I understand what that's like, unfortunately there are leftists that don't want to hear from anyone who disagrees with them; and the irony is that their the one's acting like fascists.

There's crazy stuff going on on both sides. Until we dispense with the liberal vs conservative, or democrat vs republican you won't be able, in a lot of cases, be able to distinguish what's fact and what''s not fact. Politicians in many cases are only interested in holding onto power, and they create a narrative that people buy into, that narrative in many cases has little to do with facts. It's simple, the ends justify the means for many politicians.

I agree with much of what you said. This is why it's so important to be able to express your beliefs openly, and preferably in debate with others who disagree. This is also why it's not good what many on the left are doing, viz., shutting down speech they disagree with on many campuses. I'm making a distinction between liberals and democrats and leftists, because many democrats also agree with not shutting down speech.

Sometimes we get people in office that we don't like, and that we disagree with vehemently, but if you start limiting (as you say) who can say what, then you open yourself up to the same kind of censorship. I don't want to see a socialist get into office, but we still need to keep the communication lines open. It's paramount to keep yourself informed, and not just from a one-sided perspective.

I just saw a video on youtube on the why of logic as in how one justifies one's belief in the system of logic as the correct method of thinking.

1. It claims that to question logic is, itself, to be logical and therefore all criticisms of logic already subsume the principles of logic - we are looking for reasons to justify our doubts about logical authority.

2. Others claim that to justify logic is to, again, assume logic's authority. This, they allege, is a circularity and therefore logic has no justification.

So, it appears that we can neither justify nor critique logic. Both are circular.

I feel like Buridan's ass right now.

Please help...Thank you — TheMadFool

Logic is a language-game, and like any language-game it starts with rules. I presume that you're asking what justifies the rules, and the answer is that the rules don't need to be justified, no more than the rules of chess need to be justified. The question is mostly senseless. It's very similar to asking what justifies a definition - nothing justifies a definition, it's just how we play the game, or how we use the word. Why do people think that everything needs a justification? There are some things that are just foundational or basic to the way we do things, or the way we act.

You can think of it this way: Suppose we're looking at the foundational supports of a building, and you ask, "What justifies placing that foundational support there?" - the reply might be that that particular beam is needed to support the extra weight in that corner of the building. However, to ask what supports bedrock, is to not understand that justification ends at some point, i.e., nothing supports bedrock, it's foundational to all that rests on it. You can think of the rules of logic in the same way you think of resting a building on bedrock. It holds up all that follows, it doesn't need a justification.

Also because something is circular doesn't mean that something is necessarily wrong or incorrect. The fallacy of circularity pertains to arguments - not definitions, or rules, or anything outside what the definition pertains to within the framework of arguments.

I agree he rejected the picture theory as presented in the Tractatus. However, as I've mentioned, that doesn't mean that propositions can't or don't represent a kind of picture in some uses. A statement can be used as a picture, that's one of the uses of statements. There are an array of uses, of which picturing is only one among many uses. Whereas in the Tractatus Wittgenstein was more dogmatic about how statements pictured things in the world.

Yes, picturing is something we do with statements. So I agree with your point. I'm not sure where you think Wittgenstein went wrong in the PI. Picturing is clearly a use in the PI.

Sorry, but I don't see Wittgenstein putting forth a picture theory in the PI. That said, of course there are places where he talks about how statements put forth a picture, but that's a far cry from saying that Wittgenstein has continued the picture theory in the PI. If anything he criticizes it.

You quoted the Tractatus. Where does the PI put forth that view?

Let me just preface my remarks with this. First, I'm an independent, I don't like the two party system in the U.S., it's too tribal. Second, people tend to be blinded by their political world view, it's akin to religion. Third, Trump does say stupid things, there's no doubt about. He's childlike in many of his responses. Fourth, the left lost much of their power in the last election, including the control of many states. That said, it doesn't mean they won't get it back, but much of what you're hearing from the left are the irrational screams of that loss, not all of it, but much of it. Their narrative is created to drive a particular storyline, and much of that storyline isn't based on fact at all, but is driven by the story. This is true of both sides, but is particularly true of the left, which has gone bonkers. I'm not saying that the right doesn't have problems, obviously they do, and many on the right will defend Trump no matter what he does or says, but that's also true of the left.

Trying to look at this objectively I see more irrationality coming from the left then I do the right; and that irrationality is driven by hate. Whenever you hate someone you're going to see everything they do through those eyes, everything will be filtered through that prism. It's dangerous.

What I find difficult here is that the picture theory continued into PI, yet I would have it replaced by use. I wonder what Sam26 has to say about this. — Banno

Where do you see that Wittgenstein continued with the picture theory in the PI? If anything he rejects it, although when considering use, and the multiplicity of uses, some statements are pictures in a manner of speaking. It's just that the picture theory doesn't explain all statements. Just as some definitions of the word game don't explain all uses of the word game. Use is primary in the PI, but even use has it's limits.

So logic does not tell us what is true? — Banno

No, logic doesn't tell us what's true. Logic is a tool to help us draw proper conclusions, but it certainly doesn't guarantee truth. If certain propositions are true (for e.g. a proof), then it follows that the conclusion is true, but that is contingent on whether the premises are true. So in that sense it doesn't tell us what's true. Logic is a tool of correct reason.

Epistemology is all about certainty, not “Truth”. Real Truth is inaccessible to us because of physical and mental filters between us and the real world, namely biological, cultural, and psychological.

There are only two ways of knowing, empirical probability and logical necessity. — Kaiser Basileus

Epistemology is about knowledge, and knowledge deals with beliefs, justification, and truth. If I say that I know algebra, that statement is either true or false.

There are at least two ways I can talk about certainty. One way is a subjective portrayal of my inner feelings about what I claim to know, and it can be expressed by emphasis. Another way that the word certainty is used, is as a synonym for knowing or knowledge. For example, I am certain that I saw Tom shoot Mary, or I am certain that Abraham Lincoln was the 16th president, etc.

There are many uses of the word know that go beyond your limited description of knowledge. I can know by sensory experience, I can know based on testimony, I can know based argument, inference, or proof, and I can know based on linguistic training, to name a few. The use of the word know is much more expansive than people seem to think.

In the most shorthand form we find. The issue is we tend to think our shorthand, our therefore merely convenient form of description, is itself what reality is. — raza

I understand that our language is just a description of reality, and thus how we talk about reality. It doesn't follow from that that our description is reality.

"I am sitting at my pc" is not what is occurring. It describes a picture that even we ourselves do not see in the moment of that particular experience.

So what is it, then, that is ACTUALLY occurring in that moment?

You do not see a you at the pc, correct? — raza

You seem to want to talk about simple everyday explanations in a metaphysical way. If we spoke to each other in the way you seem to want too, we would never get anywhere with our talk. Obviously we can analyze our experiences in ways that we don't normally do in our everyday speech. If what you're saying is the case, then we wouldn't know what we were talking about when we told each other, "I am presently sitting at my computer typing." The fact is that we do understand. If you talked with people in your everyday life like you're talking right now, they would think you were crazy. Unless of course there was a specific context that dictated a more accurate picture (however, I don't think the way your talking is more accurate) of what it means to experience these kinds of experiences. In my case I'm talking about everyday speech acts.

Raza, I can't make any sense out of your contention. It might make for interesting philosophical discussions, and that's a stretch, but other than that, I don't find some of it plausible.

One criterion for strong testimonial evidence is corroboration. If multiple people testify to witnessing an event then the claims corroborated by the testimony have more weight as evidence. (likewise, if people testify to not-witnessing something when they allegedly should have, it weakens the testimonial evidence)

Another criterion is the credibility of witnesses. If a witness has a clear bias (such as a conflict of interest or having been inebriated at the time) then this can weaken the inductive strength of testimony as evidence.

Falsifiability is a great attribute for improving the strength of testimonial evidence. The more you try and fail to falsify a claim, the stronger that claim is shown to be. — VagabondSpectre

All of these have been talked about, and you're right, corroboration, credibility, and falsification are all part of a good argument. My argument was presented at the beginning of this thread, several posts down from the first post.

I have good evidence that during the experience conveniently described as “I am sitting at my pc” this is not in fact what is occurring.

What is occurring is the experience of sitting at “my” pc.

I (me) can only logically and fundamentally be the entire experience (the room, the chair, sounds, sensations of all kinds). “I am sitting at my pc” is merely a description for sake of convenient transmission during an experience of a conversation about the previous “pc” event. — raza

I would submit that your just playing word games. "I am sitting at my pc," is the experience of sitting at my pc, what else could it mean? What else would we be talking about when we say, "I am sitting at my pc," besides the experience itself? When you talk about it, you're merely describing the event, or describing the experience. We use the words to convey the experience to others.

A shade off topic but, actually, there is evidence. Our microbiome, for example, extends beyond our bodies; we carry a cloud of our microbes around us at all times, as well as an EM field and a heat field. There is also a mental field interpreted as personal space. There are also the fields of our senses that extend a long way from our bodies.

These things are not generally interpreted as as "I", not only because we can't see them, but we can't feel them - they don't trigger our nervous systems. Thus, we are not evolved to perceive all that we are, just the aspects that played the greatest role in survival. — Greta

I see your point, but how would that explain the experiences people are having in an NDE? Let me put it this way, there is no evidence that the extension of our body in the ways you describe, are extensions that would give rise to these kinds of experiences. And I agree that we don't perceive all that we are, in fact, I think NDEs give evidence that we are more than this body.

The argument from evil is an inference that a 3- omni God cannot exist, because this is inconsistent with the presence of so much evil in the world. Theists reject this with the "free-will" defense, which suggests that God "had" to allow evil because it is a necessary consequence of free will. My argument defeats this defense based in Christian doctrine:

1. Logical contradictions do not exist.
2. If x exists then x is not a logical contradiction (converse of 1)
3. Omnipotence entails the ability to directly create any contingent entity whose existence is logically possible.
4. There exist contingent free-willed souls in heaven who do not sin (e.g. the departed souls of faithful Christians). (Christian doctrine).
5. Therefore God's omnipotence entails the ability to directly create free-willed beings that do not sin.
6. Therefore God could have created a world of free-willed beings who do not sin
7. In this world, evil befalls the innocent due to the sinful acts of free-willed individuals
8. God created this world instead of a world of free willed beings that do not sin.
9. Therefore God chose a world with needless pain and suffering.
10. Therefore God is not omnibenevolent. — Relativist

I'm going to say a few things to add to the argument.

I believe the argument has merit. First, it does seem that God (as most Christians define God), does have the ability to create beings with a free will, and who never sin. For example, supposedly God created the Angels in heaven with free will and yet some rebelled and some didn't. Given that, it would seem that an omnipotent being could have only created beings that have a free will, and only use that free will in benevolent ways. So God could have only created the Angels that he knew wouldn't choose to use their free will in evil ways. Presumably this is true of all persons.

Second, if we have free will here on Earth, and we then go to heaven where we no longer have free will, would it still be the same person? Also taking away freedom of will would seem to go against God's desire to have beings that freely love him. Does God want robots, what kind of love can someone give who doesn't have the ability to choose otherwise?

Christians seem to think (many Christians) that having a free will solves the problem of evil, but I think it adds to the problem. For example, God being omniscient would have to know who would choose him and who would reject him. Why even create beings that you know will choose to reject you? If you choose to create beings that you know will end up in eternal damnation what does that say about you? If I create a robot with a free will, knowing that robot would murder 1000 people, that makes me responsible. The free will argument that many Christians propose makes God responsible for evil.

With regards to your "position", I'd rather say that "I don't know that my experience of sitting at my PC writing is not an illusion, but I know that I am currently having an experience of some kind." That's a foundational belief for me. — numberjohnny5

I would say that normally we do know that it's not an illusion. However, I maybe using the word know differently from you. What I mean, is that we are reasonably sure that such-and-such is the case. I don't have to know with absolute certainty to make the claim that "I know..." Furthermore, if you don't know that you're sitting at your computer doing X, viz., having that experience, then how would you know that you're having any experience? We can be reasonably sure that our sensory experiences generally don't mislead us, if this wasn't the case, then we couldn't be sure of much.

I am doubting the claim "I am sitting at my pc" due to it's unreality. It is a belief rather than real, I contend (although, in reality, there is merely the experience of a "contend" thought).

The reality is that there is an experience of "sitting at my pc". — raza

My point is that to doubt something means that one has good reasons to doubt, or has good evidence to doubt. In my epistemology one doesn't just need a justification for knowledge, but one needs a good justification for doubt, the two go hand-in-hand. So I'm not sure what it would mean to doubt that you're sitting at your pc. I'm sure that you might be able to construct a scenario in which it would make sense to doubt it, but what would it mean to doubt it in normal everyday circumstances. Do we normally doubt such things?

Sure. At the present moment, (I know that) I'm sitting at my PC writing this sentence. — numberjohnny5

My position is that you "don't know that you're sitting at the PC writing," i.e., that proposition is a foundational belief. What I mean by foundational is that the belief doesn't fall within any epistemological construct, i.e., it doesn't make sense that it would need justification, and it doesn't make sense that it can or could be doubted (at least generally). There are many foundational beliefs that fall into this category, for example, "This is my hand," or "I live on the Earth;" I would call these beliefs bedrock, basic, or foundational. One can identify these foundational beliefs when we consider whether or not it makes sense in particular contexts to doubt the statement/proposition, which is why it's not a matter of knowing that you're sitting at the PC. It's simply a very basic belief that falls outside any epistemic consideration, which is to say that it doesn't need to be justified. Justification comes to an end with these kinds of statements.

People tend to ignore facts, they're more interested in buying into a particular narrative (right or left); and they see everything through their narrative. We're in a culture where we belong to our own little tribe, and damn all others who don't think like my tribe.

Sorry, but I just don't have the time to respond, I've been very busy.

I guess my point is - the question in the joke is nonsense, and the answer is nonsense. It would take quite some theorising to put together a group of concepts to suggest that there is a meaningful answer, and the answer is going to be wholly determined by the premises that you bring to it. We can certainly ask if God is timeless or eternal, but first we have to have determine what God is, what timelessness and eternity are, and so forth. And by the time we've done this we are so far away from wherever we started that the entire question and answer are just abstract, fictional constructs that don't tell us anything except how creative we can be.

It reminds me of the 'orange juice seat'. There is a linguistics discussion in which it is questioned whether the phrase 'orange juice seat' can be meaningful. Given context, it can: if there are three seats at which apple juice has been served and one at which orange juice has been served, we can identify this seat with the phrase 'orange juice seat'. So it can be meaningful, and so ca, probably, any phrase be meaningful. But the entire context that makes them meaningful has to be supplied and doesn't tell us anything much about the world or how it works. — angslan

I'm not sure how much of what I'm about to say relates to your point, but your post triggered much of my response. Hopefully there will be some overlap.

After studying philosophy of language for some time there has been this bit of skepticism in the back of my mind about many things. It seems that since we use language to describe reality, all of our constructs, the one you posted, and the one I'm about to post, come with a certain set of presuppositions that only have meaning within a social linguistic construct. So we construct a reality, or what we believe to be reality in this linguistic context, and what we construct is only an approximation of reality. Moreover, even the word reality will be argued about, and even if we do agree about the meaning of the word reality, it only has sense within that particular language-game. In fact, I'm not even sure I can make sense in the way that I want, because making sense and not making sense are confined linguistically. It's as though my thoughts about reality are constricted by language, as though there is a part of me that can't relate - it's a kind of mysticism (no it is mysticism -what cannot be said), but even this brings a kind of baggage that I may not want. What's really weird about all of this, is that when I say, "my thoughts," this only has meaning within our confined linguistic space, i.e., the way I'm using the word thought, only has meaning or sense linguistically, and I'm trying to go beyond what can be said.

All of this reminds me of the early Wittgenstein, and his ideas of sense, senseless, and nonsense. What gives sense to what we say necessarily occurs in language, senseless is something on the border region between sense and nonsense; and nonsense for Wittgenstein was going beyond what can be said, it was the mystical. So there is this constant tension between what can be said and what cannot be said. It's as though I want to talk about what cannot be talked about, and in some way this may relate to the mystical side of Wittgenstein's conclusion in the Tractatus. This is really weird, because I think we all experience this, it's as though our private experiences in some sense will always remain private, because there is no way to attach meaning to the private, it has to be done publicly. Once meaning happens publicly it necessarily destroys, in some sense, our private experiences. Why? Because meaning or sense is a public thing, again this tension.

So what' my conclusion? My conclusion is that in some weird sense it's difficult to conclude anything, because all of our talk leads us astray in some sense, it's too confining, it doesn't quite grasp reality, or what I would call ultimate reality. It's as though I'm trying to make sense where there is no sense, trying to go beyond language, whatever that means. Trying to climb up the ladder with language, but once I'm the ladder, I must throw the ladder away. But you may ask, "Where does this leave me?" -- I'm not sure, maybe it leads absolutely nowhere. So in a sense I agree with Angslan, even though Angslan may not see any relationship between what he said, and what I'm saying. Unless you've had these thoughts this may all appear as so much nonsense.

Fair enough. You've done a good job of keeping the thread going.

:up:

Same here. That's my preferred method of communication and learning. It's very tedious and cumbersome though. Not something that will ever allow you to succeed in college. Maybe if you were ultra fast at this method, which I am not. — Posty McPostface

You do need some background, so I wouldn't recommend trying to do it if you don't know much about Wittgenstein. The Tractatus, for example, is one of the most difficult works in philosophy, so it's very difficult to read and to think you'll understand it. Many philosophers have misunderstood Wittgenstein's works.

What's been fun for me, is to read and study Wittgenstein, then to compare my interpretation with others who are experts. It's exciting to learn that your interpretation is one that the experts also have, or you see where you disagree with the experts. Whatever the case may be, you've thought it through yourself.

If I were you I would concentrate on primary source material. The best way to understand Wittgenstein is to read Wittgenstein. Secondary sources are important, but I think we can rely to much on them.

I don't agree. Meaning, so far as it has any meaning, is constructed by folks doing stuf — Banno

I take it by "doing stuff," so to speak, that it's "doing stuff" in a particular way, i.e., one can do stuff, but the stuff we're doing may still lack meaning, even when it appears to have meaning. For example, Wittgenstein criticized philosophers for doing stuff, because some of it lacked sense. Note also, and I think we agree on this, that many threads appear to be "doing stuff," and yet, much of it is senseless. As I've gone through Wittgenstein's PI recently, I began to see much more complexity to the "meaning as use" idea.

I pointed out in another thread that use doesn't always translate into meaning, but that if we want to learn what it is to mean something, then use is the place to start. I say start because of the complexity behind Wittgenstein's ideas. I think sometimes we can oversimplify his ideas.

This is not a criticism of your point, but only an added observation.

No, I'm not saying you're making a mistake, just trying to make sure there is no misunderstanding. I'm trying to point out things that should be kept in mind.

No, I don't want to start it another way. Why? Because it's clear that this is the case. If you do think of these things in another way, then you will be completely misguided. I'm not offering an opinion about this, i.e., it's well established.

You must not think that when Wittgenstein if referring to objects or names that this corresponds to what we normally think of as objects and names. I would suggest getting clear on this before moving on.

In the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein tells us what the aim of the Tractatus is:

"The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood. The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.

"Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather--not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought).

"It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (Tractatus, p. 3)."

It's generally regarded that T. 1.0 and 1.1 are conclusions to what follows. Also keep in mind that Wittgenstein is trying to solve the problems of the connection between thought, language, and the world. Wittgenstein believed that there was an a priori order to the world. The world has a fixed structure (Nb p. 62). Wittgenstein moves from the nature of logic, then to language, and finally to the world (Nb, p. 79).

if all interpretations fit what you were saying, the discussion would be over.:smile: — Arne

Very true, and the fact that there is disagreement is very important to working through these ideas, and it's very important to not being bored. :nerd:

It's interesting that the various interpretations of what I'm saying, doesn't quite fit what I'm saying. Fdrake is probably the closest to my view, although there are some subtle differences in terms of his overall picture of language, and other differences I'm sure. Some of it has to do with what parts of language we're emphasizing. I've tried to explain my ideas as clearly as I could, but maybe I've fallen short. That said, I do enjoy the conversation.

You appear to consider the use of the word 'soul' as equivalent to Wittgenstein's 'beetle' because one person doesn't know what the next person has in their box (in either case). Is that a fair description of your position? — Luke

I'm going to try to word this a bit differently to see if it helps to make my position clear.

I am saying that we don't know what's in each other's boxes, but it's more than that, the only access we have to the inner experience, is the outward behavior (pain for e.g.). Other than that there is no access to be had. So again it's not only that we don't have access.

So the boxes equate to our inner experiences, which none of us has access to except that there is an outward cry, as in the case of pain. Note that Wittgenstein says, "But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these peoples language?--If so it would not be a name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something." This compares nicely to what I'm trying to say, because the meaning of the word soul that I'm critiquing, is that use that is pointing to the inner thing. Remember this particular incorrect use has a referent, the thing that lives on after we die. I'm saying there is no referent, because it's similar to the beetle example. However, in this incorrect use, they're saying the meaning of the word soul has a referent, but what is it? It's like asking what your beetle is, it may be something, but it may be nothing.

We never should point to the inner thing in terms of meaning or sense. Why? Because there is no outward expression of it. Obviously there are words that have referents, not all, but many words are learned in just this way. But we never should be pointing to something internal to give meaning or sense to a word. This is not to deny the inner thing, but only to say that a word doesn't get its sense in this way (at least in terms of inner experiences). But again, this is exactly what they believe gives meaning or sense to soul. And if it's not the inner referent that they're pointing to, then what is it? Again, even the definition points to the inner thing.

There's not much more I can say, we just disagree.

I think a belief can be justified without anyone actually justifying it. A cat is justified in believing there is a mouse in the mousehole by its sense of smell, it does not require a syllogism as well. — unenlightened

I believe what you're doing is imposing our linguistic understanding onto the cat or dog. The only way we know, for example, that an animal has a belief is because of it's actions. Note, however, this is only done from a linguistic perspective.

Knowledge along with the necessary ingredient of justification is only done with propositions, i.e., in a linguistic setting. Beliefs can take place apart from a linguistic setting, and this is seen by the actions of the one having the belief. So a belief can be pre-linguistic, but knowledge or justification is something that happens after one learns a language. It's necessarily linguistic. I would say the cat believes there is a mouse in the hole because he smelled it, not that the cat is justified. And of course it doesn't require a syllogism, that would be linguistic. These beliefs are simple and basic, there is no need for justification.

Since when does epistemology happen outside of language? I think the most you can say is that the dog has beliefs. Knowledge involves justification, who is the dog justifying his belief to? Himself? This reply is to unenlightened too.

This is different to your earlier claim, where you said that "Christians generally use the word soul incorrectly". Now you are saying that their use of the word is neither correct nor incorrect. Please clarify your position. — Luke

Ya, you miss understood my point. I did say earlier that there is a correct use of the word soul, also that there is an incorrect use of the word soul, the latter being that thing that lives on after we die. However, that's different from the point I was making in that quote. One of the reasons it's incorrect is that there is no way to demonstrate that it's incorrect or not. That's also part of the reason the beetle example is also senseless, because there is no way for us to establish a correct or incorrect use of the word beetle. Think of it in terms of how we learn to use the word pain, we learn based on the rules of use that happen socially, but these rules are rules that have a correction built into them (like mathematics), and it's observable. I can observe if you call someone's joyful acts, painful, that that is incorrect. Let's say that there were no outward signs of pain, would you think it had sense? Would you think it had sense if we attached a definition to it?

Wittgenstein's example has nothing to do with what "we" talk about as a community; it refers to the (mistaken) philosophical assumption that an individual can create sensation terms (or other language) solely via their own sensations. Clearly, the word 'soul' has an established communal usage by more than one person, so it is completely unlike Wittgenstein's beetle. — Luke

Yes, you're right, he's talking about this in reference to a private language. My point is that there would have to be a rule based social component to give it meaning. Also, I'm connecting what Wittgenstein said in these passages, with his ideas in other passages. The problem is that we have to look at Wittgenstein's total picture. I do more of this in my commentary on Wittgenstein. This is why I often argue with the idea that Wittgenstein is giving some absolute picture of meaning as use. His writings are much more nuanced and complicated. Use alone doesn't drive meaning, even if it's done with others. If that's what Wittgenstein is saying, then I just vehemently disagree, but I don't think it's that simple, and I think it involves some of the things I mentioned above.

Note also that Wittgenstein's beetle example involves a group of people, each having their own beetle in a box; so it's not that an individual can't create meaning via their own private sensations, even though that's true, it's that no person or persons can do it. According to your idea, if a group of people started calling pain something quite different than what we normally mean, then it would have sense, even if there were no outward signs of pain. Language always involves rules, but, and here's the important part, those rules necessarily have a social corrective mechanism. Ask yourself, what would it mean to be incorrect in this particular use of the word soul, it's a kind of self-sealing use of the word.

By the way I'm very familiar with those passages. All I do is read Wittgenstein. Of course that doesn't mean I'm always right, but I am very familiar with those passages. In fact, I've just recently gone all the way through the PI.