I think Hegel at no point goes theologica — tim wood

I don't know what this means. Did Spinoza "go theological"?

The first question should not be whether he believed in God but what he means by God. Once that question is answered the answer to whether he believed in God would be, for those who hold traditional beliefs, no. But that is not the end of the matter. Like talking about man when he is but an embryo, we should wait to see how things develop.

He does not reject:

... taking God to be the one substance

When he talks about:

The life of God and divine cognition ...

this reads to me like an affirmation. But it seems clear from what he has said that his concept of God is not the God of the Bible or the God the traditional theologians.

I also think even in his time it was unwise to be to clearly or explicitly anti-religious. — tim wood

There is some truth in this and I am sure that Hegel, like his predecessors, was well aware of the practice of philosophical esotericism - hiding your meaning from those who are not ready for it. I think that what he says would be regarded as anti-religious by many both in his time and ours, who consider themselves religious. His comment about:

... taking God to be the one substance shocked the age in which this was expressed ... — tim wood

speaks to this.

19. The life of God and divine cognition might thus be expressed as a game love plays with itself.

“Thus” indicates that the life of God and divine cognition follow from what has been said. God and the divine are not separate from but within the circle. A game love plays with itself, the game of uniting two as one, but to play the game one must first become two, dividing and uniting itself with itself. Divine life and divine cognition are being and knowing.

Hegel immediately adds that this idea must be thought with due seriousness, that it was won through the suffering, the patience, and the labor of the negative. The reference is to the life and death of Christ and the themes of suffering and sacrifice, death of the body and life of the spirit. Whatever Hegel’s own beliefs were on such matters, they are an important part of the history of spirit, if not in terms of actual events then in terms of the shaping of consciousness.

Precisely because the form is as essential to the essence as the essence is to itself, the essence must not be grasped and expressed as mere essence, which is to say, as immediate substance or as the pure self-intuition of the divine. Rather, it must likewise be grasped as form in the entire richness of the developed form, and only thereby is it grasped and expressed as the actual.

What does the pure self-intuition of the divine mean? First, this intuition is the subject’s intuition. As immediate substance it takes the divine to be other than itself. To be grasped and expressed as form requires that it be articulated both as self-forming and formed, as both the development of form and the entire richness of the developed form. It is only from this stage of its development, when it has become actual, that it can know itself.

This is summed up in #20:

20: The true is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence completing itself through its own development. This much must be said of the absolute: It is essentially a result, and only at the end is it what it is in truth.

He goes on to express this:

The beginning, the principle, or, the absolute as it is at first, or, as it is immediately expressed, is only the universal. But just as my saying “all animals” can hardly count as an expression of zoology, it is likewise obvious that the words, “absolute,” “divine,” “eternal,” and so on, do not express what is contained in them; – and it is only such words which in fact express intuition as the immediate.

Zoology is not adequately expressed by the universal “all animals”, for in the universal the particular is negated or not expressed. All animals tells us nothing about any particular animal. In the same way, “absolute,” “divine,” “eternal,” tell us nothing about the particulars within the universal.

Whatever is more than such a word, even the mere transition to a proposition, is a becoming-other which must be redeemed, or, it is a mediation.

Hegel goes on to explain mediation:

21: ... mediation is nothing but self-moving self-equality, or, it is a reflective turn into itself, the moment of the I existing-for-itself, pure negativity, or, simple coming-to-be.

The transition from a word to a proposition is mediation for it must be thought and expressed. So too the absolute, the divine, eternal, must be mediated, that is, thought and expressed, given shape and content. But they are mediated by, the I. Existing-for-itself, the I is other than the subject or object of thought. At the same time it negates this otherness by making it one’s own by the understanding. What is thought, the universal, comes to be the subject matter, which is to say, the subject’s matter.

The I, or, coming-to-be, this mediating, is, on account of its simplicity, immediacy in the very process of coming-to-be and is the immediate itself. – Hence, reason is misunderstood if reflection is excluded from the truth and is not taken to be a positive moment of the absolute.

Reason is not unmediated intuition. It is not the understanding. It is positive in that it reflects on what is taken up in the understanding as immediacy without reflection on the process of unity. It is, in other words, reflection on a central problem of philosophy at least since it was first expressed by Parmenides: thinking and being are the same.

The movement in consciousness is from the immediacy of objects in consciousness, to their difference or negativity as objects of rather than from consciousness, to the immediacy of objects of consciousness, their sameness or positivity as objects from consciousness.

Reflection is what makes truth into the result, but it is likewise what sublates the opposition between the result and its coming-to-be. This is so because this coming-to-be is just as simple and hence not different from the form of the true, which itself proves itself to be simple in its result. Coming-to-be is instead this very return into simplicity.

Hegel expresses the same idea in yet another way, this time making explicit that it is not just something that occurs in the consciousness of the individual:

However much the embryo is indeed in itself a person, it is still not a person for itself; the embryo is a person for itself only as a culturally formed and educated rationality which has made itself into what it is in itself.

It is not the capacity for rationality but the culturally formed and educated rationality that allows the person to become for herself what she is in herself. While the importance of culture was recognized by the Greeks, it was to a large degree atemporal. The importance of history as self-moving and self-development was not a factor. The truth was regarded as unchanging. Today both views are represented and defended.

You might be interested in this exchange between Jefferson and Madison. Jefferson says that no generation has a right to bind another. https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/thomas-jefferson-james-madison

Truth is not a value, but a relation between mental judgements and reality. Since it depends on judgements, it can't be prior in time to them. — Dfpolis

There is no judgment of the truth of the deductions of non-Euclidean geometry that independent of reality, unless of course you maintain that there is a mathematical reality. They are formal logical truths. Whatever your theory of truth may be, non-Euclidean geometry works. They find their application in reality.

There are no actual infinitesimals in calculus. — Dfpolis

The point is that they are theoretical constructs. They are not abstracted from nature.

Having read Kant's reasoning, he seems to have been unaware of the errors he was making. — Dfpolis

Him and several generations of Kant scholars. When are you going to publish your findings in a peer reviewed journal?

I said that non-euclidean geometries could be abstracted from models instantiating them. — Dfpolis

But the fact that you are trying to dance around is that they didn't.

If so, that would mean they had a hypothetical status until it was realized that they could be instantiated. — Dfpolis

They did not have a hypothetical status because they were not hypotheses. They were formal logical systems that were not intended to relate to anything else.

According to the Wikipedia article: "Bolyai ends his work by mentioning that it is not possible to decide through mathematical reasoning alone if the geometry of the physical universe is Euclidean or non-Euclidean; this is a task for the physical sciences." — Dfpolis

This is besides the point. They were not constructed as models of the universe. The question is how is it that they do apply? Is it just coincidence?

I have answered all this previously. Knowing an object's intrinsic nature need not entail knowing its relationships. — Dfpolis

The problem is that a baseball being a baseball is not a relationship. It is intrinsic to what it is to be a baseball.

One might figure it out, but only if one knew there were beings that could use it so. — Dfpolis

You might claim that a car's being a mode of transportation is not intrinsic to it being a car, but that is only because you want to maintain your questionable claim about intelligibility. If not for that you would define it as everyone else does.

I think you are entirely right. It would be helpful to circle back. After all, the circle is the best and most powerful image of the self-movement of spirit. Since it is so easy to get lost in the details and opacity of Hegel's writing, before moving forward I want to collect a few things together that he has said.

12: ... the whole which has returned into itself from out of its succession and extension and has come to be the simple concept of itself.

Returning to itself from out of itself the whole comes to know itself. This is the fundamental movement of spirit in its self-realization. It is articulated by Hegel in various ways. It is important to see that this is a self-enclosed movement whose progress is not linear. There is nothing outside of it.

13: Only what is completely determinate is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed by everybody. The intelligible form of science is the path offered to everyone and equally available for all.

Until the whole completes itself, that is, comes to know itself, knowledge is still indeterminate, incomplete and the possession of the few. Who are these few? The philosophers who have moved knowledge forward. Knowledge is self-knowledge is a double sense - the movement from the Delphic "know thyself" to knowledge of the spirit's knowledge of itself. With the completion of this movement the individual, the subject knows itself in the truth of the whole. It is not available for all in the sense that information is, but rather as self-realization.

13: To achieve rational knowledge through our own intellect is the rightful demand of a consciousness which is approaching the status of science. This is so because the understanding is thinking, the pure I as such, and because what is intelligible is what is already familiar and common both to science and to the unscientific consciousness alike, and it is that through which unscientific consciousness is immediately enabled to enter into science.

The understanding is thinking, thinking is the pure I, the pure I is the understanding. Knowledge and understanding are in this way distinguished. How is it that what is intelligible is what is already familiar and common? What is intelligible is what is or can be understood, that is, made intelligible through the understanding, through the I that thinks, and is thus found not in the object but in thinking the object. What is made intelligible in thinking is then available to all. It is through the thinking of the few that knowledge is made possible to all who think. Thinking is carried forward by the few and becomes the available possession of all.

17: In my view … everything hangs on grasping and expressing the true not just as substance but just as much as subject.

Hegel is not just expressing an opinion. It is his view that will become what everyone will be able to see. In this moment of the movement substance and subject are distinct. But the true is as much one as it is the other.

17: ... substantiality comprises within itself the universal, or, it comprises not only the immediacy of knowing but also the immediacy of being, or, immediacy for knowing.

Substance is the whole, knower and known. Substance is not in or a name for the universal. The universal is within substance. It should be noted that Hegel is not rejecting immediacy. We know the immediacy of being in that we are. The immediacy for knowing is 'der Sache selbst', the thing itself that is to be known. I intentionally translated it in this way to draw the connection with Kant.

17: However much taking God to be the one substance shocked the age in which this was expressed, still that was in part because of an instinctive awareness that in such a view self-consciousness only perishes and is not preserved.

If substance is the whole, and as such there can only be one substance, then God is in truth subject. It is not just that God was taken or regarded to be subject. It is something now understood if not yet known. And because it is not fully realized, self-consciousness perishes, but this is only half of it. It is also preserved, taken up anew.

18: Furthermore, the living substance is the being that is in truth subject, or, what amounts to the same thing, it is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of self-positing, or, that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself.

The movement of self-positing is the movement described in paragraph 12, the movement in which the subject returns to itself from out of itself. It is a mediated process, but not, as for example with Kant, the mediation of the object given in experience by the subject's understanding, but rather the mediation of the subject with itself. This is not to exclude the object. The object is taken up in the understanding, the I thinks it. In taking up the understanding itself, the understanding is mediated, that is, becomes an object for knowledge for the subject.

[Edited to add:

18: The true is not an original unity as such, or, not an immediate unity as such. It is the coming-to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its end for its beginning, and which is actual only through this accomplishment and its end.

I was telling you why abstract numbers do not occur in nature, which is what we were discussing. — Dfpolis

Of course abstract numbers do not occur in nature, nothing abstracted from nature exists in nature.

If five is an abstraction from particular instances of five units or items then it is not actual except in that it is an actual abstraction.
— Fooloso4

Exactly! At last we agree. — Dfpolis

At last? I have never said anything to the contrary. What was at issue was your denial five of something is actually rather than potentially five of something. You recently corrected yourself on that matter.

People can argue whatever they like. There is no sound argument that "mathematical truths are not dependent on experience." How can we even know they are true unless they reflect our experience of reality? — Dfpolis

It those truths precede in time our experience of reality then they cannot be dependent on experience. Such is the case with non-Euclidean geometries. As another example consider infinitesimal calculus. There is no experience of infinitesimals. Not only are they not found in experience, they confound experience, as Zeno's paradoxes show. They are not abstracted from nature, they are theoretical constructs applied to it. In addition, the experience of motion or change does not yield the mathematics that adequately describes it.

non-Euclidean geometries. They are not abstracted from experience.
— Fooloso4

They can be. They are instantiated on spherical and saddle-shaped surfaces. If some axiom can't be, it's hypothetical. — Dfpolis

Instantiation is not abstraction.

Nothing can tell us something of the world without being instantiated in it -- and if it's instantiated in it, it can be abstracted from it. — Dfpolis

The historical fact of the matter is that they weren't abstracted. Non-Euclidean geometries were first developed as purely formal systems.

Kant had no sound reason to claim that. — Dfpolis

I won't bother getting into this. Do you imagine that neither Kant nor those who followed him were aware of this?

Perhaps, but as counting never exhausts the potential numbers, so human knowing never exhausts anything's essence. There is always more to learn. — Dfpolis

What is at issue is your claim regarding the intelligibility of an object. Whether or not human knowing exhausts something's essence, if intelligibility inheres in the object then a sufficiently advanced intelligence should be able to know what a baseball is without knowing what the game is, or, perhaps, would know from the ball what the game is. But there is nothing in the ball that would provide this information.

Yes, that is the issue, but your argument is based on the fact that our knowledge is not exhaustive. That our knowledge is only partial does not show there is no potential to know more -- no greater intelligibility that that we have actualized. — Dfpolis

No, my argument has nothing to do with the limits of human intelligence. It has to do with what is knowable from the object itself. Not knowable within the limits of human intelligence but from an intelligence without our limits.

Its purpose is in the minds of humans, not in the ball. — Dfpolis

That is right and that is why you cannot tell from the ball what its purpose is. To the extent the ball is intelligible its purpose is not part of that intelligibility. By your logic the intelligibility of a car does not include the potential to know that it is a means of transportation.

We can use the ball for other purposes, such as to be a display or even a paperweight. — Dfpolis

Yes, we have been through this already.

You said you were not a mathematical Platonist. — Dfpolis

I am not but your topic is an attack on mathematical platonism and if you are going to attack it you must accurately represent it.

I was explaining to you why the abstract five is not actual until abstracted. — Dfpolis

Your talk of potential and actual is misleading. If five is an abstraction from particular instances of five units or items then it is not actual except in that it is an actual abstraction.

No, it is not a mere assertion, but an appeal to experience. Platonists have no basis in experience for their position. — Dfpolis

I think they might argue that the fact that mathematical truths are not dependent on experience is all the experience they need. Consider, for example, non-Euclidean geometries. They are not abstracted from experience. They were initially seen an useless, mere curiosities. But with the discovery of the curvature of space, they found their application. They work. They are not merely formally or internally consistent, they tell us something about the world without being dependent on it.

If we merely constructed concepts, there would be no reason to think they apply to or are instantiated in, reality. — Dfpolis

First, see above regarding non-Euclidean geometries. Second, to some extent (Kant would say completely) experience is itself constructed. Third, concepts that are constructed are not all "merely" constructed, the construct may be based on experience but cannot be reduced to experience.

The intelligibility of an object is knowledge of its essence, that is, what it is to be the thing that it is.
— Fooloso4

First, intelligibility is not knowledge. It is the potential to be known. — Dfpolis

Okay. Let me rephrase it: The intelligibility of an object is the potential to know its essence. This changes nothing about what I said that follows from this. To use your favored language, knowledge of an object's essence is the actualization of its intelligibility.

Second, all human knowledge is partial, not exhaustive. We may, and usually do, know accidental traits rather than essences. — Dfpolis

The question is whether intelligibility inheres in the object. Whether or not our knowledge is partial is not at issue. The question is whether from the baseball alone it can be known that it is a baseball. An intelligence far greater than ours would not know this unless it also knows what the game is.

Third, there is nothing intrinsic to a baseball that relates it to any particular game. — Dfpolis

Of course there is! Being a baseball is not incidental to it being a baseball. It is constructed according to specific rules for a specific purpose. 'Baseball' is not simply a name attached to it. But if there is nothing intrinsic to a baseball that relates it to any particular game then your argument fails. We could not tell from it that it is a ball designed, manufactured, and used for one specific purpose.

In the same way, there is no actual five in nature. — Dfpolis

The mathematical platonist does not claim that there is an actual five in nature.

What is not actual is abstract fiveness, i.e. the pure number. — Dfpolis

That is nothing more than an assertion. The platonist asserts that there is, but it is not in nature.

Our act of attending/awareness actualizes intelligiblity, converting it into concepts. — Dfpolis

I agree with those who say we construct concepts rather than actualize them.

We have to distinguish inherrent intelligiblity from relational intelligiblity. All objects have both. — Dfpolis

The intelligibility of an object is knowledge of its essence, that is, what it is to be the thing that it is. What it is to be a baseball is not something that inheres in the object. It is to that extent not intelligible unless we know it as a baseball. To know it in its role in the game is not relational, it is essential to what it is.

My hope is that there are still enough people who value the truth and can distinguish truth from lies, and, and this is important, they reside and will vote in one of the states that will determine the election.

Mueller reluctant to the last to come straight out and say that the President committed impeachable offenses — Wayfarer

This is a big problem. Unfortunately, the Republican politicians are putting their own interests ahead of the country's and together with Fox News have convinced a large portion of the country not to believe Mueller while at the same time convincing them that Mueller did not find that Trump did anything wrong.

I am not denying that you have 5 fingers on your hand -- it is just that five fingers is not the abstract number 5 -- it is specific instance of five, not the universal five. — Dfpolis

What you seemed to be claiming is that the number, whether it is fingers or fruit, is not actual but potential until it is counted. One iteration of what you said is:

The number is predetermined, but not actual until the count is complete. — Dfpolis

What I said is that I actually have five fingers whether I count them or not. If I only get to three I still have five fingers.

As I said early on, I do not intend to defend platonic mathematics. For one, I am not well versed in the arguments. For another, I am agnostic on the matter.

If we cannot determine the unit, we can't count. The things we count are prior to our counting them. — Dfpolis

Agreed. I have said this from the beginning in my discussion of Greek mathematics.

The count of your fingers was predetermined to be five before anyone counted them, but there was no actual count of five fingers. — Dfpolis

Here we go again. There is no actual count until they are counted, but there are actually five fingers, which is confirmed by the count.

If it were not able to be known, no one could know it -- and if the knower were not able to be informed she could not be informed about the ball. — Dfpolis

Knowledge is not passive reception of "intelligibility". Knowledge is conceptual.

The ball is a baseball because of its relation to the game. Knowing the ball in itself will not tell us its relation to the game. — Dfpolis

And it follows from this that the intelligibility of a baseball is not something that inheres it the object.

The assumptions are all after learning. You have provided no alternate account of learning the concept. — Dfpolis

The child has learned to count the objects. If she is not told, or as you would have it, learned what a number is, what she thinks a number is can vary. Is she is taught by a mathematical platonist what she learns the concept is is not what she learns if you tell her what you think it is.

An excellent PhD adjunct instructor in Classics at the U of Minnesota said back in the early 1980s that college teaching was turning into 'migrant labor' because one could never put together enough jobs at one institution. One would end up running all over town. — Bitter Crank

They are academic migrant workers. — Fooloso4

I assume that it was a conservative push to reduce government expenditures ...Or maybe it was born out of a basic hatred of college professors. — Bitter Crank

I think it had something to do their animosity toward higher education, and, as you say a basic hatred of college professors. The Koch brothers are fixing that. They have bought whole departments and decide who will teach in those departments. Another problem is that considerable funds go to facilities to make colleges more like country clubs.

Yes, and unfortunately, in America, people would tell those qualified people to get out there and do something (those who can do, those who can't teach). — ZhouBoTong

I wonder what they think those with a PhD in philosophy should do. Be like Socrates and harass people at the mall?

I think that if potential students and their parents are aware of the problem and make clear that they will not apply to schools with a high percentage of adjuncts things may begin to change. Grad students teaching courses is another problem, especially in the sciences when the grad student comes from another country and her command of English is poor or has a heavy, difficult to understand accent.

And you believe the American people care about the truth because...? — Benkei

Because I am not yet that cynical. Perhaps four more years of Trump and I will be.

I don't think it is because people don't care about the truth, it is rather what they believe the truth to be. But it is also about priorities. Some may not care that Trump obstructed justice or has questionable dealings with the Russians or whatever unless they think I will hurt them in some way.

I hope you caught that I was joking — ZhouBoTong

I didn't. There are some who think it is an easy way to make a living with lots of free time.

Is not good and needs fixing. — ZhouBoTong

There was at time talk of adjuncts forming a union. I don't know if that ever happened. One major problem is that they would have no power. It would be no different than declining to teach a class. In some schools full-time faculty have successfully petitioned to put limits on the number of classes an adjunct could teach. I think that is a step in the right direction but for practical purposes it simply means that the adjunct would look to pick up classes elsewhere with possible extra burden of travel.

I don't know what will bring about change but as long as there is a pool of qualified people willing to teach and an administration unwilling to hire full-time, let alone tenure track, faculty the problem will persist.

Let's try this a different way. Surely the number does not inhere in the objects we count, for they can be grouped and counted in different ways to give different numbers. So, if it is already actual, and we agree that it does not pre-exist in our minds, where is it? — Dfpolis

The number is how many of whatever it is we are counting. If I count the number of fingers on one hand and I count correctly the number is 5. That is because I actually have 5 fingers on my hand. If one of my fingers was cut off I would count 4 and that is because I actually have 4 fingers on that hand.

So, do you agree that items can be counted if and only if they are actual and distinct? — Dfpolis

As I said from the beginning, the count depends on the unit. If we cannot determine the unit we cannot determine the count. It the items to be counted are actual then their total number is also actual.

What we choose to count is up to us, how many there are of what we count is not
— Fooloso4

Think of it this way. Classical physics is deterministic. — Dfpolis

No wonder you are confused! Counting something has nothing to do with determinism.

So it is with counting. The number is predetermined, but not actual until the count is complete. — Dfpolis

I would say that the number is not determined until we count, but what we are counting, the items, as you said, are actual. It is because there is actually this item and this item that we can determine how many there are. We can call this determination the count. It we count six and we count correctly that is because there are actually six of the items to be counted.

It means that its intelligibility is actualized by someone's awareness. — Dfpolis

This is evasive. Intelligible in what way? Which is to say, as I asked, what does it mean to say the ball is known?

It has to be known as an object, as a tode ti (a this something) before it's classified. — Dfpolis

If you mean that it stands out (literally, exists) distinct from all else, that does not mean that intelligibility is a property of the object. To be is not a property of what is. To be is a necessary condition for having properties. "This" is not a property of this something. To be intelligible a thing must be distinguishable as separate from other things but to be intelligible there must also be some subject to which it is intelligible. Without subjects there is no intelligibility.

Being a baseball is intelligible, but it is the ball as a whole, not a property of the whole. — Dfpolis

What you said was:

intelligibility inheres in objects — Dfpolis

If someone from a tribe that knows nothing about baseball were to find a baseball what it it about it that would make it intelligible to the tribesman that it is a baseball? Its intelligibility as a baseball is not something that inhere in the ball. To be intelligible as a baseball one must know what baseball is.

Now that I've answered your questions, can you explain their relevance? — Dfpolis

The relevance can be seen in the what I just said. If intelligibility inheres in the object then someone would know what a baseball is even if they did not know what the game of baseball is.

That would not change how she came to the concept. It was by abstracting from her experience of counting real things -- not by mystic intuition. — Dfpolis

No, it would not necessarily be by abstracting. I gave several different things she might assume, stories she might tell herself.

I am saying that whatever concepts we do have are abstracted from empirical experience. — Dfpolis

I would say that since none of us are without experience we cannot say what if any concepts we would form, but that concepts are not always abstractions, the can be something we add to rather than something we take away from experience.

I think the goal of the testimony has been achieved. An educated electorate is perhaps the highest good that can be imparted by one's leaders. — Wallows

While the Republicans are anxious to declare the end of the investigation, I do not think that Mueller's testimony accomplished what needs to be done. My not rendering conclusions he left it up to Congress, but Congress is so divided along partly lines that it will not render impartial conclusions. The Democrats must do what Mueller did not. They must present the investigation's findings in a clear and persuasive manner. They may not be able to convince their colleagues to impeach but they can bring the truth to the American people.

Don't these adjuncts just have more freedom to pursue their other interests when they are paid on a 'per classes taught' basis? — ZhouBoTong

Traditionally, adjuncts were experts working in other fields who brought their knowledge to the classroom. Since there is now a shortage of academic jobs and there are several financial advantages to the university, adjuncts are taking the place of full time instructors. They would prefer a full-time position but they are few and far between. The workload carried by an adjunct may the about the same as a full-time faculty member, but since adjuncts are so poorly paid and there are no healthcare and other benefits they must either work full time doing something else or work at multiple schools with a workload that far exceeds full time faculty, and still make only a small fraction of full-timers. They rarely have the time or energy to pursue other interests.

I have gotten the feel from both of you that you may be agreeable to American libertarianism? — ZhouBoTong

If you are referring to me then no I am not a libertarian. In my opinion libertarians cannot see passed their own self-interests narrowly and myopically construed. While I certainly favor individual rights I do not accept the notion of social atomism. Due consideration should be given to the public good and the good of the whole not just the protection of individual rights.

There are two potentials here. One is our potential to be informed, which belongs to us. The other is the set's potential to have its cardinality known, which belongs to what is countable, and is the basis in realty for the proper number to assign to the set. — Dfpolis

Both are dependent on us to determine, that is, to know or be informed of the number. In neither case is the number a potential number except with regard to our potential to know it.

I beg to differ. The items can be counted if and only if they are actual distinct items. — Dfpolis

I am not going to get into methods of counting bacteria.

How many there are of whatever it is we choose to count is independent of us.
— Fooloso4

This is self-contradictory. If the number is "How many there are of whatever it is we choose to count," it is not independent of us. — Dfpolis

What we choose to count is up to us, how many there are of what we count is not.

Necessarily, whatever is actually done can be done. If the ball is known, necessarily it can be known, and so is intelligible. As it can be known whether or not it is actually known, intelligibility inheres in objects. So, why do you say it is not a "property"? — Dfpolis

You ignore a great number of questions. What does it mean to say the ball is known? When someone identifies an object as a ball is the ball known? If they cannot tell you whether the material is rubber or synthetic is the ball known? If they do not know the molecular or subatomic make-up is the ball known? If they know it is a baseball is being a baseball an intelligible property of the object? If some other ball is used to play baseball is being a baseball an intelligible property of the object? If the ball is used as a doorstop does someone who only knows it as it is used for this purpose know that it is a ball? A baseball? If they saw someone hitting it with a stick wouldn't they wonder why he was hitting the doorstop with a stick? Perhaps they might think that he does not know what a door stop is.

And abstract arithmetic concepts from that experience. You let a child count four oranges, four pennies, etc., and she abstracts the concept <four>.. — Dfpolis

She might be a platonist and assume that <four> must still exist even when the oranges are eaten and the pennies spent. Or she might assume that <four> vanishes with the oranges and pennies. She might assume that there is only <four> when there are this many objects, even if they are not oranges and pennies. The "experience" of abstract arithmetic concepts may only come as the result of being taught to think of numbers in a certain way.

If numbers were objects in nature, you would be right, But they aren't objects in nature, they are the result of counting sets we chose to define. Why count only the fruit in this bowl instead of some other set we define? — Dfpolis

We might say, for example, that the number of bacteria in a petri dish is potentially thousands or tens of thousands. Whether one is platonist or not, however, in such a case the number refers to the objects being counted. At any given moment that number is an actual number, even if we do not know what that number is. Here potential means we do not know what the actual number is.

What you said was:

Quantity in nature is countable or measurable -- potential not actual numbers. "There are seven pieces of fruit in the bowl" is true, if on counting the pieces of fruit, we come to seven and no more. — Dfpolis

The number of bacteria in the petri dish or fruit in the bowl or whatever it is that we are counting cannot be counted if that number is not an actual number of items.

That makes the numbers partly dependent on us and partly dependent on the objects counted. So, numbers do not actually exist until we define what we're going to count and count it. — Dfpolis

What is dependent on us is what we choose to count. How many there are of whatever it is we choose to count is independent of us. Here we are not talking about the concept of number but how many of something.

The intelligibility of an object simply means that we are able to understand it in some way. That is not an aspect of the object.
— Fooloso4

So, being rubber or spherical are not aspects of a rubber ball? — Dfpolis

Rubber and spherical are properties of the object. Intelligibility is not a property.

Just because we can fix on the ball's matter or the form does not mean that the ball's intelligible properties depend on us (unless we're the ones defining the object). — Dfpolis

The intelligible properties are those properties we understand, rubber and spherical. Intelligibility is not another property that is intelligible.

What depends on us is which notes of intelligibility we choose to fix upon. — Dfpolis

What depends on us is the ability to understand, to make the object intelligible to us.

What we experience is not an assumption. It is data. — Dfpolis

We are talking about what a number is, the concept or ontology of numbers. That is not an experience or data. We do not experience numbers, we experience objects of a certain if indeterminate amount.

Right. I never said that variables and determinate numbers were the same. — Dfpolis

You were responding to the following:

In the briefest terms, the arithmos is always a definite number of definite things,a collection of countable units, whereas in modern math a number, '4' for example, is itself an object. With the move to symbols, 'x' does not signify anything but itself. — Fooloso4

The point was the one you now acknowledge. Klein's insight is into the radical shift in mathematics from numbers to symbols. Although we treat them as interchangeable when we assign value to the variable, numbers and symbols are not interchangeable. We do not assign values to numbers, we must assign value to variables. Numbers are determinate. Symbols are indeterminate. 3+2=5 is true. a+b=5 may be true or false. 3+2=5 is not dependent on us. a+b=5 is dependent on the values we assign to a and b.

Yes, the cardinality of the fruit in the bowl is seven whether we count or not. — Dfpolis

My issue is with what you call "potential numbers". The number of pieces of fruit in the bowl or the number of seeds in the pieces of fruit in the bowl in never a potential but an actual number. We may have the potential to determine that number but that does not make it a "potential number".

It is not trivial that the intelligibility of an object does not constitute an actual concept. A state's potential for a seven count does not exclude is simultaneous potential for other counts when conceived in other ways. So, it is not trivial that states require further (mental) determination to be assigned actual numbers. — Dfpolis

This is really convoluted and seems to be contradictory. The intelligibility of an object simply means that we are able to understand it in some way. That is not an aspect of the object. The way in which something is understood is not an aspect of the object but rather of our ability to see it or understand it in different ways. If a state requires mental determination then that determination is not an aspect of the object but rather something we say or know or understand or have determined about the object.

Exactly, and so one that requires justification. — Dfpolis

No inquiry is free of assumptions. The ontology of mathematical objects is an open question. It is not that different theories of mathematical objects are without justification it is that there is no universal agreement regarding their justification.

It lacks determinant reference, but it has a reference type. That type may be a numerical value or something else that can be represented by the formalism. — Dfpolis

Which means that it differs fundamentally from a number, which is always has a determine value.

...to which end, Trump is about to sign off on the all-time record for Government deficits..... — Wayfarer

Once upon a time, long, long ago, before Trump that was supposed to have mattered to Republicans, although the truth is that the Democratic administrations have done much better at lowering the deficit. In any case, I don't think it has ever been much of a concern for the Evangelicals, since for them small government means staying out of their business, the business of religion.

I can’ t fathom how any self-described Christian could approve of Trump if they know anything about him.
— Wayfarer

Might have something to do with ushering in the End of Time. — Amity

I agree. To fill it out a bit. Based on Revelations a "new Jerusalem" is one of the signs of the Apocalypse according to Evangelicals. One of Trump's promises was to make Jerusalem the capital of Israel.

A few other points:

Trump is a man and even if he is, as some believe, sent by God, he is a man and has human foibles, he sins and is deserving of forgiveness no matter of how many pussies he grabs and how many women he cheats on his wives with.

He claims to be anti-abortion and has promised to overturn Roe, packing the courts with anti-abortion judges.

Evangelicals favor small government and the dismantling of the administrative state because they see the government as a threat to freedom, specifically religious freedom, and more specifically their religious freedom. Trump has positioned himself as a champion of religious freedom, even if they see through his phony religious piety.

Many of these students are ill-prepared for higher education but there is a persistent push to get students to attend college. Higher education has adopted a business model sometime in the seventies and since the bottom line is now the most important thing, a major concern is retention. It is couched in terms of the interest of the students but it is really all about not having empty seats. "The customer is always right" is their unspoken motto.This has contributed to grade inflation. Instructors bear the brunt of the blame from both students and administration if students fail or get poor grades. Students expect to get A's of B's for doing minimal work of poor quality. There is an enormous sense of entitlement.

Some years back I read something by a professor whose evaluations by students were always low. The most common complaint was that he was too demanding. And so he decided to treat the class as if it were kindergarten. He even brought cookies for snack time. He praised them for whatever they said or did. He made sure all assignments were easy and if they could not handle even that he still graded them as if they were the exceptional students they thought they were. He quickly became teacher of the year.

More and more classes are now being taught by adjuncts. As full time faculty retire or move on they are not replaced by tenure track instructors. Adjuncts are often as qualified as tenured faculty but are paid very poorly and must teach multiple courses at several schools and take other jobs on top of that if they are to live above the poverty level. The are academic migrant workers. No contracts and no benefits.This is not an exaggeration. No matter how qualified they cannot keep up with the amount of classes they teach. It is one of higher educations dirty little secrets.

My comment is directly on point, and does not attack a straw man, but premise ii. — Dfpolis

2+2=4 is not a "Platonic relationship". That 2+2=4 is true, according to mathematical platonism is due to the nature of numbers. The relationship is made possible by their nature. The relationship itself is not another platonic object.

Quantity in nature is countable or measurable -- potential not actual numbers. "There are seven pieces of fruit in the bowl" is true, if on counting the pieces of fruit, we come to seven and no more. — Dfpolis

The number of pieces of fruit in the bowl is undetermined until counted. This does not mean that the number of pieces is a potential number. It is an actual number that before we count we might say it could be six or seven or eight. There are actually seven pieces whether we count them or miscount them. They do not become seven by counting them. We are able to count seven because there are actually seven pieces of fruit in the bowl.

I'm saying that every note of intelligibility is an aspect of the object known. — Dfpolis

So, an aspect of something known is that it is knowable. Aside from being tautological and trivially true it raises questions that go beyond the current topic and so I will leave it there.

Do you mean different concepts that were in prior use?
— Fooloso4

No, I mean that concepts don't change. — Dfpolis

The question was about your wording. Whether the 'not' in "not in prior use" was a typo.

This is an interpretive, not a mathematical, claim. — Dfpolis

Of course it is interpretative! What is at issue is the concept of number. That is an interpretive question.

No, "x" does not mean the letter "x." It has reference beyond itself. — Dfpolis

It does not have any reference until it is assigned one. That is the point. It is a variable that can stand for any unknown. In this sense it is different from both "4" as how many or "4" as an object.

[Added trivia note: I read somewhere that Descartes' publisher used x because he was low on letters an x was not frequently used in French. Whether that is true or not I did not verify.]

It may mean an unknown we seek to determine, a variable we can instantiate as we will, or possibly other things ... — Dfpolis

Right.

but it never signifies itself — Dfpolis

It is because it is indeterminate that it does not signify something other than itself, which is to say, unlike a number it has no signification until or unless assigned one. It could stand for any number or no number at all.

I personally don't believe that a God played any role in the apparition of life on earth or in evolution (I am saying this because maybe my post suggested otherwise). — Patulia

I took your statements to be about Darwin and evolution, not your own beliefs on the matter.

I respect those who believe that everything happened according to God's plan — Patulia

I have always found this claim to be problematic. It may be for some a source of comfort, but since things happen as they do there is no way to know whether they happen according to plan since whatever happens can be said to happen according to plan but just as well can be said to happen without a plan or at least in the case of human actions contrary to God's will.

Darwin was a believer and, after reading his books and notes, one could come to the conclusion that Darwin actually believed there was a God behind the whole evolution process. — Patulia

The Origin of Species says nothing about the origin of life. This is an important point that is often overlooked. Whatever his beliefs in God may have been, it is quite clear that he did not describe God as playing any role in speciation. And, as you say, the science of evolution has evolved since Darwin.

Fooloso4 The old jokes are still the best ones, eh? — Pattern-chaser

I have become one.

Since the topic of this thread is Trump I will refrain from saying more about Warren.

I am going to leave it there. This thread is not the place to discuss economic realities.

As others have said, education in the US varies widely, both in an between public and private schools. I cannot speak of elsewhere.

A few observations:

The idea of individuality is of central importance, thus there not much emphasis on conformity, except perhaps with such things as school uniforms. Individuality of thought and action plays well, within certain bounds.

I do not know if things have changed recently but last I checked those receiving degrees in education were in general at or near the bottom of their class.

Parents tend to take the side of their children when it comes to discipline problems and will blame the teacher if the student is failing.

Some years back I did some reading on the philosophy of education and it was a dismal affair. Schools would change their approach to education often and sometimes radically based on questionable theories of education and research that seemed to be designed to confirm whatever assumptions it intended to prove.

Someone earlier - was it you? - mentioned that for whatever reason the average American credits and/or discredits the current president - at that time - for the economy - at that time. Well, this sort of thinking has all sorts of problems inherent to it... — creativesoul

Yes, there is are all sorts of problems inherent to it, but it is a common belief.

There is no measure of what ought be done. — creativesoul

This is something the Federal Reserve is dealing with now. The economy is not behaving according to the common assumption that when employment is high it creates inflation. Contrary to standard practice rather than raise interest rates Powell is lowering them. His idea is to respond quickly to what is occurring at the moment rather than based on predictions of what will happen. Since no one really knows the consequence of whatever action is taken it is hard to say whether his strategy is sound. There are always unintended consequences and unforeseen factors. Quick corrections might be the way to go. But the US is just one player in the global economy. It is not really in control of what happens to the US economy.

The standards of measurement for success/good are suspect to say the least. — creativesoul

Elizabeth Warren's concerns with income inequality is not egalitarian ideology or anti-capitalism. She thinks that based on past history when there is great disparity between rich and poor the result will be depression. Right now that disparity is greater than it was before the Great Depression. She has a pretty good record on things like this. But again, the economy right now is defying predictions.

No reason at all. We're all gonna die. Etc. — bongo fury

Being smothered to death by a blanket though does not seem like a good way to go.

Let's compromise: snooty joke. — bongo fury

Sure, why not.

Fair, if snooty, point. — bongo fury

I prefer the term arch. It was a joke.

If my last post above is in any way to blame for your sense — bongo fury

Don't take it personally. I won't name names or initials.

Aw shucks.

There's a C S Lewis book called God in the Dock. It's a collection of essays, but the meaning of the title is that it implies a "God on Trial", based on an analogy made by Lewis suggesting that modern human beings, rather than seeing themselves as standing before God in judgement, prefer to place God on trial while acting as his judge. Which is exactly what I think the OP does. It my view, it's related to the (false) modern, anthropological conception of deity, which sees God as a kind of super-manager or ultimately responsible agent, in the same way as a CEO or executive is responsible. — Wayfarer

This is a big part of what the story of Job is about. It is by no means a modern conception of deity.

See also Elie Wiesel's discussions and play about putting God on trial while he was in Auschwitz.

18.

Furthermore, the living substance is the being that is in truth subject, or, what amounts to the same thing, it is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of self-positing, or, that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself.

In #17 he said:

... substantiality comprises within itself the universal, or, it comprises not only the immediacy of knowing but also the immediacy of being, or, immediacy for knowing.

How are we to reconcile these statements? Is it immediacy or mediation?

#17 begins as a view from the end or completion, a view which Hegel says:

... must be justified by the exposition of the system itself ...

Hegel identified two modes of this exposition. Both are the consequence of thinking identity without difference. These should not be thought of as simply abstract logical consequences but as having occurred within the history of philosophy, the logic of the development of spirit.

In the first it is the identity of thinking with itself - universality, simplicity, undifferentiated, unmoved substantiality.

In the second the identify of thinking and being as immediacy - inert simplicity, actuality itself in a fully non-actual mode.

In #18 he shifts from lifeless categories to living substance, the being that is in truth subject. In its immediacy it is both the knower and what is known (#17). But in is in truth only insofar as it
is the movement of self-positing. The term comes from Fichte:

Fichte is suggesting that the self, which he typically refers to as "the I," is not a static thing with fixed properties, but rather a self-producing process. Yet if it is a self-producing process, then it also seems that it must be free, since in some as yet unspecified fashion it owes its existence to nothing but itself. https://www.iep.utm.edu/fichtejg/

Hegel adds that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself. As self-determining it is other than itself in that it is not yet what it determines itself to be.

As subject, it is pure, simple negativity, and,as a result, it is the estrangement of what is simple, or, it is the doubling which posits oppositions and which is again the negation of this indifferent diversity and its opposition.

Self-positing is negative in that it is a rejection of what it is in order to become what it will be.

That is, it is only this self-restoring sameness, the reflective turn into itself in its otherness.

The movement is within the subject, a turning from within itself away from and back to itself. In its otherness it is still its sameness. That is, it is never wholly other.

The true is not an original unity as such, or, not an immediate unity as such. It is the coming-to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its end for its beginning, and which is actual only through this accomplishment and its end.

The subject here is not the individual or only the individual but mankind.

I think our poor little three year old has suffocated under her blanket. It seems that no one has been paying attention to her.

I myself like to use a kind of falsification method... not sure how to describe that in English, an "Ausschlussverfahren"? As in, I see what ideas, associations and hypotheses I can come up with myself, and then check if they hold up under scrutiny: Test them against the text itself, and with external sources, shave them with Occams razor and see what remains. — WerMaat

I do something similar. I start with what I think he is saying and then go back to the text to see how well that squares with what it says. It may seem as though I am on the right track but then I ask myself how this or that statement fits in. Without forcing it I see if I can make it fit and whether this helps make sense of the larger context or if I need to change how I initially understood it. This process continues as I read. Sometimes what I thought fit together must be torn apart and rebuilt if I cannot get what I am now reading to fit. Maybe what I had put together is not right and maybe what I am now trying to put together is not right and sometimes neither is right and the whole thing needs to be revised. But it may be that there are pieces that come later, and so, everything remains tentative.

Each part must be understood in its details and taken together all the parts should form a whole with those parts serving their function within the whole. The parts themselves can form wholes in the same way that a hand is a whole but a part of a larger whole. The process of reading is both analytic and synthetic, breaking things down and putting them together.

I noticed that often when I appeal to common sense, people will want some background reference, or statistical or other evidence to support an opinion. — god must be atheist

There is a difference between an opinion and an informed opinion. Common sense is not sufficient when what you are offering an opinion about is something that involves matters of fact. If your opinion is an informed opinion then you need to say what it is that informs that opinion. An example, let's say you are arguing about vaccines. Common sense is that we should not inject harmful substances into the body, but that does not tell us whether the substances in vaccines are harmful or whether the benefits outweigh the risks.

I also noticed that when I make an opinion, and state it as a claim, on the works of some classic philosopher, then people will ask me "where did he state that / can you quote an exact page number and book where he said that, so I can look it up, etc. — god must be atheist

There are several reasons why one should cite the source. So that others can read what the author actually said. To determine whether what you said accurately represented the author's words. To see the context, which is important to understanding the meaning of what is said.

Case in point I talked about Wittgenstein on July 20 and 21, 2019 — god must be atheist

Case in point, without providing information on where you said this we cannot read what was said or evaluate it without access to content and context.

At this point I don't know if this demanding nature of other users of the forum is genuine, and they really need me to back up my opinion with quotes, statistics and other hard evidence, or else they are using this tool as a tactic to discredit my opinions. — god must be atheist

I cannot speak for everyone but there are some of us here who do not think that is is being demanding but rather is just standard practice in philosophical discussion that makes reference to philosophers or deals with matters of fact.

... I'll ask them to please forego the demand for evidence, and accept my argument on the strength of my reasoning. — god must be atheist

The strength of your reasoning is directly tied to the evidence on which it is based. Or, if your claim is that in any particular case or in all cases there is no need for evidence then you must be able to explain why evidence is not needed.

If your position is that it is just your opinion then why should anyone take it seriously? Is it your opinion that a philosophy forum exists simply to allow you to inform us of your opinions?

[Added]: Out of curiosity I tracked down the posts where you talked about Wittgenstein. You presented your opinion:

In my opinion Witty lacked the insight of accepting the status quo of language.

but qualifying it by saying it is your opinion does not mean that it is correct. It is completely at odds with what Wittgenstein was showing in the Investigations. There is a reading group in the forum on Wittgenstein's PI. Meaning as use it discussed at length and citations are given. He repeatedly points to the "status quo of language" as fundamental to most of our language games. If you opinion is at odds with what is said in the text then it is up to you to show that your opinion should be taken seriously by appeal preferably to the text or to the secondary literature. Note that this is how the reading group functions. It has nothing to do with a tactic to discredit your opinions.