The person’s knowing that they are seeing a pink elephant is knowledge by acquaintance; it is non-inferential and so not contingent on justifications; — javra

Does that mean that you are thinking of seeing the pink elephant as introspection and so immune from mistake? I can't help feeling that applying the description "pink elephant" to whatever I am seeing is not immune from mistake. — Ludwig V

If the pink elephant happens to be a hallucination or mirage*, then hallucinations and mirages are not introspections (aka, self-examinations of one’s own being, thoughts, etc.) … but imaginings (such as can occur in daydreams) seen with the mind’s eye that a) are not willfully produced at a conscious level and b) which the person does not, at least momentarily, realize are merely imaginings seen with the minds eye. Do you disagree with this?

If you agree, then what is seen with the mind’s eye remains known-by-acquaintance as that which one so sees (here, again, with the mind’s eye): here, then, the person sees a pink elephant and knows this (thereby knowing it isn’t a pink snake or else a green elephant, etc., which is being seen). And this is so known-by-acquaintance without any inferences involved - it is brute data of experience with presents itself to the person (in contrast, most introspection that I know of is inferential in some capacity or another).

Introspection is not immune from mistakes, because it is most always inferential. That one experiences what one presently experiences is, on the other hand, a brute given. One would need to delve deep into hypotheticals (e.g., the possibility that there in fact is no "I" and hence no perceiver) to grant room for possible mistakes in the affirmation of, "I am currently seeing X" when one is in fact so currently seeing (be it with the mind's eye as is the case with imaginings or else with one's physiological eyes).

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* Otherwise, the intoxicated person could conceivably have seen a real elephant covered in pink powder, such as occurs at times in India during certain celebrations, in which case it would not have been a hallucination or mirage but an externally existing elephant which was physiologically seen.

In one way, I'll accept that we can imagine that the vase on my table is an alien or a hologram. But there is not a shred of evidence for either possibility, so there is no rational basis for an actual doubt. — Ludwig V

Yes, and, again, that was the entire point of the example given. One can intellectually acknowledge the possibility (not the plausibility) of being mistaken in a maintained proposition without in any way finding any rational, coherent, or else sane means of doubting anything about the proposition maintained. As I was saying to @Leontiskos in my last post, the epistemological stance of fallibility does not equate to uncertainty, of which doubt is a variant of. Same will then apply to BIV hypotheses, the hypothesis of solipsism, and so forth: "I can't prove that there's no possibility of being wrong in upholding that we are not BIVs but, all the same, I can find no rational basis whatsoever to in any way doubt that we are not."

I agree that when it comes to claims of knowledge, justification is required. On the other hand I know many things with certainty that require no justification simply because they are directly known―in these cases justification just doesn't enter the picture. — Janus

And this resembles the "A or ~A" case, where it's difficult to see it in terms of justifications. Still, I think the conclusion we ought to draw from this is that we're not quite sure what a justification is. What sorts of reasons may play a part in justification? (We noted earlier that a "good justification" is very unclear, in many cases.) If you ask me for my justification in believing "I am having thought X right now" and I reply, "I am directly observing this occurrence as we speak," have I offered a justification? — J

At least the last example overlaps knowledge by acquaintance, which is not contingent on justification, with knowledge by description, which is.

We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths. (Russell 1912: 78)

I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when I am directly aware of the object itself. When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which constitutes judgment, but the sort which constitutes presentation. In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S. (Russell 1910/11: 108) — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-acquaindescrip/#Dis

Say an intoxicated person is seeing a pink elephant. The person’s knowing that they are seeing a pink elephant is knowledge by acquaintance; it is non-inferential and so not contingent on justifications; this knowledge thereby does not equate to or else require JTB. Knowledge that the pink elephant seen is either real or not, on the other hand, will require some form of inference and, so, will be contingent on justification; thereby equating to the JTB sense of knowledge.

Finished what I had to do early, so I'll reply now.

That's also an intelligible argument, but I think it's weaker than the other one. This is because it seems to commit the error of applying the LEM to justification, so to speak. — Leontiskos

The issue I posed had nothing to do with the Law of the Excluded Middle but with contradiction and consistency, hence with the LNC. The proposition that “no ontic truths occur” can’t help but contradict itself upon analysis—for it intends to covey that which is actual and thereby specify an ontic truth. If it happens to be (ontically) true, this then directly contradicts what is affirmed. And if it’s not (ontically) true … what viable alternative can there be obtained other than that it is an untrue, and thereby a false or else erroneous, proposition? Else, how can the proposition of “no ontic truths occur” be interpreted to in any way convey a partial truth? The proposition is either completely true or it is not.

The justification provided for the proposition that ontic truths occur then serves to evidence that the stance is held knowledge. The contrarian, if they cannot provide cogent justification, then cannot claim to have knowledge in the form of JTB that no ontic truths occur. This then results in (yet fallible) JTB that they do vs. blind belief which is in no way justifiable that they don’t.

The words "infallible" and "fallible" are often used by "fallibilists" but never by "infallibilists," which makes me think they involve contentious presuppositions. — Leontiskos

As pertains to this and a good portion of the remaining comments in your post:

As you might already know, “certainty” is a very difficult semantic to adequately define. For my part, I’ve so far tried to define it as being “completely assured, fixed, and unvarying”. But since you place so much emphasis on the issue of certainty in respect to knowledge, please define what you yourself mean by the term. For example, the SEP article on certainty specifies a distinction between psychological certainty (as one example, being certain that X due to a gut feeling one cannot consciously justify) and epistemic certainty (i.e., the highest degree of certainty possible). And I presume you are here referring to epistemic certainty. You will find the article further addresses four different possibilities of what epistemic certainty might signify, with infallibility being formally introduced as one of these four possibilities addressed. If you disagree that epistemic certainty equates to infallibility (this being something that I myself disagree with), then, again, please specify what it is you believe certainty in relation to knowledge equates to.

But if "fallibility" means that we cannot be certain, then the same problem arises. — Leontiskos

As I understand it, fallibility (simply: the possibility (but not the plausibility) of being mistaken) does not equate to a lack of certainty, neither to lack of psychological certainty nor to lack of epistemic certainty. For one example, I can find no “higher degree of certainty possible” than applies to, for one example, the proposition that the ontic is, i.e. that being is. In then upholding this affirmation to be epistemic certainty, and because I don’t equate epistemic certainty to infallibility (i.e., the impossibility of being mistaken), I then can yet intellectually acknowledge the possibility (but not the plausibility) of being mistaken in so upholding. And, thereby, of the proposition being technically fallible. But this does not in any way diminish the fact that I hold the occurrence of being to be epistemically certain. No psychological uncertainty whatsoever involved here. Again, this even though I don’t take this epistemic certainty to be infallible, i.e. impossible to be mistaken, and thereby yet deem it fallible.

Well you're walking a tightrope with these sentences. — Leontiskos

I might better address this after you specify what you mean by "certainty". For the time being though, to toot my own horn: perhaps I am, but, if so, I so far find this tightrope walk to be steadfast, secure, and successful: Ontic knowledge obtains, hence occurs, when one can justify a belief which is, in fact, ontically true. A belief which in fact is ontically true is certain in the sense that it conforms or else corresponds to an actuality that is itself ontically (rather than psychologically or epistemically) certain - and, hence, is ontologically assured, fixed, and unvarying given its context, or else limitations, of space and time. For example, if a cat is on a mat at that location and at that time, this will be ontically certain, i.e. completely assured, fixed, and unvarying ontologically. If my pronouncement that "the cat is on the mat at that location and at that time" is ontically true, then my pronounced truth is as completely assured, fixed and unvarying as is the cat being on the mat ontologically. And lastly, no, I cannot conceive of there being no ontically true beliefs. If you can, please elaborate on how that might be possible.

You seem to be saying that "epistemic truths" presuppose the existence of "ontological truths"; we all believe ourselves to be uttering "epistemic truths"; therefore we are all presupposing the existence of "ontological truths"; and because of this the belief in "ontological truths" is justified.

I think that's a good account on the "game of pool" approach, but I would prefer an account that provides for knowledge of at least some "ontological truths," rather than mere justified belief. — Leontiskos

Here is a different approach to the same conclusion:

Can it be in any way validly justified that no ontologically occurring truths occur? If one believes that this is the case, what does one intend to express by the proposition of “no ontically occurring truths occur” if this proposition is not meant to conform/correspond to the actual states of affairs of the world and, thereby, of itself be an ontic truth? Thereby contradicting the very proposition made. Therefore, there is no justifiable alternative to the proposition that ontic truths occur.

As to providing knowledge of some "ontological truths", this, again, is what our ability to honestly and cogently justify offers us the possibility of. It just that our JTB knowledge will not, by a fallibilist account, be infallible. (Fallibiilty does not equate to being wrong.)

Then on the premise that we know that every p (epistemological truth) could be false, we cannot know any p. — Leontiskos

Remember that the JTB model of knowledge was presented by an Ancient Skeptic. If one presumes knowledge to be infallible, then this quote holds. If one presumes knowledge to be fallible, then it does not.

On all of these conceptions certain knowledge is impossible, and knowledge is traditionally understood to be certain. — Leontiskos

By everything I've so far stated, there then can occur ontically true beliefs which we can justify at will. These then will be instances of ontic knowledge, which is certain. Because we can only hold epistemic appraisals of what is ontically true, though, everything we uphold as knowledge will be epistemic knowledge, rather than ontic knowledge - which, as with epistemic truth, is less than "completely assured, fixed, and invariable."

I'll be back tomorrow.

Is there a contradiction? — Leontiskos

Not as far as I know.

Consider this proposition as if it were itself a truth:

<Ontological truths (which are absolutely certain and not possible to be wrong) do occur all the time.>

Is this "truth" an "ontological truth" or an "epistemological truth"? Because if it is an "epistemological truth," then it is not certain, and if it is an "ontological truth," then your appraisal is not fallible. This is why I'm not sure the way you are dividing up this territory is ultimately coherent. — Leontiskos

To be clear, I'm not here writing a formal philosophical thesis but a forum post intended to address a specific issue. That mentioned:

The truth of the proposition here quoted would of course of itself be an epistemic truth. One which I so far find thoroughly justifiable: To keep things short, I so far find that there can be no epistemic truth in the absence of an ontically occuring truth it aspires to express. Can you, or anyone else, cogently justify the occurence of an epistemic truth that does not claim to be or else intend to conform to an ontic truth?

If not, then it remains cogently justifiable that ontically occuring truths do occur. Conversely, it then becomes unjustifiable that ontically occurring truths do not occur. (The "all the time" part I'll cut off for now, for it would require a great deal of further justification.)

* The monkey wrench is logical and other putatively analytical truths. [...] There's something odd about asking whether "If A, then not (~A)" is a belief, or how we might justify it. But I'll leave that for others. — J

A prime example of this (and it does regard what can well be considered hinge propositions) are those who take dialetheism to be true. We thereby now have an inconsistency between the principle of noncontradiction being true and dialetheism being true. And this inconsistency as to which in fact conforms, or else corresponds, to the actual states of affairs can only be resolved via optimal justifications. Yes, maybe for now these are lacking, but, short of aggressions of each camp toward the other such that “might makes right”, what other avenue is available to us toward discerning what is true in respect to this aspect of ontology (what might possibly be termed the ontology of valid reasoning or of valid logic … or, maybe more esoterically, of logos)?

You make repeated mention of skepticism. Of a Cartesian or of a Ciceronian variety? (the latter being a good example of an Ancient Skeptic—in both his theories and his lifelong praxis) The two versions staunchly contradict. But maybe that’s a separate issue.

As to this,

1. Truth is always known via justification, and ensured by justification
2. Justification can never overcome the possibility of the one-in-a-million anomaly
3. Therefore, truth is never certain — Leontiskos

Item #1 I find blatantly wrong in so far as, for example, I know the truth of the color of an object as it appears to me not by justification but by brute awareness/experience. But yes, successful justification wherever needed validates that what we take to be (ontically) true in fact so is.

Item #2 might be a less cordial way of saying that all justification is to some extent fallible. As per my posts here and here, I do uphold this.

Lastly, item #3 clashes with what I’ve stated in my posts. When differentiating the ontological from the epistemological, ontically occurring truths (which are absolutely certain and not possible to be wrong) do occur all the time. But our epistemic appraisals of what are and are not ontic truths (the latter, again, do occur) will be fallible to some measure.

Therefore, ontic truths are always (completely) certain, and are that toward which we (at least some) ideally aspire. This by optimally (which is different from “perfectly”) justifying our beliefs (by my count, with each belief being in essence a psyche’s ascent (conscious or otherwise) to that which is in fact actual—such that to believe that X is to believe that X is true, i.e. corresponds/conforms to what ontically is).

Hence, in one possible summation of what I previously expressed: Ontic truths are, and are always certain. Our epistemic appraisal of what are and are not ontic truths, however, will always be to some extent liable to being wrong. Call the latter "epistemic truths". And it is for this reason we then honestly seek to justify our epistemic turths whenever required: if our justifications remain consistent given all available data and reasoning, there then is no reason to conclude or even assume that our beliefs of what is ontically true are in fact mistaken, thereby allowing us to maintain that our beliefs are ontically true (only when our justifications become inconsistent with data or coherent reasoning, and are thereby endowed with contradictions, can the honest person conclude that their belief of what is ontically true is in fact mistaken and, hence, ontically untrue).

Ontic truth is always certain, in the sense of "completely assured, fixed, and unvarying". Epistemic truth, while aspiring to be one and the same with ontic truth, is however not "completely assured, fixed, and unvarying", for it might in time change with new data or reasoning.

This is a very helpful analysis. It sharpens the question, — J

I’m very glad to hear it was helpful at least to some.

I don't know whether every proponent of JTB would be happy with this, though. — J

I know (in the JTB sense) that some out there are quite uncomfortable with the implications of fallibilism for issues of JTB.

To try to reduce possible confusion, how this works in practice: “I know that the planet is physical and roughly spherical,” is a claim of JTB. — javra

Here, I wonder whether you misstated your target sentence. Are you talking about a JTB claim for "The planet is physical and roughly spherical" or for "I know that the planet is physical and roughly spherical"? A great deal depends on this, so I'll wait until you reply before going on. — J

Trying to save some space, what I intended by what I wrote is that the proposition of “the planet is physical and roughly spherical” is taken to be an instance of knowledge, thereby being JTB claim (the first option you present). But, yes, it could have been better written.

Again, in fallibilism, no justification (which is always epistemological in its nature) can guarantee the ontological occurrence of some given truth in question. — javra

That's a bit sweeping, isn't it? Certainly, an absolute guarantee of an empirical truth seems to be built in to their definition as contingent. But, if the conditions are met, surely we can guarantee the truth. Then there are the embedded or hinge propositions, which seem beyond the possibility of any coherent or rational doubt. Perhaps our choice is not between fallibilism or infallibilism across the board. After all, not all propositions (candidate truths) are of the same kind. — Ludwig V

I did provide some justification for the claim in my previous post. That justification can either be infallible or fallible presents two alternatives that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Or can anyone show this wrong by producing a third alternative alongside that of infallibility vs. fallibility?

Also, why would “seeming to be beyond the possibility of any coherent or rational doubt” completely/absolutely guarantee the truth of the matter such that there remains no possibility, irrelevant of how small, of being wrong?

As one banal example, why must something which by all accounts appears to all everywhere to be a vase on a table in fact necessarily be a vase on a table—such that it being a vase is true—rather than, say, being an extraterrestrial alien which is camouflaged as a vase, or else an advanced hologram (which maybe operates on all senses, such as that of touch, rather than only on sight), or some such alternative to the truth of it being a physical vase? Despite these possibilities, that it is a physical vase remains beyond the possibility of any coherent or rational doubt (given all the data and justifications available to us).

As I previously said, and as far as I know, all our justifications are always only good enough for the purposes at hand given the time limitations for the justifications we engage in—but they do not ever obtain a state of perfection wherein all possible questions or else issues have been consistently accounted for. And this thereby makes our justifications (here, implicitly understood, justifications for that which is true) less than infallible. They are thereby fallible in the strict technical sense of the word (i.e., liable to some measure of being wrong, irrespective of how small the possibility might be).

It's not enough, for the sentence to be known, that we believe it to be true. It must also be true. — Banno

What bothers me is the interface between belief and reality. "It must be true" is the something more that is required. But once I have assessed the evidence, what more could there be? so I have difficulty in seeing what this amounts to. The best I can come up with is that claims to knowledge, like any other claim, have to be withdrawn if they turn out to be false. There may be cases in which the truth or otherwise of the proposition in question is finally and conclusively determined, but most of the everyday stuff doesn't come up to that standard. So the caution remains in place. — Ludwig V

But Q1c was not about belief, but rather truth. Yes, it follows from believing something that I also believe it to be true, but that's not a reply to Q1c, which asks "Is it true?" Nothing I believe can supply the answer; it depends on the facts.

JTB is supposed to help us evaluate knowledge claims -- keep us epistemologically honest. And on this construal, it can't.
— J
It doesn't tell us if they are true or not, so much as if they are known or not. — Banno


That's what I don't see how to separate. We both agree that only true things can be known. So if JTB tells us that X is known, it must also tell us at the same time that X is true. — J

I find that it helps out a lot to differentiate between the ontological and the epistemological in these matters:

Whether or not a belief is in fact true, and (given our ability to justify it) furthermore known, is a purely ontological issue. The occurrence of a truth—be "truth" defined as a correspondence to that which is actual, a conformity of belief or psyche to what is actual, or in some other such way—is either ontically actual or it is not.

Yet our only means of appraising what is ontological (or else ontically actual)—in this case, the reality of a truth—will be via some form of epistemology; and our utilized epistemology can, in at least theory, be either infallible or else fallible (with no other possibility being available to us).

If our epistemological appraisal of what is ontological happens to be infallible, there then is no possibility that we could be in any way wrong when we appraise a belief to be either true or not.

If—as any fallibilist will maintain—all possible epistemological appraisals can only be fallible, then our appraisal of a belief being either true or not will always be liable to some possibility of being wrong (with the likelihood of this possibility varying by degrees). And this is where (fallible) justification becomes paramount to our appraisal of what is (ontically) true: The quantity of justifications we can engage in can only always be temporally limited: There will always remain some yet awaiting potential “why” which goes unanswered in all that we justify—granting that we do not somehow obtain infallible justifications; our justifications are thereby always good enough for the purposes at hand, but can never be perfected in infallible manners.

Then, if we believe X, entailing that we thereby uphold our “belief that X” is in ontological fact true, and we can justify the X in question which we believe (at least with the epistemological honesty to recognize when our justifications no longer are sound, if they ever so become unsound), then we hold no grounds by which to presume that the truth of X is not in fact an ontologically occurrent given.

Again, in fallibilism, no justification (which is always epistemological in its nature) can guarantee the ontological occurrence of some given truth in question. One would need to have an infallible epistemology to do so. But, so long as one can soundly justify X at will as time permits irrespective of the data and possible counter-reasonings that might eventually surface, one then has no reason to suppose that one’s "belief that X" is not in fact ontologically true.

In short, when a truth occurs, it occurs ontically—and that which ontically is is not subject to the possibility of being wrong, i.e. fallibility. But we can only appraise what ontically is epistemologically, which will always be to some extent fallible.

As with the issue of truth, so too with the issue of knowledge as JTB. Knowledge can be ontologically had: if one’s belief is (ontically) true and one can justify it, one is then ontically in possession of knowledge (which can never be untrue and so can never be mistaken). But figuring out whether or not this is so will always be epistemological—and one’s applied epistemology, again, can either be infallible (in at least theory) or else can only always be fallible. So long as we can soundly, but yet fallibly, justify our “belief that X” to be ontologically true, we then have fallible justification for our “belief that X” to in fact be ontologically occurring knowledge.

To try to reduce possible confusion, how this works in practice: “I know that the planet is physical and roughly spherical,” is a claim of JTB. The justification—although always only good enough for the given purpose and always in some extreme philosophical sense yet fallible—for the belief that I hold being in fact ontologically true has so far always been sound. I thereby have no epistemological reason to presume that this belief which I can soundly justify at will is untrue (ontically). I thereby then have all the reason I need to conclude and uphold that my proposition is an (ontically) true belief I hold which I can (soundly) justify at will—and that it is thereby something I know as an ontological state of affairs, this in the JTB sense of “know”. Still, because this appraisal of what is ontically the case is wholly epistemological and not infallible, I can yet acknowledge that my appraisal of what I in fact know to be the case could in principle—at least hypothetically—be someday discovered to no longer be soundly justifiable, say due to new data. If this day ever arrives such that this proposition cannot at that point be honesty justified, then this belief will be evidenced to in fact be untrue (ontically): it will not in fact conform to that which is actual. And if in fact untrue, then I in fact do not (ontologically) know that which I so far deem to be knowledge.

You can replace the proposition given with any other, and the same will hold. For one example: “I know that 1+1=2”. If pressured, I might not be able to justify why this belief must conform to what is ontically actual in all possible cases (including all possible worlds), but if I can honestly justify it regardless without inconsistencies and if it does indeed happen to conform to that which is ontically actual in all possible cases, then this proposition will yet ontically be knowledge I hold. Same with “I know that I am not a brain in a vat”. Or else more trivial things, such as “I know that tomorrow it will rain”.

I don't deal well with dishonest people - for I don't in any way respect them.

You have a penchant for ignoring the parts of a post that are more crucial. For example, you said:

I would ask you to express which part(s) of it you, in fact, find to be invalid. — javra


But you had already ignored the answer given, namely:

There are different problems, but I think the primary one is the idea that if something does not fulfill some end then it doesn't have that end as a final cause. For example, on that reasoning if an acorn does not grow into an oak tree then it does not have the final cause of an oak tree. But I don't see how that could be right. A teleological ordering does not depend on each individual reaching the end in question. — Leontiskos — Leontiskos

This is not what you originally posted and what I replied to. You might notice that even clicking on the link, as of now, leads one to a post in which no such thing is stated.

Shame. Or maybe the lack of it.

And similarly, in this case you chose to ignore this:

And who cares whether or not it is "ultimate"? Does Aristotle or Aquinas somewhere claim that "ultimate" (whatever that means) ends are not able to be frustrated? — Leontiskos — Leontiskos

Whom else but Aristotle originated to concept of an "unmoved mover"? And this asked of someone whose supposedly an authority on "classical" theology?

Have your last say to make yourself look righteous at the expense of others. I'm done here.

I'm exceedingly serious. As for real arguments ... wake up some. The unmoved mover is the only ultimate telos that there can rationally be - beyond which no other telos occurs.

That's a pretty standard ad hoc response. If an oak tree is not an acorn's ultimate end, then what is? And who cares whether or not it is "ultimate"? Does Aristotle or Aquinas somewhere claim that "ultimate" (whatever that means) ends are not able to be frustrated? — Leontiskos

OK, you. The fully grown acorn become tree is in and of itself a/the unmoved mover of all that exists. You got me.

Dude - or your royal highness, whichever title you prefer going by - acorns becoming trees is NOT an ultimate telos/end. News flash though this might be. God, and only God, is defined as that which is the ultimate end/telos in "classical" theology. But no, there no point in explaining this, especially for one who presumes to be so astute in the subject matter. But wait, this must be "irrationality" on my part.

And here I thought you favored rational discourse. It looks otherwise. So be it.

See, I don't find this argument to be valid. Therefore I would ask you to spell it out further, rather than me guessing at what might get us to the conclusion. — Leontiskos

I already spelled out the argument here:

If eternal hell/damnation in fact does occur, then God cannot logically be the ultimate telos/end of all that exists/occurs - for those eternally damned cannot ever, for all eternity, approach God teleologically as their ultimate end, and this irrespective to changes in their psyche’s constituency and character that might occur over the span of eternity. — javra

Since its you who does not find this argument valid, I would ask you to express which part(s) of it you, in fact, find to be invalid. To be blunt: since you explicitly affirm that you deem the argument to not be valid, then you must know why you deem it invalid.

Is there a particular part of my post that your interpretation is seizing upon? — Leontiskos

Yes, the main part:

On the issue of Hell and punishment there has been a tectonic shift since the 19th century. See for example, "Universalism: A Historical Survey," by Richard Bauckham. What this means is that the propulsion in an anti-Hell direction is more cultural than rational, and the recent works on the subject produce more heat than light.

Here is a basic Thomistic approach:

Article 3. Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment? — Leontiskos

... With all four objections to eternal punishment being if not refuted then denounced - with many offerings of certain portions of scripture.

This is what the "am I reading this right?" question was addressing.

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So again, logically, if eternal punishment does in fact occur, is God to then be understood as not being the ultimate telos/end of all that exists?

Interesting. So, in respect to the topic of the OP, this being eternal hell/damnation - rather than any transient period of hell or purgatory, irrespective of how long the latter might end up being:

If eternal hell/damnation in fact does occur, then God cannot logically be the ultimate telos/end of all that exists/occurs - for those eternally damned cannot ever, for all eternity, approach God teleologically as their ultimate end, and this irrespective to changes in their psyche’s constituency and character that might occur over the span of eternity.

Am I reading this right?

You can even see this in church decoration, with the most obvious single item in most Western churches being a crucifix right at the center of the church where all can see, whereas the images that dominate Eastern churches will be Christ Pantocrator (Christ Almighty, Ruler of All) on the central dome of the church (surrounded by icons of the prophets and saints), and at the center of the iconostasis the image of Mary the Theotokos (the Incarnation) and Christ as man (or the "Royal Doors" will also have the Annunciation, Gaberiel announcing the Incarnation to the Blessed Virgin). By contrast, May will be off to the side in a Western Rite Roman Church and generally wholly removed (along with any imagery except for the crucifixion) from most Protestant churches. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To me one very interesting semi-exception to this is Michelangelo’s depiction of the Last Judgment in the Sistine Chapel – this being an aspect of the west rather than the east. It has symbolism galore (including that of the entry into Hell being placed right behind the space where the Pope is meant to stand – maybe as a reminder of why the Pope ought to be and remain someone of virtue and not succumb to corruption) but, maybe most pertinent: if one focuses on the empty spaces of blue rather than on the details of individuals one will make out the outline of a skull – hence of death, or more spiritually appropriate, of the death of ego (this in its dualistic sense wherein there is distinction between self and other - without which there can be no existent corporeal life). God, the Highest Good, being often enough deemed to be egoless awareness of infinite being and understanding which grounds all that exists.

There are three broad paradigms I think one can identify here: infernalism (Hell as temporally unending punishment), annihilationism (the eventual destruction of unrepentant souls, also an "eternal punishment" in that it never ends), and universalism (the eventual reconciliation of all and total destruction of all sin) All seem to be very old and each have been advocated for by some of the universal Fathers and Doctors of the Church (the more influential saints). Notably, most ancient universalists, unlike modern ones, still think people go to Hell, just not forever. Indeed, they tend to think virtually everyone goes to Hell for purgation for some time, Mary and Christ might be the only sure exceptions (and Christ still goes for the Harrowing). And they tend to think salvation and deification come exclusively through Christ (so they would be exclusivists in modern terms). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I won’t here comment much on infernalism – although it can be noted that even certain Buddhist schools of thought share the same roundabout notion of temporary Hell(s) that can occur for some (just as they share the idea of Heaven(s)) – but as to annihilationism and universalism, I’ll present the following hypothesis:

Iff God is the Highest Good as infinite intellect devoid of ego and also ultimate end/telos of all that exists, then the closer the cosmos at large approaches God:

a) The more the identity (here in part defined by the intentions of the individual) of “sinners” (e.g., he who willfully and gleefully commits crime(s) again humanity or it’s parts: as a sub-example, a guy who robs a liquor store at gunpoint simply for the thrill of getting away with it, thereby committing a crime against his fellow men) will by entailment vanish from the cosmos – thereby speaking for annihilationism – for the closer the cosmos at large approaches God’s being the less willful deviation from God’s being of the part of individuals will occur, this by entailment of cosmic proximity to God.

b) The more those who have been and remain relatively aligned with the Highest Good will become increasingly selfless, hence non-egoistic, hence egoless, this until that very ultimate point is reached wherein all perfectly unify with the Highest Good in so becoming perfectly selfless, resulting in a final state of divinely simple, all-encompassing, completely unified, and infinite intellect-endowed-awareness that is utterly devoid of (dualistic) ego. Here, while the identity of sinners irrespective of their degree in so being will all vanish – to include their tendencies of intention (and I presume we can all acknowledge ourselves to be less than completely and perfectly good, hence to engage in some measure of "sin" at least at times), the very essence of their/our being, the very core of who we are so to speak, shall nevertheless persist in living in perfect and complete unity with God. Thereby speaking of universalism.

To be clear, this can only logically apply when assuming the premises of non-physicalism and of the reality of God as the ultimate telos of the Highest Good and the ground of all being as pure, divinely simple, egoless essence of infinite intellect.

But, given these two premises, then annihilationism and universalism seem to me to both be equally entailed in the process of a closer cosmic approach, and hence proximity, to God. And ultimately, likewise, in a complete and perfect unification with God. Within this context of presumptions, there will be a cosmic death of all empirical egos bar none which, in turn, will give birth (so to speak) to the utterly blissful and timeless life of an infinite and divinely simple pure/transcendental ego whose understanding of being (of its own nature) becomes absolute/complete. (Maybe needless to add, at this juncture, then, all forms of infernalism that might have previously taken place for some can only then cease to occur.)

I grant this is utterly different from conceptualizations of being placed either into an Eternal Heaven or else an Eternal Hell after one’s death by an overseeing deity. Also, although it addresses the cosmos at large, there is nothing in any of this to nullify the possibility of a multitude of potentially awaiting non-eternal heavens or hells – this on the way toward the ultimate end of a perfect and complete unification with God.

I mentioned all this to provide my own outlined perspective – be it idiosyncratic or not – regarding the OP’s request for personal thoughts regarding the matter.

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p.s. Although not customary for Abrahamic religions, there is no cogent reason for why reincarnations in the ream of corporeal being cannot also occur given the premises just addressed. And as we all might know, sometimes, for some, Heaven and Hell are different places on Earth in the here and now.

p.p.s. Forgot to mention, all such proximity to God being then contingent on the free will of individuals, both individually and collectively.

Sorry, that was a joke. — unenlightened

Right. Nothing to look forward to and strive for on the horizon ... because its all nihilism. He, he, and a ha, ha. I'm not laughing, though. After all, this very perspective sort of entails its own meaninglessness.

We don't have many planets, so the Axelrod scenario doesn't apply. — unenlightened

Thee heck are you talking about???

Bearing mind that both Du Chardin and Peirce were believers. — Wayfarer

Yes, very much so.

Peirce obviously not of a conventional type, but makes it clear often enough that he has no intention of disputing the reality of God (per his book A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God). — Wayfarer

From my scattered readings, Peirce equated God to necessary being - such that God thereby occurs throughout all of existence and time, being for one example an aspect of us humans. This rather than being an intentionally creating intellect which served as first efficient cause to existence, and hence to existence's being, at large - one that thereby created us and is therefore as separate from us as we are from a scissor of our own creation and design.

If there are any references to the contrary, I'd be grateful to learn of them.

That said, neither was Teilhard Du Chardin much of the conventional type, devout Christian though he was. As an aside to this, I find interest in his notion of the Omega Point - which gets defined by him as, generally speaking, an ultimate single point of global consciousness devoid of anything else that becomes perfectly unified (for him, furthermore, in perfect convergence with Christ) - which at least seems to share many an aspect with the Neoplatonic notion of the One. It would be differently interpreted, of course, and this in a manner that encompasses the sciences known in his day, that of biological evolution much included, but - at least arguably - both the One and the Omega Point might as terms and concepts hold as referent the same ultimate ontic (though non-physical) reality of "pure/transcendental ego as perfectly unified and sole essence". Anyways, for what its worth, thought I'd mention this.

And, of course, one can easily translate both their metaphysics into one of cosmic logos - a cosmic logos, however, that can at the very least just as well be utterly devoid of a first efficient cause as designer.

You are right and I'm mistaken. My bad. Sorry. — tim wood

Cool, but no need to be sorry. Even a broken clock can be right twice a day, as the saying goes.

Dude, I'm not gonna argue with you as to whether you should be reasonable. Be as unreasonable as you want. To each their own, and their own consequences of belief.

You asked as to where the Principle of Sufficient Reason originated. And to this I replied.

On the assumption you buy your own argument as valid - not a good look for you - what, exactly, do you think you've proved? — tim wood

That if we accept the PSR as a valid first principle of metaphysics, then we infer the existence of a designer and of a first cause with inherent existence (which may or may not be the same). — A Christian Philosophy

The OP does not evidence this claim.

For instance, try to evidence that natural laws are not in fact the global result of all cooccurring existents acting as their material, bottom-up, cause – which, as global laws, then simultaneously in turn formally cause their respective constraints to apply in a top-down fashion to all individual existents in the cosmos.

Note that this reasoning for the occurrence of natural laws dispels the requirement that natural laws occur due to the intentional creation of an intellect – just as it dispels the requirement for a first efficient cause to all that exists as their reason for being.

While it might be true that humans design things, so too do some species of termites intentionally create termite mounds, intentional creation being a from of designing (the list of intentional creations in the spectrum of lifeforms is vast).

And there is no noted reason for why evolution cannot of itself serve as sufficient reason for this ability to intentionally create within the domain of life. If one likes, one can then find reason to expand this same notion of evolution to the cosmos itself – such as via the notion of a cosmically evolving logos. Teilhard’s metaphysics serving as just one example of such an understanding of cosmic evolution; in Teilhard’s view, this cosmic evolution moves toward the omega point. C.S. Peirce’s metaphysics of evolution via Agapism, replete with the evolution of natural laws as cosmic habits, as yet another example of such a perspective. Neither of which logically require there being such a thing as a first efficient cause as intentionally creating intellect to all existents, one that is thereby itself other relative to these existents. (Teilhard's notions are more akin to God being within all beings throughout all time as a perpetually driving force of cosmic evolution toward the omega point). *

As to the question of how it all began, I’ll again mention the possibility that – although the cosmos might have a contingent end as per, for one example, Teilhard’s notions of the omega point – it could nevertheless potentially be utterly devoid of any beginning: such as would be the case were this known universe to be just the latest iteration of a Big Bounce process.

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* to make this more explicit:

Teilhard de Chardin wrote two comprehensive works, The Phenomenon of Man and The Divine Milieu.[29]

His posthumously published book, The Phenomenon of Man, set forth a sweeping account of the unfolding of the cosmos and the evolution of matter to humanity, to ultimately a reunion with Christ. In the book, Teilhard abandoned literal interpretations of creation in the Book of Genesis in favor of allegorical and theological interpretations. The unfolding of the material cosmos is described from primordial particles to the development of life, human beings and the noosphere, and finally to his vision of the Omega Point in the future, which is "pulling" all creation towards it. He was a leading proponent of orthogenesis, the idea that evolution occurs in a directional, goal-driven way. Teilhard argued in Darwinian terms with respect to biology, and supported the synthetic model of evolution, but argued in Lamarckian terms for the development of culture, primarily through the vehicle of education.[30]

Teilhard made a total commitment to the evolutionary process in the 1920s as the core of his spirituality, at a time when other religious thinkers felt evolutionary thinking challenged the structure of conventional Christian faith. He committed himself to what he thought the evidence showed.[31]

Teilhard made sense of the universe by assuming it had a vitalist evolutionary process.[32][33] He interpreted complexity as the axis of evolution of matter into a geosphere, a biosphere, into consciousness (in man), and then to supreme consciousness (the Omega Point). Jean Houston's story of meeting Teilhard illustrates this point.[34] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Teilhard_de_Chardin#Teachings

... of note, for Teilhard, who was a devout Christian, this omega point was interpreted a cosmic unification with Christ.

As to Agapism:

In 1893, the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce used the word "agapism" for the view that creative love is operative in the cosmos.[2] Drawing from the Swedenborgian ideas of Henry James, Sr. which he had absorbed long before,[3] Peirce held that it involves a love which expresses itself in a devotion to cherishing and tending to people or things other than oneself, as parent may do for offspring, and as God, as Love, does even and especially for the unloving, whereby the loved ones may learn. Peirce regarded this process as a mode of evolution of the cosmos and its parts, and he called the process "agapasm", such that: "The good result is here brought to pass, first, by the bestowal of spontaneous energy by the parent upon the offspring, and, second, by the disposition of the latter to catch the general idea of those about it and thus to subserve the general purpose."[2] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agapism

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All this isn't to argue for any specific metaphysics, but, again, to illustrate that the OP does not evidence the necessity for a first efficient cause as designer of existence. This very much granting the reality of the PSR.

Question: how is it that, what it the reason, I can walk on the sidewalk? Ans.: because it's solid ground. And that's a perfectly good reason. Except it is not true, not even a little bit. Most folks know that atomic-scale spaces are profoundly empty, — tim wood

You're living the grand illusion, I see. Corporeal you, here, being utterly unreal to begin with, this physically, as equally applies to everything and everyone else. Save for the reality of the atomic-scale "spaces of profound emptiness". Okay. Just as long as it ain't spiritualish in its implications, such as might apply to the Eastern notion of maya, right?

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Further, if the Principal under discussion is the one attributed to Leibniz, and his reads, "nihil est sine ratione, which I believe is accurate, then from where exactly came the "sufficient"? Because "sufficient" is no part of the PR.

If the PSR is a separate and distinct principal, then by whom and what did he or she have to say about it in terms of any justification. A reason for Leibniz, it seems, was evaluated on practical grounds. — tim wood

Here are some not too hard to look us references for this information:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/
more specifically as to Leibniz and sufficient reason:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/#Leib

Or, as a far more laconic article:

The principle of sufficient reason states that everything must have a reason or a cause. The principle was articulated and made prominent by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, with many antecedents, and was further used and developed by Arthur Schopenhauer and William Hamilton. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_sufficient_reason

At least according to these two references, the PSR was indeed endorsed as such by Leibniz, as per:

In the Monadology, he says,

Our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles, that of contradiction, in virtue of which we judge false that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false; And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known by us (paragraphs 31 and 32). — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_sufficient_reason#Leibniz's_view

Meh. Silly stuff. — Banno

I'll ... um ... endeavor to more strictly communicate which those who are reason-able and thereby give importance to rational thought, this from here on out. Good day, Banno.

no one has provided a reason to think that everything has a reason….


Show me to be mistaken. Set out why every whatever must have a reason.

After all, there must be a reason… — Banno

This, its now worse than rubbish, its bullshit.

Reason provided here.

Unanswered question to justify the point is as follows:

In sum of what ought to not be so readily overlooked, in theoretical principle only, if so much as one occurrence can occur and/or cease occurring in manners devoid of any determinants and hence reasons, then:

By what means can you conclude that the occurrence or disappearance of anything whatsoever is not in fact the same feat of pure nonsense (here, "pure nonsense" being shorthand for an event that holds no determinants, and hence reasons for occurring, whatsoever)? — javra

I can't, and won't, spoon feed you any more than this. Thinking is sometimes far easier said than done.

↪javra
rubbish. — Banno

Is what your reply is. You all of a sudden conflate ontology and epistemology as thought there would be no difference whatsoever between them. And then, instead of giving a reasoned answer to the question placed, reply with what essentially equates to an emotivist "boo".

Yea, rubbish. (I can be emotive too, don't you know.)

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Saying this at large and not to Banno:

If not yet amply clear, the Principle of Sufficient Reason no more entails the necessitarianism of causal determinism than it does there being a "first cause" - which is nil. This as per the previously mentioned example of how tychism (i.e., ontic randomness) in a game of soccer can well occur within a cosmos wherein the PSR applies - as it only can for those who maintain any coherent form of rationality.

Why? — Banno

This very question - the act of asking and expecting a cogent answer or else refusing the offered premise - entails and screams out the underlying presumption of the PSR. Else, there'd be no reason to ask.

The movement of an electron to the right instead of to the left is inexplicable, and yet the world has not ended, explanations have not collapsed.

You seem to think that one absent reason implies that there can be no reasons at all. Why? Prima facie that just does not follow. — Banno

What I've done is provide a reason for the Principle at hand, and not purport to thereby know the reasons for each and every last occurrence that is, has been, or will be. An extremely major difference in scope.

In sum of what ought to not be so readily overlooked, in theoretical principle only, if so much as one occurrence can occur and/or cease occurring in manners devoid of any determinants and hence reasons, then:

• By what means can you conclude that the occurrence or disappearance of anything whatsoever is not in fact the same feat of pure nonsense (here, "pure nonsense" being shorthand for an event that holds no determinants, and hence reasons for occurring, whatsoever)?

The supposed principle is let down by three ambiguities. "What is it that it seeks to explain?" "What counts as sufficient?" And "What counts as a reason?". — Banno

A reason is an “aitia”: an account of why, irrespective of the type of account it would be: e.g., causal, teleological, constitutional, or else formal. More technically, one could also address a reason as an account of what determinants (again, irrespective of type, as per the aforementioned examples) in part or in whole determined that addressed – thereby being the reason for the presence or occurrence or being of that addressed.

What is sought to be explained is whatever exists, in particular or in general, in the abstract or in the concrete – this in the present, in the past, in the future, or else atemporally (with natural laws being a possible example of the latter type of existence, this if they indeed never change throughout all of time (not my own point of view but all the same)).

“Sufficient” specifies the following when it comes to causes:

Sufficient causes
If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the subsequent occurrence of y. However, another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the prior occurrence of x.[20] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality#Necessary_and_sufficient_causes

... here, replace "cause" with "reason" and remove the implied necessity that the determinant precedes that which it determines (this not being the case for final causes, material causes, or formal causes). The meaning of "sufficient" will then remain the same for the context of "sufficient reason".

If the PSR does not apply, then at least some occurrences can occur and cease occurring in manners utterly devoid of any conceivable determinants – this irrespective of appearances and beliefs to the contrary, for the latter too could of themselves then be events that hold no conceivable determinants for being or ceasing to be. If this were to in fact be the case, then, quite rationally, the only cogent conclusion is that all epistemology would eventually implode when analyzed: There would then be no means of establishing what, if anything, occurs via some determinants rather than occurring in manners that are utterly “magical” - to use the pejorative meaning of the word. No justification would then rationally hold any water or carry any weight – for that which constitutes the justification could itself in fact be devoid of any substance and, hence, not capable of justifying anything. There could then be no declarative truth, which relies upon justifiability. And there could then be no grounded knowledge or understanding of any sort regarding reality or any aspect of it.

If the PSR does apply, then epistemologies can hold, and thereby knowledge and understanding of what is in fact real and what is not. As too can tychism then cogently hold: the randomness of some events too here will have their reasons, i.e. explanations: for one relatively easy to express example of this, the degree of randomness, if any, in a soccer game’s outcome will be determined by the skill of the respective team members of each team, with each team’s actions being of itself in large part teleologically determined by the final cause – here, more specifically, aim – of winning the addressed game.

To chose against the PSR is to shoot oneself in the foot in terms of reasoning, philosophy, knowledge, and the like. Or, at best, is to revert to a literal interpretation of "it is so because I so state it is" - which is not any better.

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That offered, the PSR says nothing about there needing to be a first cause to all that is – existence could just as conceivably be devoid of any ascertainable beginning, with our current physical universe being only the latest iteration an any number of prior Big Bounces or the like – to not even start on the PSR saying nothing about the notion of a grand omni-this-and-that “designer” deity.

So why on earth would someone explore deeply into their tradition of inherited norms to determine how to best act? It would arise from a respect of tradition and a recognition of the successes such a tradition has previously yielded. — Hanover

I've acknowledged the importance of tradition previously via the Crane quote.

But this then can raise the question of whether - for one example currently pertinent to the ethics of the US populace - such a thing as Christian Nationalism's desire to hold onto its Christian traditions ethically outweighs the very teachings of Jesus Christ himself - the latter, more often than not, stand in direct contradiction to the ethos of the former. A Christianity that holds no respect for what its official founder honored and desired ... sounds exceedingly vacuous - as something that JC's spirit might itself be utterly antagonistic to and angry about - at least to me.

And then you have various other traditions from all over the world, Judaic, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Inuit, and so on; none of which can cohabitate peacefully were each tradition to vie for a power over all others, this so as to remain in no way altered by any other, believing itself the sacred pinnacle around which all of life and sacredness and morality revolves.

Via examples such as these I then uphold that: Yes, tradition of course has its importance, but it ought not be the be-all and end-all to ethics and ethical conduct, very much including in relation to the so called "righteousness of rules".

To use previously addressed concepts and terminology: tradition does not of itself equate to that which is the Good - also addressed as "God" by some - and tradition, irrespective of what it might be, can only be good when it is aligned with the latter.

So when we have lots of crises with human induced climate change, we might learn to deal with it, eventually. — unenlightened

One can only hope. But it is certain not to happen devoid of involvement, and maybe even commitment, on the part of most members of humanity in sharing at the very least this common cause. And, although the details might be lacking, such can only then signify a global governance of one form or another. May it indeed be one of moral rectitude.

I of course grant a good portion of what you say. Yet to my knowledge there are many variants of Judaism, with Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform branches being only very general examples of these. And if we for further example go back into antiquity, prior to the Maccabean Revolt, there were great sums of Hellenized Jews in Judeia.

As to the first question as to how one would not make the two compatible, would be someone who accepted a very strict divine command theory, where textual support or reference to oral tradition is analyzed for the rule one is to follow.

That tends to be the approach of orthodox Judaism, as an example. — Hanover

Slightly bringing this back into the purview of the general notion of the Good / the One: Kabbalah teachings, including those of the tree of life, are pivoted upon the Ein Sof - which holds the very same attributes as the Good (as previously discussed in this thread). This says it better than I can:

Ein Sof, or Eyn Sof (/eɪn sɒf/, Hebrew: אֵין סוֹף‎ ʾēn sōf; meaning "infinite", lit. '(There is) no end'), in Kabbalah, is understood as God before any self-manifestation in the production of any spiritual realm, probably derived from Solomon ibn Gabirol's (c.1021–c.1070) term, "the Endless One" (שֶׁאֵין לוֹ תִּקְלָה šeʾēn lo tiqlā). Ein Sof may be translated as "unending", "(there is) no end", or infinity.[1] It was first used by Azriel of Gerona (c. 1160 – c. 1238), who, sharing the Neoplatonic belief that God can have no desire, thought, word, or action, emphasized by the negation of any attribute. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ein_Sof

This then being - or at least gives all indication of being - the very same ontic reality interpreted via different filters of culture and reasoning.

I know it can get complex, but this reference for example illustrates that the Kabbalah and Orthodox Judaism are by no means two separate belief systems. Nor does the Kabbalah seem to in any way be a fringe system of beliefs in respect to Judaism at large, including when considering Orthodox Judaism.

Here, then, there appears to be a good amount of theological reasoning involved in relation to the nature of God and reality to total - and this in respect to Orthodox Judaism.

It so far feels like you are unfairly pigeonholing most of what Judaism consists of.

While this last suggestion might seem odd, it does to some degree describe the Judaic view, where faith in the existence of God is really not all that important from a daily living or eternal reward perspective. What is important is knowing the rule, studying the rule and following the rule. Faith, under this system, is in the righteousness of the rule, not in the existence of God himself. But always most important in not what you beleive and why you believe, but what you do. — Hanover

This is very easy to say, but exceedingly difficult to in any way comprehend. Should one understand that "duty and adherence" to "the righteousness of the rule" is done for no reason, motive, whatsoever? Unless what one addresses are automata - rather than sentient people - this can only be utter nonsense. And if there is some motive for so doing, this motive has nothing to do with "the existence reality of God" playing an important role in "a daily living or eternal reward benefit perspective"??? What other plausible reason could there be for "the righteousness of the rule"?

The idea does bug me, the thought that if it's all just chemicals then there would be no real reason to not plug into it. What difference is there if we can just replicate everything? — Darkneos

The same roundabout question can be asked in alternative means, such as: Would you willingly undergo a lobotomy knowing that the lobotomy will make you perpetually pleased with all aspects of life in general, this irrespective of what might happen to you, even if the lobotomy entails you becoming generally oblivious via the operation?

I’ll make the following hypothesis: The reason we wouldn’t willingly lobotomize ourselves or else place ourselves into a perpetual “experience machine” (were the latter possible) for the sake of obtaining optimal pleasure or happiness has a lot to do with our inherent nature – even if we’re not consciously aware of it – specifically, an inherent nature where we (or at least a majority of us) value reality, thereby that which is in fact actual, and conformity to such, thereby truth, above all else.

Why then would we so value reality and, hence, truth? Maybe because we tacitly (if not also unconsciously) know with dire – although unspoken – conviction that only reality and truth thus understood can bring about our optimal happiness and wellbeing, aka our optimal eudemonia - such that here our eudemonia is not false, illusory, and thereby eventually results in our unwanted pains and suffering. And this unspoken desire then reigns supreme in our multitude of desires irrespective of the obstacles and strifes that might dwell on the way to approaching this pristine reality and one’s conformity to, ultimately maybe unity with, it.

I grant that this hypothesis is not easy to logically establish. That it in many a way transcends the convictions of physicalism - which, after all, gives little if any understanding of the reality of meaning itself. And that many, in in fact holding this very desire, prefer to consciously give up on it rather than endure the unpleasantries of living with this desire perpetually unfulfilled. Thereby arriving at affirmed conclusions such as that there is no meaning to anything: something which can pacify an otherwise unfulfilled desire and what might best be described as the suffering associated with this lack of fulfillment.

That said, were this offered hypothesis to be more accurate than not, then of course we would not choose to lobotomize ourselves, or else permanently plug into an experience machine, for so doing would remove us from closer proximity to a better grasping of this very nature of reality, of what is in fact actual … this being where, given the addressed hypothesis, the only genuine form of optimal eudemonia can be found – an optimal eudemonia that, again, is in large part constituted of optimal understanding (and hence meaning) regarding that which is real and true.

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I won’t endeavor to here “prove” this proposed hypothesis: it’s by no means something easy to do, and most certainly impossible in soundbite forum form. Nevertheless, the hypothesis does answer the question of why we (typically) don’t do things such as desire to lobotomize ourselves or else enter the unrealities of an experience machine – this irrespective of the prospective pleasures such might promise and possibly accomplish.

I should add that, in the absence of this hypothesis, I have not answer to give for why one ought not, for one example, lobotomize oneself, or else choose to perpetually remain in a virtual reality.

I don't wish to derail the thread unless you think this an interesting question, but I'd point to the Athens/Jerusalem distinction that asks to what extent reason (the Athens approach) should play in theological discussions versus duty and adherence (the Jerusalem approach). — Hanover

This raises the question: If not "duty and adherence" to that which is accordant with "reason" (which ought not be confused with a strict adherence to today's formal logics), then "duty and adherence" in respect to what?

I maintain hopefully not a "duty and adherence" to that which is thereby utterly unreasonable in all respects.

Basically, I don't find "reason" and "duty and adherence" to be in any way antagonistic but, instead, to require each other - and this rather intimately - within the context of theological discussions. This if any semblance of theological truth is to be approached.

Then, of course, there's the issue of traditions in respect to theological issues. And, in this regard, who's to deny the presence of truth in the following - be one an atheist, a theist, or something other:

Tradition, thou art for suckling children,
Thou art the enlivening milk for babes;
But no meat for men is in thee.
Then --
But, alas, we all are babes. — Stephen Crane

As I've previously mentioned, I'm agnostic about the Trinity - not being a Christian myself, although I admire JC a great deal in multiple ways. That said, I very much like your perspectives regarding the topic.

Or there is the view in Ferdinand Ulrich of being itself being fundamentally "gift." — Count Timothy von Icarus

In the ambiguities of the English language - which I find work wonders for poetical expressions and compositions - I often enough indulge in the double sense of the term "the present". Such that to live in the present becomes in part understood as to live in the gift. This quote reminds me of this.

Clearly neither of you understand the prisoner's dilemma. You, the prisoner, cannot "create incentives", you have to rely on each other's solidarity - or not. — unenlightened

I concur with

But if you’re going to get all technical about it, the most interesting part of the prisoner’s dilemma game theory is in discovery of those strategies that outcompete others within iterated versions of the original game theory:

Interest in the iterated prisoner's dilemma was kindled by Robert Axelrod in his 1984 book The Evolution of Cooperation, in which he reports on a tournament that he organized of the N-step prisoner's dilemma (with N fixed) in which participants have to choose their strategy repeatedly and remember their previous encounters. Axelrod invited academic colleagues from around the world to devise computer strategies to compete in an iterated prisoner's dilemma tournament. The programs that were entered varied widely in algorithmic complexity, initial hostility, capacity for forgiveness, and so forth.

Axelrod discovered that when these encounters were repeated over a long period of time with many players, each with different strategies, greedy strategies tended to do very poorly in the long run while more altruistic strategies did better, as judged purely by self-interest. He used this to show a possible mechanism for the evolution of altruistic behavior from mechanisms that are initially purely selfish, by natural selection.

The winning deterministic strategy was tit for tat, developed and entered into the tournament by Anatol Rapoport. It was the simplest of any program entered, containing only four lines of BASIC,[10] and won the contest. The strategy is simply to cooperate on the first iteration of the game; after that, the player does what his or her opponent did on the previous move.[11] Depending on the situation, a slightly better strategy can be "tit for tat with forgiveness": when the opponent defects, on the next move, the player sometimes cooperates anyway, with a small probability (around 1–5%, depending on the lineup of opponents). This allows for occasional recovery from getting trapped in a cycle of defections.

After analyzing the top-scoring strategies, Axelrod stated several conditions necessary for a strategy to succeed:[12]

Nice: The strategy will not be the first to defect (this is sometimes referred to as an "optimistic" algorithm[by whom?]), i.e., it will not "cheat" on its opponent for purely self-interested reasons first. Almost all the top-scoring strategies were nice.[a]
Retaliating: The strategy must sometimes retaliate. An example of a non-retaliating strategy is Always Cooperate, a very bad choice that will frequently be exploited by "nasty" strategies.
Forgiving: Successful strategies must be forgiving. Though players will retaliate, they will cooperate again if the opponent does not continue to defect. This can stop long runs of revenge and counter-revenge, maximizing points.
Non-envious: The strategy must not strive to score more than the opponent. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner's_dilemma#Axelrod's_tournament_and_successful_strategy_conditions

In summary, altruistic heuristics that retain a sense of justice – with the “tit for tat with forgiveness” program exemplifying this – do best long-term, outcompeting all other strategies that can be employed in this particular game theory. Learned of this back in university days. To me, it's a rather nifty empirical means of addressing theoretical issues of ethics - ethics which, lo and behold, turn out to have their pragmatic advantages long-term.

That said, such altruistic heuristics are something direly missing in most of today’s politics, especially in regard to climate change. As just one notable example, the Kyoto Protocol is long gone now, and an abject failure precisely due to the lack of such strategies.

I think the standard Patristic response here would be to object to the literal reading of Scripture. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In case it wasn't obvious, I'm in agreement with this. Still, interpolations of all sorts have been made galore, and some of these become dogma at expense of others being then deemed heretical. Aside from which, it is relatively typical for most to treat scripture as God's word, however interpreted, rather than the words of fallible humans, some of which were bound to be more aligned with the Good than others - such that the others here addressed might have been less than honest with themselves in terms of what is and is not known.

At any rate, my last post was an attempt to exemplify the implications of the previously given post. Such that the Good being utterly nondualistic and finite-less understanding, hence awareness, which serves as ground for all existence and existents cannot logically be any deity - this irrespective of the nature of the deity addressed - but which nevertheless teleologically moves the deity(ies) specified (this were deities to be in any way existent or else occurring) via either their free will guided affinities toward the Good or their free will guided aversions to it (e.g., by deeming the Good a falsehood, thereby being a false promise, thereby being an incorrect and hence wrong appraisal of what is real which, as such, can only result in both short and long-term suffering - this as can be exemplified in the conviction that love always leads to suffering or else in laughter at love, peace, and understanding).

In short, though, my last post attempted to exemplify that the Good as God cannot be a deity (but, instead, can only be that to which deities we can label "good" are teleologically aligned to - this much in the same way that relatively selfless or non-self-centered humans are more teleologically aligned to the Good than relatively selfish humans are).

All this being in keeping with your description of the One / the Good as:

The One is not, as it were, unconscious, rather all things belong to it and are in it and with it, it is completely self-discerning, life is in it and all things are in it, and its intellection of itself is itself and exists by a kind of self-consciousness in eternal rest and in an intellection different from the intellection of the Intellect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And this as an ultimate telos rather than a deity (that for example sees and judges what we do as other) which, as such, is the only end that is not a means to any other - and which, as ultimate telos, thereby both awaits and at all times accompanies. And in this roundabout respect can then be stated to be omnibenevolent without any hypocrisy.

I'm not really sure what "I-ness" is supposed to mean here, or why a "deity" is defined by it. To refer to my earlier point, these notions have long been theological orthodoxy in the traditional churches, but have not been seen as precluding that God is God. God is impassible, eternal, immutable, not a being, simple, unlimited, etc. and this is precisely why God is God. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'll say this as an agnostic in relation to the reality of the Trinity, but here is an example of how the aforementioned could be rationally accounted for within Christian contexts, here treating the issue of the Trinity more from a comparative religions view point wherein the Good is presumed to be real, this rather then relying on dogma or any particular authority:

Instead of assuming that the Father is an omni-creator Lord which walks the earth (logically contrary to be omnipresence), which is upset by the doings of the serpent, Eve, and Adom (logically contrary to omniscience and omnipotence), and who thereby curses them all and the generations that will follow with animosity and suffering (logically contrary to omnibenevolence), assume that the Father is Elohim, the “We” of Genisis I, which is commonly understood as a plurality of beings all unified … here assume unified in their affinity and proximity to the Good (which could under certain interpretations be understood as the ineffable G-d). (Granted, in so assuming, the Lord of Gensis II onwards is then potentially be a being which formerly partook of Elohim but then presumed himself to be the entirety of, or else the superlative pinnacle of, divinity – this then being contrary to alignment toward the Good. Here echoing certain Gnostic interpretations wherein JC is conceived as an embodiment of the serpent’s spirit which, as such, attempted to bring knowledge of right (i.e., the Good) and wrong to all, this being contra the Gnostic Demiurge’s wants.)

So the Father is here presumed to be the unified plurality of celestial beings which addresses itself in Genesis I as “We”, the same which says let there be light (presumably, awareness of the Good) in a time of darkness.

Next presume JC to be in some spiritual sense unified with Elohim, this in terms of understanding, knowledge, awareness at large – such as could occur given henosis.

Next presume the Holy Spirit to be – rather than some who knows what thing or ghost – something at least akin to what C.S. Peirce termed Agapism: the universal process of agape via which universal evolution works, here, ultimately, toward a universal realization of the Good.

Then, given these presumptions, there is plenty of possibility for a logically sound Trinity to occur – wherein Elohim, JC, and the Holy Spirit, though sperate in their own right, unify into the same deity, the same identity of I-ness which addresses itself as “We”. However unfathomable such a deity might be, it as deity would yet remain extremely aligned and proximate to the Good (more Abrahamically, to G-d), the latter being a non-deity. And this rather than being the Good (else G-d) itself. The trinity will yet be endowed with some dualism, such as being other than that which is wrong (in an Abrahamic sense, call such Satan), or else in terms of hearing and responding to prayers. Whereas the Good (G-d) – that to which the Trintiy is the unfathomably proximate - will yet be perfectly nondualistic in all respects.

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Again, I’m agnostic about the Trinity’s reality. And I am not myself a Christian, in that I acknowledge truths in many another religion out there. Traditional interpretations, dogmas, and notions of heresy aside, I so far find that this understanding of the trinity – when allowing for the ontic occurrence of celestial beings – becomes fully cogent in manners devoid of all logical contradictions.

And, due to the wide ranging potential audience of this forum, I’ll add to the aforementioned another honest opinion: there is no reason or need to believe in celestial beings of any kind in order to uphold the ontic reality of the Good – one could just as well be a naturalistic pantheist and do so, as just one example to this effect.

A footnote: the philosophical term is 'ipseity' — Wayfarer

Sure, but I wanted to be as easy to understand as possible; and ipseity of itself tmk does not address the easy to overlook dichotomy between the a) pure/transcendental ego which is the knower of self and b) the empirical ego which is the self thus known.

I saw that in the sayings of the Advaita sage Ramana Maharishi, that he would frequently draw attention to the bibical God's proclamation of His identity "I AM THAT I AM" (Ex 3:14). This, he equated with the Self as the ultimate (or only) reality. — Wayfarer

Here again, though, it would only be the self as pure/transcendental ego rather than the self as the empirical ego which could be cogently understood as the "ultimate (or only) reality". El, then, would be aligned and proximate to the pure form of this ultimate reality, such as via henosis, but - by virtue of proclaiming something to someone other - could not be this ultimate reality, i.e. the Good, itself, for the Good is utterly nondualistic and devoid of any finitude (etc.) in all respects.

And, then, one could potentially interpret the pure/transcendental ego as being in keeping with no-self (this in the complete absence of an empirical ego - as the Good necessitates by virtue of being nondualistic in any manner), this as per Buddhist doctrine in relation to the issue of self.

ps. Thereby resulting in the interpretation of the Good being an utterly and literally selfless state of infinite being - one which the relative selflessness of human beings better approximates in comparison to relatively selfish human beings.