No, we don't justify that we have hands through sensory experience. Is that how you came to believe you have hands. — Sam26
.The statement that "I know I have hands" is just epistemologically wrong — Sam26
What would it mean to doubt that you have hands in Moore's context? — Sam26
But we justify orange juice is sweet by our taste? You seem to be inconsistent here. — Richard B
Wittgenstein doesn't make this distinction, at least not clearly, but I do. We act in the world with a certain conviction that things are the way they are, and it's not a matter of justification as W. points out in PI 325. And, it's through these actions that these very basic beliefs (other philosophers refer to them animalistic beliefs) are seen. — Sam26
I find it strange to say a basic belief is “I have two hands”. Not only is absurd to say “I doubt I have two hands”, but also “I believe I have two hands” or “I am convince I have two hands”, when, in fact, I have two hands. — Richard B
The book's point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here, because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing. I have managed in my book to put everything firmly in place by being silent about it. And for that reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great deal that you yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won't see that it is said in the book. For now, I would recommend you to read the preface and the conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point of the book.
Facts for Wittgenstein are states of affairs which are not things (not a list of things like table, chairs, mountains, etc), but the arrangement of things and their relationship to each other. — Sam26
(2.02)Objects are simple.
(2.021)Objects make up the substance of the world.
That is why they cannot be composite.
From what I've read and heard things in this statement are not objects. — Sam26
A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).
We're not at the object stage yet. — Sam26
objects by themselves don't do much of anything — Sam26
If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all
its internal properties. (2.01231)
If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given. (20124)
Declaring "I have two hands," may or may not fall under the category of conviction, i.e., there are contexts where it might be appropriate. — Sam26
If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all
its internal properties. (2.01231)
If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given. (20124)
It would seem that we know these objects in so far as they are the source of the possibilities of the world. From themselves they generate the world through the ways in which they combine.
There is a bottom up order to the universe. — Fooloso4
Do you read it as suggesting that we can know any "internal properties" of objects, or is all we can know of objects "external properties"? — Janus
Well, to begin we would have to identify the objects.Wittgenstein does not do this. We do not even know what these objects are let alone knowing internal or external properties except that internal to them they must have the ability to combine with other objects. — Fooloso4
But they seem to be as inscrutable, and hence as propositionally useless, as Kant's 'things in themselves' — Janus
(5.55)We now have to answer a priori the question about all the possible forms of elementary
propositions.
Since, however, we are unable to give the number of names with different meanings, we are
also unable to give the composition of elementary propositions.
Simple names function as the names of simple objects, but this does not mean they name things in the way tables and chairs do. They are not the names of 'this' or 'that'. They are about the form not the content of propositions. — Fooloso4
but his notion of facts as states of affairs existing in reality and quite separate from propositions — Sam26
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