I’m thinking at the margins, not the whole pie. It’s the decision of the individual. For example, one persons meat eating dies or negate another’s veganism. — schopenhauer1

Didn't sound like it, but OK. Still, how does your reply address the logic/fallacy to this argument:

As far as hypotheticals and their logical consequences go, one could hypothetically manage to obliterate all sapience off of the planet but, logically, the same magnitude of sapience will only re-evolve to its current state. This is because givens such as the planet and its bacteria will remain even after the destruction of all sapient life—and this because one will not have actualized a complete nothingness (via an omnipotence that also obliterates itself?). Given that nothingness is not actualized, the same magnitudes of experience-dependent pleasure and suffering will, then, again unfold among increasingly intelligent sentient beings—only so that life once again finds itself at the magnitude of relative wisdom that we as a human species are at currently. The hypothetical is analogous to a suicidal Sisyphus that always gets reborn to re-experience the same suffering … played out at a magnitude of species. — javra

Edit: I'm here allowing for the hypothetical that, somehow, all individuals will make that decision that your advocating for.

Thanks. :wink:

Here’s a premise I’d like for anyone to debunk: Nothingness*--i.e., the complete absence of being—is a chimerical abstraction of human imagination that, thereby, does not reference anything real.

* This concept, however worded, here stands in contrast to the transient nonbeing of givens within a context of underlying being/existence: As in, after breaking a mug into a thousand pieces proceeding to claim that the mug is no longer, that it now holds no being, that it is now nothing … when, in fact, all that’s happened is that its constituents have changed their structure while yet existing just as much as before.

Without the just stipulated premise being evidenced false, the longing for nothingness holds the exact same properties as the longing to arrive at the planet’s horizon. It can’t be done. Not that it’s inconceivable; it is—as evidenced by our ability to understand the concepts. It’s just that it’s metaphysically impossible and, hence, a complete falsehood.

Advice for those who will try to evidence the premise false: Address nothingness without in any way presenting it to be endowed with any form of presence—for, were it to be endowed with presence, it would be being rather than nonbeing (it would thereby hold some form of existence). An example of what not to do: do not claim that existence can turn to nothingness on grounds that existence was/is itself caused by nothingness—for this entails that nothingness is itself a causal agency, thereby entailing that nothingness is something that holds being (minimally, as a causal agency): Thereby resulting in quite the logical contradiction in regard to being.

I would like to know where this "mission" comes from? — schopenhauer1

As far as hypotheticals and their logical consequences go, one could hypothetically manage to obliterate all sapience off of the planet but, logically, the same magnitude of sapience will only re-evolve to its current state. This is because givens such as the planet and its bacteria will remain even after the destruction of all sapient life—and this because one will not have actualized a complete nothingness (via an omnipotence that also obliterates itself?). Given that nothingness is not actualized, the same magnitudes of experience-dependent pleasure and suffering will, then, again unfold among increasingly intelligent sentient beings—only so that life once again finds itself at the magnitude of relative wisdom that we as a human species are at currently. The hypothetical is analogous to a suicidal Sisyphus that always gets reborn to re-experience the same suffering … played out at a magnitude of species.

Given that actualizing nothingness is a metaphysical impossibility, I’d say that the quote-unquote mission is there because there is no other way—metaphysical or otherwise—of alleviating existential suffering at large than via increased understanding.

What we pointed out in the art thread, was that an educated art critic is the one most likely to ascribe some great artistic significance to an elephant's rambling scribbles (as long as you tell them it was by some brilliant young up and coming artist). — ZhouBoTong

Yea, I’ve already written a bunch. But to not be lopsided about my reply given your post:

The issues addressed in this quote represent, at least to me, an all too commonly occurring instantiation of the emperor’s new clothes. People who don't have the courage to stay true to their own aesthetic tastes - but instead label beautify/aesthetic that which they think will earn them greatest social status. Thereby making a farce of what is aesthetic.

To me, good art is emotively powerful, felt from the guts if not also intellectually, at least relative to the audience for which it is intended. It has power to transfix and to transform; to change one’s worldview and understanding via the expression of truths (personal to universal) that are best conveyed via means other than ordinary language. But one can only subscribe to this perspective once one also subscribes to there being such a thing as good art v. bad/stupid/ineffective art.

How much of today’s art has the power to bring vast proportions of young adults into states of awe? That, to me at least, is roughly equivalent to the amount of modern art that is good. A good artist (painter, poet, sculptor, musician, etc.) has enough wisdom to know how to transmute her/his personal truths into expressions that captivate a large number of people. A relative rarity, to be sure. But, imo, this is a large factor in what makes artists good.

Furthering my spiel, most of today’s good art is found below the belt, so to speak: in advertising. Bummer that it has no inherent worth to its artists—that it doesn’t express any truths which the artist per se values; nor, for that matter, any personal truths pertaining to those who pay his/her wages for the artistic creations. The art is instead a means of getting costumers to purchase things that they/we don’t need and wouldn’t otherwise want, this via emotively powerful expressions—ones that are for the most part devoid of any inherent aesthetic value, but are instead fully instrumental in the accumulation of somebody’s stashes of cash. I’m not claiming it’s the only type of modern art out there that has an impact on society … but do find that it, today, is the most prolific among these.

Anyway, my two dimes on the matter.

I was called out for off topic, so I just responded to your post in this thread.

Yea, you know, if you're one to believe that an elephant's painting is as aesthetically valuable as is a human's, to each their own. — javra — ZhouBoTong

To reword my initial argument, to which your quote alludes:

Premise: We humans value sapience; we, for example, want ourselves to be sapient, rather than non-sapient. As another example that is applicable to the philosophy forum: we almost by definition value those historical philosophers we deem to have been of greater wisdom, and do not value those whom we deem to have been utterly devoid of wisdom (given that philosophy is a love of wisdom).

Is there anyone who disagrees with this premise? If so, please explain on what grounds the disagreement stands.

If this premise stands—and if wisdom is not concluded to be an irrational or fallacious concept in respect to what is real—then I offer that this conclusion then rationally follows: We, thereby, likewise value those artworks which to us expresses great sapience over those artworks that to us are either devoid of sapience or express minimal amounts of it. This regardless of whether it’s Shakespeare, the Transformers, or the Simpsons. To find aesthetic value in a blank canvas as a finished work of art, or in a musical piece that is devoid of sound, one will need to experience it as endowed with worthwhile wisdom; otherwise, one will not find aesthetic value to such pieces of art.

If the offered premise stands, how would the given conclusion be erroneous?

-----

By the way:

This is not to deny the truism that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. But, as previously illustrated by comparison between a chimp and a human (both of which have been known to paint), that beholder of greater sapience will likewise be privy to greater awareness of aesthetics as direct experience. No dog or cat will witness beauty in any artwork, much less endeavor to create it. Many humans will.

Yes, of course, complexities abound in what is and what is not aesthetic—as contrasted to mere attraction toward (most will agree that a heap of cash does not embody the aesthetic; while proportionality of form and color often time does). Not to even mention that no one in the history of mankind has as of yet discovered a satisfactory philosophical description of the experience—an experience which we nevertheless all seem to recognize as real. Yet, unless one wants to drastically redefine it, it is a facet of experience at large that strictly pertains to minds capable of abstraction and, hence, of wisdom. Aesthetics does not pertain to the experiences of insects, cats, or dogs, and only marginally to some chimps and elephants.

To emphasize: I am not saying that wisdom equates to aesthetics; the former is a property of psychological being whereas the latter is an experience applicable to the former. And no, magnitude of wisdom cannot be linearly plotted on some chart. Many forms of wisdom can and do occur—and to each their own aesthetic calling.

Nevertheless, just as a human’s arithmetic is better than a chimp’s, so too is a human’s awareness of aesthetics better than that of a chimp’s. To doubt the second is on par to doubting the first.

Yea, you know, if you're one to believe that an elephant's painting is as aesthetically valuable as is a human's, to each their own.

Are you, or are you not, saying that if something is more sapience-oriented, then it is of better value, or greater aesthetic value? — S

Yes. To recap:

P: We as sapient beings value sapience
C: Artwork that is of greater sapience is therefore of greater aesthetic value to us

an argument, that's all

That's all I need to know, because that won't ever work for the reasons I've explained. — S

Ah, but the reasons you've explained are pivoted around the rationality of using sapience as a measure. Hence:

The question remains beside the point. — S

... is completely fallacious.

Is "sapience" a rational concept despite not being measurable via a metric stick or some such?

Wow. OK. How then is the quality of sapience in any way rational to uphold? Or is sapience an irrational concept? — javra

It has nothing to do with sapience, it has to do with aesthetic value. — S

At any rate, the question still stands: Is "sapience" an irrational concept on grounds that is it not measurable?

You must of not read my initial post on this thread, then.

Rationality in this context allows us to set a measure, and draw conclusions from it, but outside of that context, it is meaningless or impotent. There is nothing forcing me or anyone else to adopt whatever measure you happen to present to us. I don't think you're capable of demonstrating a measure that's some sort of super measure that's absolute. The holy grail of all measures! — S

Wow. OK. How then is the quality of sapience in any way rational to uphold? Or is sapience an irrational concept?

----

Remember, you've already said that it hods a factual referent. Best I can interpret your former reply, at least.

So your saying that the term "sapience" has no factual, hence impartial, hence objective referent? — javra

No, I'm saying what I said. Do you need me to repeat it? — S

Then, in the context of this:

Therefore, human paintings are of greater aesthetic value than chimp and elephant paintings; again, because human paintings are more sapience-centric. — javra

how does this rationally fit in?:

I don't think that any argument would work, because they'll all be based on an unwarranted premise of that form that if something is more this or that, then it is better, when that's actually just a subjective judgement trying to pretend to be something else. — S

when that's actually just a subjective judgement trying to pretend to be something else. — S

So you're saying that the term "sapience" has no factual, hence impartial, hence objective referent?

I get that we're subjective about what is factually ontic. This to me, however, does not negate the presence of facts ... such as that of sapient beings (e.g., humans at large) being distinct from non-sapient, but yet sentient, beings (e.g. ameba; yes amebas can sense their environments). If I need to clarity: this by incremental gradations, as per biological evolution. (different topic, though)

How about this one:

Most, if not all, of those who can understand the content of Shakespeare can also understand the content of Transformers movies. In contrast, a significant portion of those who get Transformers movies (such as preadolescents, as one example) do not get Shakespeare. Premise: sapience has an importance to us. Conclusion: Shakespeare is a better form of artwork than Transformers … ‘cuz it’s more sapience-oriented.

Consider this analogy: chimps and elephants can paint. Humans can understand the paintings of chimps and elephants; but chimps and elephants cannot understand the paintings of humans. Therefore, human paintings are of greater aesthetic value than chimp and elephant paintings; again, because human paintings are more sapience-centric.

Or is me saying that “an elephant’s painting is of lesser aesthetic value than one of Leonardo’s” simply me being an elitist? I can deal with that, I think. And no, I'm not bashing on the Transformers movies.

:grin: funniness sometimes happens. cool

Oh. For the record, I was being darkly humored as I sometimes get. :wink:

Just throw out the baby, keep the bathwater. — Merkwurdichliebe

Hm. How do you find that that could logically work? Throwing out the aim of an equality between sexes while yet preserving its modern-day outcomes within society …

Besides, disposing of babies down the sewer doesn’t sit too well with most people … this as metaphors go.

Is there something lost in interpretation?

Camille Paglia feminism [...] — Merkwurdichliebe

As it happens, I'm no expert on the modern shenanigans of feminism; just now read up a little on this quoted person. But, yea, bathwater gets dirty after awhile, so out it goes ... just as long as it doesn't get confused for the baby. :razz:

The short answer to the titular question is that it does and it is called Feminism. — Banno

Given what I known about feminism at large, that’s a very astute summative statement.

All the same, most self-labeled “true/real men” associate most everything regarding femininity to a weakness of mind and body. As in, “women are emotional” and such. Thereby detesting this “–ism” that gets attached to “feminine” and which seeks to be of equal importance to masculinity. To these men feminism is, or at least symbolizes, a direct affront to their social power of superiority relative to women. So addressing their interests via feminism is rather mute.

That aside, even when not addressing those who view male superiority over women to be a natural/god-given right (plenty of these worldwide), there’s still an oddness to addressing men’s issues via the label of feminism:

To try to make my point, I’ll use myself as one honest example: I’d love to find a lifelong mate that at least in part personifies Elizabeth Stanton’s spirit; and so she would be quite proud and dignified in calling herself a feminist—despite all the spin-mongering against feminism that our present culture offers. I’d share her sentiments and ethics regarding the issues of feminism. But I’d still feel odd in declaring myself to be a feminist. This is because I’m a male and value those beneficial masculine attributes that typically pertain to the male sex. There is no doubt that feminist women such as Elizabeth Stanton value the same beneficial masculine attributes in men that an equalitarian such as myself does. Feminism, after all, is not anti-masculinity. But, nevertheless, there’s something amiss with labeling a man feminine, this rather than masculine … and this is something which the term “feminism”, as a term (rather than a historic movement), often tends to imply culturally. Especially since our culture is in part composed of those antagonistic to equality between the sexes.

In short, I’m pro-feminism (as per Elizabeth Stanton, who historically epitomizes the movement and its aims … one will notice that it extends beyond the concerns of a particular race of economic class), but can’t feel comfortable labeling myself a feminist.

Just as former liberals are now labeled progressives to stand apart from neo-liberalism, it seems that feminism would be benefited by a new term so as to more easily make its point: an equality of worth between the biological and sometimes psychological differences of the sexes.

All the same, pleasantly humbled to see other males that don't bash feminism. :up:

I'm an egalitarian, and quite frankly as well as technically that is NOT feminism. — Anaxagoras

Here’s the problem with that statement:

Feminism is a range of political movements, ideologies, and social movements that share a common goal: to define, establish, and achieve the political, economic, personal, and social equality of the genders. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feminism

Well, yea, I was familiar with these perspectives prior to making my posts on this thread. Is there any particular argument you want to make? The quoted text is one of presumed authority, but no logical arguments are provided for its basic affirmations. And, as per the arguments I've previously offered against a completely causal determinism and for a (metaphysical) freedom of choice, I disagree with these basic affirmations. But we can always agree to disagree.

A perspective seeking to exit the merry-go-round:

Suppose that all our “dos” are driven by “wants” … this including our doing of reasoning: since wants are emotive, as per Hume, reasoning is foundationally driven by underlying desires. Further suppose that our wants are in search of a resolution to that wanted. Reasoning, then, is arguably an optimal means of discovering how to best obtain and thereby satisfy our wants.

Given any degree of realism (here not confused with physicalism), there will then be constraints to how these wants can obtain their sought after aim of resolution. These constraints will then—in some way or another—(pre)determine which actions can factually satisfy our wants and which actions (though intending to so satisfy) cannot.

Those behaviors that factually satisfy our wants will then be logically correct means of so satisfying. They will be the right behaviors for us. And, since what we want is for our wants to be satisfied, right behaviors will constitute good, beneficial, behaviors for us. That aim, whatever it might be, that satisfies all our wants will then be conceptualized by us as complete good: “the Good” as Plato worded it.

And vice versa: all our intentions and subsequent acts to satisfy our wants that are fallaciously conceived to so satisfy our wants will then be wrong behaviors to engage in—for they always lead to frustrated wants and, in due measure, suffering. They will be deemed to be bad behaviors by us for this very reason.

To the same degree that there occur universal and fundamental wants among all humans (or mammals, or life in general), there will then also logically result aims that are universally good to that cohort considered. Being universally good, these aims will hold existential presence in manners that are impartial to the (sometimes fallacious/wrong) intentions of individual beings to satisfy their wants. In this sense, then, this universally good aim (or maybe aims) shall then, by certain definitions, be validly labeled that which is objectively good.

Within this general train of thought, then, subjective want-driven good entails there being some objective good—which can be expressed as “that end which satisfies all wants”—that, whether or not obtainable within our current lifetime in complete form, is nevertheless pursued by all subjective beings.

Discerning what this objective good is can itself be a fallacy of reasoning (a wrong/bad appraisal) or a discovery of what is in fact true (a right/good appraisal). Disparity between discernments of what is objectively good then leads to divergent ethical norms—as well as to, at times, what are labeled acts of evil by the society at large.

***This hypothesis is to illustrate that there is no entailed logical contradiction between subjective good/bad and objective good/bad.

As to Hume’s dilemma when looked at from this offered vantage: figure out what the logically and factually correct aim is that satisfies your wants (this factually correct aim being an “is) and then you logically derive what should be done to get there (this being an “ought”) … thereby deriving ought from is.

So, here, good and bad are determined by wants which naturally entail their own resolution as aim/goal--and this within the constraints of some form of realism.

It take it from your terminology, you hold to a few Aristotilean presuppositions. — Merkwurdichliebe

Yes. As I’ve previously expressed, I do believe in Aristotle’s four different types of determinacy.

In layman terms, causality is nullified by immutability, qua. the deterministic model. — Merkwurdichliebe

Nicely summarized.

The important distinction is, as you say: existing, versus standing out. But I might argue that this standing out is existing, as such. [...] — Merkwurdichliebe

The sneaky issue is that of the first-person point-of-view’s existence. It is, has being, but it does not stand out even to itself. You look into a mirror and see all the biological apparatuses via which you as a first-person point-of-view can physiologically see—but you never physiologically see yourself as that first-person point-of-view which is seeing … and which can also see with the mind’s eye. So if to exist is defined as to stand out, does one as first-person point-of-view of awareness exist?

It’s this same, ever-changing, first person point of view that does the choosing.

[...] And, if the deterministic model does essentially negate the deciding agent, then, then thing that exists is gone, and what are we left with: the model and irrelevant spectators. — Merkwurdichliebe

Yup, I agree with the conclusion.

Thank you. You have a nice way of framing it all. — Merkwurdichliebe

Thanks

I would add there is also the important debate of whether predetermined factors allow for the existence of the will, and to what degree it is free in relation to those factors. — Merkwurdichliebe

True. It’s why I find interest in exploring the mechanisms of volition. It can’t be completely determined, nor completely undetermined. Nor are our lives and experiences helped out by forsaking the subject of volition on grounds of it being illusory—this due to upholding a model of causal reality that (as I previously tried to illustrate) is contradictory to causal efficacy.

The eternal decision. I think this is what makes the willing agent relevent, whether or not its decision manifests into reality. In fact, I would say that when the will does not correspond to any existing state of affairs, it takes on even more importance. — Merkwurdichliebe

Via example, what I generally have in mind is: there’s my decision to move my hand, followed by the state of affairs of my hand moving as I willed; likewise, when I decide to not move my hand, my hand does not move. So there generally is a uniform correlation between what I willfully intend to do and what ends up being done.

On occasion though, my will shall not be efficacious. If I decide to express an idea I have in confident manners but instead end up being tongue-tied in the idea’s expression, the resulting state of affairs will not correlate with what I willed to occur.

As I interpret it, then, you’re saying that the property of will is more important when it is not efficacious—this as per my second example of ending up being tongue tied.

I’m curious to find out more about why you think so.

I will agree that every choice is in itself another cause of a long line of events, so it is the efficient cause in that sense. I do not see how it is the "originating" cause if it itself is also caused. — NKBJ

These are indeed the hard to depict nuances that, all the same, distinguish causal determinism (including those forms that claim compatibilism) from any position affirming any type of metaphysical freewill (including those forms that also claim compatibilism).

We typically say that lightning causes thunder. In fact, lightning is fully determined by antecedent efficient causal factors; the thunder is then causes not by the lightning but by the set of these antecedent causal factors. Between these factors and the thunder, lightning is just an immutable link and is thereby fully non-efficacious. In other words, given the verity to these antecedent causal factors, lightning in truth holds no causal agency of its own. Hence, logically, it is not the lightning which causes the thunder but its antecedent causal factors.

In a system of causal determinism, then, there is no causal agency to speak of. All appraisals of causal agency become chimerical. Everything is causally predetermined in full by antecedent causal effects ad infinitum, such that causal agency as we “naively” conceive of it is an impossibility.

When it comes to choice between alternatives, what I’m saying is that despite its determinacy by motives (and other non-causal determinants), we agents in fact cause the effect. In effect, our commonsense notions of causal agency are in fact accurate representations of one underlying metaphysical form of causality, one that applies to freewill.

Each and every moment of our being we are different, thought the same person, and will have been in part predetermined by our former choices in life. Yet at each juncture of choice—part, present, and future—we again engage in being the agency for effects as decisions, or commitments, to future realities, this given two or more alternative means toward the end of resolving our want(s).

As causal agencies—and unlike the lightning bolt—we of our own constituency of being originate the effect of our particular decisions. … Whereas the lightning bolt does not causally originate the thunder of its own being (again, this since the thunder is causally predetermined by causal factors antecedent to the lightning).

If there’s a need, I’ll have to reply later on.

Would you say this is true regardless of whether the choice can be shown to have any causal relation to the corresponding state of affairs? — Merkwurdichliebe

From my vantage, it easy to forget or overlook that causation (of any variant) cannot be shown (empirically demonstrated) to be factual. The philosophy of causation is metaphysical in full. From the ontology of Aristotle, to the works of Hume, to those who have affirmed that reality is fully non-causal (e.g., instead being fully mathematical), the "showing" part can only pertain to reasoning and logic. I think for most of us, ideally a reasoning that is accordant to empirical world we experience.

Correlation does not entail causation. Yet causation is always co-relational. Given a sufficient quantity of uniform correlations between some given and its antecedent, one simply presumes causation.

So whether choice has any causal efficacy in relation to the corresponding state of affairs is, I believe, the crux of the freewill debate. Causal determinists presume it doesn't. Those who uphold freewill presume it does. And resolving this via empirical data has at least so far proven futile.

I was going to pull just that aspect out from your dissertation there! :wink: — NKBJ

:yikes: :cool:

I agree that is a "want" that pushes us towards certain decisions, in fact, a whole host of them, sometimes contradictory ones pulling us in opposite directions.

The distinction if that want is determined or not is the crux of the matter. I would say that these wants are products of both our experiences and our biology, and that they are fully determined. In fact, if they were not determined, they would not be trustworthy. — NKBJ

As I so far see things, want is of course determined: by biology, by experience, as well as by our previous choices in life. I'll even go so far as to suggest that some form of meta-want is even a metaphysically predetermined facet of any awareness, or sentience--devoid of which no such thing as ego can be.

My contention is, again, in that the actual choice of which of two or more alternatives to choose (so as to approach and obtain the want's resolution) will itself not be an immutable link in infinite causal chains/webs. Rather, the act of making the specific choice will stem from the momentary form of the agent as an originating efficient cause, such that its effect is the choice taken.

So are you saying that this "want" or "motive" is determined or the part of choice that is not fully determined? — NKBJ

Stating it differently: there can be no choice (an action or motion) without some form of want (a driving motive where "motive" is understood as "something that determines motion"). The motive--irrespective of what it itself is determined by--determines the process of choice making.

Though more vague than what I had in mind, I think I can relate to that. The mechanisms to volition is what most intrigue me in relation to this theme.

What part is not determined? — NKBJ

If the non-equivalence between determinacy and causation as I’ve previously described it is accepted, freewill could then be argued to be necessarily (pre)determined at all times.

--> It would only not be fully determined by antecedent efficient causes—such that the decision-as-effect which is produced holds that which makes the decision to be the metaphysically terminating origin—hence, originating efficient cause—of the decision (... this rather than the decision being a link in an infinite chain, or web, of efficient causal processes devoid of any exception).

One means of potentially arguing this is to provide for the contradiction of (a fully) causal determinism: In summation of one such argument, we agents (i.e., sentient beings; hence, instantiations of awareness in the form of ego) can only hold presence (i.e., exist, but not necessarily “stand out” … a subtle but metaphysically important clarification of semantics for some) given the presence of change, hence motion—this irrespective of whether the change/motion is physical or mental. That being a given, when impartially appraised, a world of full causal determinism does not logically allow for the possibility of change/motion—this since all relations of efficient causation are within this model perfectly immutable by definition, and because everything is deemed to consist of these perfectly immutable causal relations. Here, then, our experience of being directly contradicts with our theory of a fully casually deterministic being—for our experience entails the presence of change whereas the model of reality entails a perfect changelessness of being. I fully grant that the summation of this argument many be emotively lacking; yet I would challenge anyone to find rational fault with it. BTW, to hypothetically then claim that awareness is an illusion on grounds of the model used is to place the cart before the horse: it is our awareness which devises models of what being is; not vice versa.

If this logical contradiction is valid and if awareness holds ontological presence (rather than being chimerical), then (a fully) causally deterministic universe is rationally concluded to be an error of reasoning. This, minimally, then facilitates the possibility of freewill as I’ve just described it.

Another means is to address experiences (here granting that our awareness is not perfectly chimerical): we are aware that we strive to choose which alternative to commit to whenever we deliberate between alternatives. We are typically aware via non-physiological sensations (i.e. emotively) that there is a want in us whenever we so deliberate. This want, whatever it may be, is the a propelling motive for us to make a choice between alternatives—and this propelling motive determines our motion (roughly, our change of being) in actively making a decision; i.e., determines that we engage in the psychological action. Each want (each propelling motive) has some either ready established or else not yet established resolution that is pursued. The resolution to the want attracts us—and it too is a motive that determines what we choose; it is a fully teleological (goal-based) determinant that is entailed by the want. So when we deliberate in order to come to a decision we are determined by our propelling want and by that end/goal which we deem to resolve the given want. As to the actual alternatives between which we chose, at any given moment of deliberation, these are not determined by us as aware agents (but are instead determined, arguably, by our unconscious mind); these ready alternatives, instead, (pre)determine what our future courses of action can potentially be at any given instance of choice. We choose that alternative which best satisfies our motives—our desire when this is conceptualized as a propelling motive of want that simultaneously entails a sought after resolution to the same want, the latter being the telos/end that attracts or pulls.

In short, we are always determined by motives and by the alternatives we are aware of in the choices we make. Our choices are thereby never chaotic.

But add to this the following possible paradox: when we deliberate between alternatives, each alternative will be both a credible means toward the attracting motive we are determined by (otherwise we wouldn’t entertain it) AND each alternative will be to some extent an uncertain optimal means toward the attracting motive, which serves to determined what we choose (otherwise, were we to be certain that one alternative is better than all others, there would be no need for deliberation). Choosing which alternative is the best means toward the telos-motive, then, is a matter of metaphysical freedom—freedom strictly from antecedent efficient causes. We at these junctures of deliberation in essence momentarily become the causal origin of the ensuing decision as effect--thereby rationally holding responsibility for our choices.

I’m not claiming that what I’ve so far expressed is comprehensive. Though it’s an expansive topic, I’ve already written a mouthful, I’m thinking.

I am wanting to claim that what I’ve expressed does rationally illustrate how our choices are always determined and yet are—or at least rationally can be—metaphysically free from an otherwise infinite web of perfectly fixed efficient causations … and this without being in any way chaotic.

You'd have other reasons that caused your action, though. — NKBJ

Using this train of thought as a springboard:

In common modern parlance, determinacy is not equivalent to causation. The material used in a construction determines the relative flexibility of the edifice (e.g., wood makes the edifice flexible in comparison to the material of stone); yet the material does not efficiently cause the flexibility of the structure: the material and the structure are simultaneous. The same can be said of formal determinacy—what determines some particular form (with emergent properties of constituents as one possible example)—as well as for teleological determinacy, namely those of motives that most always determine particular motions of sapient beings and which simultaneously co-occur with the given motions. Causation as commonly understood pertains only to efficient causation—wherein the cause temporally precedes the effect it has the agency to produce. (This, though, is not do deny that at times all four of Aristotle’s categories of determinacy can be addressed as causal factors—further obfuscating the issue with unnoticed equivocations.)

Freewill as defined by the op seems to me to be, at best, a logical contradiction: effects being themselves determined by some originative cause that a) is devoid of motives for the action of effect origination and also b) is non-stochastic.

If freewill does exist, it is always semi-determined by, at minimum, motives—which are not efficient causes. It’s just that what one chooses will not be fully determined by antecedent (efficient) causes. In other words, that which does the choosing will itself be a terminating efficient cause of the effects produced within the constraints of, at minimum, the motives that are present.

Yea, I’m battling with windmills in thinking this is going to hold any sway in soundbite form—though I find nothing irrational about what I’ve just addressed. And this is one means of going about a compatibilist universe: one where freewill requires determinacy for its very manifestation (but is contradictory to being fully determined by antecedent efficient causes, i.e. a causally deterministic universe).

So, with all that said, should there be a distinct and credible men's rights movement? — Not Steve

I find myself onboard with your posts, but also find the term “men’s rights” lacking in its description of what you are addressing. To me (and I think to many others) a ‘rights’ movement connotes an intention to ameliorate the lack of rights applicable to a certain cohort.

My initial reaction to the title of this thread was: Is this about wanting to increase men’s rights so that they at last become of equal power to the social, economic, and political rights of women … because the latter have historically been used to oppress the rights of men? Or is this about men’s natural rights / God-given rights (choose as one’s pleases) being oppressed by the opposite sex’s wants. As one possible example of the latter: the oppressing of each man’s right to do as he wants with forty virgins that he owns as property … if not during one’s life on earth than in the afterlife; or, as a similar example: the right of certain skin-toned men (but not others) to impregnate any woman they want (this irrespective of the women's wants) being an unquestionable good that, thereby, should not be oppressed by anyone anywhere.)

Having read your posts, I'll assume you’d agree with the absurdity of these given examples.

How about a “men’s wellbeing or health movement” rather than one addressing rights? This, I’d agree, is direly needed considering all the suicides and such.

A personal observation: men’s wellbeing is most prevalently undermined by other men—rather than by women, though I hold no doubt that exceptions to this do occur. To be more explicit: engaging in very traumatizing unjust wars, the lack of reliance upon empathy or sympathy for one’s ailments, or any number of other male issue that impede men’s mental and physical wellbeing are most often caused by men in the same society ... that goad everyone into unjust wars, that decry affectionate men as [pick your pejorative: fairies, wusses, etc.], and so on.

From this vantage: it is not a lack of men’s rights that is the problem but, instead, the predominant, implicit, societal rights of men in current culture: the societal right to outcast those men who question authority in its decrees of war; the right to demean the human value of a man who sheds tears, even if in private; and so forth. … And yes, some women will sometimes reinforce the same by, I hold, following the social norms of ingrained rights that authoritarian men enforce in our shared culture.

For me, at least, it’s a complex and tough topic to handle. Especially since it, in part, addresses touchy-feely issues … which are, again, a current societal pariah among males. And in part because toughness is still often enough required; though I'd say this is valid for men and women alike, each in their own ways.

Fair enough. Never mind my post. I don't have the heart to enter into discussions about the proper significance of all the terms you've pointed out.

First, I wouldn't say that anything is objectively true. I see that as a category error. — Terrapin Station

I was making use of terminology previously used in this thread. The rest seems to also be about nitpicking semantics. Ignore what I said, then.

If a) it is objectively true that subjective beings hold presence, if b) it is objectively true that all subjective beings share a grouping of core characteristics that thereby validly makes them subjective beings, and if c) it is objectively true these core characteristics entail common, or universal, core wants (e.g., that of living life with minimal dolor), then: it is objectively true that all subjective beings hold an implicit, if not also explicit, understanding of what is good for them, this being a core reality that is universal to all subjective beings.

A possible candidate for this core preference universal to all subjective beings: the preeminent, basic, and generalized want of not having one’s intentions, or context specific wants, obstructed or barred (to be barred from doing what one wants to do will arguably always lead to some degree of displeasure in the short term if not also in the long term); or, more succinctly, the minimization of dolor, of suffering.

Then, considering such core and universal preference: parents who hold child vaccinations to be good and parents that hold child vaccinations to be bad, for example, will both operate from the same core preference universal to all subjective beings: say, that of minimizing dolor, this then of itself being an/the objective good (which is just as much an objective truth as is the existence of subjective beings to which this universal core preference pertains).

Given the objective good of the here hypothesized universal preference of minimizing personal dolor among all subjective beings, there will then be an objectively better and worse means of optimally actualizing this objective good—in the given example, via either vaccinating children or not.

But in short, if there is an objective good, it will not be found outside of subjective beings (like rocks over there are) but, instead, it will be an invariant and intrinsic preference universal to all subjective beings, one that is as objectively true as is the very presence of subjective beings.

Devil’s in the details. Nevertheless, to deny such objectively true good is to deny that subjective beings share any core characteristics of want/desire/need which defines all of them/us as subjective beings. Again, such as the generalized, hence universal, want of minimizing personal dolor—a preference whose universality among subjective beings can well be argued to be an objective truth.

I’m not intending by this to prove the reality of an objectively true good. I’m only adding to what previous posters mentioned: that a preference based ethics is in no way contradictory to the presence of an objectively true good.

Would you agree that confidence is required for activity, and doubt being an activity therefore requires confidence, but certainty is a special type of confidence which is not required for doubt? — Metaphysician Undercover

yes

p.s. I should say "yes" with certain caveats, but these would amount to the same overall summary I'm thinking.

Meta is the one who involved the word "possibility" in this discussion. Wittgenstein was content to remove the practicality of doubt. — Banno

Got it.

The problem specifically is that I often have the confidence required to proceed with an action, while I am actively doubting whether I will be successful in that procedure. This confidence I would not call certainty, because I am doubtful. So I am really calling into question your definition of certainty. If certainty is a type of confidence, as you claim, then it must be a type of confidence in which doubt is excluded, [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I look upon it this way: all subjective certainties will entail respective states of confidence, but not all states of confidence will entail certainties. This to me gets into the complexities of human consciousness—which, imv, always entwines with our sub/unconscious mind, from where emotive states result. Hence, for one example, we can be emotively confident of an activity while consciously doubting ourselves in terms of this very activity. And yes, ditto to certainty being a type of confidence wherein the mental activity of doubt is absent—this for the timespan of the given certainty.

Debating definitions of certainty I think is deserving of its own thread, especially since folks here want to get on with their analysis of Wittgenstein. I’m hesitant to currently start one. Still, for accuracy’s sake, I personally define certainty so (this in the most general way possible): the state, or an instance, of givens that do not compete with alternative givens and thereby hold determinate presence. For example, an idea X which we consciously hold in manners devoid of alternative ideas that compete with idea X for what in fact is shall, then, be a held certainty concerning idea X—this for the timespan in which idea X holds a determinate cognitive presence within our minds; again, this on account of not competing with credible alternatives for what in fact is. As a more concrete example, Pyrrho held a certainty, thus defined, that his methods lead to eudemonia (rather than being uncertain or doubtful about this being so).

Let me know if you’d like me to start a thread dedicated to definitions of certainty, uncertainty, and doubt. I have an online chapter that addresses this very subject which I could link to, and which could do with some criticism. But I doubt I’ll partake in the thread as much as would be appropriate. I might start it next weekend if there is a call for it.

In the context of Wittgenstein, you might be correct in your arguments about “eliminating the possibility of doubt” being untenable. I have not read him so I don’t know.

In the context of philosophical skepticism, the subject matter changes tremendously. Here’s one reference to this point:

Consider next the notion of doubt. Doubt is often considered the hallmark of skepticism. So how can it be that ancient skepticism is not about doubt (Corti 2010, Vogt 2014a)? Insofar as ‘to doubt’ means no more than ‘to call into question,’ the ancient skeptics might be described as doubting things. However, skeptical investigation as Sextus Empiricus describes it does not involve doubt (I shall focus here on Pyrrhonism; on Cicero’s use of dubitari, see Section 3.3). — SEP (Ancient Skepticism)

Pyrrhonism is arguably the most extreme form of non-Cartesian philosophical skepticism. And, as stated in the quote, it does not involve doubt. Rather, it upholds a fallible subjective certainty (i.e., a consciously entertained confidence) that its methods result in eudemonia. No non-Cartesian philosophical skeptic ever expressed holding the stance of global doubt. If you disagree, please provide a credible reference to the contrary if such exists.

As to your more detailed observations concerning my stance:

Going by common usage of the term, doubt is well defined as “to call into question”—as per the definition given in the quoted text —thereby being a cognitive activity, and not a mood or generalized attitude. You also want to pigeonhole the term “certainty” to in all cases signify “the property of being indubitable”—which is not how the term is commonly used: e.g., I’m very certain (rather than somewhat certain) that the term holds the synonyms of sureness and certitude. To the extent to which we disagree about the semantics of these terms—which currently seems significant—we then have no bearing for a proper argument concerning the terms’ referents.

I'm totally cool with that. Let's do our bit to give some status to principled non-conformism, especially when it results in crucifixion. — unenlightened

If your sarcasm’s jab doesn’t contain hypocrisy, then you uphold that every social movement that has ever been was conducted by a bunch of cretins. Unless, that is, no risks in being humiliated by the powers that be were incurred in speaking truth to power—as though this were a realistic model of how the world is.

A contemporary example: Have those in charge call investigative journalists “the enemy of the people”, and only those who are deplorable cretins will continue investigating and reporting the same issues rather than becoming humiliated into proper shape. And yes, these unwanted journalists sometimes get assassinated (crucified, allegorically speaking)—in some countries a lot more than in others. Your rebuke: These journalists are imbeciles living in Lala land for not becoming properly humiliated in a timely manner; or even better, for not living life in manners that eliminate the risk of humiliation to begin with.

Or am I misunderstanding you yet once again? Maybe you’re totally cool with crucifying principled non-conformists, ya’ know, like those in the USA who claim that climate change is not a hoax. Imbeciles that they are, because a certain Trump so treats them.

No, I don't think you're catching my drift. — unenlightened

My bad in misinterpreting, then. As things go, I of course agree that your last post presents an accurate general overview. Most generalities do have their exceptions, though. I admire good willed people that persevere through hard times, rather than having their will broken – more specifically, rather than succumbing to unjustly imposed societal humiliation by becoming in fact humiliated at heart (they include some Jews that went through the Holocaust – from what I've gathered in my life, at least). I’d like to think that what I’ve just said is somehow intelligible to you. Was trying to speak up for those I find admiration for. (To be honest, this because I’d like to have a social context with more such people in it – and denying their presence, or even possibility, is antithetical to such want.)

I don't see how you can make a valid argument here. I'm doubting the location of my cup. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

Doubt (as we are addressing it) is a conscious activity. Do we agree?

So, when doubting the location of the cup, can one simultaneously doubt that one is doubting, and furthermore doubt that one is in doubt about one's doubting of where the cup is, and this in infinite regress, at a level of momentary conscious awareness? If not, one will be psychologically certain that one is in doubt at the moment one is in doubt. Thereby making global doubt a psychological impossibility.

That one can doubt everything more or less sequentially if one wants (fist doubting this then doubting that) does not imply a global doubt (one that is fully devoid of any momentary certainty) ... unless one equivocates between infallible/absolute/indubitable subjective certainty and regular subjective certainty as it is commonly understood. But, then, if by "global doubt" one intends to express the held psychological certainty that there are no infallible certainties, this would in itself be a position one is certain about - and this, of itself, contradicts the position of global doubt.

I'm trying to address extremes since less extreme examples don't appear to be convincing to you.

As to the rest of your arguments, I noticed that they revolve around the issues of what words mean. As I previously mentioned, I have not read much of Wittgenstein. Started reading On Certainty but then lost interest. So I'll abstain from arguing these issues in general. I will make the observation that we cannot help from being momentarily certain of what we mean by the words we express to convey our meaning. Otherwise, why would any words be expressed by us?

Having by now read your post, I agree with most everything you’ve stated. Goths can serve as a good example of strong but not big egos, yes.



To be in pain, pissed, or even in states of despair over the injustice that befalls oneself is, to you, to be in states of humiliation without exception. OK

Your argument for this in simplified format:

I don't want to dismiss the personal side of identity, but [...] you can think what you like - in Lala land. — unenlightened

OK

Not much left to discuss on my part.

But as I've been explaining to unenlightened, there is a fundamental inconsistency between probabilities and impossible. Any impossibility created through probability is not a true impossibility, as the principle of plenitude indicates. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m in agreement with this.

So maybe you can explain to me what the others have not been able to. Why must there be an underlying psychological certainty? Take your example. I've lost my cup. — Metaphysician Undercover

The leading implicit (psychological) certainty in this hypothetical is that “I’ve lost my cup”. Devoid of this certainty, how would doubts as to where it might be begin manifesting?

I’ll do my best to summarize my position. Both certainty and uncertainty (but not doubt) can be linguistically applied to either a) ontology or b) epistemology. Emotive reasons for such statements aside, when it is said, “It is certain that the planet Earth is not flat,” one here affirms, what I’ll term, an ontic certainty: a determinate state of affairs that thereby holds no alternative possibilities. In contrast, when one says that, “I’m certain that planet Earth is not flat,” one here affirms, what I’ll term, a subjective certainty: a determinate state of mind pertaining to an awareness wherein this awareness deems that which its certain of to be the sole credible possibility, notably, regarding what is in fact ontically certain. Conversely, there are statements such as, “the future’s uncertain,” which can specify an ontic uncertainty: the indeterminate state of affairs that is found in the timespan we term the future. And: “I’m uncertain about the future,” which specifies a subjective uncertainty: an indeterminate state of mind wherein multiple credible alternatives compete for what in fact is the ontically certain (or determinate) state of affairs as it pertains to the future.

I’m hoping that the intelligibility of these four sentences here suffices in substantiating the validity of these two distinct categories of certainty and uncertainty: those which are ontic and those which are subjective.

Ontic certainties and uncertainties are not taken by us to be possibilities but, instead, to be factual states of being. These to me are fancy ways of re-expressing the concept of “is”—which isn’t a possibility but, in our cognition, an absolute. “The cup is on the table” doesn’t express a probability but a fact, which, as facts go, are taken by us to be absolute/total/complete actualities (in so far as they are not mere possibility, or mere potential regarding being). Extreme scenario: the stance that there are no ontic certainties is itself cognized, however implicitly, as depicting that which is ontically certain, thereby resulting in contradiction (hence, an error of reasoning). We think in terms of ontic certainties. A tangential: all ontic uncertainties (i.e., indeterminate states of affairs), if they factually hold presence, shall themselves be ontically certain; e.g. that the future is uncertain, if it is factually so, will itself be a(n ontic) certainty. Otherwise, we couldn’t claim that ontic uncertainties / indeterminate states of affairs factually occur/are.

All subjective certainties (including both psychological and epistemic) will hold some ontic certainty as referent. E.g., if one is certain that planet Earth is not flat one will hold this affirmation to adequately depict that which is ontically certain (or, that which is a determinate state of affairs). The clincher is that no known subjective certainty can be infallible in what it upholds to be ontically certain—but this here seems to be an aside.

With this as general background:

All subjective uncertainties (of which doubt is a type) will likewise be about some given state of affairs, about something which in fact is. This given or set of gives one is uncertain or doubtful about, however, shall itself be subordinate to a subjective certainty (which upholds a referenced ontic certainty): namely, that there is a determinate state of affairs (an ontic certainty) to the subject matter one is uncertain or doubtful about. Devoid of our subjective certainty that there is a relevant, underlying ontic certainty to be discovered, states of uncertainty and doubt become meaningless. This last sentence might be the hardest point to convey given your stances so far, but, as an example: if I am uncertainty/doubtful about whether or not the cup is on the table (or anything else), I already hold a certainty that some cognitive possibility that is conceivable adequately depicts that which is ontically certain regarding this matter. It’s just that I can’t figure out which of the multiple cognitive possibilities I’m pondering this one cognitive possibility is (this for as long as I remain uncertainty/doubtful). Devoid of this underlying subjective certainty that some relevant ontic certainty holds presence, uncertainty and doubt would again not be possible—the multiple alternatives that go through my mind would then not be competing for what in fact is (each, instead, then being its own stable reality, even if they are contradictory to each other).

More briefly, one must first be certain that something is in fact the case in order to be uncertain or in doubt about what the case might in fact be.

Going by the aforementioned, the conclusion is that no subjective uncertainty (including that of doubt) is possible in the complete absence of all subjective certainty. (To me related: also, no ontic uncertainty is possible where it’s presence to not be ontically certain—and, thus, and ontic certainty). Hence, the presence of uncertainty is always subordinate to the presence of certainty.

I’ve condensed my views a lot in this post. Won’t be surprised if there happens to be lack of clarity in what I’ve written. But, if so, point out the pertinent areas where I’ve been less than sufficiently clear.