Comments

  • Esotericism: Hierarchy & Knowledge
    The 'mystical Plato' is perfectly at home in later Christian mysticism, where Platonism played a seminal role,Wayfarer

    The "mystical Plato" a failure to understand his use of mythos andpoesis. The conflation of the works of Plato and Platonism is a fundamental mistake.

    The images of knowledge in the Republic are his exoteric teaching cleverly disguised as an esoteric teaching. But there is nothing esoteric about it. It is available to all who open the book. It his his salutary public teaching.

    Plato, like Socrates before him was a zetetic skeptic, that is, one who seeks and inquires, driven and guided by his knowledge of his ignorance. (Stewart Umphrey uses the term but means different by it).
  • Machiavelli and Stilbo: a contrast of ancient and modern
    ... you propose a very radical and relativistic interpretation of Plato’s cave that I have never heard of...whence did you obtain that opinion, that Plato is manipulating us through images of the ideas in this way?Todd Martin

    I am addressing some of this in the thread on esotericism.

    My opinion was changed by one of Strauss' students, Stanley Rosen, a contemporary of Bloom. I am away from my books for the next few weeks and I think my memory may be faulty so I won't mention a particular book. He was the first to get me to see that the Forms were themselves images. Another of Strauss' students, also a contemporary of Bloom, Seth Benardete, stresses the importance of philosophical poesis, the making of images. Laurence Lampert distinguishes between Plato's salutary public or exoteric teaching and an esoteric teaching that is suitable only for those who are by temperament and intelligence. The common theme that unites them is Socratic ignorance. In brief, if we take Socratic ignorance seriously then the ascent from the cave is a poetic image. What drives the philosopher is an erotic desire (Symposium) to become wise. Short of that the Socratic lover of wisdom is a zetetic skeptic, one who inquires but does not know.

    You might think of what you call 'manipulating' as the forceful dragging of the prisoner to see the source of our opinions and on the ascent to the truth.
  • Esotericism: Hierarchy & Knowledge
    Just because we don’t have it, doesn’t mean it isn’t real. So that is rather like an argument from ignorance.Wayfarer

    I am not arguing that it is not real. I am saying that I have no experience of it and so no longer simply assume it is real. To do so would be like the cave dwellers think that images are real. It is not an argument from ignorance it is a recognition of ignorance and the seduction of images.

    I hasten to add, I don’t claim to possess such an insight either - but I don’t recoil from the possibility that Plato understood things that I cannot.Wayfarer

    I have no doubt that Plato understood things that I cannot. That does not mean that I would accept a mysticism that is read into the text as something found in the text.

    To ‘reach what is free from hypothesis’ I would take to be the direct apprehension of the forms.Wayfarer

    Yes, that much is clear. My question is how dialectic can free us from hypothesis and give us direct apprehension of the Forms? How can we use hypothesis to free ourselves from hypothesis? If there is a method of apprehending the Forms then why does Socrates profess ignorance of the beautiful and good?

    That excerpt we discussed the other day:Wayfarer

    The image of the turning of the soul is a depiction of what true knowledge would be. We have not been turned around in that way. But there is still a turning, a coming face to face with our ignorance. The passage should remind us of what happens when the prisoner is released from the shackles and turned around to see the light of the fire and the images that the images on the cave wall are images of.

    There is another sense of the images of Forms. Not the things of the world, but the things of the mind. It is analogous to the mathematician's uses images. But the mathematician is not able to free himself of hypothesis and neither are we. The philosopher of the Republic is not the philosopher of the Symposium. The images Plato gives us fuel the desire to be wise, they do not make us wise.
  • Esotericism: Hierarchy & Knowledge


    On dialectic.

    These things themselves that they mold and draw, of which there are shadows and images in water, they now use as images, seeking to see those things themselves, that one can see in no other way than with thought."
    "What you say is true," he said.
    "Well, then, this is the form I said was intelligible. However, a soul in investigating it is compelled to use hypotheses, and does not go to a beginning because it is unable to step out above the hypotheses. And it uses as images those very things of which images are made by the things below, and in comparison with which they are opined to be clear and are given honor."
    "I understand," he said, "that you mean what falls under geometry and its kindred arts."

    "Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses - that is, steppingstones and springboards - in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole.

    The problem is, how does one free himself from hypothesis? How does one use hypotheses as a springboard? Does one simply jump back to what is free from hypothesis? How does one land at the beginning of the whole?

    I think there is a tendency to deprecate the mystical aspects of Plato, as it sits uncomfortably with naturalism, but as Plato is such an important figure, then he has to be accomodated.Wayfarer

    I attempt, to the extent that I am able, to read Plato on his own terms, and certainly not from the perspective of naturalism. I too once believed that the ascent from the cave and the power of dialectic was a description of the mystical experience of truth. I no longer see things that way. Among other things, it occurred to me that I had no knowledge or experience of transcendence. Like many others I mistook his image of knowledge for knowledge itself, just like the cave dwellers mistake the images on the cave wall.
  • Esotericism: Hierarchy & Knowledge
    But what could philosophy be other than rational discourse? If the esoteric is outside the bounds of rational discourse, and if philosophy cannot be anything other than rational discourse, then how could the esoteric be within the purview of philosophy?Janus

    The same problem must be faced with regard to Plato's dialectic. Reasoned speech cannot lead to knowledge of the Forms. Dialectic is nothing more than reasoned speech.
  • Esotericism: Hierarchy & Knowledge
    Fooloso4 I think your reading is tendentious,Wayfarer

    Well, I could point to the work of various highly regarded scholars whose reading too is what you would regard as tendentious, but I never met a Platonist who was persuaded by such arguments, with one exception, That exception is me. Plato is deep enough to allow for differing interpretations.
  • Esotericism: Hierarchy & Knowledge
    But the implication is, Socrates has proceeded beyond 'image and symbol' - has indeed made that ascent - but that Glaucon cannot 'follow' him, i.e. is not equipped to understand his meaningWayfarer

    Socrates, as you quote, says:

    the very truth, as it appears to me

    The two terms I put in bold need to be considered. How something appears is not the same as noesis. What appears to him may not appear that way to someone else. There is no such difference or ambiguity when it comes to seeing the Forms themselves. It not a matter of how they appear to me or you or Socrates.

    The footnote to this remark is that Socrates will not insist that he perceives rightly, as to do so would be dogmatic.Wayfarer

    I don't know whose opinion that is, but the term itself, from the Greek, means opinion. If Socrates does not want to dogmatic then he does not want to insist that his opinion is true. If that is what the note means then I agree. It makes no sense to claim that if he knows the truth but does not want to insist on the truth.

    At any rate, the following passagesWayfarer

    Right before those passages he say:

    And may we not also declare that nothing less than the power of dialectics could reveal this, and that only to one experienced in the studies we have described, and that the thing is in no other wise possible?

    Two points. Glaucon is not experienced in dialectic and so is merely going along with what Socrates says. He has no understanding of it. Second, he does not say that the power of dialectic does reveal this. Dialectic is not some magic power that transforms speech and thought into noesis.

    To deny this is to deny the possibility of the knowledge of the forms, and of the form of the Good, which is fundamental to the entire enterprise ..Wayfarer

    Yes, that is the point. It should be noted that talk of the Forms is conspicuously absent in the Theaettetus, a dialogue about knowledge.
  • Esotericism: Hierarchy & Knowledge
    So - isn't the whole task of the philosopher to ascend from from opinion through dianoia to noesis 'through dialectic'? Isn't that what the remainder of the passage is about?Wayfarer

    Except that is not what happened in Socrates own case. The passage from the Republic 533a makes this clear. If what you mean by higher knowledge and truth is the leap from reason to intellection then I find it peculiar that Socrates never made that leap. The whole thing is an image of the truth, an image that "cannot be properly insisted on".

    And so, if this is what you mean by "higher knowledge" and "higher truth", Socrates was not and never met a sage.
  • Esotericism: Hierarchy & Knowledge
    No actual sages in the sense of having divine knowledge.
    — Fooloso4

    I don’t regard ‘divine knowledge’ as interchangeable with higher knowledge. Not all wisdom teachings are necessarily theistic. I suspect that it’s the reflexive association of ‘higher’ with ‘divine’ that is often at the basis of the rejection of the idea of ‘higher truth’.
    Wayfarer

    I was referring to Socrates and the distinction between human and divine wisdom. As I understand it, he points to the limits of human knowledge. I don't think Plato's teaching are theistic. It is, after all, the Good not the God.

    In the Republic after Socrates presents theimage of the Forms Glaucon wants Socrates to tell them what the Forms themselves are. Socrates responds:

    You will no longer be able to follow, dear Glaucon, although there won’t be any lack of eagerness on my part. But you would no longer seeing an image of what we are saying, but the truth itself, at least as it looks to me. Whether it really is so or not cannot be properly insisted on.(emphasis added) — 533a

    Socrates presents an image of the truth not simply because that is all he can show Glaucon but because he cannot, to use another image, ascend the divided line from eikasía to noesis via dianoia, that is, from the imagination to insight via reason. Grasping hold of the truth remains out of our reach. While philosophers tend to focus on reason and dismiss the power of imagination, it is what art, religion, and philosophy have in common. It is why philosophers from Plato to Wittgenstein talk of philosophy as poetry, poiesis, the making of images.


    What is "higher knowledge" and "higher truth"? Are they transcendent truths and knowledge? Exstatis? Are they truths and knowledge that you are privy to or just truths you believe others have attained?
  • Esotericism: Hierarchy & Knowledge
    There were no actual sages?Wayfarer

    No actual sages in the sense of having divine knowledge. At least none that Socrates ever met and none that he identified as such. Someone worshiped for possessing divine wisdom does not necessarily possess it.

    According to the IEP entry on Hadot:

    The Sage was the living embodiment of wisdom, “the highest activity human beings can engage in . . . which is linked intimately to the excellence and virtue of the soul” (WAP 220). Across the schools, Socrates himself was agreed to have been perhaps the only living exemplification of such a figure (his his avowed agnoia notwithstanding).

    by ignoring esotericism, we risk cutting ourselves off from a full understanding of Western philosophical thought.
    — Melzer

    That would never happen. Not in a million years. Everyone is aware of that.
    Wayfarer

    There are a great many scholars who do in fact either ignore it or deny it.
  • Esotericism: Hierarchy & Knowledge
    There is another important use of the term 'esoteric' as laid out in great detail in Arthur M. Melzer's "Philosophy Between the Lines".

    Philosophical esotericism—the practice of communicating one’s unorthodox thoughts “between the lines”—was a common practice until the end of the eighteenth century. The famous Encyclopédie of Diderot, for instance, not only discusses this practice in over twenty different articles, but admits to employing it itself. The history of Western thought contains hundreds of such statements by major philosophers testifying to the use of esoteric writing in their own work or others’. Despite this long and well-documented history, however, esotericism is often dismissed today as a rare occurrence. But by ignoring esotericism, we risk cutting ourselves off from a full understanding of Western philosophical thought. — Melzer

    Examples from throughout the history of Western philosophy are given here: https://press.uchicago.edu/sites/melzer/index.html
  • Esotericism: Hierarchy & Knowledge
    In Plato's Symposium Socrates says the difference between a sage and a philosopher (Ancient Greek: φιλόσοφος, meaning lover of wisdom) was that the sage has what the philosopher seeks. While analyzing the concept of love, Socrates concludes love is that which lacks the object it seeks. Therefore, the philosopher does not have the wisdom sought, while the sage, on the other hand, does not love or seek wisdom, for it is already possessed.

    Seems to indicate that ‘the sage’ is superior even to Socrates (and by implication Plato and Aristotle also).
    Wayfarer

    There is no Socratic dialogue with a sage. It is not that the sage is superior to Socrates but rather that elenchus reveals that no one who professed wisdom or had the reputation for wisdom was wiser than Socrates, and Socrates was wiser than others in that he knew that he did not know.

    It should be noted that the image of the philosopher in the Republic is at odds with the philosopher as the lover in pursuit of wisdom. The philosopher of the Republic possessed the wisdom that that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle sought. He exists only in speech, only in poetic images.
  • Was Nietzsche right about this?
    I haven't studied Strauss but I was intensely influenced/inspired by the lectures on Hegel by his friend Kojeve. Anyway, I like the way Strauss puts it, an active role.j0e

    You might find Strauss' On Tyranny of interest. It contains the correspondence between Kojeve and Strauss.
  • Was Nietzsche right about this?
    That projected gist is continually revised as we bump up against fragments that don't gel with it.j0e

    Another of my teachers, Leo Strauss, although I know him only through his books, said that when you come upon a contradiction take this as an indication that there is something more going on and that you must play an active role in discovering how it is resolved.
  • Was Nietzsche right about this?
    I like his vibe.j0e

    I did too. These were small classes, sitting around the seminar table. He had an air of gravity, but also a lightness from the pleasure of thought and discussion.
  • Pronouns
    Your use of the preposition "forward" implies progress.Bitter Crank

    By forward I mean from today to tomorrow, as in, from this day forward. I do not mean progress but rather change. We do not live in a time of cohesive culture. How things will develop remains to be seen.

    It seems to me that what they are actually doing is just stumbling, possibly stumbling in circles.Bitter Crank

    When I say "we" that includes them, both singular and plural as well as the rest of us.
  • Pronouns
    But they normally do so gradually and by following use, not by dictat determining use.Isaac

    Whose use is one following if not that of those who request to be identified as such? It is a matter of frequency of use.

    I can't think of a reason to simply assume all such requests are about gendered language.Isaac

    I won't speak for all cases but in this case the person making the Reddit post said:

    I haven't done it and just avoid using pronouns or stick with they/them since it's the most neutral.

    Indeed, you might. But by advocating such a response for others too...Isaac

    I have said nothing about what others should do. I am speaking about what I would do and why.

    We used to just get along and accept that not every aspect of the world can be tailored to our individual preference.Isaac

    While I agree some people are excessively sensitive and too eager to take offense or become obsessive in their fear of not giving offense at every perceived 'micro-aggression", real or imagined, what you see as just getting along might mean for someone else keeping quiet and hidden their deep seated shame for not fitting in.
  • A Law is a Law is a Law
    The 'law' can be construed narrowly or more widely depending on what one is asking. If one is asking whether doing X is legal then we look to what the law states. But if you are asking, as you did about:

    ...the nature of the law and its operation.Ciceronianus the White

    then the answer that the law is whatever the law says it is is unsatisfactory. The question of the nature of the law asks about from what it derives its authority and legitimacy, it social and political function, its responsibility to the people, its source and power, etc.
  • Pronouns
    You presumably don't comply with any and all of your student's requests, just out of civility and respect do you? You deem some requests to be reasonable and others not.Isaac

    If I think the request uncivil or disrespectful I would not comply. The meaning of words and their connotations change. Case in point, see the etymology of the term 'it':

    Old English hit, neuter nominative and accusative of third person singular pronoun, from Proto-Germanic demonstrative base *khi- (source also of Old Frisian hit, Dutch het, Gothic hita "it"), from PIE *ko- "this" (see he). Used in place of any neuter noun, hence, as gender faded in Middle English, it took on the meaning "thing or animal spoken about before." — https://www.etymonline.com/word/it

    The issue is whether the discomfort is well-justified. with 'she' (instead of he), or some new term like Xe, it's very hard to make a case that they would reasonably make anyone uncomfortable since they're words with either harmless of absent connotations.Isaac

    Many people would be uncomfortable referring to a male as 'she' instead of 'he'. What connotations that may accrue to 'Xe' is anyone's guess.

    What is at issue here is gendered language. Some are in favor of preserving it, others of changing it. Agreed upon terminology does not yet exist. As we stumble forward I would take my lead from someone who wants to be referred to as 'it' and comply.
  • Pronouns
    Call them what you likefishfry

    I think it best to call them what they like. If people call you what they like you may not like what some of them call you.

    It is a matter of civility and respect. If a student told me they had a preferred pronoun I would put aside my own opinion of the matter and honor the request.
  • Was Nietzsche right about this?
    In my view there's always at least a slight risk in dismissing an ambiguous other.j0e

    I agree. Engaging them in discussion and reading what they have to say to others decreases that risk, but it is possible that their thinking is so far advanced that I simply can't comprehend.
  • Was Nietzsche right about this?
    Something we haven't taken account of is the possibility of creatively misreading thinkers. While in general I think we do want to grasp what they really thought, this is not the only reason to read (we aren't just biographers of their interior.)j0e

    There are, as I see it, three related issues here. The first is a fruitful misunderstanding of the text that takes on a life of its own. The second, a deliberate misreading requires either having first sought to understand it and then appropriate it, or, and this is more often the case with those who do not attend carefully to the text, an attempt to be be clever, acting under the misguided assumption that they are equal to the author they are misreading. The third is the principle of humility, that the philosopher has something to teach us; that it is not a simply a matter of what they thought but, by attempting to understand what they are thinking they will help us in our thinking.
  • Was Nietzsche right about this?
    I know it's a big quote, but I think it's good stuff. What's your take on it?

    When I took classes with Gadamer at Boston College all of this was put aside. We simply read the text.

    I met with him once and told him I was interested in exploring the significance of the practice of philosophy as interpretation. He told me he thought it was a worthy project but one that should wait until I had been interpreting texts for about 25 years. I never did take up that project but continue the practice of interpretation.
  • Was Nietzsche right about this?
    ...surely you are also aware of the anti-intellectualism that seizes on this kind of statement.j0e

    What I had in mind here was not the authors but the discussion of the authors. Cut through the jargon and it becomes clear that they have not really understood the author, and cannot defend what they say by giving a detailed analysis of the text that ties together the parts into a coherent whole.

    Who's unsimple in the bad way?j0e

    On this forum Heidegger is often dismissed because people are unwilling to do the work to understand him. But this is different from what I was referring to above.

    I strive to write clearly and concisely, but even on philosophy forums I have been accused several times of being hard to read. So what 'simple' means is relative.
  • Was Nietzsche right about this?
    Reading lots of thinkers is something one does over a lifetime.j0e

    I might agree with the, but that depends on what you mean by "lots of books" and in what period of time. It also depends on what one means by reading and what it is one is reading.
  • Was Nietzsche right about this?
    But imagine a fanboy of X who's just stuck in the charisma and perspective of a few thinkers.j0e

    It has been my experience that those who rush do a poor job of reading. Their heads are full of ideas but they do not take the time to think through the problems.

    IMV, it's the clash of perspectives that sophisticates the mind.j0e

    This is part of the problem. Consider the root of the word of the word. One of the hardest things to do is think and write simply. Strip away the jargon and name dropping and what is laid bare does not amount to much. Of course there are exceptions.

    In philosophy the race goes to the one who can run slowest—the one who crosses the finish line last. — Wittgenstein

    My sentences are all supposed to be read slowly. I really want my copious punctuation marks to slow down the speed of reading. Because I should like to be read slowly. (As I myself read.) — Wittgenstein
  • Why Did it Take So Long to Formulate the Mind-Body Problem?
    So what you seem to be concluding is that they were aware of a problem. I just think that there awareness was different, on a subtle level. They did not have Darwin, Galileo and Wikipedia to assist them with information like we do. We can find words like panpsychism to express our ideas, so it is probably more about understanding basic worldviews which were so different from our own.Jack Cummins

    You underestimate the ancients. Panpsychism is an ancient concept. Even the term itself if from the Greek

    From the SEP article on panpsychism:

    What is striking about these early attempts to formulate an integrated theory of reality is that the mind and particularly consciousness keep arising as special problems. It is sometimes said that the mind-body problem is not an ancient philosophical worry (see Matson 1966), but it does seem that the problem of consciousness was vexing philosophers 2500 years ago, and in a form redolent of contemporary worries.
  • Why Did it Take So Long to Formulate the Mind-Body Problem?
    The ancients made the distinction between body and soul. According to Aristotle man has a rational soul. Descartes used the terms mind and soul interchangeably
  • Machiavelli and Stilbo: a contrast of ancient and modern
    I started reading Jaffa's review but decided not to force myself to continue. It contain a great deal of rhetoric but is wanting in reasoned argument. He seems to deliberately misconstrue what Bloom says.

    William F Buckley once quipped:“If you think Harry Jaffa is hard to argue with, try agreeing with him. It is nearly impossible.”

    Jaffa champions some version of traditional morality, some combination of reason and revelation, ancients and moderns, made manifest in a mashup of Aristotle, natural rights, the Founding Fathers, Lincoln, and the Bible. Jaffa and his students seem more interested in persuasion than truth, or perhaps, persuasion in the service of truth as they see it. God and Country.

    Edit: I finished the article. If the intent of philosophical argument is to examine the truth to the best of our ability then this is not a philosophical argument, but rather a poorly disguised sophistic argument.
  • Not knowing what it’s like to be something else
    2. However much I learn about the objective world I can never know what it is like to be a bat.

    However much I learn about the objective world I can never know everything about the world.

    From this it does not follow that

    3. Therefore there is something in reality that is outside of the objective world.

    What follows is that there is something in reality that is outside the limits of my knowledge.
  • Wittgenstein's Blue & Brown Books [Open Discussion]
    Work on philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them.) (CV, 24) — Wittgenstein
  • Was Nietzsche right about this?
    I'd say the same thing about philosophy. Any philosophy geek can give a list of their favorite books, but the main thing is to read lots of booksj0e

    I think it is much more valuable to learn to read a few books, slowly and carefully. Too often philosophy is tread as if it were merely information, and books treated as trophies or notches in a belt.

    Since this threat is on Nietzsche, a couple of quotes:

    Our treasure lies in the beehive of our knowledge. We are perpetually on the way thither, being by nature winged insects and honey gatherers of the mind. — Nietzsche


    Of all that is written, I love only what a person hath written with his blood. Write with blood, and thou wilt find that blood is spirit.
    It is no easy task to understand unfamiliar blood; I hate the reading idlers.
    He who knoweth the reader, doeth nothing more for the reader. Another century of readers—and spirit itself will stink.
    Every one being allowed to learn to read, ruineth in the long run not only writing but also thinking.
    Once spirit was God, then it became man, and now it even becometh populace.
    He that writeth in blood and proverbs doth not want to be read, but learnt by heart.
    — Nietzsche
  • Graylingstein: Wittgenstein on Scepticism and Certainty
    Ok, I'll do some more reading.frank

    Yes, there is always more reading to do.
  • Machiavelli and Stilbo: a contrast of ancient and modern
    I have not read the essay yet. I just checked to see how much of it is included.

    There is a gap of a few page here and there but it appears that the bulk of the essay is here:

    https://books.google.com/books?id=X7ePDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA53&lpg=PA53&dq=Humanizing+Certitudes+and+Impoverishing+Doubts&source=bl&ots=PJd8G781Dv&sig=ACfU3U34xCmqOY88fK2eRGK1l9-enpKN9g&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjGkNe3vYbwAhWll-AKHVMoBSYQ6AEwCnoECBMQAw#v=onepage&q=Humanizing%20Certitudes%20and%20Impoverishing%20Doubts&f=false

    I assume by “we” and “us” you mean philosophers.Todd Martin

    I meant you and I and our neighbors and strangers.

    “epistemologically”Todd Martin

    Epistemology is the problem of knowledge. This is the central issue of the cave and th/e ascent from it.

    But the difference between him and other men is that he learns they are only shadows—shadows which give us access to the truth—whereas they believe the shadows are the real things and are passionately committed to that belief.Todd Martin

    I do not agree with Bloom. One meaning of the shadows is opinion - opinions are takes to be the truth. If I remember correctly he makes this clear in the translation of the Republic. Where I disagree with him is with regard to the truth, that is, the "things themselves", the Forms. Socrates' wisdom was his knowledge of his ignorance. Part of what it means to be in the cave is to be ignorant, to lack knowledge of the Forms. We, you and I, and Bloom and the philosophers are cave dwellers. Plato is the guy parading images before us, images of truth and knowledge, the Forms.
  • Graylingstein: Wittgenstein on Scepticism and Certainty
    He's taking aim at the Tracticus, right?frank

    Yes, but I think he is also challenging traditional assumptions about man and reason.
  • Graylingstein: Wittgenstein on Scepticism and Certainty
    So Witt wasn't talking about speech acts. He was talking about something in the range of things discussed in that SEP article.frank

    I will sidestep the theory of speech acts and say that hinges are not limited to what we say.

    From earlier posts:

    A key passage in OC is a quote from Goethe's Faust:

    "In the beginning was the deed." (OC 402)

    This is expanded upon:

    "But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or
    unjustified; as it were, as something animal." (OC 359)

    "I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
    not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
    communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
    ratiocination. " (OC 475)

    Language games are an extension of man's acting in the world. Primitive hinges are pre-linguistic. They are not language games, they are an essential part of the form of life in which language games come to play a part. It is not that they cannot be doubted, it is simply that they are not.
    Fooloso4

    A mistake that is frequently made is to treat hinges as if they are all the same. There are propositional hinges and pre-linguistic hinges. Empirical hinges and mathematical hinges.Fooloso4
  • A Law is a Law is a Law
    We move away from the belief in supernatural beings.Athena

    I have no belief in the supernatural but I do recognize the power of myth and the imagination.
  • Graylingstein: Wittgenstein on Scepticism and Certainty
    Would you say that the word 'proposition' is being used in this thread the same way Witt used it?frank

    I posted this the other day.


    From Stanford:

    "The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.[1]), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences.

    One might wonder whether a single class of entities can play all these roles. If David Lewis (1986, p. 54) is right in saying that “the conception we associate with the word ‘proposition’ may be something of a jumble of conflicting desiderata,” then it will be impossible to capture our conception in a consistent definition.

    The best way to proceed, when dealing with quasi-technical words like ‘proposition’, may be to stipulate a definition and proceed with caution, making sure not to close off any substantive issues by definitional fiat."https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/

    It is not Moore's statements about his hand that function as a hinge. If Moore's propositions about his hands are hinges then what revolves around them? Most people do not know who Moore is. It makes little or no difference if he claimed to have hands. Not much hinges on the statements that any of us make about having hands.
    It is the fact of our having hands around which things pivot. Our doing things with our hands, our holding tools and other things designed for hands. Even our statements about hands hinge on our having hands.
  • Was Nietzsche right about this?


    Again, I have not looked at it in its larger context but from what you presented the topic is physical power, not its use. As such, power is morally neutral. Nietzsche comes up in the context of the measurement of power, a quanta of power. It is in the ability to measure power that Strauss says that Nietzsche went beyond Hobbes. The discussion then shifts away from Nietzsche and Hobbes to potestas. The right of the sovereign as distinct from the use of those powers is morally neutral.

    In Leviathan Hobbes says:

    "The Power of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Originall, or Instrumentall."

    His concern is with use of power. The amount of power for Hobbes is relative the the power of others. It is more or less, not a "quanta", that is, it does not have a specific measure.

    Nietzsche's will to power extents to all of life not just man.

    I see no equivalence, but maybe I am missing something either in the quoted passage or in the text.
  • A Law is a Law is a Law


    According to Wiki (with reference footnotes):Lady Justice (Latin: Iustitia) is an allegorical personification of the moral force in judicial systems.

    Justice is not the law, but the idea of the law without regard to justice is, in my opinion, impoverished.