Hmm. You've introduced the term correlation here. And as a result, lost me. Is a correlation a truth?

Here's my grammar again, just to be clear.

Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition.

Beliefs range over propositions. (arguably, they might be made to range over statements: Fred believes the present king of France is bald.)

Beliefs set out a relation of a particular sort between an agent and a proposition.

This relation is such that if the agent acts in some way then there is a belief and a desire that together are sufficient to explain the agent's action. Banno wants water; he believes he can pour a glass from the tap; so he goes to the tap to pour a glass of water.

The logical problem here, the philosophical interesting side issue, is that beliefs overdetermine our actions. There are other beliefs and desires that could explain my going to the tap.

How agreeable is that?

Where do correlations fit?

Sure we are. But then, we are both confident that we are talking epistemology on a web site in English. — Banno

I'm not so confident that what you're discussing is epistemology. And if what you are discussing is epistemology, then what I'm discussing is not epistemology, because we clearly have incompatible descriptions of this thing which we are referring to as "epistemology".

So because of your uncertainty we cannot begin the discussion.

That is, we need some sort of certainty in order to get started. — Banno

Don't you think that we ought to discuss things first, throw some words back and forth at each other, to get an idea as to how each of us uses the various words, before we make any assumptions about certainty? Discussion is prior to certainty.

If I am certain that my opinions concerning "epistemology" are correct, and you are certain that your opinions are correct, then we will never make any progress. And if you're not prepared to doubt your opinions for the purpose of compromise, why should I be prepared to doubt my opinions? Certitude is counter-productive in epistemology, doubt is productive.

If I am certain that my opinions concerning "epistemology" are correct, and you are certain that your opinions are correct, then we will never make any progress. And if you're not prepared to doubt your opinions for the purpose of compromise, why should I be prepared to doubt my opinions? Certitude is counter-productive in epistemology, doubt is productive. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, at the least your actions in replying to me belie any doubt you might express that we are having a discussion in English.

Sorry, never gave it any thought, because it's irrelevant. So I really doubt that I was certain of it at the time.

Why do you think that I need to be certain that I'm having a discussion in English in order for me to have a discussion in English? I've seen children discuss a lot of things in English before they even knew what "English" is.

Indeed; not all your beliefs are stated. And yet you persist in replying in English.

315. That is to say, the teacher will feel that this is not really a legitimate question at all.
And it would be just the same if the pupil cast doubt on the uniformity of nature, that is to say on the justification of inductive arguments. - The teacher would feel that this was only holding them up, that this way the pupil would only get stuck and make no progress. - And he would be right. It would be as if someone were looking for some object in a room; he opens a drawer and doesn't see it there; then he closes it again, waits, and opens it once more to see if perhaps it isn't there now, and keeps on like that. He has not learned to look for things. And in the same way this pupil has not learned how to ask questions. He has not learned the game that we are trying to teach him.

Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition. — Banno

Proposition are statements that can be true or false, and we agree on this point. However, "The present king of France" is a proposition, it's a proposition because it does have one of the features put forth in the definition, viz., that of being false. What you stated above is contradictory based on the definition you put forward. Thus, the definition is correct, but your example in not.

This is inaccurate, my mistake.

"The present king of France" is a proposition, — Sam26

Hm. Complexity.

"The present king of France is bald" is a statement but not a proposition. It is neither true nor false because it says nothing. It is nonsense in the grammatical form of a statement.

And now we are disagreeing as to the grammar of sentences and propositions, and what is one but not the other.

I do agree that all beliefs are stateable. The overwhelming majority of beliefs are propositional(take the form thereof... belief statements). Where you and I differ, as well as Sam and I(I think), regards the content of belief. Sam notices and attempts to make sense of how language gets off the ground without belief. If all belief has only propositional content, and all propositions are existentially dependent upon language(which they are on my view), then so too are all beliefs(which they aren't on my view). I think you agree here. — creativesoul

All beliefs are stateable. I'm not sure what that means. If an animal has a belief, can the animal state the belief? No. So there is one example where a belief is not stateable, unless you deny that animals have beliefs. Now if you're saying that in some linguistic context any belief can be stated, of course I agree with you on that. You can always stick any belief in a linguistic context and say, see, it's stateable. However, what do you do with beliefs that are simply shown and not stated? We know that a belief can be stated given a linguistic context, but not all beliefs originate in linguistic contexts, i.e., they can simply be reflections of our actions, again like Wittgenstein's examples. Language enables us to share our beliefs, but the belief itself doesn't necessarily originate in language. It originates in the mind of the person who has the belief. Then if language is a part of that person's life, it is expressed to others in the form of a statement/proposition. Beliefs aren't simply generated because there is a language, if that was the case, then we could say that computers have beliefs simply because they can make statements.

The point about hinge-propositions is that they're not really propositions. This is seen not only in my discussions about them, but in the discussions of other philosophers.

Sorry I misread that proposition, you're correct. It's getting late for me. I need to go to bed. lol

Ah, cool. Thanks for today. I am reading the IEP article you posted closely. Sleep well.

All beliefs are stateable. — Sam26

This is a consequence of what a belief is - a part of the explanation of an action. Explaining is not the sort of thing we can do without language, surely.

But not all beliefs are stated. I believe there are no aardvarks in the stuffing of my armchair. Up until just then, this belief had gone unstated. There are innumerable (literally!) such unstated beliefs. That the beliefs of dumb beasts are unstated is a small consideration.

We are led astray by the picture of a belief as a thing in a mind. A belief is rather post hoc, inferred as a folk explanation of the behavioural results of brain activity. So I can agree with your causal chain leading from perceptions to brain to behaviour; but not to belief. The belief is a different language game - dare I use that term - running in parallel with and about the same thing, the act; but instead of being in physical terms, it is in intentional terms.

I'm simply saying, again, that the beliefs, the private beliefs apart from language, are similar to the private sensations we have. And these private sensations are also prelinguistic. They have an existence quite apart from any statement about them. Their existence is not dependent upon language. — Sam26

Okay, but it seems much more reasonable that the word "belief" gets its meaning from, and refers to, public behaviours in much the same way that sensation words like "pain" do. And I would assume that the word originally referred to human beliefs before anything else. This would make your attribution of beliefs to other animals and prelinguistic man an anachronism, a potential misuse of the word "belief", or at least an error in Wittgensteinian grammar.

ETA: Basically, I'm just reiterating Banno's concern that a belief is not "a thing in the mind".

Indeed; not all your beliefs are stated. And yet you persist in replying in English. — Banno

Let's see if we can find a point of agreement. I would agree that when we proceed with conscious actions, we proceed with "confidence". And I also agree that "confidence" implies a "certitude". This certitude is involved with "knowing-how". However, I maintain a separation between the "knowing-how" of human actions, and the "knowing-that" of JTB. Can you agree to this distinction?

If the certitude which is associated with the confidence of human actions is proposed to be a part of knowledge in the sense of JTB, then I would disagree. I believe that the certitude of "knowing-how" must be broken down through doubt, and the request for justification, before any such beliefs become a part of knowledge in the sense of JTB. The only role that the certitude of knowing-how plays in JTB, is in knowing-how to justify.

Therefore I believe that hinge-propositions, which have the certitude of knowing-how, have no part in knowledge as JTB. They must, of necessity be doubted and consequently justified, before they can play any role in knowledge as JTB. It appears like this would create an infinite regress of justification, but what it really does is expose why we need to go beyond words, to "showing" itself, as the basis for justification.

Notice that in science an hypothesis is tested through experimentation. That is "showing". It is not tested by words and logic, it is tested by actions. Those who carry out the actions (test the hypothesis) must have certitude and confidence in relation to the actions of the testing, but doubt in relation to the hypothesis. We must always maintain that separation between the certitude of knowing-how in our actions, and the certainty of knowing-that in JTB knowledge. They are completely distinct.

Okay, but it seems much more reasonable that the word "belief" gets its meaning from, and refers to, public behaviours in much the same way that sensation words like "pain" do. And I would assume that the word originally referred to human beliefs before anything else. This would make your attribution of beliefs to other animals and prelinguistic man an anachronism, a potential misuse of the word "belief", or at least an error in Wittgensteinian grammar. — Luke

I'm not saying the word or concept belief doesn't get it's meaning from public behavior, of course it does.

When I sit on a chair, am I not showing that I believe a chair is there to sit on? No one has to state the belief to know that the person showing the belief, has the belief. You can state it, or I can state it, but that doesn't mean there is no belief prior to the statement. It's often seen in our public actions even before it's stated.

Are you saying that a concept cannot refer to something prior to it's linguistic creation? When I read what others are saying it seems they're implying this, as though beliefs can't exist apart from the concept belief, or the linguistic use of the term belief.

This is a consequence of what a belief is - a part of the explanation of an action. Explaining is not the sort of thing we can do without language, surely. — Banno

Of course you can't explain a belief apart from language, that's what an explanation amounts to. I'm not talking about an explanation of a belief, I'm talking about how people can show beliefs apart from statements, and thus apart from explanations. Read my reply to Luke.

Some of you seem to be confusing the fact that we can talk about beliefs, share beliefs, explain beliefs, and we're doing this in this thread; but this is quite different from how we show beliefs. Forget about everything prelinguistic, we show our beliefs everyday.

Let's see if we can find a point of agreement. I would agree that when we proceed with conscious actions, we proceed with "confidence". And I also agree that "confidence" implies a "certitude". This certitude is involved with "knowing-how". — Metaphysician Undercover

Good to hear. I agree.

However, I maintain a separation between the "knowing-how" of human actions, and the "knowing-that" of JTB. Can you agree to this distinction? — Metaphysician Undercover

While I like the idea of looking for agreement, I can't agree with this. Since the meaning of a word is its use, knowing-that reduces to knowing-how. Language is, after all, a human action.

But a good post, Meta - you have perhaps hit on a basic disagreement.

Any belief can be said. On this we agree. Also, there are unstated beliefs.

Are you saying that a concept cannot refer to something prior to it's linguistic creation? When I read what others are saying it seems they're implying this, as though beliefs can't exist apart from the concept belief, or the linguistic use of the term belief. — Sam26

One thing I've realised in this thread is the extent to which I have mixed J. L. Austin and Searle into my thinking about Wittgenstein.

My criticism of belief as mental furniture comes from Austin, Are there a priori concepts. Roughly speaking he rejects the reification of concepts; so when we talk about the red in the sunset and in the new merc, we are not talking about a concept that is something in our minds, but just using the same word to talk about different things. A concept is not a piece of mental furniture, but just a way of using a word to talk.

I'm not much of a fan of Searle, but I think Austin made some important contributions. Have you read Sense and Sensibilia?

One way to think of what I'm saying is this: We talk about facts using the concept fact, and that concept refers to states-of-affairs, but even without the concept, or without minds to apprehend the facts, there would still be states-of-affairs in the universe. Those facts have an existence quite apart from a mind, and quite apart from any linguistic reference to them. So there is an objective reality in back of our language, but how we talk about that reality takes place in a community. Moreover, the concepts that refer to that reality, get their meaning from how we use the words in language-games.

We talk about facts using the concept fact, and that concept refers to states-of-affairs, but even without the concept, or without minds to apprehend the facts, there would still be states-of-affairs in the universe. Those facts have an existence quite apart from a mind, and quite apart from any linguistic reference to them. So there is an objective reality in back of our language, but how we talk about that reality takes place in a community. — Sam26

We don't need to be idealists to see that this is wrong. Talk of states-of-affairs only makes sense in relation to talk of points-of-view. And whether we talk of the point of view being subjective or objective, it is still a point of view.

Of course, in practice, we live in a world where it is full of mind-independent events and objects and voids. We don't need to be idealists in our ontic commitments.

But still, we can't then also deny that the very idea of "a state of affairs" is a world description that demands a viewer or interpretant of some kind. That is why a maximally objective point of view is often called the God's eye view - the view from nowhere which is also the view from everywhere.

It gets worse for the naive realist as, in practice, this maximally invariant viewpoint has to start to see the "laws of nature". It has to transcend the nominalist particulars - all the medium-sized dry goods that seem to populate a world that is "a state of affairs" - and focus on what is maximally general or universal about the world being viewed. The local particulars become the contingencies or the accidents in being just the individuated variety contained within the general constraints or invariances.

So the concept of states-of-affairs carries with it both the need for some viewpoint - the maximally objective one - and also a viewpoint that then adds a nominalist fixation on the contingently individuated. It is the viewpoint that reduces the world to some instantaneous collection of concrete particulars.

Thus the very idea of a "state-of-affairs" incorporates a complex metaphysical position. There is nothing direct or simple about it. And to say that the facts of the universe exist in a mind-independent fashion is both true - in regards to an idealist metaphysics - and untrue, in regards to a properly holistic metaphysics such as the triadic model afforded by semiotics.

Yes - I agree with all of that, although I might say it slightly differently.

There is a sense where I would say that my comments are both true and not true also, but that has to do with my metaphysics. Ultimately I believe that at the bottom of everything is consciousness. In fact, I think it's the unifying principle, but this is a discussion for another thread.

It's the "slightly different" that I'm concerned about. :-O

OK. But I am finding your whole position a struggle to follow. So this would seem the missing link.

And yes, a proper understanding of what we might mean by the consciousness is central to having a position. I've been making that point. People hereabouts have been using Wittgenstein as if he absolved us of a need to have a background metaphysics in this regard.

I can unite the two, but trying to get people to understand my point on this is a struggle as it is. My metaphysics would be another exercise in futility. :-$

OK, to those difference.

One way to think of what I'm saying is this: We talk about facts using the concept fact, and that concept refers to states-of-affairs, but even without the concept, or without minds to apprehend the facts, there would still be states-of-affairs in the universe. Those facts have an existence quite apart from a mind, and quite apart from any linguistic reference to them. So there is an objective reality in back of our language, but how we talk about that reality takes place in a community. Moreover, the concepts that refer to that reality, get their meaning from how we use the words in language-games. — Sam26

I balk at talking about facts using the concept fact. Following Austin, I think talk of concepts leads too easily to the philosophical error of thinking of facts, beliefs, colours, shapes and so on in the same way we think about moving things around in a room - as mental furniture. So we might say that Fred does not use the word "blue" correctly because his concept of blue is wrong; as if Fred had a thing called "blue" in his head that was the wrong shape and our task in helping him was to make it the right shape. The way we make it the right shape is to carefully explain to Fred what things are blue and what are not, so that his concept of blue becomes the same as our own.

But that is a deceptive picture of what is going on. We can eliminate the mental furniture with no loss of clarity. Rather than manipulating Fred's mental furniture, what we are doing is showing Fred how to use the word "Blue".

Although this path derives from Austin, it fits in very well with Wittgenstein's beetles. Concepts reek of private mental languages, or languages of thought, or whatever you will. Languages of thought are a final vestige of the homunculus fallacy.

Those facts have an existence quite apart from a mind, and quite apart from any linguistic reference to them. So there is an objective reality in back of our language, but how we talk about that reality takes place in a community. Moreover, the concepts that refer to that reality, get their meaning from how we use the words in language-games. — Sam26

With this I am in agreement - especially in pointing out yet again that talk only takes place in a community. There is an objective reality in back of our language. I might add that the "in back of" part is about hinge propositions, but we should remember that our world is saturated by language, and language saturated by our world. It is innately social, so we are quite able not only to see our own point of view, but to understand the point of view of others, and even to take on that point of view. Consider Wittgenstein' discussion of pain. The upshot of that is, even if we grant that we must talk from a specific point of view (and I don't), it would not follow that we could not indeed talk about things in the world. We can and do; those who deny this have missed the lesson of meaning as use.

If it's any consolation, I think I understand your view on belief being caused; and my objection is a relatively minor one. It's just that I get stuck in holding that talk of acts and beliefs is distinct from talk of neurones and causes. I baulk at mixing the two.

Hmm. You've introduced the term correlation here. And as a result, lost me. Is a correlation a truth? — Banno

Correlation is what all thought and belief consist entirely of. There are no exceptions. As many times before, if we are to make sense of a distinction between belief without language and belief with, then both 'kinds' must have common denominators which constitute being belief.

Here's my grammar again, just to be clear.

Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition.

Beliefs range over propositions. (arguably, they might be made to range over statements: Fred believes the present king of France is bald.)

Beliefs set out a relation of a particular sort between an agent and a proposition.

This relation is such that if the agent acts in some way then there is a belief and a desire that together are sufficient to explain the agent's action. Banno wants water; he believes he can pour a glass from the tap; so he goes to the tap to pour a glass of water.

The logical problem here, the philosophical interesting side issue, is that beliefs overdetermine our actions. There are other beliefs and desires that could explain my going to the tap.

How agreeable is that?

Where do correlations fit?

Well, your grammar changes according to circumstances. Be that as it may, here you've invoked the term "relation" as a means to define belief as a particular sort of relation between an agent and a proposition...

There's a few issues I could take, but won't...

I want to see you draw and maintain the obvious distinction between reporting upon another agent's belief and the other agent's belief. Or between talking about thought and belief and thought and belief. Either will do here.

All beliefs are stateable. I'm not sure what that means. If an animal has a belief, can the animal state the belief? No. So there is one example where a belief is not stateable, unless you deny that animals have beliefs. — Sam26

Being stateable, on my view at least, means exactly that. The agent need not be able to state it's own thought and belief in order for it's belief to be able to be stated by another capable agent...

...what do you do with beliefs that are simply shown and not stated? We know that a belief can be stated given a linguistic context, but not all beliefs originate in linguistic contexts, i.e., they can simply be reflections of our actions, again like Wittgenstein's examples.

I would say that you have this exactly backwards. Behaviours reflect belief.

Language enables us to share our beliefs, but the belief itself doesn't necessarily originate in language. It originates in the mind of the person who has the belief. Then if language is a part of that person's life, it is expressed to others in the form of a statement/proposition. Beliefs aren't simply generated because there is a language, if that was the case, then we could say that computers have beliefs simply because they can make statements.

Well, there's a whole bunch of unpacking to do here, but suffice it to say that some belief are generated precisely because there is a language. One's belief about social status is one easy example to point towards...

The point about hinge-propositions is that they're not really propositions. This is seen not only in my discussions about them, but in the discussions of other philosophers.

Then the term "hinge proposition" is a misnomer.

your grammar changes according to circumstances. — creativesoul

It's pretty much the same as the one posted on my user page in the old forum. The only significant difference is that I no longer accept any statement as evidence for any other - part of rejecting coherentist approaches to truth.

"relation" is no more than a predicate of valency 2. Beliefs have the form Bap, where a is an individual and p is a statement.

Reporting another agent's belief is no more than changing the first constant. Bcp.