I agree with the absurdity of it:

Where is there motion (in the philosophical sense of change - such as causation requires) within maths themselves? Without mathematics consisting of the causation by which we live - or, at the very least, accounting for why we hold the illusion of constantly changing, in a temporally unidirectional manner at that, within a mathematical 4D block universe - mathematics cannot be equivalent to the world.

Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and equations. What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe? — Stephen Hawking

... or, in this case, the universe as we know it.

I wonder that if in some way a phenomenological approach and its wholesale 'dissolution' of totalizing metanarratives is not in itself a form of metanarrative. Can one make the claim that what we experience are intersubjective agreements between localized communities of narrative (and the personal, subjective location), without this coming from a totalizing viewpoint? — Tom Storm

I’m not one to believe that one can. To be more to the point, at least as I currently see things:

I’ve so far found totalizing meta-narratives to apply to all forms of supposed relativism that attempt to deny any kind of objective reality - the latter being itself presumed by such to be just one more relativistic narrative. So denying manifests a logical contradiction wherein an objective reality both does and does not occur at the same time and in the same respect: namely, the objective reality of the relativism proposed - which is itself a totalizing meta-narrative.

So that it’s said, I mention this with the firm understanding that objective reality is not logically necessitated to strictly pertain to the physical; as one example of this which I find relatively easy to express and understand: that “I am / we are (currently)” can well be argued to be an objective, rather than subjective, reality - this including even within the most funky interpretations of Berkeleyan idealism, wherein nothing material/physical occurs - for the nature of this offered reality is, or at least can well be argued to be, fully independent of my/our beliefs, justifications, biases, etc., for or against.

Since I find this relevant, as one example: Einstein’s ToR does depend on certain “totalizing meta-narratives” for its implementation: the constant speed of light and the occurrence of observers (however “an observer” is therein interpreted) as two elements of it that I think could serve as adequate examples. More directly from my pov: It is a relativistic system grounded in, or else governed by, a list of objective realities which we at least presume to be. To the extent that the ToR in its current form is mistaken (say, because the variable speed of light theory happens to be true and thereby correct), the objective realities it is currently dependent on will then be themselves evidenced to be mistaken … hence at that point being evidenced to be mere narratives. Yet this does not take away from that fact that whatever then takes their place will yet be our best inference of what is in fact objectively real … which, again, will ground or else govern the system of relativity in the ToR.

I can see the relativist’s take on this … that all our best current assumptions of objective reality are narratives. But I don’t concede to there being no objective reality in actuality on account of the logical contradiction previously mentioned that this brings about. (Yes, here upholding the law/principle of noncontradiction.)

Though your question didn't directly address objectivity, I hope that I've satisfactorily addressed the underlying issue posed. Well, at least tentatively so ...

More importantly, how ought I make sense of this statement:

I think the kinds of suppositions that would make a ‘meta’ useful or even coherent [in relation to meta-ethics] have been unraveled by phenomenological approaches. — Joshs

... given that phenomenology disavows there being a "meta" in relation to ethics / values?

Just seems to illustrate what I initially affirmed: phenomenology does not address meta-ethics.

And you believe there are such things as meta-ethical
givens, right? — Joshs

Apparently just as much as you believe there aren't. Moral objectivity v. moral relativism in a nutshell.

Just wanted to through this into the game: a contradiction, as per Aristotle, specifies contradictory givens (propositions, states of affair, experiences, etc.) that occur at the same time and in the same respect.

All questions pre-suppose the conditions of their possibility. So your question pre-supposes the coherence of the idea of something being able to be thought that is beyond all conditions and contingencies, and it also assumes the coherence of the universal. But for phenomenology both of these. it is are derived abstractions generated from a subjectivity that is radically contingent and temporal — Joshs

I get that, but then how can I interpret this in any other way than affirming that there are no (objective, if one wills) meta-ethical givens?

You mean you haven’t found in Thompson a satisfactorily meta-ethics? — Joshs

Or in any of my second-hand readings regarding phenomenology as an established philosophy, such as in its established distinction between noesis and noema.

I think the kinds of suppositions that would make a ‘meta’ useful or even coherent have been unraveled by phenomenological approaches. — Joshs

OK, I'm definitely curious. What is the non-conditional good that is universally applicable to all value judgments that anyone can make (to be clear, from Saint Teresa to Jack the Ripper) as described by phenomenology? If it is a long argument that you'd rather not engage in, can you point me toward where such exposition is given.

Edit: On second thought, in case I've misinterpreted this quoted statement, I of course agree that subjective experience needs to be analyzed - this as systematically as needed - so as to facilitate any hope of discovering that which is the "non-conditional good" of meta-ethics. And, my bad if my possible misinterpretation irked you.

Anyway, as I see it, if you are looking for ways to talk about ultimacy, you have to go "to the things themselves" and here, you have to discover the "Otherness" of the world. In my thought, this begins with Husserl. See his Ideas I, and prior (or contemporaneously) the last books of Logical Investigations which I am just reading now for the first time. Husserl gets very intimate with the intuitive disclosure of the world and gives the whole affair ground breaking language. One cannot SAY the world, but one can approach it, negatively (apophatically) go into it. Husserl's phenomenological reduction is like this: a method, not unlike meditation! — Astrophel

I have affinities to this branch of philosophy. Very much enjoyed reading Thompson's Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, for example. Haven't yet read Husserl, though. Still, I've so far not found in it a satisfactory exposition of meta-ethics. And meta-ethics naturally addresses issues of value such as those we've been discussing. If you, @Joshs, or someone else disagree and knows of such, please inform me of them / point me toward the reading.

That's an exceedingly nice analogy. Bravo! for it.

But in relation to my previous argument, I would suggest that while consciousness might be put forward as the unique attribute of a player, thought is very much a mechanical process of 0s and 1s. — unenlightened

One issue that can be raised: Might not an individual consciousness ontically create some of the mechanical process of its own thought? In so thinking, the issue becomes one of whether there is any degree of mind over matter involved in our existence. If we are to any small degree masters of our fate. If free will, then the answer becomes "yes" - with many details remaining to be worked out. If no free will, then there is a resounding "no" to these questions.

This is a bit tangental, but might give another perspective on the source of freedom ...

http://accountability.qwriting.qc.cuny.edu/files/2016/08/Philosophy-of-Education-Chapter-2_-Pedagogy-of-the-Oppressed.pdf — unenlightened

Skimmed through the chapter. I find myself in agreement with what I've read. Such as (taken from the concluding paragraph):

Problem-­posing education does not and cannot serve the interests of the oppressor. No
oppressive order could permit the oppressed to begin to question: Why? — Paulo Freire

In which ways do you find this relevant to the topics of this thread?

:grin: Hey, thanks for the reply. Iffy about this post since I don’t want to take away from the OP, but I’ll post it as a minor sidenote regarding alternative views.

Supposing consciousness to be a different substance — javra

Consciousness is not a substance (Re: Substance ia particular kind of matter with uniform properties.).

[...]

I would rather say "substance - non-substance" dualism . — Alkis Piskas

In the way you are using “substance”, I would tend to agree with your notion of a duality between “information as substance” and “consciousness/awareness as non-substance”. So it’s known, I wrote substance in the substance-theory sense of that which is an ontically independent and non-contingent given, and which ontically occurs before changes, during changes, and after changes - that which undergoes changes without being itself changed - in a sense, as that which “stands beneath” all attributes and changes and thereby serves as a primary ontological foundation to all else that occurs.

To however share a different perspective - this where “substance” is understood as I’ve just described it - if a) we take information to be something that can be both ontically created and eradicated (as one example, when a person dies some of the persons unique psychical information, like hopes and dreams, can be argued to disappear forever from the physical world; conversely, with a person’s birth new psychical information can come into being), b) further presume a metaphysical primacy of awareness (to include all forms of unconscious awareness in addition to our conscious awareness), and c) then further premise that all existent information is in one way or another and in some ultimate sense contingent upon awareness, then we obtain the following: in a topsy-turvy manner to what was first mentioned, there here is a duality between “awareness as substance” and “information as non-substance”. This without in any way taking away from awareness being “in-formed” by the information it is bound to, very much including the physical information of the body and, hence, brain. Mentioned in part because this latter phrasing is accordant to my own current metaphysical beliefs. If any of this strikes you as a wrongheaded mindset, please let me know.

for its identity as ego or self — javra

Now here we are moving here into a quite controversial area! :smile: — Alkis Piskas

Very true. But awareness devoid of any information could then not be limited or bounded (else expressed, ratioed in relation to anything else) and so could then not have an ego or self, for the latter is always bounded/limited in some sense to itself, entailing a psyche and its relation to other. Instead, the awareness would be concluded to be limitless or boundless, hence with no subject-object divide (in part because no information would occur for this to happen). On the upside, being literally limitless, awareness would then be literally infinite. Something like the actualization of (not just inference of) Nirvana, or some such, as an ultimate reality that consists of a literally selfless/egoless awareness. But yea, a very controversial area indeed.

At any rate, I do find that our selfhood (but not awareness) is contingent on the information that surrounds.

I think you are close, or, closer than anyone I have come across. — Astrophel

Wow, thank you much.

But you don't quite say what intrinsic value IS. [...] What makes it intrinsic? Being non contingent. [...] Intrinsic value can't be something that is relativized to a particular person's tastes, for if, say, skiing were an intrinsic value, it would be a value for all. Intrinsic values are not variable.
The trick is to reconcile the vagaries of subjectivity with the requirements of intrinsic value. — Astrophel

In my defense, I took my best shot at answering the thread’s question of “what has intrinsic value?”, not bothering with the issue of what intrinsic value is in the metaphysical sense.

Doing so is no easy task. But I’ll just say that if intrinsic value is a non-contingent end-in-itself this to me strongly connotes concepts of an ultimate reality. Brahman as an eastern, Hindu notion of this; the One as a western Neo-platonic notion. The underlying idea pivoting around the supposition that all sentient beings are, for lack of a better phrasing, fragmented emanations of this ultimate reality which is not contingent and is an end-in-itself. Thereby making each sentient being endowed with that which is not contingent and an end-in-itself, i.e. with intrinsic value, relative to itself.

I’m quite certain that this will be odd sounding to many hereabouts. And I don’t mean to defend this position. So far though it's my best understanding of how your question can be addressed. Open to alternatives though ...

Problem is that you can never know. — Janus

Not with infallible certainty, no, but I at least believe that one can justify the universe not being accurately described by physicalism to a sufficient extent.

Is there any point entertaining a question, the answer to which could never be determined (beyond entertaining it just once in order to realize what alternative possibilities are imaginable)? — Janus

With what I just said in mind, imo, sure there are substantial points to entertaining non-physicalist systems of ontology. As one example I find noteworthy, if non-physicalism, then the possibility opens up of there ontically being such a thing as an objective good superseding any psyche (to be clear corporeal or, if such occur, incorporeal). This objective good in contrast to physicalism’s requisite moral relativism, which, for instance, at the end of the day maintains that the Nazis were good folks relative to their own social way of being. Concentration camps and all. This no more and no less in any objective sense then those who were/are antagonistic to them.

Which stance are we talking about here? His, or mine? You quoted me, so supposing my stance, that we are not only our thoughts, your comment that we don’t necessarily change along with our thoughts, seems to support it, which isn’t in contrast to it. — Mww

My bad, I should have made myself more explicit: If my thoughts and other attributes can change without me changing along with them, then it seems reasonable to conclude that I am neither my thoughts nor my other attributes. But that - just as our language coincidentally has it - my thoughts and other attributes are things that belong, or else pertain, to me (rather than equating to me).

That I am not my thoughts and other attributes is a different perspective than the one you mentioned ... a perspective that to me holds at least some justification.

On the other hand, one could fall back on “knowledge that”, in order to escape “knowledge of”. Like I said....gotta be careful. — Mww

I was going more for knowledge by acquaintance ... as in, "I know what I saw". Still, point taken.

Where is the ability to actualise a different outcome, viz. tea? My fixed desire is for coffee. — unenlightened

Well, going by what I previously said: If it is a fixed desire, then in this instance there would thereby be no deliberation between the alternatives of tea or coffee - no degree of psychological uncertainty between which to choose, which is requisite for deliberation - hence no consciously made choice/decision is being made and, hence, no conscious utilization of free will ... volitional thought the activity of you saying "I want coffee" to the waiter is (this on grounds of it nevertheless yet being in accord with some other longer-term goal you might have ... just guessing at hypotheses, such as that of quenching your thirst in manners that don't displease you).

One can argue that potential alternatives to what we do are rampant everywhere at all times: "choices" as you call them. But its only when we consciously deliberate between alternatives that we in any way engage in conscious choice-making.

And, in case this comes up: Yes, not each and every activity we engage in is freely willed/chosen by us as conscious beings at each and every instant. Or, at least, so I argue. Most of what we do is decided by out sub/unconscious - sub/unconscious decisions often enough guided by our previously made conscious choices. E.g., I chose to drink coffee after a bit of conscious deliberation between coffee and tea, so I then move the cup to my mouth without in any way deciding on how to best do so.

This " ability to actualize different outcomes" is where all the difficulty hides. — unenlightened

Full agreement here.

Supposing consciousness to be a different substance from the information it is aware of, wouldn't you agree that all this scientific evidence nevertheless demonstrates that the limits or boundaries of an individual human consciousness is for all intended purposes largely, if not fully, set by the brain?

To clarify: In this substance-dualism supposition just offered, information - be it the physical information of the body, the psychical perceptual information of what is perceived, and so forth - would literally give form to, i.e. in-form, one’s consciousness such that it holds specific limits or boundaries … A consciousness which is yet upheld to be a different substance from that of information, including that of the physical information which is the body, but which - in being so limited/bounded by the body - is nevertheless dependent on the body’s being for its moment to moment form (i.e., for its identity as ego or self).

Merely asking out of a curiosity to better discern your worldview.



Likewise kudos for - from what I can currently tell - a well thought out thesis. And I say this as a non-physicalist.

Except I am more than my thoughts. I am not only my thoughts. — Mww

In contrast to such stance, it at least seems valid that I don't necessarily change whenever my thoughts change. As one example: I'm the same being I was any number of years ago, despite many of my thoughts having drastically changed over the years. To not mention changes in my body.

Which in a roundabout way brings to mind Descartes: if he knew he was because he thought and knew he thought because he doubted (per common interpretations of his philosophy, doubt proves thought proving the "I" as thinker), then: did he not know he was (i.e., existed - but not in the "stands out" sense) whenever he didn't doubt his own existence?

Else, assuming that the "I" is equivalent to its own thoughts + other attributes, was Descartes not the same person when he didn't try to doubt his own being?

(personal identity is quite the headache, at least for me)

Choice-making and desiring are not one and the same process, and so can’t be simplified into the same given. Other than that, I don’t see any significant disagreement between your latest post and what I’ve stated in regard to free will. But please clarify if you do.

I’m mainly replying because I don’t yet understand how you find my definition of free will contradictory, this given a modern standard English use of the term “will”. For ease of reference, I’ll succinctly summarize my tentative definition of free will here: Free will is the partly-determinate ontic ability to actualize different outcomes in those self-identical situations wherein one deliberates between two or more possible outcomes – this such that the decision one makes between said alternatives will be partly determined by, at the very minimum, one’s momentarily held goal (i.e., long term intent; long term desired outcome).

To be clear, I’m not here interested in whether free will thus defined occurs. Only in addressing other possible misunderstanding of semantics via which this general definition can be found, as you’ve previously said, contradictory (needless to add, when it is considered in whole).

One more time...

A chess player on her turn is free to make any legal move. Her will is to make the best move she can.
The only sense I can make of her 'free will' is not that she can make a poor move, but that she can stop playing chess.

The following is a simplification:-
Freedom is 'you can have what you want'
Free will is 'you can want what you don't want', or, 'you can not want what you want'. This contradiction is built in to your definition as...

different outcomes / effects can be generated in identical situations — javra — unenlightened

We seem to have so far been speaking past each other.

To my best understanding, the issue is with your use of “will”, which in what I've quoted and like instances in your post is not common standard English use: You are conflating “choice” (common standard English synonym for “will”) with “desire” (archaic synonym for “will”).

In: “Her desire (or want) is to make the best move she can” one here is addressing "will" as the goal toward which she aspires. And, in this sense and context, it makes no sense to state that her desire, else goal, is something she can freely alter in the given situation - this on account of it being preestablished that that in fact is her desire/goal in the situation.

In: “Her choice is to make the best move she can” one here is addressing “will” as a conscious deliberation between two or more alternatives. And, in this sense and context, it does make sense to state that her choice is not fully predetermined in all conceivable manners. If her choice/decision is to make the best move she can, this then was one of two or more outcomes during a previous deliberation: the other potential outcome maybe having been that of intentionally allowing the other to claim a checkmate. Here, she chose to play the best she can rather than let the other win.

As to the smoking addiction example, it’s a good example for the issue of free will; but again, not when will is taken to be synonymous with desire. Rather it would make for a good example when addressed in terms of choice - which requires deliberation between alternative outcomes. But here we’d be addressing the more complex issue of willpower: the ability to adhere to one’s formerly made choice come what may; hence, in the example of addiction, irrespective of the passions (wants as you’ve termed them) and other dolors which goad you toward not realizing what you’ve chosen.

If you insist that “will” is not equivalent to “choice” in the context of (philosophical) free will, on what grounds do you do so?

My take on the reality of universals (and numbers, laws, principles and the like) is that they are only perceptible to reason, but they're the same for all who think. I suppose you can say mythological animals, like unicorns, and fictional characters, like Sherlock Holmes, are real in the sense that they're part of a shared culture, but they're fictional nonetheless. The Pythagoeran theorem is real in a way that they aren't, although spelling out why is obviously going to be tricky. — Wayfarer

I’ve mentioned this before … some long time ago. I’m myself operating with the notion of there being distinct forms of reality within the metaphysics I’ve been working on: intra-subjective reality in the plural (realities strictly located within an individual subject: e.g., the reality of one’s dreams: “that was a real dream I had an not a lie”); inter-subjective reality, also in the plural (e.g. languages and cultures, as well as religions, etc.); [now termed] equi-subjective reality, which is singular [poetically, “the uni-verse” where “verse” is taken to be equivalent to logos] (very much including physical objectivity, as well as at least some universals such as that of a circle: basically that set of actualities which affect and effect all subjects equally with or without their awareness … and, hence, this regardless of their intra-realities and inter-realties); and last but not least, ultra-subjective reality (a lot more cumbersome to succinctly express, but, in short, that which is considered to be ultimate reality … by all means in no way necessitating an Omnipotent Deity, it could just as well be Nirvana, or Brahman, or “the One” (or, for fairness, even absolute nonbeing … long spiel to clarify this last one … but, point being, there are conceivable alternatives to choose amongst)).

So, within this stipulated frame of mind, Sherlock Holmes will be an inter-real entity, but not an equi-real one. Pi and the Pythagorean theorem will be non-physical equi-real givens. I know all this is kind’a worthless without a full account of the philosophy. I’m working on it … but it’ll be years before I’m anywhere close to completion.

At any rate, my current terse thoughts on the matter. In short, I’m in agreement.

In reply to the question of "What has 'intrinsic value'?" and to add to some of the previous posts:

To my mind the answer is: that for which anything is instrumental. More precisely: each and every first-person subject itself relative to itself in nonreflective manners (“nonreflective” here meaning: intrinsic value doesn’t pertain to the thoughts one thinks of oneself - for these are instrumental - but to oneself as, in part, thinker of such thoughts).

Given that each sentient being holds intrinsic value relative to itself, it can then be possible for some sentient beings to find other sentient beings’ personal intrinsic value to be of intrinsic value to their own selves: we address such tendencies by terms such as “compassion”, “love”, and so forth. Their suffering becomes our suffering just as their joys become our joys.

This to the effect that if one’s compassion for some other is strictly instrumental then it cannot be genuine compassion. For example, if you hold compassion for another strictly so as to be praised by the general public so as to get a promotion at work, you in fact don’t genuinely care for the other. But to the extent that you do genuinely care for the other, their being - replete with its intrinsic value relative to itself - will become intrinsically valuable to you.

When we don’t (intrinsically) value the intrinsic value of another, they at best become only instrumentally valuable to us. And this is where they get used.

If all this holds, then by shear fact that subjective beings occur in the world, so too occurs intrinsic value. If any one of us doesn’t find anyone else to be intrinsically valuable, the individual will nevertheless be intrinsically valuable to him/herself.

and to anyone else in general ...

Out of curiosity, come to think of it:

Other than by positing the metaphysical position of causal determinism as true without first evidencing its soundness—which, by the way, as a metaphysical position can apply just as readily to those monotheistic metaphysics that posit an omnipotent deity as it does to the atheistic metaphysics of physicalism—on what rational or else empirical grounds can one deny the validity of free will as I’ve just described it?

----------

p.s. Regarding the Libet experiment: That certain actions of mind or body we willfully, voluntarily, hence intentionally, engage in will be determined by our subconscious mind seems to me to go without saying. It’s a natural outcome of how our minds operate. As one example, just because I, as a conscious self, voluntarily look at this monitor in front of me while typing out my post doesn’t necessitate that perceiving it is a conscious choice on my part. If free will can be ontic for our conscious selves in certain situations, namely those in which we deliberate, I see no reason to deny that free will can likewise be an ontic reality for our sub/unconscious selves as well. In other words, to deny that freely willed decisions can be made by our unconscious … which would cogently explain the Libet experiment in terms that, at the very least, validate the possibility of free will. Again, it seems obvious that not all of the intentions we consciously engage in are consciously chosen by us via deliberation between alternative outcomes … and a valid inference that those intentions not consciously chosen by us are/were freely chosen by our sub/unconscious selves.

At any rate, of sole concern to the question of free will I’ve here placed, again, is only the process of making conscious deliberations between those alternative outcomes we are consciously aware of.

Unicorns don't exist on planet earth other than as a human fantasy -- though we can't rule out that they might 'exist for real' elsewhere in this vast universe -- so the question seems to be: how many Joules for a dream? — Olivier5

I guess my main point with that example of unicorns as existent thoughts was the absurdity of stipulating that there can be "existent physical things that are not physically real". I'll stand by the absurdity of this till evidenced wrong.

Unlike any type of monism, pluralist philosophies try to recognise the diversity and complexity of our experience. They don't try to put square pegs into round holes. I suppose their disadvantage is that they don't offer a fully coherent view of the world. — Olivier5

I like that, though the last sentence might imply to some that physicalism does offer a fully coherent view of the world. It doesn't. Otherwise there wouldn't be logically substantiated debates about it.

[...] Physicalism has no leg to stand on, right? — Agent Smith

Some, such as myself, would agree with this statement. :smile:

At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing birds, and could experience the singing birds without the red book. But at the same time, the experiences seem to be tied together in a deep way. They seem to be unified, by being aspects of of a single encompassing state of consciousness. — Chalmers and Bayne


This is not dependent on representative realism. — Wayfarer

:100:

So define freedom, such that it encompasses the available choices, tea and coffee, and will as the choice one makes... — unenlightened

As far as I can tell, I've already done so. Remember, free will, as with any notion of causation or determinacy, is a metaphysical one. So, the "freedom" in "free will" only entails the ontic ability to generate different effects in an identical situation (this, it might go without saying, in non-stochastic manners). Now, each an every unique situation is self-identical - this as per the law of identity. So, the position of free will affirms that in every instantiation wherein you've made a decision between a set of alternative outcomes, each such instantiation being a self-identical situation, you could have decided on a different outcome than that which you did. Otherwise expressed, "freedom" here is strictly defined as the metaphysically valid, or else ontic, freedom of consciously choosing any one of the two or more alternatives one consciously deliberates on (quite arguably, two or more alternatives whose presence to oneself during a conscious deliberation one does not consciously choose in any given self-identical situation ... but as cause only chooses amongst, thereby effecting one's choice).

As is obvious, this offered ontic ability is contradictory to the notion of causal determinism. And it is in this contradiction that free will becomes such as big deal to some.

Stalemate. — unenlightened

Yup. That was my current intended point. This in opposition to the position of free will being nonsensical to begin with.

So to ask if there is "free will" is to be caught between asking if one can be free from the determinations of one's will, and asking whether one can determine one's determinations before one has determined them. Neither make sense, and so there can be no resolution, and we are, alas, bound forever to revisit the topic in a vain attempt to understand nonsense, until a fuller understanding liberates us. — unenlightened

I take that to be a bit of a strawman. I haven’t read of anyone upholding free will that endorses the things you mention.

Why not try to find a common understanding of what “free will” minimally denotes? Here’s my take:

First, let “to be determinate” be understood as “to have set limits or boundaries”.

P1: I am the cause of that which I decide whenever I deliberate between alternative outcomes. (If I don’t deliberate between alternative outcomes, I’m not consciously making decisions.)

P2: As the cause of the decision, a) I might be fully determined in all conceivable respects such that I do not hold the ontic ability to generate different effects given an identical situation; b) I might be partly determined and, thereby, partly not determined, in what I decide such that I do hold the ontic ability to generate different effects given an identical situation; or c) I might be utterly not determined by anything in the effects I generate (e.g., the limits or boundaries of my decision would in no way be set by anything I might perceive, desire, intend, etc.).

P3: “P2c” is an absurdity in part due to being contradictory to our experiences; what remains as viable options are “P2a” and “P2b”.

C: If free will occurs, it is defined by “P2b” in that it would be a semi-determinate process of generating the effect of a decision … and it would be necessarily semi-determined in part by the intents (goals) momentarily held. If free will does not occur, our sensations of our deliberative decisions being accordant to “P2b” is illusory, instead ontically being accordant to “P2a”.

Basically, I venture that the “free will” upheld by the people which endorse it is to be minimally understood as a semi-determinate process of effecting decisions wherein different outcomes / effects can be generated in identical situations – hence nether as a pan-determinate process nor as an utterly non-determinate process.

Edit: In case this comes up, free will thus conceived would then be a non-stochastic process in part due to being semi-determined by one's intents.

The point about the implications of knowledge in the sense of 'enlightenment', is that the Eastern conception of avidya (translated in some texts as 'nescience') carries the implication that real knowledge is itself salvific. — Wayfarer

Brings to mind the only means I've so far found of making any type of reasonable sense of JC's statement that "truth shall set you free": but I think this requires one to hold a more Ophite-like interpretation of things. Where truth is interpreted with a capital "T".

Eh, I don't know.

Thanks though for the input.

At a very high level of generalisation, the 'Western' view of the human condition is that we're 'ensnared in sin' as a result of the Fall. The 'Eastern' view is that we're ensnared in ignorance, avidya, as a consequence of beginningless karma. So the 'Western view' is volitional, a corruption of the Will, whereas the Eastern view is cognitive, corruption of the intellect (in the sense of the organ of knowledge).

However in my view, these are not quite as far apart as many would expect. — Wayfarer

Can you clarify your views as to how this speaks to the Western vilification of enlightenment when enlightenment is understood to minimally entail knowledge of right and wrong? Else the whole issue of virtue not being integral to enlightenment.

As to the divinity of the serpent of the garden of Eden, its been often enough identified with Lucifer, the "lucid one" and, in accordance to genesis, the serpent was not a physical serpent for it did not slither on the Earth prior to being condemned to so do by "the Lord". If it didn't slither the earth when conveying info to Eve my initial reaction is to interpret it as spiritual, flying within the heavens. In relation to function, I in many ways liken the myth of the serpent to the myth of Prometheus (who was punished by Zeus for the crime of bringing divine fire, wisdom(?), to mankind). At any rate, the divinity of the serpent has a long heritage in Eastern and Western cultures alike. I'm thinking of Greek mythology, for instance, and if not then earlier western religious beliefs.

However in my view, these are not quite as far apart as many would expect. I've had some exposure to Pure Land Buddhism, which also views human nature as intrinsically corrupted - that all of us are bombu, 'foolish mortal beings' - who can no way save ourselves by engaging in meditation. — Wayfarer

Well, I certainly qualify as a bombu most likely. :smile: But, again, how does this relate to the cultural evaluation of the ideal of everyone obtaining enlightenment?

We also need to bear in mind that the word "divine" in this context need not have the usual religious connotations. — Apollodorus

With the intention of complementing your statements, divinity appears to be intimately related to that which is sacred in nearly all, if not all, situations.

Western culture tends to have many religious branches which want to divide that which is sacred from that which is profane. Compare A) the first Council of Nicaea’s beliefs of the Christ as the incarnation of the Creator Deity as trinity (here, utterly other in relation to mankind, which is deemed profane) which will redeem some of humankind by granting them a place in heaven, this as subjects of the supreme being of the Christ; with B) the beliefs of the Ophites, an ancient Gnostic sect (else grouping of such) predating the first Council of Nicaea (which found this and like sects heretical): the sect identified the Christ with the serpent (if not valuing the serpent more than the Christ); in essence, then, identifying the Christ with a being seeking to enlighten all humankind to the divine knowledge of right and wrong (thereby intending to make all humans endowed with this divine wisdom, i.e. to make everyone equally enlightened; and, hence, more or less equally divine). Within such prevalent Western contexts, then, to be enlightened would seem to necessarily imply being a transcendently sacred psyche - i.e., a supernatural deity; e.g. Jesus Christ as God - which, then, stands in an unbridgeable relation to the common man (which are here taken as profane subjugates or, at the very least, followers).

It’s in this roundabout sense of deification that I made the statement that viewing enlightened persons as deified might be utterly wrongminded.

Yet, by comparison, Eastern culture tends to have many religious, spiritual, and/or philosophical branches which want to integrate that which is sacred with that which is profane while yet acknowledging a distinction: framed in a western point of view, the world as at least resembling a pantheistic, or panentheistic, system wherein nature itself is divine and, in this sense, an integral aspect of divinity.

To this effect, some easterners will traditionally bow to themselves in acknowledging each other’s literally divine, or sacred, aspects of being. As a different example, the Dalai Lama is held to be the incarnation of the Buddha of universal compassion, and, hence, as a divinity; and yet no one views him as a transcendently sacred psyche, as a supernatural god, but simply as one who is inherently enlightened of ultimate reality. One intending to enlighten ideally all of mankind. (The current Dalai Lama, at least, has published quite a bit. Last book I read by him was “The Middle Way: Faith Grounded in Reason” … mentioned because I really like the subtitle.)

These common enough Eastern perspectives hold much more in common with the view you’ve presented of Platonism which, for the sake of brevity at the cost of some inaccuracy, I’ll abridge into the belief in logos (in the sense of an anima mundi). Here, tmk, there can usually be inferred closer and further proximities that sentient beings can hold in relation to the “Ineffable One”—thereby allowing for a cline of beings’ sacredness, this in contrast to some transcendent sharp divide in the nature of psyches—yet, despite the polarities of this cline, here also all the cosmos is deemed to be in at least some sense divine, sacred.

This, again, is not the sense of deification that I intended. But for a westerner, the two senses of divinity do tend to become convoluted most of the time, at least in my experiences.

Interestingly for me, whereas easterners tend to view the enlightenment of all humankind as a good to be hoped for, we westerners have typically been enculturated into viewing it a sin, if not pure evil, this via our mainstream tellings of the acquisition of knowledge of right and wrong so being.

Many things appear to exist, that do not consist of "physical energy". — Olivier5

I'm in agreement with this, and is what I basically maintained in the context of this thread in regard to the mind and its contents. That it's absurd to maintain that "the idea that a unicorn, being an existent thought, is a mass / physical energy endowed physical thing that is not real" is one of the (acknowledgedly minor) points I somewhere hereabouts previously made. The point wasn't addressed.

Well, for a layperson like me, it tells me not to confuse genius with sagacity or decency. A lesson we need to re-learn periodically. So I keep coming back to virtue as being a key element of enlightenment - if we are going to accept this loosely understood doctrine as a phenomenon we might encounter in the world. — Tom Storm

Aptly pointed out and well put.

Focusing on:

Does the word enlightenment hold any real meaning, or is it just a poetic umbrella term for a fully integrated and intelligent person? — Tom Storm

Haven’t read most of this thread but I’ll join the chorus and opinionate. To start with, I’m a fallibilist, so I can’t speak for some form of definitive evidence of anyone being or having ever been enlightened, this because I can’t think of any definitive proof (or, else, of any type of infallible experience or justification) in respect to there being (or of there not being) such a thing as ultimate reality - “The Real” as some have termed it.

But as far as the significance of the term “enlightened”, it seems reasonable to me that it is fully contingent on whether or not there ontically is such a thing as an ultimate reality. If and only if there is, then it stands to reason that it might be possible for some to have some epiphany whereby this ultimate reality becomes understood. Logically, given that truth in general is a conformity to what is real, this apprehension of ultimate reality would entail a psyche-filtered (likely even psyche-predispositioned and, hence, biased) awareness of Truth with a capital “T”. An awareness which then might govern their awareness of all other truths with a lower case "t". Then, for the roundabout reasons of why we all bicker with each other about what the nature of reality is on this website, it stands to reason that at least some such persons would then want to convey this understanding of the nature of reality to others. But such a person would likely be contextualized by differing cultures, languages, semantics, preestablished beliefs and norms, and so forth - this in conjunction to holding their own individual types of intelligences, perspectives, personal desires, and common knowledge: so their conveyance of this same, unitary ultimate reality would differ ... in part, so as to make it as understandable as possible by the language, norms, preestablished beliefs, etc. of the society they find themselves in.

Iff there is an ultimate reality, then I see no reason not to take a cross-cultural perennial-philosophy approach to enlightenment. As Plotinus says:

"There are," says Plotinus, "different roads by which this end [apprehension of the Infinite] may be reached. The love of beauty, which exalts the poet; that devotion to the One and that ascent of science which makes the ambition of the philosopher; and that love and those prayers by which some devout and ardent soul tends in its moral purity towards perfection. [...] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Real#In_philosophy

Yes, Socrates and Plato might have both been as enlightened as was the Buddha, or as was JC - each in different contexts; why not Kant, or even Hume?; why not so many others? This whole “deification” motif of being enlightened, to me at least, might be an utterly wrongminded approach to it. Iff there is an ultimate reality, that is.

Iff there is not an ultimate reality, then all such accounts - and not just those given by wannabes and charlatans looking for access to extra capital - are, at best, mistaken.

I used to be struck by this quote from Carl Jung. I am not a Jungian but he takes the idea into a different place. Illumination through darkness. Perhaps I hear Nietzsche calling.

"One does not become enlightened by imagining figures of light, but by making the darkness conscious. The latter procedure, however, is disagreeable and therefore not popular.”
― C.G. Jung — Tom Storm

To me at least, aesthetically reminiscent of William Blake’s “Auguries of Innocence”. Who also gives some inklings of having been enlightened. Maybe.

You had me as a reference but you did not quote the part you found pertinent. — god must be atheist

I thought the entire post was, in particular:

Socrates was totally wrong. [...] — god must be atheist

I don't see anything wrong with fallibly knowing that one knows nothing infallibly. As far as the supposed Socratic paradox goes, it makes logical sense of it and is in line with much of ancient skeptic reasoning ... this as far as I can tell.

I think we think too much into texts. If he wanted to say that you think Socrates really wanted to say, he could have said that. Not to disparage you, but you said that. Why could then Socrates not say that?

I believe that people say what they mean. If Socrates said "I know nothing" he meant he knew nothing. — god must be atheist

For the historically accurate record, Socrates never said that he knew he knew nothing:

"I know that I know nothing" is a saying derived from Plato's account of the Greek philosopher Socrates. Socrates himself was never recorded as having said this phrase, and scholars generally agree that Socrates only ever asserted that he believed that he knew nothing, having never claimed that he knew that he knew nothing. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_know_that_I_know_nothing

That he believed he knew nothing is not a contradiction, and I don't see how anyone can evidence this proposition wrong - especially when knowledge is taken to be infallible by the principle of it being necessarily true, as in being "justified, true belief".


:

:up: :grin: Maybe a bit unfair to some Academic Skeptics (my first thought is of Cicero), but I do agree with the overall spiel.

... and:

Pyrrhonists view ataraxia as necessary for bringing about eudaimonia (happiness) for a person,[3] representing life's ultimate purpose.[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ataraxia#Pyrrhonism

Now, while Pyrrhonism is different from Academic skepticism, there's no doubting that the latter was strongly influenced by the former.

This as there's no doubting that fallibilism does not translate into universal doubt. Which is to say, different degrees of fallible certainty are part and parcel of ancient skeptic thought: cf., Pyrrhonism's (fallible) certainty that eudaimonia is life's ultimate purpose.

OK, but all that kind'a flies in the face of their notion of ataraxia.

Why must the Academic skeptic be classified as "sad"? :gasp:

Skeptic: Someone who knows he knows nothing. — Agent Smith

Its only contradictory if no equivocation is involved. Importing some terms from the more modern notion of fallibilism, me thinks the statement nowadays ought to read: “I fallibly know that I infallibly know nothing” :razz: Here illustrating two distinct senses of the term “know”.

Skeptic: Knows one and only one thing viz. that he know nothing. — Agent Smith

Academic skeptics such as Cicero fallibly knew a plethora of things, including that they didn’t hold infallible knowledge. :smile:

To the Academic skeptic at least, he who believes himself endowed with infallible knowledge would be ignorant.

'Detachment' would be a better description than objectivity, I think. — Wayfarer

I’m certain that “detachment” makes perfect sense in the context of the Eastern languages where it is thus used. In Buddhism, to my best understanding, detachment intensifies compassion, for example. In English, at least, “detachment” connotes states such as that of apathy to the extent that it is interpreted as antithetical to compassion. Maybe more poignantly, in English, love - from interpersonal to universal - is nearly the opposite of being detached, for it implies attachment to other as that loved.

I get that objectivity has its issues: basically pivoting around objects being physical things - objectivity thereby implying physicality. But there is also the notion of objectivity being equivalent to impartiality, to a lack of bias. With some effort, one can then find that physical things are perfectly impartial, detached from any semblance of ego and its many properties, if one will: Perfectly selfless. Making that sensibly cohere to the notion of impartiality being a good to be pursued for all ego-endowed entities would take quite the shpeal. I know. All the same, I so far find objectivity – in it’s sense of impartiality - to be a suitable term within Western, at least English speaking, context. Think of the notion of blind love: a convenient way of metaphorically addressing an love impartial to - or, one could also say, detached from - outward appearances. Importantly, this while yet being partial / attached to the ideal good of being selfless, at least in relation to that loved.

Plus there’s the common western notion of perfect objectivity being an awareness devoid of a point of view (i.e., an ego or self) – this as is parodied in the statement “view from nowhere”.

Not saying “no”, but expressing why I so far find using the term “objectivity” preferable.

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Will soon be on my way to a New Year’s Eve event.

Happy New Year’s!!! May the new year bring about better things.

I think people can confuse the moment of the experience with some deep truth. — Manuel

I'm in full agreement. Happens all the time for all types of experiences, mirages as one example. But, to be fair, Neo-Platonism (or Buddhism, for that matter) isn't about "I've had an experience so there you have it". It's about attempts to coherently comprehend an entire cosmology in a manner that makes sense. This to say, I think way too much weight is placed on the experience factor in these or similar enough philosophies. But that's just me.

As for the idea of "the One", perhaps this can be illuminating in certain instances for the individual capable of having these experiences. — Manuel

Personally, I'm doubtful that anyone can. Ecstatic experiences that get close to it, maybe, sure, but - as a personal belief grounded in, granted, imperfect reasoning - not full identity as "an awareness devoid of selfhood, hence literally devoid of ego, hence any type or degree of point of view, hence any conceivable boundary or limit". Experiences are, after all, bounded or limited. That mentioned, to me the idea has a certain logical ring, or appeal. In part having something to do with the ancient Greek notion of logos, as in an anima mundi rather than a literal word. But I'll let that can of worms be.

Which is why we always keep asking "why" questions. — Manuel

:up:

There’s lots of, I'll go ahead and say, inferential content in your latest post to me. Some of which I agree with; some of which I don’t.

Trying to keep this focused on the OP’s intent:

The way I'd say it is that there might or might not be forces that "govern" [...] — Millard J Melnyk

Correct me if you find I’m mistaken, but the semantics to this can fluently translate into: “natural laws might or might not exist”. Natural laws are "forces that 'govern'" and to exist is "to be". If you do correct me, please make the correction semantically coherent, but maybe this goes without saying.

At any rate. Here, there is a possibility that they do exist and a possibility that they don’t. To be nitty-gritty, this then makes the possibility that they might exist semantically cogent to us. Otherwise, the former sentence would be utterly nonsensical.

We’re addressing the semantic differences, or lack thereof, between “exists” and “is somewhere now”.

Conceptually, or else semantically, if a natural law exists, then it – by definition of what a natural law is understood to be - would not be somewhere now, but everywhere at all times.

Therefore, the semantics of “a natural law might exist” is not equivalent to the semantics of "a natural law might be somewhere now”. Hence, here is concluded that the semantics of “exists” is not equivalent to the semantics of “is somewhere now”.

To be clear, here we’re addressing the actuality of semantics; not the actuality of natural laws.