaboration on that to which it relates in the discourse.

In the case where a quote is an initial submission for discourse, as opposed to a response in a continuing discourse, there’s no need to look it up at all. Work with what’s given, simple as that, and the burden is on the initiator to append the submission as the discourse requires.

Dunno about yours, but my online Guyer/Wood is not searchable. If yours isn’t either, I’d seriously recommend obtaining a translation that is. And if you already have one…..wtf is the problem???

All that being said, I’m not changing half a century’s worth of writing habits because it’s thought I’m not doing it right. Deal with it or ignore me; I don’t care which.

sometimes it can take me 15 minutes to find the source of your quote. — RussellA

Ooooo….15 whole minutes!!! Time well spent, then, huh?

….plagiarize.…. — RussellA

Hard to call passages bracketed by quotation marks as plagiarized, innit? I think that’s why they’re called “quotation marks”.

All well and good; just don’t confuse the nature of experience, with the experience itself.

How does Kant justify the possibility of an a priori knowledge — RussellA

By presupposing it given some general observations, then constructing a theory that supports the presuppositions without contradicting the observations.

“….. it is quite possible (the presupposition) that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions (the observation), and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (the theory), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it (the LNC).

Still, regarding long practice and attentive skill….

“…. when we get beyond the bounds of experience, we are of course safe from opposition in that quarter; and the charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so great that, unless we are brought to a standstill by some evident contradiction, we hurry on undoubtingly in our course. This, however, may be avoided, if we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account….”

….leaves metaphysics a nonetheless purely speculative theory. Even if all the predicates of transcendental philosophy are internally consistent with each other, and coherent as a whole in itself, there is nothing given from it that makes those predicates actually the case, at the expense of other relevant philosophies.

It is not a matter of intelligence…. — Corvus

Of course it is:

“….our criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics which must perform its task entirely à priori, to the complete satisfaction of speculative reason, and must, therefore, be treated, not popularly, but scholastically….”

And my limit on courtesy is nothing more than respect for one and his opinions.

I’ve already respected your intelligence, by surmising you have the capacity to research what you don’t know, or do know but find disagreeable. And if we stick with Kantian metaphysics in its practical sense, me doing your work for you….or any of the members of the audience, however scant their number….is disrespecting myself.
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….use your own reason.
— Mww
You seem to be missing the point. — Corvus

I’m the one that missed the point? Really?

Using one’s own reason is what everyone has no choice but to do, all else being given.

What….use my reason to answer your reason’s questions, asked of itself?

Nahhh….I ain’t gonna do that. You’re smart enough, you got the books, use your own reason.

It shouldn’t matter that I don’t detail where the quotes come from, it being tacitly understood, from the thread title, they’re always from CPR. If a greater context, or specific pagination, is desired for a quote, do a search.

All quotes I post are in response to something you’ve said that Kant agrees with or not, as I understand both of you. If I misjudged, it’s on you to inform me as to my mistake.

but the entire reason d’etre of the Critique is aimed at the empiricists in general and Hume in particular particular, regarding the lack of critical examination of the capabilities and employment of pure reason herself.
— Mww
I am not sure if this is true. It sounds unfamiliar, diffuse and groundless. — Corvus

There’s a whole section on it.

“…. To avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all questions would be a profession certain to convict any philosopher of extravagant boasting and self-conceit, and at once to destroy the confidence that might otherwise have been reposed in him. There are, however, sciences so constituted that every question arising within their sphere must necessarily be capable of receiving an answer from the knowledge already possessed, for the answer must be received from the same sources whence the question arose. In such sciences it is not allowable to excuse ourselves on the plea of necessary and unavoidable ignorance; a solution is absolutely requisite. The rule of right and wrong must help us to the knowledge of what is right or wrong in all possible cases; otherwise, the idea of obligation or duty would be utterly null, for we cannot have any obligation to that which we cannot know. On the other hand, in our investigations of the phenomena of nature, much must remain uncertain, and many questions continue insoluble; because what we know of nature is far from being sufficient to explain all the phenomena that are presented to our observation.

Now the question is: Whether there is in transcendental philosophy any question, relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is unanswerable by this reason; and whether we must regard the subject of the question as quite uncertain, so far as our knowledge extends, and must give it a place among those subjects, of which we have just so much conception as is sufficient to enable us to raise a question—faculty or materials failing us, however, when we attempt an answer.

Now I maintain that, among all speculative cognition, the peculiarity of transcendental philosophy is that there is no question, relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is insoluble by this reason; and that the profession of unavoidable ignorance—the problem being alleged to be beyond the reach of our faculties—cannot free us from the obligation to present a complete and satisfactory answer. For the very conception which enables us to raise the question must give us the power of answering it; inasmuch as the object, as in the case of right and wrong, is not to be discovered out of the conception...”

Dogmatism (of the rationalists = Spinoza, Wolf, Mendelssohn) was what Kant tried to fix. — Corvus

And yet, the question was…what caused Kant’s awakening from his dogmatic slumbers, which he allotted to Hume specifically.

Now you wish Kant to be fixing the dogmatism of the rationalists, but the entire reason d’etre of the Critique is aimed at the empiricists in general and Hume in particular, regarding the lack of critical examination of the capabilities and employment of pure reason herself.

Why not say Kant was just as dogmatic as Hume, up until he stopped to think about how that brand of philosophy wasn’t as fulfilling as it should be. So he woke up, from being a dogmatic thinker himself, something similar to the possibility I mentioned four days ago, around the top of pg 13.

So now it’s a matter of figuring out just what dogmatic thinking entails, and from there, why it’s unfulfilling, and lastly, the method by which it could be fixed.

Mitigated academic scepticism is a natural human instinct and good for understanding the world better. — Corvus

No it isn’t. It is forced upon us, by the criticism of pure reason, for without it we are apt to credit the world for that which does not belong naturally to it, can never be found naturally in it, therefore has no business being included in our empirical understanding.

Crap. Another duplicate post. How does that keep happening?????

Read on.
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This is a minor point, which no one really cares. — Corvus

Hence, skepticism and dogmatism in those who don’t.

set the limit of the reason for its power only able to deal with what is perceived via sensibility in empirical world. — Corvus

If that were the case, mathematics would be impossible.

We don’t care as much for that to which pure reason deals, but moreso the mechanisms by which it functions, re: the construction of principles a priori.

Again…..

“… Pure reason, then, never applies directly to experience, or to any sensuous object; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity à priori by means of conceptions—a unity which may be called rational unity, and which is of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the understanding….”

(Sigh)

According to Kant, certain concepts, like causation, are not derived from experience but are rather innate to the human mind….. — Wayfarer

Everybody knows the famous one-liners….understanding cannot intuit, intuition cannot think; thoughts without intuition are empty, intuitions without concepts, blind.

The two faculties must work together or we don’t have knowledge….yaddayaddayadda…..how they work together is given by the transcendental deduction of the categories, which…

“….is an exposition of the pure conceptions of the understanding (and with them of all theoretical à priori cognition), as principles of the possibility of experience (….), as the form of the understanding in relation to time and space as original forms of sensibility….” (B169)

So we get from the individual parts, to the unity of their working together, but the question remains as to how to arrive at the one, an internal condition, when the other is given to us, as an external condition. That which is given to us needs no explanation….it’s here, deal with it. But the origins of that which is not given to us, but arises within us, is susceptible to the possibility of having no explanatory power insofar as whatever is claimed for it, can be negated with equal justice.

In general, or, without getting too particular about it, we have knowledge of things from the union of sense and category. Cool. But the human animal can think real objects without them being sensed, re: possible knowledge of possible things. Here’s where the real question comes in….even if no object is given to the senses, but we can think it, does that mean the categories are necessary for those possible objects as equally as for directly sensed objects? The question takes the form….

“…. Now there are only two ways in which a necessary harmony of experience with the conceptions of its objects can be cogitated. Either experience makes these conceptions possible, or the conceptions make experience possible…”

…..so it seems as though the latter must be the case, insofar as the thought of possible objects, which we have, is sufficient for the possible experience of them, which we don’t. If the categories, the pure conceptions, were not necessary for the mere thought of possible objects equally with the thought of real sensed objects, we wouldn’t think them (synthesis of conceptions and all that behind the scenes stuff) and the experience of them, possible or otherwise, would be irrelevant.

So there are conceptions we have, not dependent on experience, but used for both experience and possible experience….but what can be said about them? If they are in us, the where in us can be said to be understanding, the what can be said to be that which makes cognition of objects possible, but what remains is that which states the origin of them. They’re here, they do this and that, but where do they come from?
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Now the fun part, where reader is left to his own devices, depending on the text he’s referencing, either original (“selbstgedachte”) or “self-thought first principles a priori”. All that being said, what is categorically denied, in addition to the empirical origin of the categories, is the validity of “subjective aptitudes” for this purpose, those being.….

“…. implanted in us contemporaneously with our existence, which were so ordered and disposed by our Creator, that their exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws of nature which regulate experience…”

…..and even though that sure sounds an awful lot like the innate which may or may not be drawn out of the original German word, depending on the translator’s justifications, the denial of it is pretty cut and dried:

“…. with such an hypothesis it is impossible to say at what point we must stop in the employment of predetermined aptitudes, the fact that the categories would in this case entirely lose that character of necessity which is essentially involved in the very conception of them, is a conclusive objection to it….”

So it is that Kant grants no authority with respect to the origin of the categories to “subjective attitudes” and if one wishes to associate the innate with such attitudes, he is granted no authority as well.

Apparently, Kant wants it understood that the origin of the categories are reducible only as far as self-thought first principles a priori, and if that wasn’t vague enough, now arises the question as to tabula rasa, which seems on the one hand ill-fated insofar as there are self-thought first principles a priori residing in us, re: the mind does not come blank, but on the other it is reasonable insofar as these are not merely part of our subjective aptitude, re: the mind does come blank.

Time. When does “self-thought” begin”. When do subjective aptitudes develop? If these are not explainable, or are variable, they are not relevant. All that’s needed, for the sake of the consistency of the theory, is the logical function of pure conception within the tenets of a speculative paradigm.

“Shut up and calculate!!” held to the metaphysical fire.

…..were abandoned in the late medieval period…. — Wayfarer

Understood, and thanks. You and are much further along the philosophical evolutionary scale than I.

My point was….ideas can’t be extinguished, except by defining them out of existence, or embarrassing their proponents into submission.

Aren’t those just complementary pairs?

Are inequality/dishonesty complementary in the same degree or manner?

We don't know, likely will never know. — Manuel

Probably right. But the scientists’ll keep stabbin’ at it, hoping for a happy accident.

…..morphed into the view that there is no mind or mental. — Manuel

On the one hand, it doesn’t seem like there could be, but on the other, it seems impossible there isn’t.

It's ghosts all the way down, as far as I can see. — Manuel

Yeah, like…..whose bright idea was it to get rid of ideas anyway???

why would Kant had said that Hume woke him from the dogmatic slumbers? Something doesn't sound quite right here. — Corvus

According to Kant, because Hume used the word ideas, as an example, without proper criticism of the principle by which the conception connects to his use of it. As the lesser of the two “perceptions of the mind”, in Hume ideas are thoughts, which are hardly a lesser, and aren’t even perceptions at all.

He could have said ideas are objects of the mind, but he couldn’t intermingle the object of empiricism with object of the intellect. Kant did just that, by putting the concept “idea” back where the Greeks had it, turning it into an object of reason, which makes its relations transcendental, and not intuitive or demonstrable.
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To call math a science just means math follows the strictest of procedures, always consistently repeatable, always with the same result for each of its operations, and never false if properly followed.

It can't be Mathematics or Geometry knowledge Hume was talking about. — Corvus

“….Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science…”

What science would a mathematician be an expert in, if not mathematical science?
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There wasn't anything that Kant could have fixed in CPR, was there? — Corvus

Kant fixed….

Reasoning on Relations of Ideas are "which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain." — Corvus

…..Hume’s reasoning on relations of ideas as empirical, indicated by “intuitive or demonstrable”, which indicates phenomena, to transcendental, which is merely logical, insofar as the relations of ideas is not at all phenomenal.

There’s a section in CPR where the meaning of idea is returned to the ancients, Plato in particular. So I guess Kant fixed….or at least changed…. Hume’s meaning of idea in order to change the reasoning on their relations.

Where is that quote from? — Corvus

As I said….your reference: Treatise on Human Nature 1.4.1., Of Scepticism Regard to Reason, although it should read…scepticism with regard to reason.
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Now I see you’ve switched to E.C.H.U. And “demonstrably” certain is the very criteria of experience. So yes, Euclidean figures are demonstrably certain in their relations, but it does not follow from the demonstrations, that the relations themselves are given by them.

He had done his own critical examination regarding its own powers and its capacities and limits in Treatise 1.4.1. Of Scepticism Regard to Reason. — Corvus

From your reference….

“…. There is no Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science, as to place entire confidence in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it, or regard it as any thing, but a mere probability….”

….we see the problem writ large. Math is that science by which reliability and certainty is given, and thereby should hardly be considered a mere probability. Hume didn’t grasp how it is that the human mind can originate necessary truths on its own accord, without be subsidized by experience. So if one wishes to say Hume had his own critical examinations, which he did, some additional explanation is necessary for why such examinations were not sufficient for mathematical certainty.

Hume took for granted pure reason could not provide the principles necessary to make math more than mere probability. If you prefer, we could just say Hume was skeptical reason could so provide, but if so, we must also admit he was skeptical to the point of denying the possibility, which just is to take it for granted it could not. And, of course, in the next section, he carried this skepticism over to the existence of the body, and the continued/distinct dichotomy of the operation of the senses regarding the existence of any object.