So God can make square triangles?

What makes a circular argument viciously circular? I see philosophers doing this thing where they claim that such-and-such argument is circular, yes, but it's not viciously circular. But I haven't been able to find any work on the difference between the two. What is it about a viciously circular argument that makes it vicious, and what makes a virtuous circle virtuous? I've seen philosophers appeal to this, but I don't know what the basis is.

Let's say I claim that P is true. Let's say you claim that P is false. Neither of us can justify our argument without it being circular. What does that mean?

Another one: let's pretend that some philosopher offered you a really convincing argument that all arguments are ultimately circular. How would you pick out the vicious ones? — Pneumenon

Some of this, not all, probably points to the differences between deductive arguments and inductive arguments.

One could also give the example of A proving B, then later one might argue that B proves A. This can be seen in some mathematical proofs, which aren't necessarily seen as circular or fallacious.

One could also argue that some statements are just so foundational that they need no justification, thus the argument may be seen by some as circular, but because the of the nature of these basic propositions, they fall outside the parameters of justification.

If someone makes the claim that all arguments are circular, then I would claim that they don't understand circularity as presented in most logic courses. However, some people try to define circularity in a peculiar way.

This is the second post of my continuing summary of the theory of epistemology as presented in this thread.

Post #2

Third, it's the contention of this theory that not only are actions reflections of a thought life, but that language is also a reflection of a thought life. Therefore, it's a twofold reflection of what's happening in our mind. However, there is a difference in these two reflections. Actions are a necessary feature of minds (thought life), but language isn't. Prelinguistic man can be said to have a mind similar to our own because their actions reflect these similarities. But note that although actions are a necessary byproduct of a mind, language isn't. In fact, it's easy to imagine the existence of only one person (one mind), and the actions that reflect the kind of mind states we see in ourselves, and this is imagined quite easily apart from any language.

Language is primarily used to communicate with other minds, and the rules of usage are developed within a community of language users. The rules of correct usage are not dependent upon any one person, but are dependent on how the users use the words, statements, or propositions. And when one speaks of the logic of correct usage, one is speaking of the agreed upon (implicit or explicit rules) rules of language within a community.

It's also important to point out that words, statements, or propositions, get their meaning from how the community uses them, i.e., meaning is not a reflection of things in our mind. Our actions, though, are reflections of what's happening in our minds; again, linguistic meaning is derived from a community of language users, quite apart from what's happening in the mind. Note that our actions are completely private (actions as reflected in OC 284 and 285), they reflect private thoughts, and can be directly traced to private thoughts. There is a one-to-one correspondence between these actions and one's thoughts.

Statements can and do reflect beliefs (what's happening in our minds, viz., private thoughts), but statements themselves are not private things, and moreover, statements are completely dependent upon something that's not private, viz., language. So unlike actions, statements serve a duel purpose. However, where actions are used to communicate, then these actions would be similar in kind to statements, so not all actions have the requisite privacy I'm referring to, i.e., they too can serve a duel purpose.

So the third presupposition of this theory is noting the difference between statements and actions and their corresponding differences in demonstrating or showing a belief.

I'm going to summarize my theory of epistemology again to make things as clear as possible. I'll do this in a series of numbered posts.

Post #1

First, since my theory starts at states of mind or mind states, whichever you prefer, let me say something briefly about what's meant by this phrase. A state of mind is only meant to point out that there is something going on in the mind that is prelinguistic. This, it seems, is undeniable; you may want to call it something else, you may say that states of mind is not an accurate way of portraying what's happening in the mind, but that something is occurring is undeniable. Moreover, that something is happening in the mind, is also a precursor to linguistics or to language development. This subjective reality is indubitable, i.e., it cannot be doubted sensibly. So this is the first presupposition to this theory.

Second, how do we know that anyone else has a private thought life, we know it by what they do, i.e., it's reflected in their actions. How can it be otherwise? We know, because we are familiar with how we act, and how our actions are associated with our own thought lives. Thus, when we see others acting in similar ways, therefore, we reasonably infer their private thought life too. In fact, this is how we can reasonable say that there are other minds. If there were no acts associated with a thing, how in the world could we say that that thing has a mind, or that the thing can think or have thoughts associated with thoughts/beliefs. After all, how do we know that rocks don't have minds? We know because there is nothing associated with rocks (no acts, as it were) that can be reasonably said to point to the rocks mind or thinking. Thus, there is a kind of correspondence between a mind and the products of minds. This correspondence is a necessary ingredient to the inference that something has a mind/brain. This is not to say that all acts of living things reflect the same level of consciousness, or that all actions are associated with beliefs. Some actions are instinctual. So the second presupposition to this theory is that acts are reflections of mind states, thoughts, beliefs, self-awareness, consciousness, etc.

I've been busy with other things lately, so I haven't had much time to respond. Hopefully I'll get back to this soon.

I'm not a fan of Searle, so I don't know what to tell you.

I've been using the term "brain states" to generally talk about brain/mind phenomena, because there seems to be some correlation between beliefs and brain states. I'm not sure that one can associate a brain state with, say, belief in God, because there are probably overlapping frequencies and chemical reaction taking place in the brain. So in my limited understanding of brain physiology, I'm simply saying that brain states happen or take place within a physically (this assumes of course that consciousness is limited to the brain, which I don't believe) defined area. I'm not sure if we can assume that if someone has belief X, that that belief is associated with some function Y, i.e., that there is a one-to-one correspondence. It's most definitely more complicated.

Thanks for the information Mcdoodle, I appreciate it.

Yes, I think what you're expressing is close to what I'm saying.

Being stateable doesn't require that the believer do the stating. If the content of belief is propositional, then it only follows that it can be stated. Earlier I address the linguistic aspect when talking about the coherency aspect of JTB(epistemologists). If propositions are not existentially contingent upon language, then belief can be propositional in it's content, stateable, and not linguistic. — creativesoul

I understand that "being stateable" doesn't imply that someone actually state the belief. Yes, it seems quite obvious that if a belief is in the form of a proposition, then necessarily it can be stated.

Contingency, being a subset of possibility, implies that things could happen differently, but how is it that propositions are only contingent upon language? Can propositions arise apart from language? I think not, unless you can provide an example. I would say that propositions are necessarily a feature of language. Thus, propositions, in terms of existence, are necessarily dependent upon language, not contingently dependent on language.

Your final statement "...then belief can be propositional in it's content, stateable, and not linguistic," seems strange, since if it is linguistic (definition - relating to language), then a proposition is necessarily linguistic. To say that a proposition is stateable, is also to say that a proposition is linguistic. Stating something is a linguistic endeavor, is it not? It seems to me that being stateable is a subset of linguistics.

I do not hold such a view. However, it is consistent with the notion that belief content is propositional. I say that Witt worked from that tenet because ihe talked about hinge "propositions" as beliefs that need no justification. I've read nothing of his, early or late, that would suggest that he did not hold that the content of belief is propositional. The limits of my language is the limit of my world. Whereof one cannot speak. All doubt is belief based. When one doubts a proposition, let's call it 'X', upon what grounds does the doubter of 'X' rest their disbelief upon? Doubting 'X' is to doubt that 'X' is true; is the case; is the way things are/were, etc. — creativesoul

For me it's quite clear that beliefs can be shown in what we do apart from what is sayable. I can't make any sense out of the idea that pre-linguistic man did not have beliefs apart from language. If pre-linguistic man was observed building something, then necessarily his actions of gathering material shows his belief that the materials are in a certain spot, and that the materials are used for a specific purpose. Thus, he shows his beliefs quite apart from any statements or propositions. Moreover, it seems to me that one of the functions of language is to convey my thoughts and/or beliefs to someone else.

I also can't make sense of animals having beliefs, if beliefs are necessary to language. Animals also show what they believe apart from saying something. For example, a dog may express its belief that its master is home by jumping up and down and barking - thus, the dog also shows what it believes based on its actions.

Thoughts/beliefs are pre-existent necessarily, if not then language would develop in a vacuum.

"William James, in order to show that thought is possible without speech, quotes the reminiscences of a deaf-mute, Mr Ballard, who wrote that in his early youth, even before he could speak, he had had thoughts about God and the world. -What could that mean!- Ballard writes: 'It was during those delightful rides, some two or three years before my initiation into the rudiments of written language, that I began to ask myself the question: how came the world into being?" - Are you sure - one would like to ask - that this is the correct translation of your wordless thoughts into words?...... (PI 342)."

Also you can't just dismiss OC 284 and 285 by saying that Wittgenstein just didn't have time to edit his remarks, as though he would have edited this out of the final draft. If this is your position, then any of Wittgenstein's remarks could be dismissed based on this criteria.

I'm not going to argue with you anymore. First, because it's not going to solve anything. Second, we've argued these points before, several years ago, and I just don't see any point in going over the same issues over and over again. Others have also tried to point out where you thinking goes astray, but you're in your own philosophical world. If you want to argue these points further start up your own thread. At some point, there isn't any reason to keep arguing, and I think we have reached that point.

Ever consider that your capacity to distinguish between "good philosophy" and "blowing smoke" isn't as objective as you think? Perhaps you are swayed more by what "agrees" with you, than you think you are. Consider your reference to LR Hubbard. Clearly what he has written is not as you say, gibberish, because he has millions of followers. I suggest that you simply do not agree with him, like you do not agree with me. And, since I need to repeatedly point to the same weakness in your belief, over and over again, because you refuse to acknowledge this weakness, this irritates you. — Metaphysician Undercover

None of us are probably as objective as we think; and we are all probably swayed more by arguments we tend to agree with, so nothing new there. Now just consider the statement you just made, viz., "Clearly what he has written is not as you say, gibberish, because he has millions of followers." I would not associate good thinking or good arguments in terms of having millions of followers. There are millions of followers of astrology, but I surely don't think there is any logic to astrology, or any way one can coherently justify such a belief. So having millions of followers doesn't do anything to lend support to your criticism of my remark. This is an example of the kind of basic mistake that a beginner would make.

What irritates me is not that you supposedly point out some weakness in my argument. It's your constant misunderstanding of basic things; and it's not just what your saying to me, but this is a hallmark of many of your posts with others. Your remarks with Michael in another thread show an inability to understand basic things. People have to continuously correct what your saying, and you seem to change the meanings of words based on private interpretations.

Ahhh, I feel much better now that I got that off my chest.

What exactly is your background in philosophy MU? The reason I ask is that you talk using philosophical jargon, but it's as though it's generally not connected with what I would call good philosophy. And this has nothing to do with agreeing with me, because there are members that I don't agree with, but I respect their arguments. You can tell by the way they write that they aren't just blowing smoke.

I suggest we go back to working out exactly where you and I differ on the nature of hinge propositions?

Where was that... — Banno

I posted a paper earlier in the thread about states of mind. Did you have a chance to read it? It's on page 11, the very first post. I provided a link.

I can't reply to him any more, it's useless. I'm beginning to wonder if he has any background in philosophy, or he just pulls this stuff out of the air. This has been going on for years. I think I know what I'm saying, but he wants to tell me what I'm saying, as though I don't know my own thoughts. It's just crazy. I was watching his responses to Michael in another thread, and it's the same bull, so it's not just me.

Where did I claim that those were hinge-propositions?

This goes back to Sam26's claim that hinge-propositions — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said those propositions were examples of hinge-propositions. We've been talking about this stuff for years. You'd think by now you will know my position.

This goes back to Sam26's claim that hinge-propositions (I'll just refer to them as "some rules") ought not be doubted, because they are necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

MU I never made any such claim, that rules shouldn't be doubted because they are necessary. This is what I mean by not understanding what's written, or at the very least misinterpreting what people are saying.

So I think that Wittgenstein has taken two world views which are completely incompatible and attempted to establish compatibility between them with the proposal of hinge-props. In my opinion it fails because the two world views are incompatible, and so the attempt is misguided. — Metaphysician Undercover

You know MU, I read your responses not only in this thread, but your responses to Micheal in another thread, and the only one misguided is you. What you write isn't even coherent at times. You talk about Wittgenstein, but you don't even understand much of what he is saying. So don't give me this crap about being misguided, or that Wittgenstein's proposals fail, because it's clear that you're the one who doesn't understand what you're criticizing. Reading your posts reminds me of reading Ron L. Hubbard, most of it is gibberish.

The argument has been that it is unreasonable to doubt specific fundamental propositions. This implies that these propositions cannot be reasonably doubted under any circumstances. That is what is supposed to form the foundation of justification. It prevents the infinite regress of asking for justification of a proposition, then asking for justification of the justification, etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Banno was correct in saying that there are certain proposition that cannot be doubted within a given language-game, or within a particular context. W. demonstrated that while Moore's proposition, as stated before the audience was senseless, viz., could not be known or doubted. He also demonstrated that Moore's proposition could be doubted under the right conditions or context. So it's the phrase "under any circumstances" that I take issue with. I think that we can safely say that Moore's propositions cannot generally be doubted. I think this is more accurate. Moreover, it's true as you say, that these propositions when acting as bedrock, I believe, solve the infinite regress problem.

Witt held that belief has propositional content. Thus, he insisted that a belief must be stateable. — creativesoul

You said that a belief must be stateable. However, OC 284 and 285 implies that beliefs can simply be shown in the actions of people. Why does a belief have to be stateable? It's true that within language beliefs do get stated, but that doesn't mean they have to be stateable or stated, which seems to further imply that beliefs aren't beliefs unless they're linguistic. Also, does this mean that if the actions of "rooting around," as W. puts it, never get stated, that it doesn't imply a belief. It doesn't seem to me that W. held that beliefs (necessarily (my words))have propositional content, some do, but others do not.

Anyway Creative, that's my take on it. I understand though that you seemed to leave open the possibility that beliefs are not necessarily propositional.

There are other passages, but I'd have to look them up.

284. People have killed animals since the earliest times, used the fur, bones etc.etc . for various
purposes; they have counted definitely on finding similar parts in any similar beast.
They have always learnt from experience; and we can see from their actions that they believe
certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not. By this I naturally do not want to
say that men should behave like this, but only that they do behave like this.
285. If someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a certain place, he shows that
he believes that what he is looking for is there.

Witt held that belief has propositional content. Thus, he insisted that a belief must be stateable. — creativesoul

Just curious, where did W. say this? And how do you reconcile this with OC 284?

I'll wait for Πετροκότσυφας to respond. He's done a pretty good job of answering.

Sam, just to mention that although I'm not participating in this thread, I'm finding your contributions really interesting and useful to my own thinking. I wouldn't want you to feel you were just whistling into the wind :) — mcdoodle

Thanks Mcdoodle.

Must a belief be argued for in order for it to be well-grounded? Isn't a well-grounded belief exactly what justification shows? — creativesoul

When I use the term justification it has a specific application, and in particular to the uses of JTB across a wide spectrum of language-games. It means being justified not only in terms of arguments, but also in terms of the other uses that I mentioned early on in this thread.

The term well-grounded can also be used as a synonym for justification in the JTB sense, but it also has an application quite apart from epistemological applications. Thus, well-grounded also applies to those applications that are not epistemological, like Wittgenstein's bedrock propositions. So Jack's belief is grounded, but not justified in the JTB sense (language-games of epistemology). Jack's beliefs are grounded in reality, but not linguistically grounded, i.e., they're not dependent on a statements.

Of course someone could ask what it means for a belief to be grounded in reality.

I don't know about all of you, but it takes me a lot of time to respond to your remarks. I've been sitting at this computer for about 4 hrs. This is why I can't always respond to everything. It just takes too damn long.

I agree that animals certainly hold beliefs. While Jack cannot believe that "the bowl is empty", he most certainly can look at the bowl and see that there is no food in it and hence believe that the bowl is empty. If that is not well-grounded and true belief(assuming it's empty) then nothing can be. Moreover, on my view, a justified belief does not necessarily require justification(providing one's grounds to another). So, with that in mind, Jack has formed and holds justified true belief. Jack knows that his bowl is empty, despite his not being able to justify his belief. That is a metacognitive endeavor. It requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. Metacognition requires language. Thus, Jack cannot justify his own belief to us, nor can he even be aware that he has such belief. — creativesoul

I think there is a sense where one can be grounded in one's belief apart from epistemological ideas. One's experience as one acts in the world provides a kind of grounding. Jack's belief has a grounding to it, but it's not an epistemological grounding, i.e., the epistemological grounding that occurs within the language-game of knowing. So knowledge, in terms of how I'm using it (JTB), is something that necessarily occurs within language. Justification is something we do with others, i.e., it gets it's meaning within a rule-based language. If it's something one can simply do on one's own, then whatever seems justified to you, is justified. It would seem to lose it's meaning if we separate the idea of justification from a linguistic format. Not only can't Jack justify his belief to us, but he can't justify it period. He just HAS the belief - the state of mind reflected in his actions.

Again, well said. I agree, there is a kind of certainty regarding the external world that's different from the certainty that arises out of epistemology. This certainty in many ways is reflected in our actions. It's a kind of trust that arises out of the backdrop of reality.

I was talking to Πετροκότσυφας but I'd be interested to hear why you think it's more nuanced than that — Janus

Before I respond to this let me get a little more familiar with what you contending.

But if there can be no coherent skepticism about our hands existence, then to say that we know that they exist is incoherent as well. If Moore gives perceptual evidence for the existence of hands, then he accepts skepticism as coherent. — Πετροκότσυφας

Well said, I definitely agree with this. The knowing and the doubting in Moore's context are incoherent, which is why Moore's answer doesn't work. It's important to understand the connection between knowledge and doubt.

This point, which Wittgenstein suggests, "whether it makes sense to doubt the statement", is just an arbitrary line, a division which Wittgenstein seeks to impose. In reality, "whether it makes sense to doubt", is just a decision which we all must make, and a decision which is specifically formulated for each particular instance of usage. There is no general principle, of this or that statement ought not be doubted, as Wittgenstein might appear to imply. In reality any statement might be reasonably doubted under the right circumstances. So your claim that there are foundational statements which are outside the epistemological language-games cannot be supported. Otherwise we would have to admit that there are statements which are "necessarily correct". But the correctness of statements is contingent on how the statements relate to the world, and this contingency denies the possibility of "necessarily correct" statements. If you go that route, toward necessarily correct statements you validate Platonic Realism.
— Metaphysician Undercover
(My italics)

I decided to quote this in full, since it shows not only the inoperability of Meta's position, but also the misunderstanding of Wittgenstein that underpins his criticism of Sam.

That the bishop moves only diagonally is, in the context, arbitrary. And it makes no sense to doubt it in that context - the playing of chess.

Nor is the movement of the bishop a decision that we all make. I never made that decision. But I did learn the rule. That rule is the general principle that underpins the absurdity of doubting that the bishop only moves diagonally!

And... saying that the bishop moves only diagonally is not playing chess. Similarly, saying "here is a hand" is not doing epistemology. It is a foundational statement that is outside of epistemology. It's not a necessary statement - necessary being a term that Meta uses in his own curious way - it is a foundational statement, in the same way that "the bishop moves only diagonally" is not necessary, but foundational. — Banno

I thought I would respond to both of these points. First, MU's comments...

My contention from reading Wittgenstein isn't that Wittgenstein is drawing an arbitrary line as to whether it makes sense to doubt a particular statement/proposition. As I read you MU, you seem to suggest that whether we can doubt a particular statement is purely subjective, i.e., dependent on a "decision we all must make." You seem to suggest that each person must decide for him or herself, whether say, Moore's proposition is doubtable. I'm suggesting based on my understanding of Wittgenstein, that it's senseless for anyone to doubt Moore's proposition, and that it's not an arbitrary decision, but one that's rooted in the nature of Moore's proposition. What is this nature? Certain propositions have at their core something basic, foundational, or bedrock, which makes doubting them nonsensical. This is rooted in the language-game of doubting. There is a kind of logic built into a language-game that dictates how words are used. And although context plays an important part, context does not drive correct usage. Correct usage can be seen in particular contexts, but it's not the context itself driving correct usage. If this were true (and I'm not necessarily suggesting that you think this), then any word would have an arbitrary meaning based on whatever context I choose to use it in. So if I use the word car to refer to the moon, then it would be correct, because meaning is driven by a context. However, this is not the case, it's the implicit rules of usage within a wide range of cultural driven language-games, that provides the logic behind correct usage. Sure these correct uses of words do take place within a range of contexts, but that's not the driving force behind correct usage. Think of contexts as having importance in terms of the rules of language within a context.

So is there a general principle that dictates whether some statement is doubtable? One cannot tell this by looking at a written statement alone, apart from how that statement or word is used within a wide array of language-games and contexts. How could all statements be doubtable? If that were the case, then doubting would lose it's meaning. Doubting only makes sense against a backdrop of non-doubt. We learn what to doubt, and what to not doubt. There have to be good reasons to doubt.

There are statements that are necessarily correct. For example, triangles have three sides, or bachelors are unmarried. There are many necessarily correct statements. And I would disagree that this would validate Platonic Realism. There are also statements that are contingently correct, for example, the Earth has one moon.

I agree with your response Banno.

There is a lot to respond to in these posts. I just won't be able to respond to everything. There is something though that I think is worth pointing out, and that is, what is a brain state? This is important to understanding the idea that beliefs refer to brain states. It's my contention that brain states "are synchronized neuronal activity in a specific frequency," based loosely on, What is a Brain State? (2006) Philosophical Psychology 19(6) 729-742 Richard Brown. There is a distinction made in this paper between "brain states" and "states of the brain." This paper doesn't bring up the idea that beliefs are brain states, but it does point to the idea, which is a basic intuition of mine (and others) that there is something specific going on in the brain that is associated with beliefs as brain states, which is then correlated with actions that are related to that brain state. This is an interesting paper. If you would like to read it I have provided a link... https://philpapers.org/archive/BROWIA-2.pdf

If you're talking to me, I think it's just a bit more nuanced than that.

It's nothing new, it happens all the time. That's just the way it is.

It's interesting how many different ways all of you have interpreted what I've said. Half of what's attributed to me is not what said at all. I thought my writing was very clear, but I guess not clear enough.

Some beliefs are caused, but not all.

I think I see more clearly now, what you mean by "hinge-propositions", and why you assume that they are bedrock, or foundational. Is it correct to say that hinge-propositions would demonstrate, or show the use of the individual words, such that the hinge propositions act as fundamental justifications in themselves? Moore's "here is a hand" acts to demonstrate the meaning of "hand". If this is the case, then the hinge-proposition would take the place that definitions hold in formal logic, or axioms in mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Moore is trying to answer the skeptic, who in this case seem to deny the existence of physical objects. Moore points out that there are certain things he knows, things that seem indubitable. These things, like Moore's assertion that has knowledge of his hands, are beyond doubt. Wittgenstein who is sympathetic to Moore's cause, because it seems that in Moore's quest to answer the skeptic has pointed out something special about these kinds of statements, something bedrock. Moore just didn't seem to understand the fundamental nature of these statements. Therefore, we get Wittgenstein's more nuanced view of just what kind of statements, Moore's statements are.

Moore's justification, as far as I know, isn't about the "meaning of hand," which would be a linguistic justification. I don't believe the skeptic is doubting the meaning of the word hand, although in a sense if the skeptics are able to doubt Moore's propositions, then certainly they couldn't be certain of the meanings of their words. However, it's important to keep in mind what Moore is responding to, and it doesn't seem to be about linguistic justification. It's about the knowledge of whether one knows that we have hands, i.e., the object hand. In a practical sense the skeptic probably wouldn't doubt such things, but there seems to be a doubt beyond what's practical, Wittgenstein points this out. So Moore doesn't seem to be "demonstrating the meaning of 'hand.'"

All statements including hinge-propositions show the use of individual words. Here we must be careful what we mean by justification, and we can see this is Creative's question about being grounded as opposed to being justified. These statements are grounded, but not justified in an epistemological sense. Just as the rules of chess are the ground of the game, so to speak.

Didn't Witt use the notion of "well-grounded" as compared to "justified"?

If a prelinguistic belief cannot be argued for, which by definition it cannot, does that mean that it cannot be well-grounded?

Banno's cat Jack. Jack can believe his bowl is empty. Does his inability to argue for that render his belief unjustifiable, and hence he cannot know that his bowl is empty simply by virtue of looking? — creativesoul

I think there is a difference between being well-grounded and being justified, at least as Wittgenstein seems to use the terms. Hinge-propositions are grounded, but not justified. Justification takes place in epistemology, as in JTB. However, hinge-propositions, don't need to be justified, at least generally. We can always think of an example where one could justify Moore's propositions, i.e., where it would make sense to doubt that this is my hand, as in the examples I gave in other posts.

Consider the rules of chess, i.e., we can state the rules, but there is no need to justify the rules. They are simply the ground of the game, and in this case quite arbitrary. But to ask how you justify that the bishop moves diagonally is simply nonsense, and it seems that this is why Wittgenstein referred to such propositions as bedrock or hinge. There seem to be certain things that we just accept as part of reality, things that we trust, things that make it possible to have, for example, the language-game of epistemology.

The cat cannot know in the sense that it can use the language-game of epistemology. It's obvious, at least to me, though, that animals show beliefs, i.e., they act in ways that demonstrate their beliefs.

So this is my problem right here. Why ought we assume that some statements fall outside the need for justification? We are talking epistemology here, and knowledge is assumed to be justified true belief. So if a statement falls outside justification, then what that statement says cannot, by definition, be considered to be knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem with this is that you're not following closely what I'm saying, and that's part of the problem. I answered this a few posts back. Wittgenstein points out, and I believe correctly so, that Moore statements are outside the purview of epistemological concerns. And of course, if a statement is outside of epistemology, then it doesn't concern itself with JTB, and that's the point. Moore's propositions are nonsensical, it's not about knowing, it's about something that's bedrock or basic, which is why Wittgenstein refers to them as hinge-propositions. Think of the door as the language-game of epistemology, and the hinge allows it to swing. Without such basic beliefs there would be no epistemology. The door wouldn't swing, so to speak.

Thanks Creative. My ontology of a belief is that it starts pre-linguistically, so it tends to be broader in its scope.