Thanks, that's interesting. I'm interested in your perception of Bernie Sanders. He comes across as strongly anti-establishment to me. Is that your perception?
Hundreds? Thousands?
You think that from my perspective I’d fall asleep looking down at my white-skinned body, the operation would be performed, and then I’d wake up looking down at the same white-skinned body, but with a new brain?
Whereas I think that from my perspective I’d fall asleep looking down at my white-skinned body, the operation would be performed, and then I’d wake up looking down at my new black-skinned body.
That depends entirely on how you account for an individual identity. There is no objective basis for doing so.
Because the brain is where personhood is found. Personhood concerns consciousness, and consciousness is what the brain does.
Say currently I'm a white guy and you're a black guy. We have a brain transplant. What colour is my skin after the transplant? I say it's black because my brain has been placed in a black-skinned body, and I am my brain.
As a thought experiment, let's assume that brain transplants are medically possible. My brain is placed in @NOS4A2's body and his brain is placed in my body.
Who is NOS4A2 and who is me after the operation?
There is a moral difference between a living body with a functioning brain and a living body without a functioning brain.
Brain death is death of the person.
And if the brain could be removed but kept alive then even though it's a single organ it's also a person.
This is a tangent. I have no problem with identifying an individual identity as a series of causally-connected spatiotemporal stages. The objection I have is in defining the "natural kind" (for lack of a better term) of "individual human being". This would have to be based on a well-defined set of necessary and sufficient properties, that unambiguously identify an object as either being one of these, or not. An object that can produce multiple human beings cannot possible be said to be an individual human being, even though it is commonly in the developmental history of human beings. The same is true of blasotocysts- clusters of cells, that may produce multiple human beings at several stages.
So my position is that an individual human being (i.e. an object of that type) is something that emerges. gradually during fetal development. I regard a properly functioning individual human being as a self-sustaining organism with certain physical and intellectual capabilities, including a sense of self. You can disagree, because there is no unequivocally correct answer. But you have no rational basis for denying me (or women) the privilege of deciding for themselves.
I recognize the image on the right as a person. I don't recognize the image on the left as a person.
If you recognize the image on the left as a person, can you explain how you recognize it as a person?
Provide your complete principium individuationis. My issue is that there is no such thing because "individual human being" is a concept with vague boundaries. A zygote isn't a strict boundary because a zygote can produce multiple individuals. If we focus on the histories of a set of twins, they are clearly not individuated at the zygote level.
Identical twins begin with the same genetic material, they lack this uniqueness you mention. So unique genetics can't be the basis for identifying an individual human life.
Rights *arent* just values. It seems you havent understood my post. Rights are values instantiated in the world through physical force. I can value anything I wish, but I do not have the power to enforce my own values in the world.
How is that possible before there was a government to rule those medieval gangs and city-states?
This is not a picture of a person, Fire.
Some people may think it's a person because that's what they've been led to believe.
There is a reason that people have been led to believe it's a person. Is that reason based on morality or something else?
1. x)(x is a human animal & x is sitting in your chair)
2. (x)((x is a human animal & x is sitting in your chair) x is thinking)
3. (x)((x is thinking & x is sitting in your chair) x = you)
4. (x)(x is a human animal & x = you)