The twist in the Chinese room, I guess, is to reveal a human (Searle) who is then revealed to be, in relation to the outer behaviour of the creature, a mere machine himself.
— bongo fury

I’m not really understanding how this twist is relevant. — TheHedoMinimalist

It brings out how processing of meaningful symbols by a machine may be no more meaningful for the machine than processing of any other materials. Even a component of the machine obviously capable of attaching meaning to certain (e.g. English) symbols might be oblivious as to any meaning attaching (for others present) to other (e.g. Chinese) symbols in its possession. It brings out how symbolic processing may be merely syntactic and not semantic. Devoid of understanding. Unconscious.

The Chinese AI would have to be programmed to know how to learn Chinese instead through interactions with Chinese speakers because it’s impossible to simply hard code the knowledge of Chinese into the AI. — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, putting the thought experiment on a more realistic footing could suggest conditions under which we might expect genuine semantic processing to occur. Searle would insist on interactions with Chinese speakers and the environment spoken of... so that the alleged added semantics needn't turn out to be just more syntax.

But I actually think that being able to follow very complicated instructions would also require consciousness. — TheHedoMinimalist

But my PC fits that requirement?! But I forget, you are happy to attribute consciousness in such a case. :gasp:

Just as the human in the thought experiment cannot follow his instructions without mentally understanding them, — TheHedoMinimalist

But remember that a premise (not necessarily realistic) of the thought experiment is that his understanding is purely of the syntax, so any mental aspect to it is surplus to requirements.

Well, I actually don’t consider cars to be autonomous or having consciousness as a whole. — TheHedoMinimalist

Nor did I, nor did the post-apocalypse society. We (I and they) consider them to be "automobiles"... whatever that means - which (what that means) was meant to be the problem analogous to that of "consciousness". But maybe that word is too dated to work, and too easily confused with the more up to date problem of the consciousness (or otherwise) of self-driving cars. Which is just the problem of the consciousness of any AI. So I may need a different analogy.

If the post-apocalyptic world had self-driving cars, how would the reductionist sages of that world explain them in terms of simpler mechanical processes? — TheHedoMinimalist

If you're talking about AI and consciousness directly and not my analogy of "automotivity" then I guess my answer would be the same as previously: their explanation is too bland and uninformative.

I believe that you are claiming some ontological basis for placing human beings (or at least human organisms) in a distinct category here. — simeonz

Again, apparently my analogy mis-fired. No metaphysics intended. Only trying to save "conscious/non-conscious" as a vague binary.

The analogy was, "when does a vehicle become truly automotive i.e. a true automobile?".

Similarly, my past experience of having behavioral patterns and seeing that they are influenced by my mental activity provides evidence for the hypothesis that insects are more likely to be conscious than zombies. Why do you think they are more likely to be zombies? — TheHedoMinimalist

Because of my past observations of robots whose behavior, while suggestive of mental influence, was soon explained by a revelation: either that there was no robot after all because a human actor operated from inside; or of mechanics and software inside, whose operation I recognised as obviously non-conscious. The twist in the Chinese room, I guess, is to reveal a human (Searle) who is then revealed to be, in relation to the outer behaviour of the creature, a mere machine himself.

None of this can impress you if you have lost all intuition of the non-consciousness of even simple machines. I'm not sure how to remedy that, although...

... see the motor car analogy, below, and...

... also, at least bear in mind that arguments for "other minds" (arguing by analogy with one's own behaviour and private experience) were (I'm betting... will check later) designed to counter the very healthiest intuition of zombie-ness, which might otherwise have inclined us to doubt consciousness in even the most sophisticated (e.g. biological) kinds of machines (our friends and family).

So you might at least see that your intuition of zombie-ness is likely to have depleted drastically from a previous level, before your interest in AI perhaps? Not that that justifies the intuition. Perhaps zombie denial is to be embraced.

I always suspect that (replacement of heap/non-heap by as many different grades of heap as we can possibly distinguish) is a step backwards.
— bongo fury
I understand, but what is the alternative? — simeonz

Short answer: my pet theory here.

More generally, how about this silly allegory... Post-apocalypse, human society is left with no knowledge or science but plenty of perfectly formed motor vehicles, called "automobiles", and a culture that disseminates driving skills through a mythology about the spiritual power of "automotovity" or some such.

Predictably, a primitive science attempts to understand and build machines with true "automotivity". The fruits of this research are limited to sail-powered and horse-powered vehicles, and there is much debate as to whether true automotivity reduces ultimately to mere sail-power, so that car engines will eventually be properly understood as complicated sail-systems. And even now the philosophers remark sagely that engines may appear to be automotive, but the appearance of automotivity is, in reality, the sum of millions of sailing processes.

Do we hope that this society replaces its vague binary (automotive/non-automotive) with an unbounded spectrum, and stops worrying about whether automotivity is achieved in any particular vehicle that it builds, because everything is guaranteed automotive in some degree?

I told you it was silly.

In particular, does materialism deny awareness and self-awareness as a continuous spectrum for systems of different complexity? — simeonz

They do not deny that it is a spectrum but they don’t have to think that it begins on a molecular level or that all objects are part of the spectrum. — TheHedoMinimalist

This is still the question, for me. I think the OP is quite right that consciousness denial and zombie denial will both tend to lead to replacement of the vague binary (conscious/non-conscious) with an unbounded spectrum/continuum of umpteen grades (of consciousness by whatever name).

I always suspect that (replacement of heap/non-heap by as many different grades of heap as we can possibly distinguish) is a step backwards.

In this case my complaint against the unbounded spectrum is,

• you build lots of AI, confident that all of it is conscious in some degree or other, but you could well be wrong. Hence my aversion to zombie denial.
  
  
• we don't get to understand what consciousness is / how it works. We remark sagely that it is all an illusion... but by the way quite true, and why worry about it...
  But I want to understand my conscious states. Hence my behaviourism: my skepticism about the folk psychology of consciousness, the inner words and pictures.
  
  

This seems to me to suggest that John Searle wanted to reject machines sentience in general. — simeonz

Apparently not, at least not by way of the Chinese room. He does say he suspects consciousness is inherently biological, but for other reasons.

, I mostly suspect that insects are conscious because they are capable of moving. They also appear afraid whether I try to squash them. — TheHedoMinimalist

But wouldn't they appear that way if they were zombie robot insects?... if you can imagine such a thing... could zombie actors help? :lol:
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0088024/

I would start by mentioning that bongo fury corrected me — TheHedoMinimalist

No correction intended, I was just trying to orient myself on the wikipedia map of positions. (I think I'm happy here, but in some respects also here and here.)

I would say that my view is more properly called functionalism rather than eliminative materialism. — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, point taken. You are more likely to ascribe consciousness to non-fleshy as well as fleshy brains. (?)

Thanks to you and @simeonz for the Chinese room arguments. I will be pleased to respond later, for what it's worth.

Hi.

, the classical Turing test is outdated, because it limits the scope of the observations to static behavior. — simeonz

Wasn't that Searle's point? That the test was useless already, because an obvious zombie (an old-style symbolic computer) would potentially pass it?

Not that everyone then or now finds it obvious that an old-style computer would be a zombie, but the man-in-the-room was meant to pump the intuition of obvious zombie-ness. That was my understanding, anyway, and I suppose I tend to raise the Chinese room just to gauge whether the intuition has any buoyancy. Lately I gauge that it doesn't, much.

In particular, does materialism deny awareness and self-awareness as a continuous spectrum for systems of different complexity?
— simeonz

They do not deny that it is a spectrum but they don’t have to think that it begins on a molecular level or that all objects are part of the spectrum. — TheHedoMinimalist

I agree, and I don't know that I could without a rather clear intuition that all current machines are complete zombies.

How many neurons (or similar structures) would we need to create an organism whose behavior can be considered minimally sentient - five, five hundred, five million, etc?
— simeonz

This is difficult to precisely answer but I would make an educated guess and say enough to form a microscopic insect. — TheHedoMinimalist

I must say, I find it easy to intuit that all insects are complete zombies, largely by comparing them with state of the art robots, which I likewise assume are unconscious (non-conscious if you prefer). I admit there is an element of slippery slope logic here - probably affecting both "sides" and turning them into extremists: the "consciousness deniers" (if such the strong eliminativists be) and the "zombie-deniers" (panpsychists if they deserve the label).

I agree it is interesting to poll our educated guesses (or to dispute) as to where the consciousness "spectrum" begins (and zombie-ness or complete and indisputable non-consciousness ends). I vote mammals.

Related to that, it might be useful to poll our educated guesses (or to dispute) as to where the zombie "spectrum" ends (and consciousness or complete and indisputable non-zombie-ness begins). I vote humans at 6 months.

At this point, would the people collectively manifest the consciousness of the original brain, as a whole, the way it would have manifested inside the person? — simeonz

Do you here allude to, or have you just re-invented, the China brain?

Also relevant, this speculative theory of composition of consciousnesses. Also it attempts to quantify the kind of complexity of processing with which you (likewise) appear to be proposing to correlate a spectrum of increasingly vivid consciousness.

Thanks to you and others for supplying informed clarification as requested in the OP.

Does ontological eliminative materialism ascribe awareness to everything or nothing? — simeonz

On the wikipedia page is Quine's question:

Is physicalism a repudiation of mental objects after all, or a theory of them?

This neatly distinguishes a strong eliminativism (ascribing consciousness to nothing) from mere identity-ism (ascribing consciousness to some things, some brain states). The former would be what causes horrified reactions from many (see above), and the latter is accepted by @Terrapin (I think), and @TheHedoMinimalist (I think).

Note we are also given an intermediate option of ascribing some modified notion of consciousness to some things, some brain states. That would be my choice, and the likely scale of modification is enough to make me often want to side with the strong camp, especially when identity-ists embrace the folk-psychology of consciousness (e.g. mental words and pictures) with so little care or modification as to suggest Cartesian dualism.

Then there is, as the OP says, the further option of ascribing consciousness to everything, and the subsequent question whether this could tell us anything that ascribing it to nothing wouldn't have told us anyway. (Or not, as argued here.)

My question:

Doesn't ascribing consciousness to any machines with "software" set the bar a bit low? Are you at all impressed by Searle's Chinese Room objection?

Eliminative materialism sounds like a regurgitation of behaviorism
— T Clark

:up: That’s exactly what it is. — Wayfarer

... hold noses... access handkerchiefs, gas masks...

I mean, if number (etc), is real but not physical, then it's a defeater for physicalism, right? — Wayfarer

I said, "at least for the non-Platonist"... who won't accept numbers as the values of bound variables, or whatever. And probably regards them as on a par with fictional characters. Or is a formalist. But isn't, either way, tempted to look beyond physics for their cast of actual entities, on redeeming the IOU.

Funny thing is, I thought I gathered from reading some of @Terrapin's stuff that he is quite willing to posit fictional characters as mental entities... which could complicate things here.

But no - no "revolutionary implications" for physical ontology in fairy or other fictional stories.

In terms of definition or reference (which is the y in question), all terms have the ambiguity you refer to re "eternal" for example. — Terrapin Station

Do you mean, as appears to, that metaphysical discourse is in no worse a condition than any other kind of discourse is when it comes to definition or reference? And probably also that that limitation shouldn't in itself be assumed to damn the enterprise? As we notice with fdrake's examples of broken leg diagnosis and war trials conduct? Where, if we are sensible, we get our priorities right and manage not to split the wrong hairs?

If so, I would be interested to know whether you (or fdrake) regard any metaphysical conundrums as comparable to these examples, either in urgency or in the feasibility of reasonably meaningful thought and discussion about them.

Actually, I expect you won't say they compare in urgency, but what about feasibility?

I think the nature of the existence of numbers - the ontology of number, if you like - is actually a clue to the meaning of metaphysics. And I bet when you try and conceive of 'the abstract realm', your mind instinctively tries to imagine where such a realm could be. But 'where' is the 'domain of natural numbers?' Obviously nowhere, and the use of the word 'domain' is in some sense metaphorical in this context; but nevertheless, there is such a domain, because some numbers are 'in' it, and others are 'outside' it. — Wayfarer

But if this is a clue, as you say, won't it make the subject of metaphysics non-urgent in the extreme, at least for the non-Platonist? You don't want to call the cast of characters in a story the "ontology" of the story, except as an IOU for that ontology. I'm not doubting we often get by without redeeming the IOU for the real thing, and even enjoy or use the story better on that basis. But the interesting philosophy would be in how to unpick the metaphor, not how to take it literally?

The world is full of obscurantists. — Magnus Anderson

What really lies beyond the constraints of my mind?
Could it be the sea... or fate, mooning back at me?

On a graph of urgency against feasibility, where do you plot the bard's question (or that of the nature of the world beyond the physics), relative to broken leg diagnosis and war trials conduct?

The "invisible real me" projects the shadow puppet because it is just very useful to have a business rep out front which can deal with other business reps, which are also 'out front'. — Bitter Crank

So,

- Does consciousness = shadow-business-rep-puppetry?
- Does consciousness = any combination of this with any of the many other suggestions?

But then, do you mean any shadow-business-rep-puppetry, including the clearly unconscious kind which I presume is implemented in my PC as operating system "shells" and the like?

And if not, how do you narrow it down?

Sorry to butt in.

it makes no sense whatsoever to talk about any meaningful connection/association/correlation for a thermostat. — creativesoul

Well, exactly. That's why I'm calling it mere syntax. We agree on much, as I keep saying.

Does consciousness equal:

• Awareness?
• Attention?
• Experiencing?
• Thoughts/mental ongoings?
• Belief?
• Reasoning?
• Meaning?
• Thoughts about thoughts?
• Mental correlations?
• Mental associations?
• Mental connections?
• Expectation?
• Fear?

Does any of these do the trick? Or can all of them be unconscious?

I suspect they all can, on any definitions plausibly grounded in common usage. (Fear, maybe not yet, but soon, when we start attributing it to some gratuitously cute robot.)

So, taking the bull by the horns, what distinguishes, for example, conscious meaning from unconscious meaning: genuine from fake? That was my reason to invoke Searle and his Chinese Room, and you got that, totally. As here:

When we're discussing consciousness, the discourse needs to include not only the candidate(creature), but also what *exactly* the candidate is conscious/aware of, and/or attentive towards? — creativesoul

That would be Searle's message, too, I think.

It leads, of course, to the question how or roughly when a creature achieves consciousness of the (external or internal) objects of its awareness, attention, thought, belief, correlation, expectation, etc.

Thanks for sketching your approach to that question, and thanks for looking at mine!

You writing all this down? — creativesoul

Can you doubt it?

All meaning is attributed solely by virtue of drawing mental correlations, associations, and/or connections between different things. — creativesoul

Agreed. But then, the same old problem. Conscious (mental correlations), or unconscious?

I'm suggesting, conscious where the meaning is genuine, in the sense of not reducing, like the light-heat connection for the thermostat, or the salivation-bell connection for Pavlov's dog, to syntax. (You don't like widening linguistic terminology to symbolic functioning in general, I do. That difference between us is negotiable, I expect.)

Genuine, though, in what more positive sense? (You might ask.)

Here I have to contradict your cherished separation of meaning from its study - from "semantics". Genuine meaning, worthy of associating (roughly at least) with consciousness, is for me a semantical understanding, exercise of the high level social skill of agreeing which words or pictures or other symbols we are to suppose are pointed at (directed at, thrown at, landed on, applied to, attached to) which things.

The dog plays fetch with sticks. We play fetch with words.

The dog understands where the stick was thrown towards, and where it landed, out of a range of possibilities. But it doesn't, as we do, understand what a word was pointed at, or even that anything got pointed, at all; even though it might be trained or innately disposed to respond a certain way (which we of course may interpret semantically). Understanding and recognising the semantic relation is a much harder game, which, by contrast, the human infant very soon delights in.

The dog is conscious, I conjecture, roughly to the (rather limited) extent that it can join in the harder game.

Thank you for looking.

Some people (i.e. Searle) associate consciousness, in particular, with a linguistic capability having an irreducibly semantic component. Or at least, they associate lack of (or failure to demonstrate) consciousness with a reduction of semantics to syntax. (As in the Chinese Room.)

This particular association (i.e. consciousness <---> genuine semantics) seems a useful one, to me. What about you? — bongo fury

Things were meaningful to us long before we became aware of it. — creativesoul

I guess that nicely expresses denial of the association I proposed? (Maybe so. Not looking for a fight here. Just clarification.) — bongo fury

(I seem to have read 'aware' as 'conscious', but no harm done.)

Yes. I'm denying the characterization of consciousness as 'genuine semantics'. — creativesoul

Cool. We know where we stand. — bongo fury

But hey, kudos to us for exploring and questioning a bit further, despite the inevitable misunderstandings. I think our concerns are very similar, and there is plenty we could soon agree on, or disagree more clearly on. And in the end...

Is meaningful language use proof of consciousness? Certainly. I'm guessing that that is what Searle's Chinese Room is all about(what exactly counts as meaningful language use). Is it required for consciousness in it's most simplistic manifestation(s)? I think not. — creativesoul

So an association after all (if only one-way not two-way).

And maybe worth bringing up after all.

Semantics involves thinking about (pre-existing)meaning. Prior to thinking about X, X must first somehow exist.
— creativesoul

Prior to the chicken, the egg?
— bongo fury

:brow:

You'll have to do better than this. — creativesoul

:sigh:

You don't see the chicken and egg, here?

Clue:

Meaning is not equivalent to semantics.
— creativesoul

You've heard of the "theory of mind theory of mind"? I give you, here, a "theory of meaning theory of meaning". — bongo fury

Hi again.

Yes. I'm denying the characterization of consciousness as 'genuine semantics'. — creativesoul

Cool. We know where we stand.

Meaning is not equivalent to semantics. — creativesoul

You've heard of the "theory of mind theory of mind"? I give you, here, a "theory of meaning theory of meaning".

Semantics involves thinking about (pre-existing)meaning. Prior to thinking about X, X must first somehow exist. — creativesoul

Prior to the chicken, the egg?

Consciousness is not existentially dependent upon such high order social skills. — creativesoul

It's a hypothesis, though.

Pre and/or non-linguistic meaningful thought/belief is not existentially dependent upon language, whereas both syntax and semantics are. — creativesoul

But pre and/or non-verbal-linguistic meaningful thought/belief is of a piece with pre and/or non-verbal-linguistic language, i.e. symbolic functioning in general, with its syntactic and semantic aspects.

I put it to you that thought, belief, and meaning are part and parcel of all conscious experience. — creativesoul

Sure.

Is language part and parcel of all cases of consciousness? I don't think so. — creativesoul

Ok. I say that language in the very broad sense of symbolic functioning is part and parcel of all awareness, attention and now also (entering stage left) experiencing, thought, belief and reasoning. To distinguish the specifically conscious awareness, conscious attention, conscious experiencing, conscious thought, conscious belief and conscious reasoning, I hypothesise the need for genuinely semantical understanding, as outlined previously.

I am willing to hear an argument for consciousness being existentially dependent upon language use, and would agree as long as that claim/argument was properly quantified. Some consciousness is... Not all. — creativesoul

Some dependent on verbal language, all dependent on a genuinely semantical competence in some kind of language in the obvious wider sense (of symbolic functioning).

Hi , thanks for your response.

It's all about meaning. — creativesoul

Me too!

This endeavor also requires thinking about thought/belief. — creativesoul

... Or does it? Maybe those issues will sort themselves out if we deal with meaning first?

Things were meaningful to us long before we became aware of it. — creativesoul

I guess that nicely expresses denial of the association I proposed? (Maybe so. Not looking for a fight here. Just clarification.)

So, I'm unsure what "genuine semantics" is supposed to be referring to. — creativesoul

One that doesn't amount, on closer inspection, to just another layer of syntax. Suppose we endow a thermostat with a sub-circuit containing a coloured light-bulb. This is genuine semantics for us, as users, but for the device itself, only more syntax.

However, unless I'm mistaken he [Searle] is a speech act theorist, or was. They work from thought/belief having propositional content, — creativesoul

Well, my fascination is primarily with plain old "assertoric" speech acts, which may or may not coincide with production of declarative sentence tokens (utterances or inscriptions) but more generally amount to (as I see it) pointing of words (or pictures) at objects. As though we drew an arrow from one to the other. Which we generally don't, so we are talking here about a social skill which is in the practice of a mutually agreed pretence, and is of the highest order of complexity.

Earlier, you mentioned what we can do that chimps and babies and robots cannot. Point to both an actual symbol and it's referent. — creativesoul

Thanks for looking, and forgive the correction: it's vital to see that I am talking about our ability (e.g. the infant St. Augustine's ability) to understand that someone is pointing (directing, as it were) a word at an object. It's been fashionable for well over half a century now to dismiss such an ability as too easy a matter, and anyway unrepresentative of language as a whole. So I'm aware that I need to argue its complexity and relevance. (BTW though, our having to deal with people's constant Heraclitan equivocations between instance and kind does kind of hint at the level of complexity.)

...taking proper account of obvious prima facie meaningful and attentive thought/belief of language-less creatures. — creativesoul

Consciousness of language-less creatures, though? I would guess not. Certainly a relatively weak consciousness in creatures showing a relatively reduced form of the kind of semantical understanding just outlined. But in our closest competitors (chimps, robots) that looks very reduced indeed.

Talking of language...

Some people (i.e. Searle) associate consciousness, in particular, with a linguistic capability having an irreducibly semantic component. Or at least, they associate lack of (or failure to demonstrate) consciousness with a reduction of semantics to syntax. (As in the Chinese Room.)

This particular association (i.e. consciousness <---> genuine semantics) seems a useful one, to me. What about you?

Concerning Quine's holism:

Instead of reductionism, Quine proposes that it is the whole field of science and not single statements that are verified. All scientific statements are interconnected.

That is utterly wrong.

No, Quine's holistic solution is "not even wrong".

A scientific statement stands by itself, because it can only be tested experimentally by itself. Experimental testing of one scientific statement says nothing about any other scientific statement. You would have to experimentally test that one too. — alcontali

This would be how a "falsificationist" is an "anti-inductivist", I dare say?

The only kind of links, by which it makes sense (on this view) to connect scientific statements into some larger web, is the deductive kind of links. If the whole thing appears to hang together tighter than the known deductive links would themselves suggest, or if we are asked what brought this (rather than any other) particular set of largely unlinked statements together, we must still resist recognising any other kind of linkage.

And if we succeed in this resistance, we will find it easy enough to deny any holistic influence among scientific statements. Because we recognise far fewer links than the holist typically does.

Is this fair? Do you identify as "anti-inductivist" in this sense, of recognising only deductive links between scientific statements?

I think (but could be wrong again of course) that you've got your choice of tick/cross on your final scenario wrong in each frame? I'm reading that final pic each time as "no people, some dinosaurs"? I.e. dotted circle meaning no people?

Aren't we all agreed we are allowed to read "no people are dinosaurs" as allowing for there being no people?

Perhaps not, if we take Aristotle's alleged stance?

But as others (including @snakes alive and @unenlightened) pointed out correctly, we don't need to, to prove option (c)?

Also, what about "no people, no dinosaurs"?

Haha, no worries.

What I believe, is that the attempt to simplify a complex thing is a mistake, because it leads to misunderstanding, in the sense of a person who believes oneself to understand the thing because it has been simplified, but really does not understand the thing because it is complex. — Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly, I'm barking up the wrong tree trying to sell my favourite theory to you as a paragon of scientific systemization and simplification. Never mind.

As a non-metaphysician I don't quite see the problem with tracing (albeit provisionally) reference to future objects and events. But perhaps you will provide me with a rude awakening in that regard?
— bongo fury

You see no problem with taking it for granted that one can point to something which is not there? I don't understand how you can believe that you can point to something which is not there, and then just assume that you are actually pointing at something. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, if it turns out that there was (in the end) nothing there, I and probably the speaker will look for an alternative interpretation. I did say "albeit provisionally".

What you are really doing is pointing at language use, and insisting that all language use is a matter of pointing, but when it is shown that this is impossible because sometimes there is nothing there being pointed at, instead of seeing that this is not a matter of pointing, — Metaphysician Undercover

I notice you keep saying "pointing at something" and ignoring my reminders that it is generally a matter (or rather a mutually agreed pretence) of "pointing a word at something". This (stated properly as a semantic relation between word and object and not usually finger-pointer and object) strikes me as perfectly intuitive, something a child will recognise as being essentially what we are playing at, with language. I sense that you sense this, and are forced into mis-stating the principle in order to deflate the intuition, or to divert us into a certain famous ready-made critique of finger-pointing, which I think is an unnecessary diversion.

Obviously, we can easily cause the child to question the intuition, and quite possibly to soon disavow it. I, though, think the intuition is a good enough basis for a thoroughgoing theory, such as the one I have alluded to, recommended, and tried (however inadequately) to apply to the OP. And I thought you might be interested. And thank you very much for your highly interesting interrogations about it!

Again, why is this a problem, that we should be ever unsure whether a token is pointed at some one or several or all of the things that every token "of the word" ever points at? This would be how we generalise and particularize.
— bongo fury

I will ask you then, how is this a pointing? Suppose there are a thousand equally probable possibilities indicated by a single use of a single word, for example, "get me a cup please", when there are a thousand cups in the room. How can you describe this use of that word as a pointing? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm admitting it's far worse than that! Your token of "cup" could be pointing at (referring to) any or all of past, present and future cups. Obviously your interlocutor will look for suitable examples that are ready to hand. You might even produce a token (or, indeed, a finger) that points out a more particular target. But you both want to allow the pointing at any or all cups as well, as this is how (according to the theory I recommend) we create what other philosophers were (and on occasion still are) inclined to call a "concept" or "idea" or "form" of a cup, but which we can better see as a classification, through language, of objects.

I'll let you have the last word. Thanks for looking!

Thanks for your continued indulgence in this matter. I will be keen, I assure you, to know of the theoretical possibilities from your perspective as well.

Telling someone what to do is not a matter of pointing to an activity, because the particular activity which is referred to does not even exist at the time of speaking. So even if we say that speaking is pointing, there is really nothing which is actually being pointed at. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not that, typically, we discourage children from pointing out hypothetical or potential circumstances? Fictional ones, even. Not in my home, anyway.

This problem is very evident with "meaning". Meaning is related to intention, and intention is related to what is wanted, and the "thing", or state, which is wanted is nonexistent. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know if you come to bury "meaning" here or to praise it, but I would point out that I offer a considerable simplification: in equating use, meaning, reference, denotation, labelling, and pointing; and from largely (initially at least) setting aside such related notions as intention, desire, connotation, depiction, metaphor, expression and sensitivity. This is in the spirit of enlightened reductionism outlined above, with an expectation of dividends from the theoretical effort, not least by way of insights into the related notions.

So your thesis is lacking, because it requires that we can point at non-existent things. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I was saying before, the aspiration is entirely in the direction you urge: towards an analysis that traces reference to concrete, existent things. More so, perhaps, since the reference is assumed to be by uttered or inscribed linguistic (or pictorial) tokens, rather than mental items? And you seem to me to exaggerate the difficulty of interpreting most word-pointings as being directed towards physical items. As a non-metaphysician I don't quite see the problem with tracing (albeit provisionally) reference to future objects and events. But perhaps you will provide me with a rude awakening in that regard?

Now, the speaker was not referring to that particular thing which the hearer brought, nor is "a cup" a thing unless you're Platonic realist. And, if you're such a realist, then there is a huge gap between the "thing" referred to, the Idea of "a cup", and the thing which the person brings to you, a particular cup. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're preaching to the converted, here. I'm surprised you don't see that.

So referring to an activity is always a reference to something general, but if one points to a particular thing which has carried out this activity, is carrying out, or will carry out this activity, we attempt to particularize this reference. But such a thing, to particularize the general, is impossible because there is an incompatibility between the two. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the difference between us is that you see an impossibility where I see a normal human skill of constructive ambiguity, could that be because you haven't grasped the relevance of the inscrutability involved: there being no fact of the matter?

But as you can see, the thesis that speaking is pointing is really inadequate, because pointing at all these different possibilities would require that one is pointing in many different directions at the same time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, why is this a problem, that we should be ever unsure whether a token is pointed at some one or several or all of the things that every token "of the word" ever points at? This would be how we generalise and particularize.

Just to be absolutely clear, I am saying that since it is false that "No people are not dinosaurs." it must necessarily be true that at least one person is not a dinosaur. And thus that there are no people is incompatible with the given premise. — unenlightened

Yep, I get it :lol: thanks :pray:

No, I don't think so. The region was excluded, so in the negation it is opened up again, but not necessarily populated.
— bongo fury

You think wrong, — unenlightened

Hey, perhaps I should have said "No I don't think so, assuming that we're using a Venn diagram to illustrate FOPL, like Snakes' - not Aristotle".

if there are no unicorns, then there are no unicorns with a horn AND no unicorns without a horn. Thus they all have a horn AND they all have no horn. — unenlightened

... all what have a horn and no horn??

By the way, you aren't suggesting that option C does follow on the assumption there are no people?

Or, that the assumption is incompatible with the given information? [Edit: this one :wink: ]

"No people are not dinosaurs" -> ~Ex[Px ^ ~Dx] — Snakes Alive

Agreed.

This is NOT true, so:
~~Ex[Px ^ ~Dx] — Snakes Alive

No, only this: [Edit: Yes! At least this:]

~{~Ex[Px ^ ~Dx]}

Which can't [Edit: yes it can] equate to

(~~Ex)[Px ^ ~Dx] = ~~Ex[Px ^ ~Dx] = Ex[Px ^ ~Dx]

as you hope, unless [Edit: if] it is ruled out that there are no people. Because after all, if there are no people,

~Ex[Px ^ ~Dx]

is true. So the negation of that would be false, but you want it to follow as true (option C).

[Edit: yeah, well I suppose wanting option C to follow is no good reason to say the negation is true, and that the previous line is therefore false, and that therefore there are no people. But of course the initial info is telling us the previous line is false, and that therefore there are no people. I think I kept imagining that there being no people could somehow survive the negation. Probably I was just thrown by the simple multiple negatives that unenlightened warned about above. :lol: Thanks and apologies to and ].

So,

If we take this as having no existential import (and it seems to me that it doesn't), then we cannot infer anything that does have existential import. This rules out A and C. — Virgo Avalytikh

is quite right. [Edit: well, no.] Where you have to be a genius (as so often with puzzles) is not with the logic [Edit: although apparently that helps] but guessing which presuppositions are meant to be obvious. The testers here might be thinking it's obvious that there are people, maybe that we shouldn't take anything of the sort for granted. We don't know. Since they take the trouble to remind us that "Note: some does not exclude all", I'm guessing they have neglected to clarify (or even notice) their own assumption that there are people. So most people here are geniuses, but Virgo you fail for being a bit too clever.

In Venn diagram terms, a universal (all or none) statement declares a region empty, but its negation declares that region populated. — unenlightened

No, I don't think so. The region was excluded, so in the negation it is opened up again, but not necessarily populated.

[Edit: ahem]

So in Aristotelian logic, 'All people are dinosaurs' does have existential import? Or is it just ambiguous? — Virgo Avalytikh

My question too, so I went here, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism#Existential_import, and found interesting history and controversy to elaborate Tim's basic answer, i.e. yes assumed in Aristotle but not in modern systems. [Edit: beside the point after all.]

That should end with “QED,” — Noah Te Stroete

Haha, but "non sequitur".

Likewise, if you restrict your understanding of "inertia" to "momentum", thereby understanding inertia as mass times velocity, you will not apprehend the inertia of a body at rest. — Metaphysician Undercover

My analogy was: if you reduce your pre-systematic notions of momentum to mass times velocity, at the obvious cost of sidelining all sorts of helpful pre-systematic notions of momentum and wider aspects of motion, you gain a powerful theory which you may even find develops and generalises to apprehend all of those other pre-systematic notions, including notions of inertia. I don't claim this is the actual historical sequence with mechanics. Just that any theory is, typically, reductive (we certainly don't insist it is complete), but we hope that it produces thereby a more complete and systematic view, long term.

Sure, it may fail, and just be reductive. And a less obviously reductive theory may achieve a more systematic view. Let's judge by results.

I think that telling someone what to do, is not a matter of pointing at anything. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unless, as apparently occurs to you right away, it is a matter of pointing at an activity, probably from a range of alternatives. But,

How is an activity, which doesn't even exist yet, a thing? — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean 'thing' in the loosest sense, at least if questioned during the discourse itself, but later on...

So, how does "I can't function...", point to anything? You might say that the subject is "I" so it points to I, but the matter is "function", so the subject matter is "my functioning" and this is not a thing which is being pointed at. Subject matter in general, is not a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

... I will prefer a parsing that imputes pointing of a word at a relatively concrete entity. Here it is quite plausible that the girl points the phrase "can't function" at her concrete self.

Then there is what you call "metaphorical use". How do you think that metaphorical use is a matter of pointing at something? — Metaphysician Undercover

By being a word-pointing that participates in a novel sorting of some domain that is not its original or usual domain. In "can't function" the transfer is from the domain of machines to the domain of people.

I really think that most language use cannot be characterized as pointing at something. — Metaphysician Undercover

Pointing of words (or phrases, or pictures or sunsets) at things, though? Participating in the vast cultural network of pointings we call usage. Helped along by what I was calling type-token equivocation, by which I meant the cultural pressure to infer (and the frequent utility in inferring) that a thing pointed at by one token of a word will tend to get pointed at by another token, and that two things alike in getting pointed at by one word will deserve to get jointly pointed at by other words too. Induction. Generalising. Learning through example and association. That kind of view of language use.

What do you even mean by "pointing a word"? Is this metaphor? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure. If it doesn't work for you, try another? The author of the theory I'm hawking calls it "labelling". We don't literally attach words to objects by uttering them, but by a few months old we are able to play the game of inferring the semantics that later on we learn to describe in these and other metaphorical (though often dead-metaphorical) terms: "calling it a...", "describing it as...", etc.

I know that many people (under a certain famous influence) assume such a view of language to be hopelessly impoverished. To me, it looks rich enough. If it were simply a matter of establishing and following a correlation (a word-object mapping), then yes, too easy - easier than human language, and not likely to pass any Turing tests. But what the human baby does is a lot more: it understands the correlation as a large and fragile game of pretence, not reliably tied to the facts of the situation; it has to engage in the complexest kind of collaboration and negotiation.

An interesting tidbit: If you think about it, there's only one way for nature to be uniform, and infinite ways it can vary. — Purple Pond

No such luck...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_riddle_of_induction

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/437915

Finally! We can get down to business. See if we can trade any ideas despite our (apparently) very different views on "use".

The word "use" is used in many different ways. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed.

If we restrict "use" to the sense of using words, — Metaphysician Undercover

... or at least recognise use of words as an important kind of use...

then I think you need to realize that we use words for a lot of things more than just pointing at things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here we differ.

Do you agree that the most common use of words is to tell someone what to do? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, not really, but anyway...

And do you agree that this is not a matter of pointing at something? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, not really. I think it's a matter, at least, of us striving to agree what some words (or pictures or sunsets) are pointed at. One domain from which to choose objects pointed at might be a set (perhaps fuzzy) of slabs, another domain might be a set of places-to-lay, another might be a set of expected tasks, another might be a set of payments or punishments, and so on.

"Urggh! How restrictive... "

Not necessarily. Or, rather... If only!

Under what elaborations, or other scenarios, would you like to explore / test it?

"Can't function" is nice... A relatively entrenched, 'literal' usage sorting the domain of machines into, roughly, those in working order and those not. Then, a more novel, 'metaphorical' usage to sort the different domain of people, according to criteria some of which agree and some contrast with those for literal application. An important contrast, creating humour, would be the more stringent standard, denying the status of working order to perfectly healthy and normal humans recently roused from a sleep state. The story amuses because the child has learnt the secondary, metaphorical use before the original, probably not sensing the humorous implications of the change in domain and criteria. The metaphor itself (the change in domain and criteria) amuses by creating referential links, under the surface as it were, by which other machine-words and machine-pictures are readied to help sort the domain of persons.

And of course we sense the more general struggle of the novice to project, from limited examples, to suitable occasions for pointing a word. Which is always cute. Because we feel so much more expert. Even though we can barely cope, ourselves, with the constant dilemmas of projection, domain ambiguity and type-token equivocation, which are endemic to the game.

Why do you want to restrict the meaning of "using words" to "using words for a particular purpose", when that particular purpose is to point at things? — Metaphysician Undercover

For the same reason someone might want to restrict the meaning of "momentum" to "mass times velocity". The promise of theoretical simplicity and generality. What I thought you might be craving when you lamented:

So these people are trying to create a division between this type of meaning and that type of meaning, without any supportive principles to show that one supposed "type" is actually different from the other. In reality, the meaning which a defined word has is no different from the meaning which a piece of art has, which is no different from the meaning which a beautiful sunset has. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ha ha, I like the philosophical dog, but I don't think we are on the same page here.

I meant the alleged appropriateness (complete and utter) of some particular probabilistic framework in the inductively (and therefore uncertainly) projected state of affairs wider than the evidence. I didn't mean some test of falsificationism as a doctrine. I was clarifying for Purple that Hume is not appealing to probability to justify induction.

Pardon me if I'm being too serious here. Or yet unclear.

You mean the habit of the mind to associate two or more things that are constantly conjoined, justifies our belief that they will be constantly conjoined in the future? — Purple Pond

It justifies our provisional (falsifiable) theories, yes.

Why? — Purple Pond

Seems to work.

It's not obvious that our habits of association in the past are relevant to what will happen in the future. — Purple Pond

Eh?? You don't choose to adopt such habits of association, then, in your daily life?

Am I missing some point? — Purple Pond

You're not alone in finding the whole situation to be a scandal.

mine and Hume's personal beliefs about the efficacy of induction are not of any importance in this discussion. We're here to consider arguments not personal beliefs. — Purple Pond

Yes, arguments, not only beliefs. Including arguments about whether deductive argument from observationally verifiable premises is sufficient to support induction. Hume argues it is not.

The point is that Hume needs to provide justification for his use of induction — Purple Pond

Which is that it seems to work.

But what's left? You say habits and customs, but first I need you to explain exactly how they justify our use of induction. — Purple Pond

They seem to work.

Yes, it does. Just not a guarantee.
— bongo fury
You mean lend probable support? — Purple Pond

No, because as you say:

You would then have to assign probabilities to events. How do you do that without assuming that the past will be like the future? — Purple Pond

So I mean, rather, it lends inductive (fallible, less than certain) support to a hypothesis which may or may not be framed in probabilistic terms. But which, if it is so framed, will - as I think you are rightly pointing out - imply a universal hypothesis about the appropriateness of a particular statistical or probabilistic framework.

To cut a long story short, in my opinion, Hume makes sense by supporting falsificationism because Pavlov's dog does that too. — alcontali

Which points up that the question too rarely asked in this kind of discussion is: "which are the good habits and customs... the good inductive hypotheses thereby produced?". Falsifiable ones, yes. Let's assume that. But that leaves an embarrassment of riches to choose from. Unlike the dog, we may want to decide (and formulate) what are the best habits to follow.

What kind of justification do you have in mind that he would approve of? — Purple Pond

Habit, custom.

Hume may believe that induction is efficacious, however that doesn't excuse him from coughing up justification in order to persuade others. — Purple Pond

Why not? Do you not advocate science, on the grounds of its success?

Put it this way, how is he supposed to convince me his inductive conclusion is accurate when he puts serious doubts on the very process of induction? — Purple Pond

He doesn't put doubts on the process. Like I said, he only wants to recommend that you give up the futile search for a justification in deduction.

He approves of it in the sense that when he stops philosophizing he forgets all his skeptical doubts and goes on with his day. — Purple Pond

Which, if I remember rightly, he implies was a relatively louche existence. But if he was a scientist, it would mean getting on with his science. Following inductive habits and customs, of course.

It doesn't mean that he thinks that there is any rational reason why induction will continue to work. — Purple Pond

Yes, it does. Just not a guarantee.

I specifically mentioned his words, "custom", and "habit". To me it makes it seem like Hume is implying that our inductions are quite arbitrary. — Purple Pond

He definitely doesn't want you to think that way.

... for Hume there is no warrant for extrapolating beyond what we observe and remember. — Purple Pond

You mean extrapolating deductively? Yes, that's right. No warrant for induction in deduction from experience.

If you say that he does warrant such things, I'm dying to know what kind of warrant he approves of. — Purple Pond

Habit, custom.

I agree that induction can't be justified using deduction, — Purple Pond

And that is the only kind of justification which Hume is seeking to deny to induction. He isn't trying to discredit induction as an enterprise, he is only asking how, in general, it might get done. Rather than inventing some infallible method, he quite sensibly looks at how animals generalise beyond their experience. You can question the flow of sources backing up his biological and psychological claims about the role of habit, but you can't say he is inconsistent. Quite the opposite. He is probably reaching these claims through the exercise of precisely those habits of mind that he ends up claiming are efficacious (though fallible) for such a purpose.

What I find odd is that right after Hume talks about how induction is unjustified — Purple Pond

Nope! He approves of it.

From what I see, it's not only that Hume uses induction when he argues that induction is unjustified, — Purple Pond

Nope! He loves it.

Hume is using induction as if it were a perfectly fine method to show that, after all, it's a rather arbitrary method (habit, custom). — Purple Pond

Nope! Not arbitrary, depends on experience.

Whereas, I see it as a game of 'pretend', on which we must collaborate.
— bongo fury

Yes, I understand this, but where does the "we must collaborate" come from? — Metaphysician Undercover

So... you do understand how I might see your example (of how you use the words to point at different things) as a game of 'pretend', but it surprises you that I might see this as likely to involve collaboration?

You wouldn't expect a game of 'pretend' to involve agreement about what is to be pretended? (If it is to amount to a game between or among players, and not just a set of one-person games?)

Do you recognize a difference between loving a person and using a person? — Metaphysician Undercover

Rather, you are saying you oppose dignifying a narrower, technical sense of "use" whereby it means, more specifically, "using a word to refer to something" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use–mention_distinction)? You want instead to emphasise and keep in play the very general sense of "using something in some way"? Resist reducing linguistic "use" to the mere pointing of words at things?

Such a disagreement between us (where you resist what I embrace) is what I said I expected to be the case, yes. Do you agree this is the disagreement? — bongo fury

Agreement (about just where it is we disagree) looming in sight? No, I don't kid myself, but anyway...

You say,

When I say something to someone, and the person understands what I have said (understanding is demonstrated by the person's actions), I do not think that it is the case that the person agrees with how I use the words to point at different things. I think it is simply the case that the person understands how I use the words to point at different things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly! As though there were some fact of the matter (to be understood) of how you use the words to point at different things.

Whereas, I see it as a game of 'pretend', on which we must collaborate.

You say,

So for example, when a person speaks to me using a lot of jargon which I do not think is warranted in the situation, I might understand what that person is saying, but I wouldn't agree with that person's use of words. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whereas I reject the jargon for the reason that it is not conducive to the necessary collaboration. We won't be able to agree (enough) what things (we should pretend) the words are pointed at.

Hence the gulf between our agendas, explaining why you answer this,

Do you associate meaning with use? (Or were you just interrogating T Clark on the point?) I certainly do associate the two. Equate them, even. But probably I see it/them quite differently to you. I see it as definitely not a matter of fact, but one we can reliably find agreement on in many cases (the clear ones). Like the case of a single grain of wheat not being a heap, snow not being black etc. I deny that you can (within the language) succeed in pointing the word heap at a single grain. Whereas, from what you say, I'm guessing you will accept any such attempt at use as inevitably counting as an instance of use of the word, however anomalous? — bongo fury

... with this,

I do associate "use" with meaning, but I would not equate the two. I believe that meaning extends beyond use. We could consider the metaphysical distinction between "good" and "beauty". "Good" is associated with use, but "beauty" is something desired for no purpose, just for the sake of itself. So "a good" is desired, and called "good" for some purpose, use, and it is meaningful because it is useful for that purpose. But things of beauty are desired and are apprehended as meaningful, though not because they are useful for a purpose. That brings meaning more toward the desire, rather than the act which is intended to fulfill the desire (use). This is why I believe that "use" accounts for some aspects of meaning, but it doesn't account for the entirety of meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is fine, I'm not complaining. We have different agendas, different half-baked theories of discourse. I speak for mine when I say half-baked - yours can be done if you like.

As expected, very different views on "use", the difference resting, if I'm not mistaken, on whether we see reference as a matter of fact.

Bongo had said that we strive for agreement, — Metaphysician Undercover

... about, specifically, which words (or pictures or sunsets) are pointed (already or eventually) at which things.

I was aware that as a description of human discourse this calls for plenty of clarification, and I was trying to begin it by alluding to the "inscrutability of reference": the (alleged) fact that any actual connection between symbol and object is in our imagination or diagram. (Straw man version: no bolt of energy passes between symbol and object.) MU thought this irrelevant, so I wasn't surprised to find it difficult to know how best to engage with their subsequent critique, or whether it really engaged with mine.

But I fancy that their evident fear and loathing of equivocation might be related to my own fascination with what I see as a kind of equivocation at the heart of the social game (of agreeing what is pointed at what). As when, for example, we equivocate between implying that a particular token is (or isn't) pointed at a thing and implying rather that every single token "of the word" is (or isn't) pointed at the thing. Not to mention the equivocation dual with this, between referring to a single thing and referring to each of a whole class of ("same") things.

Not that I would think that all of this equivocating is necessarily a problem, if properly understood. Nor that I'm assuming anyone else would think it necessarily a problem, or that they don't already understand it better than I do. Hard to know what people's assumptions are in a discussion of this sort. Well, obvs.

Being smothered to death by a blanket though does not seem like a good way to go. — Fooloso4

You're drunk, aren't you?

... reposting... below

Sure, why not. — Fooloso4

No reason at all. We're all gonna die. Etc.

Let's compromise: snooty joke.

In my opinion Witty [...] was a genius who stopped his thinking at a premature insight, whereas he ought to have proceeded further in his thinking.

"A conclusion is a place where you stop when you got tired of thinking." -- traditional, origin unknown. — god must be atheist

Well! With these kinds of views, I'm surprised you dare to show your face here in church.