Philosophy could be called highest because it is without presuppositions. — Leontiskos

Such presuppositions are the death knell of philosophy.

Inquiry stops with philosophy because being -- what there is -- does not extend beyond what can be reflected upon. — J

Why would you assume that the limits of human thought are the limits of being? Perhaps what is is without limits.

So I'm interpreting W as saying that when I imagine calculating there appear to be nothing that fills the blank in "I calculated by..." (except possibly imagining that I was calculating) — Ludwig V

I take him to be saying that the question: "What I am calculating by?" is misleading. There is not this something that is analogous to the hand or mouth. I imagine. I calculate. In some cases this involves the hand or mouth, but in others there is not some other agent or thing to be identified. And, of course, as you point out, it is not the hand that does the calculating.

The temptation is not to treat words as objects, but to assume that there must be some object that corresponds to the word:

But it is the use of the substantive "time" which mystifies us.

(6)

This is worth repeating:

We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.

(1)

When we look for the meaning of the word 'cow', for example, there is no inexplicable temptation to treat the word as an object. But there is an object, an animal that we can point to that explains the meaning of the word 'cow'. We cannot, however, explain the meaning of 'time' by pointing to something. There is no thing that corresponds to it.

Both 'cow' and 'time' are substantives, but grammatically they do not function in the same way. When the grammar is understood we are no longer misled by the language of substantives.

Is doing a calculation with pencil and paper a mental or a physical activity? — Ludwig V

Wittgenstein takes up this question in the PI:

236. Calculating prodigies who arrive at the correct result but can’t say how. Are we to say that they do not calculate? (A family of cases.)

(364) Is calculating in the imagination in some sense less real than calculating on paper? It is real calculating-in-the-head. Is it similar to calculating on paper? I don’t know whether to call it similar. Is a bit of white paper with black lines on it similar to a human body?

His use of "agent" here is unusual.When I think by writing, the agent is my hands. When I think by imagining, there is not agent - for some reason the obvious agent - me - doesn't count. — Ludwig V

It does count. As he says, "we think by writing", "we think by speaking" (6). But then:

... and if we think by imagining signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that thinks.

(6)

There is no agent here that is analogous to the hand that writes or mouth that speaks. We might say that in this case it is the mind that imagines, but we do not think with the mind in a way that is analogous to thinking with the hand or mouth.

We are misled by language, or, more precisely, the grammar of our language, when we regard 'mind' as we do 'hand' or 'mouth'. Grammatically all are substantives. They are nouns. As such we may be led to assume that they all name particular things.

What we must do is: understand its working, its grammar, e.g. see what relation this grammar has to that of the expression "we think with our mouth", or "we think with a pencil on a piece of paper".

Perhaps the main reason why we are so strongly inclined to talk of the head as the locality of our thoughts is this: the existence of the words "thinking" and "thought" alongside of the words denoting (bodily) activities, such as writing, speaking, etc., makes us look for an activity, different from these but analogous to them, corresponding to the word "thinking". When words in our ordinary language have prima facie analogous grammars we are inclined to try to interpret them analogously; i.e. we try to make the analogy hold throughout.

(7)

What does Wittgenstein mean when he says?

I can give you no agent that thinks.

(6)

He is not denying that we think, but rather that the mind is the agent that thinks:

It is misleading then to talk of thinking as of a "mental activity". … This activity is performed by the hand, when we think by writing; by the mouth and larynx, when we think by speaking; and if we think by imagining signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that thinks.

(6) [emphasis added]

He continues:

If then you say that in such cases the mind thinks, I would only draw your attention to the fact that you are using a metaphor, that here the mind is an agent in a different sense from that in which the hand can be said to be the agent in writing.

(6-7)

Elsewhere he says:

I really do think with my pen, because my head often knows nothing about what my hand is writing.

(CV 17)

This is, of course, metaphorical. Contrary to the Tractatus, however, metaphors although not propositions of natural science, are no longer regarded as nonsense. The logical structure of language and thought that was fundamental to the Tractatus has been rejected.

We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.

(1)

A substantive is some thing named:

We feel that we can't point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something.

(1)

What is at issue is a critique of the Tractarian metaphysics of mind. The logical necessity of the connection between names and the existence of corresponding objects, and, by extension, propositions and facts.

One difficulty which strikes us is that for many words in our language there do not seem to be ostensive definitions; e.g. for such words as "one", "number", "not", etc.

(1)

This is followed immediately by the question:

Need the ostensive definition itself be understood?--Can't the ostensive definition be misunderstood?

That “tove” can ostensibly mean pencil or round or wood might seem to be veering off on a tangent, but it raises a related question about the logical connection between language and the world. Language lacks the precision assumed in the Tractatus. That 'tove' means ‘this’ (pencil)and not ‘that’ (wood) is something that is clarified in practice by the activity of using language.

This activity may involve mental processes but is not reducible to them.

We are tempted to think that the action of language consists of two parts; an inorganic part, the handling of signs, and an organic part, which we may call understanding these signs, meaning them, interpreting them, thinking. These latter activities seem to take place in a queer kind of medium, the mind; and the mechanism of the mind, the nature of which, it seems, we don't quite understand, can bring about effects which no material mechanism could.

(3)

Why does the mind seem to be a queer kind of medium? This happens when the mind is taken to be a substantive, a thing with its own mechanism, but a mechanism that can bring about effects that no material mechanism could.

But here we are making two mistakes. For what struck us as being queer about thought
and thinking was not at all that it had curious effects which we were not yet able to explain (causally). Our problem, in other words, was not a scientific one; but a muddle felt
as a problem.

(5-6)

Consistent with the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintains the distinction between philosophy and natural science.

Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us.

(6)

Is it Plato or the translator? — Amity

It is Plato.He uses these two different words. As Paine pointed out, the fault of the translator lies with those translators who fail to distinguish between these terms. I think Plato intends for us to try and work though the connection.

Where is the overlap in meaning? — Amity

Doing certain things will cause me trouble and pain. If I do them anyway I am being heedless or careless or unmindful. We often fail to learn from our mistakes. Have we forgotten what happened in the past?

We need to be clear on what is happening at the river Lethe. — Amity

I would like to, but I forgot.

What do you think is the purpose of its meaning 'forgetfulness' - in its place just before the re-birth. — Amity

It explains why we do not remember what happened. Er remembers because he did not drink from the river.

What do you think is the purpose - at this spot - if its meaning is 'heedless' or similar? — Amity

We can avoid being heedless by keeping to our proper measure in all things. Determining what that is has something to do with knowing who we are, which includes knowing who or what we are not.

We will have to agree to disagree that there can only be one meaning: per you saying: "I see only one river and one meaning or understanding, given the context."
— Paine

Perhaps we need a negotiator? — Amity

Plato uses two different words λήθη (621c) and ἀμέλητος (621a) when referring to the same thing, the river. Heraclitus might say it is not the same river but by this he means something different. Although we might ask him whether we should use the same name if the river is not the same.

λήθη, forgetfulness, and ἀμέλητος, heedlessness, carelessness, or unmindfulness, do not mean the same thing but there is an overlap in meaning, just as there is with the three terms used in translation.

Lethe and Aletheia have the same root. We might think of Lethe as having forgotten the truth, and Aletheia as remembering or recollecting the truth. There is, however, not a single truth but overlapping truths at issue. The truth of what has happened, the truth of the soul, the truth about yourself.

And the almost obsessive focus on the degree of 'justice' of the sou — Amity

Socrates' task as set out at the beginning of Book 2 is to persuade them, as Glaucon puts it:

that it is better in every way to be just rather than unjust

(357a-b)

So, it is about 'forgetfulness' not 'carelessness'. — Amity

It is about the connection between them and with philosophy as phronesis (practical wisdom, prudence, thoughtfulness)

the role of Lethe set over against the role of Mnemosyne (or Memory). — Paine

We should not forget that in the Phaedrus there is the plain of Aletheia or truth. (248b)

That suggests to me that the role of recollection is principally the activity of the living soul. — Paine

I agree. In the Phaedo the distinction between recollection and being reminded are blurred:

'Yes, and besides, Socrates,' Cebes replied, 'there's also that argument you're always putting forward, that our learning is actually nothing but recollection; according to that too, if it's true, what we are now reminded of we must have learned at some former time. (72e)

'But if that doesn't convince you, Simmias, then see whether maybe you agree if you look at it this way. Apparently you doubt whether what is called "learning" is recollection?'

'I don't doubt it,' said Simmias; 'but I do need to undergo just what the argument is about, to be "reminded"

...

'Then do we also agree on this point: that whenever knowledge comes to be present in this sort of way, it is recollection?”

He goes on to give an example of recollection:

'

Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.'

(73b-d)

The question is why must they drink the water. — Amity

It is by necessity. Given the conditions the souls all get thirsty. There is not other source to drink from.

If you mean why does the story include this, I think it is a response to the anticipated question of why we don't know what happens in death.

No mention of a River of Heedlessness. — Amity

Heedlessness is Horan's translation. Bloom translates it as carelessness. The Greek is ἀμέλητος It means, according to Liddell and Scott. An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, not to be cared for.

See the note in the Perseus translation you linked to:
2. In later literature it is the river that is called Lethe.

The later literature calls the river of ἀμέλητος the river of Lethe (Λήθη)

I see that Paine has edited his post to include this.

Why does it matter if it is the same river? — Amity

I do not think Plato uses words heedlessly or carelessly. To say why it matters we must first make note of the difference terms. Someone who forgets might act heedlessly, but one might act heedlessly without forgetting.

Doesn't it depend on the definition? — Amity

If you mean the definition of philosophy, I am going off of what is said beginning at 618e through 619e.

Hmmm. The word 'actually' bothers me. It can mean 'according to one's beliefs, views or feelings'.

There is no certainty that we can be so thoroughly objective. — Amity

Actually is used to mean how things are as opposed to one's beliefs, views, or feelings. More to the point, as opposed to how things are represented in images.

What is the message from either Plato or Socrates?
To be good, to care, to think, to be wise, to be just, to study and practise philosophy? — Amity

Yes, all of the above.

Does knowing ourselves save us from ourselves? — Amity

If to know yourself is to know what is and is not good for you then you are saved unless you are heedless and do things that are contrary to what is good for you.

If no vessel can hold the river's water, then how can it be properly measured? — Amity

I took this to mean that the whole of heedlessness is greater than what any vessel can hold. The heedlessness of souls is without limit.

What is a 'certain measure'? — Amity

I am not sure. Perhaps enough so that we forget what has transpired but not so much that we forget yourself.

To be 'saved by wisdom' or 'good sense' - does it take philosophy? — Amity

I think that this is what he means by philosophy.

Or are some born with it? — Amity

Some will be born with it if they did not drink too much.

We must pay the utmost attention to how each of us will be a seeker and student who learns and finds out, from anywhere he can, who it is who will make him capable and knowledgeable enough to choose the best possible life, always and everywhere, by distinguishing between a good life and a degenerate one.

(618 b-c)

How wise is it to keep reading Plato - as opposed to any other philosophical, religious, psychological texts or works of literature? Knowledge of the sciences? — Amity

Reading Plato need not preclude reading other things. In part it depends on what appeals and resonates with you.

The Plain and River of Forgetfulness or Lethe

Because of the heat and harsh conditions of the Plain of Forgetfulness it is necessary for the souls to drink from the River of Heedlessness. (621a) In his closing comments Socrates refers to the river as the river of Forgetfulness rather than the river of Heedlessness. What is the connection between heedlessness and forgetfulness?

Those who are prudent are not heedless. They are made prudent by the study and practice of philosophy.

… by looking to the nature of the soul, and calling the life that leads soul to become more unjust, the worse life, and the one that leads it to become more just, the better life. All other studies he will set aside, for we have seen that in life and after death this is the supreme choice.

(618e)

Philosophy is about self-knowledge. Forgetfulness is forgetting yourself. To act heedlessly is to forget yourself. Human wisdom, knowledge of ignorance, is not the divine knowledge of the gods. It is, more moderately, phronesis not sophia.

Socrates tells Glaucon:

“And that, dear Glaucon, is how the story was saved and not lost, and it may save us too if we heed its advice, and we shall safely cross over the River of Forgetfulness without defiling our soul.

(621b-c)

Socrates began the story by saying:

Once upon a time …

(614b)

Starting with this fairytale opening and by telling us that the body of Er, unlike the other bodies, had not begun to decompose, we have reason to doubt the truth of the story. But

… knowing things as they actually are. (595b) — Fooloso4

is limited by things as we can actually know them. We cannot know things as they are after we die but we can come to know ourselves as we actually are. The mythological truth lies in recollecting and heeding the message of the story. In this way we may be saved.

One aspect that is often ignored is that we are historied and encultured beings.

Looking back I see that I did not include quotation marks for the passage from the Laws. I have edited it.

I took Lachesis' role to be that once the choice of a daimon and of a life is made by the soul, that choice becomes part of the fate of that soul. There is a connection here with something Socrates tells his friends in the Phaedo:

... all who actually engage in philosophy aright are practising nothing other than dying and being dead.

(64a)

The best preparation for making that fateful choice is something you can do now.

With regard to virtue or excellence, it too is a choice:

... each will have more of her or less of her, as he honours her or dishonours her.

(617e)

This does not make sense to me. If people were in heaven, then they will already have been judged as good. Even if their virtue is through habit, it is part of their character, formed and informed by life experience and doesn't mean 'without philosophy'. — Amity

One can be brought up with good habits, but that does not mean that philosophy is part of their education. Good habits do not preclude philosophy, but may not be the result of philosophy.

'untrained in sufferings' — Amity

Perhaps given their wealth and good fortune Cephalus and Polemarchus are untrained in suffering. Socrates repeats a common assumption to Cephalus:

... for they say that wealthy people have consolation in abundance.

(329e)

Cephalus agrees and goes on to say:

Indeed, the possession of wealth has a major role to play in ensuring that one does not cheat or deceive someone intentionally ...

(331b)

No academic philosophers required. — Amity

I agree. As I understand it, what is meant by philosophy here is something different. I will have more to say on this in connection to the River of Forgetfulness.

I don't see where Plato's concept differs from ours. — Amity

In the Timaeus necessity is called the wandering or errant cause. (48a) The necessary connection between necessity (ananke) and chance (tyke) is discussed in Plato’s Laws:

Fire, water, earth and air all exist by nature and chance, they say, and none of these exist by artifice. And the bodies that then come after these, those of the earth, sun, moon and stars, have come into being through these four, entirely soulless entities. They move by chance, each according to its particular power, in such a way that they come together, combining somehow with their own, hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with hard and so on for any mixture of opposites that is produced, of necessity, according to chance. In this way, based upon these processes the whole heaven has come into existence and everything under heaven, including animals and indeed all the plants too, and from these all the seasons have arisen, not through intelligence, they say, or through the agency of a god, or through artifice, but, according to them, through nature and chance.

(889b-c) Emphasis added.

The Spindle of Necessity or Ananke.

In the eponymous dialogue Timaeus he identifies two kinds of cause, intelligence and necessity, that is, Nous and Ananke. Given the earlier emphasis in the Republic on the Forms, the introduction of ananke is both surprising and significant. Here at the end we must, by necessity, begin again. Forms and their imperfect images do not tell the whole of the story.

Plato’s concept of necessity differs from ours. What is by necessity is without nous or intellect. Necessary causes can act contrary to intelligible causes. What is fixed and unchanging cannot serve as the cause of a world of change, contingency, and chance. It should be noted how often necessity occurs in this story. The various cases helps to give us a better sense of the scope of what necessity means and what it entails

The Fates, Lachesis, Clotho and Atropos are the daughters of Necessity.The are respectively what was, what is, and what will be. Clotho, with a touch of her right hand, helps turn the outer revolution of the spindle, pausing from time to time, while Atropos, with her left hand, does the same for the inner revolutions, and Lachesis lends a hand to each revolution in turn, with each hand in turn.

In less figurative terms, by necessity, what was, the past, influences what is and what will be. What is, the present, influences what will be. The influence of what was on what will be is not eliminated by what is. In other words, by necessity we cannot undo what has been done.

Each soul chooses a daimon and also a pattern of life. (617e) The daimon is the guardian of that life. (620d) Nothing is said about choosing a daimon, on what basis it is chosen, or how closely it reflects the soul that chooses it.

Before choosing a life the souls are told that one who chooses wisely will choose a life midway between extremes. In this way a human being attains the utmost happiness. (619 a-b) They are warned that:

‘Even for the person who comes up last, but chooses intelligently and lives in a disciplined way, an acceptable life rather than a bad one, awaits. The first to choose must not be careless, and the last must not be despondent.’

(619b)

The first to choose by lot chooses extreme tyranny. (619b) We might think that this person had led a life of hardship and oppression and now wants to be on the giving rather than receiving end, but:

He was one of the people who had come from the heaven and had lived his previous life under an orderly system of government, where any share of excellence he had came from habit in the absence of philosophy. And, generally speaking, those who had come from the heaven were more likely to be caught out in this way, since they had no training in dealing with suffering, while those who had come out of the earth, for the most part, having had experience of suffering themselves, and having seen others suffer, did not make their choices in a hurry. This, and the element of chance from the lot, is why most souls undergo an interchange of what is good and what is bad.

(619c-d)

The first to choose had chosen quickly out of stupidity and greed. He came to lament his choice. He blames chance and the spirits, everything but himself. (619 b-c)

Yet if someone were to engage in philosophy, consistently, in a sound manner, whenever he comes back to live in this world, unless he is among the last to choose, it is likely not only that he would be happy whilst here, but also that his journey from here to there, and back here again, would be a smooth journey through the heaven, rather than rough and underground.

(619d-e)

The last to choose is Homer’s Odysseus:

When his turn came, he remembered all his former troubles, gave up the love of honour he had held previously, and went about for a long time seeking the life of an ordinary man with a private station. And he found it with difficulty, lying about somewhere, neglected by everyone else. And he said, when he saw it, that he would have done the same thing even had he been given first choice, and he chose it gladly.

(620 c-d)

Unlike most souls who made their choice based upon the habits of the previous life, (620a) Odysseus now chooses a life of moderation. The suggestion seems to be that although he has chosen last he is an example of someone who has attained phronesis, someone who engaged in philosophy, consistently, in a sound manner. He has become, so to speak, a philosophical hero. Put differently, Socrates has transformed Homer. The soul that was Odysseus comes home again after his journey from there to here.

The polls could change. Thump might do or say something disastrous. — Baden

It does not seem as though there is anything he might say or do that would significantly change the polls. It is not as if, even with the evidence, Trump supporters, backed by his propaganda machine, will believe it or not discount it because they think other things are more important.

According to FiveThirtyEight

“Polls’ true utility isn’t in telling us who will win, but rather in roughly how close a race is — and, therefore, how confident we should be in the outcome.” Historically, candidates leading polls by at least 20 points have won 99 percent of the time. But candidates leading polls by less than 3 points have won just 55 percent of the time. In other words, races within 3 points in the polls are little better than toss-ups — something we’ve been shouting from the rooftops for years.

Because I believe in science ... — Baden

There are too many variables for there to be a scientific determination based on the polls of the outcome of the election.

Rather than bet, I'll hold on to my money. I might need it.

Appreciated but no apologies necessary.

From my last response to your thread "With philosophy, poetry and politics on my mind..."
I think in discussions of Plato we are doing at least two things:

1) Discussing ideas and issues that arise in the part of the dialogue.we are reading.
2) Discovering how those ideas and issues are addressed by Plato in the larger context of the whole of the dialogue and other dialogues.

We all start with the first. We might do this without ever going too far into the second.

I'll add that those involved in the dialogue do not know where it will go or how it will end. We can imagine ourselves to be participants of the dialogue and add our responses to what is being said.

I decided rather than continue with Fooloso4' Book 10 discussion that I need to read the whole Republic. — Amity

I think in discussions of Plato we are doing at least two things:

1) Discussing ideas and issues that arise in the part of the dialogue we are reading.
2) Discovering how those ideas and issues are addressed by Plato in the larger context of the whole of the dialogue and other dialogues.

We all start with the first. We might do this without ever going too far into the second.

An equality of all possible fates. — Paine

An interesting point. Socrates says:

And this, dear Glaucon, it seems is the moment of extreme danger for a human being, and because of this we must neglect all other studies save one. We must pay the utmost attention to how each of us will be a seeker and student who learns and finds out, from anywhere he can, who it is who will make him capable and knowledgeable enough to choose the best possible life ...

(618b-c)

Republic V contains two revolutionary proposals for the social organisation of the ideal state — The Role of Women in Plato's Republic - C. C. W. Taylor

I question this assumption. The purpose, as stated at the beginning of Book 2, is not to make an ideal state, but to persuade those listening that it is better in every way to be just rather than unjust. (357a-b)

Adeimantus says:

And no one, so far, either in poetry or in ordinary language, has described in a sufficiently detailed argument what each does, itself, by its own power, when present in the soul of its possessors, unnoticed by gods and humans, an argument according to which injustice is the worst of all the evils that any soul can have within itself, while justice is the greatest good.For if you had all described it in these terms from the beginning, and convinced us of this from our earliest years, we would not have been acting as one another’s guardians for fear we might behave unjustly, but each of us would himself be his own guardian, for fear that by acting unjustly he would have to live with the worst evil of all.’

(366e-367a)

In other words, the ideal city would be one in which each acted as his own guardian to assure that he is just while shunning injustice as the greatest evil. In such a city there would be no guardian class.

The city Socrates creates in speech suffers the same problem as the bed made by a maker of images. You can't sleep in this bed or live in this image of a city. In addition, far from being ideal such a city is in its first iteration first, in Glaucon's words, a city of pigs. (372d) Glaucon wants a more conventional city, one with couches, tables, relishes, and desserts. (372e) Socrates goes along in the making of this "luxurious city", but although it accommodates some of our human desires, it it far from ideal. Even with the compromises away from what Socrates calls the "true city", a "healthy one" (372e), it is not one that any of us would want to live it.

Rather than a proposal for an ideal state, it is anti-idealist. Whatever we might imagine the ideal to be, its implementation involves great injustice. Socrates starts as we must with what is there to work with. Human beings with all their flaws and weaknesses.

Did you not think the missing sections to be important as to an understanding and assessment of Book 10's value? — Amity

It is. I will address some of it in relation to the myth of Er, but that does not mean the rest is not important.

I wanted to address what @Benkei referred to as:

misleading, and emotionally manipulative — Benkei

but got sidetracked and left it undeveloped. I touched on the first part with the distinction between leading and misleading. And with regard to emotionally manipulative, the story is Er is emotionally manipulative in so far as it brings hope to some and fear to others, with the intend to lead to the listener being just.

An intended irony or just plain sarcasm? — Amity

I think it is ironic because he does some of the same things he faults the poets for doing. The difference is his intent.

To talk of justice at the same time as comparing men and women. — Amity

In the Republic women are regarded as equal to men when it comes to the capacity to be philosophers. But, of course, this should not obscure the differences attributed to men and women.

In the myth of Er Necessity and her daughters play an important role. I will have more to say on that.

Or, as mentioned above, it may be typical Platonic irony, taken to the extreme, the boundary of hypocrisy. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think of Socratic/Platonic irony as a turning around, and this not simply as saying one thing and meaning another, but of things being more and other than they may seem to be, requiring us to look again, to look more closely, to make connections.

The discussion turns to the fate of the soul.

Are you not aware,” said I, “that our soul is immortal and is never destroyed?”

And he looked at me, in amazement, and said, “By Zeus, I am not, but are you able to say this?” (608d)

We might be surprised at Glaucon's reaction. But for Homer, to lose one’s life is to lose one’s soul. It enters Homer’s “joyless kingdom of the dead”. (Odyssey 11.105) It is this image, above all others, that Socrates quarrels with. He does not do so by replacing images with reasoned argument but by presenting a different image.

Socrates’ defense of justice depends on an afterlife, on what awaits the just and the unjust after death. (614a) This differs from his own defense in the Apology where he raises the possibility that:

… the dead person is nothing and has no perception of anything …

(40c)

Here however he ignores that possibility and presents the myth of Er, the story of a man who comes back to life. (614b)

The problem remains:

… knowing things as they actually are.

(595b)

Unlike the poetry that Socrates criticizes, the purpose of the story of Er is not to bring pleasure to the listener. (607c) It may bring hope to some, but fear to others. It may not be the truth of what happens in death but it could be considered leading rather than misleading, for:

What’s at stake is becoming good or bad, and so we should not neglect justice, and excellence in general (608b)

A way of life that does not talk about itself. — Paine

Can you say more about this?

Plato critiques poetry and the arts for being imitative, potentially misleading, and emotionally manipulative, distancing people from truth and rational understanding. — Benkei

There is another side to this that I will be addressing.

The laws of a city is an imitation of natural laws. — I like sushi

What are the natural laws? How are they known? If they are known then what is the purpose of imitation of the laws? Or is it that the law givers attempt to approximate something that is not known?

The human 'soul' is a 'natural law'. — I like sushi

What do you mean?

So, perhaps a resolution of everything before? — Amity

I don't think so. Many of the problems raises in the dialogues do not seem to have a resolution. Some might find the odd or unsatisfactory, but I think it is a reflection of life. There is much that we do not have answer for.

book 10 is weird and some would say adds nothing of much value to the whole work's argument. — Jamal

My first thought was that those who say that book 10 adds nothing of much value have not understood it. But that is not very helpful. So, instead of leaving it there I decided I will start a thread on book 10, commenting as I go along.

Again, the crucial thing is that the real Simonides is unimportant. The new element is that because of this he can function as a blank canvas onto which Plato can project his ideal poet, in contrast with Homer, who is problematic.

Simonides does not function as a blank canvas. Quite the opposite. He was too well known and influential to be treated this way. In the Protagoras Socrates says he has studied a particular ode of Simonides closely . (339b) The theme is a good or bad man and the significance of circumstances in his being the one or the other. There is an obvious parallel to Socrates discussion with Cephalus and another saying of Simonides.

Protagoras, the famous sophist, tells Socrates that Simonides like Homer and Hesiod concealed his skill as sophist in his poetry. (316d) By putting the sophists and poets together, the "ancient quarrel between the philosophy and poetry" is extended to include the quarrel between the philosopher and the sophist. What the poets and sophists have in common is a rhetorical or persuasive way of speaking whose strength can be separated from the logos.

Protagoras later says:

... a most significant part of a man’s education is proficiency in relation to poetry. This consists of being able to ... give an account of them when questioned. (338e-339a)

[Added: And again turns to Simonides.]

What the poet says requires giving an account, one which includes both explication and a defense of its soundness if it is to be accepted. (339c)

Here is the problem in Socrates own words:

For the offspring of the painter’s skill stand before us like living creatures, but if you ask them a question, they are very solemnly silent. And the same goes for written words. You might assume that they are speaking with some degree of intelligence, but if you wish to learn from them and you ask them a question about what they are saying, they just point to one thing and it is always the same.

(Phaedrus 275d)

... poets who cannot be questioned about the topic they are speaking of. And when the majority of people quote them in discussions, some say the poet means one thing while others say he means something else, and they end up discussing matters they are unable to resolve.

(Protagoras 347e)

he could be intentionally associating the poets with tyrants and injustice without actually saying so — Jamal

Your point is broadly good, but Socrates does on the surface mean to show that Simonides and other wise men could not have --- or at least probably did not --- say it. — Jamal

This is truncated. What is at issue is how what he is purported to have said is to be understood. If it is misunderstood this does not mean the a wise man could not have said it, but that what the wise man said is not understood.

Socrates says:

Then when Simonides says that giving back what is owed is just, he is not referring to this sort of thing but to something else.

(332a)

After purposing a possible answer he follows it with:

Is this what Simonides means, according to you?

(332b)

What we might regard as wise is not independent of us. If we are not wise can we adequately judge who or what is?

in the OP I took things. in a different direction with a view to uncovering a possible covert criticism. — Jamal

Yes, that is understood. But the criticism is quite overt. The larger issue at stake is the relationship between philosophy and poetry. What Socrates will later call the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry. (607b)

To suggest that Socrates is covertly claiming that the poets are tyrannical seems to overstate the case.

Socrates' goes on to say:

.. let’s declare that if someone is able to put forward an argument as to why there should be poetry and imitation, whose aim is pleasure, in a well-regulated city, we would gladly receive these back again, because we realise that we are still charmed by them.

(607c)

The argument would have to show that poetry and imitation which aims at something other than pleasure does have a place in a well-regulated city. What we should not miss is that this is precisely what Socrates himself does. He makes full use of poetry and imitation, only the aim is not simply pleasure. The cave, for example, is:

an image of our nature in its education and want of education.

(Republic 514a)

The image of the cave and the images on the cave wall originate with the poets. The education they provide goes far beyond pleasure.

Cephalus might be suggesting here that unlike many of the masses, he is not "filled with foreboding and fear," because he has not found many injustices in his life. — Jamal

Perhaps, but there is a big difference between not having acted unjustly and being unaware that one has acted unjustly. In any case, it seems he believes the poets regarding such things.

Quite how your post relates to the OP, though, I am struggling to understand, because you don't actually say (except to suggest that the question of attribution is secondary, and the bit about P's appeal to authority). — Jamal

You quote the text:

SOCRATES: So if someone tells us it is just to give to each what he is owed, and understands by this that a just man should harm his enemies and benefit his friends, the one who says it is not wise. I mean, what he says is not true. For it has become clear to us that it is never just to harm anyone. — 335e

(emphasis added)

Who does "the one who said it" refer to? As I read it, what is at issue is the distinction between what is said and what is meant or understood. Socrates says that the poets speak in riddles. (322b) We do not know what Simonides said or did not say, and so cannot comment on what he meant. But whether or not he said this, the question remains as to how we are to understand it.

You say:

In other words, since the definition is false it cannot have originated from a wise person, and since Simonides et al were wise, it follows that it did not originate from them. — Jamal

We cannot too quickly conclude that either Simonides is not wise or if wise did not say this. It may be our own wisdom or lack of wisdom that is being called into question.

You go on to say:

On the surface, Socrates, not content with having refuted the definition, is rather facilely associating it with real injustice, and we get the feeling that he has just made it up. In doing so he is probably suggesting that the definition is merely the biased opinion of self-serving rulers. — Jamal

I think it is a conventional opinion, one shared by conventional men such as Cephalus and Polemarchus. Socrates questions the the conventional understanding. It is, however, the starting point.

Now, at this point in the Republic, the problem with poets has not yet come up — Jamal

But it has been brought up! Cephalus opinions about such things as justice are shaped by the poets. Consider how frequently the poets are appealed to.

Since nobody in the conversation seems to know for sure where the definition originated, and since Socrates is well aware of this and does not even pretend that he knows for sure himself, he could be intentionally associating the poets with tyrants and injustice without actually saying so. — Jamal

This connection requires textual support. Again, I see the question of origination as secondary to how it is to be understood. The truth or falsity of what is said does not depend on who might have first said it.

And his good character. He says that wealth is not enough. — Jamal

Agreed, wealth is not enough, but we should not understate the importance it has for Cephalus. As he says:

Indeed, the possession of wealth has a major role to play in ensuring that one does not cheat or deceive someone intentionally,

He himself brings into question how just he would have been if he were not wealthy.. But, of course, as I am sure he knows, it is not sufficient. There are plenty of wealthy people who do intentionally cheat and deceive people.

The other thing he cites is fear of punishment in death. Something that he never took seriously when he was younger. As far as I know we do not know anything about him prior to his old age. We do not know to what extent fear of death might have changed his behavior.

I will let Cephalus speak in my defense:

For mark my words, Socrates,” said he, “once someone begins to think he is about to die, fears and concerns occur to him about issues that had not occurred to him previously. For the stories told about people in Hades, that someone who has acted unjustly whilst here must pay a penalty when he arrives there, stories that were laughable before then, torment his soul at that stage, for fear they might be true. (330d-e)

Indeed, the possession of wealth has a major role to play in ensuring that one does not cheat or deceive someone intentionally, or again, depart to that other world in fear because some sacrifices are still owed to a god, or some money to another person.

(331b)

Cephalus has been freed from eros,

a raving and savage slave master

(329c)

but has not escaped the fear of death.

He is, by all appearances, a gentleman. To the extent that he is just, he credits his wealth. The gentleman is not at fault for not being a philosopher, but the philosopher’s understanding and practice of justice differs significantly. The philosopher's being just does not depend on wealth, and because he is just he does not fear death.

Shorter answer:

The question of whether a saying or definition should be credited to someone who is wise is secondary to the question of what the saying or definition means:

Well,” said I, “it certainly is not easy to disbelieve Simonides, for he is a wise and divine man. But although you probably appreciate what precisely he is saying, Polemarchus, I do not understand it.

(331e)

Socrates attempts to clarify what Simonides means:

Then when Simonides says that giving back what is owed is just, he is not referring to this sort of thing but to something else.

(332a)

He goes on:

“In that case,” said I, “it seems Simonides was speaking in riddles, as poets do, when he spoke of what is just. For apparently he had in mind that what is just is this: ‘giving back what is appropriate to each’. But to this he gave the name ‘what is owed’".

(332b-c)

What is owed and what is appropriate are not the same thing. This is a crucial distinction:

So, if someone maintains that it is just to give back what is owed to each, and by this he means that harm is owed to enemies by the just man, and benefit is owed to friends, the person saying this was not wise for he did not speak the truth, since it has become evident to us that there are no circumstances in which it is just to harm anyone. [Emphasis added.]

(335e)

There is a shift from what Socrates thinks Simonides meant to what:

… anyone [who] maintains that Simonides, or Bias, or Pittacus, or any other wise and blessed man, has said so.

(335e)

Prior to this Socrates asks:

“Then tell me,” said I, “you, the inheritor of the argument, what do you say Simonides says, and says correctly,about justice?”

(331e)


This leads to the longer answer.

There are several themes that are developed at the beginning of the dialogue including the questions of persuasion and inheritance. We need to take a step back.

Socrates asks Polemarchus :

Could we not persuade you that you should let us leave?

(327e)

The question of persuasion and its means is of central importance. On the one hand, it is behind both the arguments of Thrasymachus and the other sophists as well as those of Socrates and the philosophers, and, on the other, of the poet’s stories of men and gods. The stories of the poets are an inherited means of persuasion manifest as belief. From an early age children are told the poet’s stories.

Socrates asks:

Cephalus,” said I, “did you inherit most of what you have, or did you acquire it yourself?”

(330a)

In response Cephalus says:

As a money-maker, I am sort of midway between my grandfather and my father. For my grandfather, whose name I bear, having inherited about as much wealth as I have now acquired, made many times as much as this again. Then my own father, Lysanias, reduced the wealth below its present value, while I would be pleased if I could leave just as much as I inherited to these lads here, and a little more besides.

(330b)

Polemarchus inherits his father’s argument regarding justice. (331e) What will he make of it? Will he become more just or less just than his father? What shapes his idea of justice? Does he depend on the wisdom of the poets or those who make arguments?

This is reflected in what Socrates says next:

Well,” said I, “it certainly is not easy to disbelieve Simonides, for he is a wise and divine man. But although you probably appreciate what precisely he is saying, Polemarchus, I do not understand it.

(331e)

It is not simply a matter of inheriting wisdom, as if it can be passed down from generation to generation as wise sayings, but of how one is to understand what is said and how one makes use of it. In other words, it is not simply either the poets or the philosophers but of how one understands and makes use of the stories of the poets and the arguments offered by sophists and philosophers.

The opening exchange with Polemarchus asks about the connection between persuasion and power. Socrates accuses the sophists of making the weaker argument the stronger. It is, however, not at all clear what is to stand as the weaker or stronger argument. Thrasymachus reduces justice to power. Argument is regarded as a means to power. The power of argument, however, depends, as Polemarchus points out, on whether someone is willing to listen. Otherwise it is powerless.

Cephalus believes his money is power. It is used in his old age to protect himself. His only interest in being just is self-serving. He is persuaded by the fear engendered by the poet’s stories of what will happen to him when he dies.

We might ask whether Socrates is wise in claiming that we should not harm our enemies. How can one win a war without harming his enemies? It is at this point that Thrasymachus enters the argument. What Socrates means is put on hold but remains in the background. Socrates agrees in part with Thrasymachus. He does not deny that there is an element of self-interest in being just. He attempts to persuade Glaucon and Adeimantus that being just is itself a benefit, both to oneself and to others. To this end, he acts the poet, weaving stories together with arguments.