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  • How Useful is the Concept of 'Qualia'?
    I'm mystified how "qualia" is any more lazy or obfuscating than "consciousness" or "subjective experience"; and why Dennett and Banno continually want to let the others off the hook.
  • How Useful is the Concept of 'Qualia'?
    A photographic image of a tree is obviously a physical trace of a seed, but just as obviously not a photographic image of the seed. — bongo fury

    So, an image isn't an image of anything by being a physical trace of it. It's an image of the thing by being interpreted as being (an image) of the thing. By being made to refer to the thing, in a system of pictorial reference or interpretation.

    Does the retina get to be made to refer to things?
  • How Useful is the Concept of 'Qualia'?
    A photographic image of a tree is obviously a physical trace of a seed, but just as obviously not a photographic image of the seed.

    A retinal image of a tree is obviously etc.
  • How Useful is the Concept of 'Qualia'?
    ↪Banno


    The 'representation' wedge.

    a continuous channel of re-processing, imagined as stretching from "object" all the way in to... er, yes, how does it end? — bongo fury
  • How Useful is the Concept of 'Qualia'?
    A camera?
  • How Useful is the Concept of 'Qualia'?
    ↪Jack Cummins
    Yes. I suppose for most optometrists the concept of a retinal image must be an everyday one.
  • How Useful is the Concept of 'Qualia'?
    at an image constructed by the visual cortex. — Banno

    Well said. But would you allow "at an image in the retina"?

    Isn't that the thin end of the wedge?
  • How Useful is the Concept of 'Qualia'?
    The concept of 'qualia' isn't all that useful for feeding a witting or unwitting dualism. More than twice as many philosophers use the concept of 'representation' to the same tragic end.
  • God exists, Whatever thinks exists, Fiction: Free Logic
    What was used, what mentioned? — Banno

    In

    In {eggs, bacon}

    Paris = London = porridge     — bongo fury

    "Paris", "London" and "porridge" were used, in order to mention*, in this case, nothing.

    The relevance is

    obvious baloney such as

    the domain of non-existents.
    — Snakes Alive     — bongo fury

    There's only one nothing, if any.

    * Edit if it helps @Banno, or anyone: to mention something is to refer to it. To use a word to mention something is to use the word to refer to the thing.
  • God exists, Whatever thinks exists, Fiction: Free Logic
    In {eggs, bacon}

    Paris = London = porridge

    use and mention, as ever — bongo fury
  • God exists, Whatever thinks exists, Fiction: Free Logic
    you can define it in a regular old first-order predicate logic, which is pretty much what you did above.

    So we say, as a postulate governing its interpretation, that E!x iff ∃y[y=x].     — Snakes Alive

    But then, this isn't very first-order, is it? More as though,

    Quantifiers are (nothing but) predicates of formulae. — Snakes Alive

    You're using predicates to refer to predicates (and other formulae including individual constants why not), instead of using them to refer to (only) individuals.

    Which potentially is a problem if it isn't clear, and encourages equivocation between the x and the "x", the individual and the individual constant (use and mention, as ever), resulting in the obvious multiplicity of empty constants being used to excuse obvious baloney such as

    the domain of non-existents. — Snakes Alive
  • What is Being?
    Why not set up an extensional, referentially transparent domain that is Tolkien's world? — Banno

    Because fiction isn't meant to be read as fact.
  • What is Being?
    Frodo walked into Mordor. "Frodo walked into Mordor" is true. — Banno

    You don't agree that in an extensional, referentially transparent context, all fiction is false?
  • What is Being?
    we can at least try to put parts of this conversation into a first-order predicate format, — Banno

    Hurrah. Russell and Quine. What the thread needs, I do agree.

    But not by saying something like "There is something that is an apple and is imaginary", surely. — Srap Tasmaner

    :100:

    One would presumably take care to remain inside the intensional scope, sure; — Banno

    Like this, though?

    If on the other hand we are talking about Mordor and surrounds, — Banno

    Pretending to talk about? Agreeing to pretend there is something that is named Mordor? Agreeing to pretend that "Frodo" does indeed refer? It doesn't seem that you care at all to remain inside the scope of such clarifications.

    If on the other hand we are talking about Mordor and surrounds, then "Frodo" does indeed refer, — Banno

    Reassurance welcome, of course.
  • Vesto Slipher, Christian Doppler & Albert Einstein
    Where cars on the highway are concerned, the earth is taken as fixed, and the speeding ticket is deserved. [...]

    Along with the recognition that there is no fixed distinction between fact and convention must go the recognition that nevertheless there is almost always some distinction or other between fact and convention - a transient distinction drawn by the stance adopted at the time.     — Goodman, Inertia and Invention
  • Possible Worlds and Toity worlds
    Contingent is defined as possible but non-necessary. — bongo fury
  • Possible Worlds and Toity worlds
    Anyway, you haven't helped yourself by appearing to want 'toity' to correspond to contingent as well as possible, and to worlds as well as truths. Because you end up referring to contingent worlds, which looks like you didn't understand what you're criticising.

    Haha, I just googled "true in all necessary worlds" to see if there isn't some bizarre mathematical dual of the usual possible worlds malarkey, and I'm surprised if (as appears so far) there isn't.
  • Possible Worlds and Toity worlds
    But one must not then define necessary truths as a species of contingent truth, which is what one would be doing if one made the very notion of a necessary truth identical to the notion of a truth that is true in all possible worlds. — Bartricks

    But one wouldn't be doing the first by doing the second, quite the opposite. One would be defining necessary and contingent truths both, as mutually exclusive (and jointly exhaustive) species of possible truth.

    You might (I don't know) have an argument that such a definition is wrong. Unfaithful to pre-theoretic usage? But you denied having one?
  • Possible Worlds and Toity worlds
    But one must not then define necessary truths as a species of contingent truth, — Bartricks

    I don't think anyone did? ... As a species of possible truth, sure. You see the difference? Contingent is defined as possible but non-necessary.
  • Solution to the hard problem of consciousness
    ↪Marchesk


    I was asking about the alleged restriction of "everything that we can directly observe". What is (or what did Russell mean by) direct observation? Is it,

    ongoing contact — Marchesk

    ?
  • Solution to the hard problem of consciousness
    I prefer to use Strawson's terms "non-experiential" for matter and "experiential" for mental. — Manuel

    Democritus called it atoms. Leibniz called it monads. Fortunately the two men never met, or there would have been a very dull argument. — Woody Allen, My Philosophy
  • Solution to the hard problem of consciousness
    In fact, everything that we can directly observe of the physical world happens inside our heads,
    -- Russell 1937     — SophistiCat

    The "we" an inner homunculus? If not, why the restriction?
  • Some remarks on Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA)
    ↪Luke
    Ok, cool, I think you were just unaware that "token of a noun" would tend to be understood as referring to a syntactic, linguistic item, such as an utterance or inscription of the noun itself. You mean rather the one (for a proper noun) or several (for a common noun) objects denoted by the noun. Pardon me and carry on.
  • What is beauty
    Beauty is the red herring of aesthetics. Metaphorical use of a word for high socio-sexual status would lend power to any propaganda of recommendation: see this, eat that, use the other.

    It's natural to confuse this propaganda purpose with the aesthetic purpose of the recommended art. Especially when so much art happens to refer to (e.g. depict) people of high status.
  • Some remarks on Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA)
    Why can a common noun refer to its instances but a proper noun cannot refer to its instance? — Luke

    That would be grossly unfair. Both are fine. It doesn't mean, though, that the phrases "common noun" and "proper noun" refer to any non-linguistic items. Which is what you seem to claim here:

    So 'proper noun' refers to both the name and the named object? — Luke

    Reference isn't transitive (in the mathematical sense of transitive). "Proper noun" refers to names; names refer to their bearers; but "proper noun" doesn't generally refer to the bearers (either severally or as a class). Perhaps your single quotes are scary but not, like my doubles, quotational? Then you are perhaps saying that a name e.g. "Jupiter" refers to itself as well as the planet? That can't be right either. I mean, I see that you're not saying that at all. But then what to make of,

    So 'proper noun' refers to both the name and the named object? — Luke
  • Some remarks on Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA)
    the first also refers to the second. — Luke

    Do you mean, the name refers to the named? Sure.

    So 'proper noun' refers to both? — Luke

    No, only to the name.
  • Some remarks on Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA)
    My bad. — Luke

    Now I feel bad. But if you're a Wittgenstein exegisist that dares answer to the name 'nominalist', then hooray, but I want to be sure I understand you.

    it is perhaps more correct to say that a proper noun is both a token and a type - — Luke

    I just need clarification. Does 'proper noun' refer to the name or the named object? Anyone would assume the first and not the second, and possibly "both a token and a type" in the sense of referring ambiguously to either a particular token (utterance or inscription) of the noun in question, or the type which is the class of all such tokens. But then, with

    "the unique token of its type" as you say. — Luke

    I was definitely referring to the second and not the first. The unique bearer of the name.

    It can't be both.

    I know I've made this sound pedantic. But it's the difference between written notes and sounded tones. It's going to be crucial. I've had the same trouble with most of the big shots around here, so you oughtn't worry.

    MU is on his own road.
  • The Essence Of Wittgenstein
    There you go then :wink:

    (Your required other uses.)
  • Some remarks on Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA)
    I had assumed MU was being at least offered a correct rendition of general usage of the type/token distinction, but I have to admit to being startled, here:

    proper nouns only have one token, which does not make a type. — Luke

    Do you mean, they each denote a single individual, which is the unique token of its type, making the type/token distinction superfluous? (Though perhaps harmless.)

    Then you might or might not want to get into syntax, distinguishing tokens (utterances, inscriptions etc.) of the denoting noun from the word itself, considered as class or type of those tokens?

    common nouns which can be classified into types and their tokens. — Luke

    Again, you mean they each denote either (depending how you look at it), a class or type or extension, or on the other hand severally the several objects which are members of that extension, i.e. tokens of the type?

    The syntactic items properly called common nouns are identifiable either as single items or as classes (types) of tokens, no different from the situation with proper nouns (see above).

    Types represent their tokens in the sense that a type is a word that represents a (class/type of) concrete token/object. — Luke

    This could be (to a nominalist) a lovely way to start deflating types/classes/extensions so that there's no commitment to them as entities. But the general usage admits the implication of such a commitment. Types are an accepted piece of Platonism in linguistics and analytical philosophy.

    AFAIK. You might be channeling a different tradition? Apologies if so.
  • Do Chalmers' Zombies beg the question?
    ↪Pantagruel


    If a machine with no ghost thinks it has a ghost, it is wrong. Tick.

    If a machine with a ghost thinks it is not a machine with no ghost, it is correct. Tick.
  • Do Chalmers' Zombies beg the question?
    One difference must be that the actually conscious being can know that it is conscious (in the strong sense); — Pantagruel

    How does this work? Acquaintance of the head with an immaterial picture inside it?
  • Do Chalmers' Zombies beg the question?
    If zombie-consciousness is devoid of phenomenality, what possible set of conditions could give rise to the zombie asserting phenomenality? — Pantagruel

    Are we to exclude deliberate deception? If so, how about innocent confusion?
  • The Essence Of Wittgenstein
    to obey a rule is to act; — Banno

    But not only to behave oneself in the manner of the rule. Also it is to discourage and exclude incorrect behaviours from the game.

    I don't claim Witty says this. But it was my point here.
  • The Essence Of Wittgenstein
    ↪Wayfarer
    Obviously no one was talking about syntax.
  • The Essence Of Wittgenstein
    Nobody talks much about the "incorrect" use of words. We like to think language is democratic.
  • The Essence Of Wittgenstein
    What about incorrect uses? People use words incorrectly all the time, is their incorrect use driving the meaning of the word? — Sam26

    I love this question. Especially if we substitute "usage" for "meaning". Which we might as well. Or vice versa: "people mean things by words incorrectly all the time, is their incorrect meaning driving the meaning of the word?"

    It must be, because correct derives from precedent practice, and originally anything went.

    Ok, so now, in a mature language game, we prefer to deny the relevance of this. We say, "people can say what they like, it doesn't make it true". But I don't think they can. And it would.
  • When Alan Turing and Ludwig Wittgenstein Discussed the Liar Paradox
    The relation is as real as the things. — unenlightened

    Well, the relating is as real as the things. The pointing a relation word at them. There just aren't any relations being pointed at, like there are things being pointed at. Unless you're Plato.
  • Logic is evil. Change my mind!
    When we do deductive logic we literally try to reduce options so that the truth (aka prey) can't escape anymore and only one option is left. — FalseIdentity

    This might be true if we never reasoned hypothetically. If we held premises only absolutely, and awaited conclusions as fresh intelligence. As it is, conclusions are just premises playing a role. (Prey? Maybe.) The game of deduction teases out tensions between (all 3, in a syllogism) premises. Helps us redefine and improve them all: refine what we think they say, if they are to be kept provisionally on board.
  • Language and Ontology
    "fictional entities" — Shawn

    Scary quotes :scream:
  • The important question of what understanding is.
    Humans that know what "water" means map that word to that stuff... — InPitzotl

    :100:

    and to do that, we form a concept — InPitzotl

    Careful now...

    The idea of such things — InPitzotl

    a model of the stuff — InPitzotl

    Are concepts and ideas and models any more harmlessly, less misleadingly identified as the referent of "water" than are phrases like "cool flowing substance"?
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