I find Wittgenstein's examples of such irregularities interesting because he does not claim that such improbable things are impossible. From On Certainty:

505. It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something.

508. What can I rely on?

509. I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did not say "can trust something").

And from Philosophical Investigations:

84. But that is not to say that we are in doubt because it is possible for us to imagine a doubt. I can easily imagine someone always doubting before he opened his front door whether an abyss did not yawn behind it, and making sure about it before he went through the door (and he might on some occasion prove to be right) a but for all that, I do not doubt in such a case.

So I first juxtaposed this "for us" approach against Speculative Realism, as they do not take stock in the "critical" approach which Kant really started and has been with us up through Wittgenstein and beyond. They think that philosophy should turn back to ontological speculation again, pace Leibniz, pace Decartes, pace Medievalists, pace Stoics, pace Aristotle, pace Plato, etc. They do not like this "critical turn" of epistemology limiting speculation, so to say. — schopenhauer1

I am having a hard time deciphering this. As I said in my initial post, I am not familiar with Speculative Realism. If you explained it, I missed it. "They" (I assume you mean the speculative realists) reject Kantian philosophy and want to return to ontological speculation, but then you say they also disagree ("pace") with Leibniz, Descartes, Medievalists, Stoics, Aristotle, and Plato. Perhaps you mean in accord with rather than politely disagree with?

The term ontological speculation is too broad for me to comment in general. It has a variety of meanings ranging from Aristotle's being qua being, to questions about God, to necessary and contingent beings, to universals, to hierarchies, to questions about physical objects, imaginary objects, and so on. Then there are questions about the activity and constraints on speculation.

But what are these facts compared to science? — schopenhauer1

The facts that concern the woodworker may overlap in some cases with the facts that concern someone doing materials science, but the woodworker's main concern is making something from wood whereas the materials scientist studying wood is concerned with the properties of wood and may have no idea what a scarf joint or a kerf is.

By simply saying it is a different human inquiry, so requires different language games, is misleading. — schopenhauer1

How so? Human languages developed in a world that is very different than what the sciences encounter and investigate. Physics can no longer be done without sophisticated mathematics. Biochemistry, although not as reliant on mathematical models, requires a vocabulary that is incomprehensible for those without the necessary education.

The practical applications of use, the recreational applications of use, and simply the social applications of use, seem different in kind and not degree. — schopenhauer1

If that is the case then that supports the claim that they require different concepts and vocabularies.

This a good formulation of the argument that this particular POV is contrasting to and calling into question. — schopenhauer1

Which POV? The one you have not been able to clearly articulate? I really am having a hard time trying to figure out what you are trying to say. What is it in that formulation that this POV is calling into question? What is the contrasting POV?

However, there is something different when it is observing how the world is operating itself, perhaps. — schopenhauer1

The farmer observes how the world is operating. The ships captain observes how the world is operating. The climatologist observes how the world is operating. The astrophysicist observes how the world is operating.

Yeah it can be "for us" because we have our epistemological tendencies for systematizing, but I guess I'm wondering if there can ever be an indication of the things-themselves through this science outlook. — schopenhauer1

It is "us" who observe and experiment and theorize and conceptualize. We see the world as we do not simply because it is the way it is but because we are the way we are. This holds for both our ordinary experience and for science.

Perhaps an extreme form of this, which I can certainly see as being considered "scientisim" is Max Tegmark's theory of mathematical realism. I do not see much justification for it, but it is an example that is definitely opposed to the more epistemological approach like that of Wittgenstein. — schopenhauer1

The fundamental difference is that Wittgenstein considers mathematics to be a human invention, a human construct. Tegmark is a mathematical Platonist. I think they agree, however, that, in Tegmark's words: there exists an external physical reality completely independent of us humans.

The question then is not about the existence of reality but about how we are to understand it. Is there some way to understand it that is independent of us? Tegmark thinks there is because mathematics is independent of us. But even if that were the case, it seems to me that our knowledge of mathematics may be limited, that given its complexity we even with the aid of our most powerful computers will never grasp the whole of it.

↪Fooloso4 Do you think PI 242 also speaks to this? — Luke

Yes. Here is 242:

242. It is not only agreement in definitions, but also (odd as it may sound) agreement in judgements that is required for communication by means of language. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so. - It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call “measuring” is in part determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement.

I will say a bit more about 242, but first:

240. Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question of whether or not a rule has been followed. People don’t come to blows over it, for example. This belongs to the scaffolding from which our language operates (for example, yields descriptions).

Wittgenstein used the term "scaffolding" in the Tractatus to refer to what underlies both language and the facts of the world. (See the earlier quote about the harmony between thought and reality). The scaffolding, however, is no longer regarded as logical and is no longer thought of as underlying reality. Hence the complaint in 242 about abolishing logic.

241. “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” - What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life.

It is our agreed upon, that is, shared or common, form of life that is the scaffolding. Our agreed upon definitions and judgments are part of our form of life. It is not simply that we share the same opinions, but that both our agreement and disagreement regarding opinions rests on our form of life. And this means, in part, not only that we agree on the definition of a meter but that there is a certain constancy of results when we measure. When the woodworker measures the length of a board it is not first one meter then two or three. It is not human agreement that determines that the length of the board does not change, but we agree when we say that it is true that it does not change.

Perhaps the language of the woordworker is real in that community, but they are contingent conventions. This is not so with the science language game. There are constraints that nature is imposing, making the findings a necessity. — schopenhauer1

First there are constraints on the woodworker. The properties of the wood, the tools, the adhesives, the fasteners. There is also the woodworker's language that deals with these things and the working with the materials. It is a fact that pine is a soft wood and oak a hardwood. It is a fact that some woods are more prone to cupping and warping then others. It is a fact that some woods are more resistant to rot and insects than others. The terms used are conventions, but they are based on the activity of working with wood. The techniques are conventions but not independent of the tools that have been developed over time and what works and does not work.

Second, the findings of science are not a necessity. Science has a history. It has developed differently in different times and different places. The discoveries are not independent of the paradigms or the particular concerns of the investigators or the ability to fund their research.

Wittgenstein's "forms of life" and "use" may not fit this scenario of science. — schopenhauer1

The philosophy and sociology of science say otherwise. It has its own activities which are not independent of but different from other human activities.

But I still think that is fundamentally different than how the observable evidence and technological gains fostered by modern science dictates certain understanding of reality. — schopenhauer1

I think the same is true throughout human history. Many cultures have stories of a golden age that has been lost. This is tied to technological advances - agriculture was perhaps the most disruptive, tying people to a patch of land, but tool making and weapons is another.

As I said already, either there is a "how things are for us" which is prior to language and necessary for the existence of language, or "how things are for us" is something which emerges from language. Which position do you think Wittgenstein supports? — Metaphysician Undercover

In On Certainty Wittgenstein quotes Goethe:

In the beginning was the deed.

We are social animals. The group and its activities comes first.

OK, now suppose we take this Kantian position, and attempt to justify this notion you put forward about "how things are for us". — Metaphysician Undercover

schopenhauer1 introduced Kant into the discussion. I have no interest in justifying his position. I think the noumenal-phenomenal distinction is problematic. I also think the universality of mind is problematic.

As I said:

The point is, he [Wittgenstein] is not making the distinction between "things as they are", and "as they are for us" nor investigating that distinction. — Fooloso4

.

Recognition of patterns of nature does not indicate something "not for us". It is, after all, "us" who have become aware of it.
— Fooloso4

But then what are these "learn new facts". — schopenhauer1

You miss the point (or perhaps I do). The patterns are phenomenal or in some cases extrapolated from what can be observed. If the patterns were noumenal we have have no access to them according to Kant.

But what are these scientific "facts" that are presenting to us, as opposed to "social facts" of conventions and ways of doing things? — schopenhauer1

I am not sure what you are asking. The sciences have their language games and ways of doing things. Biology does not deal with the facts of astrophysics or astrophysics the facts of biology. There are, however, interdisciplinary endeavors. If one wants to converse across disciplines one must learn the language of the other disciplines.

Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning.

What do you think that means? — schopenhauer1

In the spirit of his work, I will let you think about that for yourself.

But can some empirical facts be different in regards to being part of the language game? — schopenhauer1

Language games do not change the facts, but may represent or describe the facts differently or describe different facts. We may say that the floor is solid - we do not fall through, but a physicist will say that it is not.

Is there something science is showing us? — schopenhauer1

There is a great deal that science shows us. Have you seen the pictures from the Hubble telescope?

But is that just a language game we hit upon or something else? — schopenhauer1

No, it is not just a language game and Wittgenstein never suggested that it is. It does, however, involve language games. The language games are not something we hit upon.The language-games of the sciences continue to develop. We have reached a point, where the language that developed in line with ordinary life and events is no longer adequate. Physics is largely mathematical.

What are facts to Wittgenstein? — schopenhauer1

He does not have a theory of facts if that is what you are asking.

Are there social facts vs. scientific facts, or is it all the same kind of conventionalism all the way down? — schopenhauer1

The behavior of sub-atomic particles is not a social fact. The behavior of people is not a fact of particle physics. There are conventions in both but they are not of the same kind because they deal with very different matters, that is to say, very different facts. Perhaps someday there will be a unified theory that accounts for both, but for now they are very different.

Some may argue that facts are conventions, but as far as I can see, Wittgenstein does not.

The issue is, as I described to Schop, how one gets from how things appear to me, to how things are "for us". — Metaphysician Undercover

The point I was addressing is the noumenal-phenomenal distinction, the distinction between things as they are in themselves and things as they are for us. According to Kant, the categories of the understanding are universal. Whatever distinction you are making between things as they appear to you and how they are for us is another issue.

I do not have any idea how you got from anything I said that he takes for us for granted. The relationship between us and language is that language is our language. It does not exist independently of us.

He says:

Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language (PG, 12)

This, of course, is an age old question. Neither the question itself nor Wittgenstein's response is framed in terms of Kant's distinction. The question of the harmony between thought and reality may be metaphysical, but Wittgenstein's answer is not. It is a matter of human practice. We do not discover connections we draw them.

The quote is consonant with the earlier one about grammar and essence.

If I remember correctly, (it has been twenty years), Cavell sees in Wittgenstein's method of examples, something akin to Pyrrhonian skepticism.

[Edited to add:]

It is not just a matter of method. He regards Wittgenstein as a kind of skeptic, but not the radical skeptic he argues against. I agree.

But what happens when the "for us" bumps against patterns of nature that seem indicate the "not for us"? — schopenhauer1

As he says in the first quote above:

It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts ...

When it becomes evident that our conceptual framework excludes important facts then we change the framework. Recognition of patterns of nature does not indicate something "not for us". It is, after all, "us" who have become aware of it.

From Culture and Value:

Man has to awaken to wonder - and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again.

And:

Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning.

But isn't the principle of "as they are for us" rather than "as they are for me" for example, a metaphysical principle? — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not say anything about a principle. I do not recall anywhere where he discusses the distinction. If you can cite where he does then perhaps we can discuss it.

135: ... Asked what a proposition is a whether it is another person or ourselves that we have to answer a we’ll give examples ... So, it is in this way that we have a concept of a proposition.

This is exactly the kind of answer Socrates rejects in response to his "what is" questions. He does not want examples of justice, for example, but what justice itself is. And, of course, such inquiries end in aporia. Instead of definitions Wittgenstein says:

133: ... a method is now demonstrated by examples, and the series of examples can be broken off. —– Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.

Why do you say that this is "not metaphysical"? To make a distinction between "things as they are", and "as they are for us", is to make a metaphysical assumption. If the point of interest is "as they are for us", this makes the assumption no less metaphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point is, he is not making the distinction between "things as they are", and "as they are for us" nor investigating that distinction.

I cannot speak to Speculative Realism. I am not familiar with it. But I think the following from Wittgenstein's Zettel addresses some of your concerns:

Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favorable to the formation of certain concepts; or again unfavorable? And does experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa. (It is discovered e.g. that what formerly counted as a difference in kind, is really only a difference in degree. (352)

He accepts that there are facts, but facts do not determine concepts. We do not have the concepts we have because the facts are as they are, but if the facts were not as they are our concepts would not be as they are.

The closing remark refers to Darwin's On the Origin of Species. Elsewhere he says:

What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory, but of a fertile new point of view. (CV 18)

If we look at species as kinds then we construct our picture of the world, or some aspect of it, in accordance to it, and attend to those facts that conform to this way of looking at things. But if we regard the differences between species as a matter of degree or variation then we begin to take into account facts that were previously overlooked or disregarded. We begin to see not only species but a great many other things differently. There is no fixed, unchanging order to life.

What are we to make of the following?:

Essence is expressed in grammar … Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar)” (PI 371, 373).

Is this an ontology? Yes and no. Grammar does not reveal the being of things as they are, but as they are for us, that is, how we regard them, what they mean for us. This is not the noumenal-phenomenal distinction. It is not metaphysical. Wittgenstein is not concerned with the question of how things are in themselves, but rather with what we say and do. The essence of something, what it is to be what is it, means it's place in our form of life. It is in that sense not fixed and unchanging.

It's true that you believe in those things. Is it not? — Sam26

Your claim was not that one believes what he claims to believe but that the belief is true or false. It is true that I believe those things but that does not mean that what I believe is true or false. The proposition: "The earth is flat" is not true because I believe it is.

You're saying what Moore is saying, that is, it is on par with his claim to know he has hands. — Sam26

Wittgenstein makes a clear distinction between Moore's propositions and mathematical propositions.

10. Then is "2x2=4" nonsense in the same way, and not a proposition of arithmetic, apart from particular occasions? "2x2=4" is a true proposition of arithmetic ...

I'm not sure what this has to do with what we're talking about. In terms of meaning this is true, meaning has nothing to do with your state-of-mind. — Sam26

It is your claim that 12x12=144 is a belief and that belief is a state of mind. Wittgenstein, in the cited quotes, denies this. Contrary to your claim about mathematical belief he says "mathematical knowledge". 12x12=144 is an epistemic hinge.

Don't talk to me like I no nothing about the subject, as if I haven't read Moore's papers. He actually says, "Here is one hand." But these are things he claims to know, as he argues with the skeptics. — Sam26

Accusing you of equivocating is not to say you know (or no) nothing about the subject. On the contrary, to equivocate is to use language to hide or obscure a distinction that undermines your claims. Moore's claims cannot be hinge propositions if, as you claim, hinge propositions are statements of belief.

Propositions are beliefs, they are statements that are true or false. — Sam26

"I believe in freedom, justice, and equality." Is that proposition true or false?

Well, do you believe 12x12=144? — Sam26

I don't believe it, I know it. I know how to calculate and I've done the calculations. Others have done so as well.

38. Knowledge in mathematics: Here one has to keep on reminding oneself of the unimportance of the 'inner process' or 'state' and ask "Why should it be important? What does it matter to me?" What
is interesting is how we use mathematical propositions.
39. This is how calculation is done, in such circumstances a calculation is treated as absolutely
reliable, as certainly correct.

The state of mind or belief regarding the calculation is unimportant.

42. ... To think that different [mental] states must correspond to the words "believe" and "know"
would be as if one believed that different people had to correspond to the word "I" and the name
"Ludwig", because the concepts are different.

If hinge propositions are beliefs then it is not that they differ from epistemic propositions because of different corresponding mental states.

179. It would be correct to say: "I believe..." has subjective truth; but "I know..." not.

You have claimed that Moore's "I know ..." are hinge propositions and that hinge propositions are beliefs. But Moore does not claim that they have subjective truth, he presents them as objective evidence in support of the existence of the external world. He claims not simply to believe but to know.

245. So if I say "I know that I have two hands", and that is not supposed to express just my subjective certainty, I must be able to satisfy myself that I am right. But I can't do that, for my having two
hands is not less certain before I have looked at them than afterwards. But I could say: "That I have
two hands is an irreversible belief."

"I know that I have two hands" is not a belief. It does not express just my subjective certainty. The irreversible belief that I have two hands is not a proposition.

I say, "I have hands," that's a belief. — Sam26

You are equivocating. Moore does not say: "I have hands", he says, "I know I have hands" which is not the same as saying "I believe I have hands".

10. ... it is only in use that the proposition has its sense.

What is the ordinarily use the proposition "I believe I have hands"?

I do not doubt I have hands simply because I have been using them my whole life. The belief that I have hands is something that develops at some point after I have been using my hands. A newborn baby does not suck its thumb because it believes it has a hand or a thumb. It does not grasp things because it believe it has hands and that there are things to be grasped. As it gets a bit older it does not watch it's hand move as it moves without its being able to control the movement or gradually gain control of it because it believes it is it's own hand and that there are things to be held with it. It reaches and grasps. These actions are not manifestations of mental states.They are not mind dependent. This is why Wittgenstein points to other animals. Not all animals have brains and thus do not have mental states, and yet they are able to respond to their environment.

Is the one example of a hinge proposition given - 12x12=144, a belief? Isn't that proposition true whether one believes it or not? If it is true (or false) whether I believe it or not, then at least one hinge proposition, the only one given, is not a belief.

If it is a belief then what does one believe when he believes 12x12=144? That he has done the calculation correctly? That there are numbers? That 12 and 144 are numbers? That numbers can be multiplied? Are each of these things hinge beliefs? Are hinges based on hinges? Is there a first in the series or does each depend on the other?

Is 12x12=144 non-epistemic, as you claim hinge propositions must be? Or is it something known? Something that can be rationally demonstrated?

Is 12x12=144 pre-linguistic as you claim hinge propositions must be? Does one hold a pre-linguistic belief that there are numbers and they can be multiplied? It should be kept in mind that Wittgenstein held that mathematics was a human invention. Can a pre-linguistic humans invent mathematics?

I think the best way to think of a hinge, is to think of them as beliefs — Sam26

In that case why doesn't he just call them beliefs?

From an earlier post:

As I understand it, according to OC, a hinge proposition is one, as the name suggests, on which other propositions turn.

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason
we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

What would make one a hinge but not the other? — Luke

I edited my post soon after posting it:

[Edit]: More precisely it is not Moore's claim that the earth existed for a long time before my birth that serves as a hinge, but rather, propositions that inform it. Propositions about the age of the earth. — Fooloso4

The age of the earth informs geology, evolution, astronomy, and so on. I know that here is a hand serves no such function.

I think he relishes the fight. His mentor, after all, was Roy Cohn. Right and wrong don't matter. It's win or lose.

It seems to me that Trump doesn’t understand what the Mueller report is about, or what’s in it. — Wayfarer

Although it is extremely unlikely that Trump read the report, what we are seeing is not a reflection of his ignorance of its content, but the lies he is feeding his followers. He knows full well that they have not read it either and rely on what Trump and his propaganda machine, a.k.a. Fox News. is telling them. In addition, since only one Republican in Congress has come out against him, it seems to them that the "case is closed".

One might hope that additional information might persuade them, but first they must be persuaded that legitimate news sources such as the New York Times is not fake news.

A downturn in the economy might turn some against him. This may happen as a result of his tariffs. Those in the agricultural and manufacturing sector have already been hurt. When they become uncertain of their future and are unwilling to make capital investments and be forced to trim payrolls then they will begin to question whether Trump has made America great again. Their animosity might then be directed against the rich and come to believe that Trump has not drained the swamp but filled it with his ultra-wealthy cronies. If politicians sense the tide is turning then they will turn with it against Trump and no longer hide his lies.

The whole book is about Moore's propositions, and the fact that they are hinge propositions. If any commentator said otherwise he would be laughed at. — Sam26

Laughter is no substitute for evidence and philosophical argument. Again, what hangs and pivots on Moore's claim that he knows he has hands? The whole book is about doubt and certainty. It was prompted by discussion with Malcolm about Moore's propositions, but it does not follow that Moore's claim to know he has hands stands as a hinge. Not everything we accept serves as a hinge. Further, the problem of how this claim serves as a hinge when Wittgenstein finds it so problematic must be addressed.

I would challenge you to find someone who said otherwise, especially a philosopher. — Sam26

If you were to raise this challenge against some of the more recent readings of Wittgenstein fifty years ago, would you have found someone who agreed with these readings?

The literature on hinge propositions is not very extensive and fraught with disagreement and is based on an incomplete first draft of issues W. was thinking his way through.

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

So, how does the proposition "I know that here is one hand" serve as an axis? Moore's proposition: "The earth existed for a long time before my birth" might function in this way, but just because I don't doubt that I have hands does not mean it is a hinge.

[Edit]: More precisely it is not Moore's claim that the earth existed for a long time before my birth that serves as a hinge, but rather, propositions that inform it. Propositions about the age of the earth.

Moore's propositions are in fact hinge propositions. — Sam26

I have seen some commentators who treat them as such, but I have found nothing in On Certainty or other texts of Wittgenstein's that make that identification.

What hangs on "know this is my hand"? What role does it play in any of our ordinary language games? Where does it even occur? Why would anyone even say such a thing except in extraordinary circumstances or when one is "doing philosophy?

I am skeptical of the explanations we find in the literature that rely on some theory.

The one example of a hinge is:

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

Does Wittgenstein give any specific examples of hinge propositions?

When he says:

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.

we should not overlook "in deed". I take this to mean, in practice. It is not that these things are indubitable, but that a great deal hangs and pivots on them. If they are doubted then everything that depends on them becomes doubtful. That does not mean that they cannot be doubted but that they are not doubted. They are fixed, but not in some absolute unchangeable way.

The sun revolves around the Earth may have at one time been a hinge proposition. There is much that hung on it, including astronomical calculations and existential beliefs. One was as certain of it as one was that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. It belonged to the logic of their scientific investigations that this was in deed not doubted.

I said, that the act of picking up a toothbrush shows that I believe there is a toothbrush to pick up. — Sam26

On this we disagree. I do not think belief enters into the picture unless someone asks whether I believe that what is see in front of me is a toothbrush. When I put my foot on the ground and stand up or walk I do not believe the ground is solid and that I can stand and walk on it. I simply do what I have always done ever since I learned to stand and walk. We stand and walk long before we form beliefs about such things. I take it that this is W.'s point regarding children and animals. Consider the rooting reflex. A newborn has not formed a belief.

The other reasons you give are linguistic reasons. — Sam26

That is my point. I do not just pick up anything, I pick up the toothbrush to brush my teeth. I do not do that unless I believe in the benefit of brushing my teeth.

I'm not trying to be in line with or against Wittgenstein's ideas, I'm developing a theory of epistemology based on some of his ideas, and my interpretation of where some of his ideas lead. — Sam26

This is problematic because it is not always clear where you are interpreting him and where you are developing your theory. Your "interpretation of where some of his ideas lead" is ambiguous. It is an interpretation of his ideas or an interpretation of where his ideas lead? In the former case the question arises as to how convincing of your interpretation is, in the latter whether you have understood him correctly need not come into question, except you say that what you are doing is "an expansion of his thoughts". However interesting or important your theory is, it cannot be an expansion of his thoughts if you have misrepresented his thoughts.

I don't understand what the duck rabbit idea has to do with what I'm saying. — Sam26

It speaks to your claim that many bedrock beliefs or hinge-propositions are causally formed. There is nothing that causes me to see it one way or the other. The same goes for whatever you might claim is a bedrock belief or hinge-proposition. If you did not know what a duck or a rabbit was you would not see a picture of a duck or rabbit but that does not mean that knowing what a duck or rabbit is causes you to see it that way.

All propositions are beliefs — Sam26

A proposition may express a belief but it is not a belief.

All beliefs, if they are said to be beliefs, are reflective of states-of-mind, no minds, no beliefs. However, not all beliefs are confined to language, that is, there are other kinds of actions that can and do reflect states-of-mind. Thus, the act of picking up a cup of coffee, or the act of brushing your teeth, or the act of digging for worms, all reflect states-of-mind — Sam26

Are you claiming that there is a picking up a cup of coffee state of mind or the act of brushing your teeth state of mind?

If I pick up my tooth brush, that act shows my belief about the tooth brush, that there is a toothbrush. — Sam26

I do not pick up a toothbrush because I believe there is a toothbrush. My belief about the toothbrush is not simply that there is a toothbrush but that it is used to brush teeth and that brushing my teeth is an important part of hygiene.

My conclusion based on these ideas is that many bedrock beliefs or hinge-propositions are causally formed, that is, there is a causal connection between the reality around us, our sensory experiences, and our mind. This, it seems to me, is what triggers the belief. — Sam26

Do you think that this is in line with or contrary to Wittgenstein's claim about the spade being turned at bedrock?

Do I see the duck-rabbit one way or another because something causes me to see it one way or the other? Can the cause of seeing one way be the same as seeing it the other?

475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination.

476. Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc.,etc. - they learn to fetch books,
sit in armchairs, etc.,etc.

478. Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a
mouse exists?
479. Are we to say that the knowledge that there are physical objects comes very early or very late?

480. A child that is learning to use the word "tree". One stands with it in front of a tree and says
"Lovely tree!" Clearly no doubt as to the tree's existence comes into the language-game. But can the
child be said to know: 'that a tree exists'? Admittedly it's true that 'knowing something' doesn't
involve thinking about it - but mustn't anyone who knows something be capable of doubt? And
doubting means thinking.

That there are things in the world is not something a child believes, but neither is it something she doubts.

402. In the Beginning was the Deed.

but hinge-propositions are not traditional propositions. — Sam26

So you have said, but where does W. say this?

They are beliefs, but very basic beliefs that can be shown in our actions. — Sam26

That may be true in some cases but I do not see where W. says that all hinge propositions are like this.

Bedrock beliefs (hinge-propositions) are not part of a noetic structure, they are probably formed causally based on our interactions with the world around us. — Sam26

I don't think they are causally based. When I have more time I will try to find relevant passages.

The contention of this paper is that hinge-propositions are prelinguistic or nonlinguistic — Sam26

How can a proposition be prelinguistic or nonlinguistic? A proposition is by definition linguistic.

It is this system that is foundational or bedrock to hinge-propositions or hinge-beliefs, these beliefs give life to language, and to our epistemological language-games. — Sam26

Consider the following:

108. "But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the
moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the
moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our
whole system of physics forbids us to believe it.

This is interesting for two reasons. First, the example no longer works. The river banks have changed. It is no longer certain that no one has ever been on the moon. Second, note "our system" includes "our whole system of physics". It is not that the system is foundational to hinge propositions but that hinge propositions form part of the system. As he says at the end of 105, the system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life. The system is the whole of it - what we believe, what we accept without question, language, what we are told, what we learn, what we discover, hinge propositions, and what turns on them.

The foundation then of our epistemic system is ... [our] subjective certainties — Sam26

At 305 he says:

Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.

Just as there is no fixed point from which we can observe the motion of the universe, there is no fixed foundation for our knowing. Our subjective certainties are not fixed and unchanging. Our subjective certainties are not the foundation. That we are subjectively certain of something is not prior to but occurs within our epistemic system.

There is some help in understanding or identifying a bedrock belief (or hinge-propositions) — Sam26

Does Wittgenstein claim that there are bedrock beliefs? In PI he says:

Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do."

The context is justification for following a rule.

As I understand it, according to OC, a hinge proposition is one, as the name suggests, one's on which other propositions turn. They are neither prelinguistic nor non-empirical:

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

It is not that they cannot be doubted but that they are not doubted.

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason
we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

Hinge propositions are bedrock. Instead he uses the analogy of the river and its banks:

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it
because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I
distinguish between true and false.
95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their
role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning
any explicit rules.
96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were
hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid;
and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became
fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I
distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself;
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.
99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or
deposited.

Rather then bedrock beliefs he says:

166. The difficulty is to realise the groundlessness of our believing.

I think the following from Zettel speaks to this:

Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favorable to the formation of certain concepts; or again unfavorable? And does experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa. (It is discovered e.g. that what formerly counted as a difference in kind, is really only a difference in degree. (352)

No it bloody doesn’t mate. It means, as you keeping forcing me to say, that they ought to be believed. — AJJ

It would help if you provided the original claim in context, but despite the request to do so early on, you have not, unfortunately, done so. And so, all we have to go on is what you have presented. It is a simple if-then claim - if not this then not that. Now you may claim it means something else, and perhaps Clark meant or said something different, but based on what you have presented there is not reason to believe he did.

As stated, it does not say we ought to believe facts. If says that if there are no facts then there is nothing we ought to believe. One major flaw with this is the jump from objective values to facts. As has been stated repeatedly by various participants, that we ought to believe something is not a statement of objective value. Even if we accept that one ought to believe objective facts, it does not follow that this is an objective value.

In order to see this, suppose that all those who agree that we ought to believe objective facts are wrong. If you object that they can't be wrong, an appeal to objective values does not demonstrate that they are wrong. The demonstration that they are wrong is based on a) the contraction of accepting a fact and not believing it - if one accepts it as a fact then one believes it, and if one does not believe it then one does not accept it as a fact it, or b) the practical consequences of not believing the facts of the matter - if you do not accept that the ice is too thin to skate on you risk falling through. Practical consequences are not objective values. If there is some third option that demonstrates that accepting facts is an objective value you have not presented it, even if you have unflaggingly repeated it. Neither logic nor practical consequences are objective values.

Come on now, it’s not “being believed” that is necessary, it’s that they ought to be believed. — AJJ

Come on now, when you or Clark say:

If there are no objective values then there are no facts ( — AJJ

that makes facts contingent upon belief. You may want to revise his/your claim but either make it clear that you are revising it, or stick with what was said and defend it. You already backed away from defending it on page one:

Facts don’t depend on whether or not we believe them — AJJ

And so, if facts do not depend on whether or not we believe them then how can it be that if there are no objective values then there are no facts?

And I contend facts do exist, which means they ought to be believed if that is indeed a necessary part of their existence. — AJJ

What is it that you contend and what is it that Clark contends? Is your OP a statement in his words or yours?

Is the claim that facts ought to be believed a fact? I have asked this question before.

In what sense is being believed a necessary part of the existence of facts? Can something exist without its necessary parts? According to what you say, in the case of facts, it seems they can; and so, in what sense is believing them a necessary part of their existence if their existence does not depend on them? They ought to be believed implies that they are not necessarily believed, and so, being believed is not a necessary part of their existence.

It’s not that they don’t exist if they’re not believed. Everyone could stop believing facts and they’d still exist. It’s that they can’t exist without the necessary factor that they ought to be believed. — AJJ

What cannot exist does not exist.

The problem, as I see it, is that we cannot disentangle ontology and epistemology. All ontological claims are grounded in some particular epistemology, but all epistemology is grounded in ontology. Ontology in the former sense refers to what we say (logue) regarding what is (ontos), and in the later sense to what is. In other words, without something there would be nothing to say and, of course, no one to say it, but what we say is not what is, it reflects our current knowledge and understanding regarding what is.

The claim that there are :

... only consistent human 'interactions' with an aspect of the world ... — fresco

asserts that there are humans, a world, aspects of that world, and interactions between humans and aspects of the world. They could not interact if they did not in some way exist.

The question then is what are they? The answer is, we do not know. Whether an electron is a "thing" or "object" that exists independent of us is an epistemological question. How one answers the epistemological question determines the ontology, in the sense of what we say, of the electron.

Is the question of the ontology of an electron the same or different than the question of the ontology of, say, the moon? Is the interactions between humans and aspects of the world of the same kind or different in the case of electrons and the moon? Would the moon exist without some form of interaction with humans? Is the aspect of the world of the same kind in the case of the moon and an electron?

Yeah. But that’s not to say that the very existence of facts is determined by our beliefs, but that a necessary part of what they are is that they ought to be believed. — AJJ

But that is not what he says. Or perhaps it is not what he actually says but what you say he says. In either case, the statement is:

If there are no objective values then there are no facts (since there’s nothing that we ought to believe). — AJJ

If a necessary part of what facts are is that they ought be believed, then if this necessary part does not exist, if they are not believed, then they do not exist.

The idea is rather that the values are a fact — Terrapin Station

Right, but to be more precise, the claim is not simply that it is a fact that there are values but a fact that there are objective values.

I have asked AJJ whether it is a fact that we ought to believe, which is to say, whether "we ought to believe" is an objective value.

Clark is attempting to collapse the fact/value distinction.