Again, to be selfish is to be being self interested when one OUGHT not to be. So, if or when it is right to be self interested, it will not be selfish. — Bartricks

That is an example of moral reasoning assigning ethical value to self interest (which involves instrumental reason).

The normative (ought) in instrumental reason is about much more practical matters, it usually is concerned with doing things the correct way to achieve one's benign nonmoral interests. But, it can sometimes interfere with and contradict ethical reasoning, forcing a person to choose between the two. And this is precisely when moral reasoning invokes the notion of "being self interested when one OUGHT not to be - selfishness."

If you have moral reason to do what you have instrumental reason to do, then that does not make the instrumental reasons into moral reasons or vice versa.
For instance, if it is in the best interests of others that I do what is most in my interests, then the moral reason to do what I gave instrumental reason to do remains grounded in the interests of others, just as the instrumental reasons remain grounded in my interests. — Bartricks

Exactly. Moral reasons, although normative like instrumental reasons, are of an entirely different qualitative nature. Moral reasoning can only relate to instrumental reasoning in assigning it an ethical value (viz. it is good/bad to serve one's interests). While instrumental reasoning can only relate to moral reason by assessing to what degree a moral/immoral act is instrumental in serving oneself. And although they overlap occasionally (e.g. if it is in the best interests of others that I do what is most in my interests), they represent discrete normative categories that are mostly incompatible.

and, flatterers are always evading questions about their erroneous logic.

@180 Proof, @Bartricks

Are you saying it's instrumental reason if it is the morally right act, and instrumental reasoning if it is a selfish act?...that is just plain stupid reasoning.

Apparently, you don't get it. — 180 Proof

You haven't defended your position here, but you are right, it is hard for me to digest bullshit.

(Edit:)

What kind of reasoning is it when an individual's selfless altruistism is generated by his own interests rather than those of another? For example, founding a charity that makes you rich. — Merkwurdichliebe

You conviently ignored this inquiry btw.

What kind of reasoning is it when an individual does something that serves his own ends because [non sequitur]. — Merkwurdichliebe

Instrumental reasoning. — 180 Proof

I get it

What about when a person does the morally right thing because [non sequitur] — Merkwurdichliebe

Moral reasoning

What about when a person does the morally right thing because he thinks it serves his own intetests?

So then, it follows that moral reasoning can be instrumental reasoning, but instrumental reasoning cannot be moral reasoning.

Maybe you know:

What kind of reasoning is it when an individual does something that serves his own ends because he thinks it is the good or morally right thing to do? For example, you steal food to eat because you think being hungry is wrong.

What kind of reasoning is it when an individual's selfless altruistism is generated by his own interests rather than those of another? For example, founding a charity that makes you rich. — Merkwurdichliebe

And when it comes to moral reasons, they are a subset of normative reasons. A reason to do something because it serves one's own ends - so a reason generated by one's own interests rather than those of another - is called an 'instrumental' reason, not a moral reason. They are both from Reason. But one is grounded in one's own ends - and so we call it 'instrumental' - and the other is not, and so we call it 'moral' (although there are other defining features). — Bartricks

What kind of reasoning is it when an individual does something that serves his own ends because he thinks it is the good or morally right thing to do? For example, you steal food to eat because you think being hungry is wrong.

What kind of reasoning is it when an individual's selfless altruistism is generated by his own interests rather than those of another? For example, founding a charity that makes you rich.

Well, you can't have an obligation to be selfish — Bartricks

Why not? What if I were to make a vow (based on moral reasoning and ethical principles) to serve only myself in every interaction with others? To honor such a vow, I would be obligated to abide by its demands.

the concept of selfishness incorporates wrongness - that is, to be selfish is to be self-interested when one ought not to be. — Bartricks

You are treating the wrongness of selfishness as an absolute ethical principle. Perhaps, you are right, and there are abolute principles, althought it is exceedingly hard to prove. And I don't disagree.

Moving past all that, that which is universal to ethics is obeying the rules. So, regardless of whether ethical principles are relative or absolute, that which matters most to each and every ethical individual is loyalty, devotion, and absolute adherence to one's subscribed morality. This is because the primary, universal, ethical imperative is to be good. Each and every ethical individual seeks above all: to conform to the good and eschew evil...not to serve others (which is secondary at best).

a simple definition shouldn't be hard to give. ;) — Manuel

I think the main problem is that different philosophical schools have incompatible definitions, and there has been an attempt here to somehow reconcile those definitions with little success.

Waaaay too much man reading man, that I leave for books or exchanges with people here, a simple definition shouldn't be hard to give. ;) — Manuel

Most definitely the wise move. This thread should be renamed "sophistry in action".

I don't know how you got that from what I said. — Bartricks

I didn't get it from your remark. You posed a question, I was only answering it facetiously.

My point was that it is one of the marks of a moral norm that it is grounded in the interests of others. If I have a reason to do x for your sake - so, the ground of the reason is your sake not mine - then it seems to qualify as a moral reason. More to it than that, no doubt. But it seems to be one of the hallmarks

It does qualify as a moral reason, but morality is not rooted in selfless altruism. It is rooted in the individual's obligation to adhere to moral reason or ethical principles. If a person's moral reasoning tells him that it is good to be a selfish bastard that gets over on others, then it is the moral thing to do, and nothing can tell against it.

I'd love to be proven wrong about this though. — Agent Smith

I would think, on face value, that a person who holds true to his principles is much more deserving of respect, and much more likely to have self-respect, than a person who conveniently betrays his principles on occassion.

But surely morality is primarily about others, not oneself? — Bartricks

I guess it doesn't matter if I act morally, it only matters if others act morally. I like that, it gives me license to be a complete bastard :smile:

Why should there be any superiority of one value judgement over another, other than in the practical sense that some judgements are in productive of social harmony, or at least not productive of disharmony, and are therefore adaptive, and others are antisocial and hence maladaptive? — Janus

Because, that has been done, done in many ways, and it has never worked out. Its a slow death at best.

But, Platonism never made it into practice on a massive scale, so we don't know it's ultimate practical consequences in society. Imagine a world of philosophers carrying staffs and wallets, wearing half-folded cloaks.

in platonism, the mind does not create what the world becomes, but discovers the world as it is. Remember that plato talks about a triple nature in man, as opposed to a dual nature like many popular modern philosophies. For Plato, there is the rational/volitional/appetitive, whereas the modern view recognizes only mind/body (amalgamating will with thought). He demonstrates the superiority of the rational to the appetitive, arguing that it apprehends reality more truly than the senses, and that the superior man aligns his will with his rational nature. This all goes on into apprehending intelligible objects in the quest to discover, not just the truth, but the better from the worse. Socratic ignorance is absolutely necessary to succeed in this quest.

I know this is common knowledge, just making sure it's being noted here.

What kind of hierarchy are you positing? — Janus

Probably something based on Platonism, like the quote provided by @Wayfarer: "[a heirarchy] making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble." Plato claims that certain things are heirachically superior, like the Good and Beauty. And he shows Socrates going around discussing things such as the beautiful and the ugly.

Intelligibility is apparent and not in question; even animals find their environments intelligible, a fact which is made obvious by their ability to function and act purposively.

I'm talking about intelligibility in the Platonic sense. In that there are intelligible objects that are separate from the individual, and which are invisible to the senses, but can be apprehended (or in a sense, sensed) by the rational mind. The popular philosophies of our time claim that animal and man relate to the natural environment strictly through the senses, and anything intelligible is something that occurs internally. It does not admit of a parallel but qualitatively separate dimension of nature (the intelligible) that is apprehended by the rational mind (as does platonism). This is because it views the rational mind as something that can be reduced to physical processes, something which essentially creates all of the rational contructs by which it manipulates and navigates and understands the world.

why should I be convinced on account of it? What relevance, for example, do pigs or baboons have for the question? For pigs perhaps it is pigs that are the measure of all things, and for baboons, baboons. Why then for men, should men not, in some senses, be the measure of all things? — Janus

Because, it is ironic for someone to claim special knowledge of a subject, if at the same time he concedes to the notion that man is the measure of all things. He is using the imagery of baboons and tadpoles to highlight the irony, that if "a thing is for any individual what it seems to him to be", then neither the man (meNing the speaker) nor the knowledge have any inherent merit or authority.

So, remember before I said it is a complex issue. In relation to any person, who is responsible for determining their views if not the person, assuming that they find themselves capable of thinking for themselves? Is it desirable that others should overrule and impose their authority against the freethinking individual (provided of course that the indivdual is not seeking to impose their own views on others)? — Janus

It is not desirable. But it is also not desirable that others should overrule and impose inferior things over superior things just because of the right to individual opinion. I'm with Nietzsche on this one, the democratization of society leads to a "slave morality".

I don't know what it could mean for one philosophy to be superior to another in any absolute sense, since it could not be verified, and superiority is nothing more than a value judgement, which is always going to remain subjective or at best, if much agreement exists, inter-subjective. I don't see how there could be any objective fact of the matter about it. — Janus

It is really a matter of whether a hierarchy exists. And that requires a world in which intelligibility exists. It would then be possible for the rational mind to discern a universal value-order of things.

In every case without intelligibility and hierarchy, man necessarily becomes the measure of all things, and superiority becomes a subjective value judgement - "that a thing is for any individual what it seems to him to be". Then the superiority of one value judgement over another (not to mention that of entire value systems) comes down to things like sophistry, coercion, consensus, &c.

Sure, but what makes some better and happier may make others worse and unhappier. How can we justify saying that some philosophies are "superior" tout court? Couldn't we only justify such an opinion if we could show that adherence to such a philosophy would make everyone better and happier? — Janus

That is the problem, such types of claims are unverifiable. But just because we cannot verify it, it does not mean that it is not the case that one philosophy is superior to another.

...

The typical modern view is that mathematics has to be a human invention, something that is created by us, for our purposes, because it can't see how the Universe has an innately mathematical structure. — Wayfarer

In other words, it has ruled out the existence of intelligible objects, so that everything must be reducible to a sensible object.

So this is a hint that 'our best theories' are empiricist, namely, that knowledge is only acquired by sensory experience, and that there is no innate facility for knowledge, of the type that mathematical reasoning appears to consist in. — Wayfarer

And according to 'our best theories' ... even if mathematics is a human invention, it only has reality insofar as it is applied to the sensable - positivism.

So, if the 'rationalist philosophers' are correct then we're not physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies! When 'our best theories' all all premised on the fact that we are. That's the motivation behind this whole argument. Because if number is real but it's not physical, then this defeats materialism, so it's acutely embarrasing for mainstream philosophy. Especially because the 'mathematicization of nature' has been so central to the ballyhoed advance of modern science. — Wayfarer

It would be a very embarrassing thing to read on its epitaph. And, I imagine that the advocates of the modern view would do what is necessary, doubling down and tripling down, even deprecating any alternative positions, to ensure that it prevails.

I find much promise in the idea that there is an invisible (nonsensable) aspect to reality that is directly accessible to the rational mind.

This lead me to look into why the faculty of reason was attributed with divine powers by Greek philosophy. Now there's a research topic for the ages.

If I remember correctly, reason was a gift from Zeus to mankind. One thing we can say for certain, reason and divinity have invisibility in common, and do not belong to the world of sensability.

And I think that's a simplistic and egregious generalization. The common aspiration of all philosophy is to understand, and if that were all that was meant by "veridical cognitive events" then I could agree. The point is there are many different kinds of understanding in many different contexts. — Janus

Just because a thing is simplistic, egregious or generalized doesn't not mean it's untrue. But to be clear, it's not refering to all philosophy but to a very popular trend in present day philosophy, which comes from a long line of thought that can be traced back to Descartes' work.

I disagree I think it's just that we often cannot relate to different understandings so they seem irrelevant to how we might conceive the human situation. People vary; it's "horses for courses". — Janus

There could also be the possibility that when we view the big picture, some things are merely superior to others. This is the case with many things in life, why not with philosophy? Would you say that a philosophy that makes you a better and happier person is superior to one that doesn't? I would argue it is more than likely that some philosophies can do this much better than others.

Man as the measure of all things is very much what is promoted primarily by those of an idealist bent. I think it's a complex issue, and there are ways in which humanity is the measure of all things, at least for us. — Janus

Plato certainly shows little favor towards "man as the measure" in Theaetetus. He goes so far as to have Socrates mock it sarcastically:

Well, I was delighted with his general statement of the theory that a thing is for any individual what it seems to him to be; but I was astonished at the way he began. I was astonished that he did not state at the beginning of the Truth that ‘Pig is the measure of all things’ or ‘Baboon’ or some yet more out-of-the-way creature with the power of perception. That would have made a most imposing and disdainful opening. It would have made it clear to us at once that, while we were standing astounded at his wisdom as though he were a god, he was in reality no better authority than a tadpole—let alone any other man. — Theaetetus160b

If there is a cure for the pernicious aspect of this mindset it would be philosophical naturalism, not the kinds of idealist or religious philsophies that take humanity to be special, to be the privileged "crown of creation". — Janus

Why philosophical naturalism? It has just as many, and arguably worse, pitfalls as the others.

As you're seeing the point, — Wayfarer

You might be the only relevant philosopher on TPF who consistently argues on this point. It is such a different view that it is nearly impossible to get through to one who is inured with the modern paradigm, I give you credit. I have a deep affinity for Platonism, but my philosophical acuity is not sophisticated enough to argue with the modern mind from the platonic perspective. It's just easier to fall back on phenomenology. But you are really helping me to sort it out.

...

There are many, many streams. — Janus

It is not denying that there are many streams in modern philosophy, it is saying that out of all those streams, its highest aspiration is in securing veridical cognitive events.

The more important streams are those concerned with giving us the tools to understand what life is for us, and with ethics, with wisdom as to how to live. — Janus

I agree, the most important philosophical threads are indeed concerned with giving us the tools to understand what life is for us, and with ethics, with wisdom as to how to live. However, those things are clearly not a priority in the modern philosophical paradigm, and I don't see it giving us many of those tools to work with.

But the retrograde idea that there is just one answer is pernicious, toxic: it invites authority to the table, and authority and wisdom are terrible bedfellows; one or other of them will always be kicked out of bed. — Janus

I don't see much wisdom coming from man-as-the-measure of all things, especially combined with the upsurgence in the right to individual opinion. I would argue that the present world could use a little authoritative and life-altering wisdom to balance things out a bit.

You're not wrong! The roots go back to the disputes about universals in medieval times, between the scholastic realists (Aquinas and others) the nominalists (Ockham, Bacon) and then later the empiricists (who were mainly nominalist.) And history was written by the victors. All of it happened so long ago that collectively we've forgotten about it. — Wayfarer

Well, shit! Great excerpt there.

there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble. — What's Wrong with Ockham, Joshua Hothschild

Indeed, Platonic hierarchy of forms. The purpose of philosophy (traditionally speaking) is to make this ascent, and best exemplified in the accounts of Socrates.

Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom. — What's Wrong with Ockham, Joshua Hothschild

That is on point and very well put. It's a terrible tragedy that philosophy has become such a lowly enterprise for the modern consciousness.

(Unfortunately (or so it seems to me) this kind of critique is often associated with social conservatism, which I am not really comfortable with, but it's a matter of 'let the chips fall where they may'.) — Wayfarer

That is why this debate is so important. Philosophy has real consequences for the sociological predispositions of its adherents, regardless of whether they adhere consciously/volitionally or not.

Unfortunately, it seems that the traditional view defaults into a position of social conservatism. Yet, I'm not so sure the alternative (based in the modern paradigm) is any better - so much creative/destructive power, and so little wisdom. It is really a question of lesser evils.

Well, for the sake of argument we might regard properties as thoughts or words that represent certain similarities between particular objects. — litewave

That is the basic nomimalist view. when I compare it to the traditional view it is obviously more problematic. For instance, things like mind, justice, love, happiness, &c. can only be inferred from concrete particulars so that they have no actual reality in themselves, but have existence only as abstractions (i.e. concrete particulars to which we apply a conventionalized name).

But it does seem to me that properties are "out there" in the objects that have them. — litewave

I agree. These properties inhere in the object, and humans possess the appropriate faculties to apprehend the sensible and intelligible properties of what is out there.

Even then though, it seems that we are not able to apprehend them directly but rather in the form of usual or typical examples of them and in the feeling that the similarity of the examples evokes in our minds. — litewave

It only seems that we do not apprehend them directly because our modern culture has confused what apprehends and what is apprehended. Is it out of the question that there could be qualitatively different modes of apprehending the same thing, or qualitatively different properties constituting the thing in itself?

For example, you can't imagine a general circle because it is not even a spatial object, but you can imagine particular circles and have an experience of their similarity. — litewave

Actually, it is the optical distortion in the human eye which makes it virtually impossible to percieve a perfect circle in spacetime. But geometrically speaking, adobe photoshop can technically render a perfect circle. This properly illustrates how qualitatively different the sensible and intelligible are.

Then take as real only concrete collections as opposed to generalized collections (properties). — litewave

But then you necessarily rule out the reality of rational thought... along with the capacity for apprehending intelligible objects. It diminishes human existence to a particularized absurdity.

I'm not saying I believe it but I'm very interested in understanding it, and also in understanding criticisms of it. — Wayfarer

Me too. I'm mostly interested in ethics, but this issue is the one nonethical philosophical issue I can't let go

the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Wayfarer

Hopefully you can help me understand more, you're obviously better informed than me.

Is it as simple as saying humankind has a dual nature (appetitive and rational) which directly relates to the dual nature of reality (the perceptual and the intelligible)? — Merkwurdichliebe

Is that a simple thing to say? — Wayfarer

The current generation of philosophers would have us believe it. But no, it appears simple, but it holds as much weight as any other school.

If you would be so generous, what is the greatest criticism you've heard of the traditional view? I always assumed it was dismissed in our time, not because of any major deficieny in itself, but because of modern arrogance. Please correct me if I'm wrong

But you're still using the term 'objects' metaphorically. Numbers, space-time, the wave equation - none of these are actually 'objects' in the literal sense. — Wayfarer

They are intelligible objects, apprehended in the mind. And, although they are objects in the metaphorical sense, they have literal existence in the same way a cup does (minus the perceptual component). In fact all universals are non-objective and literal realities.

Perhaps we infer universals from particular instances. — Banno

Universals have little significance in nominalist views. They are nothing but particulars we call by the same name.

If universals exist at all, then all particulars are subordinate.

Yes, each individual is unique; and has their own unique set of variations on the universal themes (some more interesting than others, of course).. — Janus

Don't forget about the blessed nomenalists, they only have access to their own unique set of variations on particular themes :smirk:

Of course. But I question the naturalistic assumption that there's a clear-cut division between 'in the mind' (subjective, internal) and 'in the world' (objective, external). What that sense is, in actuality, is one of the underlying dynamics of 'the human condition' - that sense of otherness or separateness from the world (recall Alan Watts' books). You do find, in classical philosophical literature, scattered references to the 'union of knower with known' - which harks back to the insight that transcends this 'illusion of othernesss'. And that, I say, is something lost to modern philosophy, due to its incompability with individualism. — Wayfarer

It is this "union of knower with known" that is difficult for me because it insinuates a division (knower/known). And when I reconcile it by saying the knower directly apprehends the known, I feel like it is too simple of a solution. I would love to say: that is simply the way it is and be done with it...but the human in me wants to go further and explain the mechanism by which it all works. And that always leads into the Kantian nightmare.

I'm of the view that intelligible objects (such as number) are real - same for everyone - but not existent - they're not out there somewhere. But if they're not 'out there' then where are they? Aha, comes the conclusion, 'in the mind'. But they're the same for all minds, do they're not subjective, either. In fact, neither subjective nor objective - but those two categories exhaust our instinctive ontology of what the world must be like.

So, in pre-modern and early modern philosophy, 'phenomenon' was one of a pair, the other term being 'noumenon' (not necessarily in the strictly Kantian sense) meaning appearance and reality. So my sense is that due to the overwhelming influence of empiricism and (broadly speaking) positivism, that we now have a conviction that only phenomena are real - that the totality of the universe comprise phenomena, 'out there somewhere', and apart from that, there's only the internal, private, subjective domain. — Wayfarer

If this false sense of separation is part of the human condition, I'm interested in how an unseperated pair is unified. Is it as simple as saying humankind has a dual nature (appetitive and rational) which directly relates to the dual nature of reality (the perceptual and the intelligible)?

Not so. Your seven is exactly identical to mine. Otherwise nothing would ever work. They're not subjective, but they're only discernable to the mind. The base confusion of the modern world is that 'in the mind' means 'subjective'. We live in a world of shared meanings. — Wayfarer

Yes, math is universally discernable to the rational mind, so it will be identical for anybody capable of comprehending it. You make a good point about it not being technically subjective. However, i must point out that the world of shared meanings has a massive subjective component, and is not necessarily universal like mathematics.

And it's a subject of great interest to me, and one of the motivations for this thread. — Wayfarer

Me too. It's one of the greatest philosophical subjects of all time.

do not exist as things, but only as intelligible objects — Wayfarer

Rather peculiar to refer to math as an intelligible object since the intelligible is subjective. Math is a universal logic that is rather easily projected onto perceptual reality, and it comes to appear objective because once applied, it is hard to deny the mathematical properties of a perceptual object.

But that's what I'm questioning. Such 'objects' as the wave equation, or many other logical or mathematical laws and principles, do not exist as things, but only as intelligible objects - they are only perceptible to a rational mind, not to empirical observation although they may have empirical implications. — Wayfarer

A wise philosopher once told me: "there are interminable arguments in philosophy of mathematics as to whether maths is invented or discovered, whether it's in the mind of humans or is something real in the world."

You get points for imagination and evasive tactics! — Agent Smith

Thanks. I usually attack head on. But it is obvious that TPF is oversaturated with evasive tactics, so I feel the need to work on my evasive tactics so that I...can...fit...in!. :halo:

This however raises the question of where exactly in samsara (hell/earth/heaven) souls started out. It's a rather interesting puzzle, oui? Did we begin with a net karma that was positive (heaven/earth) /negative (hell)/zero (limbo)? Basically, how does karma in samsara work? — Agent Smith

Very interesting indeed. I find it's best not to think about karma too much. But according theosophy, we started out as spiritual/ethereal beings in paradise with zero karma. But as the "race of adam" became mired in matter, it began accumulating karma. That race has since evolved over the aeons into our glorious generation, where we are currently working out the karma that we have built up through countless lifetimes. But that's only one perspective.

Also Johannes Climacus

Consciousness, then, is the relation, a relation whose form is contradiction. But how does consciousness discover the contradiction? If that fallacy discussed above could remain, that ideality and reality in all naivete communicated with one another, consciousness would never emerge, for consciousness emerges precisely through the collision, just as it presupposes the collision. Immediately there is no collision, but mediately it is present. As soon as the question of a repetition arises, the collision is present, for only a repetition of what has been before is conceivable.
In reality as such, there is no repetition. This is not because everything is different, not at all. If everything in the world were completely identical, in reality there would be no repetition, because reality is only in the moment. If the world, instead of being beauty, were nothing but equally large unvariegated boulders, there would still be no repetition. Throughout all eternity, in every moment, I would see a boulder, but there would be no question as to whether it was the same one I had seen before. In ideality alone there is no repetition, for the idea is and remains the same, and as such it cannot be repeated. When ideality and reality touch each other, then repetition occurs. When, for example, I see something in the moment, ideality enters in and will explain that it is a repetition. Here is the contradiction, for that which is, is also in another mode. That the external is, that I see, but in the same instant I bring it into relation with something that also is, something that is the same and that also will explain that the other is the same. Here is a redoubling; here it is a matter of repetition. Ideality and reality therefore collide-in what medium? In time? That is indeed an impossibility. In eternity? That is indeed an impossibility. In what, then? In consciousness-there is the contradiction. The question is not disinterested, as if one asked whether all existence is not an image of the idea and to that extent whether visible existence is not, in a certain volatilized sense, a repetItIon. Here the question is more specifically one of a repetition in consciousness, consequently of recollection. Recollection involves the same contradiction. — Kierkegaard

And Repetition:

WHEN the Eleatics* denied motion, Diogenes, as everyone knows, came forward in protest, actually came forward, because he did not say a word, but simply walked back and forth a few times, with which gesture he believed he had sufficiently refuted the Eleatic position. When I had been preoccupied for some time, at least when I had the opportunity, with the problem of whether repetition was possible and what it meant, whether a thing wins or loses by being repeated, it suddenly occurred to me: you can go to Berlin, since you were there once before, you could in this way learn whether repetition was possible and what it meant. I had come to a standstill in my attempts to resolve this problem at home. Say what you will, this problem is going to play an important role in modern philosophy because repetition is a decisive expression for what ‘recollection’ was for the Greeks. Just as they taught that all knowledge is recollection, thus will modern philosophy teach that life itself is a repetition. The only modern philosopher who has had the least intimation of this is Leibniz.* Repetition and recollection are the same movement, just in opposite directions, because what is recollected has already been and is thus repeated backwards, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forwards. — Kierkegaard