book 10 is weird and some would say adds nothing of much value to the whole work's argument. — Jamal

My first thought was that those who say that book 10 adds nothing of much value have not understood it. But that is not very helpful. So, instead of leaving it there I decided I will start a thread on book 10, commenting as I go along.

Again, the crucial thing is that the real Simonides is unimportant. The new element is that because of this he can function as a blank canvas onto which Plato can project his ideal poet, in contrast with Homer, who is problematic.

Simonides does not function as a blank canvas. Quite the opposite. He was too well known and influential to be treated this way. In the Protagoras Socrates says he has studied a particular ode of Simonides closely . (339b) The theme is a good or bad man and the significance of circumstances in his being the one or the other. There is an obvious parallel to Socrates discussion with Cephalus and another saying of Simonides.

Protagoras, the famous sophist, tells Socrates that Simonides like Homer and Hesiod concealed his skill as sophist in his poetry. (316d) By putting the sophists and poets together, the "ancient quarrel between the philosophy and poetry" is extended to include the quarrel between the philosopher and the sophist. What the poets and sophists have in common is a rhetorical or persuasive way of speaking whose strength can be separated from the logos.

Protagoras later says:

... a most significant part of a man’s education is proficiency in relation to poetry. This consists of being able to ... give an account of them when questioned. (338e-339a)

[Added: And again turns to Simonides.]

What the poet says requires giving an account, one which includes both explication and a defense of its soundness if it is to be accepted. (339c)

Here is the problem in Socrates own words:

For the offspring of the painter’s skill stand before us like living creatures, but if you ask them a question, they are very solemnly silent. And the same goes for written words. You might assume that they are speaking with some degree of intelligence, but if you wish to learn from them and you ask them a question about what they are saying, they just point to one thing and it is always the same.

(Phaedrus 275d)

... poets who cannot be questioned about the topic they are speaking of. And when the majority of people quote them in discussions, some say the poet means one thing while others say he means something else, and they end up discussing matters they are unable to resolve.

(Protagoras 347e)

he could be intentionally associating the poets with tyrants and injustice without actually saying so — Jamal

Your point is broadly good, but Socrates does on the surface mean to show that Simonides and other wise men could not have --- or at least probably did not --- say it. — Jamal

This is truncated. What is at issue is how what he is purported to have said is to be understood. If it is misunderstood this does not mean the a wise man could not have said it, but that what the wise man said is not understood.

Socrates says:

Then when Simonides says that giving back what is owed is just, he is not referring to this sort of thing but to something else.

(332a)

After purposing a possible answer he follows it with:

Is this what Simonides means, according to you?

(332b)

What we might regard as wise is not independent of us. If we are not wise can we adequately judge who or what is?

in the OP I took things. in a different direction with a view to uncovering a possible covert criticism. — Jamal

Yes, that is understood. But the criticism is quite overt. The larger issue at stake is the relationship between philosophy and poetry. What Socrates will later call the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry. (607b)

To suggest that Socrates is covertly claiming that the poets are tyrannical seems to overstate the case.

Socrates' goes on to say:

.. let’s declare that if someone is able to put forward an argument as to why there should be poetry and imitation, whose aim is pleasure, in a well-regulated city, we would gladly receive these back again, because we realise that we are still charmed by them.

(607c)

The argument would have to show that poetry and imitation which aims at something other than pleasure does have a place in a well-regulated city. What we should not miss is that this is precisely what Socrates himself does. He makes full use of poetry and imitation, only the aim is not simply pleasure. The cave, for example, is:

an image of our nature in its education and want of education.

(Republic 514a)

The image of the cave and the images on the cave wall originate with the poets. The education they provide goes far beyond pleasure.

Cephalus might be suggesting here that unlike many of the masses, he is not "filled with foreboding and fear," because he has not found many injustices in his life. — Jamal

Perhaps, but there is a big difference between not having acted unjustly and being unaware that one has acted unjustly. In any case, it seems he believes the poets regarding such things.

Quite how your post relates to the OP, though, I am struggling to understand, because you don't actually say (except to suggest that the question of attribution is secondary, and the bit about P's appeal to authority). — Jamal

You quote the text:

SOCRATES: So if someone tells us it is just to give to each what he is owed, and understands by this that a just man should harm his enemies and benefit his friends, the one who says it is not wise. I mean, what he says is not true. For it has become clear to us that it is never just to harm anyone. — 335e

(emphasis added)

Who does "the one who said it" refer to? As I read it, what is at issue is the distinction between what is said and what is meant or understood. Socrates says that the poets speak in riddles. (322b) We do not know what Simonides said or did not say, and so cannot comment on what he meant. But whether or not he said this, the question remains as to how we are to understand it.

You say:

In other words, since the definition is false it cannot have originated from a wise person, and since Simonides et al were wise, it follows that it did not originate from them. — Jamal

We cannot too quickly conclude that either Simonides is not wise or if wise did not say this. It may be our own wisdom or lack of wisdom that is being called into question.

You go on to say:

On the surface, Socrates, not content with having refuted the definition, is rather facilely associating it with real injustice, and we get the feeling that he has just made it up. In doing so he is probably suggesting that the definition is merely the biased opinion of self-serving rulers. — Jamal

I think it is a conventional opinion, one shared by conventional men such as Cephalus and Polemarchus. Socrates questions the the conventional understanding. It is, however, the starting point.

Now, at this point in the Republic, the problem with poets has not yet come up — Jamal

But it has been brought up! Cephalus opinions about such things as justice are shaped by the poets. Consider how frequently the poets are appealed to.

Since nobody in the conversation seems to know for sure where the definition originated, and since Socrates is well aware of this and does not even pretend that he knows for sure himself, he could be intentionally associating the poets with tyrants and injustice without actually saying so. — Jamal

This connection requires textual support. Again, I see the question of origination as secondary to how it is to be understood. The truth or falsity of what is said does not depend on who might have first said it.

And his good character. He says that wealth is not enough. — Jamal

Agreed, wealth is not enough, but we should not understate the importance it has for Cephalus. As he says:

Indeed, the possession of wealth has a major role to play in ensuring that one does not cheat or deceive someone intentionally,

He himself brings into question how just he would have been if he were not wealthy.. But, of course, as I am sure he knows, it is not sufficient. There are plenty of wealthy people who do intentionally cheat and deceive people.

The other thing he cites is fear of punishment in death. Something that he never took seriously when he was younger. As far as I know we do not know anything about him prior to his old age. We do not know to what extent fear of death might have changed his behavior.

I will let Cephalus speak in my defense:

For mark my words, Socrates,” said he, “once someone begins to think he is about to die, fears and concerns occur to him about issues that had not occurred to him previously. For the stories told about people in Hades, that someone who has acted unjustly whilst here must pay a penalty when he arrives there, stories that were laughable before then, torment his soul at that stage, for fear they might be true. (330d-e)

Indeed, the possession of wealth has a major role to play in ensuring that one does not cheat or deceive someone intentionally, or again, depart to that other world in fear because some sacrifices are still owed to a god, or some money to another person.

(331b)

Cephalus has been freed from eros,

a raving and savage slave master

(329c)

but has not escaped the fear of death.

He is, by all appearances, a gentleman. To the extent that he is just, he credits his wealth. The gentleman is not at fault for not being a philosopher, but the philosopher’s understanding and practice of justice differs significantly. The philosopher's being just does not depend on wealth, and because he is just he does not fear death.

Shorter answer:

The question of whether a saying or definition should be credited to someone who is wise is secondary to the question of what the saying or definition means:

Well,” said I, “it certainly is not easy to disbelieve Simonides, for he is a wise and divine man. But although you probably appreciate what precisely he is saying, Polemarchus, I do not understand it.

(331e)

Socrates attempts to clarify what Simonides means:

Then when Simonides says that giving back what is owed is just, he is not referring to this sort of thing but to something else.

(332a)

He goes on:

“In that case,” said I, “it seems Simonides was speaking in riddles, as poets do, when he spoke of what is just. For apparently he had in mind that what is just is this: ‘giving back what is appropriate to each’. But to this he gave the name ‘what is owed’".

(332b-c)

What is owed and what is appropriate are not the same thing. This is a crucial distinction:

So, if someone maintains that it is just to give back what is owed to each, and by this he means that harm is owed to enemies by the just man, and benefit is owed to friends, the person saying this was not wise for he did not speak the truth, since it has become evident to us that there are no circumstances in which it is just to harm anyone. [Emphasis added.]

(335e)

There is a shift from what Socrates thinks Simonides meant to what:

… anyone [who] maintains that Simonides, or Bias, or Pittacus, or any other wise and blessed man, has said so.

(335e)

Prior to this Socrates asks:

“Then tell me,” said I, “you, the inheritor of the argument, what do you say Simonides says, and says correctly,about justice?”

(331e)


This leads to the longer answer.

There are several themes that are developed at the beginning of the dialogue including the questions of persuasion and inheritance. We need to take a step back.

Socrates asks Polemarchus :

Could we not persuade you that you should let us leave?

(327e)

The question of persuasion and its means is of central importance. On the one hand, it is behind both the arguments of Thrasymachus and the other sophists as well as those of Socrates and the philosophers, and, on the other, of the poet’s stories of men and gods. The stories of the poets are an inherited means of persuasion manifest as belief. From an early age children are told the poet’s stories.

Socrates asks:

Cephalus,” said I, “did you inherit most of what you have, or did you acquire it yourself?”

(330a)

In response Cephalus says:

As a money-maker, I am sort of midway between my grandfather and my father. For my grandfather, whose name I bear, having inherited about as much wealth as I have now acquired, made many times as much as this again. Then my own father, Lysanias, reduced the wealth below its present value, while I would be pleased if I could leave just as much as I inherited to these lads here, and a little more besides.

(330b)

Polemarchus inherits his father’s argument regarding justice. (331e) What will he make of it? Will he become more just or less just than his father? What shapes his idea of justice? Does he depend on the wisdom of the poets or those who make arguments?

This is reflected in what Socrates says next:

Well,” said I, “it certainly is not easy to disbelieve Simonides, for he is a wise and divine man. But although you probably appreciate what precisely he is saying, Polemarchus, I do not understand it.

(331e)

It is not simply a matter of inheriting wisdom, as if it can be passed down from generation to generation as wise sayings, but of how one is to understand what is said and how one makes use of it. In other words, it is not simply either the poets or the philosophers but of how one understands and makes use of the stories of the poets and the arguments offered by sophists and philosophers.

The opening exchange with Polemarchus asks about the connection between persuasion and power. Socrates accuses the sophists of making the weaker argument the stronger. It is, however, not at all clear what is to stand as the weaker or stronger argument. Thrasymachus reduces justice to power. Argument is regarded as a means to power. The power of argument, however, depends, as Polemarchus points out, on whether someone is willing to listen. Otherwise it is powerless.

Cephalus believes his money is power. It is used in his old age to protect himself. His only interest in being just is self-serving. He is persuaded by the fear engendered by the poet’s stories of what will happen to him when he dies.

We might ask whether Socrates is wise in claiming that we should not harm our enemies. How can one win a war without harming his enemies? It is at this point that Thrasymachus enters the argument. What Socrates means is put on hold but remains in the background. Socrates agrees in part with Thrasymachus. He does not deny that there is an element of self-interest in being just. He attempts to persuade Glaucon and Adeimantus that being just is itself a benefit, both to oneself and to others. To this end, he acts the poet, weaving stories together with arguments.

What do you understand under the term Transcendentalist "genius?" — Jafar

The term 'genius' as used by the Transcendentalist Emerson. As expressed in the passage from Emerson quoted by T Clark:

To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart, is true for all men-that is genius.

It seems to me to be an odd mix of individualism and universalism. An overestimation of the reliability of intuition.

I wonder if we can get past these factors? — Tom Storm

I think the best we can do is be aware of them. Even when we examine our beliefs we cannot do so by stepping outside of them. Philosophical dialogue can help, but we often tend to defend our beliefs because they are our own rather then test them to allow them to stand or fall based on the strength of the argument. Easier said than done.

I too am suspicious of the idea of the Transcendentalist's "genius". It easily becomes pernicious self-flattery.

Agreed, but the purpose behind that examination and evaluation is to figure out how other's thoughts fit into your own understanding of how the world works. If they don't fit, then you can either reject them, change your own understanding, or do a little of both. — T Clark

Your tell Jafar:

... many of us here disagree with Fooloso4’s opinion. — T Clark

as if anything I said was intended to:

stop [him] from putting [his] thoughts into words — T Clark

Your claim that "the purpose behind the examination and evaluation is to figure out how other's thoughts fit into your own understanding of how the world works." is not a point of disagreement with what I said:

It is critical and evaluative. It is dialogical in a double sense - both a dialogue with others and a dialogue with oneself. — Fooloso4

You should appreciate the irony of him giving his personal preference without justification in this instance. — T Clark

The only irony here is that once you get passed your misreading of what I said, it turns out that you support what I said. As for the others you presume to speak for I see no evidence of their alleged disagreement.

I think it's also important to be able to formulate an idea and also be challenged on it. — Jafar

I found the following from my response to you to be very helpful:

... dialogue with others should be impersonal. — Fooloso4

The Daodejing says:

practice extreme tenuousness

(Chapter 16)

Tenuousness is an openness, a lack of insistence. It is to allow things to show themselves as they are rather than imposing some conceptual scheme or structure on them. There is freedom in the play of ideas unfettered by being too attached to your opinions.

I'm curious about the introspection part. How do you critically evaluate your own thoughts? — Jafar

Good question! It involves a sense of detachment from whatever your opinion is. Of being willing and able to be wrong. To be able to change your mind. It involves an acknowledgement of ignorance.

There is an ancient practice of defending a position that is at odds with the one you currently hold. The benefits include - developing a greater flexibility of thought, looking at the issue without having a stake in it, seeing things from another perspective, and even being able to give a stronger account of your own position after examining the alternatives.

I'm very interested in how other people ask "good" questions. — Jafar

I would say you are well on your way!

You shouldn’t let it stop you from putting your thoughts into words. — T Clark

Jafar said:

I feel like I never really have anything to say on a given topic, or I feel that I do not know enough about a given subject to say anything meaningful. — Jafar

Telling him to put his thoughts into words is to ignore the thoughts he has put into words.

Articulating your thoughts is an essential part of philosophy, but there is, in my opinion, more to philosophy. It involves a critical examination and evaluation of those thoughts and opinions, whether they are your thoughts and opinions or someone else's.

I really value philosophy as a means of introspection and a way to practice it, but I also get the impression that there is a lot to learn from others through discussion. — Jafar

We are in agreement:

It is dialogical in a double sense - both a dialogue with others and a dialogue with oneself. — Fooloso4

The points you [clarification: T Clark] seem to be missing is that: 1) giving an opinion is not having a discussion, and 2) there is value in being a silent participant is a discussion.

I feel like I never really have anything to say on a given topic, or I feel that I do not know enough about a given subject to say anything meaningful. — Jafar

I think this puts you at a distinct advantage. All too often giving an opinion is mistaken for doing philosophy. Rather then telling others what you think inquire into what others say on topics that interest you.

Inquiry is a mode of thinking. It is active rather than passive. It is critical and evaluative. It is dialogical in a double sense - both a dialogue with others and a dialogue with oneself. Dialogue with one's self is deeply personal, but dialogue with others should be impersonal. The former is about you, the latter should not be about you, it should be about the ideas at issue.

Much, however. depends on your priorities. Whether you regard philosophy as a way of finding answers or a way of asking questions. You might consider: what do you want and expect from philosophy?

He's peddling Crypto now. Act now! Don't wait! What do you have to lose? @180 Proof

A book based on facts cannot compete against a manufactured TV and magazine image developed over decades that gives him the appearance of being the embodiment of the self-made man having attained the pinnacle of the American Dream.

Good analogy!

Vance knows full well that the problem with such lies is that the MAGA - nauts will believe it and act on it. Vance may be unscrupulous but he is not stupid.

And then there is Vance who openly admits lying in order to get attention.

I ask you to place yourself in the shoes of some form of supreme being, whatever that may be or mean to you. — Benj96

Get some new shoes?

Maybe it's their right to do so. — Eros1982

It is not a question of their right but of what is right.

Turning Kamala into a hero overnight, crediting her with qualities she does not have, etc. — Eros1982

The public response to her campaign is news worthy. Perhaps there is some gushing from some sources but this is not as serious an issue as Trump's being unfit for office.

These media do not sound serious or sincere every time that election approaches. — Eros1982

The line between news and entertainment has been blurred.

If the investigators, reporters, and producers at NPR have, based on the facts, concluded that he is a serious danger to the US democracy and groups of people don't they have a journalistic responsibility to say so?

What else do you want to know about me?

For instance, what does Trump traveling to the 9/11 memorial with a 9/11 conspiracy theorist imply? — praxis

Great question and observation. This allows him to say something without using words while leaving him an out. Having an out is very important to him. He can just deny that he believes what she says, but why bring her?

Labour conditions, human rights, pollution and build quality are all issues. — Benkei

China is moving car manufacturing to Mexico. Trump's threat of a blood bath referred to this. Of course, American car manufacturers also make cars in Mexico.

To say that 12x12 =144 is a hinge proposition is to think of it as a rule for arriving at the product 144. — Joshs

Wittgenstein calls it a proposition not a rule. We follow rules. We do not follow propositions. Propositions are either true or false. Calling it a hinge does not change that.

That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

(OC 341)

That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.

(OC 342)

If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

(OC 343).

It is not, as some would have it, that a hinge is neither true nor false, it is that its truth is not doubted.

The result of a calculation can be true or false but the rule for arriving at the result is neither true nor false. The rule merely stipulates the criterion for determining what would constitute the correct or incorrect answer. — Joshs

What is the rule for arriving at the answer? When we calculate correctly we arrive at the correct answer. Are there infinite rules for the infinite amount of numbers that can be multiplied? Does anyone know or follow these rules or do they calculate?

Or, perhaps you are wrong!

Deleted. I decided that there is no benefit in responding to your churlishness.

To say that hinges are justified in any epistemic sense is to miss the main thrust of OC. It would be to "...grant you [Moore] all the rest (OC 1)." — Sam26

There is not a single agreed upon sense or meaning or assumptions that define the term 'epistemic', but I do not think we can deny that epistemology deals with the problem of knowledge. Clearly from beginning to end Wittgenstein was concerned with the problem of knowledge. It is one thing to claim that his epistemology in OC differs from more traditional views, but quite another to deny that it is epistemology. Annalisa Coliva and Danièle Moyal-Sharrock have edited a book titled "Hinge Epistemology"

Hinge propositions are not subject to verification or falsification (the doubt) within the system — Sam26

In OC Wittgenstein identifies one hinge proposition: 12x12=144. This propositions is true. 12x12 = any other number is false. If one doubts it, it can quickly and easily be demonstrated. If this cannot be proven then there can be no mathematical proofs.

My interpretation of Wittgenstein and hinge propositions is that hinges are neither true nor false, i.e., hinges have a role similar to the rules of a game. — Sam26

Within the game, according to the rules, it is true that some things are allowed and others not.

One can use “true,” but note it’s not an epistemic use of the concept as justified true belief. — Sam26

It is justified within the system.

Do you mean the question of whether Peter wrote First or Second Peter and your answer that if he did then we have a direct account from someone who lived with Jesus for years, etc? If he did then the rest follows, but we do not know if he did.If we cannot answer the question then we do not know if what is said in those writings is what Jesus or Peter said. We do not know what Jesus said or taught.

Most scholars today conclude that Peter the Apostle was the author of neither of the two epistles that are attributed to him.

(Wikipedia, "Authorship of the Petrine epistles", with note to twelve different scholars).

At best, suggestive, but certainly not reliable evidence of what Jesus and/or Peter or his other disciples believed and taught.

Made is X is a somewhat meaningless term since parts and materials may come from elsewhere. According to Forbes there are no American made vehicles that are completely American made,

I was half joking, but not really surprised.

What is the big issue regarding Chinese products? — javi2541997

It is largely a matter of politics. Both parties claim unfair trade practices. This is questionable because US companies including auto manufactures are subsidized.

At a rally in March Trump threatened that there would be a bloodbath if he was not elected because he would impose a 100% tariff. In a fact sheet from the White House in May Biden announced that he was imposing a 100% tariff on electric vehicles in addition to other tariffs.

Made in China. Imported to the US.

There is a difference between being unable to distinguish between what he actually said and what has been attributed to him and the claim that a message has or has not been transmitted faithfully.

I would not be surprised if this escalates. Eating people is next.

I too think it matters, but the question is how much it matters to the voters. Certainly it will to may, but will it be enough in those states that matter most? I would like to think so, but a lot of people have and will overlook everything else if they believe they will benefit with Trump and/or be hurt by Harris. How they might calculate that, if they do calculate it, or go with what their gut tells them, remains a mystery.

Up until last night I worried about coyotes eating my dog. Now it seems I have worry about illegal immigrants eating my dog. Or is it all immigrants? Or just those from "shithole countries"?

These are not statements that apply to angles or even Zeus. — Count Timothy von Icarus

When was John written? Does it reflect the beliefs found in the synoptic gospels? We cannot say what Jesus would have said, but can this be squared with Jesus recitation of the Shema and calling it the first of our commandments? (Mark 12:29)

1 Timothy 3:16) — Count Timothy von Icarus

The authorship is in dispute. I think the emphasis on false doctrines and trustworthy saying is significant . It seems likely that whenever it was written there were different teachings vying for authenticity. Is the fact this this one made the canonical cut and others did not indicative of more than the preferences of the collectors?

What does it mean to manifest? This too is open to dispute. To manifest is to show, appear, or be seen. This is not the same as for God to be in the flesh.

It is readily apparent that the "Son" is not one son among many in John. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree. John appropriates the passage from Psalms for for own ends. It is readily apparent that in Psalms there is not just one son. This raises the question of authority. Is Psalms authoritative or John? It seems far more likely that Jesus would come down on the side of Psalms.

There is a distinction between the sheep and the Good Shepherd — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is also the distinction between father and son in this passage.

The Septuagint was motivated by the fact that they increasingly only wrote and read Greek. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is true, but:

There exists a consensus among scholars that the language of Jesus and his disciples was Aramaic.

(Language of Jesus)

and provides references. In addition to the question of language there is the question of culture. An audience not familiar with Jewish Law and teachings may not hear a term such as 'son' in the way it is used in the Hebrew Bible even if they are reading in Greek translation.

,,, that Paul was a gentle, — Count Timothy von Icarus

I did not say that Paul was a gentile, but that he spoke to a gentile audience. Paul himself, as you probably know, confirms this.

Nor is it in any sense definitive that none of the epistles attributed to Jesus disciples were written by them. I have no idea where you are getting this certitude. — Count Timothy von Icarus

My certitude is not so great that it will hold in the face of evidence to the contrary. Do you have such evidence? Which Gospel or which part of the Gospel? Do you reject the source theory such as Q source?

Well no, this is also overreaching. You keep using the lack of definitive evidence as an excuse to make definitive claims. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If we cannot distinguish between what Jesus actually said and what is attributed to him that is because of the stories and claims that stands between them. Or do you have a way of making that distinction?

St. Paul states in unambiguous terms that Christ existed from before the foundations of the cosmos — Count Timothy von Icarus

To be more precise, he is the image of the invisible God, first-born of all creation. This is hardly unambiguous. As the image of God he is not God. If he is first-born he is not the creator. Through him and in him differs from 1 Corinthians 8:6 where a distinction is made between God from whom all things came and Christ through whom all things came. The NIV translation has "firstborn over all creation". Young's Literal Translation has of all creation. RSV also has of all creation. If he is "of creation" he is created. If he is "over all creation" he is still firstborn, that is, created.

The Gospel of John is markedly different from the synoptic gospels and the writings of Paul. Nowhere in those gospels does Jesus call himself God. In addition, John begins:

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.

How is it that the word could both be with God and be God?

With "in the beginning" what John says would have sounded familiar to Jesus and his disciples, but in the Genesis account God the creator stands apart from His creation. If John was aware of this difference he presents a brilliant rhetorical piece of writing. The word of God as opposed to the Word shifts the voice of authority.

In John Jesus defends himself by saying:

Is it not written in your Law, "I have said you are ‘gods’’
(10:34-36)

He is most likely referring to Psalms 82:6-7:

‘I said, ‘You are ‘gods’; you are all sons of the Most High.’ But you will die like mere mortals; you will fall like every other ruler.’

John leaves out the second part. If Jesus understood himself to be a son of God in this sense then he is not the one unique Son". And, of course, those who die like mere mortals are mere mortals. Jesus goes on to say, according to John, that he does the work of his father. (10:37-38) Does he do the work of his father or is he his father?

He goes on:

"I and the father are one"
(10:30)

this expression of unity can be taken to mean united together or one and the same. But the latter is at the expense of ignoring the distinctions between him and the father that he repeatedly makes. It is only when his words are heard with foreign ears that his words come to take on a very different meaning. A pagan meaning where the distinction between man and God is obliterated.

As for the "Greek authors," the entire New Testament is in Greek. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. That is the point. They are not Jesus' Jewish disciples. If any of them were Jewish they still spoke to a gentile audience with gentile ears, that is, with gentile and/or pagan beliefs and understanding.

But per his own reckoning, not one single word written by a Disciple has come down to us. But no one wants to buy a book that says "it's impossible to know," — Count Timothy von Icarus

Do you agree that it is impossible to know? If so, then it is true that whatever might have been written or told by a disciple has not come down to us because we cannot know that this or that was said or written by one of his disciples.

We do not know what Jesus said or taught. Between Jesus and the Gospels stand many voices. The voice of Paul stands out not only in his own writings but that of other Gospels. But Paul never saw or heard Jesus speak. He relies first and foremost on his own vision. A pious view of this is that he was witnessing the indwelling of spirit. That he was inspired. One problem with this is that the Church Fathers sought to destroy the writings of others with similar experiences. There were other voices that were silenced by the Church Fathers. Voices that if they were heard might give us a very different understanding of Christianity. We might ask: by what authority did they take this upon themselves?

Again, the justification for "I know the key is on the table" cannot be "The key is on the table"; that's just a repetition of the claim. — Banno

I agree. But that is not what I said.

Previously you said:

Wittgenstein takes it as read that knowing requires justification, and hence were there is no proposition to supply the justification, one cannot be properly said to know. — Banno

If you still hold to this claim then it is not enough to say a propositional justification is and must be possible. If you cannot provide propositional justification then why should we assume that there is one? Why isn't showing the key on the table sufficient to conclude that I knew where the key is?