I wonder to what extent such a non-dualistic viewpoint offers a solution to the split between materialism and idealism, as well as between atheism and theism. I am aware that there have been many debates on the topic on the forum. Also, there are various philosophical positions, including substance dualism and deism, so it is a complicated area. Here, in this thread, I am focusing on the idea of non-duality and asking do you see the idea as helpful or not in your philosophical understanding, especially in relation to the concept of God? — Jack Cummins

A thoughtful OP.

For me, non-duality is certainly helpful, if not pivotal, to my philosophical understandings. Yet this necessitates a very different perspective compared to mainstream views. Firstly, in the non-dualistic ontology which I hold onto there must - or at least should - be initially clarified different levels of reality (here more stringently interpreted as actuality): the realities/actualities that are strictly private to individual agents (e.g., the reality of the quality of what one experiences during an REM dream which one upon awakening does not share with any other; or, more broadly, the reality of what is nowadays termed one's personal umwelt - which to me currently seems incommunicable in whole); then there is the realities/actualities of mutually shared experiences or else of mutually shared information and interactions (e.g., the reality of languages, cultures, and relationships); then there is the globally singular reality/actuality of, in part, that information which is equally applicable to all coexistent agents (this being the reality of what we know of as physicality). These three distinct, though entwined, realities will however all be dualistic when technically appraised: if for no other reason, in all these there will occur a duality between self/selves and other. Then, finally, there is that reality which is non-dualistic in all conceivable senses. Maybe for obvious reasons, this ultimate reality is hard toward impossible to illustrate via examples - other than by introducing what are typically termed religious or mystical concepts found throughout cultures both past and present. But for the sake of this post, this non-dualistic ultimate reality is - at the very least for all intended purposes - logically identical to what in many a philosophy is termed the Good (Neo-Platonic notions of "the One" as just one instantiation). Once one adjusts to the notion that this ultimate non-dualistic reality is (for lack of better concise terminology) in fact the only reality that actually is in in the sense of being eternally permanent, or static, or fixed (and is thereby both uncreated and imperishable) - to further complicate matters, with this same non-dualistic ultimate reality being one and the same as an egoless awareness that is therefore utterly devoid of any limitations (the complexities of this here placed aside) which, nevertheless, comprises the very essence of any aware being - then one can then intellectually (but not experientially) look back upon the first three layers of reality previously addressed (all of them being dualistic) as a mixture of this ultimate non-dualistic reality (in the form of all co-occurringt instantiations of awareness) and the ultimately transient information it creates (either as individual agents/selves, or as societies, or, far more complexly, via the simultaneous co-occurrence of all agents/selves in the cosmos). I know this mouthful is here poorly expressed rationally, but I'm not here seeking to adequately justify my philosophical outlook, only to outline its key features. So, then, from the vantage of this non-dualistic ultimate reality, all duality will then be interpreted as various forms of maya/illusion. To include all three types of reality first expressed.

The more concise I make this outline, the more implausible or else gappy this worldview becomes. I know. But, again, I won't be expounding on what I find to be the rational consistency of this outlook in this post.

Nevertheless, once this perspective becomes comfortably upheld, one then can quite easily both have the cake and eat it too: Yes, all "form is emptiness" and there can be no thing as a self - this from the vantage of ultimate (and, in at least one sense, the only true/authentic) reality - while at the same time (but in a difference sense) fully acknowledging the truth of physicality and all that it encompasses (e.g., that there can be no living human mind if the human brain gets too badly injured or else perishes; that brain-operations fully correlate to the operations of mind - both pertaining to an individual human self which can quite safely affirm "I am" such that it is other than all which it is not (hence,forever being in a dualistic relation to the world as an I-ness/ego); and so forth). And one can likewise make sense of the Hindu notion of Brahman wherein all currently divided or else separate "witness consciousnesses" are constituents of the true, authentic, or else absolute Self of Brahman (here, though, the true self is utterly devoid of ego/I-ness). But to so comfortably interpret the just aforementioned, all four levels of reality/actuality previously mentioned need to be entertained.

I don't deem this philosophical perspective which I espouse to be either theistic or atheistic. Nor agnostic for that matter. But it is certainly non-physicalist. And it could be understood as one particular type of idealism - or else of neutral monism in so far as both mind and matter are deemed to equally be aspects of the comsic maya/illusion (which, again, shall always be dualistic).

And, as to the concept of God, God can mean many disparate things to different people. As one example of more Western beliefs regarding divinity, or else God, which can be fairly easily interpreted in non-dualistic manners is the Judaic notion of the Ein Sof that can be found in Kabbalah. But this or like notions proper are in no means anthropomorphic; God here is not an ego which creates or controls or determines or judges. Rather it is infinite (in the strictly literal, non-mathematical sense of "devoid of any limits whatsoever") awareness which holds no duality relative to anything other whatsoever yet - to here introduce Aristotelian terminology - "moves everything" despite being itself as infinite being utterly unmovable and part-less (divinely simple). To assimilate this in what I previously described of my own current philosophical perspective, this notion of God as just expressed is identical to the non-dualistic ultimate reality of the Good which I've previously mentioned. But express this same concept to most via the term "God" and most - from my experiences so far most Jews included - will wrongly assume you're thinking of a superlative and incorporeal ego that in some way or another controls everything. Which would be an utterly incorrect interpretation of what is being upheld.

Almost feel like apologizing for getting so personal into my outline of my own currently held beliefs. But then the OP does ask its leading question at a personal level.

Returning to the original topic, I do wonder how much of the success of anti-realism has to do with how people have learned to think of alternatives to it as being something like positing "objective values." The focus on "values" doesn't really fit with philosophy prior to the 19th century. In it's current usage, it's a term coming down from economics. Nietzsche seems to have been big in popularizing it, and I honestly think he uses the shift to "values" as a way to beg the question a bit in the Genealogy (to the extent that it assumes that the meaning of "good" has to do with valuation as opposed to ends). I'd agree that the idea of something being "valuable in-itself," is a little strange, since "value" itself already implies something of the marketplace, of a relative transaction or exchange. At the very least, it seems to conflate esteem with goodness, which essentially begs the question on reducing goodness to subjective taste. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In respect to this, I'd be happy to change my terminology, this in terms of my use of "value" in the context of ethics, if I thought it might be helpful in better conveying the concepts I wish to express. But I so far don't see any pragmatic reason to do so; despite being very open to change.

In today's lexicon, there is the whole branch of philosophical study of axiology, which by definition is the study of values, such that both ethics (and in some ways meta-ethics) and aesthetics are deemed subsets of axiology. In this and similar contexts, "value" is synonymous to "significance" in the sense of "the extent to which something matters and the type of quality of so mattering" (and, hence, in some ways synonymous to "importance"). As one further sub-example, in psychology the term "valence" is defined as "A one-dimensional value [emphasis mine] assigned by a person to an object, situation, or state, that can usually be positive (causing a feeling of attraction) or negative (repulsion)." (reference here). And, to further complicate issues, this just mentioned definition of valence could potentially also be interpreted in the mathematical sense of the term "value" - roughly, a quantitative and hence "mathematical object determined by being measured, computed, or otherwise defined" (reference)

I'm very sympathetic to how the term "value" can be easily interpreted in terms of marketplace exchanges and, hence, monetarily. I however find this pervasive association to be largely due to the materialistic metaphysics and quick to follow materialistic ideologies (to not here say "values") that pervade most societies today (as one possible example, the prioritizing of economy over politics; as yet another example, the thinking of success in terms of financial gains rather than in terms of intent-accomplishments).

So "intrinsic value" can well intend and thereby mean "a significance, or mattering, that has no instrumental utility but, rather, matters in and of itself to those agent(s) concerned". At least two potential examples come to mind: First, an agent's (well-)being will be of intrinsic value to the said agent; an agent's very own well-being holds no usefulness to the said agent but, instead, is that by which all usefulness to the agent is established. Secondly, for those who entertain the possibility of the Good, the Good too would then necessarily also be intrinsically valuable - and hence devoid of instrumental worth in accomplishing something else. And these two examples of intrinsic value certainly can have a lot to do with discussions regarding both ethics and metaethics - wherein multiple agents are at play.

I so far don't see any alternative terminology to that of "value" in today's world that would better serve the conveyance of these same ideas - this despite the term's many definitions and the audiences' tendency to be materialistic in its interpretation of the term. Do you?

Although I agree that the notion of "objective values" at the very least feels exceedingly misplaced.

But this is not a theory of truth. — apokrisis

The example wasn't intended as a theory or truth, but as an illustration of where I find the pragmatic theory of truth wanting (and, again, there are variations to it dependent of the system of pragmatism endorsed)

I am happy to have a technical discussion about epistemic method. If you want to talk about the social construction of everyday terms, that again is a quite different inquiry. No point mixing the two. — apokrisis

Hmm, my post pivoted around the issue of goodness, not around epistemic method.

I'd be happy if you'd answer at least some of the questions I've posed - granting that my latest post was somewhat long winded, I nevertheless did ask (at least a couple of) questions revolving around the issue of goodness throughout. But, of course, that's up to you.

Hey, my bad, just found myself with time to spare :smile: So I'll reply presently.

By some, sure, but how would this relate to the Good as that via which we, for one example, discern that a correct argument is good and an incorrect argument is bad? — javra


What else is pragmatism about as a ground for a theory of truth? — apokrisis

I see we analyze this issue via very different schemas. But to first answer your question:

Although more in depth answers would revolve around the pragmatic maxim, to answer in a single word: utility, of course. But then - that different variations of pragmatism as philosophy will address this same issue of truth differently aside - the implicitly maintained premises of this assertion have yet to be made explicit: utility to what or to whom? I here say, utility to that which seeks one or more as of yet unrealized outcomes to become manifest and hence actualized. But this directly revolves around that pesky set of terms you find problematic: "sentience" (literally, that which senses), "awareness", and the far more convoluted term of "consciousness". A rock (granting it is insentient, lacks any form of awareness, and hence holds no consciousness) will hence be in ownership of no truths. The pragmatic theory of truth, much like the correspondence theory of truth, will hence pivot on the occurrence of sentience. No sentience, no truths.

For the record, however, in a substantial number of cases I disagree with the pragmatist theory of truth. For one incomplete example, lies can be very pragmatic (in the sense of, "with a great deal of usefulness") when successfully enacted but are nevertheless not truths - even when they become believed as truths by the very same person which formally made the lie (this being one form of self-deception; e.g., many of Trump's statements and apparent beliefs). But this epistemological issue being for now overlooked:

This notion of pragmatic theory of truth neither addresses the question I've asked nor the substance of the OP. Utility - i.e, usefulness (to further make explicit what this implicitly denotes: useful to our accomplishing our goals/intents) - is itself to be deemed something good on what grounds? To better clarify via example, incorrect reasoning holds the potential to be exceedingly useful - everything from Orwellian propaganda to gaslighting and more. This then implies that incorrect reasoning is good when it is useful to satisfying the intents of, for example, tyrants, autocrats, oligarchs, despots, or authoritarians - specifically, it will be good for those just addressed (rather than those which they subjugate and manipulate via this incorrect reasoning). Yet this just addressed goodness of incorrect reasoning does not make the use of incorrect reasoning to subjugate and manipulate others (this in some respects often being a more complex form of lies told to benefit the ego of the liar, this by having those lied to hold untruths as truths) an ethical good. Or, for those of us who acknowledge global warming and its dire future perils: not changing to renewable energies is, and has always been, good (useful) for petroleum corporations, those who own stocks in petroleum, and those who value status quo stability above all else. But for those who view this usefulness as both shortsighted and egotistic, this same goodness (usefulness) is deemed to in fact be bad (if not outright evil, akin to what tobacco companies have been doing, but far worse).

I so far find nothing of physical entropy - or of physical negentropy - to ground what is deemed good, bad, or even useful for that matter. Instead finding these issues to be intimately grounded in the very nature of sentience, else awareness, else consciousness: in short, this globally applicable nature of sentience being the minimal incursion of suffering and the optimal obtainment of happiness in both short- and long-term time-spans.

You so far seem to disagree. On what grounds do you then justify good, bad, and utility resulting form the Second Law of Thermodynamics? More concretely asked, how does the Second Law of Thermodynamics constrain or else determine that incorrect arguments are bad rather than good even through they are (or at least can be) useful to those who espouse them?

Nature is its own self-balancing flow — apokrisis

That's one interpretation of what the nature of Nature is There are plenty others. I've even encountered those online who sustain that the term is utterly vacuous - this as some will say of the term "matter" (Thomas Huxley, who first coined the term "agnostic", here comes to mind) and yet others will say of the term "sentience".

It is not me that is defending good/bad as valid terms. — apokrisis

:lol: :smile: These staple terms are no more valid or invalid than any other staple term, "pragmatic" very much included. I think it's possible that you're overlooking much of what the terms good and bad signify in everyday use. You might not be stating that this just quoted affirmation of yours is good rather than bad, but via your apparently earnest expression of it you are nevertheless implicitly affirming your belief that the quoted statement is of a good, rather than bad, value - this to you if to no one else.

Besides, the very issue of this thread is the notion of pragmatism sans the Good. To which I can quote your previous affirmations regarding goodness - wherein you've addressed "good" as a valid term.

Using the word “control” was obviously a bad move on my part. You have seized on the same reductionist connotations to drag this discussion into what I see as irrelevancies. — apokrisis

OK, then please express what you intended by the term "control" so that it is not in line with the dictionary definitions I am so far aware of. Otherwise, the globalized notion you've expressed of "humans seek to control reality/Nature" is anything but irrelevant to the issues at hand.

If “good” is pragmatic balance, — apokrisis

I do not find "good" to be pragmatic balance tout court. To be both blunt and concise, I find "good" to be minimized suffering and optimal happiness/flourishing/eudemonia - maybe needless to add, of sentience, awareness, or else expressed consciousness.. And I find "the Good" to be a non-fairy-tale necessity for all forms of "good" wherein the "good" becomes quite literally perfected. The global constraint by which all instantiations of good are determined, so to speak. Else, that which constrains or else determines all actions to being either more good or less good. But yes, this so far seems to require a metaphysics quite distinct from that which you are advocating.

As to "good" being pragmatic balance between opposites, one could then state that an optimal balance between goodness and badness/evil (these two being opposites) is of itself optimally good. But this would be utterly nonsensical for more reasons than I think currently need expression. Taking the yin-yang of Taoism as one popularized example of balance as good, harmony between light and dark (etc.) is in and of itself a good that, supposedly, leads one to Wuji, this as "Wuji" was initially interpreted in the Tao Ta Ching - with Wuji being here possible to then interpret via Western notions as being "the Good". Imbalances between yin and yang lead one astray from closer proximity to Wuji and are thus always bad in due measure. But the yin-yang interpreted as a balance between good and bad will here make no sense whatsoever.

There is indeed the plasticity-stability balance as is modelled in neural network learning models and other models of neurocognition.

It is how brains are known to work. They must learn easily but also not learn too much - add too much destabilising novelty to their hard won memories, habits and skills all at once. — apokrisis

I'd say this is overly simplistic. Though more psychological than strictly philosophical, I've heard often enough among educational circles that cognitive dissonance, a form of psychological stress, is of significant benefit to learning. For example:

Meta-analysis of studies indicates that psychological interventions that provoke cognitive dissonance in order to achieve a directed conceptual change do increase students' learning in reading skills and about science.[60] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_dissonance#Education

So brains can well be argued know to best learn via the obtainment of cognitive equilibrium that ameliorates an actively engaged in cognitive dissonance. Without the cognitive dissonance, one simply maintains whatever beliefs one has and never gains any new perspective regarding life or reality at large. And the cognitive dissonance part is not easy.

So good/bad can be grounded in this larger thermodynamic view. That was my point. — apokrisis

By some, sure, but how would this relate to the Good as that via which we, for one example, discern that a correct argument is good and an incorrect argument is bad? More specifically, how does entropy (or even negentropy for that matter) account for the goodness or badness of particular reasoning?

Being in the flow is just being well balanced as you scoot down the slope on a pair of skis. — apokrisis

This in itself is not beyond question. But even so, the views I was referring to pertaining to what I termed "Nature" and you termed "reality" have very little to do with being in the flow. For instance, is Nature bad/evil that must be conquered or is Nature good and goodness that ought to be aligned with? This issue regarding control over nature has little if anything to do with being in the flow.

Words like sentience are a problem unless you can provide some pragmatic definition. — apokrisis

Together with words like awareness and consciousness I suppose. I'll skip this for the time being.

But anyway, if all things are in flux then that is how stability is what then evolves from that. — apokrisis

Why should stability be valued - aka be deemed good - to begin with? This question to me speaks far nearer to the heart (i.e. core) of the matter at hand.

The in jokes you've mentioned you hold regarding process theory aside, no process theory will affirm that absolute stability of physical being either is or is possible to begin with.

Have to cut this short for today. Will check back in tomorrow.

You are again freely strawmanning, inventing truths, putting words into my mouth that I've never spoken, spinning realities, whatever terminology best gets the point across. In this case, I only said that violence is a wrong in an ultimate sense from an ultimate vantage-point, but never that it is "prohibited". And I have neither the time nor the inclination to correct every strawman you've so far made.

[...]

… Which I can’t help but find intellectually dishonest. — javra


Ad hominem is what one often resorts to when they find themselves unable to address the arguments at hand. Clearly you've devolved into this state with abandon. You were doing much better towards the beginning of our conversation. Granted, the absurd things you claimed, which I have highlighted and specifically asked you to address, are indefensible, and so it's no coincidence that you refuse to defend them. But the intellectually honest person would simply retract such statements instead of playing the victim. — Leontiskos

Just remembered this old thread. You've edited your reply I see.

Anyways, as far as my (semi-) good name goes, to be clear, I here honestly expressed a blatant fact which I brought to your attention far more amicably previously: you've argued my argument contradictory after changing what I myself stated so that it becomes contradictory - rather than arguing against the very presentation I made as it was made verbatim. In case this needs to be mentioned, this is in no way an ad hominem, which is defined as follows:

Short for argumentum ad hominem: A fallacious objection to an argument or factual claim by appealing to a characteristic or belief of the person making the argument or claim, rather than by addressing the substance of the argument or producing evidence against the claim; an attempt to argue against an opponent's idea by discrediting the opponent themselves. — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/ad_hominem

As an example of what an ad hominem would be, were I to have stated that your rebuttals were those of a jerk and hence worthless, or worse as concerns your character, this would then have been an ad hominem.

I get that you might dislike me and all, and I'm sorry to see you being so sensitive to what I've stated, but replying to another's arguments integrally does not involve changing what the other states and then affirming that the other is then being self-contradictory due to the changes you've made to what they affirmed.

As before, go for it in terms of last words. I've grown a bit more thick skinned that way over the years. But no, I only stated the facts of the matter regarding your actions as I honestly saw them and as I've tried to succinctly evidence via quotes, this rather than engaging in personal attacks of your character as person so as to discredit your comments.

Glad to confirm that you do not sponsor the entailment which I so far see in you affirming, to restate the quote:

So from the Universe's point of view – to the degree it has one – entropification is good as a general goal as it allows the negentropic complexity that functionally accelerates that grand enterprise. A star is doing a cosmic solid in rounding up a dust of matter particles and wasting them to background radiation. It is a self-organising furnace serving the Second Law of Thermodynamics in a way that is "good" from the true pansemiotic point of view. — apokrisis

And I thought I was clear there is a difference between biosemiosis and pansemiosis. — apokrisis

You were. I am here applying what I take to be the implicitly maintained common sense interpretation that all of biosemiosis is taken to be fully governed by pansemiosis - hence, to be perpetually governed by the Second Law of Thermodynamics in part if not in full, this without exception.

Humans model their reality so as to control it. — apokrisis

Not all. Control of Nature is coveted by some. Others seek to be at one with Nature, often utilizing (consciously or otherwise) different metaphysical interpretations of Nature from those who view Nature as a given to be taken control of.

The Cosmos by contrast just is its own model. It does what it does. — apokrisis

Yet the Cosmos is constituted in part of sentient beings - rather than being in any way metaphysically ruptured from sentience. This, I so far find, is in full keeping with Peirce's perspectives: wherein all aspects of the physical Cosmos, all its natural laws fully included, are equated to an ever-evolving effete mind - an effete mind whose habits of being are themselves constituted from the activities of all co-existent sentient beings when addressed as a group. The two (biology and physicality) are in Peircean interpretations entwined, rather than distinct.

This misses the point that in the process philosophy point of view, all things are a balancing act. There is no such thing as "existence", just persistence. — apokrisis

Process philosophy as an umbrella school of philosophy tmk simply affirms that all things are in flux, hence that there is no thing(s) which is eternally stable. Which also brings to mind the view you seem to endorse that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is eternally stable, whereas Peirce would at the very least entertain the notion that this law of nature (here granting this human appraisal of what in fact is an unquestionable verity) too progressively evolved and yet evolves together with the evolution of the physical cosmos (i.e., of the effete mind).

If so, then your affirmation here is a reflection of your own personal proclivities rather than a defining factor of process philosophy. Hence, the notion of an absolute and absolutely stable balance between dyads, or opposites, is not a reflection of what the Good necessarily entails within process philosophy.

So the human pragmatic task is to define good as a balancing act within a realistic appreciation of that larger Cosmic (pansemiotic) context. — apokrisis

Two areas of disagreement:

First, this - because it by all means seems to affirm that all biosemiosis is governed by pansemiosis - yet either a) denounces any valid ontological occurrence of the Good which sentience ought to aspire toward or, else b) affirms that the Good is pansemiosis's very end-state, in which, in part, all awareness ceases to be, thereby again equating the objective Good to non-being (problematic for reasons mentioned in my previous post: it endorses means toward non-being in as quick a time-span as possible via, for example, suicide).

Secondly - and maybe in no way pertinent to the system of pansemiosis which you endorse - to give examples from ready present metaphysical systems: In everything from neo-Platonism to Buddhism wherein the end-state we all "ought to seek" is deemed to be beyond notions of existence and nonexistence - an end-state yet described as complete and perfect bliss and, hence, wherein awareness of bliss is yet necessarily present (even if necessarily devoid of any I-ness) - balance between ready occurring opposites is antithetical to the obtainment of, or else closer proximity to, the Good as these set of systems can be interpreted to appraise the term "the Good". Your system of pansemiosis then presents an ethics, or else morality, in which the ethics, or morality, endorsed by such models of reality are deemed incorrect, hence wrong, hence bad. And this entailment might not be what you yourself intend to specify.

[just edited the typos I've found]

First, assume for the sake of argument that Aristotle is right. There are things we can learn about the human good, and what will make us truly most happy/flourishing. Given this, who would prefer to be ignorant in this regard? Who would want to be profoundly misled about the nature of the world and themselves and to hold false beliefs that would make them unhappy? Would someone freely choose what they consider to be the worse? Would they intentionally choose to be unhappy? And here, I don't mean choosing between goods such that one is unhappy, but choosing to be unhappy simpliciter, to live what the person themselves would acknowledge to be an unhappy and unworthy life, a "bad life?"

I would say the answer to the above is no, which in turn seems to answer the question of "why should I do what is good?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

I find all this to be a very adequate assessment. Which is to say, :up: As a possible complexity, analytical issues could then emerge as to what the terms "unhappiness" or a "bad life" are supposed to indicate. Even if they make ample sense in any common sense approach. But yes, even the most diabolically evil of evildoers will always choose that option which they find, or else believe, is beneficial or favorable to them - hence, always choosing that which they (mistakenly or otherwise) find to be good in terms of their happiness and life - this rather than intentionally choosing outcomes they find, or believe, detrimental to their happiness or else quality of life. To my current understanding, the Good then being appraised as the end-point of life, else of awareness, wherein absolute (complete and perfect) benefit or favorability for oneself and all others becomes actualized.

So yes, I believe I'm in full agreement to you and the OP when I add that pragmatism devoid of an upheld notion of the Good (which is to be here understood as both universal and objective ultimate benefit or favorability) will be on a par to pragmatism devoid of any benefit-ability (or maybe better expressed "utility") and of any favorability. Or, more tersely saying the same thing, on a par to an im-pragmatic pragmatism.

So from the Universe's point of view – to the degree it has one – entropification is good as a general goal as it allows the negentropic complexity that functionally accelerates that grand enterprise. A star is doing a cosmic solid in rounding up a dust of matter particles and wasting them to background radiation. It is a self-organising furnace serving the Second Law of Thermodynamics in a way that is "good" from the true pansemiotic point of view. — apokrisis


But isn’t the implicit end-point of this process non-existence? The ‘heat death’ of the universe? — Wayfarer

I'd add to Wayfarer's term "non-existence", more specifically, the non-occurrence of any awareness via which value can obtain. If so, then this end-point of awareness's very non-being would in and of itself then constitute that which objectively is "the Good" - the objective Good in so far as it being that which ontically occurs as an ontically fixed end-point of awareness which is optimally favorable or beneficial to all sentience when all biases of awareness are removed.

But then, where the non-occurrence of one's self as that which is in any way aware to be claimed as the objective good in the "true pansemiotic point of view", this would then rationally run directly contrary to all aspects of life which seek a continuation of awareness: everything from self-preservation to greater, else deeper, understanding regarding the nature of Nature. And, since the nihility of all awareness (including all forms of awareness regarding personal being and of values) is here deemed the unbiased, and hence objective, Good, the upholding of this quoted claim then rationally reduce to nihilism regarding anything which is of benefit to life - for the continuation of life is the counter to the objective Good as it has just been specified - and likewise rationally reduces to the yearning for non-life (else non-being) as the end-point of awareness-endowed being.

This is a somewhat more formal way of saying that the quoted assumption rationally endorses the cessation of life and all entailed awareness as that which is objectively Good. Couple this with a faith in the lack of any type of afterlife and, in a nutshell, the quoted perspective rationally reduces to an endorsement of suicide in as short a time-span as possible as the absolute Good to be striven for (this then being the end-state of non-being actualized).

If my tersely outlined reasoning here is mistaken, I'm sure I'll be shown the error of my reasoning by more rational musings regarding this issue of what the Good consists of.

Are you equating these models to what science in essence is? If you are, you then seem to disagree with my appraisals of what empirical science consists of. No biggie, but I am curious. — javra

More playing devils advocate here. Course, its not too far from the Stanford Encyclopedia article's on science to think that true scientific explanation is to be found in visual analogical modeling. — substantivalism

Just saw these posts. Just in case you'll revisit the website ...

Instead of inadvertently getting bogged down with the details of interpretation, I'll try to simplify my pov in the following way: For there to be modeling, or else interpretation, in the first place, there first needs (as in necessity) to be empirical data to be modeled, else interpreted. Yes, science engages in modeling via which interpretation of data occurs. But what I'm attempting to express first and foremost is that the empirical sciences proper, via its use of the scientific method, collects empirical data in as an objective manner as currently fathomable to us humans. Models and interpretations that do not account for all data thereby accumulated - or worse, that logically contradict this data in total or in part - will be deemed falsified. As a crude example easy to gain accord upon, the theory that Earth is geometrically flat is one such model via which our communal empirical data can become interpreted. Or, more exotic, so too is the theory that planet Earth is hollow and inhabited by sapient beings in its core (which I have heard people address). These models are wrong, i.e. incorrect, only because they fail to account for all commonly shared or else commonly accessible empirical data and on occasion directly contradict it.

The empirical sciences as means of (relatively) objective data acquisition has almost nothing whatsoever to do with mathematics - especially when addressing mathematical modeling. And the latter would be nonexistent in complete absence of the former - at the very least epistemologically.

Science (by which I here mean the scientific-method-utilizing empirical sciences) does not, and cannot, fail as our optimal means of obtaining unbiased empirical knowledge regarding what perceptually is.

It is the second aspect of science - that of finding optimal explanations for this same data just addressed (what in philosophy is termed "explanatory power") - that you seem to me to be by in large addressing. Modeling of data assumes some interpretation of said data, and thereby already entails at least some rudimentary explanation even before these models are applied for the sake of obtaining even more empirical data. But again, when the models fail to account for all data obtained, or else contradict the data, the models are then known to be wrong ... our human predilection to hold onto those explanations that are familiar and ingrained in us notwithstanding. (The flat-Earther, just as much as any Young Earth Creationist, will discern the contradictions with data but will yet maintain their model of the world at all costs, often resulting in fabulated truths that attempt to reshape the data so as to fit the held onto model. But, again, it is precisely because this occurs that these two modelings of the world are considered non-scientific.) Otherwise, two or more disparate models that account for the same data without willfully neglecting some of the data or else contradicting it will then all be in play as viable possibilities as to what might in fact be the case.

Is there any major disagreement in what I've so far expressed as pertains to science?

(p.s., in case I don't hear back from you relatively soon, it might be a while till I again reply)

Despite spending time on the forum, you’ve chosen to make your reply rather late. The weekend has now passed, and I now have real world duties in need of tending.

Some parting observations:

In proclamations such as

Again, you have said that violence is prohibited because it treats another person as a means. — Leontiskos

You are again freely strawmanning, inventing truths, putting words into my mouth that I've never spoken, spinning realities, whatever terminology best gets the point across. In this case, I only said that violence is a wrong in an ultimate sense from an ultimate vantage-point, but never that it is "prohibited". And I have neither the time nor the inclination to correct every strawman you've so far made.

In your primary counter, you are conflating the end aimed at of “the Good”, however you prefer to imperfectly exemplify it (you’ve so far alluded to it being an unobtainable utopia of no real consequence), with the means toward approaching it (this assuming one deems the Good as their primary purpose to begin with) as though the Good were somehow already obtained.

In your equating of right/good action to necessary action you, for example, remove all choice from the equation, which leads to a plethora of logical complications as regards moral issues. Yes, the words you put into other people’s mouths matter.

And you have chosen to ignore both of the following:

I'm curious as to what references or arguments you have that dispel the argument this paper makes. — javra

You so far seem dead-set against the use of any measure of controlled violence in any context whatsoever, thereby, for example, condemning all police officers all all soldiers to immorality ... as though such ought to be viewed as evil rather than, at least on occasion, heroic. If I am, to what extent am I wrong in this appraisal? — javra

… Which I can’t help but find intellectually dishonest.

Thanks again for an interesting debate.

The main problem with your interpretation is that none of the texts that you have provided support it, and this is because Kant is explicit that the "Kingdom of Ends" is only an ideal, or in your quote, "merely possible." If it were more than an ideal and it were—as you seem to conceive it—an actualizable utopia, then all of the problems I have pointed out would come to bear. In that case the utopian end-state would be liable to justify the sort of violence you have in mind, all in order to achieve it. — Leontiskos

To address this first point you make that Kant's notion of a Kingdom of Ends is only (an inconsequential?) ideal, this parer, which I previously referenced, argues otherwise. An excerpt from "III. Politics and the Ultimate Goal of Human History":

A cursory reading of these essays is sufficient to reveal that Kant's interest in political his­tory was an in­tentional application of his overall Transcendental Perspective[17] to the final (i.e., ultimate) problem of the end or destiny of the human race. The essays rarely give an account or inter­pre­tation of any specific historical events. Instead, as their very titles suggest, they pose ques­tions about the necessary form of human history, such as: What was the "Conjec­tural Beginning of Human History"? (1786), "What is Enlighten­ment?" (1784), "...Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" (1798), and What is "The End of All Things"? (1794). Kant's goal, in other words, was to discover an "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective" (1784) which could bring "Perpetual Peace" (1795) to humanity through a full realization of the highest good. — Palmquist, Stephen (October 1994) 'The Kingdom of God Is at Hand!' (Did Kant Really Say That?). History of Philosophy Quarterly. 11 (4): 421–437. ISSN 0740-0675. JSTOR 27744641

I'm curious as to what references or arguments you have that dispel the argument this paper makes.

According to your source such interpretations are certainly atypical, deviating from the received view. Still, none of the sources you cite are promoting your view that it is necessary to resort to violence to bring about a Kingdom of Ends. That strikes me as a grievous departure from Kant. — Leontiskos

I find that you, inadvertently or not, have often strawmanned the arguments I've make. Which makes this conversation with you quite unpleasant. For example, I don't recall every saying "it is necessary to resort to violence" but only that the use of violence within certain contexts can be the right/good thing to do as a means of optimally approaching the Good - "necessity" having nothing to do with it. This in comments such as the following:

Again, given the exact same distal intent of, say, minimizing harm and maximizing harmony, the use of violence as means of obtaining this very same distal intent can be simultaneously right in proximal application (wherein far greater harm/disharmony is thereby avoided) and yet remain wrong in distal terms (for an absolute harmony cannot be of itself produced via violence); — javra

I am furthermore not in this thread regurgitating Kant's thoughts. But have instead made reasoned argument for oughts and ought nots given an intended proximity to the Good as ultimate end, for which Kant's notion of the Kingdom of Ends was intended to serve only as one possible example among others.

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You so far seem dead-set against the use of any measure of controlled violence in any context whatsoever, thereby, for example, condemning all police officers all all soldiers to immorality ... as though such ought to be viewed as evil rather than, at least on occasion, heroic. If I am, to what extent am I wrong in this appraisal?

To minimize harm and maximize harmony is obviously not the same as treating everyone as an end in themselves. — Leontiskos

While I'm waiting for your reply: This quote addresses means, but not the stipulated end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony" which, as end pursued, would be more properly expressed as "a state of being wherein harm is minimal, if at all yet present, and harmony is maximal, if not ubiquitously applicable". An idealized future state of being as that intended which, by my best appraisals of your previous statements, you deem to be different in nature to that state of being Kant terms "the Kingdom of Ends". *

But again, I'm waiting to discern what you interpret Kant to mean by the term "Kingdom of Ends" ... such that it, as realm of being, is not equivalent to a realm wherein minimal harm and maximal harmony is actualized.

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*

While I know this is in no way definitive, here is an online reference I picked up from Wikipedia which, in short, addressed Kant's Kingdom of Ends as the ultimate goal of humanity. Here is Wikipedia's summary of it:

In his writings on religion, Kant interprets the Kingdom of God as a religious symbol for the moral reality of the Kingdom of Ends. As such, it is the ultimate goal of both religious and political organization of human society.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Ends#Overview

That presented, potentially far more importantly, here are excerpts from the SEP article "Kant's Moral Philosophy; 14. Teleology or Deontology?". To keep things short, following are first sentences from the last three paragraphs of the section:

A number of Kant’s readers have come to question this received view, however. Perhaps the first philosopher to suggest a teleological reading of Kant was John Stuart Mill. In the first chapter of his Utilitarianism, Mill implies that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative could only sensibly be interpreted as a test of the consequences of universal adoption of a maxim. [...]

There are also teleological readings of Kant’s ethics that are non-consequentialist. Barbara Herman (1993) has urged philosophers to “leave deontology behind” as an understanding of Kant’s moral theory on the grounds that the conception of practical reason grounding the Categorical Imperative is itself a conception of value. Herman’s idea is that Kant never meant to say that no value grounds moral principles. [...]

It is of considerable interest to those who follow Kant to determine which reading — teleological or deontological — was actually Kant’s, as well as which view ought to have been his. A powerful argument for the teleological reading is the motivation for Herman’s proposal: What rationale can we provide for doing our duty at all if we don’t appeal to it’s being good to do it? [...] — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#TelDeo

My main point to these quickly produced references being, what you have taken to be "my view" is neither idiosyncratic nor original in its analysis of Kantian ethics.

(Still interested in what you interpret Kant's Kingdom of Ends to signify to Kant.)

Therefore your question makes no sense to me. — Leontiskos

Got it.

And according to you in which way does Kant use the term Kingdom of Ends?

Your answer does not answer my question, but instead seeks to analyze Kant's true intentions.

There are quotes such as:

Act according to maxims of a universally legislating member of a merely possible kingdom of ends.
— Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

But the issue remains.

What is the difference between the end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony" and Kant's Kingdom of Ends?

Means toward the end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony." — Leontiskos

And how do you view this stipulated end as differing from Kant's Kingdom of Ends?

Now if you rewrite your system and say that you're only trying to "minimize harm and maximize harmony," then these two things which were formally ends now become means. — Leontiskos

OK, If indeed now only means, means toward what?

Here is what I said:

The problem is that your system contains internal contradictions, and framing Kantianism in terms of consequence-ends is already a contradiction that Kant would not have accepted. These contradictions are producing further contradictions, such as the idea that violence is compatible with a "Kingdom of Ends." — Leontiskos — Leontiskos

Am I mistaken in understanding the quote to conclude that my arguments make use of contradictions? And does not a contradiction require that incongruent givens simultaneously occur in the same respect?

As to Kant’s Kingdom of Ends not being an intent (hence: aim, end, or else intended consequence) that Kant endorsed via his system of deontology … I do find great difficulties in accepting this position as true, rather finding this very position as contradictory to Kant’s very affirmations.

So, for example, on your scheme violence is simultaneously right and wrong. It is right qua survival and it is wrong qua using-another-as-a-means. The problem is that your principles are not necessarily in sync, and in certain cases they oppose one another (and lead to perplexity). So you could do what most perplexity-views do and weight your principles, but before that you would need to admit that you have two principles in the first place (i.e. that "survival" is distinct from a prohibition on violence).

It doesn't matter that something is not right and wrong in the same respect; such is not needed to produce perplexity. It only matters that something be simultaneously right and wrong. — Leontiskos

Perplexity does not equate to the occurrence of contradictions, which is what I addressed. Moreover, most who will uphold that the use of violence is in an ultimate sense wrong/bad will be in no way perplexed when watching an action movie as to whether it is right/good for the police officer or soldier to rescue the innocent captive from the terrorist via the controlled use of violence or threat of violence. In parallel, this just as most will not find anything perplexing about a firefighter setting controlled fires so as to combat an arsonists fire. Furthermore, neither of these two examples require competing goals, instead being quite possible to accomplish via the one intent of minimizing harm.

I’ve already explained how this can occur, but you so far seem to deem those explanations to invoke contradictions. Yet an affirmation of X does not of itself justify X being true. And I so far find no contradictions in what I’ve previously stated: Again, given the exact same distal intent of, say, minimizing harm and maximizing harmony, the use of violence as means of obtaining this very same distal intent can be simultaneously right in proximal application (wherein far greater harm/disharmony is thereby avoided) and yet remain wrong in distal terms (for an absolute harmony cannot be of itself produced via violence); therefore being simultaneously right and wrong but in different respects.

And again, I so far don’t see much point to further debates on this matter due to the impasses between us just expressed.

Our ability to reason, feel, understand, experience the world in all its qualitative richness is a matter for analysis entirely beyond the reach of evolution in a qualitative analysis. — Astrophel

I can very much respect this point of view in certain respects - especially when it comes to interpretations such as those of Social Darwinism. Nevertheless, I could present the case that the metaphorical bouncer at the bar is the constraints of objective reality itself, such that that life with is most conformant to objective reality (else least deviates from its requirements) will remain present to the world. But I'm not sure if this very abstract way of thinking about evolution is a worthwhile avenue to here investigate - especially since it makes use of the notion of an objective world which, on its own, can be a very slippery thing to identify. Yet tentatively granting this, it will be true that the possibilities of what can be will be qualitatively indeterminant, but this only in so far as these myriad possibilities nonetheless yet sufficiently conform to objectivity. Hence, as one physiological example, why there has never been an animal with binocular vision whose eyes are vertically (rather than horizontally) aligned: such positioning would be contrary to the objective world's constraint of needing to optimally detect stimuli against the horizon (best short example I could currently think up).

I've also just posted to Wayfarer. The second paragraph in that reply, to me at least, presents the case that some of what makes us human is intimately entwined with our evolution from other primates. This, namely, as per our human smile. Curious to know what you make of it.

Or maybe none of those questions are scientific questions per se but philosophical questions prompted by scientific discoveries. — Wayfarer

I will second this affirmation. One’s either consciously held or else unconsciously maintained metaphysical presuppositions will guide how one makes sense of the empirical data regarding evolution. Yes, there’s the Young Earther museums where humans are depicted as cohabiting Earth with dinosaurs but, more seriously, the very issue of whether there is any real stochasticity in the cosmos will in turn determine whether one believes either that evolution could only have resulted in the lifeforms that it has or, otherwise, that evolution could have resulted in a tree of life very different to the one we currently know of. Likewise, whether or not evolution tends toward any certain end will in large part be contingent on whether one finds a teleological cosmos at all possible, which is an issue of philosophy rather than of science.

One point I will note, is that the strictly scientific attitude to h. sapiens treats them - or us - as another species, as an object of scientific analysis. Which is fine, as far as it goes, but when that begins to serve as the basis for philosophical or (anti)religious ideologies then it oversteps the mark, and where the science begins to morph into scientism: — Wayfarer

Very true. I nevertheless yet find natural selection to be very intertwined with much of the human phenotype, behavioral as well as physiological. As an undergraduate I did some independent research (with human participants) regarding the evolutionary history of human non-verbal communication via facial expressions. Specifically, back then there was a prevalent notion among ethologists and cognitive scientists alike that the human smile evolved from out of the primate fear-grimace (in short, we smile so as to show fear and thereby appease those we smile to, taking away presumptions of aggression, and thereby reinforcing friendships). The experiments I conduced gave good reason to support the conclusion that our human smile evolved from the primate play-face (in short, an exposing of weapons (for primates these being teeth and esp. canines) in playful mock-aggression—basically, this with the intent of expressing “I’ve got you’re back” when done not as a laugh but as a sincere smile). The details will not be of much use here (though I relish them), but the issue remains: either way, our human smile (and, for that matter, all our basic and universally recognizable human facial expressions) evolved from lesser primate facial expressions, and together with the expressions so too the emotions thereby expressed. Although this does not play into human’s far superior magnitudes of cognition, it does illustrate just how intimately many a defining feature of being human is associated with our biological past from which we’ve evolved as a species. Hard to think of a more prototypically cordial human image than that of a smiling face.

Buddhism actually has a rather strange and not very well known creation story. — Wayfarer

Thanks for that!

There is of course many a diverse creation myth worldwide that explains the origins of the world as it currently is, often via what is relative to the culture some form of axis mundi. Still, to the best of my current knowledge, only in the West are there creation myths regarding the origin of existence of itself, this so as to affirm that time had a beginning. There’s the primordial Chaos of Ancient Greco-Roman religions and, or course, the Abrahamic religions’ notion of creation ex nihilo by a supreme incorporeal psyche that dwells beyond time. (Both in terms of how they are commonly interpreted.) I’m so far thinking the two creation myths of Buddhism you’ve addressed yet present a beginningless eternity of time? Please let me know if you know them to be otherwise … such that they specify a beginning to time's occurrence. Interesting stuff to me.

This corresponds to 'no edges' (in space). If existence (i.e. everything that exists) is the effect, then its cause (i.e. origin) is non-existence (i.e. nothing-ness that is also the absence of any conditions for any possibility of existence) – which is nonsense, no? — 180 Proof

Well said.

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As a general apropos to possible religious/spiritual views, Buddhism, for one example, has had this creed of "no origin" for a few millennia now.

Right - but isn’t there some sense in which even the simplest life forms act intentionally? Not consciously, of course - but a living thing by definition seeks to maintain itself and continue to exist. So I wonder if in some abstract sense whether that adds up to a very primitive intentionality. — Wayfarer

Yes, good point. This is where philosophical issues enter the picture ... the problem of other minds applied to real world applications regarding lesser lifeforms, this all the way down to prokaryotic monocellular organisms. And once you get to this juncture, there then is no rationally easy divide between monocellular organisms and the individual somatic cells of a multicellular organism, to include individual neurons to boot.

I've read Thompson's Mind in Life, but don't recall him addressing intentions per se. Maybe someone else with better recollection can chip in here.

In short, however, though I have my biases of opinion which lead me to the conclusion that there is at the very least some minuscule measure of intentionality in all life, I don't know of any means to properly justify this. Again, it relates to the problem of other minds as pertains to lifeforms whose awareness types are quite alien to us.

I will however say that I cannot conceive of intention occurring devoid of an intended goal, this as done by a consciousness or not. The two - an intention and its intent - go together like "unmarried" and "bachelor". And this intending of a goal, to me at least, necessitates forethought of one type or another - however alien such forethought might be to our own - and, hence, as per Thompson, some at least rudimentary kind of mind. Ameba can, for one extreme example, be observed to behave in such manners: intending to consume smaller amebas as their prey and to avoid larger amebas as their predators, and exhibiting forethought regarding what they perceive as other in the process - obviously, this devoid of any CNS. (Ameba have also be evidenced capable of learning new behaviors, which again to me logically necessitates some form of forethought.) But, also obviously, this is far removed from modern day consensus on what in fact is the case.

With all that stated, I'll also mention the following for the kick of it: I have at times pondered the possibility that the very primitive intentionality you've addressed might conceivable occur within every single neuron building new synapses for the sake of stimulation and nourishment. Such that the neuron's nucleus holds some, again, exceedingly primitive intentional role in the firing of its axon subsequent to sufficient dendritic stimulation. On one hand is sheer sci. fi., but on the other it's one extreme of where this allowance for all life being in some way intention-endowed, and thereby intentional, goes.

I've rambled a bit, but in my defense its very late at night where I'm at. :smile:

Then I invite you to consider that evolution is in essence entirely "accidental". — Astrophel

That all evolution is in essence entirely accidental is a mischaracterization of evolution via natural selection. In short, NS is the favoring of certain varieties of lifeforms by natural constraints—such that this metaphorical favoring by Nature is itself not a matter of chance. The following is a more longwinded but robust explanation that to me amounts to the same:

Natural selection is the differential survival and reproduction of individuals due to differences in phenotype. It is a key mechanism of evolution, the change in the heritable traits characteristic of a population over generations. Charles Darwin popularised the term "natural selection", contrasting it with artificial selection, which is intentional, whereas natural selection is not.

Variation of traits, both genotypic and phenotypic, exists within all populations of organisms. However, some traits are more likely to facilitate survival and reproductive success. Thus, these traits are passed onto the next generation. These traits can also become more common within a population if the environment that favours these traits remain fixed. If new traits become more favored due to changes in a specific niche, microevolution occurs. If new traits become more favored due to changes in the broader environment, macroevolution occurs. Sometimes, new species can arise especially if these new traits are radically different from the traits possessed by their predecessors.

The likelihood of these traits being 'selected' and passed down are determined by many factors. Some are likely to be passed down because they adapt well to their environments. Others are passed down because these traits are actively preferred by mating partners, which is known as sexual selection. Female bodies also prefer traits that confer the lowest cost to their reproductive health, which is known as fecundity selection. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_selection

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Are you saying the random mutation of genes that leads to superior survival and reproduction is intentional in some way?? — Astrophel

While @wonderer1 will speak for himself, for my part, not everything that can be teleological will necessarily be intentional, i.e. due to the intentions of agents. Gene mutations, here assuming a teleological cosmos to begin with, will then be an example of such.

That stated, the more intelligent the lifeform the less genotype will play a direct role in the lifeform’s successful survival and reproduction—and, by extension, in natural selection. It is not genotype but phenotype (which will include behavior, and which is heavily dependent on environmental history, typically coined “nurture”) that determines which carnivore gets to eat sufficient herbivores so as to then reproduce, and which herbivore gets to sufficiently evade carnivores so as to then reproduce. And the more intelligent the phenotype, the more intentions will play a significant role in this very process wherein certain varieties of lifeforms are favored by natural constraints.

As to different varieties of lifeforms emerging from intentions, there is sexual selection at play in the animal kingdom (as well as in at least some plants and fungi) and, more recently, it’s been proposed to occur in bacteria as well. Wherever one deems for intentions to start in the evolutionary tree, intentions will then logically play a role in evolution via sexual selection—this such as in terms of which variations of lifeforms get to come about in the next generation.

If someone had constant thoughts and fantasies about raping, torturing, killing etc people that they may or may not enjoy but were perfectly moral in the real world (either for its own sake or from fear of consequences of acting on said fantasies) is it reasonable to describe such thoughts as evil?

What about describing the person as evil in nature even if they never act on them?

Is this a sound moral judgement or just thought crime? — Captain Homicide

I find that the OP muddles the issue by not differentiating between different types of thoughts a consciousness can be aware of.

Regardless of where one stands on the issue of causal determinism, thoughts tout court can and should be minimally classified into two varieties: a) those of one’s own mind that appear to one as a consciousness involuntarily and b) those that one as a consciousness voluntarily enforces within their own mind if not also at least in part creates. Memories, for one example, take on this dichotomy: some are involuntarily remembered (as one extreme, such as can occur in post-traumatic stress disorder where the consciousness remembers things even though not wanting to so remember), and some are voluntarily searched for and thereby brought up to consciousness, i.e. are voluntarily re-called.

Involuntary thoughts can in turn then generally be voluntarily reinforced or else voluntarily shunned. One has a negative involuntary thought X; does one succumb to it and thereby consciously endorse it or else deem it bad/wrong and thereby distance oneself from it?

To deem this very choice-making (be it one of free will or not)—choices regarding which thoughts are right/good and thereby to be upheld and which are wrong/bad and thereby to be discarded—irrelevant to issues of morality is to maybe all too inadvertently remove all a psyche’s conscious intentions as to what ought to be from all accounts of ethics. And—for one example—without intentions mattering ethically, there could then be no ethical difference between justifiable homicide, manslaughter, and outright murder.

Otherwise, the thoughts one voluntarily chooses to think and thereby endorses are a staple aspect of what one is morally responsible for. Especially when considering that thoughts regarding what one ought to do predispose one for so voluntarily doing. So that the person with recurrent involuntary bad thoughts that voluntarily rebels against all such will be virtuous in character, whereas the person which voluntarily reinforces the involuntary thought of, for example, “I ought to kill all people of type A because they look funny” will not be (even if their circumstances never result in their so murdering).

Other examples could be given, but I so far think they all can be addressed in manners just expressed. In short, the thoughts we endorse are voluntarily, intentionally, upheld by us. And our intentions matter ethically in what we are, do, and become.

If not evil then what term should we use? Deviant? — Captain Homicide

Though I can understand the usage of "evil" in certain contexts, I’m not big on the term. How about “harmful”—and thereby wrong and unethical.

Ah. That explains that then. Thanks.

I agree with much of your post in regard to the issue of evolution. But I would like to verify what you interpret by the term "Deism".

Are you using a different sense of the term than that of the proverbial God as watchmaker—such that the whole of the universe is equivalent to a watch which, once built, is then left to operate on its own devices?

I ask because this just specified sense of Deism so far appears to me to alight to this metaphysical position:

Only in the post-Reformation world where nature is essentially a distinct, subsistent entity and God is no longer being itself does it make sense to talk about the creation of man as a sort of Humean miracle where God acts in creation in a sui generis manner that is distinct from God's acts in nature. In such a view, God is less than fully transcedent and becomes an entity that sits outside the world. In this view, God is to some degree is defined by what God is not, and indeed is defined in terms of finitude (Hegel's bad infinite), and this also causes follow on problems for the interaction of freedom and Providence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Whereas, were Deism to be understood as strictly addressing the belief that "God/Divinity can be know through reason alone and that revelations should be shunned as evidence", this so far seems to me to be utterly nondescript, for it can then encompass most anything theistic: e.g., everything from monotheism to pantheism, if not even animism, can thereby then be validly claimed to be forms of Deism. But this so far doesn't seem right to me. Or am I not understanding the issue properly?

The theological equivalent to "sognaresexual" and "herstory". — Lionino

You've never read Venus on the Half-Shell, then?

As was told, the protagonist who wants an answer to "why are we birthed only to suffer and die?" at long last arrives on that planet where God lives. The inhabitants of that planet, God's favorite creatures, these being beer-drinking giant cockroaches of extreme intelligence, inform the protagonist that God decided to forget himself a long time ago and that now no one knows where he's at. So the protagonist's question gets answered by the leader of the cockroach bunch instead with, "Well, why not?".

The best take on Deism I've so far come to know.

I'm really curious what the thinkers here think of evolution. — flannel jesus

I believe I’m most certainly an outlier, but I’ll answer the question just the same.

In short, evolution happened naturally, such that Nature itself is thoroughly teleological in its nature (I’ll, however imperfectly, lean on Aristotelian metaphysics for this affirmation). Given any system of what is now commonly enough termed “panpsychism”, this naturally occurring, teleological evolution then occurred since the commencement of the current cosmos long before life came into being (here granting a Big Bounce model of the universe). It’s very cumbersome to properly explain via justifications, but there you have it.

I didn’t select the first option due to the implicit differences in what Nature is deemed to entail: namely, modern day naturalism will tend to associate teleology with the supernatural, which is distinctly different than the position I endorse regarding Nature’s immanent characteristics.

That said, neither does this perspective fit into any of the other options, including the third option. Rather than being guided by a superlative psyche, evolution is pivotally guided by natural constraints in conjunction with the will of all beings (which thereby actively undergo the process of evolution). For one example, in sexual selection, lifeforms' choices regarding mates (this in tune with Darwin’s own works) will “guide” the outcomes of evolution in conjunction with natural constraints on what can and cannot be—such that each such individual lifeform is then “a being (of varying degrees of intelligence) that guides the trajectory of evolution” (akin to being a drop of water in an ocean, from which the ocean itself is constituted). This metaphorical ocean consisting of the total sum of all coexistent lifeforms being—either genotypically or, for me far more importantly, phenotypically—that via which variations emerge; with these variations again being culled, or selected for, by what in ultimate appraisals are universal constraints.

I’m not here intending to argue for all this. Just wanted to address the curiosity regarding different vantages on the issue of evolution.

As for the idea of political correctness as a 'horror show', I am wondering who determines what the horror is exactly? I am not saying that I am in favour of the rigidity of political correctness in language, but I do think that language sensitivity matters in day to day life. — Jack Cummins

Political correctness as concept has always been problematic for me. This because it can be all too easily used in Orwellian manners by antisocial people to further uphold their antisocial behaviors and creeds. Here’s one definition of “political correctness”:

1. (uncountable) Avoidance of expressions or actions that can be perceived to exclude, marginalize or insult people who are socially disadvantaged or discriminated against. — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/political_correctness

While it is certainty true that it is impossible to enforce via coercion a commonly upheld ideal of closer proximity to a peaceful, loving, and understanding society, the converse of this very ideal would be closer proximity to a society of unending conflicts, hatreds, and misapprehensions. And without some societally imposed constraints, the latter could well overtake a society in a short enough timespan.

In one parallel, without societal constraints on the killing of other humans, murderers would greatly increase in number at the detriment of the society’s wellbeing in general.

No, insulting, laughing down upon with malice in one’s heart, or else dehumanizing a minority does not equate to a murdering of the minority in question. But, then, what is the difference between the boogieman of political correctness and a social decency enforced via non-legal means by a majority of the societies citizens?

Here’s one concrete example: There is no law (in the USA, at least) against a white person terming an African American a n*gger. But it’s decent not to do so. And this decency, at present at least, tends to be emphasizes as a good to be held onto by the majority (as well as via most of current media, political norms, etc.)—such that not following this decency is greatly frowned upon and (as can be the case with saying this term during employment) can at times lead to disciplinary actions by institutions (such as, depending on the business, being fired from one’s job).

Is this cultural indictment of calling African Americans n*ggers (despite many calling themselves this term, such as in many a song, etc.) a “horror show” or else a “tyranny upon one’s liberties”? And, if so, are we to understand liberties as including the right to dehumanize and disenfranchise humans form society simply on account of, for one example, their minority status—such as by actively labeling other groups of people subhuman animals that ought to be lynched?

Regardless of answers, the pronouncement of not calling African Americans n*ggers remains a prime example of that which is termed “political correctness”—be this same dictum of itself deemed a “horror show” or not.

Ciao, then.

Not what I quite explicitly stated. — javra

Yeah, it was. — Banno

Wait for it ... Nope, it wasn't.

As a refresher:

such that what we empirically experience as occurring at time X actually occurred prior to time X. — javra

Does not translate into:

Any event we see occurred in the past, therefore we never see any event. — Banno

And you haven't answered the question I asked regarding the science. Somewhat disingenuous.

Any event we see occurred in the past, therefore we never see any event.

How's that again? — Banno

Not what I quite explicitly stated. Do you disagree with the linked to science?

As I so far understand the positions held, to me the issue of direct v. indirect realism is misplaced—not because it’s not important or else handwaving, etc.—but because they both occur at the same time yet this from different vantages. To have some terminology to express these two different vantages cogently:

a) Intra-agential reality; aka intrareality: that set of actualities that strictly apply to the one agent concerned; akin to an agent’s umwelt.
b) Equi-agential reality; aka equireality: that set of actualities that strictly apply in equal manner to all coexisting agents in the cosmos; what is commonly understood to be reality at large.

I'll use the issue of the present time to try to change focus on what—if I understand things well enough—is the exact same issue:

From the vantage of (b), everything empirical that we experience occurring in the present is known by science to in fact occur some fractions of a second prior to our conscious apprehension of it (with some estimates having it consciously occur nearly .3 seconds after the initial stimulus onset (1)) —such that what we empirically experience as occurring at time X actually occurred prior to time X. This, then, to me is accordant to indirect realism.

From the vantage of (a), we all experientially know that everything empirical which we experience occurring in the unitary perception of the present’s duration (2) strictly occurs in a present moment of which we are consciously aware, one that is differentiated from occurrences which occur before (even if this “before” is itself within our unitary perception of duration) and those yet to occur—such that, here, there is no time lapse whatsoever between what we empirically experience and our awareness of it (as one example of this to further this point: when we engage in a heated conversation with another agent face to face, the two agents’ awareness of the present moment—in which they each act and react in response to the other and their words—is fully identical relative to the conscious awareness of both agents … with no time lapse that we are in any way aware of). This, then, to me is accordant to direct realism.

From here, things can of course get far more complex when analyzed. For one example, we can only come to know about (b) strictly via (a).

Nevertheless, to stick to the thread’s subject, I find that both these realities (the indirect one and the direct one) necessarily co-occur. The same co-occurrence of the two can just as well then be specified for our seeing that purple shirt there yonder (I've used "purple" because colors from purple to magenta don't occur as a wavelength, being only real in sense (a) and not sense (b)).

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1)

Based on empirical and simulation data we propose that an initial phase of perception (stimulus recognition) occurs 80–100 ms from stimulus onset under optimal conditions. It is followed by a conscious episode (broadcast) 200–280 ms after stimulus onset, — https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3081809/

2)

Direct, unitary perception of duration occurs up to a maximum period of approximately 1.5 to 2 seconds from the beginning to the end of a continuous sensory stimulus. — https://www.britannica.com/science/time-perception/Perceived-duration

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Edit: I also think of things in terms of inter-agential realities (intersubjectivities), such as the human-relative intersubjectivity of all non-blind and non-colorblind people commonly seeing the same purple ... but for the sake of keeping things simple I've only specified those two reality types of (a) and (b).

These contradictions are producing further contradictions, — Leontiskos

I hope I didn't give the impression that perplexity-views such as your own are beyond the pale. I think they make a certain amount of sense given the complexity of the moral landscape. — Leontiskos

To keep things short, I don't find that my account of ethics would make any sense whatsoever were it to in fact incorporate "contradictions", which I do not find my account to incorporate: At no juncture in my account can there ever be something that is both right and wrong at the same time and in the same respect. I instead find that the nuances (in respect to ends pursued) in my account make these “different respects” sufficiently evident. But I have little doubt that disagreements would yet continue, and, at the end of the day, maybe this is neither here nor there.

Thanks for the interesting conversation. :up: — Leontiskos

Ditto!

Nevertheless, the data so far acquired from modern physics will remain and need to be accounted for in whatever scientific developments regarding category (b) that might eventually result. Making the going "back to a highly mechanistic picture of the world in scientific education/philosophy" highly inappropriate. — javra

On the contrary we already do this modern return to mechanism except it's not called mechanism.

It's called physical analogue modeling. [...] — substantivalism

Are you equating these models to what science in essence is? If you are, you then seem to disagree with my appraisals of what empirical science consists of. No biggie, but I am curious.

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When I stated that the data remains, I was addressing the verifiable results which are for example obtained from the delayed-choice quantum erasure experiment—which pose serious problems either for classical notions of causation, for classical notions of physical identity, or else for both. And I so far understand both these classical notions to be requisite for any mechanistic account, even more so for any "highly mechanistic" account of the world in scientific philosophy.

The replicable data obtained from this experiment, then, will yet need to be accurately accounted for regardless of the implemented models, mathematical or otherwise; regardless of the philosophical explanations which inevitably make use of metaphysical assumptions regarding the nature of space, time, and causality; and so forth. As to the mathematics involved, it is directly related to the data—such that were the mathematical system implemented to be contradicted by empirical test, it would hold no scientific value. Here, for example, thinking of the classic tests which were accordant to Einstein's theory of general relativity; were these test to have not so been, the mathematical system/theory would not have held water. (Related to this, because string-theory is currently not falsifiable via tests, this mathematical system is argued by some to be non-scientific—even if other speculate that M-theory can be further developed into a unified theory of physics.) At any rate, while explanations and models for the acquired data can change, the data nevertheless remains.

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But going back to the issue of a highly mechanistic picture of the world:

To be clearer, by “mechanistic” I so far understand a model, system, process, thing, etc. that incorporates a classical billiard-ball-like understanding of causation and, thereby, entails the classical Newtonian understandings of space and time required for such causation’s mechanical occurrence. Do you have something else in mind in your use of the term?

If not, and if you know of any “highly mechanistic” model (regardless of its technical name; regardless of it being strictly mathematical or else in any way analogously representational) that can accurately account for results such as from the delayed-choice quantum erasure experiment, I’d be grateful for a reference to it. (The closest I can currently think of is the MWI of QM, but this fully deterministic understanding is not accordant to “mechanistic” as I’ve just described it.)

Do you think that modern physics, or even philosophy in general, has gone off the rails with regards to non-visualized poetry/metaphor and abstract obsessions? Or is there some way to lean into non-visualization through metaphor or mathematical modeling but without an occultist taste to it? Should we go back to a highly mechanistic picture of the world in scientific education/philosophy regardless of what those analogue models may specifically be? — substantivalism

It seems to me it's been written from a perspective of a kind of disillusionment, by someone who formerly believed that the role of science was to develop a true picture of the world, but has now come to see that this seems increasingly remote. — Wayfarer

You are not wrong in that assessment. In my life I have few interests and fewer things to be proud of in their stability as well as their personal meaningfulness. However, the deflationist and deconstructivist views of others upon all philosophy, but especially scientific thought, has resulted in a rather bitter view to it all. — substantivalism

In my own, maybe all too imperfect, intentions to be of help, I’ll express my own views regarding the many at times contradictory, and often non-intuitive, perspectives that have emerged from that one empirical science of modern physics.

Speaking for myself, I try not to mistake, or else equivocate, between a) the empirical sciences as enterprise and methodology and b) the conclusions, be they popularly upheld or not, which this same enterprise has resulted in and continues to produce.

I deem (a) to be grounded in the intent of an ever-improving, psychologically objective appraisal regarding that which is commonly actual to all and thereby empirically verifiable. For the science of physics, this then is the very nature of the physical world at large. Of emphasis here is the intent just mentioned and the use of the scientific method as an optimal means of bringing this same intent to fruition. Everything from falsifiable hypotheses, confounding-variable-devoid tests of such hypotheses (or as near to such tests as we can produce), replicability of these test’s results by anyone who so wants (and obviously has the means) to so test, and the very important peer-review method (which in its own way serves as a checks and balances of biases) by which the validity of all such aspects that the scientific method utilizes is optimally verified, hence optimally safeguarding against these same aspects being endowed with mistakes of some kind.

(A) might not be perfect, but we so far do not know of a better methodology for ascertaining that which is in fact actual relative to all agents irrespective of what agents might individually believe (this actuality to me being physical reality), this in optimally impartial manners.

In turn, I deem (b) to always be fallible in its nature, never in any respect presenting a definitively proven absolute truth. Yet, due to (a), (b) shall then tend toward what is in fact less partial, or biased, in comparison to beliefs held by individual agents. I’m more interested in neurology and related sciences so, using this as example, about half a century ago it was more or less generally upheld that an adult brain’s physiology was generally static, or hard-wired, for the individual’s life (that synaptic connections did not change in any way other than by either becoming stronger or weaker - for one example, the neuroscience professor in a lab I worked in as a tech after graduating college held onto this view quite stringently). Today, via the same implementation of the scientific method that led to this generally accepted belief, we’ve now generally come to accept that neural plasticity in the adult human brain remains an occurrent phenomena (for example, that new synaptic connections can at times be made or else can at times decay to such extent that they no longer are). The commonly accepted appraisal of what the data informs us of has changed—this due to newly acquired data that disproves the adequacy of former beliefs—but the science as methodology via which this data is acquired has nevertheless remained wholly unchanged.

As to the mathematical modeling (of the acquired empirical data) you mention, I generally place it within category (b). When it comes to the application of maths in category (a)—such is the case with statistics—issues become philosophical in nature, rather than scientific.

As just outlined, I then don’t view modern day sciences as being in any way undermined by views such as those you’ve mentioned. Science as category (a) remains wholly undefeated in relation to its purposes.

As to category (b) in respects to modern physics, I personally find it useful to remember that, because we don’t have a unified theory or everything physical, either the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, or else both are then in some ways wrong—irrespective of their strong predictive value. This in parallel to how Newtonian physics is now known to be inaccurate—despite its predictive value yet being accurate enough for most purposes. When a theory of everything physical will be obtained, things will then click into place far better. Till then (if not even beyond), I find it best to not hold onto any so far well established physicist theory (ToR and QM included) as portraying an absolute truth—but as fallibilistic accounts which are known a priori to be in need of significant, maybe even foundational, tweaking. Nevertheless, the data so far acquired from modern physics will remain and need to be accounted for in whatever scientific developments regarding category (b) that might eventually result. Making the going "back to a highly mechanistic picture of the world in scientific education/philosophy" highly inappropriate.

I am hoping this might be of some help—even if it will not resolve all concerns (but, then again, such would be quite the utopia indeed :grin: ).

Or perhaps the more pertinent question is, "What happens when we encounter unforeseen dilemmas?" — Leontiskos

I see that I was addressing many presumptions which are not shared. This for instance. By "obstacle" I naturally assumed that that which stands in the way and thereby impedes is/was unforeseen. Otherwise I'd simply view it as part of the terrain to be traveled. If I see a house between me and the house's backyard to which I want to get to, I don't then discern the house to be an obstacle in my path. But if I expect the backyard gate to be unlocked when in fact it is, this I might then consider something that impedes my intended progress.

What are the two ends?

Strive to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible.
Strive to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible, in ideal circumstances. — Leontiskos

Every voyage toward a destination is, consciously or unconsciously, idealized to go as expected or planed, i.e. for the circumstances to be as one best foresees, and thereby idealizes, them. If I take a flight from A to Z, unexpected weather conditions might have it that I get detoured and delayed. Or that I never arrive. Nevertheless, I will take the flight expecting to arrive on time as per the ideal circumstances of so arriving as scheduled.

So I so far disagree with this division into two ends where considering the analogy I've provided.

Again, I see two ends, and in this case I think both are simultaneously aimed at:

1) Do not commit violence (because violence requires treating the object as a means)
2) Survive as a community


These are both involved in the goal to, "Arrive at a Kingdom of Ends."

But in this case it seems that (2) is given precedence over (1), and I'm not sure if it is possible to arrive at a "Kingdom of Ends" so long as (2) is given precedence over (1). When would you ever "get there"?
Obviously the alternative would be strict pacifism: giving (1) precedence over (2). — Leontiskos

"Do not commit violence" holds no meaning or significance in the complete absence of agents. In order for violence to not be committed, there must be agents present which do not commit violence. So I again find the presented dichotomy of ends to be inappropriate.

Aside from which, as stated (1) gives the impression of an absolute commandment. ... Whose goodness or rightness as such would be itself justified in which manner?

Moreover, the "strict pacifism" mentioned would leave all peace aspiring people to die at the hands of violent people, thereby resulting in nothing but violence-loving people to populate the world in its entirety. How might this bring about or else be in the service of a "Kingdom of Ends"?

Hearkening back to the OP, my difficulty is the way that you are apt to class exceptions as non-human acts. — Leontiskos

Aside from certain parts of the second counterexample I've provided, where have i done so?

If you wish to continue, it seems to me that we would need to discuss this issue of moral perplexity. It seems that on theories such as your own, which admit of perplexity, one must either transgress duties or else redefine those duties as being in some way non-obligatory. — Leontiskos

I am now getting the sense that you might uphold a moral code of duties via systems of deontology that traditionally have made little sense to me. Namely, those which uphold a strict duty or obligation to absolute oughts and ought nots irrespective of consequence. If so, I would rather not continue this conversation, being fairly confident that it will result in disagreements without resolution.

:up:

What puts the final nail in the coffin of determinism is the reality of the decision not to choose. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think hard determinism can have a mind of its own, meaning that it could find justification even for this. But yes, I'm in general agreement with you.

I’ll for now address the following last portion of your first reply since I see this as pivotal to most all of the other replies I might myself give. I know there is a lot left for me to address, but, before I do, please let me know if the following is something that you find fault with. If this leads to an insurmountable difference of perspectives, then I doubt you’d find any of my other further replies cogent.

Regarding your X, Y, Z analysis, I would want to say that if X is necessary to achieve Y and Y is necessary to achieve Z, then X is necessary to achieve Z. In fact this would seem to prove that it is false to claim that, "[X] does not allow for the ultimate achievement of Z." Or am I underestimating the work that your term "optimally fitting" is doing? (Note that if, as you seem to say, Z precludes X, then it cannot simultaneously be true that X is necessary to achieve Z) — Leontiskos

Via one analogy (which as analogy can only go so far), say that one strives to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible so as to win a prize. Were it at all possible to do so, one would then rationally follow a straight path from point A to point Z, this being the shortest path to travel. But there is an intractable obstacle in the way at point K.

The ideal means of arriving at Z remains that of traveling a straight path. A straight path toward Z then remains the ideal right, or ideally correct, or the ideally good means of arriving at Z in optimally short time—this in ideal circumstances. Anything that deviates from this ideal right, or correct, or good means of arriving at Z will, then, by default not be the ideally right/correct/good means of arriving at Z: In and of itself, traveling perpendicular to the ideal path will never allow one to arrive at Z—for if one perpetually so travels perpendicularly one can only ever-further oneself from the sought destination. Because of this, traveling leftward/rightward will, in and of itself, be a wrong/incorrect/bad means of arriving at Z in ideal conditions.

Still, now the conditions are not ideal due to the obstacle. If one dutifully maintains one’s ideal path, one will thereby fail in one’s attempts to win the prize. So now one must travel perpendicularly for a while, thereby engaging in what will in ideal terms be a wrong/incorrect/bad means of arriving at Z in optimal time. One, instead, must now do what is not ideally right, or correct, or good: one must circumvent the obstacle by being antithetical to that which is ideally right/correct/good and now distance oneself from Z by traveling leftward or rightward along the obstacle’s boarder till the obstacle ends.

Traveling straight toward Z is nevertheless necessary for arriving at Z. It’s just that due to the obstacle in the way, one must now do otherwise that travel straight toward Z till the obstacle is circumvented, thereby furthering oneself from Z, subsequent to which one then again proceeds to travel straight toward Z. Given the obstacle, only by so doing will one arrive at one destination of Z and win the desired prize.

Is it wrong/incorrect/bad to not travel straight toward Z at all times? In an idealized setting, it is: for so doing will at the very least always increase the amount of time it takes to arrive at Z, thereby making the time span less than optimal, and at the very worst so doing will make arriving at Z logically impossible.

Yet, given the less-than-ideal reality of the obstacle in the way, is it then wrong/incorrect/bad to deviate as little as possible from traveling straight toward Z at all times so as circumvent the obstacle? No: it is right/correct/good to so deviate as little as is required to circumvent the obstacle. This even though one will be disgruntled (rather than take pleasure) in so doing, for one knows that so doing furthers the time required to reach Z.

That which is right/correct/good in an idealized setting is then that which I previously termed “ultimately right/correct/good”—here, traveling straight toward Z—for it is that which is ultimately required to obtain Z. And from this same vantage of ultimate right/correct/good (which might also be termed “the ideal good”), traveling perpendicular to this trajectory is an ultimate wrong/incorrect/bad way of going about things—this as far as ideals go—again, because it can only further one form one’s desired destination irrespective of quantity or degree to which it is done.

Yet, sometimes this very same distancing from Z—i.e., that which is ultimately bad or wrong—will be the only possible way of further approaching Z when the scenario is less than ideal, and this only unlit this same ultimate bad can be dispensed with and that which is ultimately good or right can once again be implemented toward arriving at Z.

In so being, this “means of optimally approaching Z by minimally furthering oneself from Z so as to circumvent the obstacle” will not be that which is ultimately good (going toward Z in a straight path) but, instead, that which I will for now term “pragmatically good”. Of note, though: for something to in fact be pragmatically good it must still best approximate—or else minimally deviate from—that which is ideally good so as to obtain Z given the less-than-ideal circumstances to be had.

Now equate Z with (here a fully non-deontological notion of) Kant’s Kingdom of Ends. If this is too obtuse, then a yet to be global society wherein people don’t commit violence against each other of their own free accord—a yet to be global society I will here for brevity term “utopia”.

In ideal settings, violence will here always be a wrong (i.e., the wrong/incorrect/bad means of obtaining ends)—for violence will always further one from this Kingdom of Ends / utopia, i.e. from one’s destination of Z. Furthermore, one can never (not even in principle) actualize Z in perfected form via violence’s application. This because one cannot actualize a loving peace of mutual understanding amongst mankind via the use of violence (e.g., placing a gun to a person’s head and telling them you’ll shoot if they don’t become your best friend, which would at minimum be psychological violence, will not result in the other’s genuine friendship toward you).

Nevertheless, when someone unjustly attacks your personhood or those of fellow Kingdom-of-Ends/utopia-aspiring others, not stopping the assailant(s) via force when needed—and hence via use of some measure of violence—will further everyone from an actualization of the Kingdom of Ends / utopia. Wherein stopping the assailants, though antithetical to Z’s occurrence due to the very violence required, will however optimally allow for closest proximity to Z in long-term appraisals for those concerned.

Yet violence is here still not that which is ultimately right; it is still something that in ultimate, or else ideal, terms is a wrong—this as determined by Z itself. But the application of this means—given the obstacles that befall one in less than ideal circumstances—can yet be that which is the only pragmatic good to take. This so long as that which is pragmatically good optimally approximates—else minimally deviates from—the ideal good of never engaging in violence.

To then ask whether violence is moral or immoral will depend on the vantage taken: relative to the very actualization and thereby eventual actuality of Z, it will always be immoral. Yet relative to what is on occasion pragmatically needed to best approach the actualization of Z, it will in certain circumstances be moral. As was illustrated, this strictly contingent on—not its application per se—but the intention(s) with which it becomes applied. (edit: Hence, were the intention to be that of optimal approach toward the non-violent utopia of Z, then the application of violence as means toward the end of Z (if ever needed) will strictly occur with maximal self-constraint against any and all unneeded violence—this, in short, because the means used shall themselves be in large part teleologically determined (or else driven) by the end which is pursued. Much like wanting to arrive at location Z of itself as telos determines that in ideal setting one ought to travel a straight path toward Z, and that one optimally approximates this ideal whenever obstacles in the way require one to travel perpendicularly to this same ideal straight path.)

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I’ve already written a fair sum. So I’ll stop short for now to see if you find fault with what was just mentioned.

For what its worth, it might be cumbersome to explain, but I all the same so far find it conformant to the living of a virtuous life (this as best one can, with the occasional mistake granted).

I was clarifying what is meant by "hunger". And, rather than being sophistical, I was exposing your sophistry. When we say that someone has "the desire to eat", we recognize the generality of the supposed "object" by showing that what is actually desired is a particular type of activity, "to eat". — Metaphysician Undercover

Only in an attempt to further your argument:

Hunger is a physiological sensation or pang. The experiencing of hunger, though, does not even necessitate a person's conscious "desire to eat". Case in point: a person who is on a diet (or else fasting, such as for religious purposes) might well at times experience what is relative to the person extreme hunger ... yet the (conscious) person might nevertheless in no way intend to eat anything, thereby having no such desire.

However, when the conscious will concerned aligns, else assimilates, itself with their experienced hunger, then, and only then, will the person consciously desire to appease this physiological sensation which goads: the very appeasing of this physiological sensation then being the immediate object (or maybe better, objective) of concern. And this appeasing of the sensation as a now primary telos will then occur via a very generalized secondary telos of eating something. The specifics of what is to be eaten yet being a matter of choice between available alternatives. Only once this choice between available alternatives is made will there then be a concrete and specific object (or objective) to be realized ... this so as to satisfy the primary (consciously held) telos to all this, which is that of alleviating the underlying pangs of hunger.