Sure we are. But then, we are both confident that we are talking epistemology on a web site in English. — Banno
So because of your uncertainty we cannot begin the discussion.
That is, we need some sort of certainty in order to get started. — Banno
If I am certain that my opinions concerning "epistemology" are correct, and you are certain that your opinions are correct, then we will never make any progress. And if you're not prepared to doubt your opinions for the purpose of compromise, why should I be prepared to doubt my opinions? Certitude is counter-productive in epistemology, doubt is productive. — Metaphysician Undercover
315. That is to say, the teacher will feel that this is not really a legitimate question at all. And it would be just the same if the pupil cast doubt on the uniformity of nature, that is to say on the justification of inductive arguments. - The teacher would feel that this was only holding them up, that this way the pupil would only get stuck and make no progress. - And he would be right. It would be as if someone were looking for some object in a room; he opens a drawer and doesn't see it there; then he closes it again, waits, and opens it once more to see if perhaps it isn't there now, and keeps on like that. He has not learned to look for things. And in the same way this pupil has not learned how to ask questions. He has not learned the game that we are trying to teach him.
Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition. — Banno
"The present king of France" is a proposition, — Sam26
I do agree that all beliefs are stateable. The overwhelming majority of beliefs are propositional(take the form thereof... belief statements). Where you and I differ, as well as Sam and I(I think), regards the content of belief. Sam notices and attempts to make sense of how language gets off the ground without belief. If all belief has only propositional content, and all propositions are existentially dependent upon language(which they are on my view), then so too are all beliefs(which they aren't on my view). I think you agree here. — creativesoul
All beliefs are stateable. — Sam26
I'm simply saying, again, that the beliefs, the private beliefs apart from language, are similar to the private sensations we have. And these private sensations are also prelinguistic. They have an existence quite apart from any statement about them. Their existence is not dependent upon language. — Sam26
Indeed; not all your beliefs are stated. And yet you persist in replying in English. — Banno
Okay, but it seems much more reasonable that the word "belief" gets its meaning from, and refers to, public behaviours in much the same way that sensation words like "pain" do. And I would assume that the word originally referred to human beliefs before anything else. This would make your attribution of beliefs to other animals and prelinguistic man an anachronism, a potential misuse of the word "belief", or at least an error in Wittgensteinian grammar. — Luke
This is a consequence of what a belief is - a part of the explanation of an action. Explaining is not the sort of thing we can do without language, surely. — Banno
Good to hear. I agree.Let's see if we can find a point of agreement. I would agree that when we proceed with conscious actions, we proceed with "confidence". And I also agree that "confidence" implies a "certitude". This certitude is involved with "knowing-how". — Metaphysician Undercover
However, I maintain a separation between the "knowing-how" of human actions, and the "knowing-that" of JTB. Can you agree to this distinction? — Metaphysician Undercover
Are you saying that a concept cannot refer to something prior to it's linguistic creation? When I read what others are saying it seems they're implying this, as though beliefs can't exist apart from the concept belief, or the linguistic use of the term belief. — Sam26
We talk about facts using the concept fact, and that concept refers to states-of-affairs, but even without the concept, or without minds to apprehend the facts, there would still be states-of-affairs in the universe. Those facts have an existence quite apart from a mind, and quite apart from any linguistic reference to them. So there is an objective reality in back of our language, but how we talk about that reality takes place in a community. — Sam26
One way to think of what I'm saying is this: We talk about facts using the concept fact, and that concept refers to states-of-affairs, but even without the concept, or without minds to apprehend the facts, there would still be states-of-affairs in the universe. Those facts have an existence quite apart from a mind, and quite apart from any linguistic reference to them. So there is an objective reality in back of our language, but how we talk about that reality takes place in a community. Moreover, the concepts that refer to that reality, get their meaning from how we use the words in language-games. — Sam26
Those facts have an existence quite apart from a mind, and quite apart from any linguistic reference to them. So there is an objective reality in back of our language, but how we talk about that reality takes place in a community. Moreover, the concepts that refer to that reality, get their meaning from how we use the words in language-games. — Sam26
Hmm. You've introduced the term correlation here. And as a result, lost me. Is a correlation a truth? — Banno
Here's my grammar again, just to be clear.
Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition.
Beliefs range over propositions. (arguably, they might be made to range over statements: Fred believes the present king of France is bald.)
Beliefs set out a relation of a particular sort between an agent and a proposition.
This relation is such that if the agent acts in some way then there is a belief and a desire that together are sufficient to explain the agent's action. Banno wants water; he believes he can pour a glass from the tap; so he goes to the tap to pour a glass of water.
The logical problem here, the philosophical interesting side issue, is that beliefs overdetermine our actions. There are other beliefs and desires that could explain my going to the tap.
How agreeable is that?
Where do correlations fit?
All beliefs are stateable. I'm not sure what that means. If an animal has a belief, can the animal state the belief? No. So there is one example where a belief is not stateable, unless you deny that animals have beliefs. — Sam26
...what do you do with beliefs that are simply shown and not stated? We know that a belief can be stated given a linguistic context, but not all beliefs originate in linguistic contexts, i.e., they can simply be reflections of our actions, again like Wittgenstein's examples.
Language enables us to share our beliefs, but the belief itself doesn't necessarily originate in language. It originates in the mind of the person who has the belief. Then if language is a part of that person's life, it is expressed to others in the form of a statement/proposition. Beliefs aren't simply generated because there is a language, if that was the case, then we could say that computers have beliefs simply because they can make statements.
The point about hinge-propositions is that they're not really propositions. This is seen not only in my discussions about them, but in the discussions of other philosophers.
your grammar changes according to circumstances. — creativesoul
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