And I think that's a simplistic and egregious generalization. The common aspiration of all philosophy is to understand, and if that were all that was meant by "veridical cognitive events" then I could agree. The point is there are many different kinds of understanding in many different contexts. — Janus

Just because a thing is simplistic, egregious or generalized doesn't not mean it's untrue. But to be clear, it's not refering to all philosophy but to a very popular trend in present day philosophy, which comes from a long line of thought that can be traced back to Descartes' work.

I disagree I think it's just that we often cannot relate to different understandings so they seem irrelevant to how we might conceive the human situation. People vary; it's "horses for courses". — Janus

There could also be the possibility that when we view the big picture, some things are merely superior to others. This is the case with many things in life, why not with philosophy? Would you say that a philosophy that makes you a better and happier person is superior to one that doesn't? I would argue it is more than likely that some philosophies can do this much better than others.

Man as the measure of all things is very much what is promoted primarily by those of an idealist bent. I think it's a complex issue, and there are ways in which humanity is the measure of all things, at least for us. — Janus

Plato certainly shows little favor towards "man as the measure" in Theaetetus. He goes so far as to have Socrates mock it sarcastically:

Well, I was delighted with his general statement of the theory that a thing is for any individual what it seems to him to be; but I was astonished at the way he began. I was astonished that he did not state at the beginning of the Truth that ‘Pig is the measure of all things’ or ‘Baboon’ or some yet more out-of-the-way creature with the power of perception. That would have made a most imposing and disdainful opening. It would have made it clear to us at once that, while we were standing astounded at his wisdom as though he were a god, he was in reality no better authority than a tadpole—let alone any other man. — Theaetetus160b

If there is a cure for the pernicious aspect of this mindset it would be philosophical naturalism, not the kinds of idealist or religious philsophies that take humanity to be special, to be the privileged "crown of creation". — Janus

Why philosophical naturalism? It has just as many, and arguably worse, pitfalls as the others.

Would you say that a philosophy that makes you a better and happier person is superior to one that doesn't? I would argue it is more than likely that some philosophies can do this much better than others. — Merkwurdichliebe

Sure, but what makes some better and happier may make others worse and unhappier. How can we justify saying that some philosophies are "superior" tout court? Couldn't we only justify such an opinion if we could show that adherence to such a philosophy would make everyone better and happier?

Plato certainly shows little favor towards "man as the measure" in Theaetetus. He goes so far as to have Socrates mock it sarcastically: — Merkwurdichliebe

Sure, Plato had his opinion, but Plato was just a man like any other. I don't see much argument in that passage you quoted there; why should I be convinced on account of it? What relevance, for example, do pigs or baboons have for the question? For pigs perhaps it is pigs that are the measure of all things, and for baboons, baboons. Why then for men, should men not, in some senses, be the measure of all things?

So, remember before I said it is a complex issue. In relation to any person, who is responsible for determining their views if not the person, assuming that they find themselves capable of thinking for themselves? Is it desirable that others should overrule and impose their authority against the freethinking individual (provided of course that the indivdual is not seeking to impose their own views on others)?

Why philosophical naturalism? It has just as many, and arguably worse, pitfalls as the others. — Merkwurdichliebe

Why philosophical naturalism? It has just as many, and arguably worse, pitfalls as the others. — Merkwurdichliebe

Philosophical naturalism has its benign and pernicious forms, as I see it. The pernicious form claims that everything about humans can be explained in scientific terms; and this is patently false and wrongheaded (in my view: so note that I am not denying anyone's right to believe that, but just as with religious faith, I am denying their right to impose that belief on others). The benign form eschews explanations that posit unknowable entities such as God, angels, or spirits as explanations and authorities that must or even should be believed and submitted to.

The pernicious form denies anyone the right to have faith in Gods or entities of their own choosing; the benign form accords anyone the right to have faith in such things, but not the right to impose their beliefs on others. This is particularly relevant today in regard to issues such as abortion and gay and transgender rights. The benign naturalistic denial is not an imposition on personal faith or belief, but a denial of the possibility of any such faith or belief being of an authoritative nature.

The typical modern view is that mathematics has to be a human invention, something that is created by us, for our purposes, because it can't see how the Universe has an innately mathematical structure. — Wayfarer

In other words, it has ruled out the existence of intelligible objects, so that everything must be reducible to a sensible object.

So this is a hint that 'our best theories' are empiricist, namely, that knowledge is only acquired by sensory experience, and that there is no innate facility for knowledge, of the type that mathematical reasoning appears to consist in. — Wayfarer

And according to 'our best theories' ... even if mathematics is a human invention, it only has reality insofar as it is applied to the sensable - positivism.

So, if the 'rationalist philosophers' are correct then we're not physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies! When 'our best theories' all all premised on the fact that we are. That's the motivation behind this whole argument. Because if number is real but it's not physical, then this defeats materialism, so it's acutely embarrasing for mainstream philosophy. Especially because the 'mathematicization of nature' has been so central to the ballyhoed advance of modern science. — Wayfarer

It would be a very embarrassing thing to read on its epitaph. And, I imagine that the advocates of the modern view would do what is necessary, doubling down and tripling down, even deprecating any alternative positions, to ensure that it prevails.

I find much promise in the idea that there is an invisible (nonsensable) aspect to reality that is directly accessible to the rational mind.

This lead me to look into why the faculty of reason was attributed with divine powers by Greek philosophy. Now there's a research topic for the ages.

If I remember correctly, reason was a gift from Zeus to mankind. One thing we can say for certain, reason and divinity have invisibility in common, and do not belong to the world of sensability.

Possible/Potential $\to$ Real/Actual.

Step 1: Objects A, B, C, and E (pure language)
Step 2: Only objects A, C and E are possible (logic)
Step 3: Only objects A and E are actual (causality/PSR)

Set theoretical argument that the physical world is created from the mental world.

It isn't possible to build a subset B that's got more elements that the set A whose subset B is. We can, however, build a subset Y that's got less elements than the set X whose subset Y is.

Ergo, since the set of mental objects has more elements than the set of physical objects, it follows that the latter was created from the former. As Parmenides once said ex nihilo nihil fit (nothing comes from nothing).

:snicker:

Suppose every possibility is only instrinsic to – only constitutive of – actuality (like e.g. the set of possible matches in chess; or set of possible maps of a/the territory; or set of possible system-states in phase/design-space), including "mental states", rather than extrinsic, mere 'alternatives to the actual'... :brow:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/514081

What you say kinda makes sense - possible worlds as intrinsic to actual ones and thus "Nothing to see here! Move along, move along."

However, reconsider my argument.

Take two sets, M = {z, €, ♡, 8} and P = {♡, €}. Which set can be created from the other and which set simply can't yield the other? The answer is easy - you can't get M from P, but you can get P from M - and comes as a revelation to me if one then goes on to say, salva veritate, M = set of mental objects and P = set of physical objects.

I believe I'm repeating myself; apologies if you find that annoying. It's just that I feel I'm onto something.

M = set of mental objects and P = set of physical objects. — Agent Smith

I agree "M > P" which, to me, implies that M – P = nothing but extrinsic, mere possibilities, which necessarily cannot be actualized – necessarily are not actual – à la Spinoza's first kind of knowledge.

I agree "M > P" which, to me, means that M – P = extrinsic mere possibilities, which necessarily cannot be actualized – necessarily are not actual (in P terms) – à la Spinoza's first kind of knowledge. — 180 Proof

:smile: In a sense Momma Nature aborts some, how shall I put it?, bad ideas. Did you know, a significant number of fetuses are abnormal and these are terminated as it were via spontaneous miscarriages that go unnoticed? The same must be true of the universe itself - there's a filter between possible and actual.

I don't think so. Nature's "filter" sifts the adapted from the maladapted and Reason's "filter" sifts the intelligible from the unintelligible, in/defeasible truths from fictions, signals from noise ... possible versions of actuality from 'mere possibilities' from impossibilities, etc.

I don't think so. Nature's "filter" sifts the adapted from the maladapted and Reason's "filter" sifts the intelligible from the unintelligible, in/defeasible truths from fictions, signals from noise ... possible versions of actuality from 'mere possibilities' from impossibilities, etc. — 180 Proof

It's just that the possibles $\gt\gt$ the actuals. This leads us to the question "why is there something rather than everything?" another metaphysical conundrum worth mulling over in my humble opinion.

"Something" is a subset of "everything", so your formulation of the "conundrum" makes no sense. Why is there anything at all? There is no why avoids begging that question. :fire:

"Something" is a subset of "everything", so your formulation of the "conundrum" makes no sense. Why is there anything at all? There is no why avoids begging that question. :fire: — 180 Proof

You're right on the money 180 Proof, as always. :up:

Sure, but what makes some better and happier may make others worse and unhappier. How can we justify saying that some philosophies are "superior" tout court? Couldn't we only justify such an opinion if we could show that adherence to such a philosophy would make everyone better and happier? — Janus

That is the problem, such types of claims are unverifiable. But just because we cannot verify it, it does not mean that it is not the case that one philosophy is superior to another.

...

But just because we cannot verify it, it does not mean that it is not the case that one philosophy is superior to another. — Merkwurdichliebe

I know what it means to think one philosophy is superior to another. I agree that one philosophy cannot be proven or demonstrated, to be superior to another. I don't know what it could mean for one philosophy to be superior to another in any absolute sense, since it could not be verified, and superiority is nothing more than a value judgement, which is always going to remain subjective or at best, if much agreement exists, inter-subjective. I don't see how there could be any objective fact of the matter about it.

I don't know what it could mean for one philosophy to be superior to another in any absolute sense, since it could not be verified, and superiority is nothing more than a value judgement, which is always going to remain subjective or at best, if much agreement exists, inter-subjective. I don't see how there could be any objective fact of the matter about it. — Janus

It is really a matter of whether a hierarchy exists. And that requires a world in which intelligibility exists. It would then be possible for the rational mind to discern a universal value-order of things.

In every case without intelligibility and hierarchy, man necessarily becomes the measure of all things, and superiority becomes a subjective value judgement - "that a thing is for any individual what it seems to him to be". Then the superiority of one value judgement over another (not to mention that of entire value systems) comes down to things like sophistry, coercion, consensus, &c.

What kind of hierarchy are you positing? Intelligibility is apparent and not in question; even animals find their environments intelligible, a fact which is made obvious by their ability to function and act purposively.

Why should there be any superiority of one value judgement over another, other than in the practical sense that some judgements are productive of social harmony, or at least not productive of disharmony, and are therefore adaptive, and others are antisocial and hence maladaptive?

why should I be convinced on account of it? What relevance, for example, do pigs or baboons have for the question? For pigs perhaps it is pigs that are the measure of all things, and for baboons, baboons. Why then for men, should men not, in some senses, be the measure of all things? — Janus

Because, it is ironic for someone to claim special knowledge of a subject, if at the same time he concedes to the notion that man is the measure of all things. He is using the imagery of baboons and tadpoles to highlight the irony, that if "a thing is for any individual what it seems to him to be", then neither the man (meNing the speaker) nor the knowledge have any inherent merit or authority.

So, remember before I said it is a complex issue. In relation to any person, who is responsible for determining their views if not the person, assuming that they find themselves capable of thinking for themselves? Is it desirable that others should overrule and impose their authority against the freethinking individual (provided of course that the indivdual is not seeking to impose their own views on others)? — Janus

It is not desirable. But it is also not desirable that others should overrule and impose inferior things over superior things just because of the right to individual opinion. I'm with Nietzsche on this one, the democratization of society leads to a "slave morality".

What kind of hierarchy are you positing? — Janus

Probably something based on Platonism, like the quote provided by @Wayfarer: "[a heirarchy] making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble." Plato claims that certain things are heirachically superior, like the Good and Beauty. And he shows Socrates going around discussing things such as the beautiful and the ugly.

Intelligibility is apparent and not in question; even animals find their environments intelligible, a fact which is made obvious by their ability to function and act purposively.

I'm talking about intelligibility in the Platonic sense. In that there are intelligible objects that are separate from the individual, and which are invisible to the senses, but can be apprehended (or in a sense, sensed) by the rational mind. The popular philosophies of our time claim that animal and man relate to the natural environment strictly through the senses, and anything intelligible is something that occurs internally. It does not admit of a parallel but qualitatively separate dimension of nature (the intelligible) that is apprehended by the rational mind (as does platonism). This is because it views the rational mind as something that can be reduced to physical processes, something which essentially creates all of the rational contructs by which it manipulates and navigates and understands the world.

in platonism, the mind does not create what the world becomes, but discovers the world as it is. Remember that plato talks about a triple nature in man, as opposed to a dual nature like many popular modern philosophies. For Plato, there is the rational/volitional/appetitive, whereas the modern view recognizes only mind/body (amalgamating will with thought). He demonstrates the superiority of the rational to the appetitive, arguing that it apprehends reality more truly than the senses, and that the superior man aligns his will with his rational nature. This all goes on into apprehending intelligible objects in the quest to discover, not just the truth, but the better from the worse. Socratic ignorance is absolutely necessary to succeed in this quest.

I know this is common knowledge, just making sure it's being noted here.

I know what it means to think one philosophy is superior to another. I agree that one philosophy cannot be proven or demonstrated, to be superior to another. I don't know what it could mean for one philosophy to be superior to another in any absolute sense, since it could not be verified, and superiority is nothing more than a value judgement, which is always going to remain subjective or at best, if much agreement exists, inter-subjective. I don't see how there could be any objective fact of the matter about it. — Janus

But think about an object such as a neuron in a textbook, accompanied by verbal description. Anyone with a grade schooler's ability to reason grasps the form (Plato's "intelligibility") and function (Aristotle's "final causality") involved as long as they can receive that information via the senses. This degree of universality associated with our basic scientific models is a special kind of ideal intersubjectivity that distinguishes it as objectivity. And anyone with common abilities to reason can pursue the topic further, getting into more detail and expanding comprehension by strategically arranged study, becoming a specialist in that area. 99% of the population is at least in principle capable of becoming an expert in some discipline by similar regimen, and that 99% can make it practical for everybody. Not absolute, but not really relativistic either.

I think this ideal rationality ought to be promoted and channeled into academic pursuits more than it is, and citizens should be encouraged towards independent development. This is really the fundamental purpose of an education system in my opinion, and the justification for forums such as the one we are using. An objectivity of this kind is certainly presumed by many philosophies, at least implicitly in the methods employed.

Value judgments are just hypotheticals based on the facts of an intellectual discipline, to be tested empirically and modified as opinions. Some human beings have better initial intuition into more or less universalizable principles, and this is ethical aptitude, but it is basically honed by the same discipline as science.

Why should there be any superiority of one value judgement over another, other than in the practical sense that some judgements are in productive of social harmony, or at least not productive of disharmony, and are therefore adaptive, and others are antisocial and hence maladaptive? — Janus

Because, that has been done, done in many ways, and it has never worked out. Its a slow death at best.

But, Platonism never made it into practice on a massive scale, so we don't know it's ultimate practical consequences in society. Imagine a world of philosophers carrying staffs and wallets, wearing half-folded cloaks.