In reply to the question of "What has 'intrinsic value'?" and to add to some of the previous posts:

To my mind the answer is: that for which anything is instrumental. More precisely: each and every first-person subject itself relative to itself in nonreflective manners (“nonreflective” here meaning: intrinsic value doesn’t pertain to the thoughts one thinks of oneself - for these are instrumental - but to oneself as, in part, thinker of such thoughts).

Given that each sentient being holds intrinsic value relative to itself, it can then be possible for some sentient beings to find other sentient beings’ personal intrinsic value to be of intrinsic value to their own selves: we address such tendencies by terms such as “compassion”, “love”, and so forth. Their suffering becomes our suffering just as their joys become our joys.

This to the effect that if one’s compassion for some other is strictly instrumental then it cannot be genuine compassion. For example, if you hold compassion for another strictly so as to be praised by the general public so as to get a promotion at work, you in fact don’t genuinely care for the other. But to the extent that you do genuinely care for the other, their being - replete with its intrinsic value relative to itself - will become intrinsically valuable to you.

When we don’t (intrinsically) value the intrinsic value of another, they at best become only instrumentally valuable to us. And this is where they get used.

If all this holds, then by shear fact that subjective beings occur in the world, so too occurs intrinsic value. If any one of us doesn’t find anyone else to be intrinsically valuable, the individual will nevertheless be intrinsically valuable to him/herself.

and to anyone else in general ...

Out of curiosity, come to think of it:

Other than by positing the metaphysical position of causal determinism as true without first evidencing its soundness—which, by the way, as a metaphysical position can apply just as readily to those monotheistic metaphysics that posit an omnipotent deity as it does to the atheistic metaphysics of physicalism—on what rational or else empirical grounds can one deny the validity of free will as I’ve just described it?

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p.s. Regarding the Libet experiment: That certain actions of mind or body we willfully, voluntarily, hence intentionally, engage in will be determined by our subconscious mind seems to me to go without saying. It’s a natural outcome of how our minds operate. As one example, just because I, as a conscious self, voluntarily look at this monitor in front of me while typing out my post doesn’t necessitate that perceiving it is a conscious choice on my part. If free will can be ontic for our conscious selves in certain situations, namely those in which we deliberate, I see no reason to deny that free will can likewise be an ontic reality for our sub/unconscious selves as well. In other words, to deny that freely willed decisions can be made by our unconscious … which would cogently explain the Libet experiment in terms that, at the very least, validate the possibility of free will. Again, it seems obvious that not all of the intentions we consciously engage in are consciously chosen by us via deliberation between alternative outcomes … and a valid inference that those intentions not consciously chosen by us are/were freely chosen by our sub/unconscious selves.

At any rate, of sole concern to the question of free will I’ve here placed, again, is only the process of making conscious deliberations between those alternative outcomes we are consciously aware of.

Unicorns don't exist on planet earth other than as a human fantasy -- though we can't rule out that they might 'exist for real' elsewhere in this vast universe -- so the question seems to be: how many Joules for a dream? — Olivier5

I guess my main point with that example of unicorns as existent thoughts was the absurdity of stipulating that there can be "existent physical things that are not physically real". I'll stand by the absurdity of this till evidenced wrong.

Unlike any type of monism, pluralist philosophies try to recognise the diversity and complexity of our experience. They don't try to put square pegs into round holes. I suppose their disadvantage is that they don't offer a fully coherent view of the world. — Olivier5

I like that, though the last sentence might imply to some that physicalism does offer a fully coherent view of the world. It doesn't. Otherwise there wouldn't be logically substantiated debates about it.

[...] Physicalism has no leg to stand on, right? — Agent Smith

Some, such as myself, would agree with this statement. :smile:

At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing birds, and could experience the singing birds without the red book. But at the same time, the experiences seem to be tied together in a deep way. They seem to be unified, by being aspects of of a single encompassing state of consciousness. — Chalmers and Bayne


This is not dependent on representative realism. — Wayfarer

:100:

So define freedom, such that it encompasses the available choices, tea and coffee, and will as the choice one makes... — unenlightened

As far as I can tell, I've already done so. Remember, free will, as with any notion of causation or determinacy, is a metaphysical one. So, the "freedom" in "free will" only entails the ontic ability to generate different effects in an identical situation (this, it might go without saying, in non-stochastic manners). Now, each an every unique situation is self-identical - this as per the law of identity. So, the position of free will affirms that in every instantiation wherein you've made a decision between a set of alternative outcomes, each such instantiation being a self-identical situation, you could have decided on a different outcome than that which you did. Otherwise expressed, "freedom" here is strictly defined as the metaphysically valid, or else ontic, freedom of consciously choosing any one of the two or more alternatives one consciously deliberates on (quite arguably, two or more alternatives whose presence to oneself during a conscious deliberation one does not consciously choose in any given self-identical situation ... but as cause only chooses amongst, thereby effecting one's choice).

As is obvious, this offered ontic ability is contradictory to the notion of causal determinism. And it is in this contradiction that free will becomes such as big deal to some.

Stalemate. — unenlightened

Yup. That was my current intended point. This in opposition to the position of free will being nonsensical to begin with.

So to ask if there is "free will" is to be caught between asking if one can be free from the determinations of one's will, and asking whether one can determine one's determinations before one has determined them. Neither make sense, and so there can be no resolution, and we are, alas, bound forever to revisit the topic in a vain attempt to understand nonsense, until a fuller understanding liberates us. — unenlightened

I take that to be a bit of a strawman. I haven’t read of anyone upholding free will that endorses the things you mention.

Why not try to find a common understanding of what “free will” minimally denotes? Here’s my take:

First, let “to be determinate” be understood as “to have set limits or boundaries”.

P1: I am the cause of that which I decide whenever I deliberate between alternative outcomes. (If I don’t deliberate between alternative outcomes, I’m not consciously making decisions.)

P2: As the cause of the decision, a) I might be fully determined in all conceivable respects such that I do not hold the ontic ability to generate different effects given an identical situation; b) I might be partly determined and, thereby, partly not determined, in what I decide such that I do hold the ontic ability to generate different effects given an identical situation; or c) I might be utterly not determined by anything in the effects I generate (e.g., the limits or boundaries of my decision would in no way be set by anything I might perceive, desire, intend, etc.).

P3: “P2c” is an absurdity in part due to being contradictory to our experiences; what remains as viable options are “P2a” and “P2b”.

C: If free will occurs, it is defined by “P2b” in that it would be a semi-determinate process of generating the effect of a decision … and it would be necessarily semi-determined in part by the intents (goals) momentarily held. If free will does not occur, our sensations of our deliberative decisions being accordant to “P2b” is illusory, instead ontically being accordant to “P2a”.

Basically, I venture that the “free will” upheld by the people which endorse it is to be minimally understood as a semi-determinate process of effecting decisions wherein different outcomes / effects can be generated in identical situations – hence nether as a pan-determinate process nor as an utterly non-determinate process.

Edit: In case this comes up, free will thus conceived would then be a non-stochastic process in part due to being semi-determined by one's intents.

The point about the implications of knowledge in the sense of 'enlightenment', is that the Eastern conception of avidya (translated in some texts as 'nescience') carries the implication that real knowledge is itself salvific. — Wayfarer

Brings to mind the only means I've so far found of making any type of reasonable sense of JC's statement that "truth shall set you free": but I think this requires one to hold a more Ophite-like interpretation of things. Where truth is interpreted with a capital "T".

Eh, I don't know.

Thanks though for the input.

At a very high level of generalisation, the 'Western' view of the human condition is that we're 'ensnared in sin' as a result of the Fall. The 'Eastern' view is that we're ensnared in ignorance, avidya, as a consequence of beginningless karma. So the 'Western view' is volitional, a corruption of the Will, whereas the Eastern view is cognitive, corruption of the intellect (in the sense of the organ of knowledge).

However in my view, these are not quite as far apart as many would expect. — Wayfarer

Can you clarify your views as to how this speaks to the Western vilification of enlightenment when enlightenment is understood to minimally entail knowledge of right and wrong? Else the whole issue of virtue not being integral to enlightenment.

As to the divinity of the serpent of the garden of Eden, its been often enough identified with Lucifer, the "lucid one" and, in accordance to genesis, the serpent was not a physical serpent for it did not slither on the Earth prior to being condemned to so do by "the Lord". If it didn't slither the earth when conveying info to Eve my initial reaction is to interpret it as spiritual, flying within the heavens. In relation to function, I in many ways liken the myth of the serpent to the myth of Prometheus (who was punished by Zeus for the crime of bringing divine fire, wisdom(?), to mankind). At any rate, the divinity of the serpent has a long heritage in Eastern and Western cultures alike. I'm thinking of Greek mythology, for instance, and if not then earlier western religious beliefs.

However in my view, these are not quite as far apart as many would expect. I've had some exposure to Pure Land Buddhism, which also views human nature as intrinsically corrupted - that all of us are bombu, 'foolish mortal beings' - who can no way save ourselves by engaging in meditation. — Wayfarer

Well, I certainly qualify as a bombu most likely. :smile: But, again, how does this relate to the cultural evaluation of the ideal of everyone obtaining enlightenment?

We also need to bear in mind that the word "divine" in this context need not have the usual religious connotations. — Apollodorus

With the intention of complementing your statements, divinity appears to be intimately related to that which is sacred in nearly all, if not all, situations.

Western culture tends to have many religious branches which want to divide that which is sacred from that which is profane. Compare A) the first Council of Nicaea’s beliefs of the Christ as the incarnation of the Creator Deity as trinity (here, utterly other in relation to mankind, which is deemed profane) which will redeem some of humankind by granting them a place in heaven, this as subjects of the supreme being of the Christ; with B) the beliefs of the Ophites, an ancient Gnostic sect (else grouping of such) predating the first Council of Nicaea (which found this and like sects heretical): the sect identified the Christ with the serpent (if not valuing the serpent more than the Christ); in essence, then, identifying the Christ with a being seeking to enlighten all humankind to the divine knowledge of right and wrong (thereby intending to make all humans endowed with this divine wisdom, i.e. to make everyone equally enlightened; and, hence, more or less equally divine). Within such prevalent Western contexts, then, to be enlightened would seem to necessarily imply being a transcendently sacred psyche - i.e., a supernatural deity; e.g. Jesus Christ as God - which, then, stands in an unbridgeable relation to the common man (which are here taken as profane subjugates or, at the very least, followers).

It’s in this roundabout sense of deification that I made the statement that viewing enlightened persons as deified might be utterly wrongminded.

Yet, by comparison, Eastern culture tends to have many religious, spiritual, and/or philosophical branches which want to integrate that which is sacred with that which is profane while yet acknowledging a distinction: framed in a western point of view, the world as at least resembling a pantheistic, or panentheistic, system wherein nature itself is divine and, in this sense, an integral aspect of divinity.

To this effect, some easterners will traditionally bow to themselves in acknowledging each other’s literally divine, or sacred, aspects of being. As a different example, the Dalai Lama is held to be the incarnation of the Buddha of universal compassion, and, hence, as a divinity; and yet no one views him as a transcendently sacred psyche, as a supernatural god, but simply as one who is inherently enlightened of ultimate reality. One intending to enlighten ideally all of mankind. (The current Dalai Lama, at least, has published quite a bit. Last book I read by him was “The Middle Way: Faith Grounded in Reason” … mentioned because I really like the subtitle.)

These common enough Eastern perspectives hold much more in common with the view you’ve presented of Platonism which, for the sake of brevity at the cost of some inaccuracy, I’ll abridge into the belief in logos (in the sense of an anima mundi). Here, tmk, there can usually be inferred closer and further proximities that sentient beings can hold in relation to the “Ineffable One”—thereby allowing for a cline of beings’ sacredness, this in contrast to some transcendent sharp divide in the nature of psyches—yet, despite the polarities of this cline, here also all the cosmos is deemed to be in at least some sense divine, sacred.

This, again, is not the sense of deification that I intended. But for a westerner, the two senses of divinity do tend to become convoluted most of the time, at least in my experiences.

Interestingly for me, whereas easterners tend to view the enlightenment of all humankind as a good to be hoped for, we westerners have typically been enculturated into viewing it a sin, if not pure evil, this via our mainstream tellings of the acquisition of knowledge of right and wrong so being.

Many things appear to exist, that do not consist of "physical energy". — Olivier5

I'm in agreement with this, and is what I basically maintained in the context of this thread in regard to the mind and its contents. That it's absurd to maintain that "the idea that a unicorn, being an existent thought, is a mass / physical energy endowed physical thing that is not real" is one of the (acknowledgedly minor) points I somewhere hereabouts previously made. The point wasn't addressed.

Well, for a layperson like me, it tells me not to confuse genius with sagacity or decency. A lesson we need to re-learn periodically. So I keep coming back to virtue as being a key element of enlightenment - if we are going to accept this loosely understood doctrine as a phenomenon we might encounter in the world. — Tom Storm

Aptly pointed out and well put.

Focusing on:

Does the word enlightenment hold any real meaning, or is it just a poetic umbrella term for a fully integrated and intelligent person? — Tom Storm

Haven’t read most of this thread but I’ll join the chorus and opinionate. To start with, I’m a fallibilist, so I can’t speak for some form of definitive evidence of anyone being or having ever been enlightened, this because I can’t think of any definitive proof (or, else, of any type of infallible experience or justification) in respect to there being (or of there not being) such a thing as ultimate reality - “The Real” as some have termed it.

But as far as the significance of the term “enlightened”, it seems reasonable to me that it is fully contingent on whether or not there ontically is such a thing as an ultimate reality. If and only if there is, then it stands to reason that it might be possible for some to have some epiphany whereby this ultimate reality becomes understood. Logically, given that truth in general is a conformity to what is real, this apprehension of ultimate reality would entail a psyche-filtered (likely even psyche-predispositioned and, hence, biased) awareness of Truth with a capital “T”. An awareness which then might govern their awareness of all other truths with a lower case "t". Then, for the roundabout reasons of why we all bicker with each other about what the nature of reality is on this website, it stands to reason that at least some such persons would then want to convey this understanding of the nature of reality to others. But such a person would likely be contextualized by differing cultures, languages, semantics, preestablished beliefs and norms, and so forth - this in conjunction to holding their own individual types of intelligences, perspectives, personal desires, and common knowledge: so their conveyance of this same, unitary ultimate reality would differ ... in part, so as to make it as understandable as possible by the language, norms, preestablished beliefs, etc. of the society they find themselves in.

Iff there is an ultimate reality, then I see no reason not to take a cross-cultural perennial-philosophy approach to enlightenment. As Plotinus says:

"There are," says Plotinus, "different roads by which this end [apprehension of the Infinite] may be reached. The love of beauty, which exalts the poet; that devotion to the One and that ascent of science which makes the ambition of the philosopher; and that love and those prayers by which some devout and ardent soul tends in its moral purity towards perfection. [...] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Real#In_philosophy

Yes, Socrates and Plato might have both been as enlightened as was the Buddha, or as was JC - each in different contexts; why not Kant, or even Hume?; why not so many others? This whole “deification” motif of being enlightened, to me at least, might be an utterly wrongminded approach to it. Iff there is an ultimate reality, that is.

Iff there is not an ultimate reality, then all such accounts - and not just those given by wannabes and charlatans looking for access to extra capital - are, at best, mistaken.

I used to be struck by this quote from Carl Jung. I am not a Jungian but he takes the idea into a different place. Illumination through darkness. Perhaps I hear Nietzsche calling.

"One does not become enlightened by imagining figures of light, but by making the darkness conscious. The latter procedure, however, is disagreeable and therefore not popular.”
― C.G. Jung — Tom Storm

To me at least, aesthetically reminiscent of William Blake’s “Auguries of Innocence”. Who also gives some inklings of having been enlightened. Maybe.

You had me as a reference but you did not quote the part you found pertinent. — god must be atheist

I thought the entire post was, in particular:

Socrates was totally wrong. [...] — god must be atheist

I don't see anything wrong with fallibly knowing that one knows nothing infallibly. As far as the supposed Socratic paradox goes, it makes logical sense of it and is in line with much of ancient skeptic reasoning ... this as far as I can tell.

I think we think too much into texts. If he wanted to say that you think Socrates really wanted to say, he could have said that. Not to disparage you, but you said that. Why could then Socrates not say that?

I believe that people say what they mean. If Socrates said "I know nothing" he meant he knew nothing. — god must be atheist

For the historically accurate record, Socrates never said that he knew he knew nothing:

"I know that I know nothing" is a saying derived from Plato's account of the Greek philosopher Socrates. Socrates himself was never recorded as having said this phrase, and scholars generally agree that Socrates only ever asserted that he believed that he knew nothing, having never claimed that he knew that he knew nothing. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_know_that_I_know_nothing

That he believed he knew nothing is not a contradiction, and I don't see how anyone can evidence this proposition wrong - especially when knowledge is taken to be infallible by the principle of it being necessarily true, as in being "justified, true belief".


:

:up: :grin: Maybe a bit unfair to some Academic Skeptics (my first thought is of Cicero), but I do agree with the overall spiel.

... and:

Pyrrhonists view ataraxia as necessary for bringing about eudaimonia (happiness) for a person,[3] representing life's ultimate purpose.[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ataraxia#Pyrrhonism

Now, while Pyrrhonism is different from Academic skepticism, there's no doubting that the latter was strongly influenced by the former.

This as there's no doubting that fallibilism does not translate into universal doubt. Which is to say, different degrees of fallible certainty are part and parcel of ancient skeptic thought: cf., Pyrrhonism's (fallible) certainty that eudaimonia is life's ultimate purpose.

OK, but all that kind'a flies in the face of their notion of ataraxia.

Why must the Academic skeptic be classified as "sad"? :gasp:

Skeptic: Someone who knows he knows nothing. — Agent Smith

Its only contradictory if no equivocation is involved. Importing some terms from the more modern notion of fallibilism, me thinks the statement nowadays ought to read: “I fallibly know that I infallibly know nothing” :razz: Here illustrating two distinct senses of the term “know”.

Skeptic: Knows one and only one thing viz. that he know nothing. — Agent Smith

Academic skeptics such as Cicero fallibly knew a plethora of things, including that they didn’t hold infallible knowledge. :smile:

To the Academic skeptic at least, he who believes himself endowed with infallible knowledge would be ignorant.

'Detachment' would be a better description than objectivity, I think. — Wayfarer

I’m certain that “detachment” makes perfect sense in the context of the Eastern languages where it is thus used. In Buddhism, to my best understanding, detachment intensifies compassion, for example. In English, at least, “detachment” connotes states such as that of apathy to the extent that it is interpreted as antithetical to compassion. Maybe more poignantly, in English, love - from interpersonal to universal - is nearly the opposite of being detached, for it implies attachment to other as that loved.

I get that objectivity has its issues: basically pivoting around objects being physical things - objectivity thereby implying physicality. But there is also the notion of objectivity being equivalent to impartiality, to a lack of bias. With some effort, one can then find that physical things are perfectly impartial, detached from any semblance of ego and its many properties, if one will: Perfectly selfless. Making that sensibly cohere to the notion of impartiality being a good to be pursued for all ego-endowed entities would take quite the shpeal. I know. All the same, I so far find objectivity – in it’s sense of impartiality - to be a suitable term within Western, at least English speaking, context. Think of the notion of blind love: a convenient way of metaphorically addressing an love impartial to - or, one could also say, detached from - outward appearances. Importantly, this while yet being partial / attached to the ideal good of being selfless, at least in relation to that loved.

Plus there’s the common western notion of perfect objectivity being an awareness devoid of a point of view (i.e., an ego or self) – this as is parodied in the statement “view from nowhere”.

Not saying “no”, but expressing why I so far find using the term “objectivity” preferable.

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Will soon be on my way to a New Year’s Eve event.

Happy New Year’s!!! May the new year bring about better things.

I think people can confuse the moment of the experience with some deep truth. — Manuel

I'm in full agreement. Happens all the time for all types of experiences, mirages as one example. But, to be fair, Neo-Platonism (or Buddhism, for that matter) isn't about "I've had an experience so there you have it". It's about attempts to coherently comprehend an entire cosmology in a manner that makes sense. This to say, I think way too much weight is placed on the experience factor in these or similar enough philosophies. But that's just me.

As for the idea of "the One", perhaps this can be illuminating in certain instances for the individual capable of having these experiences. — Manuel

Personally, I'm doubtful that anyone can. Ecstatic experiences that get close to it, maybe, sure, but - as a personal belief grounded in, granted, imperfect reasoning - not full identity as "an awareness devoid of selfhood, hence literally devoid of ego, hence any type or degree of point of view, hence any conceivable boundary or limit". Experiences are, after all, bounded or limited. That mentioned, to me the idea has a certain logical ring, or appeal. In part having something to do with the ancient Greek notion of logos, as in an anima mundi rather than a literal word. But I'll let that can of worms be.

Which is why we always keep asking "why" questions. — Manuel

:up:

There’s lots of, I'll go ahead and say, inferential content in your latest post to me. Some of which I agree with; some of which I don’t.

Trying to keep this focused on the OP’s intent:

The way I'd say it is that there might or might not be forces that "govern" [...] — Millard J Melnyk

Correct me if you find I’m mistaken, but the semantics to this can fluently translate into: “natural laws might or might not exist”. Natural laws are "forces that 'govern'" and to exist is "to be". If you do correct me, please make the correction semantically coherent, but maybe this goes without saying.

At any rate. Here, there is a possibility that they do exist and a possibility that they don’t. To be nitty-gritty, this then makes the possibility that they might exist semantically cogent to us. Otherwise, the former sentence would be utterly nonsensical.

We’re addressing the semantic differences, or lack thereof, between “exists” and “is somewhere now”.

Conceptually, or else semantically, if a natural law exists, then it – by definition of what a natural law is understood to be - would not be somewhere now, but everywhere at all times.

Therefore, the semantics of “a natural law might exist” is not equivalent to the semantics of "a natural law might be somewhere now”. Hence, here is concluded that the semantics of “exists” is not equivalent to the semantics of “is somewhere now”.

To be clear, here we’re addressing the actuality of semantics; not the actuality of natural laws.

I just don't see how we could even go about trying to find a perspective-less view to see things as they are in a natural state, not affected by any representations. But then are there "things" left at all?

It's very obscure territory. — Manuel

I take this quote to be referring to the notion of objectivity, and it's in regard to this notion that I'm replying.

Well, first off, being myself biased by my own inclinations of thought, the notion of objectivity as "an awareness devoid of a point of view (hence, devoid of selfhood)" for me sort’a converges with the Neo-Platonic notion of “the One” or the Buddhist notion of “Nirvana”. Focusing on the Neo-Platonic notion of “the One”, it is taken to be the (absolute) Good and, as a derivative of this, to embody (for lack of better terms) absolute fairness. Again, not as a deity, for here there is selfhood, but as a completely selfless awareness.

At any rate, my own uncommon metaphysical proclivities aside, here’s my main point:

Complete objectivity for us shouldn’t be interpreted as the practical impossibility (but maybe not impossibility in principle) of obtaining “awareness devoid of perspective or point of view” but as the ideal of an absolute, completely unbiased fairness in one’s judgments - this regarding anything that is judged: issues of human justice (e.g., law), issues of what is and is not real (e.g., science), and so forth.

If this ideal of objectivity, i.e. of nonprejudicial fairness, would be forsaken … well, our relative fairness toward each other (ethics) and in respect to truths (epistemic appraisals of what is real) would go out the window.

Mentioning this because I am, um, biased in favor of objectivity as something which there ought to be more of. Again, not in the absolute sense - which to me would equate to being identical to “the One” or some such - but in the relative sense of the term … Come to think of it, as can equally be said for the ideal of goodness, i.e. of being good.

Basically don't like the bashing of objectivity. :grin: But I'm not saying you were doing this.

Check out my comment to Raymond, I cover this in what I wrote there, the one beginning with:

I'm aware of two fundamental domains: actuality (whatever is really going on) and narrative. — Millard J Melnyk

Yes, I saw that. A natural law, as with a basic law of thought, are taken to be actual if in fact existent. My bad for not clarifying that in my post. As to natural laws being narrative rather than actual, I can see the argument. So to you all natural laws are narrative and, thereby, not "existent". Fair enough.

What about gravity? Like any natural law, it's (taken to be) omnipresent, omni-durational, a governing factor for all mass, and actual rather than narrative. So gravity is not "something that is somewhere now" and yet is something actual, hence existent.

Now, gravity is an inference, true, and as such could be construed as a narrative. But if we go down this line of thought, would not all inferences whatsoever be narratives?

For instance, such that the very inferential notion of "actuality" which we ascribe to some either empirically or introspectively experienced givens would itself become a measly narrative we tell ourselves ... thereby possibly leading to the absurd conclusion that all actualities are nonexistent.

So at what spatiotemporal location can a natural law be found? Or do natural laws not exist?

Edit: I take it that "somewhere" cannot be omnipresent, and that "now" cannot be omni-durational ... this as natural laws are inferred to be.

I'd one day maybe smell flesh burning, turn my head around, and see my arm on fire. Or, maybe, even worse: see a loved one's arm on fire.

No physical pain either way. But there would yet be suffering. And I find it easy to conclude more suffering on account of there being no physical pain.

If I did, it was facetious. But you didn't get the joke. — Banno

Really. Now that is a joke.

Care to have another go? — Banno

Not after reading about you sense of facetiousness.

The confusion is your own. — Banno

No, Banno. It's yours.

You've claimed thoughts have physical mass. Now your evading and, worse, projecting your confusion onto me.

Your question is like asking what the mass is of democracy, and using the lack of an answer to argue that since democracy does not have a mass, it doesn't exist. — Banno

And what duck-rabbit hole did you pull that out of?

I’m not the one claiming that if thoughts don’t have mass they then don’t exist, remember. As a reminder, you're the one upholding a physicalism wherein epistemically nonphysical things - such as thoughts - are ontically physical and thereby composed of physical mass. And I’m the one saying this is utter and complete bullshit. Next thing you’ll tell me is that unicorns, being existent thoughts, are mass endowed physical things that aren't real. Tough you got me, I’m now feeling ridiculous in even needing to express this.

What does the theory of evolution visually look like?

How can one quantify its mass in principle? — javra

The obvious answers to these two questions are “it has no visual appearance” and “no one can” respectively. You can’t quantify the mass of a thought like the theory of evolution even in principle because, if for no other reason, you can’t empirically observe it in practice, and empirical data is requisite for the quantification of any physical thing’s mass.

Talk about rhetorical bulshitology.

What does the theory of evolution visually look like?

How can one quantify its mass in principle?

Your answer: "I'm agreeing with you". This due to gestalt principles of awareness no less.

No.

In brief, the neural binding problem is that neuroscience can find no functional area of the brain which can account for this unified sense of self. — Wayfarer

Yup.

Same way you did for the rocks. — Banno

You can empirically investigate - such as by visually seeing, touching, or smelling - thoughts such as the theory of evolution? Because empirical investigation is part and parcel of how I'd quantify the rocks' mass. No empirical data about them, no quantification of their mass.

I wager you can't. So your answer is, well, wrong.

Given the exchange rate, no more than a fraction of a gram. — Banno

Yes, maybe, but how do you quantitatively obtain that approximation?

You cannot tell me the mass of all the rocks in the Simpson Desert, therefore those rocks do not have mass. — Banno

Well with some empirical investigation and added resources I could give you at least a ball park figure.

How can one go about quantitatively approximating the mass of the theory of evolution in principle ... oh yea, one can't. :yikes:

But have it your way. — Banno

Alright.

Speaking for myself, preaching to the choir. I'm myself a diehard non-Cartesian, "Academic" skeptic (um...) falibiliist.

The certain, the eternal, the unchanging, were felt to be superior to the uncertain and mutable. [...] It may be the result of a psychological or religious need people have, I don't know. — Ciceronianus

Yup. Reminds me of hypotheses such as that of the block universe, of causal determinism, or of everything being physical, all of which are are so popular nowadays: each maintaining an absolutely certain, eternal, and immutable world, else grounding aspect of it. :smile:

Yes, the theory of evolution has a mass. But unfortunately that mass is mixed in with a whole lot of other stuff in such a way that it would not be calculable. — Banno

As to being mixed with other stuff, the same can be said of any physical thing, like a rock. You know, fields, quanta that fly in and out, and such. But we can nevertheless quantify the mass of a rock well enough for all given purposes.

You're basically saying thoughts are quantifiable energy that ain't quantifiable. A logical contradiction.

But have it your way.

In a culture with a long history of religion whose central point is the immateriality and immortality of the soul, if free will didn't exist, it would be more likely to arise and be supported as a concept. That doesn't lead to any necessary conclusions, but it is a factor that should be added to a Bayesian analysis. Make sense? — Reformed Nihilist

Yup. Thanks for the reply. No doubting what you say. At the same time, I'm one to believe that we ought not allow cultural prejudices to cloud our judgments. Its inevitable that they sometimes do to some extent, but its a good ideal to work toward: the ideal of objectivity. This to say, the issue of free will's reality ought to be judged independently of cultural biases and preconceptions: such as that of its association with a Creator Deity, or such as that of an emotive rejection of anything that can be associated with religion.

I don't see a problem. — Banno

OK, you. Given that you also find the premise true, let me know what the quantifiable mass of "the theory of evolution" is, or at least how to go about obtaining it. Next, is the physical mass of your average intention greater or smaller than the physical mass of the average percept?

But I grant, you are a dyed-in-the-wool physicalist. :smile:

This paragraph is not at all clear. — Banno

:lol: :ok: :cool:

If the mind is physical, then thoughts are physical. If a thought is physical, it consists of physical energy. If physical energy can be validly quantified as e = mc^2, then our physical thoughts, which consist of structured physical energy, then consist of physical mass multiplied by the speed of light squared. Ergo, our physical thoughts have physical mass.

Where's the logical fallacy in this?

I don't know if the question is meaningful to someone in china or someone living in a remote village in the amazon. I do know it is in the western world. — Reformed Nihilist

Couldn't the same be said of causal determinism, a block universe, and physicalism? (For what it's worth, from what I recall, materialism was addressed in the history of Eastern thought.)

The western world has nowadays had global influences, yes, but I don't find that this necessitates all different cultures of the world then center their existential questions - such as those regarding free will - around whether a Creator Deity is real.

For clarity, are you intending to say that belief in free will's reality entails belief in a Creator Deity?

While true, a good Bayesian analysis would consider factors such as the history of cultural myths or religions and how they might inform (or be informed by) common conceptions of things such as free will. — Reformed Nihilist

Sure, I agree. Not all cultural myths or religions subscribe to a Creator Deity, though.