Zeus is the totality of becoming, the one thing that is, the thing that cannot be named, the logos etc. I think he was using common used terminology of the time to convey to his contempories what he was getting at. — ChatteringMonkey

While I agree with the second sentence, I don't think Heraclitus can be pinned down to what you say in the first.

There are passages such as this:

(1) It is wise to hearken, not to me, but to my Word, and to confess that all things are one.[18] R.P. 40. — Heraclitus

... but, then, the "all things are one" motif is readily open to interpretation - it can be found in multiple traditions and can at least in some such be easily interpreted to stipulate a priority monism {... which thereby connects all otherwise disparate existent things - this so as to result in statements such as "everything is one" or else "we are all one"}.

Whereas fragments such as these following are harder to assimilate into this notion of "Zeus is the cosmic totality of becoming as the only thing that is one":

(97) Man is called a baby by God, even as a child by a man. R. P. 45.

(98, 99) The wisest man is an ape compared to God, just as the most beautiful ape is ugly compared to man.

(110) And it is law, too, to obey the counsel of one. R. P. 49 a. — Heraclitus

Especially when analyzing the last given fragment - and in assuming that Heraclitus was not an ignoramus in his aphorisms - in which way can one make sense of "and it is law, too, to obey the council of [the cosmic totality of all that is]"?

The totality of all that exists is itself fire, perpetual transformations of constant strife between opposites. It so far to me makes no sense to then affirm that it too is law/logos (itself here appearing unchanging) to obey the counsel of "dyadic opposites in strife in their cosmic totality" (in contrast to obeying some aspects of the total at expense of others - or, what still seems to me more likely, obeying "Zeus" / God (per the quotes above) as that only given which is nondualistic and hence one)

Can you then make sense of how one goes about obeying the council of "the cosmic totality of dyadic opposites in perpetual strife (of which one oneself is an aspect of)"?

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At any rate, I don't see how my previously offered inference can be ruled out via Heraclitus's own fragments. Again, so far finding the inference offered plausible, albeit not the only one possible.

If being is becoming, then being is a fiction because being implies something that does not become but stays the same. — ChatteringMonkey

"Being" is however a verb, a process, that is treated as a noun conceptually, the same as "becoming" is in philosophical circles.

This cultural reification of being into something that is fixed and hence not process, I'll argue, may have something to do with the metaphysical notion of an ultimate goal or telos of being (as verb) which could, for one example, be equated with the Neoplatonic notion of the "the One" - which ceases to be a striving toward but instead is the ultimate and final actualization of all strivings.

One can note that the term "becoming" can also easily raise the question "becoming what?" And, unlike many a modern interpretation of the process theory of becoming - which, to my mind, again seems to in some way reify becoming at large into a static thing, or else "something that always stays the same" - becoming does not logically entail a completely permanent relativism wherein there is nothing for all of this becoming to eventually become.

Heraclitus, or at least his known fragments, are not very explicit about the philosophical working which Heraclitus espoused. Nevertheless, one will find in Heraclitus in quite explicit manners the notion of something which is - i.e., some being per se - which is not in duality with its opposite and hence is not in a state of perpetually changing:

(65) The wise is one only. It is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus. R. P. 40. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_32

(19) Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things. R. P. 40. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_41

It then seems plausible enough to infer from his total known fragments that for Heraclitus becoming has at its ultimate end this addressed "wisdom" which is "one only" and can go by the name of "Zeus" (although imperfectly).

A very good - and might I add substantial :wink: - OP!

How do you think it affects how we talk about mind, matter, or metaphysics more generally? — Wayfarer

Personally, given its modern connotations, in my own writings I tend to reserve the term "substance" for "stuff" - be it mental (e.g., ideas, thoughts, paradigms, etc.) or else material. Whereas ouisia - being - I instead address via the term "essence".

I find that so doing allows me to specify awareness as being (as essence) and all that is non-aware (be it an idea one entertains or else a rock one sees) as a different type of being (a different type of essence) - and this without importing the baggage of "stuff", else of "thingness" (ideas are things as well), nowadays too often associated with the term "substance" into the concept of awareness's being.

That's why I'm questioning whether -- or admitting my ignorance about -- how bringing in choice-worthiness helps matters. — J

In truth, I'm not intimately familiar with the philosophical use of "choice-worthiness" ... but I take it to specify that which makes one alternative among the two or more we're faced with worthy of being chosen.

So understood, choice-worthiness would then be an intrinsic aspect of ethics - for it is that which we presume to make a given alternative worthy of being chosen which determines our ethical standing in so choosing. Hence, we always chose what we assume to be beneficial/good to us. But only if our reasons for the choice made (to include teleological reasons) are correct, hence right, will our choice then be ethical.

For instance, the murderer chooses to murder in the pursuit of that happiness which accompanies so successfully murdering. Here, to successfully murder will be good relative to the murderer's character due to the murderer deeming this beneficial to him/herself (maybe on account of the euphoric thrill thereby obtained in so doing and getting away with it). But we sane people deem this to be an unethical choice due to knowing full well that it leads, sooner or later, to everyone's reduced eudemonia/wellbeing (including the murderer's). We sane people thereby know this choice to murder to be a blatant wrong - rather than being a right / correct choice to make - and this in almost all conceivable scenarios imaginable we might care to hypothesize. To this extent making murder objectively wrong (although I could play devils advocate to this and provide examples where murder might be the lesser of the available wrongs and, in this manner, not be the unethical choice to make).

This then can be contrasted to choosing chocolate vs. vanilla ice-cream. Unless there's allergies or other outstanding factors involved, choosing one one or another will make virtually no difference whatsoever to the telos of optimal eudemonia. Here, though we yet choose based on what we deem to be most beneficial for us, our choice will not readily fall into the category of "ethics".

All the same, devoid of the criteria of choice-worthiness (as previously defined), I don't yet understand how any comportment or deed can be appraised as being either ethical/virtuous or not. Conversely, the activity of entities we deem devoid of any ability to choose - rocks as one clear example, such as when they result in an avalanche - we neither appraise as ethical or unethical. Such that it (at least so seems to me) is only via what we deem "worthy of being chosen" that any determination can be made as to the ethics concerned or the ethos we adopt.

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This seems like a good window onto virtue ethics, and the way you go on to elaborate it also makes sense. — J

BTW, I neglected to say this initially, but thanks for these comments. They’re appreciated!

I think you will like it. — Wayfarer

A fellow "mystic"? Sure! I think I'd like it as well. :wink:

I also noticed your explication of substance/essence above. I tried to introduce the topic of what substance means in philosophy as distinct from everyday use earlier in the thread. I think I'll write an OP on it. — Wayfarer

If you do, substances aside, I'd be interested on any offerings regarding the notion of essence-dualism. Again, this for example as per the Hindu distinction between maya and pure-consciousness/atman.

If I choose to read an interesting book, that book is, arguably, choice-worthy. But why? I honestly don't see how calling out its choice-worthiness gets us anywhere. You can't mean that being chosen is any sort of moral criterion. So how does "good" get brought in here? What is it about the book that would make my choice a worthy one? — J

While I hope I’m not intruding on the discussion, I thought at least parts of this might be of use to the issue (these being some personal perspectives interjected with what I take to be staple aspects of the philosophy of ethics at large):

A synonym of “good” is “beneficial”. We always select what we select to do deeming it beneficial to us. This is quite arguably a universal to all choices made and all those with an ability to so chose. Going to the dentist because it is beneficial, even if deemed unpleasant. Etc.

Ethics come into play in the context of whether or not that which we deem to be beneficial to us in fact actually is so or not. If it in fact is beneficial, then it is the correct - aka the right - thing to do. If it in fact is not beneficial to us (either in the short or long term when considered in terms of overall outcome), then it is the incorrect - aka the wrong - thing to do.

There’s of course much which could then be considered in this calculus of what is the right vs. the wrong thing to do. Including taking into account other’s actions and reactions to what one does (or does not) do.

This calculus then ultimately ending in the possible metaphysical notion of there being an ontically real but yet to be actualized, ultimate beneficiality to aim toward – one that is of itself validly obtainable in principle (this, again, at some future time rather than in the here and now), hence being correct or true, hence being right – and this irrespective of people’s perspectives pro or contra – which could be worded as “a complete and perfect eudemonia or else wellbeing”.

This, whatever it might be in its details, then being what would be termed “the (objective) Good” – which would then hold ontic presence, hence be real, as a telos (teloi, final causes, always being givens that await to be actualized in the future that, at such, are likewise always concurrent with that which they teleologically effect - in this case the very sentience which innately seeks optimal wellbeing).

As to why the Good is not yet actualized, simplistically, this can be explained via our ignorance and our capacity to choose wrongs (in the erroneous belief that they are beneficial when, in fact, they are not).

In any case, the whole thrust of the book is (as I understand it) the quantum nature of consciousness. He presents the idea of ‘seity’ - the individual, conscious subject as a unique center of experience that cannot be reduced to anything more fundamental. — Wayfarer

Yes, that's indeed up my alley, so to speak. Thanks for the reference. :up:

But there are multiple primary particles, right? Photons and electrons are not made of anything else. Protons and neutrons are made of quarks. Aren't neutrinos also primary? Can monism be the answer if we already have those? — Patterner

On a physical level of understanding, all quanta themselves emerge from the quantum vacuum state:

In quantum field theory, the quantum vacuum state (also called the quantum vacuum or vacuum state) is the quantum state with the lowest possible energy. Generally, it contains no physical particles. The term zero-point field is sometimes used as a synonym for the vacuum state of a quantized field which is completely individual.[clarification needed]

According to present-day[when?] understanding of what is called the vacuum state or the quantum vacuum, it is "by no means a simple empty space".[1][2] According to quantum mechanics, the vacuum state is not truly empty but instead contains fleeting electromagnetic waves and particles that pop into and out of the quantum field.[3][4][5] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_vacuum_state

... which is located neither here nor there but, quite literally, is physically everywhere - omnipresent.

In then interpreting the vacuum state to be physical, such that all physicality emerges from it in one way or another, physicalism can well be preserved despite the many different variants of quanta that are known to occur.

I'm not sure if anyone brought this up yet (haven't read the entire thread) but have you considered an "essence dualism" - this so as to avoid all the pitfalls of "substance dualism"?

Here is one possible example of an essence dualism; Here leaning on Hindu views as one example, one could then posit an essence of "maya (illusion or magic-trick in an ultimate sense of reality, which would in traditional views include both mater and mind)" and a separate essence of "pure awareness" (which is non-illusory actuality).

No worries if this doesn't make much sense or else work for you. But I thought I'd mention it just in case.

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BTW, the distinction between substance and essence can get easily complex and maybe at times convoluted, but for example:

Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.[1][2] Substances are particulars that are ontologically independent: they are able to exist all by themselves.[3][4] Another defining feature often attributed to substances is their ability to undergo changes. Changes involve something existing before, during and after the change. They can be described in terms of a persisting substance gaining or losing properties.[3] Attributes or properties, on the other hand, are entities that can be exemplified by substances.[5] Properties characterize their bearers; they express what their bearer is like.[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory

vs.:

The English word essence comes from Latin essentia, via French essence. The original Latin word was created purposefully, by Ancient Roman philosophers, in order to provide an adequate Latin translation for the Greek term ousia.

The concept originates as a precise technical term with Aristotle (although it can also be found in Plato),[1] who used the Greek expression to ti ên einai[2] literally meaning "the what it was to be." This also corresponds to the scholastic term quiddity or sometimes the shorter phrase to ti esti[3] literally meaning "the what it is" and corresponding to the scholastic term haecceity (thisness) for the same idea. This phrase presented such difficulties for its Latin translators that they coined the word essentia to represent the whole expression. For Aristotle and his scholastic followers, the notion of essence is closely linked to that of definition (horismos).[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essence#Etymology

So roughly construed - to provide just one more example - the Neoplatonic "the One" could then not be a substance - but it might conceivably be referred to as essence (in at least certain interpretations of it, such as in addressing it as that which is "essential" to being itself - this in contrast to something like the aforementioned maya being essential only relative to existence (that which "stands out") at large ... but maybe all this is a bit off topic).

Again, though, no problems if this seems to hinder your position rather than help it.

interesting distinction, to call yourself a monist but not a physicalist. — flannel jesus

There are many different types of monism. These can include "priority monism" - of which Neoplatonism is a type - "dual-aspect monism" - in which both mind and matter as two aspects of the same underlying given - and the far more familiar "substance monism" - of which physicalism is only one particular type (with idealism being its often mentioned opposite). Quantitatively addressed, physicalism is just one of a far greater plurality of possible monisms - with some such monisms not being logically contradictory (e.g., one can uphold a priority monism while cogently also at the same time upholding, for one example, a monism of objective idealism - else, an objective variety of dual-aspect monism).

Dennett's particular flavor of physicalism is strongly epistemological.

[...]

Almost none of that is true, especially about the first-person stance, IMO, but I want to give Dennett a fair hearing so we can see what a sample version of physicalism is up against. — J

I acknowledge this. To me, however, it does raise the question: Can there be anything epistemic without there being something ontic* which the epistemic references?

I so far take philosophical relativism to implicitly, if not also explicitly, make just this claim. A different topic maybe, but I'll argue that upholding an affirmative answer to this question can only result in a logical contradiction: at the same time and in the same respect there both a) is an ontic actuality which the epistemic addresses (namely, the ontic actuality of there in fact not being any ontic actualities - this being a sort of meta-level ontic-actuality) and b) is not any ontic actuality which the epistemic addresses ... This might be better formulated, but the same logical contradictions seems to remain irrespective of adjustments.

The stance of physicalism does seem to presuposes that everything ontically actual, and hence real, is physical. Such that any epistemological account (regarding what is) seems to pivot upon this very bedrock assumption of what the ontic is, even if its kept utterly tacit in the arguments provided.

But on what would the necessary "wrongness of non-physicalism" be grounded? (My own take so far is that physicalism provides a maximal explanatory power to those who are physicalists - and that it's due to this teleological motivation alone (namely, the intent to best understand) that physicalism is so stringently upheld and maintained.)

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* "The ontic" being that which ontology studies (this via any of various epistemologies).

To begin with, can you provide references evidencing that modern hunter-gather societies - or at least some such - are of an authoritarian leadership which so 'oversees' all others in the tribe so as to preserve social cohesion? — javra

No, because I didn't claim this. — AmadeusD

Again, what you in fact claimed:

I think the idea that a pre-historic society was egalitarian is pretty much a DOA. Nothing to it. The less oversight society has, more abuse happens. — AmadeusD

My knowledge of several of those groups is that they are decidedly not egalitarian, even in principle. — AmadeusD

Rationally then, your affirmations entail that in the absence of a non-egalitarian, hence authoritarian leadership which "oversees", societies will have ample "abuse" ingroup.

I personally don't know of tribes which have ample abuse ingroup. So I assumed that you knew of tribes with authoritarian leadership.

Can you then, instead, reference tribes wherein abuse is rampant ingroup due to not having authoritarian leadersphip?

If not, your claims above are unjustified and, thereby, rather hollow.

I sense some bristling in this response, so forgive me for being pretty lack luster in mine. I don't care for bristles — AmadeusD

Might as well be calling me a porcupine. Name-calling, while it might have its political advantages amongst some, is not something that validates affirmations, though.

"In the Aka community, despite a sexual division of labor where women primarily serve as caregivers, male and female roles are highly flexible and interchangeable. Women hunt while men care for children, and vice versa, without stigma or loss of status. Women are not only as likely as men to hunt but can even be more proficient hunters."

If you're not seeing a problem, I can't say I care to explain it. — AmadeusD

As to examples like this one, no, I'm not seeing any problem whatsoever in terms of egalitarian governance of the tribe.

"The Bambuti tend to follow a patrilineal descent system, and their residences after marriage are patrilocal..... The only type of group seen amongst the Bambuti is the nuclear family."

"Sister exchange is the common form of marriage. Based on reciprocal exchange, men from other bands exchange sisters or other females to whom they have ties.[9]"

Clearly not egalitarian, despite the claim (not referenced) in the following paragraph, that they are. — AmadeusD

Because a patrilineal society cannot be egalitarian, or because the "exchange" of women cannot be consensual?

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You offered just one reference to one patriarchal society, the Ket. Which does not a generality make.

Furthermore, if the Ket were patriarchal, this is because we know via their oral tradition that these tribes were led by shaman (it's from these peoples that the term "shaman" gained its repute) which were men. This as is clearly stated in the article:

The Kets have a rich and varied culture, filled with an abundance of Siberian mythology, including shamanistic practices and oral traditions. Siberia, the area of Russia in which the Kets reside, has long been identified as the originating place of the Shaman or Shamanism. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ket_people#Culture

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I also spent about eight years looking in to and speaking with members of Amazonian tribes (for different reasons) and it was patently obvious all of those groups (Jivaro, Shipibo, Ashaninka etc..) are patriarchal through endless books, conversations and papers - I can't pull out some specific reference without carrying out some actual research, which this thread doesn't call for. — AmadeusD

Given your empirical expertise, you might then want to rewrite the Wikipedia page on hunter-gatherers, which directly contradicts your claims. Again, this as pertains to hunter-gatherers at large as they are known to be in various scientific fields. I say this quite earnestly, for truth is truth and facts matter.

Till then, I'll trust what the referenced scientists say.

Further, this concept of hte 'noble savage" or some weird idea that indigenous societies were more just than ours needs to stop. They were mostly brutal and unforgiving. — AmadeusD

First off, I made no such mention of a "noble savage" - and only claimed they were/are largely egalitarian, which in no way precludes their ability to be brutally violent for reasons such as that of self defense or warfare.

Secondly, the boldfaced affirmation seems to directly speak to the very same inference based on your previous posts made at the beginning of this one post: namely, that of there being a good sum of ingroup abuse.

To which, again, references are as of yet lacking to show how hunter-gatherer tribes are "mostly brutal and unforgiving" or else "abusive" when it comes to ingroup members. This even as pertains to the very few human-cannibalism-practicing tribes among them,.

"descriptions and predications" — J

Yes, it doesn't address what physicality per se is. But this theme brings to mind how water can be described via, and predicated on, the structure of two elements. It also brings to mind the fact that such description and predication neither changes a) the reality that water can be wet (a liquid) at room temperature whereas the two gases cannot nor b) the reality that there is no known explanation for why H2O ceases to be strictly gaseous at room temperature, this unlike compounds such as CO2 (predictable thought it is, this quality of H2O, and of other compounds in general, nevertheless being blatant hocus-pocus events that are often overlooked as so being, as though they’ve been in some way explained).

And this, to me, in some ways parallels to the mind-brain dichotomy. There still remains a difference between mind and brain (e.g., the second can be touched, smelled, seen, even tasted; the first can’t - to skip on a long list of maybe more pertinent examples), and there is still no viable explanation of how or why the two correlate. Save that, unlike chemical compounds, the mind holds properties that are commonly understood to be immaterial.

He was less circumspect in later talks and seemed to be pushing a notion that could possibly run afoul of Hemple's Dilemma (i.e. if something is real, it is, by definition, included in what is physical).

The difficulty is that "physical," like the "methodological naturalism" mentioned earlier in this thread, is that they can be pushed very far in different directions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, exactly so. Hence, were something like “the One” to in fact be real, it would then need to be deemed physical due to the necessity of anything real being strictly physical. And what an odd form of physicalism that would be.

How then to account for the general egalitarianism of the hunter-gatherer tribes which are present in the current day? — javra

Easy: The rest of the world are no longer in those situations. My knowledge of several of those groups is that they are decidedly not egalitarian, even in principle. — AmadeusD

You offer a lot of opinions and thoughts in your post, but I am interested in the potential facts of the matter.

To begin with, can you provide references evidencing that modern hunter-gather societies - or at least some such - are of an authoritarian leadership which so 'oversees' all others in the tribe so as to preserve social cohesion? (this rather than being societies of generally egalitarian governance).

But that subjection of women to their men, rife in pretty much every group on that list. — AmadeusD

Next, can you provide references to how "the subjection of women to their men is rife in pretty much every group on that list"?

I’m assuming these references will be easy for you to provide, given the knowledge you say you have regarding these matters. (I've previously given references to my affirmations. It'd be odd for you not to do likewise.)

I think the idea that a pre-historic society was egalitarian is pretty much a DOA. Nothing to it. The less oversight society has, more abuse happens. — AmadeusD

Is this to say that devoid of some authoritarian oversight humans - and, in particular, men - are naturally abusive?

Issues such as this then signifying that men will naturally rape as many women as they/we can were it not for such oversight (this not being an ethical characteristic by the standards of most) aside:

How then to account for the general egalitarianism of the hunter-gatherer tribes which are present in the current day? There's more than a handful of these.

I believe it comes down, once again, to an unshakable faith in physicalism. — J

By my counts, quite validly expressed!

And, in keeping with this thread's theme: yes, there is a distinct difference between "faith" at large and that particular type of faith which is "unshakable" - this irrespective of the rational or, in this case, experiential evidence to the contrary.

What Dennett means by "illusion" is "something that looks like it's non-physical." — J

Within this context which you mention, the notion of "illusion" almost begins to make sense. (Save for the "looks like" part :razz: , which, again, would logically entail an awareness which so sees.) In earnest, however, I admire your willingness to see things from others' perspectives.

Since I take it you've read Dennett first-hand, did Dennett ever get around to defining what "the physical" actually is in his philosophical writings? This so as to validly distinguish it from that which would then be "the illusion of non-physicality".

The issue brings to mind Thomas Huxley - with the nickname of "Darwin's bulldog", who first coined the term "agnostic", and who was a worthwhile philosopher in his own right - whose works I have read. A quote from him, here with emphasis on the subject of physicalism / materialism:

My fundamental axiom of speculative philosophy is that materialism and spiritualism are opposite poles of the same absurdity - the absurdity of imagining that we know anything about either spirit or matter.

Techne is in some sense the proof of episteme, and what "objectifies" it in the world (in the same way that Hegel says that institutions serve to objectify morality). — Count Timothy von Icarus

While still upholding the primacy of episteme over techne in their importance, I do agree with this. :up:

And in keeping with this, I often enough think that Francis Bacon would have been better off stating "understanding is power" - this rather than "knowledge is power". But then it gets to be contingent on how one understands and translates the term "scientia".

The only eliminativist I've really spent much time on is Daniel Dennett, [...] I believe he would say that consciousness and awareness are user illusions -- as is, indeed, the user him/herself! — J

Though I'm familiar with the argument, I haven't read Dennett's works first hand myself, so I'm not sure how he would argue this illusion might work when replied to thusly:

"Consciousness" is (I think we'd all agree) a very concept-laden term - such that what some might interpret by the term might in fact not be. I grant this. But there can be no notion of consciousness devoid of all awareness.

And, as to "awareness being an illusion", an illusion relative to what if not to awareness itself?

"Illusion" - if its to be at all cogent as term - can only mean "misapprehension, i.e. a mistaken understanding (else: a mistaken seeming)". So, I'd take it that for wrong-apprehension to occur there must then by entailment yet be an ontically occurring apprehension, an understanding, by ...

And here again I ask by what else if not by an ontically actual and hence real awareness (or, as @Count Timothy von Icarus might say, "by the intellect", which is awareness-endowed by the very fact of being that which understands).

Illusion devoid of an ontically real awareness to which the illusion applies is, I argue, at best nonsensical (and at worst, possibly willfully dishonest).

I think you're overestimating the power of the "give me a predictive hypothesis" request, but yes, we do want to be able to say more than "Tradition says so" or "it's empirical too." — J

Wanted to add that focus on “a hypothesis’ ability to predict” is, to my mind unfortunately, too often prioritized over “a hypothesis’ explanatory power” – this especially in philosophy.

The first strictly addresses techne (i.e., the making or doing something (namely, that of a valid prediction)), whereas the second is about episteme (i.e., the understanding of what is) – and to me it seems obvious that there can be no techne in the absence of episteme, such that episteme is of paramount importance, with techne being only secondary..

For example, in this context it can be asked, "Does the phenomenologist or the eliminativist provide more explanatory power as regards the totality of what is?" While I'm sure that argument galore as to this question's answer could ensue, to my best understanding it remains the case that the eliminativist will not be able to explain most anything as regards awareness per se. And without awareness, there cannot be any form of empiricism.

But anywho, what is the philosophical import of this sociological discussion? — Hanover

If most of the human species’ 200,000-year or so existence has been of a largely egalitarian nature at least within ingroups, this might illustrate that human males are not genetically hardwired to be misogynists as far as the human species (as it's biologically defined to this day) goes. It might also support the credence that men being innately superior relative to women - i.e. male chauvinism - is not supportable in strictly biological terms (but gains its support strictly form culture, e.g. “God said so, therefore so it is”; Edit: else via cultural understandings of 'evolution via natural selection" as conceptualized by those who do not know and don't give a hoot about what evolutionists of biological science actually say - the history of our human species being just one such example).

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Tim wood thinks perhaps 100% of women can tell a story of sexual assault. I think he's right. All the women I know have horror stories about men. — RogueAI

As in, the evolution of human societies takes a path, and along the route women fare better and worse depending upon the moment. From my vantage point today, it does seem at this moment substantial efforts at female protection and enforcing equality are being made. — Hanover

I see an incongruity in the propositional content of these two quotes.

These are just two of many possible ways of understanding the superordinate concept. — Joshs

OK, but - as per all that I have written in this thread - I reject both these "superordiante concepts" (in sum: that of biology and of culture) as being foundational to the masculinity / femininity dichotomy. Instead adopting the more metaphysical notions of yin and yang. For which, I personally cannot so far think of any possible "superordinate concept".

Suppose there's a parallel universe where everything else is the same, but men are weaker than women. Would we see the same rates of rape and abuse? — RogueAI

I'm here presuming you mean to say "men are weaker than women" in this parallel world physically and politically, rather than psychologically. It's been my experience (in the military) that most men are anxious if not fearful of injections, whereas most women are not - to not bring in the psychological strength required for human childbirth.

Granting similar inequity of physical and political power and a similar general want of respect for the other - this in an "us vs. them" state of mind as regards the sexes (e.g., what man likes being called "a pussy", as just one common enough example in the world we inhabit) - I can easily fathom the same general rates of abuse of the weaker sex (here, men) by the stronger (here, women). But not the same general rates of rape: this because a) men are the ones biologically endowed with penises by definition (right?) and b) - either via forms of love (minimally, consensuality, even if it occurs via S&M in which physical pain might be wanted and given) or, else, via willful cruelties (unconsensual almost by definition: this being "the willful causing of suffering in another") - it is only men who thereby gain sexual, physical pleasure via use of their penises to penetrate others (here taking into account homosexuality as well).

That said, I don't find women any more "innately benevolent" than I do men. It's just that (when addressed as a whole) each sex has its own biological and hence physical equipment and, maybe, its own general talents and other psychical abilities (though how much of the latter is strictly genetic vs. cultural I don't presume to know) - which, in either sex, could be used either constructively to promote harmony or not.

I doubt that I can provide references to this (other than the biological aspects of being a man :smile: ), but it is what I generally uphold.

BTW, if you're talking about awareness per se, though it can become a concept we as aware-beings become aware of and thereby think about, awareness of itself is nevertheless not a concept. This likely deviates from the thread's topic significantly, though

... unless one gets into the issue of whether awareness is of itself masculine or feminine ... to which I'd maintain something along the lines of it being neither but instead a perpetual hybrid of both: You can't have spatiotemporal awareness without any agency (yang), and spatiotemporal awareness is perpetually penetrated by information (yin) - both simultaneously. (I here specify "spatiotemproal" to allow for the metaphysical possibility of things such as the notion of Nirvana when construed as a non-spatiotermpral and nondualistic awareness - hence one which no longer wants/wills/etc. and no longer is penetrated by information.) But again, all this is awfully distant from the thread's intents.

One of the best things about children is that you get to reexperience the magic of the world through their eyes. — DifferentiatingEgg

As the song goes, it's good to be young at heart.

And what can we say about the superordinate concept imparting to ‘masculine’ and feminine’ their intelligibility? — Joshs

I don't understand what "the superordiante concept" might be. This in relation to the yin-yang. Here addressed as though it in fact occurs.

In the quote you gave, quite logically, everything that is is magic bar none. So then there is no such thing as a non-magical event or thing.

As to this:

I mean, when my will is moving my hand, I can call it "magic" according to Crowley's definition. I can also call it non-magic as I have a scientific explanation for it. — Quk

Is why one of Corwley's aphorisms is that "blowing your nose is magical".

The empirical sciences too, bar none, in this more formal definition of magic are nothing but .... magic: the causing of change in conformity to will - here, namely, or at least ideally, the will to gain better understanding of being at large and its specifics.

In the end everything can be called "magic" and "non-magic" as well. — Quk

What part of what I said would be "non-magic"? On a related topic, one can call a rose a "buffalo" but it's still going to be a rose.

I’ll do my best to stoke this fire.

There’s your definition of magic – that which is unexplainable – and then there's the more formal definition of magic, namely:

Aleister Crowley (1875–1947), a British occultist, defined "magick" as "the Science and Art of causing Change to occur in conformity with Will",[9] adding a 'k' to distinguish ceremonial or ritual magic from stage magic.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_(supernatural)

As to magic being the unexplainable, the very occurrence of being per se is devoid of explanation. Ergo, the whole of existence is then, in and of itself, pure magic. Ergo, magic occurs.

As to the referenced more formal definition of magic, it would only not occur were it to be metaphysically impossible that such a thing as “causing change to occur in conformity to the will” can occur. This being a bit of a catch-22: If you provide proof to evidence magic's impossibility, you will in effect be “causing change such that the results end up being in conformity to your will”, thereby validating the occurrence of magic thus defined.

Ta-da … :razz:

Men have been abusing women from the dawn of recorded history. I'm sure the abuse happend way before that. If you get a bunch of men and women together human nature is such that a non-trivial amount of men are going to violate the women. Tim wood thinks perhaps 100% of women can tell a story of sexual assault. I think he's right. All the women I know have horror stories about men. — RogueAI

While yet upholding my previous views as pertain to the very distant prehistory of our human species, I can’t find anything to disagree with in what you’ve written (humanity hasn't been purely hunter-gatherer long before recorded, or at least written, history began). To me it all pivots on the occurrence, else issue, of the inequity of power and the respect for other, or else the lack of these (in no particular order or correspondence). With these two aspects of value being, for better or worse, a mostly cultural aspect of our human species (hence, of its many races and individual ethnicities).

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:up: Agreed. But to emphasize this:

What’s striking about the Homo sapiens species of animal is that - unlike, for example, the often authoritarian hierarchies of chimpanzee tribe-cultures (they too pass on cohort-relative knowledge from generation to generation, with tool use and specific variations in facial expression as two examples of such cultural transmission) - Homo sapiens hunter-gatherer tribes tend to be of a largely egalitarian ethos (such that the general tendency is for every adult individual having a voice of roughly equal value as pertains to the governance of the tribe in total). With this quick reference speaking much to this effect:

The egalitarianism typical of human hunters and gatherers is never total but is striking when viewed in an evolutionary context. One of humanity's two closest primate relatives, chimpanzees, are anything but egalitarian, forming themselves into hierarchies that are often dominated by an alpha male. So great is the contrast with human hunter-gatherers that it is widely argued by paleoanthropologists that resistance to being dominated was a key factor driving the evolutionary emergence of human consciousness, language, kinship and social organization.[33][34][35][36]

Most anthropologists believe that hunter-gatherers do not have permanent leaders; instead, the person taking the initiative at any one time depends on the task being performed.[37][38][39] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunter-gatherer#Social_and_economic_structure

What I'm making is the more modest claim, that the feminine parts are strictly feminine and the masculine parts are strictly masculine. — fdrake

Since this is easy to reply to, I will: As you’ve expressed it, I myself don’t find anything to disagree with in what you’ve written.

(I was previously under the impression that you had found the publishing of an article, as single event, to be both masculine and feminine in total, this in a way that would result in a kind of logical contradiction, its gender thereby being dependent on the arbitrariness of the event’s description - this rather than being dependent on a conformity to either masculinity or femininity as a staple aspect of the addressed event in its given context of analysis.)

In which case, we then seem to be on the same page in terms of the publishing of an article, as a single event, being both feminine and masculine at the same time but in different respects, or else within different contexts of analysis - and this not founded on the arbitrariness of one’s descriptions but, instead, on the addressed event’s accordance (again, within a specific context of analysis) to the definition of masculinity or else of femininity.

But let me know if this apparent agreement is in fact a mistaken impression. And, if so, please do clarify where the disagreements reside.

I might add that rational problems emerge when eastern, and far more commonly western, interpretations of the yin and yang portray one as “good” and the other as “bad (or even evil)”. This can, for one primary example, occur in an improper juxtaposition of two otherwise unrelated system of symbolism regarding “light” and “dark”.

In a yin-yang context, “bad” can only be an (typically extreme) imbalance between the yin and the yang. Whereas “good” is an optimal balance between the feminine/yin and the masculine/yang. In respect to “light and dark”, here, sight is interpreted as allowing one the ability to discern obstacles and potential dangers, etc. – and functional sight, in this context, can neither occur in a world completely composed of light/yang in the complete absence of dark/yin nor, conversely, in a world fully composed of dark/yin in the complete absence of any light/yang. Optimally, functional sight requires a balance between the two.

This then will be an utterly different system of symbolism from the typical western symbolism wherein “light” translates into “wisdom - and hence both understanding and knowledge (to include regarding what is right / good)” and “dark” translates into “ignorance – hence the absence of understanding and knowledge (to again include regarding what is right / good)”. Here, in the western symbolism system, it is desirable for “light to conquer all darkness” – this then being good. (In parallel to the theme that only love can conquer hate.)

And in this interplay of symbolic systems, there then can on occasion result various associations wherein “masculinity / light / yang” is deemed “good” and “femininity / dark / yin” is deemed “bad”.

All that mentioned, I just want to draw attention to this sort of association (wherein yang is deemed good and yin bad) being – rationally speaking – in direct contradiction to what the yin-yang of itself symbolizes (even if one can find references of this from Eastern cultures). In this Eastern system of metaphysical understanding via symbolism, one then commonly obtains themes such as that of “the middle path or way (with pure yang and pure yin as the extremes between which the middle path obtains)” is optimally good and hence optimal goodness. But I’ll stop this short.

All this being a different issue to what “masculinity per se is”, but it does address potential takes on the value of masculinity (just as much as that of femininity).

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I'll be away for a while, btw.

Isn't it unavoidable. — fdrake

I haven’t pondered every nook and cranny of the concept, but in general:

I take the yin and yang to of themselves be a strict dyad, this just as much as one can’t have an up-direction without a down-direction and vice versa. In this (what we westerners term "metaphysical") sense, the yin and yang present a strict dichotomy, which is unavoidable. As the notion applies to things in the world, however, there appears to always be yang-in-yin and yin-in-yang when one looks closer into the issue – such that it becomes difficult if not impossible to give an example of something in the world that is completely yang or else completely yin.

I’ll use the examples of speech being masculine (on account of occurring due to active agency and of being penetrating) and of listening being feminine (on account of being generally passive and of it consisting of penetration).

The masculinity of speech will itself be contingent on feminine aspects of reality, such that it could not be without being endowed with these feminine aspects. Examples of this could include the requirement that the words spoken are passively allowed by the conscious speaker to be produced by the unconscious mind in accordance with the conscious speaker’s will (else one would be actively deliberating on every word, every intonation, and every volume of the speech, resulting in no speech being given). This just mentioned passivity required for speech to occur will then be an intrinsic aspect of the speech which is actively given. Here, then, there will be yin within the yang addressed.

As to the activity of listening, there can’t be any passive listening devoid of an active agency via which that heard becomes interpreted, an interpretation of that heard which could itself be, in at least some ways, rather penetrating; here, for example, maybe such that one’s interpretive faculties utilize one’s preexisting understandings to in some way penetrate that understanding received, this so as to assimilate this received understanding into one’s own total body of understanding. So understood, here, then, there will be yang within the yin addressed.

The being “too dichotomous” part – as far I so far interpret it – comes into play when one insists that, because the yin and yang are a strict dyad metaphysically, speaking then must be fully yang, fully masculine, such that femininity plays no part in it. Or else that listening is fully feminine, fully yin, such that masculinity, yang, plays no part in it.

So going back to this:

You can parse each of these transitions as inseminations or births, and flip the gender they count as. If your word spills on the page, you birth it from within you, blah blah. — fdrake

This would be so - a fully arbitrary call based on description rather then on definition - were there to be a strict dichotomy in the physical world (rather than only in the metaphysical) between givens that are full yang (hence, fully devoid of yin) and things that are fully yin (hence, fully devoid of yang). If one so dichotomizes the physical world's transitions in strict ways, then, whether a transition X is (fully) masculine or else feminine becomes arbitrary based on how one views or else describes it.

But, then, this would be overly dichotomous in relation to the givens that occur in the physical world, wherein yin-in-yang and yang-in-yin occurs. There is both yang and yin in both speech and listening. Nevertheless, because speech of itself as an overall actively penetrates the minds of those spoken to, it will be, on the plane of awareness or thought here specified, a masculine activity, an aspect of yang - this as per the definition of yang. Same, then, with listening: it will be feminine, an aspect of yin.

And as to transitions such as that of publishing an article, as previously addressed, they can be both masculine and feminine simultaneously but in different respects. Here nevertheless yet preserving the yin-in-yang and yang-in-yin principle.

The only thing we have at hand as listeners and readers is ink and sound. So how can anything be transmitted? — JuanZu

By one agent interpreting the ink and sounds' forms in addition to discerning whence they originated and thereby understanding the intentions of the agent(s) from which these inks and sounds were resultant. Most of which we're so accustomed to that it occurs pretty much in fully unconscious manners on what some term "autopilot mode".

Also by not espousing the particular species of materialism you seem to currently endorse - which seems to preclude the very possibility of this.

I have no problem with an intention being the cause of the characteristics of something written in ink. But it is one thing to be the cause and another to be the ghost in the ink or in the sound. Since the sound comes out of our mouth the intention is left behind. — JuanZu

For my part, I don't think its as easy as "leaving the intention behind" - this since it's the intention which is transmitted to another via the sound or ink or braille - but OK. We seem to at least agree in terms of the sounds, written letters, or braille patterns being intentionally caused by an agent, and this so as to transmit meaning from one agent to another.

Meaning and purpose to be exact. — Darkneos

OK. Got it. But it leaves me curious: how then is the following proposition in the OP to be interpreted in the context of "meaning and purpose are not different in any respect"?

With making meaning I don’t think you need purpose to do so. — Darkneos

(It might have been a slip of the tongue, in which case I could easily understand.)

If intentions and purposes were somehow in the ink (for me that is pure fantasy) there would be no possibility of misunderstanding. — JuanZu

One: Its not a physical attribute of the ink. The intentions are what caused the ink to have the shapes that it does. And so it is inferred from the ink's shapes. It is as much in the ink as might be a spark in an exploding dynamite.

Secondly: How do you reason there would be no possibility of misunderstanding were this to be so (again, as just described)?

Just in case I might be correct in my presuppositions, here is a more concise example to the contrary:

Instances such as slips of the tongue do occur. In instances such as this, one intends/means to communicate concept A but, because one’s unconscious impinges word Z instead of what would have appropriately been word X, the meaning which one in fact wants to express does not obtain. So, here, the use of the term does entail an intent, in this case the intent of one’s unconscious mind rather than of oneself as conscious mind, but the intention/meaning which one as a consciousness holds in mind nevertheless does not manifest.

This, again, being in line with “use presupposes intentioning, but intentioning can occur without use (in this case, use of terms)”

This to me being one example to illustrate that meaning and use – although most often unified – are in fact not one and the same thing. Again, such that use is dependent upon meaning, with the latter being intentioning.

It gets more complex when addressing language as constituted of commonly understood words, but the same point, I believe, would still remain. Although, again, in vastly more complex ways.

But I'll just stick to this one example of slips of the tongue to evidence my claim.

Effectively it is to me, especially since we are talking about language where use does determine use. We aren't talking about objects or anything else so your argument doesn't apply. — Darkneos

Let me clarify: the question in my previous post was strictly addressing the context of language.

Still doesn't change what I mean about two sides. — Darkneos

I was working on the presumption that you do not interpret meaning and use to be different in any respect. Is this correct?

You're intending to make use of something — Darkneos

That's what I mean, if we analyze this proposition: "Intending to make use" of something is not the same as "making use of something".

Here, "making use of something" is the intent, the goal, of the intending which has been addressed. Which, as an intending, might well not come to fruition, in which case one would not have succeeded in "making use of something" - even though one intended to do so.

Use of X presupposes intentioning, but intentioning "that one use X" can occur without X ending up being used.