The problem is, it easily morphs into a form of fatalism and/or blame-placing. — Wayfarer

Yea, I acknowledge that. To my mind though, the same roundabout mind-games can occur with just about all other perspectives. Being or not being favored by God, as one example. Being or not being favored by natural selection as another. It doesn't seem to much matter what perspective is held, some will always find a way to use the given worldview for the purposes of fatalism and/or blame-placing; again, imo.

If you regard it as a regulative principle for action, rather than as a means of blaming or rationalising misfortune, I can't think of a more obvious moral principle than 'as you sow, so will you reap'. — Wayfarer

:up:

I’m probably gonna kick myself in the morning for asking this, still, why so harsh on the philosophical notion of karma?

I’m saying “philosophical notion” so as to differentiate the notion of karma from what, let’s say, ignorantly self-righteous folk seek to do with it: anything, any concept, can be corrupted by certain people, regardless of what the concept is, imo.

May @Wayfarer correct me to the extent that this is incorrect or incomplete: Karma at its root is the, what we westerners would call, natural law/principle of “action and consequence”. That’s all. No one is judging. Its just upheld that the action is the cause for the consequence as effect.

Since it applies to a non-materialist metaphysics, it can get complicated - especially since intentions are in themselves considered to be actions, hence causes, to consequences that result. Still, tmk, karma is basically the principle that for every act there is a consequent. Hence, to say that karma judges you is akin to saying that causation judges you, which to me is nonsense.

Just curious.

[...] The problem with this is it that it has no intellectual underpinnings [...] — Restitutor

It seems we have different metaphysical perspectives. That aside, do you find any way of avoiding some given that “just is”? To give example, historically three main candidates have been “matter/the-physical just is” (which leads to physicalism), “a creator deity of everything just is” (which leads to monotheistic creationism), and “being, when interpreted as the generalized notion of awareness—replete with correlates such those of truth and the good—just is” (which can lead, for example, to Neo-platonic notions of the “the One”).

I’m not asking for a metaphysical discussion of why one of these positions is more viable than the rest—although, in fairness, I believe I did present a somewhat mild logical argument against the viability of a creator deity.

What I’m asking is if you know of some way of avoiding the conundrum of there being some given that just is—and, therefore, some way of avoiding a given for which the principle of sufficient reason (by which givens gain their intellectual underpinnings) cannot apply?

Let me know what you think? — Restitutor

For me at least, the question can be posed in parallel to “what is truth in the context of atheism”.

For those who uphold an omnipotent creationist deity, this deity must logically be the creator of truth, and, hence, all instantiations of it. Otherwise, this specified deity isn’t omnipotent and is itself subservient to, a subject of, truth—which in this case is not of the deity’s creation.

The same issue can then be posed in relation to the good—without which all morality is meaningless: An omnipotent creationist deity is either the creator of the good, or the good is an uncreated aspect of the reality which all beings, including all deities (were they to occur), are embedded in.

I’ve addresses the parallel between truth and the good because they both seem to me to carry the same philosophical weight. If truth is a creation, whose creation is it such that the given creator(s) are not themselves subject to any truth in so creating truth (be it of physical realities, of logical principles, or anything other)? Likewise, if good is a creation, whose creation is it such that the given creator(s) are not themselves subject to doing what is good (for themselves or any other) in the creation of good?

As to morality being relative, I’d say that it is to a certain extent, varying from culture to culture, but that it is dependent upon the existential reality of the good which—though it may take many forms to many diverse beings—always remains unchanged in its property of being good. Just as truth remains unchanged despite its instantiations taking many different forms for many different beings.

While there are many different ways of addressing these two parallel issues of truth and the good, one such approach is then to uphold that both truth and the good simply are, this in the presence of beings—but are in no way the creation of any being. This presents, here loosely articulated, the uncreated and unchanging existential reality of both truth (thereby that which demarcates all instantiation of truth: all truths) and the good (thereby that upon which morals are dependent) within at least one possible atheistic framework—wherein no omniscient creator deity occurs.

Speaking of contradiction, note the following:

By the previous logic, cause and effect, being entirely distinct from one another, must therefore have entirely autonomous, separate existence already, prior to the confluence which is defined as “cause and effect” qua “cause and effect”.

[...]

The cause needs the effect to be defined as the cause; and the effect needs the cause to be defined as an effect.

But the effect cannot be a direct function of the cause without eliminating the distinction; and the cause cannot be given its absolute meaning and relevancy by the effect without likewise eliminating the distinction.

I fail to see any contradiction, contradictions as I understand them being "both X and not-X at the same time and in the same respect".

Cause and effect have a dyadic relation, so they do not occur independently/autonomously in respect to the other.

The same argument you've quoted in the OP (from whom, by the way) can, for instance, be made for "up" and "down": Up cannot occur without a down; down cannot occur without an up. The two can only have a dyadic relation. They do not occur independently/autonomously of the other - except in the faulty abstractions of some. That said, one does not conclude that up and down (and derivatives such as top and bottom) pose a contradiction, however.

Indeed–and in conclusion–the presence of relativity in object interactions precludes any actual (materially “existent”, for lack of a better term) cause and effect; yet it necessitates a conceptual cause and effect that the self-aware agent engages as a means to define and identify both what an object is, and how it is observed (i.e. its position relative to the observer at any given moment).

As to this idealist interpretation of things - with heavy emphasis on idealism not equating to sole-self-ism (this being an issue for a different thread) - I'll leave that open-ended on my part.

Come to think of it, even if "aware" is an adjective - a state of being - you still must rely on the premise that asserts that being (verb) in that state implies something that can be (verb) in that state. — TheMadFool

OK, but here ordinary language clashes with ontology: "be" is classified as a verb, yes, but then does it make any sense to affirm that X causes - or else is an agency for - its own being (let's avoid the God's causa sui issues, please). For example, does the phrase "I am" entail that the "I" addressed causes - is an agency for - its own being? — javra

Well, as I see it, the English translation of cogito ergo sum viz. I think. Therefore, I am, is slightly inaccurate. My research, for what it's worth, shows that cogito ergo sum actually means: Thinking. Therefore I am. — TheMadFool

A disingenuous answer to the issue at hand. My point is that in the phrase "it is" the being (verb) addressed is not a doing: the specified "it" doesn't do the specified "is".

Your retort is to tell me the obvious about what the cogito translates into.

My issue is with premise 1 and I've already said what I wanted to say. Your point concerns argument 2. — TheMadFool

No it is not. I agree that argument 2 is faulty.

Let's look at the issue of awareness from a different angle. In my humble opinion, if one is aware, necessary that one doing something with one's mind e.g. thinking, perceiving, etc. — TheMadFool

You've here gone off into abstractions regarding awareness rather than sticking to concrete instantiations of its first-person occurrence - with the latter including, for example, an immediate awareness of one's own emotive states of being (e.g., being happy/sad), this in addition to perceptions, sensations, and understandings.

Mind, however, is an abstraction whose occurrence can be doubted. Some eliminative materialists do so often enough.

Also, what's the proof for the premise If in a state (awareness) then exists something that is in that state (the entity that's aware)? — TheMadFool

In a state, like Texas? Or in a state of being then exists some given that is in that state of being. And who on Earth is describing this given that is as an entity?! Concepts matter here. — javra

Read above. — TheMadFool

Another disingenuous answer to the issue addressed.

You want to avoid the issue of awareness and stick to the "I think therefore I am" argument, go for it. As I stated in my first post on this thread, I too find Descartes' cogito to be possible to doubt in practice.

It lands on, I am consciousness, and from there it can not go any further. — Pop

Were this to be true, it would signify that solipsism is logically impeccable. I've disagreed with this on logical grounds in this recent thread.

So I disagree with your conclusion, instead agreeing with @Olivier5.

--Sextus Empiricus” — Darkneos

As in the truth to metaphysical and/or epistemological solipsism. Right. Deep questions that are best not cherry-picked.

Come to think of it, even if "aware" is an adjective - a state of being - you still must rely on the premise that asserts that being (verb) in that state implies something that can be (verb) in that state. — TheMadFool

OK, but here ordinary language clashes with ontology: "be" is classified as a verb, yes, but then does it make any sense to affirm that X causes - or else is an agency for - its own being (let's avoid the God's causa sui issues, please). For example, does the phrase "I am" entail that the "I" addressed causes - is an agency for - its own being?

Definition of aware (courtesy Google): having knowledge or perception of a situation or fact. In other words awareness consists of the actions knowing (verb) and perceiving (verb). — TheMadFool

To know and to perceive are both ambiguous terms in ordinary language. We can get into this if you'd like. Knowledge by acquaintance, or else by experience - such as in knowing oneself to be happy/sad or certain/uncertain in manners devoid of inference - for example. Or seeing that apple one imagines to be: the perception of imaginary givens. I'm thinking so doing might deviate too much from the topic, though.

Also, what's the proof for the premise If in a state (awareness) then exists something that is in that state (the entity that's aware)? — TheMadFool

In a state, like Texas? Or in a state of being then exists some given that is in that state of being. And who on Earth is describing this given that is as an entity?! Concepts matter here.

What's really getting me worked up [...] — TheMadFool

If this conversation is getting you worked up, I'll stop partaking. Best not to get into even more worked up modes.

I'm still trying to understand the notion of panpsychism. Currently, to me, it seems to be a logical conclusion, though I can't make sense of it, not to my own satisfaction at least.

If you don't mind indulging me further, what of the distinction I alluded to in my reply to TMF?:

Thought is caused by X, whereas awareness isn't caused by X but, instead, is a state of X's being ... thereby making thought and awareness ontologically distinct givens.

Don't mean to badger. Only want to flesh out whether or not they are the same thing in you view.

OK. Thanks. Due to the plasticity of language, I'll agree that the terms' extension is debatable. Just to further this: Then, if it is granted that an ameba can in its own way be aware of what is relative to itself predators and prey, and act accordingly, would you then also confer thoughts to the given ameba? I'm asking out of a curiosity to see if so conferring would be deemed commonsense, or else counterfactual.

If you think we should get into the mechanics of thought [...] — Pantagruel

No. Philosophy of mind is a vastly complex issue, I agree. I was only interested in whether you interpret "thought" and "awareness" to be identical.

:cool:

You've made an inference from "...are aware..." to "...aware beings." For this to work you need the premise 1. All doings are things that have doers to be true. — TheMadFool

First, "aware" is an adjective, not a verb. As such, it's a state of being; not a doing.

Secondly - and this is harder to address impersonally rather than from an experiential vantage, but I'll try - for "X to be aware" is for X to be in a state of being of awareness ... which entails that X is, i.e. holds the property of isness being, i.e. is a being (here, is a given that is).

I don't aware; I am aware.

Contrast this with the cogito. Here, the affirmation of "I think" is questioned due to lack of evidence that that which is done (the thought in question) pertains to a particular doer ("I"). Differently expressed, that that which is (the thought in question) is a product of some agency (the "I"); here, then, there can be the implicit issue of causality, as in X causes Y. It might have been Descartes demon that was doing (else causing) all the doubting that Descartes ascribed to his own agency, for one example.

However, (and correct me if I'm wrong about this) you've granted that "I am aware" is a sound experiential fact whenever the given "I" is aware. At this junction, X's awareness cannot logically occur in the absence of X; X must be in order for X to be aware. If Descartes was aware of all the given doubts he talked about - even if we get into weird doubts about telepathy on the part of the demon being the cause of this awareness, or some such - it remains the fact that a first-person awareness which addressed itself as Descartes was aware. Since this first-person awareness was aware, this first-person awareness was.

To sum up the aforementioned, regardless of the status of the world, BIVs, and the like, if I am aware, I as a first-person awareness am.

... Interesting to see where this goes.

but to infer that there's an aware-er we need the premise that says doing implies a doer in all cases of doing but [,,,] — TheMadFool

Are you intending to infer a homonculus to first-person awareness? I'd strongly disagree with that. We don't infer that we are aware so as to conclude that we are aware; instead, we as first-person points of view are aware of any such inference, and are thereby, QED, aware beings. And this regardless of us being entities, processes, both, or neither .... an ontological issue that can only be resolved (if at all possible to resolve) by inference and, hence, thoughts of which we are aware. No? (I'll check back in tomorrow.)

If you can't say, "this is thought now" then there is no thinking. It's an assertion of awareness. Thought is aware of its own authorship. It is fundamental to the nature of thought. — Pantagruel

Hmm. Can't one be aware while devoid of thoughts? As one example, while zoning-out? But this gets into the murky issue of what one interprets by the abstraction of thought. In short, is not awareness and thought two distinct - though intimately entwined - givens?

- is abstracted from a world that, Descartes himself acknowledges could be not real. — TheMadFool

Yea, but I'm not addressing this from that vantage of language realism, or some such.

It's taking place alright. I'm thinking right now, so are you and everybody else too but as crazy as this sounds, we may not exist in the sense there may not be a thing doing the thinking. — TheMadFool

Right, but - again - how do we conclude that thought is taking place?

I'll offer a suggestion: we are aware of our own thought, ergo we conclude that thought takes place. Now, one could play linguistic games with being an "aware-er" or else keep things in tune with commonsense expressions and just stipulate that we are aware beings. Here, epistemologically, our awareness of our thoughts takes precedence as a known over the thoughts in question of which we are aware.

The cogito ergo sum is an unsound argument. It can't prove that thinkers exist just because thinking takes place. — TheMadFool

Yup. As the cogito is most commonly understood - to regard thought but not awareness per se - it doesn't validate the thinker of the thought; it only validates that thought occurs. As wiser folk than I have mentioned along with you:

One common critique of the dictum is that it presupposes that there is an "I" which must be doing the thinking. According to this line of criticism, the most that Descartes was entitled to say was that "thinking is occurring", not that "I am thinking".[3] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito,_ergo_sum

That established, there's a follow up question: How does one know that thinking takes place to begin with? In other words, what entitles Descartes to say "thinking is occurring"?

Realized after my post that I’m not a contributing member of the reading group, so I’ll back off the thread. Just wanted to clarify:

I wouldn’t agree that habit level processes are unconscious and thus that only attentional processing is conscious. — apokrisis

I wouldn’t agree with that either.

Does this mean that experience is not intentionally directed but emerges as an act of subconscious attentional focus? — magritte

It is more complicated. But as a general principle, yes. — apokrisis

If my memory serves me right, you used to talk of top-down process working in conjunction with bottom-up processes.

In your post you address, more or less, bottom-up process that result in what we experientially appraise to be voluntary behaviors that do not require cogitations on our part to accomplish. You’re sitting on a stool; you feel an impetus to drink a beer; then you voluntary ask the bartender for one; this without cogitations of whether or not you should drink a beer rather than a cola or a whiskey, nor with cogitations of which word choice to utilize in order to accomplish the feat of conveying what you want to the bartender (etc.). All good. A multitude of habitual behavior process kicking in. Given that our conscious awareness is not identical to our total mind’s awareness - which in laymen terms consists of both subconscious and unconscious awareness and cognitive activities, with neither the sub- nor unconscious mind (where differentiated) being the conscious awareness we as egos hold - it only makes sense that our non-conscious minds do a heck of a lot without any conscious input; and that this should be observable neurologically. (We, for one example, don't choose, intend, what to perceive; our non-conscious minds, in their interaction with our environment, are from where these percepts develop.)

Yet, when it comes to deliberation - wherein a choice is to be consciously taken between two or more alternatives (with these two or more alternatives themselves being products of the sub/unconscious mind) - the consciously aware ego can (or else cannot) hold top-down effects upon the substratum of its total mind and, therefore, upon the neurological correlates of the respective CNS.

I’m curious at this point. Are you now upholding that consciousness (as differentiated from the total mind within which it is embedded) cannot hold top-down effects upon the CNS via its consciously performed choices during times of conscious deliberation?

Concordantly, how are we to neurologically pinpoint such top-down effects by a consciousness when we can’t even neurologically pinpoint consciousness? … here alluding to the combination aspect of the binding problem.

This could all be part of what you meant by "it is more complicated". To me, at least, top-down process of consciousness - when they occur - do touch upon an important aspect of our cognition.

But I think that our mutual misunderstanding lies in my inability to adequately explain the difference between epistemological and metaphysical solipsism. — Partinobodycular

I’m familiar with both notions of solipsism, its just that I find a non-metaphysical, epistemological solipsism to be a logically incoherent concept - much as I find metaphysical solipsism to be a logically incoherent concept.

1) Again, if there is uncertainty about being the sole self, and if uncertainty about X entails lack of knowledge about X, then how can such a position be logically labeled an “epistemological sole-self-ism”?

2) As to the egocentric predicament you mentioned, an “ego” experiences more than just perception, it also experiences its own volitional actions: e.g., to have your will as an ego thwarted can result in differing intensities of suffering, which is also an experiential given. Which comes back around to the logical contradiction of intending X and intending not-X at the same time and in the same respect as an ego … Something which we as egos never experience, but would nevertheless need to be a known truth either for a metaphysical solipsist (who affirms the ontological stance that only he/she occurs) or for an epistemological solipsist (who affirms that the only knowledge to be had is that he/she occurs, while also claiming that knowledge and what is ontic are, or at least can be, distinct).

3) Likewise, we’re here addressing knowledge, epistemology. And, while you make the case of you being infallible, you as of yet have not provided any notion of what you mean by the term “infallible” so as to differentiate it from what I understand by the term “infallible”.

What you previously said about time being a limited commodity, it applies to most of us. No hard feelings, but if the conversation we’re having in a thread labeled “logically impeccable” isn’t going to adhere to logic, I’d much rather utilize my own time differently.

OK. Take your time. Don't forget about this other question when you reply:

If there is uncertainty about other selves, then there is uncertainty in like manner about being the sole self. The two are entailed. So how does it then make sense to refer to this condition of mind as “epistemological sole-self-ism” when uncertainty regarding what is abounds? — javra

Also, as I'm kind'a laughing my ass off about it:

That way mind can at least grasp what it is that you're mind is attempting to convey. — javra

This sentence has two grammatical typos that I've corrected. Nevertheless, it's unintentional presentation speaks volumes as to a solipsists pov: self without other that is yet conversing with another that is its own self. My bad for the typos, but they're humorous in a way.

Forgive me for neglecting this bit, — Partinobodycular

Well, this is the bit that to me is nothing else be nonsensical equivocation.

If there is uncertainty about other selves, then there is uncertainty in like manner about being the sole self. The two are entailed. So how does it then make sense to refer to this condition of mind as “epistemological sole-self-ism” when uncertainty regarding what is abounds?

As to the issue of infallibilism. I noticed that you ignored what I wrote about it:

For something to be infallible it will need to be perfectly secure from all possible error. Can you given evidence that at no future time will you, your mind, or someone else provide a possible error to your conclusion that "I exist"? If so, please provide this evidence via which to demonstrate infallibility. If not, the knowledge of one's own existence is not perfectly secure from all possible error, thereby not being infallible, therefore being fallible. And, if the only knowledge worthy of the term is held to be infallible, then one does not hold knowledge of one's own existence. — javra

So I currently can't find meaning in this statement you gave:

But the fascinating thing is, that while knowledge is fallible, I'm not...I'm infallible. — Partinobodycular

Rather than asking "how do you know this?" - a very pertinent question - I'll first ask you do define what "infallible" means to you. That way my mind can at least grasp what it is that your mind is attempting to convey. The analogies you've provided have not helped in any way; in part, because it all consists of fallible knowledge.

Thank you for your reply. I do have difficulty with the notion of a non-metaphysical, epistemological solipsism. Your leading disagreement was with the definition of solipsism I provided, from which the rest of your arguments followed. Via the second wikipedia quote you specified:

Epistemological solipsism is the variety of idealism according to which only the directly accessible mental contents of the solipsistic philosopher can be known. The existence of an external world is regarded as an unresolvable question rather than actually false. — wikipedia

Solipsism holds the etymology of "sole self". What am I to understand by the phrase "solipsistic philosopher" if not such being a philosopher who is the "sole self"?

As to issues of knowledge, are you understanding knowledge to be infallible by definition?

For something to be infallible it will need to be perfectly secure from all possible error. Can you given evidence that at no future time will you, your mind, or someone else provide a possible error to your conclusion that "I exist"? If so, please provide this evidence via which to demonstrate infallibility. If not, the knowledge of one's own existence is not perfectly secure from all possible error, thereby not being infallible, therefore being fallible. And, if the only knowledge worthy of the term is held to be infallible, then one does not hold knowledge of one's own existence.

I'm in a little bit of hurry right now. Will try to get back tomorrow.

Keep things simple. Do you disagree with (1), (2), (3), (4), or a combination of these? If so, explain why the disagreement.

I really don't understand the obsession with ordinary language philosophy. Ordinary language has all sorts of assumptions baked into it. Why take those at face value? — Marchesk

Especially when one goes about picking which parts of ordinary language to rely on in ad hoc manners. In ordinary language, intentions are not illusory, for one example. We all speak as though sentient beings are endowed with agency (granted, and sometime speak of insentient things, like computers, as though they are endowed with agency; such as in, “it's thinking,” when a computer program doesn’t process information fast enough).

Apples aren't red. — Marchesk

There are red apples. You're not bothered to be saying something so obviously false? — Banno

To whomever might be interested, my take on red apples:

In short, apples are red, intersubjectively. To make it explicit, this relative to the vast majority of the human species, a populace in which ab-normalities such as color blindness and blindness occur.

Apples are not red in a (intra-)subjective manner, such that their redness is exclusive to the private experiences of one individual and no other. The apple is red to you, is red to me, is red to most humans we interact with, and, therefore, it is (intersubjectively) red - for all of us (save color blind and blind people).

Nor are apples red objectively, such that their redness is universally applicable to all sentient being save for those who are (intentionally so expressed) malformed. As one example, if one accepts biological evolution, lesser animals endowed with sight which don’t see the apple being red are equally evolved in biologically functional manners as are humans; i.e., they don’t have malformed sight. All sentient beings, however, will witness the same spatiotemporal properties of what we humans (intersubjectively) experience as a red apple, this when in proximity to it. Given that objective reality is universally applicable to all sentient beings, this then makes the apple's spatiotemporal properties objective - but not its color, nor its taste, etc., with all the latter being intersubjective realities.

Again, we need to be clear about the difference between epistemological solipsism and metaphysical solipsism. — Partinobodycular

I’m only interested in a discussion if you don’t go about waiving off logical conclusions when they don’t suit your fancy, as was previously done here:

You [as a first-person point of view] can intend X and not X [at the same time and in the same respect] by simply waving it away as a figment of your mind. — Darkneos

--------

1) Solipsism is the position that in the whole of existence only a single self occurs, or else is known to occur.

2) An epistemological solipsism that rejects metaphysical solipsism thereby rejects that only a single self occurs or, else, is known to occur; and can thereby affirm the ontological co-occurrence of multiple epistemological solipsists in the world (a world which is granted to be strictly constituted of mind). Regardless of particulars ascribed to these others, though, to denounce metaphysical solipsism is to uphold the reality of multiple coexisting selves.

3) However, the position that multiple selves (be they fellow epistemological solipsists or not) co-occur and interact directly contradicts (1), thereby making the notion of solipsism nonsensical.

4) Therefore, for solipsism as concept to hold any form of cogent meaning whatsoever, solipsism must be one of metaphysical solipsism.

Where do you find disagreement in this?

"Things as they are" aren' t much. — Heiko

Hmm. And so ontology gets thrown out the window. I'd say fine, but then epistemology would have no ontological grounding.

At any rate, I fully get that what I wrote in my last post was an oversimplification. Aside from which, I just now realize that its deviating too much form the thread's theme, which might make things less fun for some.

Could that be done on purpose? Seems much more plausible. — Heiko

:smile: Personally, I think we each like the stability of our core being - a type of metaphysical self-preservation of the identity we each hold ourselves to have - something along the lines of "ego" when interpreted as the [...] in any statement affirming "I am [...]". Entertaining this concept, then we each desire to hold onto this conceptual identity of being we've acquired via the course of our lives. We, in essence, become attached to the tales we tell ourselves that explain what and who we are. Its no longer a quest to discover what this is but it is already known and must then be safeguarded. Only that different folks hold different conceptualizations of what and who they are. So different folks then abstract different concepts in attempts to confirm (solidify, make firm) their notions of what and who they are - only that these notions often enough conflict, due to being contradictory (relative to each other). And so more such abstractions are then in turn further created for the same core motive - resulting in a massive amount of abstractions that are at odds with each other. Hence the "sea of nebulous abstractions".

So, in a way, yea, maybe it is all done on purpose, as in with a motive.

When asking what is necessary for experience to be possible, the answer should not lead to the conclusion, that it is not. — Heiko

Yes. I firmly reside on this side of the aisle as well. Got it now.

(posted too quickly so I edited the grammatical mistakes I found after posting)

The conclusion fails short. It signifies a level of thought where mind has not yet achieved self-conscousness as the being it is. — Heiko

:up:

... Although, from my way of thinking, its funny (else mesmerizing) how lesser animals are cognizant, (self-)aware, of their own being as one agency among others - this without the use of cogitations, i.e. inferential thoughts - while we humans often loose sight of this due to a sea of nebulous abstractions. This pov is doubtlessly something controversial among the learned. Not so much with, for one example, human children in regard to their pets. The topic is a can of worms, though.

Why does everyone just think, that, when talking about a-priori there would be wisdom beyond the obvious. — Heiko

Can you elaborate on this? Would like to make sure that I understand you properly.

Sigh, solipsism, what a show.

For all the solipsists out there, lyrics to a song that touches upon the issue:

See the animal in his cage that you built
Are you sure what side you're on?
Better not look him too closely in the eye
Are you sure what side of the glass you are on?
See the safety of the life you have built
Everything where it belongs
Feel the hollowness inside of your heart
And it's all
Right where it belongs

What if everything around you
Isn't quite as it seems?
What if all the world you think you know
Is an elaborate dream?
And if you look at your reflection
Is it all you want it to be?
What if you could look right through the cracks?
Would you find yourself
Find yourself afraid to see?

What if all the world's inside of your head
Just creations of your own?
Your devils and your gods
All the living and the dead
And you're really all alone?
You can live in this illusion
You can choose to believe
You keep looking but you can't find the woods
While you're hiding in the trees

What if everything around you
Isn't quite as it seems?
What if all the world you used to know
Is an elaborate dream?
And if you look at your reflection
Is it all you want it to be?
What if you could look right through the cracks
Would you find yourself
Find yourself afraid to see?

Lyrics from the song "Right Where It Belongs" by NIN:

I fail to see how this is unsound though — Darkneos

Why defer to logical reasoning when it is just a figment of your imagination that can be waived off whenever it disagrees with your whims?

Hey, be or don't be a solipisist, whatever you choose to believe. But, in case you choose the former, do keep in mind that when you interact with others the void that is your own projection, the void will interact back with you.

I’m pretty sure he’s coming from the vantage that, as with a dream of sleep, everything he experiences during awakened states is a waking dream produced by HIS mind alone - with this being rationalized by him via him not having certainty for there being other sources of awareness and intention except for he himself.

One problem to this is that, as with any dream of sleep wherein one interacts with others within the given dream, for his non-self-mind to act and react to what he is or is not doing, his non-self-mind has to be aware of what he is or is not doing. Such that the mind addresses is fragmented into numerous sources of awareness and intention of which he is only one of many. This as is is typical in many an REM dream.

We infer all the happenings of REM dreams to occur within our own personal mind, and this because these happenings are found to all be private to ourselves upon awakening from sleep: others do not share our REM dreams. In the conceptualization of reality as the waking dream one awakens to from sleep states, however, the mind in question is not private to any one of the disparate sources of awareness and intention that are to be found in the so conceptualized waking dream. Instead, all these disparate sources pertain to a common mind - such that the given waking dream mind belongs to none of them individually. And there is no awakening (as a self in a world of non-self) from the waking dream such that the waking dream of physical reality becomes “a personal and private fabrication of MY MIND” that is not shared by anyone else.

So in this conceptualization of existence wherein we awaken to a waking dream, the “mind” addressed in effect encapsulates all the sources of awareness and intention that interact (both human and non-human). Thereby not pertaining to any one source of awareness and intention. Thereby constituting one interpretation of a non-physicalist existential reality that, all the same, is constituted of multiple selves which all pertain to a common mind—for instance, a common effete mind as C.S. Peirce would say.

For the solipsist, there is an insistent equivocation between “me”, a source of awareness and intention, and “my mind” which is not “me” but instead belongs to “me”—such that both “me” and “my mind” are illogically affirmed to be identical. This is as equally true of mind (in whichever ontology) that is composed of both conscious awareness and sub- or unconscious awareness—such that both are conflated into “me” as conscious awareness—as it is in regard to the notion of mind as that which constitutes reality as a waking dream—wherein all others are irrationally deemed to be “figments of my imagination as a conscious awareness”.... Or, else, "my mind's figments of imagination" which, again, is conflated with the "me" that is one source of awareness and intention.

Because of this unsound conflation, they then insist that everything is “me”. Hence, the sole-self position … wherein everything, including logic, can be waived off as a figment of “my imagination”.

But if logic can be waived off as irrelevant, I fail to see the point in solipsists (because there’s more than one out there) attempting to use logic to affirm their case.

The fun thing about solipsism, everybody can do it! — Merkwurdichliebe

:rofl: Quite.

But how do you compare the fun factor to other what-ifs? I'm sure better one's can be found, but here's an example: What if extraterrestrials (that they exist is a good what-if for many) teleported the sun out out our galaxy and into another (teleportation is a staple what-if in many a philosophical hypothetical, typically used to gain wisdom (cough) into personal identity issues; I'm here extrapolating), this exactly seven minutes ago such that in one minute's time there won't be any sunlight? In my view, this is a far better roller-coaster ride of what-ifs than is solipsism, which is kind'a bland and boring. One can even converge the two: the same question posed but with everything now being a projection of the given solipsist.

@Darkneos I now find this thread to be more about a phobia (i.e., an unreasonable fear) than about issues of experience based logic. And I'm by no means qualified to address the former. If we'd start taking all the what-ifs we can collectively fathom seriously we'd implode. Life is more than just perception, it is also action. And no, you are not alone. I'll defer to @Merkwurdichliebe and others from here on out. Sincerely, all the best to you from me, me being a different self than the one you are.

It's not really what I think about it but what others say about it. I don't want to believe it but it's a select others that say I am mistaken in dismissing it as false or wrong. — Darkneos

I'm off to work for now, but wanted to make the comment: So too will some argue that Earth is flat irrespective of what you and I say. Why take what they say so seriously?

Especially when it comes to experience and intention ... you know your own better than anyone else, right?

You haven’t answered the question I posed. Expressed somewhat differently: Can you both intend X and not intend X at the same time and in the same respect?

It an important question. If there is either experiential or logical uncertainties about the answer, please explain where this uncertainty could possibly come from.

If no rational doubts occur for the issue, then you have yourself certainty (both experiential and logical) that when others appear to thwart your intentions it is in fact not yourself who is doing so.

Given that a self is at minimum a locus of awareness - i.e., a first-person point of view - which furthermore intends stuff, and given the aforementioned certainty, then via entailment you also hold the certainty that other selves occur. Just as their awareness of you is not your awareness of yourself, so too (and more pivotally to the argument I'm presenting) their intentions are not your intentions. Therefore, there occur other selves: loci of awareness and intention other than yourself.

I should also add, there’s massive amounts of equivocation that can and does occur in relation to what a self is. So, prior to engaging in discussions about the notion of a “sole self”, can you also please elaborate on what a self is to you. This especially if you disagree with the minimalist definition I've provided.

As to the link you’ve posted, I’m not much interested in what others say about the matter; both lies and bullshit can be expressed by others and neither should be believed. I’m interested in what your own experiences and logic have to say about the matter.

I'll further address your questions on the condition that you first address mine.

Quite the compliment. Thank you.

My pleasure. :grin:

Which satisfies Dennett's criterion? — creativesoul

You're making this feel like kindergarten.

I asked you:

Does this conscious experience consist of quality? — javra

to which you replied:

Not on my view, but perhaps on yours it may. What counts as consisting of quality? — creativesoul

to which I in essence replied:

if in your view conscious experiences do not consist of quality, where does quality take place? — javra

to which you answer:

Which satisfies Dennett's criterion? — creativesoul

... after I asked that you don't evade the question.

I'm calling it a day. Have (non-qualitative) fun!

Are those my only choices?

:brow: — creativesoul

Nope. But a non-evasive reply would do.

Does this conscious experience consist of quality? — javra


Not on my view, but perhaps on yours it may. What counts as consisting of quality? — creativesoul

If your asking me to define quality, dictionaries can do this far better than I.

Two definitions stand out: 1) level of excellence [as in quality of life, or the quality of a song, or the quality of an apple (for the purpose of eating)] and 2) a property or an attribute that differentiates a thing or a person [as in one of the apple's properties qualities is that it is red rather than green]

To then answer, if an experience is in any way qualitative, it will then consist of (be made up of) qualities - in sense 1, in sense 2, or, arguably, in both senses.

Given that we both acknowledge the occurrence of the word "quality" in the English language (you've made use of it), and if in your view conscious experiences do not consist of quality, where does quality take place?

Or is it your view that quality does not take place anywhere, that it has no occurrence, thereby making the term fully meaningless to you?

The old gag about beaviourism, which eliminativism is basically a rebage: — Wayfarer

Very much agreed.