Though I am by no means as in-depth in knowledge as you are when it comes to physics (QM, thermodynamics, etc. … to be slightly arrogant, I instead view my strongpoints to be biology and behavior, or at least to so once have been), I find our worldviews to in large part agree on the issues you’ve just mentioned.

Still, whereas you reduce metaphysics to a triadic system of relations, I’ve instead reduced metaphysics to a) a multiplicity of awareness-endowed agents (i.e., first person points of view), b) the entailed requisites of their presence (e.g., space and time as I’ve alluded to in some previous posts here) and c) a set of teloi, all being alternative means of attaining a state of being devoid of obstructions to intent … with only one such alternative being ontically real and all others being, in essence, illusions of will/sentience.

I don’t see why these two systems couldn’t integrate in principle. In practice, however, within the metaphysics I propose there are logical consequences that so far seem to be viewed in adverse ways by the metaphysics you propose. One such logical consequence is that the body is perishable while awareness is not—stated in terms of more spiritual folk, we are physically mortal but our core remains immortal (again, no homunculi here addressed). Another logical consequence is the metaphysically cogent allowance for the possibility of a multiplicity of incorporeal realms dwelling between our physical world and the pinnacle awareness of the final end. Also stated in terms of more spiritual folk, it is metaphysically possible that different incorporeal worlds exist, possibly worlds of angels, worlds of gods, worlds of chakras, etc. [although the clincher is that, while such worlds cannot be metaphysically disproven, by definition of not being universally applicable to all corporeal beings neither can they be evidenced to be real—else they would be as profane and physically objective as rocks or the laws of gravity … this gets a bit into epistemology, empirical evidence, and the principle of falsification, as well as the metaphysics of the physically real. Still, it is not intended as a joke—though one could well yet maintain atheism (lack of deities) in this metaphysics—and it ties into the logical necessity that the body (and ego) is mortal while awareness is not … something that is readily evident in the nature of the final end I’ve previously addressed.]

Do you see any possibility of these givens being incorporated into the model you endorse? These givens are some of the intrinsic aspect of the model I uphold. Again, we tend to agree far more when addressing issues of physicality.

Now, what about them questions regarding metaphysical identity?

The Heat Death is the finality of natural habit becoming eternally fixed. — apokrisis

I can paraphrase this from a different point of view: the ultimate end is the actualization of absolute order wherein a) all conflict vanishes and b) all imperfectly integral identities become an objectively perfect identity/unity.

Physical entropy--to distinguish it from IT notions--is merely the process of taking paths of least resistance toward the grand finale of this absolute order--thereby being determinstically driven teleologically toward the final end of absolute order. Negentropy, were it to approach this grand final (which is itself metaphysically determinate as end) via its top-down causal abilities, would via its own freewill become more determined/determinate in its actions toward the requirements of actualizing this ultimate end - thereby itself becoming ever-more entropic (following paths of least resistance toward absolute coherence/unity/accord/etc. given contextual constraints).

Yet there is still the same difference in the basic metaphysical underpinnings of what this final end ontically is.

Well the difference here is now that you are arguing for the bounding constraints to be caused transcendentally from without, whereas I say they arise emergently and immanently from within. — apokrisis

I don't get what makes you presume this of me. To me, purpose/telos is intrinsic/immanent to awareness. That the ultimate end is determinate has arguably nothing to do with the objectively real telos (sentience will sometimes pursue other teloi) occurring transcendentally from without as something separate from self. Think of universals ... are they in any way transcendentally from without (such that they at the very least are not also simultaneously immanent to psyches)?

But you still haven't addressed my previous questions regarding the metaphysical nature of identity.

I don't think you should be so quick to assume a spatial separation between points, because there is another way we can go, and that is a temporal separation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but here I’d also be presuming block time rather than some variant of presentism (to generalize: wherein past is collective memory of what was and future is anticipatory forethought of what will most likely be given the logically non-contradictory facts/info of the present … which themselves include the information regarding the past).

Given the premise that only conscious agents are metaphysically real—or, rather, that the whole of the phenomenal universe is derived in one way or another from conscious agents—I don’t find a means to substantiate block time. Again, I do find a requirement that before and after occur within the first-person point of view regarding apprehensions and creations relative to other and—in a more complex fashion—relative to any cohort of individual agents that can causally affect each other. But this would lead to a variant of presentism.

Let me know is this does not directly address you’re offered alternatives regarding temporal separations of identity.

Our two worldviews often converge in multiple ways when it comes to explanations of the physical world. I’m in truth uplifted by this. Yet our differences lie in the metaphysical basic underpinnings. You for instance focus on vagueness as an ultimate beginning; I instead will affirm that the ultimate beginning is unknowable by us *. You view the ultimate end as a materialist form of nothingness (to not confuse it with Eastern notions of emptiness, for example); I instead will affirm that the ultimate end—though its occurrence is contingent on the choices of all co-existing agents—is one of awareness unshackled from the limitations/constraints of space and time (even that which pertain to mind and its thoughts), and, hence, from the boundaries of selfhood (and otherness) … a juncture wherein subjectivity at last becomes, or transcends into, awareness-endowed metaphysical objectivity; else stated, where no difference remains between subject and object (not to be confused with the identity/otherness notion of objects) [* with what the ultimate beginning of space and time was maybe becoming at last apprehended by awareness at this transformative juncture of spatiotemporal finality]. Yet otherwise expressed, the contingently awaiting ultimate end is a juncture where the fist-person point of view at last apprehends—experientially and via logos/ratio-devoid understanding—what it in truth objectively is … it, in my outlook, is the only possible instance of absolute knowledge.

I’ve little doubt of others’ mistrust and distaste for this perspective I’ve been developing. Still, let it be noted that this final end—otherwise conceivable as the totality of unbounded awareness—is not itself a deity; deities are selves separated from otherness. Nevertheless, from within the framework of my metaphysics, this “omega” can only be stated to exist, if nothing else then as an existent potential with teleological impact upon all sentience (be it via freewill-resultant aversion to it or the converse). Whether this “omega” can then be termed a theistic notion of God/G-d/Divinity or, else, an atheistic construct (due to its lacking of a deity that, as a self separated from non-self, interacts with us), I wholeheartedly presume will be in the eyes of the beholder and his/her perspectives of reality.

Where all that matters is parsimony in coherently explaining the physical world, we often can cordially debate—and, again, often enough find agreement. But our metaphysical systems are built up differently.

For now I’d like to address aspects of this difference. By saying “yup” in you previous post to me, I take it you agree that evolution can be partially simplified into a universal common denominator of “preservation of identity”. How do you propose that identity is established if not via awareness which, as awareness, identifies itself as same/identical to itself and different/non-identical to other? Now, if there’s agreement that this identity is established via awareness, then how is the primacy of awareness (an identity known experientially) abandoned for the sake of primacy of matter (an identity known theoretically)? I anticipate that this will reduce to what is the true metaphysical nature of identity.

But if, in the platonic tradition, we recognize non-spatial existence as the true basis of reality itself, we open up an entire realm of non-spatial existence to our inquiring minds. It lies within, or underneath all of physical existence, which, being non-physical, cannot be perceived by the senses, but only apprehended directly by the mind. From this perspective we can apprehend the existence of information at non-spatial, dimensionless points, and the unity of those points through the means of that information. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yo, you still around?

Wanted to see how this idea might pan out with you (and others). To be explicit, I’m using geometric points as representations of aware agents. Most of this will not be analytically reasoned but, rather, terse ideas thrown out there for potential feedback, etc.

I’ll first philosophically entertain an existence (or presence) consisting of a singular geometric point—and nothing else. The geometric point, being volume-less, is in this scenario also space-less yet, nevertheless, a perfectly integral unity. Because this singularity is devoid of otherness, it is also devoid of boundaries via which it can gain a quantifiable identity and, therefore, can well be demarcated as a non-quantity whole. This mathematical scenario is rather hard to conceive other than in very, very abstract terms; but, I’ll intuit, it can be likened to Pythagoras’s circle (the circle devoid of a point at its center or of any line(s), via which quantity is represented within his system), to the Neo-Platonist’s “the One” (albeit, as with the singular geometric point, this “One” could in fact be demarcated as a perfectly integral and wholesome non-quantity being), to Kabbalistic notions of Ein Sof, to Eastern notions of the Brahman, and I dare say even to notions of Nirvana or, similarly, Moksha.

As I remember it, as was addressed in a by now ancient discussion on the old forum, we already agree that it is only once two or more geometric points hold presence that space itself holds presence. What I’m reaching at is that while a singular geometric point can be conceived to hold space-less presence, the presence of two or more points entails the co-dependent origination of space.

Were we to grant both awareness and creative agency to these geometric points, not only would the presence of two or more points necessitate to co-existence of space but also of time: the creations of one point will occur either before, after, or simultaneous to the awareness/apprehension and/or creation of any other geometric point.

Again, in the scenario of there being only one geometric point present, there is neither space nor time (because there here is no occurrence of any before or after). Space and time become, allegorically, the shell of the aware agents (for emphasis, when there are two or more of these).

Abstractly tying this into evolution, I speculate that evolution can be boiled down to “preservation of identity”. I say that this encapsulates all the more complex, empiricism based notions of evolution (begrudgingly, even the “selfish gene” one which I’ve never been able to stand). Now, what is the ontically real identity of geometric points? The spatiotemporal context within which they (again, plural) duel or, alternatively, the perfectly whole/integral being of the limitless here noted by the singular, non-quantifiable geometric point scenario? There are complexities galore in that we conscious agents, as identities, are always a conflux of both aforementioned idealized identities - I so argue. Yet, as with the notion of “we are points of light emanating from the same source”, a notion arguably as old as Akhenaten’s Ra, it is at least arguable that our metaphysically true identity (independent of our beliefs, etc., of who we are) is that of the perfectly whole/integral unity that is both limitless and non-quantifiable.

Though mumbo jumbo to some, it can further be noted that base natures of people are (overly) selfish and elevated natures of people are (relatively speaking) selfless. This singular geometric point example is, in so many other words, a perfectly selfless being: the pinnacle of elevated nature as viewed from within space and time.

So, appraising darn well that all this will be largely nonsense to many (most notably, physicalists), what I’m allegorically alluding to—hopefully in a clear enough way—is that evolution, when metaphysically appraised, might be a struggle between different beings to preserve self-identity given a conflux of teloi of what one seeks to become—one of which will be ontically real (right) and the others being illusions produced by the imagination of minds (and, hence, wrong … such as, I’d argue, the illusion that one can become a spatiotemporal controller of all spacetime/physicality, to whose authority all other conscious agents become subjects of … again, selfishness taken to its extreme, at least to my mind). This metaphysical evolution of being/identity then—to fast forward a bit—plays out physically within spacetime between different lifeforms (of varying awareness ability) and, I’d still maintain, potentially among non-living identities as well.

Ok, I feel I’ve been all over the place in my attempts for concision of basic ideas. Logically, all this would need quite a more robust and coherent means of argument to hold water—I know very well. But hey, I'm aiming for it to make some intuitive sense.

So, yes, within such a model conscious agents are the only things that are metaphysically real, but the physicality that in part emerges due to the space and time that a multiplicity of conscious agents necessarily entails would be quite real in a physical, everyday sense.

Not now such how well this would integrate with Hoffman's position ...

Thanks for clarifying. If I understand you correctly then, yes, the first person point of view is indeed a thing. It is the embodiment of a purpose, an intentionality. — apokrisis

Thanks in turn for your direct answer.

Yea, as to the first person point of view being a thing … “neither is it a (some)thing nor is it not a (some)thing” is my honest, best answer for the moment, equivocal though it may be.

I acknowledge it to be a laconic answer: both in the sense of “Spartan” and in the sense of “dense”. Still, if we’re to make things as simple as possible but no simpler (as someone once said), most any laconic statement can be a bit too simple in certain circles.

An example once given to me that I find helpful is that of a beach’s being. A beach is composed of sand particles (residing along a large collection of water drops, etc.). Mr/Ms Reductionist would insist that to understand what a beach is we must more closely study the individual sand particles it is composed of, such as by means of a microscope. Mr/Ms Irreductionist will insist that to understand what a beach is we must study the holistic totality of sand particles in its own right. This can touch upon what some may term gestalt being - something that, as an identity, is other than the sum of its parts. (I speculate that there will be some who’ll argue that, because no gestalts exist, no such thing as beaches exist either.)

I’ve opted for substantive disagreement on grounds of disagreement concerning what causal processes in truth exist. For example, all bottom up causation might be upheld by the reductionist as compared with the irreductionist upholding that at least some gestalts, or holons, can hold their own causal abilities (e.g., a beach, as a gestalt thing, can have an effect on the type of waves that manifest).

On a somewhat related note, in line with SophistiCat’s comments, I’d be grateful for further clarification on what reductionism entails. So far it seems to me that we all inevitably reduce the nature of being to something primitive: QM particles, or holons (be these objects, ecosystems, aware beings, etc.), or some set of abstract relations (be these dyadic, triadic, etc.), or processes of becoming, and so forth. Hence, so far, to me there seems to be something in addition to “reducing things to basic givens” that would need to be made explicit so as to demarcate the reductionist from the irreductionist. While I currently uphold this to be linked to the types of causation upheld to be ontic—an underlying belief through which explanations emerge—alternatives to this perspective would be appreciated.

OK, I agree, it’s a loaded term whose referent is often ambiguous. And worse, it often addresses different referents (albeit loosely associated) to different individuals.

Nevertheless, I’ve clearly specified what I meant by it in my last post to you: the first person point of view. And, if it must be repeated by me, I do not entify the first person point of view (to use your slang); consciousness is not a homunculus; nevertheless, I uphold that it is, exists, holds presence, etc. while the first person point of view holds awareness. BTW, I’m pretty certain of this one.

My question to you is then not yet answered: in your worldview, does the first person point of view (more concretely, you, me, and many, many others) hold top-down causal abilities of its own?

Tangentially, as to the agency/agent linguistic issue: a bundle of coherently functioning processes is conceived of as a unitary, holistic identity; an identity that may be in the process of becoming, but an identity nonetheless. I say “look: a rock is over there” and not “look; a bundle of coherently functioning processes that, as bundle, takes on the attributes X, Y, and Z—all of which, however, are perfectly devoid of identity—is over there”. Hence, were we to be brief in our statements, that which holds agency is addressed by the identity of “an agent”. This, then, results in the terminology of “conscious agents”.

If you disagree with these comments, on what non-contradictory grounds do you do so?

Like you, I'm sympathetic to his case, but I'm dubiuos about appealing to evolutionary theory to justify it; seems self-defeating to me. — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree. If I didn’t specify my position well enough previously, his methodology contradicts the conclusions he draws from it. More concretely, he’s using physical models of evolution to explain conscious agents’ abilities while, in the same breadth, claiming that the physical is an illusion. This leads to a chicken and egg dichotomy in which he wants to support the illusion of physicality via arguments reliant upon physicality not being an illusion. At least as I so far interpret his worldview. So, yes, to me his stance appears to be logically contradictory. Wanted to double-check, though.

In another thread i argued at length why I would instead prefer the terms attentional level and habit level processing. And one of the reasons was that that allows top-down causality to be a part of both. The difference between the two levels then becomes one of spatiotemporal scale. — apokrisis

I glanced that thread over, portions of it at any rate. As its theme relates to this thread’s: Attention is not merely conscious; e.g., the generalized conscience is also attentive to what’s going on (otherwise it couldn’t inform of alternatives to what one desires), though it is not the first person point of view we term consciousness. Habit, on the other hand, can pertain to both the unconscious and to consciousness. A murky, and altogether different topic though.

What I’m here addressing is the agency—or non-agency—of consciousness, i.e. of the first person point of view.

To keep things simple: in your worldview, does consciousness hold its own top-down causal ability?

Consciousness ends up being conscious of how it must be the product of unconscious processes. — apokrisis

A bit late in the thread with this post in relation to this and other related comments you've made.

You’ve affirmed that consciousness is there due to unconscious process of mind. On its own terms, I agree 100%. However, if this is intended to dissuade one from granting consciousness its own agency, it then does away with all possibilities of top-down causation as it would apply to consciousness. It seems to me you either a) ascribe to the unconscious mind awareness-endowed agency (i.e., top-down causal processes) or b) deny agency (i.e., top-down causal processes) to the unconscious mind.

If (a), what coherent rationale would there then be to deny agency to consciousness on its own right? If (b), how would this not be a variant of epiphenomenalism?

[Haven't read you posts in a while. Needless to say, feel free to correct any unintended misrepresentation of your stance.]

@Wayfarer

One, to me glaring, metaphysical lack in Hoffman’s worldview is that he addresses evolution as a leading cause for how we are (something that I happen to agree with on multiple levels) yet does not give any attention to how evolutionary processes work on a strictly metaphysical level.

Yes, this in itself is a can of worms; e.g., which parts of our evolutionary theories are approximated maps and not the actual terrain? (lots of things—both philosophical and of the empirical sciences—could be addressed here; sorry, can’t help myself: one easy to express example: given today’s models of fitness, a bacterium which both a) has never reproduced and b) has been around since the dawn of bacteria would be denoted as holding zero fitness, this despite it having out-survived most life forms on this planet; to me, this hypothetical (it is possible in principle, and might be actual of some individual bacterium out there that, in essence, is a species onto itself) has implications regarding our models of fitness that always bothered me … but back to the main point).

Evolution—i.e., change due to natural selection—could be universally applicable, and not strictly limited to life. (You'll note how the concept of purpose is inextricable from evolutionary theory--this despite it being explained away in multiple ways by those who deny purpose to existence.) But in order for this scenario to make sense one first needs to reduce the complexities associated with biological evolution down to their bare minimums in terms of processes (thereby excluding the means via which these processes occur in physical life both genotypically and phenotypically). Nevertheless, all this would still address the physical. What Hoffman’s worldview endorses—to me, similar enough in attitude to biocentrism—is that only awareness-endowed agencies are objectively real on a metaphysical plane. I say fine, I agree, but then what form of evolutionary theory is espoused that would further simplify change via natural selection so that it may logically hold when strictly considering conscious agents (hence, that would apply to an ecosystem of aware agents/agencies even in the absence of all physicality; or, to be more precise, in the absence of all phenomenal—though not noumenal—reality)?

If this point is not resolved, then—as it currently stands for me—he is endorsing logical contradictions on a metaphysical level in justifying who we are via theories of evolution. However, I grant that I’ve only read the interview and seen the video linked to in the OP. Maybe I’m so far missing out on something? Like I said previously, I’m sympathetic to his cause.

Don't be too sure. Remember, this professor is from California. — Wayfarer

Well, thinking that I'm getting your vibes: Dude, like, Californians can be totally rad at times. :P Nerdy as some of us can sometimes get.

Hang ten. (Y) ;)

I am pretty drawn to his model, but I'm having trouble understanding it in the abstract - when he gets down to the detail of how agents interact, and how agents can actually merge - looses me there. — Wayfarer

From the article linked to in the OP in the Atlantic:

Gefter: The world is just other conscious agents?

Hoffman: I call it conscious realism: Objective reality is just conscious agents, just points of view. Interestingly, I can take two conscious agents and have them interact, and the mathematical structure of that interaction also satisfies the definition of a conscious agent. This mathematics is telling me something. I can take two minds, and they can generate a new, unified single mind. Here’s a concrete example. We have two hemispheres in our brain. But when you do a split-brain operation, a complete transection of the corpus callosum, you get clear evidence of two separate consciousnesses. Before that slicing happened, it seemed there was a single unified consciousness. So it’s not implausible that there is a single conscious agent. And yet it’s also the case that there are two conscious agents there, and you can see that when they’re split. I didn’t expect that, the mathematics forced me to recognize this. It suggests that I can take separate observers, put them together and create new observers, and keep doing this ad infinitum. It’s conscious agents all the way down. — Amanda Gefter

Hey. Just passing through.

I’m not yet familiar with his detailed (I presume mathematical) arguments for the convergence of agents—but to offer some thoughts. To address the scenario of disparate agents converging into one agent doesn’t—yet—seem to me to be an issue of science or technology. Rather its either one of metaphysics or one of philosophy of spirituality. The quoted example Hoffman gives regarding brain hemispheres I find to be apt. However, it itself is implicitly reliant upon models of mind-brain wherein the sub- & unconscious mind is itself endowed with agencies. For the time being, it can be said that we as a society still have basic disagreements as to whether or not consciousness is itself a metaphysically valid agency or, else, an illusion (either in part or in whole; such as can be readily inferred from epiphenomenalism)—so the issue of whether or not a total mind consist of multiple agencies partly converging into a first-person conscious agency can be very controversial.

For the record, I uphold such a model of mind where the unconscious is itself constituted of at times unified, and at times conflicting, agencies. As only one example, to anyone who’s ever felt pangs of conscience, you then at those junctures experienced agencies of your unconscious mind other than the agency which you as a first person conscious self then momentarily were; if for no other reason, the intentions of your conscience and those which you then held were not the same. More concretely exemplified, were I to want to take a shortcut but then to feel pangs of conscience informing me its far better not to, the first-person conscious agency which I am yet has the choice between doing what I want or doing what I now feel these pangs of conscience inform me might be the better course of action. Momentarily, this information of my subconscious which we term conscience is not the first-person conscious I which feels, deliberates, and acts. It is instead an agency of my sub/unconscious mind interacting with me, the first-person consciousness, within my mind. More could be elaborated on, but this was offered to illustrate that a mind consists of multiple agencies which can diverge (e.g., you & your conscience) or, else—as is typical and healthy (the latter, however, being very conditional on the actions being taken)—fully unified into a singular agency that, at such junctures, is undifferentiable from the first person conscious agent's being.

So, yea, this model of mind is itself contentious; we’re habituated to think of the conscious agent as though it were a thing, and object, somehow permanently separated from what is its; namely, the agency-endowed aspects of its mind (e.g., conscience) and its body (e.g. walking while desiring to go to location X), etc. [Personally, its where I find the statement, “there neither is a self nor not a self” to enter the picture … but anyways.]

As to multiple first-person agencies (or selves) converging into one objective, perfectly unified reality of agency, one can find history littered with tales of this: from the Gnostics and their approach of Sophia, to the Neo-Platonists and their notion of “the One”, to concepts of transcendent convergence with an Abrahamic God/G-d in the hereafter, etc. And, as you know, examples can be found in Eastern traditions as well. In most such systems, there are stipulated to be in-between realms of greater awareness—dwelling in between our own present corporeal awareness and that of the pinnacle, unified awareness, however it is expressed. But this converging of minds stuff is neither new nor limited to mono-something-theisms; e.g. the Oracle at Delphi supposedly converged with the virgin priestesses there in order for these priestesses to prophesize; Shaman of varying traditions on this planet supposedly converged as conscious agents with everything from spirits and gods to (as was a common case in South American tribes) jaguars. Eah, but this a science and technology forum—so none of this here applies.

Still, notice how the metaphysical underpinnings of physical objects governing the foundations of reality—something which we’ve now come to communally project upon selfhood as well (the dreaded homunculus argument comes to mind)—first needs to be reappraised before this convergence of conscious agents/agencies can make any sense.

As to Hoffman’s overall views, I’m generally very sympathetic to them from what I’ve so far read. Though, I should admit, I currently find them metaphysically lacking. Also, the terms used need to be changed or else new terms created for notions such as—to at least paraphrase— “reality is an illusion”. In the sense he talks about, it is (or at least I too so affirm); but in the sense of “reality bites”, (perceptual, etc.) reality never is illusory. Thanks for linking to him.

Oh, and a shout out to all the UCI-ers out there: see, Ant Eaters can be competitive! [yup, UCI has an ant eater of all things as its mascot]

[...] This means that our emotions do not have some sort of mind control effect on us and make us perceive, through our thinking, our lives having value to us. It is purely the emotions themselves that allow us to see the value in our lives. [...]

[...] So, continuing on here. Most people would tell me that feelings are nothing more than just feelings and that it is our thoughts (value judgments) that make our lives valuable to us. I am actually reversing this. I am saying that thoughts are nothing more than just thoughts and that it is instead our emotions that make our lives valuable to us. — TranscendedRealms

Howdy.

Wanted to express two positions related to the title of this thread.

First, emotions come in different forms. We linguistically often express this difference by affirming either a) “I feel […; e.g., giddy]” or b) “I am […; e.g., giddy]”. Giddiness either way is an emotion. But, in instance (a) it is apprehended by the “I” in question as present within its own mind as one apprehends—via analogy—the tactile touch of a surface that is nevertheless other than that which apprehends (or perceives, in the broad sense of the word). Whereas in instance (b) the emotion is no longer something apprehended by the “I” in question but is instead one momentarily inseparable property of the respective “I”. [I’m using the term “I” to try to avoid the vagueness of the term consciousness.]

Point being one form of emotions consists of emotions felt/perceived by that which is aware of these emotions and that another form of emotions consists of emotions that are an enactively present component of that which is aware—via which apprehensions of other (including form “a” emotions) are made. Of course there’s overlap between forms (a) and (b) of emotions, but the disparity still exists.
With the former form (a), just because one feels emotion X does not then necessarily entail that one is in any way X; for instance, I could feel pangs of envy but immediately shun these creeping up emotions, myself as awareness/”I” at this juncture not being envious but, rather, antithetical to experiencing envy (though I will at such juncture indeed sense envy as one brewing—and, in this scenario, hopeful soon obliterated—emotion within my total being of mind). It would not be till I emotively deem envy an appropriate response to the here unaddressed stimuli that I would become envious, thereby now being a momentarily envious person in my intentions and outlooks.

I agree that it’s a very complex issue (as well as are issues of self when addressing the ever-changing "I" in conjunction with its total mind and body from which the "I" can well be stated to emerge). Nevertheless, my basic observation here is that there is a difference between “perceiving” one’s own emotions and enactively being momentarily undifferentiable from, or fully unified with, the emotion(s) in question.

Secondly, I for one strongly uphold that emotions consist of (mostly unconscious) reasoning. Enactive emotions—take your pick: love, anger, attraction, repulsion, etc.—entail that so doing x, y, and z, (be these general or specific) will result in some conclusion that you desire to obtain (typically for some reason). Here we have inference that is actively lived: premises accepted as true, one or more general goals/conclusions pursued, and the means by which one moves from these premises to the given conclusion—not in abstract theory but in concrete practice. Perceived emotions—or form (a) of emotions aforementioned—hold the same reasoning to them, but they emerge from fully un/subconscious portions of one’s mind in manners that you are not yet fully converged with, holding premises and conclusions you are not yet fully aware of consciously.

Conscious reasoning is driven by desire; desire is of itself an emotion (not an inference). So thought, when defined as conscious reasoning alone, is itself a tool through which we seek to actualize our enactive emotions (emotions we’re momentarily undifferentiable from … the “I am curious” type of emotion; and not the “I feel some tangential curiosity but am far more interested in doing something else (due to a conflicting emotion which I currently am one with)” type of emotion).

For the record, David Hume was the first to my knowledge to express this position of all abstract thought being governed by (often enough competing) emotive drives.

Don’t know if this will help out in better clarifying your outlook as offered in the OP. But, in summation of this post, imo there is no sharp threshold between emotion and thought. What we may think of as pure emotion is unconscious thought—either goading us as total beings or, else, with which we become fully converged with in our actions and outlooks—and what we may think of as pure thought is always itself a vehicle driven by some emotive state’s purpose.

Still, at the end of the day, for the record, I agree with you that emotions (specifically type “b” emotions) are primary and conscious reasoning secondary—such as in obtaining value judgments. This, though, is not to say that conscious reasoning is not often crucial in helping us discern what is from what isn’t … as well as what ought to be from what ought not to be. Nor am I suggesting that emotions and thoughts are not mutually entwined.

You make a good point that empiricism is classified as an epistemology, whereas materialism is classified as a metaphysics, and so they are not synonymous. — Samuel Lacrampe

I like this summation; it’s pithy. Far better than my ramblings. Sometimes, though, it takes time to edit concepts into more pithy statements (see below). :-}

Back to the original question, I wonder if all things that fit under the umbrella of natural science must be material. — Samuel Lacrampe

What makes this question so hard for me to appraise is the underlying supposition of what is and what is not material. This, though, gets into philosophy of mind … of which materialism is only one formal stance.

[...] The statement "studies show that those who live in this particular way tend to be more happy" is a valid scientific statement, and does not necessarily lead to materialism. — Samuel Lacrampe

As to science and its evidencing of materialism, I’ll offer my own perspective, right or wrong as it may be.

First as a general background, science can either be interpreted as A) “knowledge gained through study or practice”, which I take to then have derivative meanings such as “a particular discipline or branch of learning” or, else, B) “the collective discipline of study or learning acquired through the scientific method”. [These three quoted definitions are taken verbatim from Wiktionary; although other specific meanings for science can also be found there, I take these two to be the most pertinent].

As to denotation A and its derivatives: to me this sense of science may or may not hold personal value … Compare “the science of farting silently in public” (yes, this usage fully conforms to denotation A) to “the science of mathematics” … which also only pertains to denotation A: Mathematics (as with logics) is neither studied nor learned through the scientific method—i.e., (in my own attempt at pithy summation) i) falsifiable hypothesis on that which can be observationally scrutinized by all, ii) reproducible experiment (itself experiential) with no significant confounding variables which holds the potential to conclusively falsify the hypothesis, and iii) inferred conclusions of the experiment.

Then there’s the much touted and too often little understood “empirical sciences” category which pertains to denotation B. It is not mathematics, nor technology, nor logics… though it of course integrates all three in the process of empirically/experinetially/synthetically discovering new, observationally, and universally, verifiable knowledge. [e.g., gravity is a theory, but it is empirically scientific because no verifiable observation has ever been made of gravity not being the case—though just one such verifiable observation (thereby evidencing that the observation is not a willful lie, a hallucination, etc.) would be enough to conclusively falsify the theory]. In sense B of science, scientific knowledge in all cases is, again, empirical—and, hence, a posteriori—knowledge. [But notice that now stating “empirical” becomes disassociated with the branch of philosophy termed empiricism—which, again, claims that all (or, else, “nearly all”, according to Wikipedia) knowledge is a posteriori, i.e. gained after experience of that which it regards.]

While I’m certain that others will disagree with at least some aspects of this just stated appraisal regarding science, I’m again offering it as my own perspective—here, nothing more—and have only provided it to better contextualize the following opinion:

IMO: With one singular, possible exception, there is absolutely nothing of scientific knowledge (in sense B) that “necessarily leads to materialism”.

As one extreme example of this—though I disagree with Berkley’s metaphysics in multiple ways—Berkley’s metaphysics when taken in its complete, mature form (thereby including the omni-perceiving Berkleian God) is fully compatible with all scientific knowledge (of the sense-B type) of today—again, with the one exception I’ve previously alluded to. (And kicking a rock about is not going to refute this claim.) … In saying this, however, one ought to be careful to distinguish inferences drawn from scientific knowledge (e.g., quantum physics’ multiple worlds) from the scientific knowledge itself (e.g. particles have been observed to predictably behave in certain ways).

So, that one exception I’ve so far alluded to is simply this: the mainstream paradigm in most fields of empirical science contains the inference that awareness has developed from out of a perfectly non-aware universe (such as in, life having developed from nonlife) … thereby implying the metaphysical primacy of matter, i.e. the metaphysics of materialism. [However, certain metaphysical suppositions, such as panpsychism as one often mentioned example, can remain noncontradictory to all scientific knowledge without relying upon this just mentioned inference … thereby having the potential of both holding on to scientific knowledge without in any way “leading to materialism”.]

It’s a very tangled philosophical subject … this issue regarding the relation between scientific knowledge and the metaphysical subject specified by the philosophy of mind (again, of which materialism/physicalism is only one variant of).

So you say that empiricism encompasses all experiential things, which includes but is not limited to material things. Could you provide an example of an experiential thing which is not a material thing? — Samuel Lacrampe

To be clear, my statements addressed what empiricism once was upheld to be. Plainly stated, empiricism is/was the stance that knowledge develops from experience and is thereby a posteriori. Of itself, it has nothing to do with materiality.

I’m not now sure if your question intends historic examples taken from former empiricists. If so, as an overview, Hume was not a materialist. Neither was George Berkeley, another well-known empiricist. Locke was a Christian, which I take to entail that he was not a materialist either.

Rather than provide specific examples from former empiricists (I haven’t read the three just mentioned in a while, so I’d be a bit rusty) I’ll give this observation: The general question of which experiential thing is not itself a material thing places the cart before the horse if one is addressing this question from a metaphysical point of view: to the physicalist all things are material/physical things. REM dreams, sensations, expectations, intentions, imagined unicorns, the non-reasoned apprehension of (or awareness of) abstractions in adults which cannot be represented by particulars without at best diminishing the given abstraction (e.g., animal … encapsulating everything from sponges to blue whales, etc.)—to list only a few things experiential—are then all part and parcel of matter in relation to matter to the physicalist. Hence, to the physicalist, there is nothing of experience which is not material/physical—this by the very definition of physicalism.

If, however, the question intended commonsense notions of material objects, I’ll specify the experience of happiness. It is an experiential thing which is not of itself a representation of any particular material thing or set of such. (I’m limiting it to this example in case disagreements ensue.)

[edit: corrected a laughable typo about horses and carts ... if anyone noticed]

But in 150 years' time if, say, New York and London have been flooded and Bangladesh destroyed in the meantime, there will be some people who will say, 'It remains to be proved that anthropogenic climate change did this.' They will host chat shows and have followers. Just you wait and see. — mcdoodle

I get the part about disagreements. Thanks for the humorous reminder. What I don’t get is the part about whether or not there occur states of affairs irrespective to what sentience may believe or feel. We can ask this of the proposition, “I exist/am,” when we address it to our own individual selves as we can ask this of the proposition, “Elvis Presley has died”.

What’s worse to me is the proposition that, “because some believe that he has and some believe that he hasn’t, Elvis is both dead and alive at the same present time and in the same way”.

Your remarks about predictions for the future, i didn't understand. There can't be facts about future anthropogenic global warming. I think most scientists think it's likely to be true, and that on the precautionary principle the best bet is to assume they're right. — mcdoodle

The predicted fact of what will occur if we don’t counteract in the case of global warming can be construed to be a more complex version of what will happen to the proverbial ostrich with its head placed in the ground if it doesn’t start running away from the attacking lion.

Addressing the issue of facticity, through one can come up with a number of possibilities of why the lion is charging toward the ostrich (maybe the lion simply intends to greet the ostrich with a friendly lick, etc.), when the lion and the ostrich are in touching distance only one possibility will unfold. This one actualized possibility will at that juncture become a fact. When we visually imagine the proverbial ostrich placing its head in the ground as a lion charges towards it from afar, we predict what the one future actuality will be. In other words, we predict what the future pertinent fact will be. That the lion will kill the ostrich is then a predicted fact (again, emphasis on predicted).

Addressing the issue of a relativity in which facts are changeable by beliefs and feelings, if the ostrich places its head in the sand, ceases to visually perceive the lion attacking, and then believes and feels that it is free from all future danger in regard to this lion due to what it believes to be the lion’s disappearance, does the charging lion actually/factually/objectively/truly/ontically disappear? [A strictly rhetorical question since we all know via a conflux of experience and reasoning that the lion does not factually disappear relative to the ostrich’s being at such a juncture.]

The same can then be applied to the issue of global warming (a more pressing, realistic, and complex scenario): do the facts of today which point to (and limit) what will occur in the future if we don’t counteract the danger (i.e., today’s facts by which we predict what the future facts will be given set of conditions Q) then ontically disappear were one to not believe that the stated facts of today are indeed factual?

Unlike the ostrich scenario, which concerns a single ostrich, the global warming scenario regards a populace that does not currently hold a unified stance (in this case, a global consensus) regarding the danger of global warming. So, to try to keep things simple via a different question, if person A believes in human caused global warming and person B believes that global warming is a hoax, will the future of this planet be different for the grandchildren of person A and person B … this at the same time? If (objective) reality (as compared to the intersubjective realities of cultures, etc.) is relative to beliefs and feelings, how does this resulting absurdity not obtain?

I hope this clarifies what I initially intended to express.

Then I don't really understand the idea. Facts do not need any sort of justification. They're simply the way that things are. That doesn't mean they're not relative (part of the way that things are is relative--for example, properties are relative to reference "points" (spatio-temporal points)). — Terrapin Station

Yet this eludes the very issue that I’m raising.

“Facts are simply the way that things are” means what in your own perspective? Is ‘the way that things are’ non-relative to beliefs and feelings (hence absolute as previously defined by me: “something not relative that nevertheless is regardless of beliefs and feelings”) or is it relative to beliefs and feelings (and thereby malleable by beliefs and feelings)?

The only facts that hinge on beliefs, feelings, etc. are facts of beliefs, feelings, etc. For example, the fact that Joe is sad that the Miami Heat weren't in the playoffs this year. — Terrapin Station

I myself don’t follow this. If, for example, it is a fact that Joe is sad (at time A, for greater clarity), then Joe being sad at time A is a state of affairs that ‘simply is the way it is’ regardless of what anyone might believe or feel about it … including what Joe might self-delude himself into believing (and remembering) at a subsequent time B.

... In which case, facts about beliefs, feelings, etc., are not malleable by beliefs, feelings, etc. (Assuming I'm interpreting this last quote correctly.)

Hey, my last post of the day. But I am curious to better understand your own position.

Funny, I’m not a correspondence theorist of truth only on grounds that for me truth is (pithily expressed) “fidelity to that which is objective reality" (hence making sense of semantics such as "the arrows aim was true" and "staying true to oneself"). Takes a lot for me to justify this position, and this isn’t the place for me to try; still, the point of this being: though I’m not a correspondence theorist of truth, to me the notions presented by correspondence theory become one necessary form that truth takes … this via fidelity to objective reality.

This off the beaten path view, however, requires that there be a state of affairs (physical, metaphysical, or both) that is absolute, i.e. not relative--namely, that of objective reality.

To avoid this whole notion of what truth is and what it stands in relation to (never mind the issue of objective reality), I intentionally first used the words “right (i.e., correct)” in my first post in this thread. Likewise with my last given question: I asked for means of justification for the addressed state of affairs—and not whether or not the state of affairs addressed was true.

So, no, I disagree with your interpretation of my latest question (in part due to our likely different, and slightly contradicting, understandings of truth—with your understanding likely not affirming anything non-relative to which truths stand in relation).

Instead, my latest question can better be interpreted as asking how one justifies facticity without reliance upon a notion of something absolute (with "absolute" here interpreted as "something not relative that nevertheless is regardless of beliefs and feelings").

[… But all this should be taken in the context of my first post on this thread to which you first replied. More succinctly expressing its contents: if facticity too is dependent upon beliefs and feelings, then do particular facts cease to be when people (and/or ostriches) don’t believe in them?]

Thank you for your own views, TS.

If you are upholding that facts are not relative to feelings and beliefs, but to themselves, how do you establish this to be the state of affairs—i.e., the fact of the matter—without also affirming that this appraisal is itself relative to your own beliefs and feelings?

[emphasis provided because that is the missing link I don't yet understand]

[...]Aren't natural sciences dealing only with things that are empirical; and all that is empirical is material?[...] — Samuel Lacrampe

Empiricism—arguably, much like Cynicism and Skepticism—no longer means in today’s popular culture what it initially meant. Empiricism—what the natural sciences are founded on—is rooted in experience. One nowadays has to invoke different terms—such as “experiential” or “experientialism”—to evoke the same semantics that gave rise to the notion of natural sciences. Empiricism as initially intended, then, addresses experiential knowns (as in, knowledge by acquaintance)—including those regarding matter—but is in no way limited to matter as a topic of interest.

You will find this in empiricists such as Lock and Hume, among others—although I haven’t yet read the works of Francis Bacon (an earlier empiricist who is credited as the father of the scientific method).

I’m with this post trying to better understand what the relativists actually uphold in regard to facticity.

… First, a current event: USA has recently pulled out of the Paris Climate Agreement, internationally leaving it in the sole company of Syria and Nicaragua (but Nicaragua is not part of the agreement due the agreement’s not going far enough to protect against global warming; so, imo, it’s a false positive).

Q1 (regarding concrete facts of the recent past): Is the facticity of just stated current event being right (i.e., correct) dependent on how people feel about it so being and their beliefs—such that the stated current event ceases in being a fact were individuals (and cohorts composed of these individuals) to not believe that this current event actually occurred?

Q2 (regarding predicted facts concerning the future): In relation to global warming, is the appraised factuality of its occurrence right (i.e., correct) in manners fully dependent upon what people believe and feel—such that, for one example, global warming would reach lethal levels for humanity (and a good number of other species) if unchecked only were all people of the world to believe and feel that it will? [Therefore: don’t believe in human caused global warming and global warming will cease to be a factual aspect of the world you inhabit.]

Q3 (regarding abstract generalities concerning factuality obtained via a hypothetical): If an ostrich were to place its head in a hole in the ground upon seeing a lion attacking, would the danger to the ostrich then vanish and thereby rescue the ostrich from being harmed?

Q4: If any of the aforementioned questions are answered with a “no”, how does the relativist justify the answer of “no” without relying upon some absolute? … such as that of objective reality, i.e. a reality that occurs regardless of the beliefs and feeling of individuals (and cohorts comprised of these)?

Yo, just wanted to say (Y)

Tell you what, I'll reply to your posts after you reply to mine. As a reminder:

you have yet to address whether or not dfjsl-ajf'ls are existent or not - and if existent, if they exist in the same way you do. — javra

The whole spacetime is present, [...] — litewave

Not according the to model of spacetime which breaks down and thereby leads to the inference of a gravitational singularity.

If by the "sum" you don't mean "collection" or "whole" but all existent things, then the "sum" is not a single thing but many things. And each of those things exists in the context of all the other things.

And if by the "sum" you mean the collection or whole of all existent things then this "sum" is different from each of its parts - because it is not identical to any of its parts, and so the sum is a thing that exists in relation to (or in the "context" of) its parts, which are other things. — litewave

I agree that the whole stands in relation to its parts. But I'm addressing context in the what I take to be the typically utilized way: such as that within which a given resides.

Anyway, there is no such greatest collection, just as there is no greatest number. — litewave

Are you saying there is no universe?

By that standard, mathematics, hunger, vision, and love don't. — T Clark

Ah, but these stated givens don’t exist because they were named. They were named, and conceptualized, because they exist. And no, one does not need to be a physicalist to uphold this. Note the following for instance:

[...] "The unnamable is the eternally real. [...] — T Clark

That which is eternally real is itself existent despite it being unnamable.

Besides, you have yet to address whether or not dfjsl-ajf'ls are existent or not - and if existent, if they exist in the same way you do.

Given a model of language where words are akin to culturally preformed boxed within which we can place concepts and then pass them along to others—this being only a very rough analogy—then naming a new concept can at times bring awareness of the concept into existence within the minds of others … as well as better anchor the concept within our own minds via a means by which it can be succinctly addressed.

But if I name a “five-legged, telepathic, ghost unicorn that’s been teleported to Earth by AI UFOs which have traveled back in time from a future multiverse in which planets are all shaped as four-sided triangles” as “dfjsl-ajf’l” my ontological suppositions are that this entity does not then suddenly pop into existence (in the narrow sense of existence, i.e. into the realms of objective reality). [Not to put words into other’s mouths but I presume that Banno would agree.] Yea, I try for humor but seldom succeed (seriously, good natured humor was intended in the given example). Still, the outlandish nature of “dfjsl-ajf’l”—thus defined—is all the same a good example precisely due to its outlandishness, imo.

p.s. just noticed Owen already replied to the same issue. I'll post my comments all the same.

If you take a more general definition of "context" you will find that the singularity of the Big Bang does have a context from which it is different. The context can be anything that is not the singularity of the Big Bang, for example my cat (which exists at a different point in spacetime) or number 7 (which transcends every spacetime). — litewave

These are adequate contexts in reference to our concept of a gravitational singularity, which stands out as one concept among many others. Were the gravitational singularity addressed to be ontically real, however, it of itself would have no context - no not-singularity to which it could be contrasted. Neither entities, such as cats, nor quantities, such as the number seven, would hold presence. Else, we are addressing two different things.

A collection of things (such as a cosmos) is also different from its parts, so the parts provide a context for the collection/whole. — litewave

The “cosmos” was for the purposes of the argument specifically defined as the “sum of all existents” - and not as merely a collection of things among many others. Then, to state that the context of the sum of all existents is the particular existents themselves is to equivocate both the meaning of “context” and the reasoning first quoted in my previous post. The context of a cat, for example, is not one of its ears.

noAxioms,

Sorry for the delay in replying. Getting back to where we left off:

How would you address this reasoning?: The background to the sum of all existents either exists or does not. If it exists in some way, it is contained within the sum of all existents. If it doesn’t exist in some way, then there is no background to the sum of all existents. Both conclusions result in there not being a background to the sum of all existents, aka to existence. — javra

Seems like pretty good reasoning at first glance, an argument for a lack of distinction.
But can we apply this logic to a horse? Against what background does the actual horse stand apart if the background doesn't exist? I pick horse because it might stand out against the nonexistent (in this world) unicorn. Does the unicorn need to be actual enough for the horse to stand apart from it, in which case the contradiction is unavoidable.
We need to find logic that works for the horse (an example we believe to understand a bit more clearly) before attempting to apply it elsewhere. — noAxioms

You’ll have to explain this better. The main crux that I don’t yet understand: how is a horse—which is one particular existent—in any way compare with the sum of all existent things? The argument I provided was for the latter; and I can’t yet make sense of how it could be meaningfully applied to the former (or to any particular existent for that matter).

Less pivotally, you’ve lost me with how a horse can be distinguished as such without it holding a background of not-horse; I’m thinking background in terms of shrubs, the sky, a tree or two, etc. But even an imagined or dreamed horse will have some background that is itself distinguishable as such … no? Then again, say you try your hardest to visually imagine a horse with no background; let me know if you can visually imagine this such that there is no color or shade of grey, white, or black to this not-horse realm. I know I can’t. Which isn’t to say that I can’t focus my attention on the imagined horse such that the non-horse background is not payed attention to; but this non-horse area will still be relatively dark, or light, or something. This not-horse realm is then a background to the visually imagined horse.

As regards the remainder of the exchange, I’ll try to better express my own outlook:

There’s being in and of itself and then there’s things that sand out in one way or another—or, to be more up to date with the thread, things that have a context. Both givens with being and things that have a context are existents, but while being encapsulates all things with a context—such that all things with a context are—not all forms of being are things with a context.

To hopefully better phrase a previously given example: A gravitational singularity from which the Big Bang resulted (this as is modeled by todays mainstream physics) is one such instance of a given with being that is not a thing with context. One way of putting it: if the Big Bang resulted from absolute nonbeing, then it was an ex nihilo effect. Allowing for such can result in metaphysical mayhem if one is to be consistent about what one upholds—which is one strong justification for the very old philosophical proposition that “nothing can come from nothing” (maybe a different issue though, this were there to be disagreements with this outlook on ex nihilo effects). On the other hand, as our models of spacetime break down the further we conceptually move back through the Big Bang, we are left with the alternative that there initially existed a state of being devoid of both space and time. This state of being is conventionally conceived to be a gravitational singularity … which, by its very nature, can only be devoid of context, though nevertheless holding being.

But, getting back to the reasoning first offered for the sum of all existents, let “the sum of all that exists” be here termed the cosmos. If one wants to uphold multiple universes, then the cosmos would encapsulate all these multiple universes. Thus defined, I still find it justifiable to uphold that the cosmos can only exists in terms of being per se but does not exist in terms of a thing with context. The existence of things with context is a product of pertaining to the cosmos as one of its many parts, imo.

In retrospect, though, I’m arguing from a point of view not very sympathetic to there actually being multiple physical universes. If you’re leading enquiry is into how our universe’s existence compares to those of other universes, this is something that I’m not qualified to comment on.

Well, it's that background I'm seeking I think. I'm not so sure about a necessary lack of one. — noAxioms

How would you address this reasoning?: The background to the sum of all existents either exists or does not. If it exists in some way, it is contained within the sum of all existents. If it doesn’t exist in some way, then there is no background to the sum of all existents. Both conclusions result in there not being a background to the sum of all existents, aka to existence.

Actuality is a property of a temporal tulip object. The universe cannot be actual in this way. — noAxioms

I think the following supports this quoted conclusion:

Looking at things from a solely physical perspective, the Big Bang is inferred to have resulted from a volume-less gravitational singularity (both space and time began with the Big Bang, so, before the Big Bang there was no space: the gravitational singularity is then volume-less, or space-less [as well as timeless; a different issue though] … hence neither incredibly small nor incredibly big, for both these are contingent upon the existence of space). The more mainstream of modern physics—excluding suppositions such as those of QM MW and M-theory—infers the "Boundless" in the physical form (if it can be termed “form”) of a gravitational singularity. There’s lots of evidence for the Big Bang, and all this evidence points to a volume-less state of being that preceded it (in which all the energy of the universe was contained).

This volume-less gravitational singularity, then, does not exist in the manner that a tulip does. Yet, assuming it to be objectively real, it nevertheless is (or was), thereby physically existing in a manner other than the physical existence of a tulip.

I’m far less confident in upholding what I’ve heard from documentaries about the known universe of today (sorry, I don’t recall which documentaries): that the universe is inferred to have no center and no circumference. Nevertheless, were this to be objectively real, the same roundabout issue of existence would apply to the physical universe as it is today: there is distance from one tulip to another, or from one galaxy to another, but there is no distance regarding the whole. If so the universe (as everything that is) physically exists in a manner other than that in which any physical item exists as a part of the universe.

... It’s why I invoked the concept of existence as presence. Such would apply to the singularity, the universe, and the tulip. But only the tulip exists as something that is distinguishable from some background; the singularity and the universe do not exist in this latter sense ... I would still argue.

...a kind of panpsychism that asserts thought as possible mode of matter. — Cavacava

Interesting way of putting it. No, you’re right, this approach need not be contradictory. I get bogged down in the details, though. And, as I expressed previously, when push comes to shove I’ll uphold the metaphysical primacy of awareness (and will) over all other perspectives.

Yes, I’m not big on Descartes’ proof of God either, nor with much of his metaphysics, for that matter.

As to nature following the structure of though … my own tendency is to think that what we term laws of thought - such as that of noncontradiction (X cannot be not-X in both the same way and at the same time) - manifests within our thoughts as they manifest in nature at large, of which our minds are a product of. I strongly disagree with the nature vs. human intellect divide that many metaphysics uphold, Cartesianism very much included among these.

Oddly enough, though, I have a large intuitive bias against panpsychism. I can’t yet make sense of it. I can barely make sense of a plant’s awareness … even though I’m thoroughly confident that plants are endowed with it in some manner. When it gets to some form of very diffused awareness that rocks, molecules, atoms, quarks, etc. could be endowed with, I have no idea of what this could possibly mean. Its only when I start thinking of the universe (our uni-logos in the Stoic sense of Logos … so to speak; i.e., our common, singular, objective reality) as adhering to what we term laws of thought—such as that of noncontradiction—that I start feeling that there might be a logical bridge to some form of pan-something, this in relation to the awareness we sentient beings hold. Not anticipating that all this will be agreed with (assuming that it makes good enough sense as written), but wanted to share.

Anyway, thanks for the feedback.

So yea, there is an objective "fact of the matter", it existed prior to us, and I don't see a reason to suppose this independence has changed because we appeared on the scene. — Cavacava

Though a bit off-topic, I wanted to comment:

I’m on board with the general perspective you’ve mentioned: namely, that what our collective, most impartial views and inferences inform us of is that live evolved from out of nonlife (though more complex, it’s akin to the inference that the moon has a far side). Nevertheless, if metaphysics is to be understood as a study of being at large as abstraction, this rather than the study of physical being as concrete particulars (such as the study of the nature of causation rather than arriving at concluding inferences of particulars drawn from uncontemplated notions of what causation is) … then there can be found reasons to uphold a metaphysical (though not necessarily physical) primacy of awareness. Will anyone honestly contend that the presence of awareness is not itself an objective fact of our existence? How does the strength of this experiential objective fact then compare with the strength of any inference concerning our physical objective reality—this when the two propositions are compared side by side and are to any extent contradictory? I’m here intentionally avoiding an argument for the metaphysical primacy of awareness on epistemological grounds, though I do intend to allude to at least some means in which this conclusion can be obtained (and, though you and me would be implicated in this metaphysical primary of awareness, the latter is not about you or me as individual beings [unless one desires to uphold the vacuous dogma of solipsism]).

As to the resulting apparent contradiction: what can I say? There currently appears to be a contradiction between a metaphysical primacy of awareness and life evolving from nonlife; but, as with many paradoxes, philosophically resolving this paradox in a manner harmonious to the truths of both sides could bring us closer to deeper truths about our universe and ourselves. My current ballpark guesstimation—to present a rough idea of what I’m entertaining—is that awareness can become more diffuse as it can also become more acute and of greater magnitude (e.g., the awareness of a bacterium is vastly more diffuse than the awareness of a human); in some ways parallel to pansemiosis, it could then be feasible that awareness at its most diffused extreme consists of nonlife.

But again, despite these apparent incongruities, there are indeed reasons to uphold the metaphysical primacy of awareness. When push comes to shove, these reasons take precedence, imo.

javra, getting to yours. I too have finite time to digest it all. — noAxioms

Hey, no worries.

Been thinking about this some more: potential categories of existence and inexistence. You’re right, it’s a hefty topic … one I’m still muddling my way through. But I’ll wait for your replies to see where the discussion is going.

No, the U is arbitrary, and usually means all that stuff I see, and all the rest that is implied by it. The far side of the moon exists despite the lack of its direct accessibility to any of my five senses. — noAxioms

This delineation, however, does a disservice to the form of realism that noAxioms wants to uphold: one that does away with all possible notions of idealism. Because this definition of U depends on awareness in order to hold, it opens doors to idealistic notions.

Since the concept of objectivity has been used, maybe the crux of the problem can be formulated in terms of defining (via awareness) what an awareness-devoid objectivity is—this in the abstract sense, and not in the concrete sense, such as in a physical world predating the existence of physical life. By extension, resolving this would then serve to resolve what an awareness-devoid (hence, objective, in this sense of the word) existence of U consists of. Otherwise, the concept of objectivity becomes entwined with notions of awareness such as those of impartiality; such as where the confirmation biases of aware beings become optimally minimal as regards that which is concluded. This philosophical impartiality applying both to what can be made directly available to awareness as well as to what is inferred from the data of our direct awareness—e.g., the inference that the far side of the moon exists. (Both means of interpreting objectivity can result in an objective physical reality that is regardless of what any awareness might want to make of it—but the latter approach becomes amenable to some forms of idealism, namely those that incorporate the notion of an objective (or, 100% impartial/selfless) reality.)

From the OP:

But my question is more about what distinguishes this universe from a nonexistent one. — noAxioms

It could help out to better pinpoint what is intended by the term “existence”. For example, as mentioned in Wikipedia, existence can be classified into the “wide” and the “narrow” sense. In the wide sense of existence, anything that holds any type of being (or presence) can be stated to exist. Figments of the imagination, such as fictional characters, then exist in the wide sense. In the narrow sense, only that which pertains to objective reality (but see the aforementioned for different approaches to what this could imply) can be stated to exist. Harry Potter, then, does not exist in the narrow sense. Then questions can be posed such as the following: does QM MW exist in the narrow sense, or only in the wide sense?

As a related example, existence could either entail the set of “that which is distinguishable from some background” (this being in line with the literal translation of “standing out”) or the set of “that which holds any sort of presence” (e.g., hypothesizing the Buddhist notion of Nirvana, the state of Nirvana would only exist in the latter sense and not the former). The universe—here presuming it equivalent with everything that exists in the wide sense—can be argued to not exist in the first sense just mentioned: it has no background against which it can be distinguished. This conception of the universe, then, can be argued to exist only in the second sense just mentioned. To me this implies that U can exist only as a member of itself. The only way I can find to avoid this conclusion is to grant existence in the wide sense a background of nothingness (also in the wide sense)—but, then, it seems that this would endow nothingness in the wide sense with substantial presence: thereby making nothingness too an aspect of existence in the wide sense. Hence, again leading to the conclusion that set U can exist only as a member of itself.

Otherwise, it can be stated--as another example--that this universe exists in the narrow sense by standing apart from all other universes which exist a) only in the wide sense (but not the narrow) or b) in the narrow sense but in some way that is different from this universe. (I'm in favor of upholding there being only one universe, though.)

[Work has me fairly busy nowadays (not a bad thing), so I don’t know how I’ll do with follow up posts if replied to.]

The evidence is that life did not physically exist on earth. How do you know that life did not come from somewhere other than earth? — Metaphysician Undercover

MU, I’ve already addressed this possibility. The following is from what I previously posted to you:

[...] Then we have no physical evidence of life on Earth prior to this. How did this Precambrian life on Earth appear? One could extrapolate a meteor or comet of some type which brought it over to Earth from somewhere else. But, even then, given the history of the universe which physics attests to, there was a time in the history of the universe when life was not possible … such as before the atoms required for organic molecules existed.

Due to this evidence, I uphold that physical life evolved from nonlife. But again, not due to or via a system of physicalism. — javra

So the question I last placed stands despite us not knowing whether or not life first - else, independently - appeared on planet Earth.

All very valid. Yet why should it be proscribed to refer to the underlying concepts I’ve so far addressed —which have been addressed in due context—as one possible type of intersubjective reality?

If someone is unaware of some intent to control them by some other group, does that make their choices voluntary? — Harry Hindu

A difficult question, but I’ll offer that our choices under such circumstances are nevertheless voluntary—at least as a general rule.

If I like Vermeer paintings and the “manipulator” wants me to approach X—with X being in the manipulator’s long-term advantage and not in my own—then my approaching the Vermeer poster on a wall (let’s say) doesn’t of itself become less voluntary--nor is there lost any of the aesthetic value/truth I find in the illustration (i.e., nor does my motive in so approaching become in any way wrong). This even though my decision to approach the given wall now gets me trapped, impoverished, killed, or whatever.

I find the same often occurs with manipulation at the level of masses. For one example, the democratic ideal being a good could—at least hypothetically speaking—be used to ensnare us as masses into utterly non-democratic social structures of politics and economy (such as via Orwellian propaganda). With all the various context-specific details of this hypothetical overlooked, at the end of the day, one’s volition to uphold democratic ideals shouldn’t in and of itself be interpreted by us as itself an act of manipulation … hence as an activity that we now ought to denounce (thereby getting us to no longer uphold the ideals of democracy).

Since no one is omniscient, we can all become manipulated by that which we voluntarily choose. This, at least, in principle. Our choices are nevertheless voluntary. And just because we can be tricked via our choices by others does not then mandate that the motives for our choices were, in and of themselves, wrong.

Having presented that side of the coin, there is also the other side in which greater wisdom in discernment better prevents us from being manipulated into ends we do not seek. We manipulate fish into being caught on fishing lines; this does not make the fish’s biting of food which we alone know to be bait no longer voluntary; but, obviously, were the fish endowed with greater wisdom of discernment, it would stand a lesser chance of being so caught. (It’s an offbeat analogy—but it does illustrate this other side of the coin somewhat.)

That there was a time on earth when there was no life, prior to the time that there was life, is not evidence that life developed from non-life. — Metaphysician Undercover

What alternative(s) are there to explain life’s appearance given a time when life did not physically exist?

Intersubjective: of, or pertaining to, the common interpretation of context which presupposes communication between individuals. — Galuchat

As per wiktionary, it can also mean: (1) Involving or occurring between separate conscious minds. (2) Accessible to or capable of being established for two or more subjects.

In academia, the term has any number of related definitions. And it is in the wiktionary sense that I’ve addressed it. If you disagree with wiktionary's definition, a) why do you find wiktionary mistaken, and b) what term do you then sponsor to address the two meanings wiktionary offers?