Trump is not a supporter of sex offenses — Bob Ross

He is a sex offender, and not because he engages is consensual acts that some might find offensive.

Cultural relativism is a form of moral realism such that moral judgments are evaluated relative to the objective legal or moral law of the society-at-hand; whereas being vested in the national-interests is just the idea that you should be interested in your nation prospering so that you can too. — Bob Ross

You seem to have missed the point. If your nation is one of those:

obviously degenerate, inferior societies ... like Talibanian Afghanistan, North Korea, Iran, China, India ...[,/quote]

then being interested in in its prospering it to be interested in degenerate laws and governance. If it is morally defensible because it is your nation of society is cultural relativism.
— Bob Ross

A meritocracy guided by secular values (e.g., of rights, liberties, etc.). — Bob Ross

Again, you seem to have missed the point. A meritocracy guided by secular values may be your preference but others may hold to religious values as superior, that it is religious values that have elevated us above the savagery, cruelty, and viciousness of secularism.

Arguably, it is already a plutocracy and an oligarchy. — Bob Ross

It has been at times but there have been correctives such as ant-trust laws and regulations. With Musk in Trump's pocket we are headed in a direction much more severe then what we have now.

upon deeper reflection, this is utterly self-undermining. — Bob Ross

Exactly my point!

In order to argue for this, we would have to claim that it is actually good to let people pursue — Bob Ross

Do you mean something like life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness?

The human good is what grounds, in my theory, why it is actually good to let people pursue their own good. It is just. — Bob Ross

In your theory. You should not let your theory blind you to the very real tensions between the individual and the society. One troubling example: the rights of the woman versus the rights of the fetus versus the interest of the state and the country.

... if we could take over North Korea right now without grave consequences (such as nuclear war), then it is obviously in our duty to do so—and this is a form of imperialism. Why would you not be a Western supremacist? — Bob Ross

For one, because of the consequences

:lol: — Bob Ross

You do not know that we could take over North Korea without grave consequences. This points to a problem with ideological wish fulfillment.

Two, because supremacy, whether it is some version of Western supremacy or some other, has more to do with power and domination than with ideology

Yes, and you need that. This is exactly the absurdity with hyper-liberalism: it is hyper-tolerant. — Bob Ross

There is a difference between liberalism and "hyper-liberalism". The right to national self-determinism is not hyper-liberalism. The use of power and domination to get a sovereign nation to conform to your ideology is hyper-imperialism.

Are you really going to say that Hitler didn’t have inferior values to Ghandi? — Bob Ross

Interesting example since Gandhi was opposed to the very thing you say is needed - power and domination. I agree that toleration should have its limits, but the problem remains as to what ought to be tolerated? And here we encounter the kinds of differences of opinion and values that is not covered by Hitler vs Gandhi. Should gay marriage. be tolerated? Hitler would say no. I don't know what Gandhi would have said.In any case, there is no clear line between tolerance and intolerance, and that is obscured when you posit extremes.

Three, because ideology itself poses a grave threat when it is imposed through action. The lines between persuasion and coercion, no matter now noble one's intentions, blur whenever there is an attempt to move from an ideal to an actuality via political action.

All I got out of this is that it would be difficult to implement; which I do not deny. — Bob Ross

Do you not get that the lines between persuasion and coercion can blur when it comes to implementing an ideology? Consider communist ideologies and what has been regarded as needed to achieve them. An ideology and what has been done to achieve it must be considered together.

By "post-truth" I mean to refer to liars and parasites who neither value nor care bout truth and honesty. — tim wood

I think the problem is more pernicious and extends beyond liars and parasites. Post-truth is cynical nihilism. On the one hand, the doubt or denial that the truth exists, and on the other, the rejection of the value of truth. Instead of truth there are versions of things to be accepted or rejected. Instead of just facts, there are "alternative facts", which in truth are alternatives to facts.

There is also the assumption that what believes is the truth. Evidence is rejected because it must be false because it contradicts the beliefs held as truth. This might be called patriotic nihilism.

Following the election Robert Reich remarked that we should stop pretending Trump is not who we are. Is Trump who we are? Has Trump always been who we are?

and there is such a thing as having a view which should not be tolerated (e.g., a supporter of sex offenses). — Bob Ross

One will become president of the US in a few months!

The first, in the sense that whatever nation you belong to you must have a vested interest in its flourishing and protection against other nations — Bob Ross

What is you are a citizen of one of those inferior nations? Why must we have a vested interest in its flourishing. How does this differ from cultural relativism?

, if your country has substantially better politics than other ones, you should have a pride in it and want to expand its values to the more inferior ones (which leads to imperialism). — Bob Ross

What is the measure of "substantially better"? Which is substantially better, a theocracy or a emocratic republic? If your values are based on some version of the will of God, then theocracy Trumps democracy. Unless, of course, the administration is playing both sides. What we end up with is where the US is clearly headed plutocracy.

Some societies are so obviously structured in a way antithetical to the human good ... — Bob Ross

While I share your concern with the human good, there has always been a tension in Liberalism between the human good and what individuals may regard as their own good. Some regard the notion of a 'human good' as antithetical to the rights of the individual.

... if we could take over North Korea right now without grave consequences (such as nuclear war), then it is obviously in our duty to do so—and this is a form of imperialism. Why would you not be a Western supremacist? — Bob Ross

For one, because of the consequences. Two, because supremacy, whether it is some version of Western supremacy or some other, has more to do with power and domination than with ideology. Three, because ideology itself poses a grave threat when it is imposed through action. The lines between persuasion and coercion, no matter now noble one's intentions, blur whenever there is an attempt to move from an ideal to an actuality via political action.

... science cannot absorb philosophy into its inquiry, whereas philosophy can set the terms for discussing how science is done. — J

Philosophy is for Hegel science. It differs from the natural sciences in that its subject matter is not an object that is other than the subject. It is the science of the whole, which included the thinking subject.

From the thread on the preface to the Phenomenology:

3. … the subject matter is not exhausted in its aims; rather, it is exhaustively treated when it is worked out. Nor is the result which is reached the actual whole itself; rather, the whole is the result together with the way the result comes to be.

The whole of the subject matter includes not just the result of what has been worked out but the working out itself, which is to say, the working itself out.

… differentiatedness is instead the limit of the thing at stake. It is where the thing which is at stake ceases, or it is what that thing is not.

The thing at stake, the subject matter, die Sache selbst, is not a thing-in-itself, Ding an sich. In other words, it is not something to be treated as a subject does an object that stands apart.

Instead of dwelling on the thing at issue and forgetting itself in it, that sort of knowing is always grasping at something else.

That is, instead of standing apart one must stand within. The term ‘subject matter’ rather than ‘object matter’ is suggestive.

5. The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of that truth.
The truth exists only in the system of knowledge of the truth.

To participate in the collaborative effort at bringing philosophy nearer to the form of science – to bring it nearer to the goal where it can lay aside the title of love of knowing and be actual knowing – is the task I have set for myself.

Hegel sees himself as a participant in a collaborative effort with those who are lovers of knowledge, that is, the philosophers who preceded him, of whom it can be said that they are not actual knowers. To the extent he succeeds he will be the first to actually know.

The inner necessity that knowing should be science lies in the nature of knowing, and the satisfactory explanation for this inner necessity is solely the exposition of philosophy itself.

Hegel’s task is the exposition of the inner necessity of knowing, that knowing is the system of science.

However, external necessity, insofar as this is grasped in a universal manner and insofar as personal contingencies and individual motivations are set aside, is the same as the internal necessity which takes on the shape in which time presents the existence of its moments. To demonstrate that it is now time for philosophy to be elevated into science would therefore be the only true justification of any attempt that has this as its aim, because it would demonstrate the necessity of that aim, and, at the same time, it would be the realization of the aim itself.

The exposition of the inner necessity is externally realized in time, and Hegel will demonstrate that now is with his philosophy the time for philosophy to become actual knowing.

Except, as above, that all philosophical discourse resists being absorbed/reduced into a different discourse. Or at least that's the possibility we're looking at here. — J

To the contrary, much of philosophy is modeled on the success of science.

Consider also the proliferation of the philosophy of science and its disciplines, such as biology, medicine, political and cognitive science. Then there is philosophy of religion, of literature, law, environment.

The division between philosophy and literature is not so clear.

More an attempt to tease out some possibilities as we consider what, if anything, is special about philosophical discourse. — J

The only thing special about philosophical discourse is that we cannot identify anything that is special about it, that is, there is nothing unique that all philosophical discourse has in common that distinguishes it from other modes of discourse. But that might be something that is special about it.

I'm not sure what it even means to be without limits? Is this a capacity we have ... — Tom Storm

I think all of our capacities have limits, except perhaps for our capacity to deceive ourselves. I can't say what those limits are, but they fall short of omniscience and omnipotence.

Philosophy could be called highest because it is without presuppositions. — Leontiskos

Such presuppositions are the death knell of philosophy.

Inquiry stops with philosophy because being -- what there is -- does not extend beyond what can be reflected upon. — J

Why would you assume that the limits of human thought are the limits of being? Perhaps what is is without limits.

So I'm interpreting W as saying that when I imagine calculating there appear to be nothing that fills the blank in "I calculated by..." (except possibly imagining that I was calculating) — Ludwig V

I take him to be saying that the question: "What I am calculating by?" is misleading. There is not this something that is analogous to the hand or mouth. I imagine. I calculate. In some cases this involves the hand or mouth, but in others there is not some other agent or thing to be identified. And, of course, as you point out, it is not the hand that does the calculating.

The temptation is not to treat words as objects, but to assume that there must be some object that corresponds to the word:

But it is the use of the substantive "time" which mystifies us.

(6)

This is worth repeating:

We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.

(1)

When we look for the meaning of the word 'cow', for example, there is no inexplicable temptation to treat the word as an object. But there is an object, an animal that we can point to that explains the meaning of the word 'cow'. We cannot, however, explain the meaning of 'time' by pointing to something. There is no thing that corresponds to it.

Both 'cow' and 'time' are substantives, but grammatically they do not function in the same way. When the grammar is understood we are no longer misled by the language of substantives.

Is doing a calculation with pencil and paper a mental or a physical activity? — Ludwig V

Wittgenstein takes up this question in the PI:

236. Calculating prodigies who arrive at the correct result but can’t say how. Are we to say that they do not calculate? (A family of cases.)

(364) Is calculating in the imagination in some sense less real than calculating on paper? It is real calculating-in-the-head. Is it similar to calculating on paper? I don’t know whether to call it similar. Is a bit of white paper with black lines on it similar to a human body?

His use of "agent" here is unusual.When I think by writing, the agent is my hands. When I think by imagining, there is not agent - for some reason the obvious agent - me - doesn't count. — Ludwig V

It does count. As he says, "we think by writing", "we think by speaking" (6). But then:

... and if we think by imagining signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that thinks.

(6)

There is no agent here that is analogous to the hand that writes or mouth that speaks. We might say that in this case it is the mind that imagines, but we do not think with the mind in a way that is analogous to thinking with the hand or mouth.

We are misled by language, or, more precisely, the grammar of our language, when we regard 'mind' as we do 'hand' or 'mouth'. Grammatically all are substantives. They are nouns. As such we may be led to assume that they all name particular things.

What we must do is: understand its working, its grammar, e.g. see what relation this grammar has to that of the expression "we think with our mouth", or "we think with a pencil on a piece of paper".

Perhaps the main reason why we are so strongly inclined to talk of the head as the locality of our thoughts is this: the existence of the words "thinking" and "thought" alongside of the words denoting (bodily) activities, such as writing, speaking, etc., makes us look for an activity, different from these but analogous to them, corresponding to the word "thinking". When words in our ordinary language have prima facie analogous grammars we are inclined to try to interpret them analogously; i.e. we try to make the analogy hold throughout.

(7)

What does Wittgenstein mean when he says?

I can give you no agent that thinks.

(6)

He is not denying that we think, but rather that the mind is the agent that thinks:

It is misleading then to talk of thinking as of a "mental activity". … This activity is performed by the hand, when we think by writing; by the mouth and larynx, when we think by speaking; and if we think by imagining signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that thinks.

(6) [emphasis added]

He continues:

If then you say that in such cases the mind thinks, I would only draw your attention to the fact that you are using a metaphor, that here the mind is an agent in a different sense from that in which the hand can be said to be the agent in writing.

(6-7)

Elsewhere he says:

I really do think with my pen, because my head often knows nothing about what my hand is writing.

(CV 17)

This is, of course, metaphorical. Contrary to the Tractatus, however, metaphors although not propositions of natural science, are no longer regarded as nonsense. The logical structure of language and thought that was fundamental to the Tractatus has been rejected.

We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.

(1)

A substantive is some thing named:

We feel that we can't point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something.

(1)

What is at issue is a critique of the Tractarian metaphysics of mind. The logical necessity of the connection between names and the existence of corresponding objects, and, by extension, propositions and facts.

One difficulty which strikes us is that for many words in our language there do not seem to be ostensive definitions; e.g. for such words as "one", "number", "not", etc.

(1)

This is followed immediately by the question:

Need the ostensive definition itself be understood?--Can't the ostensive definition be misunderstood?

That “tove” can ostensibly mean pencil or round or wood might seem to be veering off on a tangent, but it raises a related question about the logical connection between language and the world. Language lacks the precision assumed in the Tractatus. That 'tove' means ‘this’ (pencil)and not ‘that’ (wood) is something that is clarified in practice by the activity of using language.

This activity may involve mental processes but is not reducible to them.

We are tempted to think that the action of language consists of two parts; an inorganic part, the handling of signs, and an organic part, which we may call understanding these signs, meaning them, interpreting them, thinking. These latter activities seem to take place in a queer kind of medium, the mind; and the mechanism of the mind, the nature of which, it seems, we don't quite understand, can bring about effects which no material mechanism could.

(3)

Why does the mind seem to be a queer kind of medium? This happens when the mind is taken to be a substantive, a thing with its own mechanism, but a mechanism that can bring about effects that no material mechanism could.

But here we are making two mistakes. For what struck us as being queer about thought
and thinking was not at all that it had curious effects which we were not yet able to explain (causally). Our problem, in other words, was not a scientific one; but a muddle felt
as a problem.

(5-6)

Consistent with the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintains the distinction between philosophy and natural science.

Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us.

(6)

Is it Plato or the translator? — Amity

It is Plato.He uses these two different words. As Paine pointed out, the fault of the translator lies with those translators who fail to distinguish between these terms. I think Plato intends for us to try and work though the connection.

Where is the overlap in meaning? — Amity

Doing certain things will cause me trouble and pain. If I do them anyway I am being heedless or careless or unmindful. We often fail to learn from our mistakes. Have we forgotten what happened in the past?

We need to be clear on what is happening at the river Lethe. — Amity

I would like to, but I forgot.

What do you think is the purpose of its meaning 'forgetfulness' - in its place just before the re-birth. — Amity

It explains why we do not remember what happened. Er remembers because he did not drink from the river.

What do you think is the purpose - at this spot - if its meaning is 'heedless' or similar? — Amity

We can avoid being heedless by keeping to our proper measure in all things. Determining what that is has something to do with knowing who we are, which includes knowing who or what we are not.

We will have to agree to disagree that there can only be one meaning: per you saying: "I see only one river and one meaning or understanding, given the context."
— Paine

Perhaps we need a negotiator? — Amity

Plato uses two different words λήθη (621c) and ἀμέλητος (621a) when referring to the same thing, the river. Heraclitus might say it is not the same river but by this he means something different. Although we might ask him whether we should use the same name if the river is not the same.

λήθη, forgetfulness, and ἀμέλητος, heedlessness, carelessness, or unmindfulness, do not mean the same thing but there is an overlap in meaning, just as there is with the three terms used in translation.

Lethe and Aletheia have the same root. We might think of Lethe as having forgotten the truth, and Aletheia as remembering or recollecting the truth. There is, however, not a single truth but overlapping truths at issue. The truth of what has happened, the truth of the soul, the truth about yourself.

And the almost obsessive focus on the degree of 'justice' of the sou — Amity

Socrates' task as set out at the beginning of Book 2 is to persuade them, as Glaucon puts it:

that it is better in every way to be just rather than unjust

(357a-b)

So, it is about 'forgetfulness' not 'carelessness'. — Amity

It is about the connection between them and with philosophy as phronesis (practical wisdom, prudence, thoughtfulness)

the role of Lethe set over against the role of Mnemosyne (or Memory). — Paine

We should not forget that in the Phaedrus there is the plain of Aletheia or truth. (248b)

That suggests to me that the role of recollection is principally the activity of the living soul. — Paine

I agree. In the Phaedo the distinction between recollection and being reminded are blurred:

'Yes, and besides, Socrates,' Cebes replied, 'there's also that argument you're always putting forward, that our learning is actually nothing but recollection; according to that too, if it's true, what we are now reminded of we must have learned at some former time. (72e)

'But if that doesn't convince you, Simmias, then see whether maybe you agree if you look at it this way. Apparently you doubt whether what is called "learning" is recollection?'

'I don't doubt it,' said Simmias; 'but I do need to undergo just what the argument is about, to be "reminded"

...

'Then do we also agree on this point: that whenever knowledge comes to be present in this sort of way, it is recollection?”

He goes on to give an example of recollection:

'

Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.'

(73b-d)

The question is why must they drink the water. — Amity

It is by necessity. Given the conditions the souls all get thirsty. There is not other source to drink from.

If you mean why does the story include this, I think it is a response to the anticipated question of why we don't know what happens in death.

No mention of a River of Heedlessness. — Amity

Heedlessness is Horan's translation. Bloom translates it as carelessness. The Greek is ἀμέλητος It means, according to Liddell and Scott. An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, not to be cared for.

See the note in the Perseus translation you linked to:
2. In later literature it is the river that is called Lethe.

The later literature calls the river of ἀμέλητος the river of Lethe (Λήθη)

I see that Paine has edited his post to include this.

Why does it matter if it is the same river? — Amity

I do not think Plato uses words heedlessly or carelessly. To say why it matters we must first make note of the difference terms. Someone who forgets might act heedlessly, but one might act heedlessly without forgetting.

Doesn't it depend on the definition? — Amity

If you mean the definition of philosophy, I am going off of what is said beginning at 618e through 619e.

Hmmm. The word 'actually' bothers me. It can mean 'according to one's beliefs, views or feelings'.

There is no certainty that we can be so thoroughly objective. — Amity

Actually is used to mean how things are as opposed to one's beliefs, views, or feelings. More to the point, as opposed to how things are represented in images.

What is the message from either Plato or Socrates?
To be good, to care, to think, to be wise, to be just, to study and practise philosophy? — Amity

Yes, all of the above.

Does knowing ourselves save us from ourselves? — Amity

If to know yourself is to know what is and is not good for you then you are saved unless you are heedless and do things that are contrary to what is good for you.

If no vessel can hold the river's water, then how can it be properly measured? — Amity

I took this to mean that the whole of heedlessness is greater than what any vessel can hold. The heedlessness of souls is without limit.

What is a 'certain measure'? — Amity

I am not sure. Perhaps enough so that we forget what has transpired but not so much that we forget yourself.

To be 'saved by wisdom' or 'good sense' - does it take philosophy? — Amity

I think that this is what he means by philosophy.

Or are some born with it? — Amity

Some will be born with it if they did not drink too much.

We must pay the utmost attention to how each of us will be a seeker and student who learns and finds out, from anywhere he can, who it is who will make him capable and knowledgeable enough to choose the best possible life, always and everywhere, by distinguishing between a good life and a degenerate one.

(618 b-c)

How wise is it to keep reading Plato - as opposed to any other philosophical, religious, psychological texts or works of literature? Knowledge of the sciences? — Amity

Reading Plato need not preclude reading other things. In part it depends on what appeals and resonates with you.

The Plain and River of Forgetfulness or Lethe

Because of the heat and harsh conditions of the Plain of Forgetfulness it is necessary for the souls to drink from the River of Heedlessness. (621a) In his closing comments Socrates refers to the river as the river of Forgetfulness rather than the river of Heedlessness. What is the connection between heedlessness and forgetfulness?

Those who are prudent are not heedless. They are made prudent by the study and practice of philosophy.

… by looking to the nature of the soul, and calling the life that leads soul to become more unjust, the worse life, and the one that leads it to become more just, the better life. All other studies he will set aside, for we have seen that in life and after death this is the supreme choice.

(618e)

Philosophy is about self-knowledge. Forgetfulness is forgetting yourself. To act heedlessly is to forget yourself. Human wisdom, knowledge of ignorance, is not the divine knowledge of the gods. It is, more moderately, phronesis not sophia.

Socrates tells Glaucon:

“And that, dear Glaucon, is how the story was saved and not lost, and it may save us too if we heed its advice, and we shall safely cross over the River of Forgetfulness without defiling our soul.

(621b-c)

Socrates began the story by saying:

Once upon a time …

(614b)

Starting with this fairytale opening and by telling us that the body of Er, unlike the other bodies, had not begun to decompose, we have reason to doubt the truth of the story. But

… knowing things as they actually are. (595b) — Fooloso4

is limited by things as we can actually know them. We cannot know things as they are after we die but we can come to know ourselves as we actually are. The mythological truth lies in recollecting and heeding the message of the story. In this way we may be saved.

One aspect that is often ignored is that we are historied and encultured beings.

Looking back I see that I did not include quotation marks for the passage from the Laws. I have edited it.

I took Lachesis' role to be that once the choice of a daimon and of a life is made by the soul, that choice becomes part of the fate of that soul. There is a connection here with something Socrates tells his friends in the Phaedo:

... all who actually engage in philosophy aright are practising nothing other than dying and being dead.

(64a)

The best preparation for making that fateful choice is something you can do now.

With regard to virtue or excellence, it too is a choice:

... each will have more of her or less of her, as he honours her or dishonours her.

(617e)

This does not make sense to me. If people were in heaven, then they will already have been judged as good. Even if their virtue is through habit, it is part of their character, formed and informed by life experience and doesn't mean 'without philosophy'. — Amity

One can be brought up with good habits, but that does not mean that philosophy is part of their education. Good habits do not preclude philosophy, but may not be the result of philosophy.

'untrained in sufferings' — Amity

Perhaps given their wealth and good fortune Cephalus and Polemarchus are untrained in suffering. Socrates repeats a common assumption to Cephalus:

... for they say that wealthy people have consolation in abundance.

(329e)

Cephalus agrees and goes on to say:

Indeed, the possession of wealth has a major role to play in ensuring that one does not cheat or deceive someone intentionally ...

(331b)

No academic philosophers required. — Amity

I agree. As I understand it, what is meant by philosophy here is something different. I will have more to say on this in connection to the River of Forgetfulness.

I don't see where Plato's concept differs from ours. — Amity

In the Timaeus necessity is called the wandering or errant cause. (48a) The necessary connection between necessity (ananke) and chance (tyke) is discussed in Plato’s Laws:

Fire, water, earth and air all exist by nature and chance, they say, and none of these exist by artifice. And the bodies that then come after these, those of the earth, sun, moon and stars, have come into being through these four, entirely soulless entities. They move by chance, each according to its particular power, in such a way that they come together, combining somehow with their own, hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with hard and so on for any mixture of opposites that is produced, of necessity, according to chance. In this way, based upon these processes the whole heaven has come into existence and everything under heaven, including animals and indeed all the plants too, and from these all the seasons have arisen, not through intelligence, they say, or through the agency of a god, or through artifice, but, according to them, through nature and chance.

(889b-c) Emphasis added.

The Spindle of Necessity or Ananke.

In the eponymous dialogue Timaeus he identifies two kinds of cause, intelligence and necessity, that is, Nous and Ananke. Given the earlier emphasis in the Republic on the Forms, the introduction of ananke is both surprising and significant. Here at the end we must, by necessity, begin again. Forms and their imperfect images do not tell the whole of the story.

Plato’s concept of necessity differs from ours. What is by necessity is without nous or intellect. Necessary causes can act contrary to intelligible causes. What is fixed and unchanging cannot serve as the cause of a world of change, contingency, and chance. It should be noted how often necessity occurs in this story. The various cases helps to give us a better sense of the scope of what necessity means and what it entails

The Fates, Lachesis, Clotho and Atropos are the daughters of Necessity.The are respectively what was, what is, and what will be. Clotho, with a touch of her right hand, helps turn the outer revolution of the spindle, pausing from time to time, while Atropos, with her left hand, does the same for the inner revolutions, and Lachesis lends a hand to each revolution in turn, with each hand in turn.

In less figurative terms, by necessity, what was, the past, influences what is and what will be. What is, the present, influences what will be. The influence of what was on what will be is not eliminated by what is. In other words, by necessity we cannot undo what has been done.

Each soul chooses a daimon and also a pattern of life. (617e) The daimon is the guardian of that life. (620d) Nothing is said about choosing a daimon, on what basis it is chosen, or how closely it reflects the soul that chooses it.

Before choosing a life the souls are told that one who chooses wisely will choose a life midway between extremes. In this way a human being attains the utmost happiness. (619 a-b) They are warned that:

‘Even for the person who comes up last, but chooses intelligently and lives in a disciplined way, an acceptable life rather than a bad one, awaits. The first to choose must not be careless, and the last must not be despondent.’

(619b)

The first to choose by lot chooses extreme tyranny. (619b) We might think that this person had led a life of hardship and oppression and now wants to be on the giving rather than receiving end, but:

He was one of the people who had come from the heaven and had lived his previous life under an orderly system of government, where any share of excellence he had came from habit in the absence of philosophy. And, generally speaking, those who had come from the heaven were more likely to be caught out in this way, since they had no training in dealing with suffering, while those who had come out of the earth, for the most part, having had experience of suffering themselves, and having seen others suffer, did not make their choices in a hurry. This, and the element of chance from the lot, is why most souls undergo an interchange of what is good and what is bad.

(619c-d)

The first to choose had chosen quickly out of stupidity and greed. He came to lament his choice. He blames chance and the spirits, everything but himself. (619 b-c)

Yet if someone were to engage in philosophy, consistently, in a sound manner, whenever he comes back to live in this world, unless he is among the last to choose, it is likely not only that he would be happy whilst here, but also that his journey from here to there, and back here again, would be a smooth journey through the heaven, rather than rough and underground.

(619d-e)

The last to choose is Homer’s Odysseus:

When his turn came, he remembered all his former troubles, gave up the love of honour he had held previously, and went about for a long time seeking the life of an ordinary man with a private station. And he found it with difficulty, lying about somewhere, neglected by everyone else. And he said, when he saw it, that he would have done the same thing even had he been given first choice, and he chose it gladly.

(620 c-d)

Unlike most souls who made their choice based upon the habits of the previous life, (620a) Odysseus now chooses a life of moderation. The suggestion seems to be that although he has chosen last he is an example of someone who has attained phronesis, someone who engaged in philosophy, consistently, in a sound manner. He has become, so to speak, a philosophical hero. Put differently, Socrates has transformed Homer. The soul that was Odysseus comes home again after his journey from there to here.

The polls could change. Thump might do or say something disastrous. — Baden

It does not seem as though there is anything he might say or do that would significantly change the polls. It is not as if, even with the evidence, Trump supporters, backed by his propaganda machine, will believe it or not discount it because they think other things are more important.

According to FiveThirtyEight

“Polls’ true utility isn’t in telling us who will win, but rather in roughly how close a race is — and, therefore, how confident we should be in the outcome.” Historically, candidates leading polls by at least 20 points have won 99 percent of the time. But candidates leading polls by less than 3 points have won just 55 percent of the time. In other words, races within 3 points in the polls are little better than toss-ups — something we’ve been shouting from the rooftops for years.

Because I believe in science ... — Baden

There are too many variables for there to be a scientific determination based on the polls of the outcome of the election.

Rather than bet, I'll hold on to my money. I might need it.

Appreciated but no apologies necessary.

From my last response to your thread "With philosophy, poetry and politics on my mind..."
I think in discussions of Plato we are doing at least two things:

1) Discussing ideas and issues that arise in the part of the dialogue.we are reading.
2) Discovering how those ideas and issues are addressed by Plato in the larger context of the whole of the dialogue and other dialogues.

We all start with the first. We might do this without ever going too far into the second.

I'll add that those involved in the dialogue do not know where it will go or how it will end. We can imagine ourselves to be participants of the dialogue and add our responses to what is being said.

I decided rather than continue with Fooloso4' Book 10 discussion that I need to read the whole Republic. — Amity

I think in discussions of Plato we are doing at least two things:

1) Discussing ideas and issues that arise in the part of the dialogue we are reading.
2) Discovering how those ideas and issues are addressed by Plato in the larger context of the whole of the dialogue and other dialogues.

We all start with the first. We might do this without ever going too far into the second.

An equality of all possible fates. — Paine

An interesting point. Socrates says:

And this, dear Glaucon, it seems is the moment of extreme danger for a human being, and because of this we must neglect all other studies save one. We must pay the utmost attention to how each of us will be a seeker and student who learns and finds out, from anywhere he can, who it is who will make him capable and knowledgeable enough to choose the best possible life ...

(618b-c)

Republic V contains two revolutionary proposals for the social organisation of the ideal state — The Role of Women in Plato's Republic - C. C. W. Taylor

I question this assumption. The purpose, as stated at the beginning of Book 2, is not to make an ideal state, but to persuade those listening that it is better in every way to be just rather than unjust. (357a-b)

Adeimantus says:

And no one, so far, either in poetry or in ordinary language, has described in a sufficiently detailed argument what each does, itself, by its own power, when present in the soul of its possessors, unnoticed by gods and humans, an argument according to which injustice is the worst of all the evils that any soul can have within itself, while justice is the greatest good.For if you had all described it in these terms from the beginning, and convinced us of this from our earliest years, we would not have been acting as one another’s guardians for fear we might behave unjustly, but each of us would himself be his own guardian, for fear that by acting unjustly he would have to live with the worst evil of all.’

(366e-367a)

In other words, the ideal city would be one in which each acted as his own guardian to assure that he is just while shunning injustice as the greatest evil. In such a city there would be no guardian class.

The city Socrates creates in speech suffers the same problem as the bed made by a maker of images. You can't sleep in this bed or live in this image of a city. In addition, far from being ideal such a city is in its first iteration first, in Glaucon's words, a city of pigs. (372d) Glaucon wants a more conventional city, one with couches, tables, relishes, and desserts. (372e) Socrates goes along in the making of this "luxurious city", but although it accommodates some of our human desires, it it far from ideal. Even with the compromises away from what Socrates calls the "true city", a "healthy one" (372e), it is not one that any of us would want to live it.

Rather than a proposal for an ideal state, it is anti-idealist. Whatever we might imagine the ideal to be, its implementation involves great injustice. Socrates starts as we must with what is there to work with. Human beings with all their flaws and weaknesses.

Did you not think the missing sections to be important as to an understanding and assessment of Book 10's value? — Amity

It is. I will address some of it in relation to the myth of Er, but that does not mean the rest is not important.

I wanted to address what @Benkei referred to as:

misleading, and emotionally manipulative — Benkei

but got sidetracked and left it undeveloped. I touched on the first part with the distinction between leading and misleading. And with regard to emotionally manipulative, the story is Er is emotionally manipulative in so far as it brings hope to some and fear to others, with the intend to lead to the listener being just.

An intended irony or just plain sarcasm? — Amity

I think it is ironic because he does some of the same things he faults the poets for doing. The difference is his intent.

To talk of justice at the same time as comparing men and women. — Amity

In the Republic women are regarded as equal to men when it comes to the capacity to be philosophers. But, of course, this should not obscure the differences attributed to men and women.

In the myth of Er Necessity and her daughters play an important role. I will have more to say on that.

Or, as mentioned above, it may be typical Platonic irony, taken to the extreme, the boundary of hypocrisy. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think of Socratic/Platonic irony as a turning around, and this not simply as saying one thing and meaning another, but of things being more and other than they may seem to be, requiring us to look again, to look more closely, to make connections.

The discussion turns to the fate of the soul.

Are you not aware,” said I, “that our soul is immortal and is never destroyed?”

And he looked at me, in amazement, and said, “By Zeus, I am not, but are you able to say this?” (608d)

We might be surprised at Glaucon's reaction. But for Homer, to lose one’s life is to lose one’s soul. It enters Homer’s “joyless kingdom of the dead”. (Odyssey 11.105) It is this image, above all others, that Socrates quarrels with. He does not do so by replacing images with reasoned argument but by presenting a different image.

Socrates’ defense of justice depends on an afterlife, on what awaits the just and the unjust after death. (614a) This differs from his own defense in the Apology where he raises the possibility that:

… the dead person is nothing and has no perception of anything …

(40c)

Here however he ignores that possibility and presents the myth of Er, the story of a man who comes back to life. (614b)

The problem remains:

… knowing things as they actually are.

(595b)

Unlike the poetry that Socrates criticizes, the purpose of the story of Er is not to bring pleasure to the listener. (607c) It may bring hope to some, but fear to others. It may not be the truth of what happens in death but it could be considered leading rather than misleading, for:

What’s at stake is becoming good or bad, and so we should not neglect justice, and excellence in general (608b)

A way of life that does not talk about itself. — Paine

Can you say more about this?

Plato critiques poetry and the arts for being imitative, potentially misleading, and emotionally manipulative, distancing people from truth and rational understanding. — Benkei

There is another side to this that I will be addressing.

The laws of a city is an imitation of natural laws. — I like sushi

What are the natural laws? How are they known? If they are known then what is the purpose of imitation of the laws? Or is it that the law givers attempt to approximate something that is not known?

The human 'soul' is a 'natural law'. — I like sushi

What do you mean?

So, perhaps a resolution of everything before? — Amity

I don't think so. Many of the problems raises in the dialogues do not seem to have a resolution. Some might find the odd or unsatisfactory, but I think it is a reflection of life. There is much that we do not have answer for.