We have to re-calibrate our view of Plato's view of the value of truth. — Ludwig V

I do not think it is a question of the value of truth but of the problem of certain political truths around the natural interest in what one's own versus those of the city. The truth may be that about certain things at certain times sometimes it is better to lie. It is not simply a matter of pragmatism but of the good.

I think that the criteria for a just society will not be the same as the criteria for a just person. — Ludwig V

That may be, but if we do not know what justice is in the one and the other we cannot say what the criteria should be. When Socrates suggestion that:

“Then, perhaps, there would be more justice in the larger object and more easy to apprehend.

my response is: perhaps not! The opposite is likely to be the case. Unless we are very unjust we are likely to encounter more injustice in the city than in ourselves.

But if there is a part of me that wants to do it, and another part that does, I am not in conflict with myself, and the problem is misrepresented. — Ludwig V

Do you mean another part that does not? In that case you both want to do it and not do it. Isn't that a conflict?

But the city as an institution has neither heart nor soul of its own — Ludwig V

In line with the question of noble lies consider allegiance to the fatherland and/or mother earth. Patriots consider their state or country or homeland as more than just an institution. It is their own.

The puzzle is why people will sometimes put the good of the city above their own or anyone else's good. — Ludwig V

The noble lie is a solution to this puzzle. People come to believe that the good of the city is their own good. All one big happy family.

I think you will admit it is not the traditional interpretation — Ludwig V

Yes, but the "traditional" interpretation continues to change. Two quick examples of recent changes. There is now a greater awareness and serious attention to what the Phaedrus calls “logographic necessity” (264b). The dialogues are not doctrines surrounded by window dressing. The dramatic setting and action are important, not to be ignored or abstracted from when Plato is discussed in terms of theories and doctrines. There is also a shift in attention from the supposed period during which a dialogue was written to the dramatic time in which the dialogue takes place. Perhaps most significantly, consideration should be given to the fact that the Parmenides takes place when Socrates was young. Typically the focus is on whether this is a middle or late period dialogue with the assumption that this marks a change in Plato's views of the Forms. Rather than a change in Plato's view, the dramatic setting implies that what Plato has Socrates say about Forms in the dialogues was from early on informed by what he learned from Parmenides in that imaginary dialogue.

Whether, and how far, that argument works is the issue. — Ludwig V

If noble lie is accepted as the correct translation then the issue is whether and why such a lie is needed.

To start with, the theory of forms sits in the background ... — Ludwig V

I do not see it as "the theory of forms" but as the problem of knowledge of justice, or, rather our lack of such knowledge. Unless what justice is is something known then we are in the realm of opinion. This is our natural starting point. The task then is to try and determine what seems to be the best opinion when it comes to matters of justice and the just life.

But his analysis is presented as if were a dissection. — Ludwig V

If I understand you correctly the point is that there is no clear divisions. I agree with that, but I think Plato points to that problem rather than maintaining the divisions. A world of Forms is not the world we live in. A world populated by people who are either rational or spirited or appetitive is not the world we live in. Our world is, as Socrates says, messy, things are mixed and blended.

The parts of a person are not people and have no rights of their own. — Ludwig V

He is, of course, speaking metaphorically. But we are often at odds with ourselves. If I want to be healthy I should not sit on the couch eating cake. I might claim that I am free to do this or not do it, and even though there is a part of me that does not want to do it, I may end sitting on the couch eating cake anyway.

The city is obligated to its people, for their own sake, not merely for the role they play in society. — Ludwig V

That is the view of modern liberalism. We might endorse and defend this view, but it is a matter of political philosophy not a matter of fact or even settled agreement. It is not a one way street. There are things we owe to the city.

There is no business of the city over and above the good of its citizens — Ludwig V

As individuals? What stands as the good of the people? What I might regard as good for me might not be what you regard as good for you.

The soonest Trump could pardon himself is January. SCOTUS will not take that long. — RogueAI

Good point. It does seem likely that the trial will have concluded by then, but if the trial is not completed before the election then the results of the election might be determined by the court's unwillingness to render a timely decision. Their unwillingness to clear the way is tantamount to election interference.

Careful deliberation is certainly always necessary but on such an important issue it is incumbent upon them to act quickly. Despite defense claims, to act quickly does not mean to act without careful deliberation. If they put other issues before them aside the claim of absolute immunity can be decided in a matter of days and then the trial can and should proceed. The extent to which he is immune need not delay the trial further if they rule that he is not immune from charges of attempting to overturn the election.

If Trump pardons himself the case against him will not proceed. If the case does not proceed the question of whether he has blanket immunity will not be addressed unless some other case arises before the court addressing this issue.

Logical space is like the the common playing field of thoughts, without being tied to any individual instance of thought. — 013zen

Logic underlies both thought and the world. Logic is prior to, independent of, and the transcendental condition for them.

The only commonality between pictures which compose the world, and reality, is the logical form of the picture and the state of affairs it is a picture of. — 013zen

The pictures do not compose the world. The world is not a collection or arrangement of pictures. The pictures of the world are pictures of reality made possible by the logical structure underlying both the picture and the world, that is, the picture and reality.

The world is made up of pictures — 013zen

The world is not made up of pictures. Nowhere does Wittgenstein say this.

The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

(1.1)

A fact is not a picture, although a picture can picture a fact.

The world, is a possible picture of reality. — 013zen

The world is not a possible picture.

The world is all that is the case.

(1)

All that is the case is not a picture of what might be the case.

There are not "pictures of the world" and "pictures of reality", with one being in the mind and the other not. — 013zen

Isn't that what you said?

There is a distinction being made between reality and the world. The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind. — 013zen

There's more at stake than just Trump. — RogueAI

Yes. I agree. Although we might not agree as to the scope of what is at stake.

quote="RogueAI;899432"]Well, there was some concern that the criminal laws might be used by political opponents of former presidents to go after them for decisions they made or acts they took.[/quote]

That is something to be adjudicated on a case by case basis. The attempt to protect a president should not extend to protecting them from being held accountable for illegal actions.

There was concern that presidents were — or knowing that there's no immunity, might actually pardon themselves for everything before they leave office. — RogueAI

I can't follow the logic of this. Is the argument that they should have immunity because if they don't they will in effect make themself immune by pardoning themselves? The result is the same. Perhaps the solution is to pass a law against self-pardon. But that is beyond the scope of the judiciary.

But, most importantly, I think there was concern about whether there would be a chilling effect on a president doing his or her duties if there is no immunity at all for official acts. — RogueAI

The problem with that concern is that immunity need not be all or nothing. The question before the court is:

“whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.”

The court need not answer this in order for the trial to proceed. A president should not be free to overturn the legitimate results of an election. That does not fall within the scope of his or her official acts and duties. That is clear cut and unequivocal.

The defense should be allowed to argue that what Trump did was done within his official acts, but they do not want to do this, because they know they will loose. If the court allows this tactic to derail or unduly delay the trail then they are at best dupes and at worse complicit.

It's more important for SCOTUS to get this right than to ensure Trump goes on trial before November. — RogueAI

If it does not go to trial before the election and Trump wins then the possibility of getting it right vanishes.

Elected officials are only part of the system.

To not take any principle, rule, or law seriously goes much deeper. It matters. Things could be much worse. There will always be those who pay attention and are ready to step in to seize power if unopposed.

If it gets to that point then we are in deeper trouble than we are now. We must be on guard against the contagion of nihilism.

From that perspective, Witt does seem to disregard his own statements, and say quite a bit about what shouldn't be said... — 013zen

Of course we can make statements about ethics and aesthetics, but we cannot compare them to the facts of the world in order to determine whether they are true or false. They are outside the bounds of logic.

So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher.

(6.42)

What can be said are the propositions of science. The only proper propositions are those that say something about the way things are in the world, that is, matters of fact. Ethics and aesthetics are not matters of fact. They say nothing about the world. Treating them the way we treat propositions leads only to confusion and fallacy. This does not mean that ethics and aesthetics and unimportant, but that they are so important that we should not regard them as something other than they are.

I hope this helps. — 013zen

It doesn't. You make a distinction between the world as pictures in the mind and reality not being pictures in the mind.

A proposition is a picture of reality.

(4.021)

What do you find in the text regarding pictures that is true of the world but not true of reality? Wheren does he make a distinction between the pictures of the world being in the mind and pictures of reality not being in the mind?

If we’re really so stupid as to elect this guy again, then what difference does a Supreme Court ruling really make? — Mikie

I think it makes a very big difference. The system is set up so that there are checks and balances, including checks against the tyranny of the majority and of a president without legal bounds.

In case anyone too quickly concludes that my interpretation of Plato is an idiosyncratic distortion of the text, I happened upon this today while reading about Thucydides:

Read in light of Thucydides, the Republic emerges as a cautionary tale regarding the susceptibility of men, living in the midst of great political and moral decay, to grand visions of political and personal transformation, to redemptive and salvific projects both in this life and the next. It is often remarked that the Republic is a book on the limits of politics. This is indeed the case, as Glaucon accepts time and again Socrates’ shocking solutions to the perennial problems of politics. We come to see thereby that, though political judgment admits of better and worse, though there are real goods and harms in how we handle these problems, nevertheless we must on some level learn to live with them.

(https://alexpriou.substack.com/p/platos-republic-in-its-thucydidean context)

Which distinction? — 013zen

Between the world as pictures in the mind and reality as not made up of pictures in our mind.

The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind. — 013zen

I don't think this distinction is correct.

The world is all that is the case.

(1)

All that is the case is not a picture in our mind. The world is not a picture of the world.

But the city has no business of its own, or rather the business of the city is the sum of everybody's business. — Ludwig V

The business of the city, over and above that of the citizens, is the good of the whole. This is why the philosopher, contrary to his own interests, is compelled to return to the cave.

This applies also to individuals and their parts. — Ludwig V

Here too it is the good of the whole and not the sum of the parts.

Agglomeration is all he knows. — Ludwig V

Just the opposite. It is question of who or what rules. In the just city and soul reason rules. In other cities and souls some other part, spirited or appetitive, leads.

Had you thought what life would be like for the ordinary people in his city? — Ludwig V

First, the city in speech is intended to make it easier to see what justice is. It is not intended to be a blueprint for an actual city. Such a city is neither possible nor desirable. More on that in a moment. Second, the ruling class, followed by the spirited, are the least free. The appetitive class is the most free to mind its own business.

So why so much time and effort painting the picture of a city that is neither possible nor desirable? Because, contrary to some interpretations, the argument is anti-ideological. The first city that Socrates makes is rejected as too austere. It is, Glaucon complains, a city fit for pigs. (372b) And so, Socrates revises it to make a city more suitable for human beings by conventional standards. In other words, we cannot start with a city as it should be, even if that is what is best. We must start with human beings as they are. Analogously, we cannot start with human beings as they should be ideally if they are to be the best human beings, but with human beings as they are.

The question of what it would take for a city or soul to be truly just leads to consideration of both the possibility and desirability of such a city or soul. Actual cities and souls, even the best of them, must be a compromise. But the city Socrates makes as a compromise with its luxuries and relishes is still not a city we would wish to live in. It is, in fact, in some ways a less desirable city then the first city.

And does Socrates/Plato know who the best people are? He doesn't even trust his own philosophers ... — Ludwig V

You have conflated two very different things, the people of an actual city and the mythological philosophers of the Republic. It is not that he does not trust these philosophers, it is that in order for them to become the guardians of the city as part of their education they must believe the story. The truth is, all societies have their stories, their myths, their lies.

"noble lie" (a mistranslation if ever there was one) — Ludwig V

This is how the term is translated in most, including what are generally considered our best translations. While it is true that the term lie is not found in that phrase, it is preceded by:

we might contrive one of those lies we were referring to earlier

the reference is to 382a

We should try to avoid harming ourselves and others as we stumble around in semi-darkness. We can learn to avoid some stumbling blocks, but even in avoidance we may encounter others. Whatever light we find leaves much else in darkness. As the old joke goes, you should not expect to find your keys by going round and round the lamppost at night because that is where the light is.

All too often answers serve to obscure the questions. One thing we should learn from reading books is the limits of what can be found in books. Another is that the ability to ask questions does not mean that there must be answers. One of the most important questions is whether we are asking the right questions.

Yes. Arguably, that was Plato's big mistake. The relationship between part and whole is quite different in the two cases. He assumed it was the same. — Ludwig V

There are different respects in which something can be the same. Plato was well aware that the politics of the soul and the politics of the city are not the same in all respects. This difference is central to the problem of justice. The freedom of the philosopher in the city is not the same as freedom from internal discord. The philosopher is by his philosophical nature not part of but apart from and at odds with the city. This is what is at play in the definition of justice as "minding your own business". In order for the philosopher to mind his own business he is forced to mind the business of the city because the city will not allow him to philosophize, as is evident in Socrates own case. It is only when the philosophers rule and take on the business of the city that the city stays out of his business.

In the Crito Plato asks whether we belong to the city, whether it and its laws are our master. Through the laws the city answers that we do belong to the city and it and its laws are our master. But the argument is full of holes. It is, as Socrates says:

The best people, whose opinions are more worthy of consideration.

(44c)

The opinions of the best people may be at odd with the opinion of the laws and city. In addition, the citizens of the Athenian democracy, that is, the multitude, are the very ones whose opinions Socrates scorns.

We are able to achieve technical sophistication and gross errors. — isomorph

I think this is at the root of difference between Confucianism and Daoism.

In a private conversation, Roger Ames tried to dissuade me of the notion of finding parallels between western thinking and the “classical Chinese mind.” — isomorph

I agree with him regarding comparative analysis.

...as Confucius said, “By nature we are alike, by practice we have become far apart.” — isomorph

I think culture or practice is an essential part of our nature. Part of what it means to be social beings. To the extent that is true the distinction between what we are by nature and what we are by practice collapses.

He does say that his hardest task is not to refute that actual accusations, but hard to remove the effects of what people have been saying about him for a long time. — Ludwig V

This was not something to be addressed in a court of law. His way of life was his defense of his way of life. He identifies what he actually does as the real source of his reputation:

The fact is, men of Athens, that I have acquired this reputation on account of nothing else than a sort of wisdom. What kind of wisdom is this? Just that which is perhaps human wisdom.

(20d)

He goes on to talk about the oracle at Delphi. Socrates' irony should not be overlooked. He is on trial defending himself against charges of impiety and he tells a story of how he set out to refute the oracle (21c). He does this by refuting everyone who had a reputation for being wise.

In addition, he changes what the oracle said:

This man is wiser that I, but you declared that I was the wisest

(21c)

The oracle did not say that Socrates was the wisest, it said that no one was wiser, that is, that others might be as wise as him.

I don't rule out Socrates enjoying it - as a caricature. But a caricature is not necessarily harmless. — Ludwig V

It runs much deeper than a caricature. The first problem taken up at the beginning of the Sophist is not the identity of the sophist but the identity of the philosopher. At the start of the dialogue Theodorus calls the Stranger "a real philosopher". Socrates responds:

I fancy it is not much easier, if I may say so, to recognize this class, than that of the gods. For these men—I mean those who are not feignedly but really philosophers—appear disguised in all sorts of shapes, thanks to the ignorance of the rest of mankind ... sometimes they appear disguised as statesmen,and sometimes as sophists, and sometimes they may give some people the impression that they are altogether mad.

(216c)

The philosopher appears to be what he is not. If the Stranger is a philosopher then he may appear to be what he is not. It is only by successfully identifying the philosopher that we can identify the imitator. Socrates then asks if the sophist, statesman, and philosopher are one or two or three. (217a)

In one's morning routine, ought one brush one's teeth before brushing one's hair or, otherwise, brush one's hair before brushing one's teeth? — javra

Either way, one ought not use the same brush.

Are you saying that Socrates was not maligned? — Ludwig V

What I am saying it that the trail was not

...the result of a long persecution — Ludwig V

As to him being maligned. What is clear is that Aristophanes lumps Socrates with the sophists. Plato distances Socrates from the sophists in some respects, but also leads us to question in what ways they do not differ. The sophists were a diverse group. Note that in the trilogy of related dialogues Sophist, Statesman, Theaetetus we might expect the third to be Philosopher. Why is there no dialogue Philosopher? The Sophist asks "what is the sophist?" and the statesman "what is the statesman?", but the Theaetus asks "what is knowledge?". It is up to us to ask "what is the philosopher?"

Malign or align?

I like to imagine that Socrates enjoyed the play. Recognizing it as both a serious challenge and appreciating the playful humor.

In my opinion, the attempt to establish and defend some set of moral principles that can universally guide human behavior is bound to fail. The demand or expectation for objective grounds is misguided. The terms 'relative' and 'subjective' are often used by those who wish to defend objective moral standards in a way that puts a thumb on the scale.

Rather than frame morality in terms of principles, I think it more productive to think in terms of moral deliberation. We are in the realm of opinion, not absolutes or truths handed down from a higher authority. In the absence of such authority morals are by default relative and subjective. This does not mean that distinctions between right and wrong or good and bad cannot be made, but that we must critically evaluate and defend such opinions in an attempt to determine and do what seems best, while also recognizing that about certain things we may be wrong or that there may be others who hold defensible opinions that differ from our own.

Plato, who Midgley says:

... right up to his death, always kept the irritable sensibility of the adolescent in resisting the claims of temperaments alien to his own.

had, as is evident from the passages you quoted, a far more penetrating, encompassing, and public minded notion of marriage then Midgley gives him credit for.

In the words of another bachelor:

Marriage: thus I name the will of two to create the one that is more than those who created it. Reverence for each other, as for those willing with such a will, is what I name marriage. Let this be the meaning and truth of your marriage.

(Nietzsche. Zarathustra, XX).

For me, what is most interesting is the difference between two representations of the same event. Assuming that neither side is lying, but that both are selecting, we might expect to get a more balanced view of what actually happened. — Ludwig V

There are different ways to represent an event. Neither of them is writing history in the modern sense. Aristotle tells us that:

... poetry is something more scientific and serious than history, because poetry tends to give general truths while history gives particular facts.

(Poetics 1451b)

Plato and Xenophon are both concerned with the truth of the matter. The truth of what actually happened does not lie in the particulars of the event. More generally what is represented is the character of Socrates, the philosophical way of life, and the tension between the city and the philosopher.

We should also consider an author's audience, who he is addressing. Plato and Xenophon are not simply relating events, they are giving a defense of the Socratic way of life to an audience that may include members of the jury who are hostile to Socrates or ambivalent about their decision, and those who may be attracted to philosophy but were concerned about the city's hostility to it.

Xenophon begins his Apology:

It seems to me fitting to hand down to memory, furthermore, how Socrates, on being indicted, deliberated on his defence and on his end. It is true that others have written about this, and that all of them have reproduced the loftiness of his words,—a fact which proves that his utterance really was of the character intimated;—but they have not shown clearly that he had now come to the conclusion that for him death was more to be desired than life; and hence his lofty utterance appears rather ill-considered.

It should be noted that Xenophon relies on the testimony of Hermogenes. Xenophon's Memorabilia is also about the trial. He begins:

I have often wondered by what arguments those who drew up the indictment against Socrates could persuade the Athenians that his life was forfeit to the state.

Here he speaks in his own name. The tone of the work is quite different. With regard to old age Socrates councils:

In this way, I think, you are most likely to escape censure, find relief from your difficulties, live in ease and security, and obtain an ample competence for old age.

(Memorabilia, 2)

The irony, of course, is that Socrates himself suffered censure. If he had not been convicted would this concern with his possible decline have been at issue? If so, then at what age does it become an issue?

But what were the real likely outcomes of the trial? — Ludwig V

In both Plato's and Xenophon's Apology Socrates refuses to allow his friends to pay a penalty. Socrates refused this option because do so would be an admittance of guilt. The larger concern for Socrates was not his own fate but the fate of philosophy.

The trial was the result of a long persecution, as Socrates tells us in the Apology; that would not have ended. — Ludwig V

Socrates is referring to Aristophanes comic play "The Clouds". There is not indication that at the time it amounted to more than a few good laughs. Metetus, Anytus, and Lycon brought changes 24 years later in order to serve Anytus' political ambitions. During that time Socrates continued to live unimpeded.

It was the first philosophical text I ever read, and still works well with beginning students. — Ludwig V

And seasoned professionals as well. It really is remarkable how much attention is paid to Plato today.

Seventy was a great age in those days. — Ludwig V

Socrates did have a young child when he was put to death. Neither Plato nor Xenophon give us any indication of failing health mental or physical. I am suspicious of Xenophon's claim about Socrates fear of failing health. This strikes me as cowardly. Elsewhere he talks about Socrates courage.

Xenophon himself lived to at least seventy-four. I am not aware of any account of him suffering any of the things he attributed to Socrates fearing.

In this case however, anyone who has been introduced to philosophy can tell the article is silly, exposition was never needed. — Lionino

I'll leave that up to the reader to decide. Opinions vary.

Otherwise, by your account, Socrates actively sort out her company. Xanthippe may have been making the point that Socrates would have no further opportunity to educate his friends after the hemlock, perhaps in an attempt to have him make an effort to save himself. — Banno

It may be that her reputation for being difficult is due entirely to Xenophon. I don't know why he might do this. With regard to the scene in Plato's Phaedo, it may be that Socrates no longer wanted her present simply because she had become distraught. We do not know how long she had been there before this or what their private conversation was like. The comment: "you know her" (60a) might be taken in different ways. This is the only mention of her in Plato's dialogues.

My most recent encounter with him was reading his Apology of Socrates and finding that Socrates, in that text, says that he was feeling his age and preferred to be executed by the Athenians rather than endure the long, horrible process of dying of old age. Very different from the flim-flam that Plato treats us to. — Ludwig V

I think this should be looked at in light of Socrates' megalegoria, his "big talk". The Athenians intend to punish him, but in response he is in effect claiming they are doing him a favor by his not having to suffer from old age. But not everyone suffers from old age and there is no indication of decline in the case of Socrates. If there is to be a decline it will be at some time in the future, perhaps many years in the future. He also mentions being wasted by disease, which can occur at any age.

Both Plato's and Xenophon's Socrates look forward to his death.

it remains that Xanthippes' presence was undoubted. — Banno

And, at least in the case of the Phaedo, unwanted.

If the name Xanthippe was just dreamed up by Xenophon — Ludwig V

It is not a name he makes up but one he plays off of. This was and remains a common practice.

As it is, I think you are reading too much into this. — Ludwig V

Perhaps, but it may be that it is a mistake to not read into him enough. One is easily fooled by his apparent simplicity and straight forward writing style. Xenophon was once widely read but fell out of favor. Machiavelli was an exception. A great admirer of Xenophon. Both are strategic writers. Xenophon has more recently received renewed interest and attention. One area of focus is his use of humor and irony.

What I know of Xenophon doesn't suggest a man likely to make jokes of this kind. — Ludwig V

Of some other kind then? From the IEP:

In a long set-piece, Socrates is shown visiting a beautiful and famous prostitute named Theodote, and conversing with her about friendship and how to treat one’s friends. This highly interesting passage, unique in ancient philosophy in presenting a conversation between a working woman (of dubious social standing even!) and a well-known male philosopher, is full of humor and double-entendre but ends with Socrates inviting Theodote to come philosophize with him and his ‘girlfriends’ any time (Memorabilia III.xi).

That doesn't sound like he's thinking of training horses. — Ludwig V

I agree. As I pointed out from his book on horsemanship he says that the horseman should leave the training to others, but the analogy between the horse (Xanthippe) and the rider (Socrates) along with the problem of educating horses and wives holds. Antisthenes' challenge to Socrates was with regard to educating her. Socrates does not answer and tacitly affirms that she is:

... a wife who is the hardest to get along with of all the women there are ...

My suggestion is he does not answer because he cannot educate her. If they, horses and wives, are not first broken they cannot be educated.

So I don't doubt that I'm justified in disrupting their doubt. — Ludwig V

This is one thing you don't doubt. I agree. Having fought this battle many times over the years I now usually leave it to others.

You can take a horse to the water, but you can't make it drink. — Ludwig V

Or as Xenophon might have it, a wife to water. In the Oeconomicus he also makes the uses the analogy of horses and wives.

Someone should, at least from time to time, try to introduce a little doubt into their thinking. — Ludwig V

Yes. Introduce a little doubt into there their doubtful thinking, that is, into what is doubtful about their doubting.

Socrates doesn't speak of taming Xanthippe, more of getting along with her. — Ludwig V

Looking at this again I need to revise what I said.

Xenophon is making a little joke. The name Xanthippe means "yellow horse". Not to push this too far but Xenophon wrote a book "On the Art of Horsemanship". The horseman does not simply get along with a horse. He rides it. It must be broken and taught. Xenophon says the breaking of a horse should be left to an expert trainer and not to the horseman. But teaching the horse is up to the horseman.

This raises the question of whether and in what sense Socrates course is like that of the expert horseman. Is Xanthippe like an unbroken horse? In that case, with regard to her his course is not like that of the expert horseman who deals with horses that are broken. But as he says:

Mankind at large [and not Xanthippe] is what I wish to deal and associate with ...

Of course mankind is not broken either. Perhaps the philosopher can only teach those who have been made ready.

While you and I might know better, Cartesian scepticism is unfortunately not uncommon. — Banno

I agree, but it is one battle I usually choose not to fight.

More than a recognition of the other, marriage seeks the likes of Joy in the presence of the other. — Banno

Yes, it is like that in some cases. In others it is transactional or a battlefield.

Midgley points out that it is redundant to deduce the existence of one's wife or husband from first principles. Doubt here is absurd. — Banno

As is the assumption that this needs to be pointed out.

So the assumption that her audience would assume that she was talking about marriage as popularly conceived in the mid-20th century is not unreasonable. — Ludwig V

Perhaps, but: 1) We are not that audience. We could read it as a quaint period piece, but if we are to evaluate it on its philosophical merits we might ask if it stands the test of time. 2) If her intention was to persuade young men to marry it is revisionist history. When she says:

People leading a normal domestic life would not, I believe, have fallen into this sort of mistake.

someone in the mid-20th century hearing this and taking "a normal domestic life" to be the married life of the mid-20th century would be misled and might conclude that if they do not marry they are not normal.

But how does that show that Plato and Descartes, in their different ways, did not both regard the human soul as radically distinct from physical objects? — Ludwig V

This is the claim I was responding to:

Philosophers did not want the human soul to be mixed up in the world of objects, as it must be to make knowledge possible.

As I read it she is claiming a concern to avoid contamination by the world of objects.

You seem to be suggesting that this is an alternative explanation for someone having difficulty with interpersonal relations. — Ludwig V

No. There are various reasons why someone does not marry. It was in response to Midgley's sweeping claims about immaturity and forming attachments.

It seems likely to me that we would not find a strong correlation between marital status and specific philosophical doctrines, but we need at least to consider the possibility, don't we? — Ludwig V

That is something I would judge from the fruits it bears. It would have to go further than just marital status, however. A happy or unhappy marriage, for example, might have to be taken into consideration. See the reference to what Socrates said in Xenophon's Symposium in a previous post.

My course is similar. Mankind at large is what I wish to deal and associate with; and so I have got her, well assured that if I can endure her, I shall have no difficulty in my relations with all the rest of human kind.

His course in marrying Xanthippe is similar to that of a horse-trainer breaking a willful horse. It is not marriage he wished to deal and associate with, but mankind at large. We see from Plato's Phaedo that he had no affection toward her. He did, however, on Plato's telling have some concern for the welfare of his children. I don't know if there is a correlation with his teachings, but it does seem that he preferred to hang out in the marketplace rather than at home with her.

There are a few threads on the forum that discuss hinges. As I understand them they are things that in the normal course of our lives are not called into question and around which other things turn. To whom would the proposition "men exist" be addressed? What information does it convey that we do not already know?

This seems to assume a naïve realist view of many things. — Lionino

I have been called worse, but I want to avoid getting entangled in such distinctions. I think Wittgenstein's notion of a hinge is right.

It seems rather unlikely that Midgley was talking about marriage ancient-Greek-style. Wouldn't the natural assumption be that she meant marriage 20th century style? — Ludwig V

Well, she does not make the distinction, which is part of the problem with her misrepresentation of the history of philosophy.

What does that tell us about their philosophy - or indeed about their science? — Ludwig V

It tells us that Midgley is wrong when she says:

Philosophers did not want the human soul to be mixed up in the world of objects, as it must be to make knowledge possible.

No distinction was made between philosophy and science.Science is from the Latin word for knowledge.

Well, we do think it is important to read their work in its context, and sometimes details of their lives give us pause for thought. I'm sure you can think of examples. — Ludwig V

I do not think it is important to determine their marital status in order to read them. Context has more to do with their historical and cultural situatedness than with their marital status. Marriage too must be put in this context, as you point out. With regard to details of their lives, in an earlier post I pointed out that:

What Midgley does not mention is that Descartes' mother died a year after his birth, that he was sent away at about age ten to the Jesuit college of La Flèche, or that he had a daughter, Francis, who died at the age of five. Rather than a deliberate and immature choice to not develop attachments, his attachments were severed from him. — Fooloso4

It may give us pause for thought but I do not think it is that important for reading him. The details are one thing, how they may have influenced someone's philosophical writings something else.

Yes, and I think liberalism has made it hard for us to see the higher good shining through our practices. — Leontiskos

It is, rather, that the assumption that there is this higher good shining through is our practices has been called into question. Imagined the existence of a higher good is not to ascertain it. This question doe not begin with liberalism. It informs the inquiries of Socrates and the works of Plato and Aristotle. The desire for what is good does not mean that the good will be found in our practices. What the good is remains highly problematic.

Reading Aristotle as if his work is not dialectical makes it hard to see that he is guided by unanswered questions rather than dogmatic answers.