But I'm not interested in what the theses are. At least, not in this passage. I'm interested in why, were such to be produced, "it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.". — StreetlightX

[edit]

What I take him to be saying is that given the simplicity and familiarity of aspects of things that are most important for us, one does not question them. Unless,of course, one is a philosopher.

We are not told what such theses might be, but we are told what they would not be - they would not be theories of the essence of language. As he says in the next paragraph:

129. The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something a because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of their inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck them. a And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.

Given their simplicity and familiarity they are not things that would be called into question. But, of course, there will always be "that guy" who does question them. And so, debate may ensue. And with that we start down the path of endless confusion.

He continues:

130. ... Rather, the language games stand there as objects of comparison which, through similarities and dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on features of our language.

131. For we can avoid unfairness or vacuity in our assertions only by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison - as a sort of yardstick; not as a preconception to which reality must
correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.)

Where we seem to be in disagreement is with regard to the meaning of 'the everyday use of language'. As I understand it, he is referring to actual language games, that is, what we say and do within our forms of life.

Does Witty simply mean that all theory collapses into description? But surely people can describe 'wrongly' - we can be wrong about descriptions, and therefore there is room for debate? Questions to provoke some replies, hopefully. — StreetlightX

I do not think theory collapses into description. I take the point to be that attempts to establish a theory of language or a theory of meaning, questions of the essence and foundations of language that must be uncovered misleads and confuses us. We are not in need of a theory of language. Description serves to point to what he wants us to see: “Don’t think, but look!” Wittgenstein does not describe language as a whole but language games, that is, not a theory of language but descriptions of language use in practice.

5. If one looks at the example in §1, one can perhaps get an idea of how much the general concept of the meaning of a word surrounds the working of language with a haze which makes clear vision impossible. - It disperses the fog if we study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of use in which one can clearly survey the purpose and functioning of the words.
A child uses such primitive forms of language when he learns to talk.
Here the teaching of language is not explaining, but training.

65. Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations. - For someone might object against me: “You make things easy for yourself! You talk about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what is essential to a language-game, and so to language: what is common to all these activities, and makes them into language or parts of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you the most headache, the part about the general form of the proposition and of language.”
And this is true. - Instead of pointing out something common to all that we call language, I’m saying that these phenomena have no one
thing in common in virtue of which we use the same word for all a but there are many different kinds of affinity between them. And on account of this affinity, or these affinities, we call them all “languages”.

89. With these considerations we find ourselves facing the problem: In what way is logic something sublime?
For logic seemed to have a peculiar depth a a universal significance.
Logic lay, it seemed, at the foundation of all the sciences. For logical investigation explores the essence of all things. It seeks to see to the foundation of things, and shouldn’t concern itself whether things actually happen in this or that way. —– It arises neither from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp causal connections, but from an urge to understand the foundations, or essence, of everything empirical. Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out new facts; it is, rather, essential to our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand.

92. This finds expression in the question of the essence of language, of propositions, of thought. - For although we, in our investigations, are trying to understand the nature of language - its function, its structure - yet this is not what that question has in view. For it sees the essence of things not as something that already lies open to view, and that becomes surveyable through a process of ordering, but as something that lies beneath the surface. Something that lies within, which we perceive when we see right into the thing, and which an analysis is supposed to unearth.
‘The essence is hidden from us’: this is the form our problem now assumes. We ask: “What is language?”, “What is a proposition?” And
the answer to these questions is to be given once for all, and independently of any future experience.

94. ‘Remarkable things, propositions!’ Here we already have the sublimation of our whole account of logic. The tendency to assume a pure intermediary between the propositional sign and the facts. Or even to try to purify, to sublimate, the sign itself. - For our forms of expression, which send us in pursuit of chimeras, prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing extraordinary is involved.

97. … We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language. That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, inference, truth, experience, and so forth. This order is a super-order between a so to speak a super-concepts. Whereas, in fact, if the words “language”, “experience”, “world” have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words “table”, “lamp”, “door”.

That said, I'm not sure what it is that the philosopher 'marshalls' when he or she 'marshalls recollections': recollections of what? Any ideas? — StreetlightX

I think it refers to "the actual use of language" (124) "to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use (116)"

Socrates asked questions similar to these once in Athens, and they killed him and giving us our own figurative Jesus figure. Only Socrates did not die for our sins, but our ignorance, prejudice and stupidity. If it was wrong for people unqualified to kill Socrates then it should be wrong for people who find it hard to spell their own name ruining democracy today. — thedeadidea

A strong case can be made that Socrates was guilty as charged. We should not assume that the way we might evaluate these issues post Socrates is the way we would have evaluated them then. Whether one judges him to have corrupted the youth depends in large part on whether you were a patriotic citizen who believed in the Athenian traditions regarding gods and men. It should be noted that Socrates did not deny the charges of atheism. We may approve of the changes he helped bring about, but the jury was persuaded that he posed an existential threat.

As to voting:

It can be argued that since everyone is effected by at least some of the decisions made by the government, they should have a voice is how they are to live. In addition, intellect alone does not assure that one will make the right decision. Well informed, intelligent people often reach very different conclusions.

If I am 10 years old and my brother is 5 years old I am twice as old as he is. If I am 50 years old and he is 45 years old I am no longer twice as old. The older we get the less the fractional difference: 5/10, 45/50, 95/100.

I think he is saying that the purpose is to be found in what is higher, when one sees the world aright from the perspective sub specie aeterni.



.

Being is indemonstrable. — philosophy

Does Parmenides say this? Either something is or nothing is. Since Parmenides rejects the latter the former must be granted or demonstrated.

This means that Being is not even accessible to reason. — philosophy

According to the poem, it is a "trustworthy account" told by an unnamed goddess who makes these things known. I take this to be rhetorical. He is holding these truths that the goddess has revealed or uncovered (aletheia) superior to those of mortal men.

reaches a mystical conclusion (that all is ''One''). — philosophy

Recent scholarship has questioned this assumption. 'What is' is whole and indivisible, but there may be more than one thing that is. There is a great deal of disagreement as to how the poem is to be interpreted, including the relationship between what is and sensible objects. One problem is that if being and different than these objects then they are not and cannot be thought.

questions relating to ''Being'', for Aristotle, belong to a subject prior to science, that subject being metaphysics. — philosophy

The subject matter is the first or fundamental science, the question of being qua being. It is not a science in the modern sense of the term but sciencia, knowledge.

A lot of ink has been spilt on Witty's understanding of the 'survayability of grammar' (@Fooloso4 linked to a nice article on it here), but I want to try my hand at reading it on my own terms. — StreetlightX

It was Luke who provided the link.

In this regard, to create a 'surveyable representation' is to create a kind of 'local map of grammar': it is to understand how the/a grammar of use relates to the particular activities (forms-of-life?) in which that grammar finds its purpose. Importantly, it is also to recognise that that grammar does not extend beyond that purpose: there is no grammar that would encompass all instances of use: there is only ever this or that use, in this or that language-game. This is what is means to say that "our grammar is deficient in surveyability": there is no Archimedean point from which one could survey (all?) grammar from without (no ideal) - one must only ever work with actual (local) grammars. — StreetlightX

I agree with the distinction between local and global. In terms of language games it is the distinction between a surveyable representation of a language game and a surveyable representation of all language games. As I read it the former is not only possible, it is "of fundamental significance for us", and is what Wittgenstein is attempting to provide. The latter, however, is not. When he says that our grammar is deficient in surveyability I take this to mean the grammar of the language game being played rather than the grammar of language games in general or in toto. This deficiency is not a necessary condition, but one that can be rectified.

One of the reasons I'm employing these cartographic terms (map making terms) like 'local' and 'global' is that it helps account for §123, which talks about how philosophical problems consist in 'not knowing one's way about'. — StreetlightX

A couple of examples I cited earlier of what might be called the "surveyor's language" :

I am showing my pupils details of an immense landscape which they cannot possibly know their way around.
— Culture and Value 7

Our language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses. — PI 18

People say: it’s not the word that counts, but its meaning, thinking of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, even though different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow one can buy with it. (On the other hand, however: money, and what can be done with it.) — PI, 120

What are we to make of the parenthetical remark? He rejects the idea that meaning is a thing of the same kind as the word; I do not, however, think he is rejecting the distinction between a word and its meaning. Buying a cow is not the only thing one can do with money. What can be done with words is like what can be done with money, but we can do more with money than just buy cows.

The question of money and what can be done with it is analogous to the question:

Yes, that is a sentence. An English sentence. And what is it supposed to be doing? — On Certainty 352

When at PI 117 he says:

As if the meaning were an aura the word brings along with it and retains in every kind of use.

we need to pay attention not only to the image of an aura but to the notion of an aura that is retained in every kind of use. "In every kind of use" would be the equivalent of money being used only to buy cows. Words may have an aura (e.g.,"loaded words"), but that aura is not inherent in the words themselves, and it is not retained in whatever circumstances the word is used.

That was my impression as well, but I wondered about him saying "Cavell's Wittgenstein", "according to Cavell", Cavell's reading", and so on. In the opening paragraph he says:

... if Cavell is right about who Wittgenstein is—Wittgenstein’s point.

Does he intend to leave this "if" an open question, as though interpretation is never settled? He does, however, reject certain interpretations.

This is a great paper that deals with Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein — StreetlightX

Does Conant agree with Cavell's reading?

In the Apology Socrates professes his ignorance. In the Republic, however, he tells stories of a transcendent reality. In trying to make sense of this contradiction what should not be overlooked is that in his talk of knowledge of the Forms he admits he has no such knowledge.

With regard to the divided line, we should not move up too quickly. Images and imagination are of central importance and at play on many levels in Plato's writings, including the image of the divided line itself.

The philosopher not only banishes the poets from the Republic, he takes their place. He creates his own images on the cave wall, a philosophical poesis, a philosophical poetry.

Socrates talks about the necessity of noble lies. Plato tells one that shaped the western world.

Doesn't awareness of forms of life also imply a transcendental vantage point? — frank

By forms of life he means our ways of life, what we say and do. An anthropologist might study the forms of life of a people, but here Cavell is pointing to our engagement in the world.

Cool. So statements about the world imply a weird vantage point, as if we're in the painting and also observing it from the outside. — frank

He is referring to "philosophers" or those on either side of the verification argument who see themselves as outside the world as a whole, as if the world is an object that one observes. Cavell, following Wittgenstein, points to forms of life -

It is as though, deprived of the ordinary forms of life in which this connection is, and is alone, secured, he is trying to reestablish in his immediate consciousness, then and there.

What Cavell says about houses turning into flowers in The Claim of Reason appears in a chapter entitled: “Skepticism and the Existence of the World”. He is responding to Norman Malcolm’s criticism of the verification argument. He says that there is overwhelming evidence that printed words do not undergo spontaneous change, and in the same way there is absolutely conclusive evidence that houses do not turn into flowers. Cavell says that in denying that we have conclusive verification that houses do not turn into flowers he is not to be understood as asserting that we do not have verification of it:

I am asserting, rather, that we do not yet know what verification for or against it would be … both [the denial and assertion] rest on the same concept of what knowledge is, or must be … Both, in a word, use “absolutely conclusive verification out of its ordinary context.

He goes on to ask and say:

What are we imagining when we think of this as merely “in fact” the case about our world, in the way it is merely in fact that the flowers in this garden have not been sufficiently watered …? It is my feeling that such things could present themselves to us as just more facts about our world were we to (when we) when we look upon the whole world as one object, or as one complete set of objects: that is another way of characterizing that experience I have called “seeing ourselves as outside the world as a whole” … This experience I have found to be fundamental in classical epistemology (and, in deed, moral philosophy). It sometimes presents itself to me as a sense of powerlessness to know the world, or to act upon it; I think it is also working in the existentialists (or, say, Santayana’s) sense of the precariousness and arbitrariness of existence, the utter contingency in the fact that things are as they are. (Wittgenstein shares this knowledge of the depth of contingency.

…

The philosopher’s experience of trying to prove it [objects or the world] is there is I will now add, one of trying to establish an absolutely firm connection with that world-object from that sealed position. It is as though, deprived of the ordinary forms of life in which this connection is, and is alone, secured, he is trying to reestablish in his immediate consciousness, then and there.

In the ordinary sense I know that houses do not turn into flowers, but this in not what the philosopher demands of claims of knowledge. Given the contingency of existence we simply do not have knowledge in an absolute, apodictic, infallible sense.

But, what about Wittgenstein? Don't you think he made his fair share of contribution to the state of philosophy? — Wallows

Yes, I do think he made a contribution, but the question is about progress.

Some remarks from Wittgenstein's Culture and Value:

‘I read: “philosophers are no nearer to the meaning of ‘Reality’ than Plato got … ” What a singular situation. How singular then that Plato has been able to get even as far as he did! Or that we could get no further afterwards! Was it because Plato was so clever?’

Philosophy hasn't made any progress? -- If somebody scratches the spot where he has an itch, do we have to see some progress? Isn't it genuine scratching otherwise, or genuine itching? And can't this reaction to an irritation continue in the same way for a long time before a cure for the itching is discovered?

Our civilization is characterized by the word ‘progress’. Progress is its form rather than making progress one of its features. Typically it constructs. It is occupied with building an ever more complicated structure. ‘And even clarity is only sought as a means to this end,not as an end in itself. For me on the contrary clarity,perspicuity are valuable in themselves. I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as in having a perspicuous view of the foundations of typical buildings.’

What is it to practise 'extreme tenuousness' ?
Do you have a reference ? — Amity

Daodejing, Chapter 16. Depending on which translation you are using it may say something slightly or significantly different. Tenuousness is an openness, a lack of insistence. It is to allow things to show themselves as they are rather than imposing some conceptual scheme or structure on them. It is the opposite of attempting to have things conform to one's will.

In line with this, I would not push the comparison with Socrates too far, but if we are aware of our ignorance then we do not insist that things are or should be according to our desires and understanding.

I'm going to take an example that keeps on popping up in my mind, a la Plato, Marx, and others that progress has been made when the Holli Poli has been changed in some fundamental way. — Wallows

I do not think of this as philosophical progress. It should not be forgotten that the social/political/theological changes brought about by Plato is due to belief in his noble lies. In the case of Marx, it was ideological, or, as some would have it, messianic. Although, thanks largely to Enlightenment thinkers we enjoy a great deal of freedom and autonomy, that condition is precarious. It is entirely possible that the future may bring an age of repression and brutality unmatched in history. Freedom and autonomy can be a curse as well as a blessing as people struggle to find their identity and way.

I do not see progress having been made in the state of the art of philosophy. There is good reason why there has been a resurgence of interest in the ancients.

But making a metaphysical claim is a context of actual use, just like any other special circumstance of use. You can't say that making a metaphysical claim is not an instance of actual use, that would be untrue. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein says:

... one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home?

What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (116)

He contrasts metaphysical use and everyday use. When he says in 117:

... he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.)

he is not referring to any use but everyday use. It is everyday use that he means by actual use. It is only the philosopher who would point to something in front of him and say "This is here". That is not actual use, that is, everyday use. In everyday use it makes sense, its metaphysical use does not.

Yes it is. When someone says something, that is exactly how the statement is used. An instance of someone saying something is a particular instance of actual use, in particular circumstances. What else could special circumstances of actual use ever mean? — Metaphysician Undercover

The special circumstances are particular circumstances. Particular circumstances are not just any circumstances.

Each instance of use is particular to the special circumstances of that instance of use. — Metaphysician Undercover

Both 'special' and 'particular' are translations of the German term Besondere.

So that instance of someone saying something is exactly how the word or statement is actually used. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the answer to the question at 116:

... is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home?

is yes, then what does he mean when he goes on to say:

What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.

?

And what does he mean when at 117 he says:

... he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.)

if the metaphysical use is actual use? If the use in the example is actual use then why would he say that this person should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used?

I don't think that you should make that assumption, but thanks for finally admitting that you are making it. You formerly said: "I don't know why you would assume that I have assumed any such thing." — Luke

The thing I make no assumptions about is what he means when he says "this is here". I do not know why he would say that.

I am not assuming a specific meaning.
— Fooloso4

But you just said that you were. Again. — Luke

The specific meaning refers to what he means when he says "this is here". I don't think Wittgenstein intends for us to question what he is pointing to or that what he is saying refers to what he is pointing to. Isn't that the way pointing works?

Then why did you say that my example "replaces the one Wittgenstein rejects"? — Luke

Because that is what Wittgenstein says he should do:

... he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.)

Why someone would point to something in front of him and say it is here makes no sense. Under other circumstances the sentence "This is here" does make sense. Wittgenstein is asking us to consider those case.

It is the same sentence and pointing, only with added context (i.e. special circumstances). — Luke

Right. The circumstances are different. That is why your example makes sense and Wittgenstein's does not.

Why does it make no sense in Wittgenstein's example? — Luke

For one, he says it doesn't. "There it makes sense" In this example it doesn't. What would someone mean by it?

You formerly said: "It is not a matter of adding context to the example in order to make sense of it." — Luke

Right. He is suggesting looking at particular circumstances where it makes sense. One might concoct a story in which his example does make sense, but that is not what he is suggesting. If you think that pointing to something in front of you and saying "This is here" then ask yourself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.

Right, the meaning of "this" (or "this is here") is different in each example, but the pointing is not different. — Luke

Once again, what you are pointing to is not the same. You are not pointing to the object, the map, but to something on the map.

But thanks for once again including the pointing. You formerly said: "He is not asking us to consider circumstances in which one points while saying it." — Luke

Your example is one in which you point. Not all examples of where it makes sense to say "this is here" involve pointing. Here are a few:

We are playing chess and someone bumps the board. I put the knight back where it was and say "this is here".

I am expecting a package and when if comes in the mail someone who knows I am expecting it brings it to me and says "this is here".

I find an novel in the reference section of the library. I pull the book out and show it to the librarian standing with me and say "this is here".

It is frustrating when you act as though your position has remained unchanged all along. — Luke

I am sorry that you are frustrated but my position has remained the same, but for some reason I cannot figure out you have not understood me. And that is frustrating!

In Wittgenstein's example, "This is here" does not yet have a sense. It's not that it doesn't make sense, but that its sense has yet to be determined. It is not meaningless; it could mean a number of things, but there is currently insufficient information to decide its meaning. — Luke

I take the example as given. There is no reason to think that there is information that is being withheld.

As I see it, 117 is a continuation of 116. It is an example of someone mistakenly ascribing metaphysical meaning to the claim "this is here". But that is not how the sentence is actually used, and so, despite what he intends, it is meaningless.

I do not think there is any value in continuing this. Perhaps as we move forward things will become clearer.

So that would be in the context of a language-game then? — Metaphysician Undercover

The context in which it is actually used, as opposed to some metaphysical claim.

If, actual usage is what determines correctness, then any and all usage is correct — Metaphysician Undercover

Just because someone says something that does not mean that is how the word or statement is actually used. Wittgenstein gives several examples that fall outside of actual usage, including "this is here" and "I am here". They make sense in some contexts but not in the circumstances Wittgenstein describes.

In my opinion, the only progress that can be made in philosophy is personal progress. The discipline itself changes over time, but does not progress. At the present time a form of pluralism is prevalent - with some looking to the ancients and others to science or religion or literature or non-western thought, and so on. Some are historically oriented - the movement and/or situatedness of thought and others problem oriented - ethics, epistemology, metaphysics. Of course none of these approaches necessarily excludes others.

In line with the notion of personal progress is the idea that philosophy is about self-knowledge, a theme we find in Plato as well as more recently in Nietzsche and Wittgenstein and others. Some, however, deny that philosophy has anything to do with the self but rather with timeless or objective truth or a view from nowhere.

My own orientation is zetetic skepticism - inquiry driven by knowledge of our ignorance. Progress in this sense is not a matter of replacing ignorance with knowledge or wisdom in some absolute sense, but with phronesis or practical wisdom. It is a matter of determining how best to live in light of our ignorance of what is best. In the absence of knowledge, one is guided by what seems to be best. But what seems to be best may not be what is best, and so, one is always willing to examine and revise his or her opinions. This is a Socratic attitude, but it may also be expressed in terms from another time and place, the Daodejing - "practice extreme tenuousness"

Yes, it does. The specific meaning you have assumed, as you yourself have just clearly stated, is that "the object he is pointing to is here". — Luke

I am assuming that when Wittgenstein says he [edit - the person in Wittgenstein's example] is pointing to the object in front of him that he is pointing to the object in front of him. I am assuming that when he says "this here" while pointing to the object in front of him he means the object in front of him is here. He assumes this makes sense. Wittgenstein does not. I do not. He assumes:

I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with.

He is not. I am not assuming a specific meaning. Following Wittgenstein I am questioning his use of the expression. Hence the question: "And what is it supposed to be doing?"

The criticism I was referring to was this of yours: "Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here." — Luke

That is not a criticism, it is a statement of fact. You were not making a claim about the object, that is, the map. You were not saying that the map is here. If you were pointing to the map in front of you and saying "this is here" then your example would be the same as Wittgenstein's, and would be just as senseless.

This indicated to me that you thought that my map example had failed to provide a suitable meaning for 'This is here', because it did not comport with your assumed meaning of 'This is here'. — Luke

I have no assumed meaning of the sentence. Again, following Wittgenstein, in the circumstances described it makes not sense to say "this is here". That is not because I assume the sentence has a particular meaning, but because in this situation it makes no sense. The question is: what is the sentence doing in this example?

The pointing is the same in either case. It is the meaning of 'This is here' that is different. — Luke

It is the same in that you are both pointing, but you are pointing to a location on a map and he is pointing to an object, say, the map. In your example 'this' means the location, in Wittgenstein's this means the object in from of him. You have provided a determine meaning, the person in Wittgenstein's example has not.

I don't believe that his example at 117 contains any circumstances. — Luke

I am not going to try to convince you otherwise, but consider this: if I were to ask in what circumstances he said "this is here" the answer would be, while pointing to an object in front of him.

I don't think that it doesn't make sense. Instead, I think that 'This is here' in his example lacks sense or has an indeterminate meaning. — Luke

What distinction are you making between doesn't make sense and lacks sense?

Where do you jump from numerous possibilities to "a correct context"? — Metaphysician Undercover

A correct context would be any context in which it does make sense, that is, any context in which it is actually used. Which is to say, the special or particular circumstances in which it is actually used.

It is clear from this that you have a specific meaning of 'This is here' in mind (i.e. "the object...being here"). — Luke

If someone points to an object and says "this is here" I assume he means the object he is pointing to is here, but he might be pointing to something else. He might mean a scratch on the object, for example. That does not mean I have a specific meaning in mind, it means that I assume he is pointing to the object and not something about the object. As I said in an earlier post:

Wittgenstein says that he is pointing to the object in front of him. While it is possible that he is pointing to something about the object, there is nothing in the example that indicates that this is the case. — Fooloso4

Furthermore, you have criticised my example because it fails to have the meaning you have presupposed. — Luke

I did not criticize your example. What I said is:

You are doing what Wittgenstein suggests we do, consider circumstances where it does make sense to say "This is here". — Fooloso4

In your example "this is here" does not mean the map is here.
— Fooloso4

That's right, because I haven't made your presupposition about the meaning of 'this is here'. — Luke

The reason it does not mean the map is here is because you are pointing to a location on the map not the map. This has nothing to do with any presuppositions you imagine I have made. My point was that your example makes sense because it provides the further context that Wittgenstein's lacks.

That's right, but I have provided a scenario in which I point to an object (map) and say 'This is here', precisely as per Wittgenstein's example. — Luke

If you mean as per what Wittgenstein says should be considered - circumstances where this sentence
is actually used then I agree. But his example was of circumstances where it does not make sense - pointing to something in front of him and saying "this is here".

Wittgenstein has not stipulated that "this" must or must not refer in a particular way to the object at which I am pointing. — Luke

There is nothing I have said that indicates he has stipulated this. Once again, your example provides a determination that his does not. This is not a criticism. It is, as I have said, doing what he says should be done.

That is, Wittgenstein has not stipulated the meaning of 'This is here'. — Luke

It is not a matter of stipulating the meaning of the sentence, but rather, that the sentence does not make sense in the example he provides. It is because it does not make sense that he says particular circumstances in which it is actually used, circumstances in which it does make sense to say "This is here" should be considered.

That's not a circumstance. Wittgenstein asks us to consider in what circumstances the sentence (and pointing) are actually used. — Luke

Of course it is a circumstance, a circumstance in which the sentence does not make sense. That is why he says to consider circumstances where the sentence is actually used.

From what you have said:
Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here.
— Fooloso4
The person pointing might think it makes sense to say that the object he is pointing to is here, but Wittgenstein does not.
— Fooloso4
What is the sentence: "This is here" supposed to be doing? It cannot be used to inform us that the object is here.
— Fooloso4 — Luke

How does any of this imply that I assume "this is here" has a specific meaning? The first statement refers to your example. In your example "this is here" does not mean the map is here. Here refers to a location on the map. I did not think this was in dispute since you said "this" refers to a location on the map. The second statement says nothing about a specific meaning, it says that even thought the person saying "this is here" while pointing to an object may think it makes sense, it does not. It is analogous to saying "I am here" to someone sitting in front of you who can clearly see you. The third statement does not say anything about a specific meaning either. It asks what the sentence is doing in this example.

I have not seen you suggest that it could have any other meaning. — Luke

Any meaning other than what? I have said repeatedly that it has no meaning. It does not make sense to point to something in front of you and say "this is here".

Yes, that is the context I have provided. — Luke

And Wittgenstein provides a context for his example as well. The problem is, the context is not one in which the sentence "this is here" makes sense.

My view of OC 348 is that statements get their meaning from correct context — Sam26

I would say it is not that statements get there meaning from correct context, but that it is only in a correct context, that is to say, particular circumstances or situations that a statements has a meaning.

His example does not contain any circumstances, so there is insufficient information to determine this. — Luke

The circumstance is him pointing to the object in front of him and saying this is here.

You are assuming that "this is here" has a specific meaning — Luke

I don't know why you would assume that I have assumed any such thing. Everything I have said runs counter to the idea that it has a specific meaning.

of the object "being here" or that 'this object is in front of me' or something similar. — Luke

The example clearly states that he is pointing to an object in front of him. He says "this is here" while doing so. Further, Wittgenstein says that if the person saying and doing this says that this makes sense to him he should look to an example where it "this is here" is actually used, there it makes sense.

That is, you are assuming that the meaning of 'This is here' is like "an aura the [sentence] brings along with it and retains in every kind of use." — Luke

Please stop telling me what I assume. I assume no such thing. I have no idea how you could reach that conclusion based on what I have said. You even quoted me as saying:

The example illustrates the point that the meaning is not something that carries "in every kind of use". — Fooloso4

In my map example, I am also talking about the object I am pointing to, but the meaning of 'This is here' in that scenario is not 'this object is in front of me', and it need not be. — Luke

Right. And that is why I said:

In your example you are pointing at a map but you are pointing to a location on the map — Fooloso4

In both examples, the person points at an object. In my example, the object is a map. — Luke

In your example you are pointing at a map but you are pointing to a location on the map:

"this" refers to a location on the map — Luke

In Wittgenstein's example someone is pointing to the object. In this example "this' refers to the object he is pointing to.

You are presupposing a meaning of 'This is here' which is not part of Wittgenstein's example. You have determined in advance that 'This is here' must have the meaning of 'this object is at this location in front of me' (or similar). — Luke

Wittgenstein says that he is pointing to the object in front of him. While it is possible that he is pointing to something about the object, there is nothing in the example that indicates that this is the case.

You seem to assume that 'This is here' makes sense to you. — Luke

I have said just the opposite. Wittgenstein's example does not make sense. It makes no sense to point to something in front of you and saying "this is here".

But you should ask yourself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense. — Luke

Yes, that is what Wittgenstein says. Whatever those circumstances are in which it makes sense to say "this is here" might be, his example is not one of those cases.

The person in Wittgenstein's example is not necessarily making a claim about the object "being here", either. — Luke

When he points to the object and says "This is here" I see no reason to conclude he is not talking about the object he is pointing to.

No such determination has been made about the meaning of 'This is here' at 117. — Luke

There is a difference between the question of what he is referring to when he says "This is here" and making a determination about the meaning of pointing to something in front of you and saying "This is here". As with the example "I am here", the problem is not with understanding the words but with why someone would say it. As Wittgenstein asks:

And what is it supposed to be doing? — On Certainty 352

You don't think that my example of pointing at a map and saying "This is here" makes sense? — Luke

In your example:

"this" refers to a location on the map — Luke

You are doing what Wittgenstein suggests we do, consider circumstances where it does make sense to say "This is here". In Wittgenstein's example "this" would refer to the object, the map.

Of course he asks us to consider pointing at the object while saying it — Luke

In his example someone points to an object. The person pointing might think it makes sense to say that the object he is pointing to is here, but Wittgenstein does not. He is asking us to compare this case with others in which one actually says this, cases in which it does make sense to say "This is here".

What does "replacing the example" mean? The example is just someone saying "This is here" while pointing to an object in front of him. You want to replace this? — Luke

Your own example replaces the one Wittgenstein rejects. Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here.

I don't understand why you want to exclude the pointing when it is part of the example described at §117. — Luke

I think the problem starts here:

I find no reason to question Wittgenstein's example. — Luke

As I read it, Wittgenstein finds the example problematic. It does not make sense to point to something in front of you and say "This is here". He then asks us to consider circumstances where it would make sense to say "This is here". He is not asking us to consider circumstances in which one points while saying it. If in those circumstances one does point, that is incidental.

Don't we need to "add" the "special circumstances" in which "this sentence is actually used", given that "there" is where "it does make sense"? — Luke

I don't think so. It is not a matter of adding circumstances to the example but of replacing the example with some situation in which it does make sense to say "This is here".

I'm not exactly sure what you mean by "compare with the example" — Luke

The example is what he describes in the text, someone who points to an object in front of him and says "this is here". This is to be compared with those circumstances in which this sentence is actually used, for there, in those circumstances, it make sense.

I don't know how to square this with your previous post (↪Fooloso4) where you stated that pointing at the object should not be included, and that it was not a matter of adding context to the example in order to make sense of it. — Luke

Pointing is not part of the sentence. If we are to think of circumstances in which the sentence "This is here" makes sense we do not have to include the act of pointing at an object that is in front of you. In other words, we do not have to start with the circumstances described in the example and add something in order to have it make sense.

So he seems to think the body part of man cannot reach perfection. — Devans99

Right, but he defines himself as a "thinking thing". He bases his claim of the immortality of the soul on the indivisibility of thinking substance.

Descartes took his motto from Ovid: He who lived well hid himself well.

How does someone whose teaching runs counter to the Church publish in an age where the Church bans books and imprisons those it judges to be heretics? He does what philosophers have always done in the face of persecution - publicly proclaim one thing and say something else between the lines.

Descartes undermines the authority of the Church, replacing it with the authority of the thinking I who uses reason. When Descartes begins by doubting everything, without the need to be specific he doubts the truth of the teachings of the Church.

If anyone is interested in working this out for themselves, look first at what God says in Genesis about man becoming godlike with knowledge, the tree of life (which God prevents them from eating from, and the story of the tower of Babel where God says that with one language they will be able to do whatever they will to do. An immortal being who has knowledge and the ability to do whatever he wills to do is a God. Now look at what Descartes says about knowledge, the immortality of the soul, and the will.

Next, look at Descartes' proof of the existence of God based on perfection, and compare it with what he says about man's perfectibility - willing only what he knows, his algebraic method of solving for any unknown, mathematics as the universal language, and we have the makings for man to become gods.

I don't think this is right. Wittgenstein gives the example, which includes the pointing, and says that in the "special circumstances" in which the sentence is actually used: "There it does make sense." — Luke

The particular circumstances in which the sentence is actually used is meant to compare with the example. It is in those circumstances that the sentence makes sense. The example illustrates the point that the meaning is not something that carries "in every kind of use". 'There', as in "There it does make sense." does not mean here, that is, in the example, but those circumstances in which the sentence is actually used.

Just as the words "I am here" have a meaning only in certain contexts, and not [in this context, e.g.] when I say them to someone who is sitting in front of me and sees me clearly ... — Luke

The same holds for the object in front of him in 117.

Hopefully I haven't made it more unclear, but I think you are mistaken to infer that Wittgenstein is saying that the meaning is not (ever) determined by the situation. — Luke

I did not say that meaning is not (ever) determined by the situation. It is undetermined in the examples given though. It is by comparing these situations with those in which it makes sense to say "this is here" or "I am here" that we see that the expression is not being used in the familiar way in these examples.

That's just it though: Wittgenstein has not provided any context/circumstances/situation for the sentence "This is here", so it needn't necessarily have the particular meaning you have attributed to it — Luke

I did not attribute any meaning to it. I said:

It cannot be used to inform us that the object is here. — Fooloso4

[emphasis added].

The question is: what is the expression supposed to be doing? There is no determinate answer to that question in these examples.

It just occurred to me that I was trying to come up with an example of pointing to something, saying "this is here", and having it make sense. But that is not what Wittgenstein is asking us to do. The circumstances in which the sentence is used and makes sense is not one in which one points to an object in front of him while saying it. It is not a matter of adding context to the example in order to make sense of it. It is rather, that there may be circumstances in which one says "this is here" and it makes sense but saying it while pointing to something in front of him is not one of those circumstances.

In answer to the question:

You understand this expression, don’t you?

I would say I do. But this is where we are led astray.

Well then - I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with.

But this may not be the way it is being used. Just because it made sense when used in some other situation does not mean it makes sense under these circumstances. It is not:

As if the meaning were an aura the word brings along with it and retains in every kind of use.

Under the circumstances in the example given - pointing to something and saying "this is here" is pointless. Of course the object is there, otherwise one could not point to it.

348. Just as the words "I am here" have a meaning only in certain contexts, and not when I say them to someone who is sitting in front of me and sees me clearly, - and not because they are superfluous, but because their meaning is not determined by the situation, yet stands in need of such determination. — On Certainty

To point to an object and say "this is here" is superfluous, but that is not the problem. The problem is that the meaning is not determined by the situation. It is the situation that renders the statement meaningless. The sentence is in need of a determination. As he asks elsewhere:

“Yes, that is a sentence. An English sentence. And what is it supposed to be doing?” — On Certainty 352

What is the sentence: "This is here" supposed to be doing? It cannot be used to inform us that the object is here. We may know what the statement means is some other situation, but here it is idle. Yet, it is here that the philosopher leaves behind everyday use and asserts metaphysical meaning.

I don't think he meant that one would actually say "This is here" but rather the particular object is here:
— Fooloso4

I disagree. Firstly, I find no reason to question Wittgenstein's example. — Luke

I think you are right with regard to what "someone" actually said. What I was getting at is that "this" means the object that is pointed to. I don't think he was drawing our attention to the use of "this" but of "here".

and/or they could also be seemingly sensible expressions which don't make very much sense upon closer scrutiny. — Luke

But he says the sentence does make sense in the circumstances in which it is actually used. If those circumstances are "special" in the sense of extraordinary then the use of the sentence in any circumstance other than that exceptional one would not make sense. But I take this to be an example of bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. The sentence: "This is here" does have an everyday use. "This is here (pointing to the table) and this is here (pointing to the chair) but where are the dishes?"

I don't think he meant that one would actually say "This is here" but rather the particular object is here: "The key is here".

"This is here" might be used in response to the question: "What happened to the things on the table?". In that case someone might say "This is here and this is here" while pointing to the items. Or, when doing an inventory to check if anything is missing: "This is here and this is here, but where is 'x'?"