But he did have this other register: We know stuff because of this huge apparatus of words that we use while understanding only a portion of it.

He was a philologist. — Valentinus

Perhaps. Nietzsche's work is wide open to interpretation. There is no claim that can be made, that is not contradicted somewhere within his writing.

Lets just speak plainly about your issue. — DingoJones

I love plain speech. But it is blood in the water for the language Nazis.

I feel the hallmark of traditional philosophy is the idea that the getting of wisdom is an endeavour or something difficult to achieve which can only be undertaken by arduous discipline and deep contemplation. That is why Hadot could write of 'philosophy as a way of life'. As he points out, it's different from religion because not reliant on dogmatic belief; but also different from science, because not concerned with instrumental mastery over nature, but rather the introspective mastery of self-knowledge and disciplined understanding. — Wayfarer

Nice! :up:

@creativesoul
After reviewing earlier discussions, thought/belief was associated with meaning. But I never got to the point at which we specifically defined it.

Nietzsche was undoubtedly a great thinker, writer, and agent provocateur. But is there in Nietzsche's writing any recognition of the idea of there being a higher domain that the philosophical aspirant is required to ascend to? — Wayfarer

I definitely think he is calling out his reader, to become Dionysian - 'amor fati'. In my opinion, he is quite religious and evangelistic in his regard for the Dionysian. And, he proceeds forth with the erraticism of a crazed prophet.

Note phrases like 'the true nature of things' and the 'eternal nature of things.' Nietzsche and others (all of us at times?) transcend what's terrible by a mystic experience through art. — ghost

The eternal return from Dionysian to Apollonian, is found in creative willpower (will to power), which transforms the absurdity and awfulness of existence into something tolerable. This is what philosophy attempts to do.

the Dionysian man may be said to resemble Hamlet: both have for once seen into the true nature of things, —they have perceived, but they are loath to act; for their action cannot change the eternal nature of things; [...] Not reflection, no!—true knowledge, insight into appalling truth, preponderates over all motives inciting to action, in Hamlet as well as in the Dionysian man. — Nietzsche

For Nietzsche the true nature of things is embodied in the Dionysian - that existence is an intoxicating dream state and there is no true nature of things. This is, indeed, an appaling truth to behold - a truth that negates all truth, the paradoxical knowledge that existence is entirely irrational, and all reason is illusory. In present day philosophy, the postmodernists take these ideas to the absolute extreme (complete nonsense), while the rest of the cutting edge of philosophy completely disregards it - preferring to exacerbate the problems of philosophy.

Nietzsche made some important points, unfortunately the modern trend is not creative enough to shift through his insanity for his essential meaning.

So we are playing around with three kinds of thought/belief. Prelinguistic, linguistic pre-reflective, and linguistic reflective.

What do they all have in common that makes them all thought/belief? — creativesoul

What is thought/belief in the first place? How are we defining it? It is impossible to determine what makes them common until we do this.

So we are playing around with three kinds of thought/belief. Prelinguistic, linguistic pre-reflective, and linguistic reflective.

What do they all have in common that makes them all thought/belief? — creativesoul

They are all modes of assessment by which we make correlations/associations/connections.

Additionally, we find a social dynamic involved in the communication of each mode.

As long the individuals treat one another as worthy of respect (independent of particular theories) this can work beautifully.
— ghost

Well put. — creativesoul

I second that.

But that is just not true. While I appreciate the friendly discourse more than my words can probably convey, I'm always at a complete loss when others talk about and/or imply some foregone conclusion that we cannot get 'beneath' language. It's just not true.

There are two main premisses at work here for my part at least. One involves what all things moral have in common, and the other involves what all thought/belief have in common.

While those two premisses can be used as premisses, they were not arrived at by virtue of assumption. — creativesoul

You are right, we've put in a lot of groundwork to validate our premise. That post was not meant to discount it.

I was merely expressing my opinion that no premise is fully immune to criticism. But that's a different topic for a different thread, so I will stop here.

↪Merkwurdichliebe I agree that "proto-morality" is not "a domain of morals", and this agreement is related to several discussions about terminology I have had with creativesoul in the past, where I have said that I think it is best for clarity and avoidance of unnecessary and possibly misleading anthropomorphization to make a distinction between the linguistically based abstract forming, having and holding of thoughts and beliefs, and the kinds of pre-linguistic cognitve processes, which we might refer to as 'thinking' or 'believing'. — Janus

Excellent. :grin:

That fits in perfectly with my current understanding. I have no objections.

I'd add that we have to already be in on something friendly to begin with in order to set up the rules. So that suggests that the rules are still a little artificial, however useful. — ghost

Rules are indeed useful.

This something friendly is part of social aptitude. Perhaps it is the ability to make oneself agreeable to alien thought/belief. The rules, whether in regard to logic or moral reasoning, demand conformity, and imply an altering of one's thought/belief so as properly to abide by the rules. In this sense, rules are absolutely artificial.

This brings us to the question of responsibility. When one has the choice to follow the rules or not. For example, when it becomes possible to consciously transgress the rule (e.g. do not to speak in tongues, or do not commit murder). In the rules of logic, this would merely make one untintellible/dumb. But under the rules of morality, this would make one wrong/unacceptable.

what moves are allowed in the game. I call these something like power dynamics. It's about everyone getting along. I think this is related to logic. It's not that we have proved that no one has mystic access to the truth. It's just that we are the kind of people who don't play the game that way. So 'logic' or 'reason' is an abbreviation for some kind simultaneously epistemological and moral background. — ghost

Well said. This places the utmost importance on being clear with respect the rules we are playing by. When we consider all the subconscious thought/belief that is not readily accessible, it seems, this getting along is essential to moving us forward in our theorizing..

That makes sense to me. I think we also have social conventions about what moves are allowed in the game. — ghost

I like how you circled back onto the automatic stuff, subconscious thought/belief factors into everything we assert.

Practice is ahead of theory.

For me this is not anti-theory, but it does free us from an obsession with artificial foundations. I like to think that we creatively forge phrases. Some of them prove themselves, others don't. I like this about Popper. We don't know (and it doesn't matter) where theories come from. It's how we judge them that matters. It's holding the results of our mystery creativity up to the fire of reality and criticism. — ghost

This touches on something creativesoul and I have discussed earlier on this thread - methodology and premise. I came to the conclusion that the foundation of the premise of any theory is inaccessible. The best we can do is presuppose the premise and proceed to investigate through strict methodology, which, at least, allows us to proceed with some consistency of logic. It is likely that we will find out nothing about the subject of our investigations. Reality and criticism will always prevail in negating theory. Despite that, what is of value is the actual conducting of the thought experiment. Only by doing so can we see it for what it is, and judge it by it's true merits.

I like noticing the darkness that surrounds us...but then getting out my fishing pole. I'm at peace with our ultimate ignorance. There is even something beautiful about an existence that is too large for our finite problem-oriented minds. — ghost

Well put, the more we know, the less we know. This is why I embrace 'Socratic ignorance '.

I agree. I guess I was generally trying to point how much of our morality is 'beneath' the artificial theories we construct on top of that darkness. I'd say that the ultimate source of morals is as obscure as why there is something rather than nothing. But we can naturally think in terms of our genetic and historical evolution. — ghost

Consciousness is a ship at sea. It cannot ever hope to fathom the depths of its necessity. But we might be able to go fishing, and catch some reasonable genetic or historic explanations. I like fishing.

As a matter or morality or taste, though, I like being able to downshift into real talk. We've probably all met a few people who can't switch off the video game and speak usefully about the real world that sooner or later we end up having to deal with. — ghost

I second that. There is always a greater need for more reference to real world examples, nothing gives greater sense to video-game speech (just as video-game speech gives relevance to the real world). A balance must be strived for.

I don't have to remind myself not to play with my poop. And that's a second point I should sneak in. Lots of morality is automatic, and it's arguably this automatic stuff that's decisive. — ghost

So I'd say that within a culture the conscious moral discussion is focused on difficult cases where the gut-level principles of a culture clash. — ghost

All conscious moral thought/belief are founded on myriad, subconscious, nonmoral and moral assessments that are acquired through prior experience.

The automatic stuff lies in subconscious thought/belief as embedded valuations. Yet, not all prexisting valuations that factor into moral thought/belief are moral in kind.

What we need to do is discuss how morals arrive in prelinguistic thought/belief, both individually and culturally.
— Merkwurdichliebe

They don't. Only rudimentary moral belief are possible(similar to Janus' "proto-morality" and some notions of "moral intuition"). Morality and morals both require language. There are no prelinguistic morals or morality. — creativesoul

Ok, good. I'm glad we don't have to go over that again. :smile:

Not all moral thought/belief is morality. All morality is moral thought/belief. Not all moral thought/belief are moral principles. All moral principles are moral thought/belief. Not all moral thought/belief are social mores. All social mores are moral thought/belief. Etc. — creativesoul

Not all thought/belief about evolution is moral in kind. Paradox is a result of inadequate framework. No need for paradox here. — creativesoul

Precisely!

I'm glad you made these points explicit. :up:

@Janus

I might call this primitive ethics. I have trouble understanding ape morality. :grin: Nevertheless, it does count as "moral-in-kind"

I have previously agreed with myself that morality pertains to thought/belief about right/wrong in respect to human thought/belief/intent/behavior. By that, I meant to rule out proto-morality as a domain of morals, not to say is isn't a necessary source of morals.

However, if morality is the result of evolution — creativesoul

Under our criterion, it would be thought/belief about evolution, by which we could talk about evolution of thought/belief. It is very paradoxical.

What we need to do is discuss how morals arrive in prelinguistic thought/belief, both individually and culturally.

How do we define the rule maker, and the rule taker, and what are the details of their relation?

I like the use of the term proto-morality.

Outside of our desires, reality has no problems, needs no solutions, etc. — Terrapin Station

:up:

I've been off the grid all day. I like the direction this discussion has taken. :up: There are some nice posts I want to address...

I found his politics more fascinating than convincing. — ghost

Their fascination is part of what makes them so convincing. These guys are original geniuses, the like of which we have never seen in our lifetimes.

I think the empircists had their eye on the right ball. They wanted an escape from superstition and linguistic confusion. — ghost

That is a near perfect assessment of their intention. The consequences did not turn out so optimal. Nevertheless, the consequence of empiricism was not as detrimental as the that of Marxist or Hegelian thought, which produced ideologies that resulted in the worst travesties in history.

What question would you like an answer to? — creativesoul

Can you explain what you mean by "moral-in-kind" and "morality". What is it that unifies them, and in what ways are they different?

I admit, I have made no distinction the entire discussion. What a fuck up on my part. So as a philosopher, heal my wound, I'm bleeding bad understanding.

Knowing the evolutionary origen of anything depends upon knowing that much... morals notwithstanding. — creativesoul

Go on...I'm listening.

That's philosophy.

Btw, we have worked out these misunderstandings numerous time throughout the course of this thread. Why would we assume this misunderstanding would condemn the conversation.

Thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour does not. That which is moral in kind is not equivalent to morality. The aforementioned list of moral things are all moral things. They are not all morality. Not all moral things are morality. — creativesoul

That is what I needed to hear. Do you not agree, that this distinction between moral-in-kind and morality is of essential importance here? We have barely discussed it.

I just need it clarified a bit more and we will be back on track.

By the way, I have retracted and re-assessed many claims I have previously made, based on your criticisms.

Perhaps we need to review some of these considerations.

The recent current veins of thought are not taking the groundwork into proper and rightful consideration. That seems to be the problem I'm seeing. — creativesoul

Then all you need to do is specify where my specific assertions are at odds with that groundwork, and I will gladly correct my mistakes. There has to be one clear cut example. Please present it as elementarily as you can.

@Janus What is the ultimate source of morals...Strangelove! :razz:

I'm considering moving on without you Merk. I do not like the signs here. — creativesoul

That would only mean that I win. Sounds like a tragic outcome to me.

An astute reader ought already know the answer. — creativesoul

How dare you assume I'm astute, you inconsiderate bastard. :joke:



Ok, just clarifying. So, we can say, that which is moral in kind is equivalent to:

Morality is codified moral thought/belief:The rules of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. — creativesoul

I would say anything codified would require language. I don't see how I have been considering it otherwise in any of my posts. Please feel free to point out where I have done so.

Perhaps we need to also set out how we arrived at the universal criterion for thought/belief? — creativesoul

I'm game. I believe we called it something like existential quantification.

My question is what makes them both moral - in kind? — creativesoul

That brings up a great point...how are we defining "moral in kind"? How does it differ from morality?

Reason-experience is directed at future consequences. I like all that is packed into this way of framing it. It looks outward at the world and prioritizes experience. — ghost

To begin, Hobbes was essentially an empiricist. But he slightly preceded Locke, who is considered the founder of empiricism. I do not mean to discount his lasting contributions, but Hobbes laid the groundwork for modern collectivism, which came to a head in the thought of Hegel and Marx, which continues to impose its influence in everything we witness in the modernized world. The ancient view generally considered the individual to be primary to the collective (an essential factor), whereas the modern view tends to assume that the individual is predicated on the collective (an accidental variable). This is something I have trouble overlooking. Democracy only monetizes the individual, as a quantity or numerical unit in relation to the whole, it does not factor in the qualitative importance of the unique value of each individual in itself.

[. . .]that it embodies a kind of forgotten truth, some vital insight that became redacted out of it by subsequent generations. — Wayfarer

Well stated. Every generation contains it's own internal politics, and the eventual abandonment of tradition over time seems inevitable. That tradition becomes the incidental victim is the great tragedy of all progress (philosophy included).

Life calls. I will check back. Great thread! — ghost

Thanks! :grin:

I appreciate your input, especially your original insights. :up:

I've got an assignment due and have to concentrate. :sad: — Wayfarer

I understand. TPF is a terrible distraction in my own life. :grin: