I hope my answer is somehow helpful or at least not boring. — jjAmEs

Definitely not boring, and certainty insightful. I agree that meaning is not static, fixed, but instead fluid and alive (allegorically speaking). It's also a given to me that language is inter-subjective, rather than what I'd term intra-subjective (as would be one's private awareness of a flashing insight, for example) - and, hence, that linguistic meaning is largely social and historical. Myself, I however am also of the general opinion that most concepts - or, at least, those which are most important - do however reference concrete existents, for lack of better terms, this in reference to what's going on within (again, as I term it, in reference to each of our own intra-subjective reality). That said, I by no means deny the complexity to our semantics, which you've eloquently expressed.

Thank you for the candid reply.

I suggest that it makes as much sense to ground the subject/consciousness in language as it does to ground language in the subject/consciousness. The whole philosophical discourse of consciousness occurs within public sign-systems. The subject is an effect of language, not as a body, of course, but as a concept, as one more sign that only makes sense in a system of signs. — jjAmEs

Though not new to me, I find this to be an interesting take.

I'd like to know if you'd affirm the same of the term awareness. More specifically, in your view, is it a valid position to affirm that the English linguistic percept of "awareness" is in itself what manifests the occurrence of awareness - such that the term does not reference anything that can occur in the term's absence?

If yes, this would naturally entail that language-less beings are devoid of sentience due to their lacking of awareness - to include not only lesser animals but young toddlers as well - for none such hold a linguistically framed concept of "awareness".

BTW, I in part ask because a) the concept of "awareness" can of course only be linguistically conveyed and because, b) given the wide array of possible denotations that can be applied to the term "consciousness" - while it is conceivable given some such denotations that awareness can occur sans consciousness (e.g., an ant can be so claimed to be devoid of a consciousness while yet aware of stimuli) - denoting consciousness as something that can occur in the absence of awareness makes the term "consciousness" utterly nonsensical. And our own awareness - via which we perceive just as much as we cognize intuitions and introspections - seems to me to be the pivotal "beetle".

So, to sum: in your view, is it a valid possibility that awareness cannot occur in the absence of language?

--which, by the way, come from Charles Sanders Peirce. — aletheist

I like some of his takes as well.

I am having trouble understanding this question, and I wonder if there is a disconnect between what I mean by "position" and what you mean by "location." Again, what I primarily wish to maintain is that continuous three-dimensional space is not really composed of discrete dimensionless points. Put another way, there are no absolute positions in space, only those that we deliberately mark for some purpose. A physical thing does not occupy a discrete point or collection of discrete points, since it is always in continuous motion. We can only designate its position relative to an arbitrary reference frame, which is also always in continuous motion. — aletheist

That geometric points don’t really hold being other than in our abstract contemplations I too take as a given. To try to better explain my own perspective:

Like the meaning applicable to specific words as percepts - be they written, auditory, or, as is the case with braille, tactile - specific units of length will hold their designation due to communal accord; alternatively stated, they hold an inter-subjective reality ... But not a reality that is solely applicable to one individual (such as would be awareness of some previously experienced, language-less, REM dream), nor one that is universally applicable to all coexistence sentient beings in manners impartial to the wants or needs of any one individual or cohort of such (as is the case with the physical universe).

Then, as with the specific, here visual, percept used to address a concept - as with a word - so too will the use of feet or meters (for example) be inter-subjectively arbitrary. But - here focusing in on the issue of spatial lengths - the spatial length will remain the exact same length regardless of which unit of measurement is used (and even if no unit of measurement is used), thereby making the discrete position at which a given length starts and ends something that is not inter-subjectively arbitrary; instead, these as discrete positions will be universally applicable to all causally interrelated, coexistent beings regardless of a) their individual idiosyncratic properties of body and mind and b) their shared mindsets. Here the discrete positions (what I’ve termed “locations” for brevity) of where the given length starts and ends will not be in any way arbitrary but, by all accounts I can currently think of, objective.

Importantly, I am of this opinion while fully agreeing that there is no objective center to the physical universe, nor any objective top/down, front/back, left/right to it.

Nevertheless, by virtue of there being multiple physical things, there will likewise be multiple discrete positions – such as the start and end of each physical thing’s longest extension (to nitpick, even if this is equally applicable in all directions as is the case with a perfect sphere … which is likely solely conceptual).

To now try to bring this back to the arrow paradox, remember I discussed the point-free topology notion of spatially extended “spots” as an alternative to volumeless geometric points, this in terms of contemplating what space is constituted of. The same conceptual dilemma emerges: if there is a distance - a start-spot and an end-spot to a given length - which has to be traversed, then there will logically be a mid-spot to this distance, this whether or not it is marked by anyone. And, also logically, there will then be an endless quantity of mid-spots getting ever closer to the end-spot but never actualizing a perfectly identical location relative to it.

Hence, in my view, this logic will hold for as long as there is some objective length that needs to be traveled. It doesn’t matter if the length is measure in feet, in meters, some other unit of measurement, or is not measured at all via any inter-subjectively established unit of measurement. The mid-points or, alternatively, mid-spots will be - not because one individual discerns them, nor because of some interpersonally established means of measurement (including those of geometric points and topological spots) - but, it seems to me, these will be just as objectively present as is the very start and end of the given length. And devoid of some start and end to length, width, and height no physical object could itself be - instead, all of physicality would be one center-less and volume-less whole.

Don't know if I expressed myself well enough. At any rate, to me the spatial aspects of the arrow paradox are just an interesting thing to think about at times, this as a distraction of sorts. But I don’t want to beat a proverbial dead horse. I think I get the perspectives you’ve presented, which is what I was interested in. And its clear to me that we both agree on space and time being continuous, with no absolute spatial (or temporal) locations (or durations) to be found in the spatiotemoral universe.

Thanks for the exchange.

No, this is conflating reality with existence; I hold that they are not synonymous or coextensive. Reality is that which is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it. Existence is reaction with other things in the environment. [...] Positions and instants are artificial creations, so they only exist after we have deliberately marked them for some purpose, such as description or measurement. — aletheist

Got it. Thanks for the clarification. Existence is a very ambiguous term in philosophy: can either imply something along the lines of “that which stands out (perceptually - sometimes, or cognitively - to some observer, some cohort of such, or all coexistent observers … such that, for example, the “points of awareness” which do the observing don’t themselves exist in this sense, for example leading to notions such as the so-called problem of other minds)” or, else, is deemed synonymous to being and, hence, that which is real (in which case, for example, we as “points of awareness” do exist). Hard to tell what gets interpreted by the term existence sometimes.

A discrete position or location is established relative to a coordinate system whose origin, orientation, and unit length are all arbitrary--again, artificial creations. — aletheist

Arbitrary relative to whom? I ask because you haven't addressed what is to me the difficult question: How does perceptual agreement between all sentient observers that causally interact in regard to the location of physical objects - very much including where they start and where they end - come about?

(While I'm aware of the "god did it" argument, I'm not of this view - nor do I want to debate issues regarding theism in this thread.)

No, physical things exist regardless of whether humans ever designate their positions/locations relative to an arbitrary coordinate system. — aletheist

Given your clarification of "existence", how can physical things (note the plurality and, hence, intrinsic quantity to this affirmation - which also entails discrete locations for each as per the law of noncontradiction) exist regardless of whether locations exist - given that the latter are mind-dependent?

Yes, but again, the unit by which we measure length or duration is arbitrary. Moreover, both the stick's length and the song's duration are subject to change--we can cut off a portion of the stick, or adjust the tempo of the song. — aletheist

We're in agreement to the second sentence in this quote. But, again, length and duration would be arbitrary relative to whom? To me "arbitrariness" loses its meaning when ascribed to that which all coexistent sentient beings do in like manner so as to result in their tacit agreement upon existent physical things that are concretely experienced and interacted with.

So as to not be misinterpreted, I've already given my own perspective in the post to which you've just replied: both continuous spatiotemporal change and discrete aspects of space and time which we quantify are real and existent, though the first is more foundational than the second.

Of note, with its possible philosophical interpretations here placed aside, the theory of relativity clearly indicates that space and time are not discrete but a continuum. — javra

No, this is a mistake in the other direction; the theory of relativity assumes that space and time are continuous, rather than discrete. — aletheist

My point to this being that, though the theory of relativity is in itself a model of reality, it accurately describes those aspects of nature it is relevant to, as is evidenced by its predictive power. This, in turn, can give additional credence to space and time not only being individually continuous but also mutually continuous.

I'm replying primarily out of my curiosity for the following.

What you said here:

Continuous motion is a more fundamental reality that discrete positions in space and discrete instants in time. — aletheist

seems contradictory with what you say here:

Yes, in my view a discrete position (or instant) is an abstraction that we impose when we mark it for some purpose, not a real constituent of space (or time). It certainly does not exist, since it does not react with anything. — aletheist

The first statement affirms degrees or reality, such that some aspects of reality are more fundamental than others, with all aspects of reality (regardless of its metaphysical(?) degree) being existent by definition. The second statement implies a strict binary understanding: either something is real, and thereby existent, or it is not.

We so far agree that at least everything we deem to be physical is in continuous change - that everything is in flux, to here paraphrase Heraclitus. I say “everything we deem to be physical” so as to bracket off certain givens such as basic laws of thought (the law of identity, for example, is not continuously changing relative to us sentient beings - despite our own perpetual changes).

To address your second comment that discrete position - i.e., location - does not exist, is the computer screen that I am now seeing not located in front of me, beneath the sky and above the earth, having locations to the left and to the right at which it terminates? Are all these in fact nonexistent? If so, how do you account for our mutual perceptual agreement of where physical objects are relative to each other … as well as for their three-dimensional spatial properties? Addressing the same in more general terms, how would one account for the physical world which all sentient beings tacitly, if not also explicitly, agree upon: e.g., an ant, a cat, and a human will all tacitly find the same spatial properties to what we humans deem to be a rock, including its three-dimensional volume. Rearticulating the same, if location is to be deemed nonexistent, would the physical world (here encompassing all physical objects which are in part known via their discrete spatial positions) also be considered nonexistent?

As for myself, I adopt the perspective that the continuity of change, hence of motion, is a more fundamental reality than the fixedness of quantity (including distances that have a beginning and end as well as durations that have a beginning and end) - this being in-tune with your first quoted statement. Yet both change and quantity are nevertheless real and, thus, existent – here, in a non-binomial manner but one of degrees. We all know where a given stick’s length starts and ends, just as we all know when a given song starts and ends – thereby making the stick’s length and the song’s duration impartially, hence objectively, real, and thereby making the stick and the song existent. For emphasis, to me this is so despite lengths and durations being of a less fundamental reality than is the reality of continuous spatiotemporal change.

… or, in the words of the Cheshire Cat, “we’re all mad here”.

It’s the ones that take themselves to be fully, absolutely, infallibly sane that you have to watch out for. They’re mad too, just differently (one can tell by their mad reactions to being informed of this).

While I’m quoting form Lewis Carrol …

Mad Hatter: "Have I gone mad?"
Alice: "I'm afraid so. You're entirely bonkers. But I'll tell you a secret. All the best people are.”

Also

Mad Hatter: “Everyone wants some magical solution to their problems and everyone refuses to believe in magic.”

To be less lighthearted in my reply, philosophy takes time. And, if its goal is the gaining of wisdom, it is then a never-ending endeavor. No wisdom is ever perfect. As to repetition expecting different results, is “if at first you don’t succeed, try and try again” to be shunned as something only lunatics do? A mostly rhetorical question, given that the attempts are made in different ways. (just noticed beat me to this :razz: )

Continuous motion is a more fundamental reality that discrete positions in space and discrete instants in time. — aletheist

I am of the same opinion. With the paradox addressed in mind, this stance in turn implies that our conceptual quantification of space and time, as a mapping of the terrain, does not accurately represent that which is being mapped. Of note, with its possible philosophical interpretations here placed aside, the theory of relativity clearly indicates that space and time are not discrete but a continuum. All the same, the quoted mindset with which I agree will also stand in opposition to the block-universe model of the world, wherein there can be no real motion (due to there being no real change). As a reminder, Zeno’s paradoxes were intended to support Parmenides’ stance that change, and thereby motion, does not exist as anything other but illusion.

The arrow indeed will pass all the Ms that we actually mark, but that will be a finite number. — aletheist

This part I don’t yet get. If we don’t mark a location, or else don’t think of a location, does that then mean that the location does not exist – this in contrast to those locations we do mark or think about which would thereby exist? I’d wholeheartedly disagree with an answer of “yes”. But this then entails an endless quantity of existent midpoints that reside ever closer to the finishing location. BTW, one could employ something along the lines of point-free topology—which does not make use of extension-less geometric points but of extended “spots”—and still arrive at the same conceptual issue of endless “mid-spots” residing before the finishing “spot”.

Again, at least one resolution, as per the implications of your previous statement, would be to understand that our conceptual quantification of space, as a mapping of the terrain, into discrete positions does not accurately represent the terrain.

The arrow can move because time is not made up of zero-sized instances/moments; instead time is essentially an interval and so, the arrow can move. — TheMadFool

I like this. To me the temporal aspects of the paradox are nicely addressed and resolved in the OP.

All the same, my problem with Zeno’s arrow paradox is not so much temporal as spatial, which the OP’s resolution doesn’t address. Maybe you, or some other, can find a resolution to it; this in parallel to the temporal issues addressed by the OP.

To sum, the arrow’s motion has a starting location, I’ll label it S, and a finishing location, here labeled F. This can get represented by a line segment between S and F. The line segment has a midpoint, here labeled M. To get from S to F one has to pass M. Once passed, though, there’s a second midpoint between M and F, here labeled M2, that needs to be passed. Then there’s a midpoint between M2 and F, M3, that needs to be passed. The trouble with the spatial paradox, as I understand it, is that it leads to an infinite quantity of midpoints that need to be traversed in order to arrive at F. In short, because the quantity of midpoints that need to be passed is endless, one could never arrive at F, for one is forever stuck in passing through midpoints that reside before F.

Once this problem is cognized as such, it then can be applied retroactively to the midpoint between S and M – such that M (the midpoint between S and F) can never be obtained either. Nor, for that matter, can any movement whatsoever occur when rationally considered in spatial terms, regardless of how miniscule the distance: given the tacit presumptions of rudimentary geometry most, if not all, of us maintain, there will always conceptually occur an infinite quantity of midpoints between the place started from and any given destination, with all these endless midpoints residing before the destination.

Eppur si muove!

Imo, the ancient Greek understanding of nature – or of the physical – would be direly incomplete without an ancient Greek understanding of logos. I here principally have in mind philosophies such as that of Heraclitus’ and of the Stoics.

Tangentially, I strongly emphasize that one should not confuse the ancient Greek understanding(s) of logos with the Abrahamic, monotheistic understanding of logos, i.e., with the notion that logos is “the word” of an omnipotent psyche by whose will all becomes created. Rather, here, logos is the stuff from which notions such as that as the anima mundi (world soul) become established. It is not just discourse and, by extension, the thought (hence human reasoning) that produces it, but also cause and effect, natural law, and the like.

Still, what Ancient Greek logos is was something that was debated even back then, never mind now when it’s very usage gets derided as mystical babble. Seems as though discussing what logos signified to the Ancient Greek philosophers (and, as is the case with Stoicism, many religious adherents, as we would today call them) would be somewhat of a quagmire.

Still, while being and logos may not be the same, for the Ancient Greeks, being as we know and live it is intimately entwined with logos – which, in essence, then presents that which is natural, or else physical, i.e. that which is “in-born”.

Just remembered, matter – in Latin, materia – is directly derived from the Latin mater (“mother”); in ancient Greece this general mindset was intimately intertwined with notions such as that of Gaia and, again, for the Stoics, of an anima mundi … this being in many ways reminiscent of ancient understandings of the “virgin mother” (birthing sentience without being inseminated), and this long before the convergence of ideologies at the first Council of Nicaea which is Christianity as we now know it.

"I am the center of the universe, and everything else moves around me." - how am I to disprove this to myself? — Pneumenon

If assuming idealism, by not assuming a solipsistic idealism. All other beings are just as much at their own center of the universe as you yourself are (thereby nullifying you being the absolute center). I’ve, for example, read Aikido philosophy to articulate things in just this manner.

It’s somewhat like saying that, because our planet is spherical, all inhabitants of Earth are always on top of the world in more or less equal fashion – so that no one person or populace is more on top of the world than any other. It to me also meshes well enough with modern cosmology’s stance that the physical universe has no - dare I say, objective - center.

Embellishing this with some imperfect thought:

We all interact with that which is impartially applicable to all sentient beings, and hence in this sense with that which is independent of us – which in common understanding is termed the physical or, alternatively, nature. Given a non-solipsistic idealism, that which is commonly termed physical will itself be contingent on the coexistence of minds (in the plural, since it's not solipsism). Via analogy, this could be in some ways comparable to the following understanding of geometric space:

The existence of geometric space is contingent on the coexistence of multiple, otherwise volume-less (hence space-less) geometric points. Hence, the very plurality of points is what the given manifestation of geometric space is dependent on, with no individual geometric point in any way being the cause to the space all share. If there is only one point in the whole of existence, then, because the one point is volumeless, there will be no space. Then, given a plurality of geometric points, the space that is thereby inter-dependently manifested by all coexistent points will itself be independent of the properties of any particular geometric point – including its location or whether the particular geometric point ceases to be. Further embellishing this analogy, one can imagine that each geometric point is itself at its own center of three-dimensional space – such that what is up or down, front or back, and left or right will be relative to each geometric point. Again, each geometric point is at the center of space in total – a space inter-dependently caused by the coexistence of multiple points standing in relation but not caused by any individual point - such that up or down, front or back, and left or right as three spatial planes hold their existence by virtue of being impartially shared among all spatially related points. Here, there is no absolute center to the three-dimensional space which the plurality of geometric points brings about; nor is there any absolute up or down, front or back, and left or right to the three-dimensional space which the geometric points inhabit.

If this analogy doesn’t make any sense, so be it. But to the extent that it might, in the aforementioned analogy each individual sentient being is represented by a geometric point, and the universe by three-dimensional space.

Not here to argue for idealism, just wanted to address the OP with a, I grant, somewhat whimsical way of thinking about the paradox of each sentient being dwelling in its own center of an otherwise centerless universe – and this within a framework of idealism.

You're increasing the complexity of your argument without considering what I've just said with regard to what the meaning of a term consists of.

The term is one elemental constituent. That fact refutes your initial objection. No kidding. — creativesoul

An assertion of fact based on what evidence?

In all honesty, my experience contradicts it. Given that the experience which “tip of the tongue” specifies is universal enough to be termed in multiple cultures and languages, including sign language (here, “tip of the finger”), I’m quite confident I’m not alone in experiences where I know what I want to say but can’t find the term for it. The meaning is there; the term is not.

Again, if a term at the tip of one’s tongue is meaningless (because its meaning is forgotten along with the term, this since they're both are one and the same "elemental constituent"), than how would one be aware of there being such a thing?

Addressing this would be an argument. Again implying that it doesn’t fit your offered definition of meaning and thereby is erroneous would not be.

Specify what you take to be the assumptions, please.

I, btw, don't take the occurrence of experience - be it in general or in particular - to be an assumption.

(I have to take off for now.)

#1 How can one know what truth is, without knowing what truth is in the first place? — Monist

Since a) we all hold the capacity to lie, b) we are all adults (more or less), and c) the adults that affirm they have never told a lie will most certainly be lying, we can then safely conclude that we all experientially know what lies are. Then, one can start addressing the question by observing that truth is what occurs in the absence of lies - contextually, this within awareness related givens, such as statements and beliefs, regarding what is experienced. (But I acknowledge that in at least a tacit matter all those who have told at least one lie in their lives already knew this.) From this can then be further inferred that delusions, illusion, hallucinations, etc. are a type of self-deception and that truth - being the opposite of deception - will, roughly speaking, be an accordance to that which is non-deceptive; the latter being roughly equivalent to what is termed reality.

The short version of the same answer: experientially.

Though not without faults, I yet find this response to be good enough to get the ball rolling.

As to the second issue, what alternatives to justification are there? Same can be said for reasoning, btw.

This makes no sense on my view. Meaning consists of correlations. Your asking me what meaning I would ascribe to the meaning of a term that is at the tip of one's tongue.

Hopefully the correct one.



"At the tip of one's tongue" — creativesoul

Joking, I presume.

Temporarily forgotten... in part at least. [...]

The meaning of a term is lost when a word is on the tip of one's tongue; when a term is forgotten; when one cannot remember which term applies. — creativesoul

I'll offer that only the term's perceptual properties (both visual and auditory) are forgotten, and that terms are always percepts - but that the concept that the term would be used to adequately reference is itself present to the awareness of the person and, hence, is not forgotten. A simple argument for this: Were the concept that the term is used to denote to be forgotten, one would hold no means of recalling what the proper term is. There would be no reason to search for a term, for there would then only be a meaninglessness background to ongoing cognition - rather than a meaning one intends to adequately convey but is momentarily unable to. To make this explicit, a concept which a person contemplates will be in some way meaningful to the bearer - even if inexpressible.

Again, at such instances of experience, there is awareness of meaning (here, of concepts) devoid of an awareness of what its proper, representational sign or symbol is (the latter always being perceptual - which concepts of themselves are not ... likely a different argument).

In order for a term to be on the tip of one's tongue, one must have already long since used it or been around it's use.

One cannot forget which word to say unless previous use has paved the way. — creativesoul

No doubt. But how a person comes to hold awareness of a particular concept and, hence, of a conceptual meaning holds no bearing on what is here at issue: the reality of being aware of meaning when the given meaning is, granted momentarily, devoid of a known sign or symbol.

Since the topic's been revived:

At a bare minimum, all attribution of meaning(all meaning) requires something to become symbol/sign, something to become symbolized/significant and a creature capable of drawing a mental correlation, association, and/or connection between the two.

There are no examples to the contrary. — creativesoul

What correlation, association, and/or connection would you ascribe to the meaning of a term that is at the tip of one’s tongue? To be clear: to the known meaning of a word which is momentarily not known to oneself as sign/symbol … but, again, whose meaning one is nevertheless aware of.

At the very juncture of this experience, the meaning cannot be deemed to be due to a correlation involving its sign, for the sign is absent from one’s awareness while the meaning is not.

There’s a term for this. Empathy. It happens when one experiences the experiences of another. If one doesn’t experience the experiences of another as one’s own but believes one does, then the empathy is delusional; hence, in all instances of non-delusional empathy, we experience each other’s experiences. I guess some hereabout would then question, “How does one know?” which can be simply answered with, “through gut feeling that is then verified via the other’s reactions to one's gut-feeling-based actions, or else falsified via the same”.

Here’s my thing with Descartes’s cogito. How else would one go about evidencing that consciousness—the so called “I”—is not illusory? This since some philosophers make it a habit to claim that consciousness does not reference anything real, but is instead a reified notion.

here I would questions some of the nuances of the term "selfish". I agree it is selfish=not thinking of others but that is not the same as selfish=seeking one's own interest above others. — jambaugh

Your statement is ambiguous, so I'll ask: How does this compare to the semantics of the term selfish as, for example, listed on Wiktionary?:

Selfish: 1) Holding one's own self-interest as the standard for decision making. 2) Having regard for oneself above others’ well-being. — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/selfish

My basic claim is that (genuine, human) love is an un-selfish activity (this in degrees). But I don’t know how to go about things if we happen to disagree on the semantics of selfish. For instance:

But there is no denying that the suicide, the intentional premeditated suicide who has no belief that he is not actually going to die but rather "cross over into another existence" has placed the value of a future in which he exists below the value of a future where he is absent. Pure selflessness in the second sense. — jambaugh

Your presenting this to be "pure selflessness" is to me a nonsensical conclusion. For one issue, selflessness pertains to being, rather than to nonexistence and nonexistent givens - desiring to not be cannot of itself be a selfless desire, for selfless desires value the preservation and thriving of beings. As one example, a mass-murderer putting scores of people "out of their misery" by murdering them is not engaged in selfless love for these people, for their friends and family, nor for humanity at large (despite maybe being self-deluded into so believing). But I can see how this can quickly get bogged down in semantics and presumptions.

More philosophically asked, are you equating an idealized pure selfless being to nonexistence and, hence, to non-being? If so, how would this not be a logical contradiction: i.e., some given both is and is not at the same time and* in the same respect.

[* edit: this if the two underlined givens can in any way be deemed to be bound by time and, hence, temporal - here recognizing that at at least one level of contemplation, neither given can be deemed to be temporal]

The self annihilating suicide could be considered as such [selfless, I mean]. — jambaugh

When would suicide (self-murder) be anything other than a selfish act? One seeks to escape pain, conceives of death as a perfect liberation from all pain via the actualization of non-being, and then kills oneself without any consideration for the repercussions this will hold for others. Sometimes suicide can be understandable; even then, it still remains a selfish act.

Of course a person jumping onto a grenade which others are standing near to is open to interpretation. But if the person jumps on the grenade out of concern, hence love, for others’ wellbeing, this it is then commonly deemed to be a selfless act and, hence, not a suicide. If, however, the person jumps on the grenade to ensure he/she will quickly die, this out of a want to die that is indifferent to the wellbeing of others, then his/her intentions would be at once both selfish and suicidal.

Self-sacrifice that is by default done out of love does not equate to suicide—but is in many ways the converse.

Wrong analogy. Its more along the lines of what Nirvana signifies to some: being in the form of awareness sans any selfhood and, by entailment, any otherness. And yes, while heretical of me to say so, the Buddha as person was an ego and thus less than truly selfless, obviously. Same goes for your example of JC. Seems like the topic is changing from that of how love is defined.

I believe I understand your point. However, every ego is ego. In other words, everyone has one. It is inescapable in so far as we only have access to our own experience/consciousness and have to infer what others experience through analogy to our own. — Noah Te Stroete

I in no way disagree with this. We often use absolutes in qualifying people, as in “that person is selfish” and “that person is selfless”. If a person, for one example, speaks at least one language, they then can’t be purely selfish—for they then hold some aptitude for integrating what goes on in the minds of other egos with their own (hope this shorthand argument is sufficient to make the point of there not being such a thing as absolute selfishness). Conversely, regardless of how selfless a person might be by comparison to others, by mere virtue of being a self separate from at least some other selves, they will hold some ego-centric interests that, for example, will conflict with those of some others—as you say, they thereby will yet hold some egocentricity due to being egos and, hence, will not be perfectly selfless.

I, though, am a non-physicalist and, as a pivotal part of what makes me so, I hold the belief in there being such a metaphysical given as an absolute state of selfless being. Not quite a Platonist notion of “the Good”, but to me close enough to warrant mention.

Didn’t, and don’t, intend for the discussion to get too metaphysical. I in part gave the post because I am genuinely curious to discover if there are meaningful disagreements with this:

My own general take is that the rational to (genuine) love is to bring egos into a closer proximity to a selfless state of being relative to each other. The smaller the egos - which divide by rationing the world into self and others - the greater the unity of psyches that can be gained via their closer proximity to selflessness.

If this is disagreed with, I’d like to hear why. — javra

Still, the question I posed to me seems to stand as a logical enigma, if nothing else. Selflessness cannot (it seems to me) have any other rationale than itself—otherwise it would be selfish interests rather than selfless interests. (BTW, this to me does not in any way contradict the Darwinian evolution of love as sentiment among more intelligent and social animals, with its culminating pinnacle being so far found in (some) humans.)

There are emotions that in English are labeled “love” which are selflessness-yearning or aspiring and there are emotions also termed “love” in English that are egotistic. The second is the easier type to demarcate: It is a strictly egocentric affinity wherein that which one loves is loved solely for its instrumental value, particularly, to oneself. Love of money is an example. When and if it is no longer useful to one’s literally selfish interests, it then loses all value relative to oneself. People can love other people in this same way; it is often enough associated with a sense of possessing an objectified other as one’s property. Much like a trophy, one here feels one can do as one pleases with the other, whose value is, again, solely instrumental to oneself. In contrast, selflessness-aspiring love is where, for example, one will willingly self-sacrifice for the other even without anybody else finding out about it - it’s not done for the egotistic reason of being praised as being a good boy/girl by others. Love of children tends to be, or at least is supposed to be, of this second generalized emotive form. At any rate, this second type of love wherein, for example, two hearts can be said to grow into one over an extended span of time (gaining common affinities, understanding of the world, etc.) is the more difficult to philosophically demarcate. This is in part because while it can be qualified as selflessness-aspiring, it yet consists of two or more (as can be exemplified by loving families) egos, each with its own egocentric needs and wants.

Despite the difficulties in finding accurate demarcation, the distinction between these two forms of emotion, both often termed “love”, seems to me rather evident. Covetousness to possess, be it money or some other person, is a bogus form of love; despite it being common enough to say that many people love money, I don’t know of any that would self-sacrifice for the well-being of the money they love. Whereas one would self-sacrifice for the well-being of kids, parents, friends, lovers, etc. if one happened to love them in non-bogus manners. As another example, when someone kills their partner upon finding that their partner no longer want to stay in the relationship, we sometimes term this “a crime of passion” but never “a crime of love”—I take it because it’s generally understood by non-psychopaths that if the first genuinely loved the second they would not have murdered the latter.

So, while I can’t speak for Wayfarer or for others that believe they get Wayfarer’s general comment of:

The point about love is that it has to be its own rationale - as soon as it serves something other than love, then it ain't love. — Wayfarer

... I do find that any emotion which could be termed “love” whose rationale is that of satisfying egocentric interests will be a false form of love, will be a perversion rather than the real thing. Love—be it for cats stuck in trees, for someone whom one also happens to have the hots for, or for humanity at large—will always open up one’s ego so that it in some way incorporates the egos of other, i.e. will make one more selfless than otherwise such that the other’s states of being become in some way incorporated into one’s own. Else expressed in terms others have mentioned, love unifies. One as a psyche does not unify with the money (nor with the ice-cream, etc.) one loves.

-------

This as background to the following:

My own general take is that the rational to (genuine) love is to bring egos into a closer proximity to a selfless state of being relative to each other. The smaller the egos - which divide by rationing the world into self and others - the greater the unity of psyches that can be gained via their closer proximity to selflessness.

If this is disagreed with, I’d like to hear why.

If not disagreed with, then this relevant question ensues: What rationale can the earnest human inclination to approach a state of selfless being hold other than the state of selfless being itself?

To say that the state of selfless being is instrumentally beneficial—hence, that it is not its own (inherent) rationale—is to make its benefit egocentric in some manner; this then thereby nullifies the reality of it being a selfless state of being whose proximity one as ego intends to approach or to maintain.

forgot to mention:

Free advice. — Xtrix

well taken by me. Thanks

A quick word on this (I'm out right now and don't have access to my usual stuff): this cannot possibly be the case. — StreetlightX

Not very charitable of you, but I've no intention to bicker.

Read: Language evolved for reasons other than language. About as clear-cut as you can get.

[...]

Read: FLN was not an adaptation. — StreetlightX

The suggestion that FLN (narrow faculty of language) – namely, universal grammar (UG) – was an exaptation (traditionally termed “pre-adaptation” - strictly speaking, not an adaptation) is not contradictory to mainstream knowledge concerning biological evolution.

It may or may not so be, but the idea that UG’s current functionality did not initially evolve for the purpose it currently has is not, of itself, absurd.

As far as I'm concerned, this post isn't about Chomsky but about what is and is not acceptable in relation to mainstream biological evolution.

No, I'm not. That Chomsky's thin gruel speculation on language amounts to "language popped into existence somehow somewhen because of totally unspecified changes to something somewhere probably genetic but we really have no idea, and then somehow somewhen probably started to be used by humans because no idea" has nothing to do with the reality of PE. — StreetlightX

I get the sarcasm and your dislike, but I don't yet get why. About the same account could be given for our bipedalism. We don't yet know the specifics of why our species' ancestors became bipedal, but it happened - evolutionary speaking, this overnight, and this aspect of us has remained in stasis. Although there are known cases of feral children that did not walk bipedally (with possible reasons for this being numerous), we do furthermore tend to assume that this inclination toward bipedalism is genetically inherited.

Placed in proper context, Chomsky's argument was against BF Skinner's behaviorist approach to language acquisition. In brief, operant behavior (and its conditioning) cannot account for human language acquisition, given the latter's complexity and variety.

BTW, this, to my mind, doesn't in any way deny that operant behavior has actual application. It only specifies that there must first be innate, general cognitive abilities that can facilitate species-specific operant behavior. For example, both a dog and a pigeon can be operantly conditioned, but each will so be in different species-specific manners due to (not behaviorist conditioning itself but, rather) the innate generalized cognitive faculties of each particular type of animal. This being where cognitive science holds sway over behaviorism - the former acknowledges the importance of innate mental predispositions whereas the latter does not.

To not be presumptuous, are you proposing that Skinner had the correct hypothesis?

If not, and the syntax to language is not acquired strictly via behaviorist means, I don't understand why you find fault with the arguments proposed by Chomsky and others of the same perspective? After all, punctuated equilibrium would account for a cognitive know-how of grammar that is genetically inherited rather than behavioristically learned - one used to acquire specific human language(s) - which has since its genetic acquisition by our species remained in a state of evolutionary stasis.

Quite literally, he has to be committed, on pain of incoherence, to the insane idea that language initially evolved for means other than language. — StreetlightX

To my recollection, Chomsky’s, Pinker’s, et al.’s hypothesis concerns neither language nor communication (where differentiated) but the grammatical syntax to these - which is found only in Homo Sapiens.

In which case, it would be correct to say, "the occurrence of syntax to language initially evolved by means other than syntax to language (via some adaptive mutation(s))"

Be this as it may.

It just popped into existence one fine day, and will remain the same forevermore.

If that isn't magic, I don't know what is. [...]

And that's the thing: this is a problem specific to Chomsky's position, and not one facing evolutionary accounts of language in general. — StreetlightX

Are you ridiculing as stupid the position of punctuated equilibrium?

Were grammatical syntax to have rapidly evolved in some evolutionary ancestors followed by a period of evolutionary stasis that persists to this day, this is nothing else but the position of punctuated equilibrium – which holds application to evolution in general. There’s a plethora of empirical evidence in support of this view, be the view taken as antagonistic to the hypothesis of phyletic gradualism or not (they need not be antagonistic hypotheses of evolution). Phyletic gradualism, for example, fails to explain what are sometimes referred to as living fossils - the common example being the horseshoe crab - while punctuated equilibrium can easily account for these.

All of these alternate possibilities, while I concede are far-fetched (brains in vats) or not the norm (hallucinations), are what make one a skeptic of one's own knowledge and skeptical of our understanding of what knowledge actually is. If we can't have proof that one's knowledge is actually true, then it is illogical to say "truth" is a property of knowledge. — Harry Hindu

To me, at least, you’re addressing things outside of their proper conceptual order. So I would address things in this way:

Firstly, is truth - conformity to that which is real - possible? To argue that it is not is to obtain a contradiction. Briefly expounding on this: if conformity to reality entails that there can be no conformity to reality, then conformity to reality will both occur and not occur at the same time and in the same respect. I thereby take it for granted that we agree that the obtainment of truth (of conformity to reality) is possible.

Secondly, wherever truth is obtained, will it be possible to not hold factual justifications for the given truth? If claim X conforms to reality, then (I presume we both agree) one will be capable of factually justifying claim X by means of other facts without end.

Therefore, those beliefs that happen to be true will also necessarily be justifiable without error regardless of extent of justification involved.

At this point, fallibilism takes this form: because we are not omniscient, we cannot hold an awareness perfectly devoid of all possible errors regarding all that is. The reality of this then entails that a) we are sometimes wrong in what we believe to be true and b) we are incapable of providing a perfectly complete (i.e. absolute) justification for those claims that do happen to be true. This, of itself, however dispels neither that true beliefs can and do obtain nor that, when they obtain, they will be capable of being justified without any error.

That a belief taken to be true might not so be is the very reason why justifiability is a requisite part of JTB – the factual justifiability of our beliefs of what is true is the optimal guarantee we can hold in practice for our beliefs in fact being true. Again, just in case they are true, they will then be justifiable without error and without end.

As with the principle of falsification as it applies to empirical claims of what is, until a claim of knowledge becomes falsified, we hold no grounds by which to assume that it is not a true belief - which, on account of so being, can thereby be justified without end by us in manners perfectly devoid of error.

Then, to ask, “How do we know when we in fact know,” either equivocates between two implicitly referenced forms of knowledge - one infallible (which, for example, is obtainable via omniscience) and the other fallible - or, otherwise, can be answered thus:

We hold no reason to doubt that we hold true beliefs that are thereby justified (i.e., knowledge) of holding true beliefs that are thereby justified (i.e. of holding knowledge) whenever the former and the latter cannot be evidenced false via the scrutiny that is either directly or indirectly placed on it.

This is fallibilism. There here is no denial that beliefs of what is true can in fact be true. And if there’s no evidence of their falsity, there’s no reason to presume them untrue. One freely trusts that one’s beliefs are in fact true when one can justify them without error - for their truth would require that they be so justifiable. One just simply doesn’t presume oneself to be infallible - but this doesn’t diminish the trust just addressed.

As to the more explicitly asked question, “How does one infallibly know when one’s fallible claims of knowledge are in fact unassailable and when they are not,” the answer from a paradigm of fallibilism is, “Never; for infallible knowledge, as with infallible awareness of anything, is not something we are capable of.”

It’s not that one knows nothing; it’s that one is fallibly knowledgeable - in manners not yet falsified by any evidence - of not being endowed with any infallible knowledge.

I don't think indefeasible and infallible are synonymous, but I get your objection.

Well, of course I have discovered many times that what I thought I knew was not in fact knowledge. That's just to say I didn't really know back then, so of course it wasn't knowledge that got defeated. — fiveredapples

(Just saw that @Janus addressed something of the same. Notwithstanding, I’m still interested in your answers)

From a theoretical view of what knowledge is, I say of course. From the stance of practice (praxis), however, I’m very curious to better understand:

What is your contention against the following position: All of our claims of knowledge are to be treated as instantiations of knowledge until they become falsified by evidence, if such falsification were to ever occur.

Importantly, the underlined portion, to me, is what makes all our claims of knowledge less than indefeasible in practice. This being the stance you previously mentioned you’re not OK with.

For clarity, according to Wiktionary, “indefeasible” is given one definition: “not liable to being annulled or declared void”.

Or are you suggesting that unlike some past experiences, everything you currently (claim to) know can never be "annulled or declared void" as knowledge regardless of what evidence might be discovered?

Again, I'm trying to better understand you're affirmations.

No. Last I checked, the term "indefeasible" is synonymous to "infallible". You take your knowledge to be infallible. Hence, you never discover that what you once you thought you knew was in fact not knowledge - for everything you know is indefeasible. Do correct me if I'm wrong, but I can find no other way of interpreting your statement.

Yes, everything I know is indefeasible. — fiveredapples

OK. Now I know your point of view. Thanks.

I would point out that this commits you to knowledge that is defeasible, but you seem to be okay with this too. I am not okay with it. — fiveredapples

Is this to say that everything you know is indefeasible? As an example pertinent to the discussion: Your knowledge that the last clock or watch you looked at was working properly and thereby gave the correct time will be indefeasible on what grounds?

:grin: Just as long as it doesn't turn into a coherency theory of truth. :ok:

Maybe coherentism is too complex for me. I'm asking myself "acceptable for what?" and I can't come up with a good answer.

Can the knowledge that platen Earth is approximately spherical be to any measure justified by the two facts that a) pyramids are not square and that b) oranges have an orange color? — javra


Okay, now this is more my speed. My answer here is no, not on the face of that justification alone. — fiveredapples

So are we now cool with the claim that justification requires coherency of beliefs?

Would you say that one does not know whether a rock that is to be thrown up into the air at some point in the future will fall back to down to earth? — javra


Yes, that's what I'm saying. — fiveredapples

Hm, I can understand your logic for so affirming, but it doesn't so far strike me as in accord to the term's common usage. I, for example, make numerous decisions based on things I presume within what I consider a context of knowns regarding the future - such as that gravity will apply or that the sun will again rise. But again, to me all knowns are to varying extents fallible.

But it was a genuine request. I don't know the terminology. — fiveredapples

LOL. Yea, I get how "valid justification" might seem weird on it own. But "invalid justification" sounds about right to me. So until we can devise a different term for the matter ... I'll be peevishly using it.

To not beat around the bush, your reply doesn’t address the heart of the matter in relation to the one principle discrepancy you pointed out: coherentism (which I've just now seen you've amended in your first post to me). Cohrentism comes in two varieties: the coherence theory of truth, which I disagree with, and the coherence theory of justification, which I agree with. My question to you was whether or not it makes sense to you that justifications which are not coherent are to be deemed well grounded, acceptable, and/or correct (since you don’t like the colloquial use of “valid”).

Well, I would assume that that satellite is providing information for the basis of your belief. I would assume that your cat's position next to the plant provided similar information. — fiveredapples

As to the details of your reply, you’ve addressed a presumption of how the two stated facts are intended to cohere into the belief which is claimed to be knowledge, this in the first example I gave – it seems by importing the details of the second example which is coherent into the first. I’ll try for a more forthright example: Can the knowledge that planet Earth is approximately spherical be to any measure justified by the two facts that a) pyramids are not square and that b) oranges have an orange color?

If so, how? Here there are no contradictions but I don’t find that there is any coherence between the two facts and the knowledge claimed.

My question, again, is bluntly this: Can a justification hold if it does not consist of givens that cohere into that which is justified, if not also into each other?

As an aside, or maybe not so aside, I have always considered beliefs about the future outside the realm of knowledge -- for the simple fact that they could be defeated by things not turning out as you predict. — fiveredapples

Would you say that one does not know whether a rock that is to be thrown up into the air at some point in the future will fall back to down to earth?

There are also more worn-out examples such as knowing that the sun will rise again tomorrow.

Is validity used to talk about justification? Having studied a little logic, it has always bothered me when people use the colloquial use of 'valid' in philosophical discussions. Sorry, just a pet peeve. But do enlighten me, not that it matters to our discussion (as I understand you) if I'm wrong about validity as a term for justification. — fiveredapples

It's the colloquial use. Tell me of your preferred term for claimed justification that doesn't amount to a squat of beans, and I'll use it in our debates.

But more importantly, this asking me to enlighten you is to me a little irksome – maybe because of the day I’ve had. If you ever happen to seek some form of enlightenment, I’d recommend that you don’t ask other people for it. Simply because there are a lot of charlatans out there, as I’m certain @Bartricks would agree, and they all claim wisdom. From a song by Leonard Cohen called Teachers that I happen to greatly like: “’Follow me’ the wise man said, but he walked behind.”

So, my position - as described in the OP - is that knowledge consists of a feeling Reason is adopting towards true beliefs. — Bartricks

As we once concluded a few days back, I’m not profound enough to understand the subtleties of your position regard Her: Reason. To which I again say, so be it! Off to the shallow tides with me.

But to give a reply given the best of my understanding regarding the position you affirm:

I have yet to encounter this person you refer to as Reason. But if I did, I’d do my best to explain to Her that truth is a conformity to what is real, that only if something is true can it be justified without error regardless of degree, and that there can be no knowledge in the absence of truth. I think I’d try to tell Her this even if Reason’s feelings might get hurt by me so saying. (I don’t like unnecessarily hurting persons, even if they are strangers to me.)

This may or may not be in accord to your position. But again, I’m not of that depth.

But it still seems true (and would seem true to them too, were they aware of the nature of their situation) that they do not, in fact, possess knowledge. — Bartricks

As I believe I've addressed in my posts, I agree with this.

To me the conceptual problems only emerge when we presume (or else intend to gain) an omniscient perspective of reality and, thereby, possession of an infallible knowledge. We never hold such.

Still:

declarative knowledge is: true belief that, on account of being true, can be factually justified without end were one to so want and be capable of doing. — javra

True propositions that can be thereby justified ad infinitum without problems - where it to be feasible to so justify - occur. When they occur will always remain to some measure fallible for all of us non-omniscient beings.

Just in case an example would be of help:

Suppose I affirm knowledge that it will rain today. You ask me why. I then reply by justifying this belief to true with the following: there’s a satellite up in the sky and my cat is next to a plant out in the backyard – with this being the full scope of my justification. The two givens, even if true, do not cohere in any intelligible manner to my belief.

Here, I’d consider that my justification was invalid.

Now suppose that I explain things in a coherent manner as such: the satellite up in the sky has given a weather forecast of 80% chance of rain and my cat has always had a weird habit of sitting next to a plant in my backyard a few hours before it rains, next to which he is now sitting. The same basic truths are presented, but now the explanation provided makes them cohere with my belief that it will rain today.

Here, I’d consider that my justifications were valid – even if less than perfect.

In case it does rain – thereby evidencing my belief-that to be true – I can then maintain my claim of having had JTB in the latter case, but I can't claim JTB in the former case.

(edited the last sentence for better semantics)

No worries.

Do you mean...Can I reasonably hold two beliefs which don't cohere? — fiveredapples

No, that anybody can.

Can you validly justify a belief-that via use of givens that do not cohere?

Am I wrong that you're a Coherentist? — fiveredapples

In its pure traditional form, quite.

Coherency of beliefs applies, in part, to justifications - not to truth. Do you find that justifications for beliefs can be incoherent and yet valid?

No, that's not enough. If that were enough, then he could simply guess the correct time and he'd have knowledge, according to your definition. This is an even weaker conception of knowledge than JTB.

At least JTB attempts to tie the belief to reality by way of a reliable source of truth. — fiveredapples

I will not repeat what I said in my previous posts, but this clearly did not take what I said in context.