I think I see more clearly now, what you mean by "hinge-propositions", and why you assume that they are bedrock, or foundational. Is it correct to say that hinge-propositions would demonstrate, or show the use of the individual words, such that the hinge propositions act as fundamental justifications in themselves? Moore's "here is a hand" acts to demonstrate the meaning of "hand". If this is the case, then the hinge-proposition would take the place that definitions hold in formal logic, or axioms in mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Moore is trying to answer the skeptic, who in this case seem to deny the existence of physical objects. Moore points out that there are certain things he knows, things that seem indubitable. These things, like Moore's assertion that has knowledge of his hands, are beyond doubt. Wittgenstein who is sympathetic to Moore's cause, because it seems that in Moore's quest to answer the skeptic has pointed out something special about these kinds of statements, something bedrock. Moore just didn't seem to understand the fundamental nature of these statements. Therefore, we get Wittgenstein's more nuanced view of just what kind of statements, Moore's statements are.

Moore's justification, as far as I know, isn't about the "meaning of hand," which would be a linguistic justification. I don't believe the skeptic is doubting the meaning of the word hand, although in a sense if the skeptics are able to doubt Moore's propositions, then certainly they couldn't be certain of the meanings of their words. However, it's important to keep in mind what Moore is responding to, and it doesn't seem to be about linguistic justification. It's about the knowledge of whether one knows that we have hands, i.e., the object hand. In a practical sense the skeptic probably wouldn't doubt such things, but there seems to be a doubt beyond what's practical, Wittgenstein points this out. So Moore doesn't seem to be "demonstrating the meaning of 'hand.'"

All statements including hinge-propositions show the use of individual words. Here we must be careful what we mean by justification, and we can see this is Creative's question about being grounded as opposed to being justified. These statements are grounded, but not justified in an epistemological sense. Just as the rules of chess are the ground of the game, so to speak.

Didn't Witt use the notion of "well-grounded" as compared to "justified"?

If a prelinguistic belief cannot be argued for, which by definition it cannot, does that mean that it cannot be well-grounded?

Banno's cat Jack. Jack can believe his bowl is empty. Does his inability to argue for that render his belief unjustifiable, and hence he cannot know that his bowl is empty simply by virtue of looking? — creativesoul

I think there is a difference between being well-grounded and being justified, at least as Wittgenstein seems to use the terms. Hinge-propositions are grounded, but not justified. Justification takes place in epistemology, as in JTB. However, hinge-propositions, don't need to be justified, at least generally. We can always think of an example where one could justify Moore's propositions, i.e., where it would make sense to doubt that this is my hand, as in the examples I gave in other posts.

Consider the rules of chess, i.e., we can state the rules, but there is no need to justify the rules. They are simply the ground of the game, and in this case quite arbitrary. But to ask how you justify that the bishop moves diagonally is simply nonsense, and it seems that this is why Wittgenstein referred to such propositions as bedrock or hinge. There seem to be certain things that we just accept as part of reality, things that we trust, things that make it possible to have, for example, the language-game of epistemology.

The cat cannot know in the sense that it can use the language-game of epistemology. It's obvious, at least to me, though, that animals show beliefs, i.e., they act in ways that demonstrate their beliefs.

So this is my problem right here. Why ought we assume that some statements fall outside the need for justification? We are talking epistemology here, and knowledge is assumed to be justified true belief. So if a statement falls outside justification, then what that statement says cannot, by definition, be considered to be knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem with this is that you're not following closely what I'm saying, and that's part of the problem. I answered this a few posts back. Wittgenstein points out, and I believe correctly so, that Moore statements are outside the purview of epistemological concerns. And of course, if a statement is outside of epistemology, then it doesn't concern itself with JTB, and that's the point. Moore's propositions are nonsensical, it's not about knowing, it's about something that's bedrock or basic, which is why Wittgenstein refers to them as hinge-propositions. Think of the door as the language-game of epistemology, and the hinge allows it to swing. Without such basic beliefs there would be no epistemology. The door wouldn't swing, so to speak.

Thanks Creative. My ontology of a belief is that it starts pre-linguistically, so it tends to be broader in its scope.

Don't you see this as a big problem for any epistemology? What "justify" means for me is completely different from what it means for you. Isn't it absolutely necessary to have some form of agreement on word usage in order to have any success in epistemology? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it's important to understand what it means to justify a belief, and I'm not sure we can come to any agreement on a general definition. I'm with Wittgenstein when it comes to understanding the meanings of words, viz., that how we use words tells us much more about correct usage than looking at a definition. I look at definitions simply as guides, but not the be all and end all of meaning. So my examples of justification point to the many uses of the word in various language-games. That said, a very simple definition is that a belief is justified if there are good reasons or good evidence to support the belief.

Getting back to sensory experiences, do our sensory experiences give us reasons or evidence to believe, for example that the desk is hard by touching it. If someone asks me how I know the desk is hard, my evidence for the claim is that I touched it. You can either accept the claim, based on the knowledge that most people don't make false claims about the hardness of desks, and most people know the difference between a hard surface and one that's not hard.

I think we should try to address the justification problem first, and we should also try to keep the posts limited to a couple of paragraphs if possible. It's much easier for people to follow.

I like to lighten things up, a lot of people are just too serious. Life's too short.

The PTSD comment was a joke. lol

Part of my response to MU...

So there's no confusion, let me suggest that there are sensory statements (like Moore's claims to knowledge about having hands in response to the skeptic) that lie outside of epistemological language-games. However, much of this is driven by context, but not all of it, since one can use statements like "I know..." in context, and still use the words incorrectly (Moore's case). The point is that we need to be able to distinguish between the two, viz., those that are understood in terms of justification, and those that fall outside any need for justification. Wittgenstein makes this distinction in On Certainty again and again. Thus, the question arises, what separates the kind of sensory statements that are perfectly normal in terms of being justified, from those that need no justification (again Moore's statements/propositions)? The answer to this question lies in another question, "Does it make sense to doubt the claim?" One must not forget the language-game of doubting when trying to understand the difference between these two kinds of sensory claims.

Moore is standing before an audience raising his hand and makes the statement that this is a hand, i.e., that he knows it's a hand. But what would a doubt here look like? Did Moore double-check to make sure those were his hands? Moreover, what would making sure look like? We can juxtapose this with a statement that does make sense to doubt, and Wittgenstein gives just such an example in the following: "And if he says he knows it, that can only signify to me that he has been able to make sure, and hence that his arms are e.g. not still covered in bandages, etc. etc. My believing the trustworthy man stems from my admitting that it is possible for him to make sure (OC 23)." In this case one may awaken from an operation in which it was in doubt about whether the infection was so severe that one might lose a hand. I wake up, my hand is still bandaged and numb from the operation, so I'm still in doubt about whether I have a hand, i.e., I don't know that I have my left hand. The bandages are removed, and I see (sensory observation) that my hand was not removed during the operation. I now know, based on what? How did I make sure? What is the justification? Lo and behold, I still have a hand!

Science also makes use of sensory observations in terms of what they claim to know. They observe experiments, and write down their observations. They make discoveries of new planets based on what they SAW through their telescopes. How do you know there is a planet in such-and-such a place? I observed it, and you can observe it too, look and see. These are not subjective observations. They can be objectively verified. The same is true in my orange juice is sweet example. How do I know the orange juice is sweet? I tasted it. Here, you can taste it too. Ahh, yes it's sweet, or no, it's not sweet. Obviously if others taste the orange juice and it's not sweet, then the person wasn't justified in making the claim that it was sweet. Just like scientists can verify a claim that such-and-such is planet, i.e., others can observe (see) whether the claim is true (objective verification) - making sure. Many claims are justified in just this way.

It would be ludicrous to claim that sensory experiences are not acceptable methods of justification. Obviously this doesn't mean that we accept every sensory observation, but generally it's true that we can rely on sensory observations as a perfectly acceptable method of knowledge.

I'll be responding Banno, it's just that I had a momentary flashback to some other conversations with MU. In fact, I copied all of the conversations from philosophyforums and I was getting PTSD reading MU's responses. - roflol - I had to take some meds. I'm starting to recover, my head is clearing, and I'm returning to my senses. :B The fight must go on! It reminds of a Jerry Seinfeld episode.

:D

As usual we're just too far apart on these issues.

Thanks for sharing that Larynx, and welcome to the forum.

What about the belief that belief should be abolished, should that belief be abolished too? Thus, this thread should be abolished.

:-O

Thanks for your input. I also learned much more outside the class setting, but the class setting enabled me to understand how to do research, and to know what and who to read. Writing is the key to philosophy, but the one thing that I picked up from my professor many years ago was the ability to write simply. I try not to use a lot of philosophical jargon when I write, although sometimes it's unavoidable.

:-O

So far in this thread we've talked a bit about beliefs, and we've talked a bit about justification, or the different ways in which a belief is justified. Next we will talk about what it means for a statement, or more accurately a proposition, to be true. However, we should preface the upcoming remarks with the following: I.e., much of what is written in this thread is based on, or is at least loosely based on Wittgenstein's notes in the Philosophical Investigations, and on his final notes in On Certainty. For example, when trying to give a precise definition of some of the terms used in epistemology, it's the contention of this thread, that it's very similar to trying to give an absolute definition of the concept game. The point is that there is no one thing that is common to all uses of the concept justification, or the concept truth; or there is no one property that can be ascribed to these terms that will cover every possible use within a language. It doesn't mean that every definition has this characteristic, but many definitions, and by extension many theories of epistemology have this problem. Wittgenstein points this out in PI 66, "Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? - Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'"- but look and see whether there is anything common to all. -For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that....I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of the a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc overlap and criss-cross in the same way (PI 66,67)."

The problem with many theories, this includes many epistemological theories, is that we (many philosophers) are trying to be as precise as we can. Precision is important, but sometimes concepts don't lend themselves to such precision. Many concepts fit the family resemblance model as presented by Wittgenstein in the quotes above. Just as there is no one definition that can describe all games, so there is probably no one definition that will fit every use of our epistemological concepts. There are just various general definitions that fit a wide swath of uses.

The problem is that when we think we have described every possible use of a concept with a particular definition or theory, and we hear of something that doesn't fit our definition or theory, we have a tendency to think it's not an example of what we're trying to define. And indeed it may not be a counter-example, but one has to "look and see" if the example has a "family resemblance." Of course this is not as easy as it sounds because many philosophers spend their whole lives developing theories, and sometimes one counter-example will destroy much of their work. This is why it's important to not be so dogmatic about some of these ideas or theories.

Not all belief statements arrived at through sensory experiences fit within an epistemological structure. This is clearly seen in Wittgenstein's treatment of Moore's claim to knowledge that Wittgenstein critiques in On Certainty. The one question that seems to separate statements that are outside our epistemological language-games, and those that fall within these language-games, is the question of whether it makes sense to doubt the statement. Note how Wittgenstein in On Certainty attacks Moore's propositions by asking if it makes sense to doubt Moore's claim to knowledge.

It seems that our doubting only goes so far, and this seems to be the case with what we know too. For example, "If [such-and-such] deceives me, what does 'deceive' mean any more? What can I rely on? I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did not say "can trust something"). (OC 507-509)." There seems to be something basic that we rely on, that we trust, something fundamental.

Wittgenstein also said, "If my name is not L. W., how can I rely on what is mean by "true" and "false" (OC 515)?" Again the fundamental nature of some of our statements or beliefs. More fundamental than epistemological statements.

I do not believe that one can justify a belief simply by referring to sensory experience. This is because "to justify" means to demonstrate or prove something. If I could justify a belief simply by saying I know that it's the case because I saw it, then many mistaken perceptions and lies would qualify as justification. To justify is to demonstrate that you really did see what you claim to have seen. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, actually we justify beliefs in this way all the time. Do you mean to say that I can't claim to know that the orange juice is sweet because I tasted it? Or, I can't claim to know that a particular tree is in a specific spot in the woods because I saw it? That would be a bit bizarre.

I don't know where you come up with such a limited definition of justify. Moreover, this problem is something I see quite a bit. If you do a careful study of how we use the term justify, it doesn't just apply to logical arguments such as proofs.

There is a difference between the concept of justification, and actually being justified. One may think one is justified based on whatever method of justification one is using, but that doesn't mean you are justified. Obviously if it turns out that what you thought you saw wasn't in fact a tree for example, then you're not justified. Simply saying you're justified doesn't mean you are. Saying you're justified and being justified are quite different. That said, our sensory perceptions are generally correct, if this wasn't the case, then much of what we believe wouldn't be justified, which I assume you believe. Besides we often make claims based on strong inductive arguments that such-and-such is the case, and we are perfectly within our rights based on the rules of good inductive arguments; but that doesn't mean that we're necessarily correct.

So if you ask me how I know the orange juice is sweet, and I say I know it because I tasted it, what kind of claim am I making if it's not a knowledge claim? Is it a mere belief, an opinion?

As to your last sentence in that paragraph, "To justify is to demonstrate that you really did see what you claim to have seen." So if a botanist comes out of the woods, and makes a claim that they know they saw an oak tree, you would say to them - "You don't know it, you only believe it." That would really be strange. You're perfectly justified based on the general accuracy of your sensory perceptions.

I'm not making the claim that all sensory experiences are justified. I'm making the claim that we do generally trust our sensory experiences, and we are generally justified in believing a claim to knowledge based on sensory experiences.

It is relevant because this is how we would know that prelinguistic man has beliefs. Beliefs aren't tied down to linguistics, they are tied down to linguistics and/or actions.

Read OC 285, in which Wittgenstein talks about beliefs quite apart from language, i.e., it points out how our activity reflects what we believe.

We accept certain things as part of the ground of our experience. Like chess players accepting the chess pieces and the chess board as part of that which allows the game of chess to take place. Then there are the rules that govern how we experience the game, viz., how we interact with others within the confines of the pieces, the board, and the rules. The rules are quite separate from the pieces and the board. The pieces and the board form the backdrop, or the foundation in which to apply the rules. The language of the game of chess is described or defined by the rules. A move in chess is similar to a language-game. Apart from the rules of grammar, there are rules that govern how we use words and/or statements within a social activity. Note that a linguistic activity also has a backdrop, that backdrop is the reality in which we find ourselves, viz., the world, and facts in the world (states-of-affairs).

The point is that there is a foundation for our experiences, and for our linguistic activity. One doesn't doubt the foundation of our world any more than one doubts the pieces in a chess game. Just as the game of chess is built around the pieces and the board, so too is our language built around the reality in which we have our life. There are certain fundamentals that are generally not doubted. For example, that I live on the Earth, or that I have hands, or that I am a humans amongst other humans. These things are fundamental, and allow our linguistics to thrive.

Just as the rules of chess are built on top of and around the pieces and board, so too is language built on top of our world, and the things in the world. Thus, my approach to language, and the language-game of epistemology, is that there is foundational support for any epistemology, and this foundational support is quite separate from epistemological language generally. This can be seen if we refer back to Moore's propositions, and what Wittgenstein says about these propositions. Wittgenstein attacks Moore's use of the word know in reference to Moore's claim that he knows he has hands. Wittgenstein points out that Moore's claim to know doesn't make sense in the context of Moore's claim, and Wittgenstein illustrates this by reflecting on what it would mean to doubt that one has hands in Moore's context. Wittgenstein points out that there is something fundamental, basic, or bedrock to Moore's claim that is generally outside epistemological language-games. However, the claim is that this is generally the case, because as Wittgenstein points out, there are cases where it would makes sense to doubt that this is my hand. Thus not every statement of the form "I know this is a hand," would fall into the category of being outside of our epistemological conversations.

There are a variety of ways of justifying a belief, and the use of logic is only one way, i.e., it's more than just using inductive and deductive logic. This, it seems to me, is clearly seen in the many uses of the word know, or the many ways we justify a belief. First, we use sensory experience to justify a belief. For example, you might ask how I know the orange juice is sweet, and I may respond with, "I know it's sweet, because I tasted it." Second, we may have knowledge of something based on linguistic training. I know that's a cup, because that's what we mean by cup in English. Third, we can have knowledge based on testimony. In fact, much, if not most of what we know is arrived at in just this way. Fourth, pure reason or pure logic, which is another way of justifying what one believes. For example, "Either Abraham Lincoln was the 16th president of the U. S., or he was not the 16th president" is true due to it's logical structure, "X or not X." Fifth, as was already mentioned, we justify beliefs by inference, or in logic what's called an argument (inductive or deductive). These are just some of the ways we make claims to knowledge, there are probably more.

Since my definition of knowledge is justified true belief, I want to address the Gettier problem since many believe that Gettier demonstrated that there are inherent weaknesses with the definition of knowledge as justified true belief. I always believed that there were problems with Gettier's examples, and Lozanski illustrates these problems in the following quote:


The first example Gettier comes up with has to do with Jones and Smith applying for a job. If Smith had strong evidence that Jones will get the job (for example if the boss said Jones will get the job) and also that Jones has ten coins in his pocket (for example, Smith counted the coins in Jones’s pocket), then he might assert the following proposition:

A) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

This proposition entails that:

B) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

If Smith sees this entailment and accepts proposition B on the grounds of proposition A, then with the given evidence, Smith is justified in believing proposition B. It turns out that Smith himself will unexpectedly be offered the job, and by random chance Smith also has ten coins in his pocket. Now B is true even though A is false. Thus, proposition B is true, Smith believes that B is true, and Smith is justified in believing B is true. However, Smith does not know that proposition B is true. He doesn’t even know how many coins he has in his own pocket. He bases his belief on the number of coins in Jones’ pocket. So, says Gettier, Smith has a justified true belief in proposition B, but he doesn’t know proposition B.

Even if we allow Gettier to make proposition B (a very broad statement) on the grounds of proposition A(a very specific statement); and even if we allow Smith’s evidence to be sufficient for true knowledge (basing his beliefs on what someone says without any further proof or evidence for that claim), other problems arise which cannot be overlooked.

Gettier makes a very specific statement (Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket), and from that he deduces a very generalized statement, (The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.) However, it is not clear who ‘the man’ refers to here. If ‘the man’ refers to Jones then the statement is false, because Jones is not the man who gets the job. If ‘the man’ refers to Smith, then Smith would be making a statement without any justification, since he believes that Jones will get the job. The first possibility violates the truth requirement for justified true belief, while the second case violates the justification requirement. Gettier has tried to use semantic obscurity to trick the reader into believing that justified true belief is not enough for knowledge. However, it can be seen that in this case the ‘knowledge’ was either not justified or false, and thus never constituted knowledge in the first place.

Gettier’s second example starts with Smith having strong evidence for the following proposition:

C) Jones owns a Ford.

Then we are told that Smith has a friend, Brown, whose whereabouts he does not know. Smith then selects three locations at random to construct the following propositions:

D) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston;

E) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona;

F) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk

Propositions D, E and F are all entailed by C. Smith realizes this entailment and accepts D, E and F on the basis of C. Smith is justified in believing all of these propositions because he’s justified in thinking that Jones owns a Ford, even though he has no idea where Brown is located.

It turns out that Jones no longer drives a Ford, and by coincidence Brown is in Barcelona. In this case Smith does not know that proposition E is true, even though proposition E is true, Smith believes E is true and Smith is justified in believing E is true by having strong evidence for Jones owning a Ford.

Again, ignoring the fact that we cannot be sure Smith has adequate evidence for Jones owning a Ford (in the original paper Gettier says Jones has owned a Ford his whole life – in my opinion not much evidence at all), a serious problem arises.

This second example cannot be accepted because it contains an inherent logical flaw. Gettier uses an example in the form of ‘either a or b, not a, therefore b’. However, this form of logic can ‘prove’ an infinite number of impossibilities. For example, I have reason to believe that Brown is in Barcelona, so I say “Either cows fly or Brown is in Barcelona.” It turns out Brown is now in Amsterdam, therefore, cows fly. This is obviously impossible, thus showing that the formula can’t be used to prove anything ­– or else it could be used to prove everything! You cannot claim here to know a proposition which randomly happened to be true just because its complementary proposition which you thought was true wasn’t. This is the wrong ‘justification’. Conclusions derived using this logical sleight-of-hand cannot be considered knowledge.

One problem that it isn’t necessary to look at in order to undermine Gettier’s paper still deserves to be considered; this problem being what constitutes adequate justification. In both cases, justification for Smith comes from empirical evidence. Now, if someone has 100% (irrefutable) evidence for X and believes X is true, then that person is justified in believing X and is considered to have knowledge of X. On the other hand, if the person has 25% evidence for X and the person believes that X is true, then the person is not (adequately) justified in believing X and does not have knowledge of X. Justification depends upon evidence, and where we draw the line of when something is adequately justified based upon sufficient evidence is unclear (would 51% evidence for X be sufficient justification?). Gettier makes the assumption that the evidence presented justified Smith’s beliefs. However, Gettier makes no attempt at saying how strong the evidence is, and if we can infer anything it is that the evidence is quite weak, and it could be argued that in both cases Smith was not justified in making the statements of knowledge he made.

The problem of reference-muddling in example one and the inherent logical flaw in example two show that Gettier problems are no threat to ‘knowledge as justified true belief’. The classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief doesn’t have to be changed, and no extra premises have to be added.

© Lukasz Lozanski 2007

This is found at the following link: https://philosophynow.org/issues/63/The_Gettier_Problem_No_Longer_a_Problem

I reject it also. Don't forget the rest of that sentence. :D

it could be that it is separate but extremely weak without a brain and people who claim to have these out-of-body experiences are just able to separate for only a small amount of time because of the sheer weakness of the consciousness without an intelligent brain — David Solman

Actually NDEs tell a different story, i.e., it's not a weak consciousness at all, in fact it's very expansive, and this reality seems dreamlike in comparison. People's sensory perceptions are heightened, their knowledge is expanded, their memories are expanded, and this expands consciousness itself. The body/brain limits our awareness to a kind of dumbed down version of reality.

When it comes to what we mean by words/statements that something external. But when I communicate a belief, that's my belief, and as such it's part of the internal self. When I communicate that belief using language, the language is social and completely governed by the rules of usage. It's social meaning isn't derived by something internal. It's not as though we can't talk about our internal experiences using language, but that language must be governed by something external (actions), and these actions, these doings, reflect internal experiences. They don't give meaning to language, but we can refer to them. It seems to me that what some want to do is allow the beetle to confer meaning, the meaning of mind states is shown in actions, not the thing in the box. I'm not saying that the meaning of mind states is derived from something private, on the contrary, it's something public, shown in our actions. However, this does not negate what's happening privately, apart from the social.

Every belief is a philosophical construction, that's a bit vague. I read part of that link, I couldn't disagree more. I'm closer to the later Wittgensteinian model, at least as I interpret him. It's true that language is a function of a culture, and that there are no referents in the mind that gives meaning to words, it's social. However, apart from language, we can observe what's going on in a mind/brain by observation. Thus, when we talk about brain states, we are talking about real things that have both an internal and external component. Each of us knows that we have this internal reality. For example, our internal experiences are real, and if I'm experiencing joy, or reflecting on a belief, that is something going on internally. This experience is quite apart from any linguistic representation of it. However, for me to know that others experience the same thing, I need to observe it, either in the actions of others (which can be quite apart from language), and/or through the utterances of others.

Don't you mean you believe in an afterlife? The question is whether you want to call that afterlife transcendent, i.e. supernatural, and what you would mean by that, and what you might think it would entail; or whether you want to call it a part of nature we do not, or even cannot, fully understand. — Janus

Yes, I do believe that we survive bodily existence, and yes I do believe in an afterlife; which is what I mean by transcendent. Some of what I believe is spelled out in this thread...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1980/evidence-of-consciousness-surviving-the-body#Item_225

I certainly believe in a transcendent world, if that's what you want to call it. I haven't had much hostility directed at me.

But that's not what happens when I lose consciousness. I experience a blow to the head, immediately followed by waking up in hospital; there is no gap in experience, because I do not experience unconsciousness. Rather, a gap is proposed or imagined to explain the discontinuity.

I go to bed at night, and the game fast forwards to morning, or if it doesn't, I complain that I haven't slept a wink. One can even imagine the 'player' pausing the game for ten minutes or ten centuries for whatever reason, and returning to it with no loss of continuity. I, as the character being played, notice nothing. — unenlightened

I think there is something to this, and it has to do with the relativity of time. In my studies of NDEs people often claim that their NDE lasted forever, or for a very long time. So if we assume that time moves at a faster rate there, i.e., let's say that change is happening at T+1000 there, but it happens only at T+1 here, there would hardly be any gap between our unconscious states. This assumes that the brain is simply a receiver, and that our consciousness lies somewhere outside the body.

When people experience an OBE, i.e., one that is near their bodies, time seems to pass at the same rate that is experienced when in the body. However, as people move further away from their bodies, the speed at which change takes place seems to change. This rate of change can be accounted for on multiple levels of consciousness. We also experience these changes when we dream, viz., different rates of change.

For Wittgenstein the most important things lie outside the world of our sensory experiences, outside "...all that is the case." Everything that can be said, i.e., what has sense, falls within the world. Then there is the senseless, i.e., the things that are said about the limit of language, which occurs at the boundary between the world and the metaphysical. Finally, there are those things that are nonsense, which are attempts to say what's beyond the limit, viz., beyond the boundary. What's beyond the limit for Wittgenstein can only be shown (ethics, religion, all that is mystical). Of course some things changed for Wittgenstein in his later philosophy, but some things for him remained the same.

There are some very interesting ideas contained in Wittgenstein's thinking. I don't agree with some of it, but it has expanded my thinking. No matter how much I read his writings I always seem to learn more.

One has to be careful trying to fit Wittgenstein's thinking into some neat philosophical theory.

I don't believe he was a transcendental idealist either, far from it, i.e., if I'm understanding the post. I would have to hear more about what this amounts to.

First, it must be said that to understand what point Wittgenstein is making, one must understand a much larger picture than these quotes you're referencing. This picture includes what Wittgenstein is trying to accomplish in the Tractatus, the background of the Tractatus, which includes Russell, Frege, The Notebooks, Hume (his argument against the impression of the self), and Schopenhauer, and that's just for starters. The Tractatus is one of the most difficult works of philosophy, and as such, there have been numerous misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's thoughts in this early work of his. This is said not to discourage you, but to put all of this in perspective.

First, it's not the case that Wittgenstein was a solipsist in the sense that you may be ascribing to him (keeping in mind that there are variations of solipsism, including linguistic solipsism), but he is sympathetic to the view that there is a metaphysical I that represents a kind of privileged view of things. The self that is associated with this privileged view is not part of the world, i.e., it's at the very boundary of the world peering in. It's also important to point out that for Wittgenstein what's beyond the boundary is what's mystical, and as such can only be shown or reflected in our actions. Remember his illustration of the eye, and the visual field of the eye. One cannot see the eye itself, the eye is behind the visual field, not in the visual field. Think of the self in this way, the metaphysical self is not part of the world, one doesn't see it in the world, although one experiences the world through the self, as one sees the world through one's eyes.

So to partly answer your question about the compatibility of realism with this kind of solipsistic view; Wittgenstein did not deny realism (if anything he affirmed realism, as I understand him), but he also did not deny a kind of privileged view of the world, which is a kind of solipsistic view, but not in the vain that you may be thinking.

There is so much more to this, but it would take much more analysis to spell it out, and it needs, again, to be seen from Wittgenstein's goal of the Tractatus.

When I get some time Posty. I've been distracted with New Years.

I'm not sure I follow your point. I understand that you don't believe that beliefs are states-of-mind, but I'm not sure how the rest of what you're arguing supports the idea that beliefs are not states.

I do believe that animals can express beliefs, so I think we agree on this point. I also believe animals can express doubts. A doubt can be a state reflected in one's action.

So you don't think that a mind is in any particular belief state, and that that state is reflected in action? What about the mind reflecting a state of happiness, or the state of being in pain, all of these states have a public and a private side. Wittgenstein dealt mainly with the public side of this in terms of language.

It's as though you're removing the mind from the picture altogether. I don't follow your thinking. What do you think a state-of-mind is?

I've spent years studying Wittgenstein, in fact, my thread in the other philosophy forum went on for years, and I still don't consider myself an expert. Still a novice.

It will take much more than quoting a couple of passages, such an argument would be long and involved, which is why I say start a thread. Understanding the Tractatus is a daunting task, it's not easy, and it's easily misinterpreted.

Start a thread on the Tractatus and spell out the argument.

In my studies of Wittgenstein, both early and late, I never got the idea that Wittgenstein believed in a solipsist view of the self. However, there are many interpretations of Wittgenstein, so I'm sure there are people putting forth such ideas. I believe it's erroneous, but that's my view after studying and reading his primary works, and after reading some of the most regarded works on Wittgenstein.