I don't see where Plato's concept differs from ours. — Amity

In the Timaeus necessity is called the wandering or errant cause. (48a) The necessary connection between necessity (ananke) and chance (tyke) is discussed in Plato’s Laws:

Fire, water, earth and air all exist by nature and chance, they say, and none of these exist by artifice. And the bodies that then come after these, those of the earth, sun, moon and stars, have come into being through these four, entirely soulless entities. They move by chance, each according to its particular power, in such a way that they come together, combining somehow with their own, hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with hard and so on for any mixture of opposites that is produced, of necessity, according to chance. In this way, based upon these processes the whole heaven has come into existence and everything under heaven, including animals and indeed all the plants too, and from these all the seasons have arisen, not through intelligence, they say, or through the agency of a god, or through artifice, but, according to them, through nature and chance.

(889b-c) Emphasis added.

The Spindle of Necessity or Ananke.

In the eponymous dialogue Timaeus he identifies two kinds of cause, intelligence and necessity, that is, Nous and Ananke. Given the earlier emphasis in the Republic on the Forms, the introduction of ananke is both surprising and significant. Here at the end we must, by necessity, begin again. Forms and their imperfect images do not tell the whole of the story.

Plato’s concept of necessity differs from ours. What is by necessity is without nous or intellect. Necessary causes can act contrary to intelligible causes. What is fixed and unchanging cannot serve as the cause of a world of change, contingency, and chance. It should be noted how often necessity occurs in this story. The various cases helps to give us a better sense of the scope of what necessity means and what it entails

The Fates, Lachesis, Clotho and Atropos are the daughters of Necessity.The are respectively what was, what is, and what will be. Clotho, with a touch of her right hand, helps turn the outer revolution of the spindle, pausing from time to time, while Atropos, with her left hand, does the same for the inner revolutions, and Lachesis lends a hand to each revolution in turn, with each hand in turn.

In less figurative terms, by necessity, what was, the past, influences what is and what will be. What is, the present, influences what will be. The influence of what was on what will be is not eliminated by what is. In other words, by necessity we cannot undo what has been done.

Each soul chooses a daimon and also a pattern of life. (617e) The daimon is the guardian of that life. (620d) Nothing is said about choosing a daimon, on what basis it is chosen, or how closely it reflects the soul that chooses it.

Before choosing a life the souls are told that one who chooses wisely will choose a life midway between extremes. In this way a human being attains the utmost happiness. (619 a-b) They are warned that:

‘Even for the person who comes up last, but chooses intelligently and lives in a disciplined way, an acceptable life rather than a bad one, awaits. The first to choose must not be careless, and the last must not be despondent.’

(619b)

The first to choose by lot chooses extreme tyranny. (619b) We might think that this person had led a life of hardship and oppression and now wants to be on the giving rather than receiving end, but:

He was one of the people who had come from the heaven and had lived his previous life under an orderly system of government, where any share of excellence he had came from habit in the absence of philosophy. And, generally speaking, those who had come from the heaven were more likely to be caught out in this way, since they had no training in dealing with suffering, while those who had come out of the earth, for the most part, having had experience of suffering themselves, and having seen others suffer, did not make their choices in a hurry. This, and the element of chance from the lot, is why most souls undergo an interchange of what is good and what is bad.

(619c-d)

The first to choose had chosen quickly out of stupidity and greed. He came to lament his choice. He blames chance and the spirits, everything but himself. (619 b-c)

Yet if someone were to engage in philosophy, consistently, in a sound manner, whenever he comes back to live in this world, unless he is among the last to choose, it is likely not only that he would be happy whilst here, but also that his journey from here to there, and back here again, would be a smooth journey through the heaven, rather than rough and underground.

(619d-e)

The last to choose is Homer’s Odysseus:

When his turn came, he remembered all his former troubles, gave up the love of honour he had held previously, and went about for a long time seeking the life of an ordinary man with a private station. And he found it with difficulty, lying about somewhere, neglected by everyone else. And he said, when he saw it, that he would have done the same thing even had he been given first choice, and he chose it gladly.

(620 c-d)

Unlike most souls who made their choice based upon the habits of the previous life, (620a) Odysseus now chooses a life of moderation. The suggestion seems to be that although he has chosen last he is an example of someone who has attained phronesis, someone who engaged in philosophy, consistently, in a sound manner. He has become, so to speak, a philosophical hero. Put differently, Socrates has transformed Homer. The soul that was Odysseus comes home again after his journey from there to here.

The polls could change. Thump might do or say something disastrous. — Baden

It does not seem as though there is anything he might say or do that would significantly change the polls. It is not as if, even with the evidence, Trump supporters, backed by his propaganda machine, will believe it or not discount it because they think other things are more important.

According to FiveThirtyEight

“Polls’ true utility isn’t in telling us who will win, but rather in roughly how close a race is — and, therefore, how confident we should be in the outcome.” Historically, candidates leading polls by at least 20 points have won 99 percent of the time. But candidates leading polls by less than 3 points have won just 55 percent of the time. In other words, races within 3 points in the polls are little better than toss-ups — something we’ve been shouting from the rooftops for years.

Because I believe in science ... — Baden

There are too many variables for there to be a scientific determination based on the polls of the outcome of the election.

Rather than bet, I'll hold on to my money. I might need it.

Appreciated but no apologies necessary.

From my last response to your thread "With philosophy, poetry and politics on my mind..."
I think in discussions of Plato we are doing at least two things:

1) Discussing ideas and issues that arise in the part of the dialogue.we are reading.
2) Discovering how those ideas and issues are addressed by Plato in the larger context of the whole of the dialogue and other dialogues.

We all start with the first. We might do this without ever going too far into the second.

I'll add that those involved in the dialogue do not know where it will go or how it will end. We can imagine ourselves to be participants of the dialogue and add our responses to what is being said.

I decided rather than continue with Fooloso4' Book 10 discussion that I need to read the whole Republic. — Amity

I think in discussions of Plato we are doing at least two things:

1) Discussing ideas and issues that arise in the part of the dialogue we are reading.
2) Discovering how those ideas and issues are addressed by Plato in the larger context of the whole of the dialogue and other dialogues.

We all start with the first. We might do this without ever going too far into the second.

An equality of all possible fates. — Paine

An interesting point. Socrates says:

And this, dear Glaucon, it seems is the moment of extreme danger for a human being, and because of this we must neglect all other studies save one. We must pay the utmost attention to how each of us will be a seeker and student who learns and finds out, from anywhere he can, who it is who will make him capable and knowledgeable enough to choose the best possible life ...

(618b-c)

Republic V contains two revolutionary proposals for the social organisation of the ideal state — The Role of Women in Plato's Republic - C. C. W. Taylor

I question this assumption. The purpose, as stated at the beginning of Book 2, is not to make an ideal state, but to persuade those listening that it is better in every way to be just rather than unjust. (357a-b)

Adeimantus says:

And no one, so far, either in poetry or in ordinary language, has described in a sufficiently detailed argument what each does, itself, by its own power, when present in the soul of its possessors, unnoticed by gods and humans, an argument according to which injustice is the worst of all the evils that any soul can have within itself, while justice is the greatest good.For if you had all described it in these terms from the beginning, and convinced us of this from our earliest years, we would not have been acting as one another’s guardians for fear we might behave unjustly, but each of us would himself be his own guardian, for fear that by acting unjustly he would have to live with the worst evil of all.’

(366e-367a)

In other words, the ideal city would be one in which each acted as his own guardian to assure that he is just while shunning injustice as the greatest evil. In such a city there would be no guardian class.

The city Socrates creates in speech suffers the same problem as the bed made by a maker of images. You can't sleep in this bed or live in this image of a city. In addition, far from being ideal such a city is in its first iteration first, in Glaucon's words, a city of pigs. (372d) Glaucon wants a more conventional city, one with couches, tables, relishes, and desserts. (372e) Socrates goes along in the making of this "luxurious city", but although it accommodates some of our human desires, it it far from ideal. Even with the compromises away from what Socrates calls the "true city", a "healthy one" (372e), it is not one that any of us would want to live it.

Rather than a proposal for an ideal state, it is anti-idealist. Whatever we might imagine the ideal to be, its implementation involves great injustice. Socrates starts as we must with what is there to work with. Human beings with all their flaws and weaknesses.

Did you not think the missing sections to be important as to an understanding and assessment of Book 10's value? — Amity

It is. I will address some of it in relation to the myth of Er, but that does not mean the rest is not important.

I wanted to address what @Benkei referred to as:

misleading, and emotionally manipulative — Benkei

but got sidetracked and left it undeveloped. I touched on the first part with the distinction between leading and misleading. And with regard to emotionally manipulative, the story is Er is emotionally manipulative in so far as it brings hope to some and fear to others, with the intend to lead to the listener being just.

An intended irony or just plain sarcasm? — Amity

I think it is ironic because he does some of the same things he faults the poets for doing. The difference is his intent.

To talk of justice at the same time as comparing men and women. — Amity

In the Republic women are regarded as equal to men when it comes to the capacity to be philosophers. But, of course, this should not obscure the differences attributed to men and women.

In the myth of Er Necessity and her daughters play an important role. I will have more to say on that.

Or, as mentioned above, it may be typical Platonic irony, taken to the extreme, the boundary of hypocrisy. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think of Socratic/Platonic irony as a turning around, and this not simply as saying one thing and meaning another, but of things being more and other than they may seem to be, requiring us to look again, to look more closely, to make connections.

The discussion turns to the fate of the soul.

Are you not aware,” said I, “that our soul is immortal and is never destroyed?”

And he looked at me, in amazement, and said, “By Zeus, I am not, but are you able to say this?” (608d)

We might be surprised at Glaucon's reaction. But for Homer, to lose one’s life is to lose one’s soul. It enters Homer’s “joyless kingdom of the dead”. (Odyssey 11.105) It is this image, above all others, that Socrates quarrels with. He does not do so by replacing images with reasoned argument but by presenting a different image.

Socrates’ defense of justice depends on an afterlife, on what awaits the just and the unjust after death. (614a) This differs from his own defense in the Apology where he raises the possibility that:

… the dead person is nothing and has no perception of anything …

(40c)

Here however he ignores that possibility and presents the myth of Er, the story of a man who comes back to life. (614b)

The problem remains:

… knowing things as they actually are.

(595b)

Unlike the poetry that Socrates criticizes, the purpose of the story of Er is not to bring pleasure to the listener. (607c) It may bring hope to some, but fear to others. It may not be the truth of what happens in death but it could be considered leading rather than misleading, for:

What’s at stake is becoming good or bad, and so we should not neglect justice, and excellence in general (608b)

A way of life that does not talk about itself. — Paine

Can you say more about this?

Plato critiques poetry and the arts for being imitative, potentially misleading, and emotionally manipulative, distancing people from truth and rational understanding. — Benkei

There is another side to this that I will be addressing.

The laws of a city is an imitation of natural laws. — I like sushi

What are the natural laws? How are they known? If they are known then what is the purpose of imitation of the laws? Or is it that the law givers attempt to approximate something that is not known?

The human 'soul' is a 'natural law'. — I like sushi

What do you mean?

So, perhaps a resolution of everything before? — Amity

I don't think so. Many of the problems raises in the dialogues do not seem to have a resolution. Some might find the odd or unsatisfactory, but I think it is a reflection of life. There is much that we do not have answer for.

book 10 is weird and some would say adds nothing of much value to the whole work's argument. — Jamal

My first thought was that those who say that book 10 adds nothing of much value have not understood it. But that is not very helpful. So, instead of leaving it there I decided I will start a thread on book 10, commenting as I go along.

Again, the crucial thing is that the real Simonides is unimportant. The new element is that because of this he can function as a blank canvas onto which Plato can project his ideal poet, in contrast with Homer, who is problematic.

Simonides does not function as a blank canvas. Quite the opposite. He was too well known and influential to be treated this way. In the Protagoras Socrates says he has studied a particular ode of Simonides closely . (339b) The theme is a good or bad man and the significance of circumstances in his being the one or the other. There is an obvious parallel to Socrates discussion with Cephalus and another saying of Simonides.

Protagoras, the famous sophist, tells Socrates that Simonides like Homer and Hesiod concealed his skill as sophist in his poetry. (316d) By putting the sophists and poets together, the "ancient quarrel between the philosophy and poetry" is extended to include the quarrel between the philosopher and the sophist. What the poets and sophists have in common is a rhetorical or persuasive way of speaking whose strength can be separated from the logos.

Protagoras later says:

... a most significant part of a man’s education is proficiency in relation to poetry. This consists of being able to ... give an account of them when questioned. (338e-339a)

[Added: And again turns to Simonides.]

What the poet says requires giving an account, one which includes both explication and a defense of its soundness if it is to be accepted. (339c)

Here is the problem in Socrates own words:

For the offspring of the painter’s skill stand before us like living creatures, but if you ask them a question, they are very solemnly silent. And the same goes for written words. You might assume that they are speaking with some degree of intelligence, but if you wish to learn from them and you ask them a question about what they are saying, they just point to one thing and it is always the same.

(Phaedrus 275d)

... poets who cannot be questioned about the topic they are speaking of. And when the majority of people quote them in discussions, some say the poet means one thing while others say he means something else, and they end up discussing matters they are unable to resolve.

(Protagoras 347e)

he could be intentionally associating the poets with tyrants and injustice without actually saying so — Jamal

Your point is broadly good, but Socrates does on the surface mean to show that Simonides and other wise men could not have --- or at least probably did not --- say it. — Jamal

This is truncated. What is at issue is how what he is purported to have said is to be understood. If it is misunderstood this does not mean the a wise man could not have said it, but that what the wise man said is not understood.

Socrates says:

Then when Simonides says that giving back what is owed is just, he is not referring to this sort of thing but to something else.

(332a)

After purposing a possible answer he follows it with:

Is this what Simonides means, according to you?

(332b)

What we might regard as wise is not independent of us. If we are not wise can we adequately judge who or what is?

in the OP I took things. in a different direction with a view to uncovering a possible covert criticism. — Jamal

Yes, that is understood. But the criticism is quite overt. The larger issue at stake is the relationship between philosophy and poetry. What Socrates will later call the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry. (607b)

To suggest that Socrates is covertly claiming that the poets are tyrannical seems to overstate the case.

Socrates' goes on to say:

.. let’s declare that if someone is able to put forward an argument as to why there should be poetry and imitation, whose aim is pleasure, in a well-regulated city, we would gladly receive these back again, because we realise that we are still charmed by them.

(607c)

The argument would have to show that poetry and imitation which aims at something other than pleasure does have a place in a well-regulated city. What we should not miss is that this is precisely what Socrates himself does. He makes full use of poetry and imitation, only the aim is not simply pleasure. The cave, for example, is:

an image of our nature in its education and want of education.

(Republic 514a)

The image of the cave and the images on the cave wall originate with the poets. The education they provide goes far beyond pleasure.

Cephalus might be suggesting here that unlike many of the masses, he is not "filled with foreboding and fear," because he has not found many injustices in his life. — Jamal

Perhaps, but there is a big difference between not having acted unjustly and being unaware that one has acted unjustly. In any case, it seems he believes the poets regarding such things.

Quite how your post relates to the OP, though, I am struggling to understand, because you don't actually say (except to suggest that the question of attribution is secondary, and the bit about P's appeal to authority). — Jamal

You quote the text:

SOCRATES: So if someone tells us it is just to give to each what he is owed, and understands by this that a just man should harm his enemies and benefit his friends, the one who says it is not wise. I mean, what he says is not true. For it has become clear to us that it is never just to harm anyone. — 335e

(emphasis added)

Who does "the one who said it" refer to? As I read it, what is at issue is the distinction between what is said and what is meant or understood. Socrates says that the poets speak in riddles. (322b) We do not know what Simonides said or did not say, and so cannot comment on what he meant. But whether or not he said this, the question remains as to how we are to understand it.

You say:

In other words, since the definition is false it cannot have originated from a wise person, and since Simonides et al were wise, it follows that it did not originate from them. — Jamal

We cannot too quickly conclude that either Simonides is not wise or if wise did not say this. It may be our own wisdom or lack of wisdom that is being called into question.

You go on to say:

On the surface, Socrates, not content with having refuted the definition, is rather facilely associating it with real injustice, and we get the feeling that he has just made it up. In doing so he is probably suggesting that the definition is merely the biased opinion of self-serving rulers. — Jamal

I think it is a conventional opinion, one shared by conventional men such as Cephalus and Polemarchus. Socrates questions the the conventional understanding. It is, however, the starting point.

Now, at this point in the Republic, the problem with poets has not yet come up — Jamal

But it has been brought up! Cephalus opinions about such things as justice are shaped by the poets. Consider how frequently the poets are appealed to.

Since nobody in the conversation seems to know for sure where the definition originated, and since Socrates is well aware of this and does not even pretend that he knows for sure himself, he could be intentionally associating the poets with tyrants and injustice without actually saying so. — Jamal

This connection requires textual support. Again, I see the question of origination as secondary to how it is to be understood. The truth or falsity of what is said does not depend on who might have first said it.

And his good character. He says that wealth is not enough. — Jamal

Agreed, wealth is not enough, but we should not understate the importance it has for Cephalus. As he says:

Indeed, the possession of wealth has a major role to play in ensuring that one does not cheat or deceive someone intentionally,

He himself brings into question how just he would have been if he were not wealthy.. But, of course, as I am sure he knows, it is not sufficient. There are plenty of wealthy people who do intentionally cheat and deceive people.

The other thing he cites is fear of punishment in death. Something that he never took seriously when he was younger. As far as I know we do not know anything about him prior to his old age. We do not know to what extent fear of death might have changed his behavior.

I will let Cephalus speak in my defense:

For mark my words, Socrates,” said he, “once someone begins to think he is about to die, fears and concerns occur to him about issues that had not occurred to him previously. For the stories told about people in Hades, that someone who has acted unjustly whilst here must pay a penalty when he arrives there, stories that were laughable before then, torment his soul at that stage, for fear they might be true. (330d-e)

Indeed, the possession of wealth has a major role to play in ensuring that one does not cheat or deceive someone intentionally, or again, depart to that other world in fear because some sacrifices are still owed to a god, or some money to another person.

(331b)

Cephalus has been freed from eros,

a raving and savage slave master

(329c)

but has not escaped the fear of death.

He is, by all appearances, a gentleman. To the extent that he is just, he credits his wealth. The gentleman is not at fault for not being a philosopher, but the philosopher’s understanding and practice of justice differs significantly. The philosopher's being just does not depend on wealth, and because he is just he does not fear death.

Shorter answer:

The question of whether a saying or definition should be credited to someone who is wise is secondary to the question of what the saying or definition means:

Well,” said I, “it certainly is not easy to disbelieve Simonides, for he is a wise and divine man. But although you probably appreciate what precisely he is saying, Polemarchus, I do not understand it.

(331e)

Socrates attempts to clarify what Simonides means:

Then when Simonides says that giving back what is owed is just, he is not referring to this sort of thing but to something else.

(332a)

He goes on:

“In that case,” said I, “it seems Simonides was speaking in riddles, as poets do, when he spoke of what is just. For apparently he had in mind that what is just is this: ‘giving back what is appropriate to each’. But to this he gave the name ‘what is owed’".

(332b-c)

What is owed and what is appropriate are not the same thing. This is a crucial distinction:

So, if someone maintains that it is just to give back what is owed to each, and by this he means that harm is owed to enemies by the just man, and benefit is owed to friends, the person saying this was not wise for he did not speak the truth, since it has become evident to us that there are no circumstances in which it is just to harm anyone. [Emphasis added.]

(335e)

There is a shift from what Socrates thinks Simonides meant to what:

… anyone [who] maintains that Simonides, or Bias, or Pittacus, or any other wise and blessed man, has said so.

(335e)

Prior to this Socrates asks:

“Then tell me,” said I, “you, the inheritor of the argument, what do you say Simonides says, and says correctly,about justice?”

(331e)


This leads to the longer answer.

There are several themes that are developed at the beginning of the dialogue including the questions of persuasion and inheritance. We need to take a step back.

Socrates asks Polemarchus :

Could we not persuade you that you should let us leave?

(327e)

The question of persuasion and its means is of central importance. On the one hand, it is behind both the arguments of Thrasymachus and the other sophists as well as those of Socrates and the philosophers, and, on the other, of the poet’s stories of men and gods. The stories of the poets are an inherited means of persuasion manifest as belief. From an early age children are told the poet’s stories.

Socrates asks:

Cephalus,” said I, “did you inherit most of what you have, or did you acquire it yourself?”

(330a)

In response Cephalus says:

As a money-maker, I am sort of midway between my grandfather and my father. For my grandfather, whose name I bear, having inherited about as much wealth as I have now acquired, made many times as much as this again. Then my own father, Lysanias, reduced the wealth below its present value, while I would be pleased if I could leave just as much as I inherited to these lads here, and a little more besides.

(330b)

Polemarchus inherits his father’s argument regarding justice. (331e) What will he make of it? Will he become more just or less just than his father? What shapes his idea of justice? Does he depend on the wisdom of the poets or those who make arguments?

This is reflected in what Socrates says next:

Well,” said I, “it certainly is not easy to disbelieve Simonides, for he is a wise and divine man. But although you probably appreciate what precisely he is saying, Polemarchus, I do not understand it.

(331e)

It is not simply a matter of inheriting wisdom, as if it can be passed down from generation to generation as wise sayings, but of how one is to understand what is said and how one makes use of it. In other words, it is not simply either the poets or the philosophers but of how one understands and makes use of the stories of the poets and the arguments offered by sophists and philosophers.

The opening exchange with Polemarchus asks about the connection between persuasion and power. Socrates accuses the sophists of making the weaker argument the stronger. It is, however, not at all clear what is to stand as the weaker or stronger argument. Thrasymachus reduces justice to power. Argument is regarded as a means to power. The power of argument, however, depends, as Polemarchus points out, on whether someone is willing to listen. Otherwise it is powerless.

Cephalus believes his money is power. It is used in his old age to protect himself. His only interest in being just is self-serving. He is persuaded by the fear engendered by the poet’s stories of what will happen to him when he dies.

We might ask whether Socrates is wise in claiming that we should not harm our enemies. How can one win a war without harming his enemies? It is at this point that Thrasymachus enters the argument. What Socrates means is put on hold but remains in the background. Socrates agrees in part with Thrasymachus. He does not deny that there is an element of self-interest in being just. He attempts to persuade Glaucon and Adeimantus that being just is itself a benefit, both to oneself and to others. To this end, he acts the poet, weaving stories together with arguments.

What do you understand under the term Transcendentalist "genius?" — Jafar

The term 'genius' as used by the Transcendentalist Emerson. As expressed in the passage from Emerson quoted by T Clark:

To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart, is true for all men-that is genius.

It seems to me to be an odd mix of individualism and universalism. An overestimation of the reliability of intuition.

I wonder if we can get past these factors? — Tom Storm

I think the best we can do is be aware of them. Even when we examine our beliefs we cannot do so by stepping outside of them. Philosophical dialogue can help, but we often tend to defend our beliefs because they are our own rather then test them to allow them to stand or fall based on the strength of the argument. Easier said than done.

I too am suspicious of the idea of the Transcendentalist's "genius". It easily becomes pernicious self-flattery.

Agreed, but the purpose behind that examination and evaluation is to figure out how other's thoughts fit into your own understanding of how the world works. If they don't fit, then you can either reject them, change your own understanding, or do a little of both. — T Clark

Your tell Jafar:

... many of us here disagree with Fooloso4’s opinion. — T Clark

as if anything I said was intended to:

stop [him] from putting [his] thoughts into words — T Clark

Your claim that "the purpose behind the examination and evaluation is to figure out how other's thoughts fit into your own understanding of how the world works." is not a point of disagreement with what I said:

It is critical and evaluative. It is dialogical in a double sense - both a dialogue with others and a dialogue with oneself. — Fooloso4

You should appreciate the irony of him giving his personal preference without justification in this instance. — T Clark

The only irony here is that once you get passed your misreading of what I said, it turns out that you support what I said. As for the others you presume to speak for I see no evidence of their alleged disagreement.

I think it's also important to be able to formulate an idea and also be challenged on it. — Jafar

I found the following from my response to you to be very helpful:

... dialogue with others should be impersonal. — Fooloso4

The Daodejing says:

practice extreme tenuousness

(Chapter 16)

Tenuousness is an openness, a lack of insistence. It is to allow things to show themselves as they are rather than imposing some conceptual scheme or structure on them. There is freedom in the play of ideas unfettered by being too attached to your opinions.

I'm curious about the introspection part. How do you critically evaluate your own thoughts? — Jafar

Good question! It involves a sense of detachment from whatever your opinion is. Of being willing and able to be wrong. To be able to change your mind. It involves an acknowledgement of ignorance.

There is an ancient practice of defending a position that is at odds with the one you currently hold. The benefits include - developing a greater flexibility of thought, looking at the issue without having a stake in it, seeing things from another perspective, and even being able to give a stronger account of your own position after examining the alternatives.

I'm very interested in how other people ask "good" questions. — Jafar

I would say you are well on your way!

You shouldn’t let it stop you from putting your thoughts into words. — T Clark

Jafar said:

I feel like I never really have anything to say on a given topic, or I feel that I do not know enough about a given subject to say anything meaningful. — Jafar

Telling him to put his thoughts into words is to ignore the thoughts he has put into words.

Articulating your thoughts is an essential part of philosophy, but there is, in my opinion, more to philosophy. It involves a critical examination and evaluation of those thoughts and opinions, whether they are your thoughts and opinions or someone else's.

I really value philosophy as a means of introspection and a way to practice it, but I also get the impression that there is a lot to learn from others through discussion. — Jafar

We are in agreement:

It is dialogical in a double sense - both a dialogue with others and a dialogue with oneself. — Fooloso4

The points you [clarification: T Clark] seem to be missing is that: 1) giving an opinion is not having a discussion, and 2) there is value in being a silent participant is a discussion.

I feel like I never really have anything to say on a given topic, or I feel that I do not know enough about a given subject to say anything meaningful. — Jafar

I think this puts you at a distinct advantage. All too often giving an opinion is mistaken for doing philosophy. Rather then telling others what you think inquire into what others say on topics that interest you.

Inquiry is a mode of thinking. It is active rather than passive. It is critical and evaluative. It is dialogical in a double sense - both a dialogue with others and a dialogue with oneself. Dialogue with one's self is deeply personal, but dialogue with others should be impersonal. The former is about you, the latter should not be about you, it should be about the ideas at issue.

Much, however. depends on your priorities. Whether you regard philosophy as a way of finding answers or a way of asking questions. You might consider: what do you want and expect from philosophy?

He's peddling Crypto now. Act now! Don't wait! What do you have to lose? @180 Proof

A book based on facts cannot compete against a manufactured TV and magazine image developed over decades that gives him the appearance of being the embodiment of the self-made man having attained the pinnacle of the American Dream.

Good analogy!

Vance knows full well that the problem with such lies is that the MAGA - nauts will believe it and act on it. Vance may be unscrupulous but he is not stupid.

And then there is Vance who openly admits lying in order to get attention.

I ask you to place yourself in the shoes of some form of supreme being, whatever that may be or mean to you. — Benj96

Get some new shoes?

Maybe it's their right to do so. — Eros1982

It is not a question of their right but of what is right.

Turning Kamala into a hero overnight, crediting her with qualities she does not have, etc. — Eros1982

The public response to her campaign is news worthy. Perhaps there is some gushing from some sources but this is not as serious an issue as Trump's being unfit for office.

These media do not sound serious or sincere every time that election approaches. — Eros1982

The line between news and entertainment has been blurred.

If the investigators, reporters, and producers at NPR have, based on the facts, concluded that he is a serious danger to the US democracy and groups of people don't they have a journalistic responsibility to say so?

What else do you want to know about me?

For instance, what does Trump traveling to the 9/11 memorial with a 9/11 conspiracy theorist imply? — praxis

Great question and observation. This allows him to say something without using words while leaving him an out. Having an out is very important to him. He can just deny that he believes what she says, but why bring her?

Labour conditions, human rights, pollution and build quality are all issues. — Benkei

China is moving car manufacturing to Mexico. Trump's threat of a blood bath referred to this. Of course, American car manufacturers also make cars in Mexico.

To say that 12x12 =144 is a hinge proposition is to think of it as a rule for arriving at the product 144. — Joshs

Wittgenstein calls it a proposition not a rule. We follow rules. We do not follow propositions. Propositions are either true or false. Calling it a hinge does not change that.

That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

(OC 341)

That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.

(OC 342)

If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

(OC 343).

It is not, as some would have it, that a hinge is neither true nor false, it is that its truth is not doubted.

The result of a calculation can be true or false but the rule for arriving at the result is neither true nor false. The rule merely stipulates the criterion for determining what would constitute the correct or incorrect answer. — Joshs

What is the rule for arriving at the answer? When we calculate correctly we arrive at the correct answer. Are there infinite rules for the infinite amount of numbers that can be multiplied? Does anyone know or follow these rules or do they calculate?