↪javra
rubbish. — Banno

Is what your reply is. You all of a sudden conflate ontology and epistemology as thought there would be no difference whatsoever between them. And then, instead of giving a reasoned answer to the question placed, reply with what essentially equates to an emotivist "boo".

Yea, rubbish. (I can be emotive too, don't you know.)

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Saying this at large and not to Banno:

If not yet amply clear, the Principle of Sufficient Reason no more entails the necessitarianism of causal determinism than it does there being a "first cause" - which is nil. This as per the previously mentioned example of how tychism (i.e., ontic randomness) in a game of soccer can well occur within a cosmos wherein the PSR applies - as it only can for those who maintain any coherent form of rationality.

Why? — Banno

This very question - the act of asking and expecting a cogent answer or else refusing the offered premise - entails and screams out the underlying presumption of the PSR. Else, there'd be no reason to ask.

The movement of an electron to the right instead of to the left is inexplicable, and yet the world has not ended, explanations have not collapsed.

You seem to think that one absent reason implies that there can be no reasons at all. Why? Prima facie that just does not follow. — Banno

What I've done is provide a reason for the Principle at hand, and not purport to thereby know the reasons for each and every last occurrence that is, has been, or will be. An extremely major difference in scope.

In sum of what ought to not be so readily overlooked, in theoretical principle only, if so much as one occurrence can occur and/or cease occurring in manners devoid of any determinants and hence reasons, then:

• By what means can you conclude that the occurrence or disappearance of anything whatsoever is not in fact the same feat of pure nonsense (here, "pure nonsense" being shorthand for an event that holds no determinants, and hence reasons for occurring, whatsoever)?

The supposed principle is let down by three ambiguities. "What is it that it seeks to explain?" "What counts as sufficient?" And "What counts as a reason?". — Banno

A reason is an “aitia”: an account of why, irrespective of the type of account it would be: e.g., causal, teleological, constitutional, or else formal. More technically, one could also address a reason as an account of what determinants (again, irrespective of type, as per the aforementioned examples) in part or in whole determined that addressed – thereby being the reason for the presence or occurrence or being of that addressed.

What is sought to be explained is whatever exists, in particular or in general, in the abstract or in the concrete – this in the present, in the past, in the future, or else atemporally (with natural laws being a possible example of the latter type of existence, this if they indeed never change throughout all of time (not my own point of view but all the same)).

“Sufficient” specifies the following when it comes to causes:

Sufficient causes
If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the subsequent occurrence of y. However, another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the prior occurrence of x.[20] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality#Necessary_and_sufficient_causes

... here, replace "cause" with "reason" and remove the implied necessity that the determinant precedes that which it determines (this not being the case for final causes, material causes, or formal causes). The meaning of "sufficient" will then remain the same for the context of "sufficient reason".

If the PSR does not apply, then at least some occurrences can occur and cease occurring in manners utterly devoid of any conceivable determinants – this irrespective of appearances and beliefs to the contrary, for the latter too could of themselves then be events that hold no conceivable determinants for being or ceasing to be. If this were to in fact be the case, then, quite rationally, the only cogent conclusion is that all epistemology would eventually implode when analyzed: There would then be no means of establishing what, if anything, occurs via some determinants rather than occurring in manners that are utterly “magical” - to use the pejorative meaning of the word. No justification would then rationally hold any water or carry any weight – for that which constitutes the justification could itself in fact be devoid of any substance and, hence, not capable of justifying anything. There could then be no declarative truth, which relies upon justifiability. And there could then be no grounded knowledge or understanding of any sort regarding reality or any aspect of it.

If the PSR does apply, then epistemologies can hold, and thereby knowledge and understanding of what is in fact real and what is not. As too can tychism then cogently hold: the randomness of some events too here will have their reasons, i.e. explanations: for one relatively easy to express example of this, the degree of randomness, if any, in a soccer game’s outcome will be determined by the skill of the respective team members of each team, with each team’s actions being of itself in large part teleologically determined by the final cause – here, more specifically, aim – of winning the addressed game.

To chose against the PSR is to shoot oneself in the foot in terms of reasoning, philosophy, knowledge, and the like. Or, at best, is to revert to a literal interpretation of "it is so because I so state it is" - which is not any better.

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That offered, the PSR says nothing about there needing to be a first cause to all that is – existence could just as conceivably be devoid of any ascertainable beginning, with our current physical universe being only the latest iteration an any number of prior Big Bounces or the like – to not even start on the PSR saying nothing about the notion of a grand omni-this-and-that “designer” deity.

So why on earth would someone explore deeply into their tradition of inherited norms to determine how to best act? It would arise from a respect of tradition and a recognition of the successes such a tradition has previously yielded. — Hanover

I've acknowledged the importance of tradition previously via the Crane quote.

But this then can raise the question of whether - for one example currently pertinent to the ethics of the US populace - such a thing as Christian Nationalism's desire to hold onto its Christian traditions ethically outweighs the very teachings of Jesus Christ himself - the latter, more often than not, stand in direct contradiction to the ethos of the former. A Christianity that holds no respect for what its official founder honored and desired ... sounds exceedingly vacuous - as something that JC's spirit might itself be utterly antagonistic to and angry about - at least to me.

And then you have various other traditions from all over the world, Judaic, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Inuit, and so on; none of which can cohabitate peacefully were each tradition to vie for a power over all others, this so as to remain in no way altered by any other, believing itself the sacred pinnacle around which all of life and sacredness and morality revolves.

Via examples such as these I then uphold that: Yes, tradition of course has its importance, but it ought not be the be-all and end-all to ethics and ethical conduct, very much including in relation to the so called "righteousness of rules".

To use previously addressed concepts and terminology: tradition does not of itself equate to that which is the Good - also addressed as "God" by some - and tradition, irrespective of what it might be, can only be good when it is aligned with the latter.

So when we have lots of crises with human induced climate change, we might learn to deal with it, eventually. — unenlightened

One can only hope. But it is certain not to happen devoid of involvement, and maybe even commitment, on the part of most members of humanity in sharing at the very least this common cause. And, although the details might be lacking, such can only then signify a global governance of one form or another. May it indeed be one of moral rectitude.

I of course grant a good portion of what you say. Yet to my knowledge there are many variants of Judaism, with Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform branches being only very general examples of these. And if we for further example go back into antiquity, prior to the Maccabean Revolt, there were great sums of Hellenized Jews in Judeia.

As to the first question as to how one would not make the two compatible, would be someone who accepted a very strict divine command theory, where textual support or reference to oral tradition is analyzed for the rule one is to follow.

That tends to be the approach of orthodox Judaism, as an example. — Hanover

Slightly bringing this back into the purview of the general notion of the Good / the One: Kabbalah teachings, including those of the tree of life, are pivoted upon the Ein Sof - which holds the very same attributes as the Good (as previously discussed in this thread). This says it better than I can:

Ein Sof, or Eyn Sof (/eɪn sɒf/, Hebrew: אֵין סוֹף‎ ʾēn sōf; meaning "infinite", lit. '(There is) no end'), in Kabbalah, is understood as God before any self-manifestation in the production of any spiritual realm, probably derived from Solomon ibn Gabirol's (c.1021–c.1070) term, "the Endless One" (שֶׁאֵין לוֹ תִּקְלָה šeʾēn lo tiqlā). Ein Sof may be translated as "unending", "(there is) no end", or infinity.[1] It was first used by Azriel of Gerona (c. 1160 – c. 1238), who, sharing the Neoplatonic belief that God can have no desire, thought, word, or action, emphasized by the negation of any attribute. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ein_Sof

This then being - or at least gives all indication of being - the very same ontic reality interpreted via different filters of culture and reasoning.

I know it can get complex, but this reference for example illustrates that the Kabbalah and Orthodox Judaism are by no means two separate belief systems. Nor does the Kabbalah seem to in any way be a fringe system of beliefs in respect to Judaism at large, including when considering Orthodox Judaism.

Here, then, there appears to be a good amount of theological reasoning involved in relation to the nature of God and reality to total - and this in respect to Orthodox Judaism.

It so far feels like you are unfairly pigeonholing most of what Judaism consists of.

While this last suggestion might seem odd, it does to some degree describe the Judaic view, where faith in the existence of God is really not all that important from a daily living or eternal reward perspective. What is important is knowing the rule, studying the rule and following the rule. Faith, under this system, is in the righteousness of the rule, not in the existence of God himself. But always most important in not what you beleive and why you believe, but what you do. — Hanover

This is very easy to say, but exceedingly difficult to in any way comprehend. Should one understand that "duty and adherence" to "the righteousness of the rule" is done for no reason, motive, whatsoever? Unless what one addresses are automata - rather than sentient people - this can only be utter nonsense. And if there is some motive for so doing, this motive has nothing to do with "the existence reality of God" playing an important role in "a daily living or eternal reward benefit perspective"??? What other plausible reason could there be for "the righteousness of the rule"?

The idea does bug me, the thought that if it's all just chemicals then there would be no real reason to not plug into it. What difference is there if we can just replicate everything? — Darkneos

The same roundabout question can be asked in alternative means, such as: Would you willingly undergo a lobotomy knowing that the lobotomy will make you perpetually pleased with all aspects of life in general, this irrespective of what might happen to you, even if the lobotomy entails you becoming generally oblivious via the operation?

I’ll make the following hypothesis: The reason we wouldn’t willingly lobotomize ourselves or else place ourselves into a perpetual “experience machine” (were the latter possible) for the sake of obtaining optimal pleasure or happiness has a lot to do with our inherent nature – even if we’re not consciously aware of it – specifically, an inherent nature where we (or at least a majority of us) value reality, thereby that which is in fact actual, and conformity to such, thereby truth, above all else.

Why then would we so value reality and, hence, truth? Maybe because we tacitly (if not also unconsciously) know with dire – although unspoken – conviction that only reality and truth thus understood can bring about our optimal happiness and wellbeing, aka our optimal eudemonia - such that here our eudemonia is not false, illusory, and thereby eventually results in our unwanted pains and suffering. And this unspoken desire then reigns supreme in our multitude of desires irrespective of the obstacles and strifes that might dwell on the way to approaching this pristine reality and one’s conformity to, ultimately maybe unity with, it.

I grant that this hypothesis is not easy to logically establish. That it in many a way transcends the convictions of physicalism - which, after all, gives little if any understanding of the reality of meaning itself. And that many, in in fact holding this very desire, prefer to consciously give up on it rather than endure the unpleasantries of living with this desire perpetually unfulfilled. Thereby arriving at affirmed conclusions such as that there is no meaning to anything: something which can pacify an otherwise unfulfilled desire and what might best be described as the suffering associated with this lack of fulfillment.

That said, were this offered hypothesis to be more accurate than not, then of course we would not choose to lobotomize ourselves, or else permanently plug into an experience machine, for so doing would remove us from closer proximity to a better grasping of this very nature of reality, of what is in fact actual … this being where, given the addressed hypothesis, the only genuine form of optimal eudemonia can be found – an optimal eudemonia that, again, is in large part constituted of optimal understanding (and hence meaning) regarding that which is real and true.

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I won’t endeavor to here “prove” this proposed hypothesis: it’s by no means something easy to do, and most certainly impossible in soundbite forum form. Nevertheless, the hypothesis does answer the question of why we (typically) don’t do things such as desire to lobotomize ourselves or else enter the unrealities of an experience machine – this irrespective of the prospective pleasures such might promise and possibly accomplish.

I should add that, in the absence of this hypothesis, I have not answer to give for why one ought not, for one example, lobotomize oneself, or else choose to perpetually remain in a virtual reality.

I don't wish to derail the thread unless you think this an interesting question, but I'd point to the Athens/Jerusalem distinction that asks to what extent reason (the Athens approach) should play in theological discussions versus duty and adherence (the Jerusalem approach). — Hanover

This raises the question: If not "duty and adherence" to that which is accordant with "reason" (which ought not be confused with a strict adherence to today's formal logics), then "duty and adherence" in respect to what?

I maintain hopefully not a "duty and adherence" to that which is thereby utterly unreasonable in all respects.

Basically, I don't find "reason" and "duty and adherence" to be in any way antagonistic but, instead, to require each other - and this rather intimately - within the context of theological discussions. This if any semblance of theological truth is to be approached.

Then, of course, there's the issue of traditions in respect to theological issues. And, in this regard, who's to deny the presence of truth in the following - be one an atheist, a theist, or something other:

Tradition, thou art for suckling children,
Thou art the enlivening milk for babes;
But no meat for men is in thee.
Then --
But, alas, we all are babes. — Stephen Crane

As I've previously mentioned, I'm agnostic about the Trinity - not being a Christian myself, although I admire JC a great deal in multiple ways. That said, I very much like your perspectives regarding the topic.

Or there is the view in Ferdinand Ulrich of being itself being fundamentally "gift." — Count Timothy von Icarus

In the ambiguities of the English language - which I find work wonders for poetical expressions and compositions - I often enough indulge in the double sense of the term "the present". Such that to live in the present becomes in part understood as to live in the gift. This quote reminds me of this.

Clearly neither of you understand the prisoner's dilemma. You, the prisoner, cannot "create incentives", you have to rely on each other's solidarity - or not. — unenlightened

I concur with

But if you’re going to get all technical about it, the most interesting part of the prisoner’s dilemma game theory is in discovery of those strategies that outcompete others within iterated versions of the original game theory:

Interest in the iterated prisoner's dilemma was kindled by Robert Axelrod in his 1984 book The Evolution of Cooperation, in which he reports on a tournament that he organized of the N-step prisoner's dilemma (with N fixed) in which participants have to choose their strategy repeatedly and remember their previous encounters. Axelrod invited academic colleagues from around the world to devise computer strategies to compete in an iterated prisoner's dilemma tournament. The programs that were entered varied widely in algorithmic complexity, initial hostility, capacity for forgiveness, and so forth.

Axelrod discovered that when these encounters were repeated over a long period of time with many players, each with different strategies, greedy strategies tended to do very poorly in the long run while more altruistic strategies did better, as judged purely by self-interest. He used this to show a possible mechanism for the evolution of altruistic behavior from mechanisms that are initially purely selfish, by natural selection.

The winning deterministic strategy was tit for tat, developed and entered into the tournament by Anatol Rapoport. It was the simplest of any program entered, containing only four lines of BASIC,[10] and won the contest. The strategy is simply to cooperate on the first iteration of the game; after that, the player does what his or her opponent did on the previous move.[11] Depending on the situation, a slightly better strategy can be "tit for tat with forgiveness": when the opponent defects, on the next move, the player sometimes cooperates anyway, with a small probability (around 1–5%, depending on the lineup of opponents). This allows for occasional recovery from getting trapped in a cycle of defections.

After analyzing the top-scoring strategies, Axelrod stated several conditions necessary for a strategy to succeed:[12]

Nice: The strategy will not be the first to defect (this is sometimes referred to as an "optimistic" algorithm[by whom?]), i.e., it will not "cheat" on its opponent for purely self-interested reasons first. Almost all the top-scoring strategies were nice.[a]
Retaliating: The strategy must sometimes retaliate. An example of a non-retaliating strategy is Always Cooperate, a very bad choice that will frequently be exploited by "nasty" strategies.
Forgiving: Successful strategies must be forgiving. Though players will retaliate, they will cooperate again if the opponent does not continue to defect. This can stop long runs of revenge and counter-revenge, maximizing points.
Non-envious: The strategy must not strive to score more than the opponent. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner's_dilemma#Axelrod's_tournament_and_successful_strategy_conditions

In summary, altruistic heuristics that retain a sense of justice – with the “tit for tat with forgiveness” program exemplifying this – do best long-term, outcompeting all other strategies that can be employed in this particular game theory. Learned of this back in university days. To me, it's a rather nifty empirical means of addressing theoretical issues of ethics - ethics which, lo and behold, turn out to have their pragmatic advantages long-term.

That said, such altruistic heuristics are something direly missing in most of today’s politics, especially in regard to climate change. As just one notable example, the Kyoto Protocol is long gone now, and an abject failure precisely due to the lack of such strategies.

I think the standard Patristic response here would be to object to the literal reading of Scripture. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In case it wasn't obvious, I'm in agreement with this. Still, interpolations of all sorts have been made galore, and some of these become dogma at expense of others being then deemed heretical. Aside from which, it is relatively typical for most to treat scripture as God's word, however interpreted, rather than the words of fallible humans, some of which were bound to be more aligned with the Good than others - such that the others here addressed might have been less than honest with themselves in terms of what is and is not known.

At any rate, my last post was an attempt to exemplify the implications of the previously given post. Such that the Good being utterly nondualistic and finite-less understanding, hence awareness, which serves as ground for all existence and existents cannot logically be any deity - this irrespective of the nature of the deity addressed - but which nevertheless teleologically moves the deity(ies) specified (this were deities to be in any way existent or else occurring) via either their free will guided affinities toward the Good or their free will guided aversions to it (e.g., by deeming the Good a falsehood, thereby being a false promise, thereby being an incorrect and hence wrong appraisal of what is real which, as such, can only result in both short and long-term suffering - this as can be exemplified in the conviction that love always leads to suffering or else in laughter at love, peace, and understanding).

In short, though, my last post attempted to exemplify that the Good as God cannot be a deity (but, instead, can only be that to which deities we can label "good" are teleologically aligned to - this much in the same way that relatively selfless or non-self-centered humans are more teleologically aligned to the Good than relatively selfish humans are).

All this being in keeping with your description of the One / the Good as:

The One is not, as it were, unconscious, rather all things belong to it and are in it and with it, it is completely self-discerning, life is in it and all things are in it, and its intellection of itself is itself and exists by a kind of self-consciousness in eternal rest and in an intellection different from the intellection of the Intellect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And this as an ultimate telos rather than a deity (that for example sees and judges what we do as other) which, as such, is the only end that is not a means to any other - and which, as ultimate telos, thereby both awaits and at all times accompanies. And in this roundabout respect can then be stated to be omnibenevolent without any hypocrisy.

I'm not really sure what "I-ness" is supposed to mean here, or why a "deity" is defined by it. To refer to my earlier point, these notions have long been theological orthodoxy in the traditional churches, but have not been seen as precluding that God is God. God is impassible, eternal, immutable, not a being, simple, unlimited, etc. and this is precisely why God is God. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'll say this as an agnostic in relation to the reality of the Trinity, but here is an example of how the aforementioned could be rationally accounted for within Christian contexts, here treating the issue of the Trinity more from a comparative religions view point wherein the Good is presumed to be real, this rather then relying on dogma or any particular authority:

Instead of assuming that the Father is an omni-creator Lord which walks the earth (logically contrary to be omnipresence), which is upset by the doings of the serpent, Eve, and Adom (logically contrary to omniscience and omnipotence), and who thereby curses them all and the generations that will follow with animosity and suffering (logically contrary to omnibenevolence), assume that the Father is Elohim, the “We” of Genisis I, which is commonly understood as a plurality of beings all unified … here assume unified in their affinity and proximity to the Good (which could under certain interpretations be understood as the ineffable G-d). (Granted, in so assuming, the Lord of Gensis II onwards is then potentially be a being which formerly partook of Elohim but then presumed himself to be the entirety of, or else the superlative pinnacle of, divinity – this then being contrary to alignment toward the Good. Here echoing certain Gnostic interpretations wherein JC is conceived as an embodiment of the serpent’s spirit which, as such, attempted to bring knowledge of right (i.e., the Good) and wrong to all, this being contra the Gnostic Demiurge’s wants.)

So the Father is here presumed to be the unified plurality of celestial beings which addresses itself in Genesis I as “We”, the same which says let there be light (presumably, awareness of the Good) in a time of darkness.

Next presume JC to be in some spiritual sense unified with Elohim, this in terms of understanding, knowledge, awareness at large – such as could occur given henosis.

Next presume the Holy Spirit to be – rather than some who knows what thing or ghost – something at least akin to what C.S. Peirce termed Agapism: the universal process of agape via which universal evolution works, here, ultimately, toward a universal realization of the Good.

Then, given these presumptions, there is plenty of possibility for a logically sound Trinity to occur – wherein Elohim, JC, and the Holy Spirit, though sperate in their own right, unify into the same deity, the same identity of I-ness which addresses itself as “We”. However unfathomable such a deity might be, it as deity would yet remain extremely aligned and proximate to the Good (more Abrahamically, to G-d), the latter being a non-deity. And this rather than being the Good (else G-d) itself. The trinity will yet be endowed with some dualism, such as being other than that which is wrong (in an Abrahamic sense, call such Satan), or else in terms of hearing and responding to prayers. Whereas the Good (G-d) – that to which the Trintiy is the unfathomably proximate - will yet be perfectly nondualistic in all respects.

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Again, I’m agnostic about the Trinity’s reality. And I am not myself a Christian, in that I acknowledge truths in many another religion out there. Traditional interpretations, dogmas, and notions of heresy aside, I so far find that this understanding of the trinity – when allowing for the ontic occurrence of celestial beings – becomes fully cogent in manners devoid of all logical contradictions.

And, due to the wide ranging potential audience of this forum, I’ll add to the aforementioned another honest opinion: there is no reason or need to believe in celestial beings of any kind in order to uphold the ontic reality of the Good – one could just as well be a naturalistic pantheist and do so, as just one example to this effect.

A footnote: the philosophical term is 'ipseity' — Wayfarer

Sure, but I wanted to be as easy to understand as possible; and ipseity of itself tmk does not address the easy to overlook dichotomy between the a) pure/transcendental ego which is the knower of self and b) the empirical ego which is the self thus known.

I saw that in the sayings of the Advaita sage Ramana Maharishi, that he would frequently draw attention to the bibical God's proclamation of His identity "I AM THAT I AM" (Ex 3:14). This, he equated with the Self as the ultimate (or only) reality. — Wayfarer

Here again, though, it would only be the self as pure/transcendental ego rather than the self as the empirical ego which could be cogently understood as the "ultimate (or only) reality". El, then, would be aligned and proximate to the pure form of this ultimate reality, such as via henosis, but - by virtue of proclaiming something to someone other - could not be this ultimate reality, i.e. the Good, itself, for the Good is utterly nondualistic and devoid of any finitude (etc.) in all respects.

And, then, one could potentially interpret the pure/transcendental ego as being in keeping with no-self (this in the complete absence of an empirical ego - as the Good necessitates by virtue of being nondualistic in any manner), this as per Buddhist doctrine in relation to the issue of self.

ps. Thereby resulting in the interpretation of the Good being an utterly and literally selfless state of infinite being - one which the relative selflessness of human beings better approximates in comparison to relatively selfish human beings.

By no means, the supposition that being "the ground of being" makes God irrelevant or impotent or both (or somehow absolutely nothing like "God") was made by many posters in this thread. I wasn't even thinking of anything you mentioned. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Alright. Got it. Slightly embarrassingly, my bad presumption, then.

I wouldn't call this arational though, [...]" — Count Timothy von Icarus

Hmm, I call the Good arational because it is the only actuality for which there is no sufficient reason - thereby being the only one actuality which is of itself beyond any reason, thereby being neither rational nor irrational. Being of itself is in this sense alone absurd - but by no means random or meaningless - for there is no reason for being's being. Yet it is, occurs, all the same; and, as the Good, Being is the ground of all existence and existents, the latter alone being subject to the principle of sufficient reason and, thereby, not being absurdist (but again, this only in the extremely restricted sense of absurdism just specified).

All this might just be a different perspective regarding the same inexplicable ontic actuality which I term the Good and which can just as cogently be termed God

[...] and at any rate God is not a "brute fact" in the sense the term is often employed today, although the term is fitting if it only implies "not referred to anything else." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, this latter being in keeping with the meaning I intended to express by the term, "brute fact" in the sense of: "a thing that [here, a concept whose referent ...] is undeniably the case, but which is impervious to reasoned explication".

As to why it is so, this would be a very, very long shpeal on my part - and I'm here assuming we're both taking "the Good's being an actual ontic facet of all which can be in any way considered real" for granted (in so far as the Good is that ultimate reality upon which all others are dependent).

I'm not really sure what "I-ness" is supposed to mean here, or why a "deity" is defined by it. To refer to my earlier point, these notions have long been theological orthodoxy in the traditional churches, but have not been seen as precluding that God is God. God is impassible, eternal, immutable, not a being, simple, unlimited, etc. and this is precisely why God is God. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm of course here engaging in philosophical discourse, attempting to be as rational as I can be about the matter at hand, but am not addressing traditions of interpretation.

I-ness is a term whose referent is difficult to demarcate, and can thus be demarcated in different ways. I find notions such as that generally adopted by Kant, Husserl, and William James to be of great benefit to this issue: To use James’s terminology: where “ego” equates to “I-ness”, there is a pure ego, which is the subject of the experienced self, and then there is the empirical ego, which is that full scope of I-ness or self experienced by the pure ego. In presuming you are familiar with this basic notion, I’ll here skip the details and justifications.

The Good, then, will consist of an infinite pure ego devoid of any duality wherein the subject of experience - pivotally, the subject of understanding - of itself becomes that which is understood and thereby known (this, maybe obviously, in non-spatiotemporal manners, these of themselves requiring some measure of duality).

A deity, on the other hand (be it a supposed omni-creator deity which would by entailment be singular or else a deity of pagan polytheistic understanding which would by entailment then not be omni-anything, this irrespective of its powers) entails a pure ego embedded in an empirical ego (be the latter either utterly non-corporeal or otherwise - for the deity knows itself to be other than X, Y, and Z, this then being the pure ego's knowledge of its empirical ego) which, as such, is furthermore other in respect to, for example, those who pray or else worship it: For the deity to in any way answer a prayer, there must logically be some form of duality between a) the deity, b) the prayer it becomes aware of (the prayer being other than the deity), and c) the response which the deity gives (the deity-generated effect as response again being other than the deity's subjectivity (i.e., empirical-ego-embedded pure-ego) itself).

Hence, a deity’s occurrence entails some form of duality between the deity as I-ness (as an empirical-ego-embedded pure-ego) and that which is not this I-ness (e.g. the communication of which the deity becomes aware and this communication’s source – both of which are then other than the deity itself).

Some of the comments in this thread seem to suggest that if "God is being itself," then God is impotent vis-á-vis creatures, insensate, irrational, etc., instead of possessing the fullness of knowledge, the fullness of rationality—as Dionysius the Areopagite says, being super-rational, super-essential, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As a suggestion, you might want to then address the previously made arguments of these numbskulls or else shmucks head on, rather than talk behind their backs without giving any mention. (Here presuming this numbskull shmuck was I.)

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As to the quoted issue of impotency:

Where the priority-monism based ground-of-being as “the Good” to be a non-deity unmoved-mover of everything that is (this as I previously expressed here and here in this thread) it would be the exact opposite of impotent. It would, instead, be that which in one way or another endows potency to all agencies that occur, be these agencies deemed good or bad – very much including the agency of deities (or else of all celestial beings, e.g. archangels and lesser angels), were the latter to occur.

While it is true that such non-deity unmoved-mover could make a deity of superlative power (else agency) utterly superfluous to metaphysical considerations regarding reality at large – indeed, not necessitating the occurrence of any so called “celestial beings” whatsoever – it does not by any means then deny the possibility of the existence of such (and if they do in fact occur, prayers to such celestial beings will then have their effects). Instead, such an understanding of the a non-deity unmoved-mover of all that exists as “the Good” will entail that, were celestial beings to occur, all these will be inescapably subject to this same non-deity unmoved-mover which goes by the term “the Good” – such that, in considering those celestial beings that are far closer to the Good than any of us are, they gain their power from their very proximity to this same “unmoved-mover of all that exists” which is of itself not a deity.

To sum: the Good as the non-deity unmoved-mover of all that is can by no means be rationally concluded impotent but, instead, can then only be the source of all potency which occurs among agencies—for it is then that which in one way or another moves all these free-will endowed agencies, without exception (e.g., via such agencies affinities toward the Good or else their fear and resultant aversions in respect to it).

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As to the quoted issue of the Good thus understood being "insensate, irrational, etc.":

By its very definitions, the Good / the One, while not being a deity, would be the non-temporal juncture wherein a) no duality whatsoever between the subject of understanding and the object of its understanding will remain and b) it will be (as it has always been) qualitatively infinite (limitless) and, hence, devoid of any quantity in so being divinely simple. This thereby entailing an infinite understanding which is of itself infinite and nondualistic awareness, one which is the source of all rationalizations but which supersedes any and all duality involved in reasoning.

And, as to its reason for being, the Good / the One as actuality here becomes the sole brute fact there is, in so being being the only a-rational reality there is. (With arational being beyond that which can be either rational or irrational, thereby in no way being of itself irrational.)

And, again, the Good thus understood cannot in any way be a deity, if for no other reason because a deity entails an occurring I-ness and that which is not this I-ness, thereby entailing a necessary duality, of which the Good is utterly devoid of.

Gestapo/KGB tactics on the streets, abuse of law - abuse of everything and everybody - disappearing people, destroying lives, delivering a steady stream of lies and "alternate facts" as justification. — tim wood

How is that in any way different from the way the establishment used to run things? :chin: — Tzeentch

The question is not one of when were humans noncorrupt – the answer here is never – but, instead, that of whether corruption is increasing or else decreasing.

My worst fear is that I will die before enough people understand what I am saying to spread these ideas and give our young a chance of having a good future. — Athena

I very much get that. It’s why our voices matter. To become voiceless in a time of conflict – this when speaking up does not lead to dire perils with any significant degree of certainty (as it would in full-blown fascism) – is to in effect empower the extremist factions which see no value in democratic principles and the heuristics which bring these democratic principles into practice.

It’s not quite trust, nor belief, so I’ll say that I have faith in the younger generations at large. Their lives are just beginning to undergo the calamities of an ever-increasing climate change which they’ll have to live the entirety of their lives through. And while some of the old farts amongst us might adopt a “que sera sera” attitude toward the future, the young are for the most part experiencing a wakeup call. But they’re up against power-hording, authoritarian institutions (economic as much as political) which nowadays have surveillance capacities that the Nazis and the Stalinist Commies could have only dreamt of.

And this, again, is why voices – such as yours – matter.

The way to escape the prisoners' dilemma in geo-politics is negotiation and coming to some kind of supra-national agreement.... you create incentives so the prisoners don't choose the default bad option. — ChatteringMonkey

In agreement with this, to give a relatively simple parallel to it:

In the early 2000’s, Bill Gates Sr. and Chuck Collins – both relatively well off people, to say the least – campaigned for an estate/death/inheritance tax in America to the following effect:

MOYERS: And do I understand correctly that you’re not advocating that the government take everything that somebody passes on to children?

GATES: On the contrary. No, we’re not. We’re saying, for example, that if the exemption were three and a half million dollars or $7 million for a family, that…. And the rate was say, 50 percent just as a for instance, then whatever dad and mom leave in excess of $7 million, and half of the rest, still there for the children. — billmoyers.com

The corporate media didn’t give this campaign much if any coverage – we wonder why – and I was only exposed to it via a Bill Moyers episode of NOW, which aired on PBS (which is currently dying).

It makes a lot of sense: For a family, everything under 7 million dollars does not get taxed a penny. And everything over 7 million would be taxed an approximate 50% - uniformly across the board. (With the same applying to the cap of 3.5 million for any one individual.) Taxes then go back into the system: for infrastructure, for education, for research, etc. – all of which serve the public good and make society stronger. And meritocratic competition would be preserved for all: the richest person on Earth would yet have the greatest sum of inheritance to give to their own children to start them off with in life.

But, even if this campaign would have been given more coverage and would have picked up steam, it wouldn’t have worked. American millionaires would have been at a loss in respect to non-American millionaires world over. Such that the offspring of non-American millionaires would then have had substantially greater capital to start them off in life then their American counterparts. Thereby nullifying the meritocratic competition previously addressed on a global scale. So it then only makes sense that most American millionaires (obviously excluding Gates Sr. and Collins) were contra this campaign and its proposals.

The only way to make such an estate tax viable (whose implementation should make a lot of sense to at least most of us) would be to make it globally applicable – this without any exceptions. But, maybe obviously, this would then require a global governance.

I'm thinking this or similar understandings might help alleviate this:

It think even before the physical effects get to us, the psychological effects might bring us down. If you wipe away the horizon... you get nihilism. — ChatteringMonkey

There you go. Automatons. What's the line between automatons and ... not automotive? — Patterner

Under panpsychism, nothing would be an automaton, right? - for everything would in one way or another be endowed with psyche (rather than being a psyche-less mechanism).

How about single-celled organisms? I don't think archaea or bacteria have a sense of self. — Patterner

Microbial intelligence (known as bacterial intelligence) is the intelligence shown by microorganisms. This includes complex adaptive behavior shown by single cells, and altruistic or cooperative behavior in populations of like or unlike cells. It is often mediated by chemical signalling that induces physiological or behavioral changes in cells and influences colony structures.[1]

[...]

Even bacteria can display more behavior as a population. These behaviors occur in single species populations, or mixed species populations. Examples are colonies or swarms of myxobacteria, quorum sensing, and biofilms.[1][3]

[...]

Bacteria communication and self-organization in the context of network theory has been investigated by Eshel Ben-Jacob research group at Tel Aviv University which developed a fractal model of bacterial colony and identified linguistic and social patterns in colony lifecycle.[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microbial_intelligence

By in large, if not in full, none of which would be possible in the complete absence of any discernment between friend and foe relative to one’s own being, aka self. Then there is the notion of autopoiesis which seems ubiquitous to all lifeforms - differentiating life from non-life (e.g. prions and viroids, this among other simpler structures of organic molecules).

Even sperm (which are not self-sustaining organisms) can be readily seen to sense and react to their environment – and thereby exhibit some sentience (via which one’s own being is discerned from that which is not) - all the while somehow innately knowing how to move via variable environments toward that which they deem to be the goal, this being the egg. (And, arguably, the egg itself seems to exhibit sentience in selecting which of the many sperm attached to it it is to unify with.)

But I really don't know what you mean by "non-conceptual sense of self", so not sure where we agree and disagree. — Patterner

Fair enough. All the same, irrespective of this:

If one entertains some form of proto-experience for subatomic particles and the like (this proto-experience being a something which we hardly can comprehend) why then necessarily exclude the possibility of a "proto-understanding" which would be innate to this very proto-experience?

Well, I guess there are two questions here: compatibility and historical influence. "God is love" (1 John 4:8) predates Plotinus by a good deal and likely influenced his thought. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If the One were to in fact be real - by this or any other name - then it is by no means impossible, but rather quite plausible, that others than Plotinus experienced what in Ancient Greek was termed henosis - and if JC was a real person, then I can find no reason to deny that he too experienced henosis in his own right. This long before Plotinus came around (for Plotinus would not have invented the reality of the one). But this addresses extreme proximity, if not unity, with the One as completely infinite being devoid of any dualistic ego (with "dualistic ego" being denoted as holding any kind of duality between I-ness and other) - this rather than being extreme proximity or else unity with an omni-creator deity. Though, of course, interpretations can vary galore.

I'm not sure. I'd disagree if the idea is somehow that what the transcendent transcends is somehow absent from the transcendent itself, e.g. if God is incapable of what man is capable of. Or as Plotnius says, if we suggest that what is best in the Nous is somehow absent from the One, or something that the One is incapable of, this would be "absurd." There can be no actuality coming from anywhere else. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I previously mentioned in passing, while I endorse the reality of "the Good", I don't much find good reason to subscribe to Plotinus' description of the Emanations - the Nous / Demiurge included. For starters, there is no cogent reason for the emanations to emanate from the One in the first place - other than ad hoc attempts to give best explanation for what in fact exists. All the same, it is the One from which the emanations emanate (even if non-temporally so), and it is the One rather than its emanations which serves as the ultimate and fixed final cause of all existents.

When one addresses the One as God - i.e. as the ultimate reality/actuality - one does not (or at least ought not) then address the Nous / Demiurge as the ultimate reality/actuality which is therefore termed God. The latter would be contrary to what the One specifies.

Even when the Nous / Demiurge is deemed inseparable from the One for as long as existence exists, this Nous / Demiurge is not of itself a deity. It is not a psyche/mind distinct from all other psyches/minds - this as an omni-creator deity conception of God has it - but is instead, in many a sense, the raw thought from which all of us are constituted and, thereby, of which all of us are a fragmented aspect of. It is an inherent aspect of us, rather than being some other mind/psyche in relation to our own.

We might not find agreement on this, but I do find the One (to emphasize, this rather than its emanations) to be logically contrary to any notion of an omni-creator deity:

As just one example, the One is in and of itself the Good - to which all deities will themselves be subject to, this were deities to occur. Whereas the omni-creator deity is not (it is instead fully amoral - such that no matter what it decides it will not be subject to judgments of whether the decision is good or bad) but instead is that from whose might/power as deity the notion of the good takes form for all of us separate psyches/minds that are of this omni-creator deity's creation. In the first, right makes might (such as when speaking truth to power), this at least in some spiritual sense if not in the corporeal here and now - whereas in the second, quite blatantly, might makes right. These two perspectives then being logically contradictory in respect to each other.

As a less pertinent example, via the One it can be validly affirmed that, despite our many differences as individuals, "we are all one" - this in a priority monism sense. Whereas via the omni-creator deity - which, for one cultural example, sends us via his judgment either into eternal Heaven or eternal Hell after our corporeal death - there is no valid means of so appraising that "we are all one" (if for no other reason, for we all are not one with the omni-creator deity himself - this in many circles being blasphemy)

The One is then at direct odds with any notion of an omni-creator deity - that said, with most nowadays understanding the latter to be what is addressed by the term "God" and having little to no comprehension of the former. -- javra


I think it would be fair to say that this has not been the common reception of Neoplatonism across history. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I of course acknowledge the hybridization of the One and the omni-creator deity in the course of history - such that the omni-creator deity takes on the characteristics of the One. Omni-benevolence being one such characteristic when it is addressed in relatively very abstract manners - which can be simplified into the dictum of "God is Love".

Are you however disagreeing with the thesis that the characteristics by which the One is defined - e.g. that of perfectly infinite pure being (hence, devoid of any and all finitudes) - are logically incommensurate with the characteristics of any deity - which, as deity, necessitates some finitude(s) in at least so far as being a psyche/mind distinct from other co-occurring psyches/minds?

Could make sense (from a distance at least :smile: ) Thanks.

I think, though, that I can imagine there is something it is like to be, let's say, a worm, but that the worm has no sense of self. Does a worm know it is not the dirt through which it digs? I'm not saying it thinks it is the dirt through which it digs. I'm saying maybe it doesn't have any concept of itself, the dirt, or anything else. — Patterner

To be clear, the tacit understanding I've been addressing does not require, nor is it equivalent to, conceptual understanding. Tersely expressed, a concept is most always an abstraction abstracted from particulars . As abstraction, it is a thought one thinks or else cognizes. One which can then be understood in various ways and to various degrees by the respective ego - such that the concept is other than the ego which contemplates the concept. But what I addressed in my previous posts as tacit understanding is not this: it is not something other than the ego (which the ego then comprehends) but instead is innate to the ego itself, fully unified with the ego or consciousness, such that no duality whatsoever occurs between the ego/consciousness in question and its tacit understanding. And it is due to the ego's tacit understanding as innate and nondualistic faculty of consciousness that the ego then holds any capacity whatsoever to understand anything which is other than itself - be it a physiological percept of that which other or a concept, etc.

A worm, even one as simple as a nematode, will of course be able to distinguish self from other. It wouldn't be able to live otherwise - e.g., if not being able to discern predator from food from self and thereby act/react accordingly. And this very innate, here likely genetically inherited in large if not in full, ability of the nematode to discern and discriminate what is predator, from what is food, from what is self will - in and of itself - be the nematodes faculty of tacit understanding - which is innate to and utterly nondualistic with the nematodes ego/consciousness (however different from our own it might be). And which, again, the nematode holds without in any way contemplating concepts - conceptual understanding being neither innate to the ego nor fully nondualistic in relation to it.

In short, the worm, just like any other organism (even prokaryotic ones), does have a (non-conceptual) sense of self. This as is empirically verifiable (at least when granting that no lifeform is an automaton). And this sense of self then entails a (non-conceptual) tacit understanding of what is and is not self on the part of the organism the organism's awareness.

Nicely worded. — Tom Storm

Thank you!

Do you find this model resonates? — Tom Storm

As I just described the big picture aspect of things, though I don't limit myself to Neoplatonic thought, yes, the notions resonate with me - the Good thus generally understood being what grounds my understanding of non-relativistic ethics. Although there are portions or Plotinus' writings which, in addressing the details of his own metaphysical understandings, I remember not resonating with me all that much. Its been a while since I've read him, though.

I guess some more nuanced information on what it means to say God is Being itself. What does it mean to say God is the fundamental existence or essence that underlies everything in the universe? — Tom Storm

Although its details are not easy to explain via the soundbites of forum posts (and I have no current interest in presenting them), one possible example of such "God is Being itself" outlook will be the following:

The Neoplatonist notion of "the One", aka "the Good" will be pure being itself of infinite, limitless, quality and magnitude that is divinely simple (devoid of any parts) and beyond both existence and nonexistence - this being a priority monism wherein the fundamental essence that underlies everything in the universe can also be conceptualized as God, this, for example, due to being a) of itself unmovable (i.e., a forever fixed, determinate, aspect of existence at large) and b) that which moves all that exists (this when understanding all that exists to be in significant part teleological and, hence, partly determined by final causes). Although open to various interpretations, this worldview then generally holds that the infinite (i.e., in no way limited or finite) pure being which is the One is the fixed and ultimate final cause of all existents, i.e. the unmoved mover of all existents to use Aristotelian terms (which as ultimate telos is thereby always contemporaneous with existence at large for as long as existence has been).

Of possible importance, the One then cannot be a deity - even when the One is expressed as being God - for a deity can only hold some existential finitude as a psyche, minimally, a limit of being by which it as deity is other than, say, an ameba's mind, a tree's life, or a human being in total (which as human might obey or otherwise listen to the deity's decrees as other than him/herself - a deity who in turn holds awareness of the human as other). The One is then at direct odds with any notion of an omni-creator deity - that said, with most nowadays understanding the latter to be what is addressed by the term "God" and having little to no comprehension of the former.

Thank you for the explanation. Still have my questions about what proto-experience or else proto-consciousness might be (this having read the OP's quotes - thanks for reposting them) - such as when devoid of any sense of self (which, as a sense of self, would then proto-experience or else be proto-conscious of that which is not self). But I'll here put those questions aside.

(Not that I currently have any informed understanding of how panpsychism might in fact work.) — javra

You and everybody else in the world. :grin: All speculation. — Patterner

To be honest, given that life evolving out of non-life can only be part and parcel of the non-physicalist philosophical views I hold, I too end up speculatively concluding that pansychism is in fact the case. Still, as previously mentioned (and as you yourself also note) - as with everybody else - I don't presume to have any understanding of how it might work. Hence my questioning in regard to what proto-experience / proto-consciousness might be. :wink:

What is happening did not start with Trump, and we might look behind the curtain to see what is really going on and who is in control. — Athena

As far as my personal observations and perspectives go:

Anti-democratic sentiments have been simmering for quite some time in certain aspects of the US, in all sorts of ways. From not wanting to partake in civic duties (e.g., in jury duty) to an outright denouncement of democracy as a system of governance.

Many, maybe too many, people value authoritarian power. Deeming the populace (of which one might say they too belong to) to be idiots and blindly led sheep. That thereby need to be domineered.

Bad parenting – e.g., parents who laugh at teachers who tell them to restrain their children from cursing in school (to say the least) – tends to result in more selfish adolescents who put their own narrow and selfish interests before those of all others without much if any empathy for others, and with bullying on the rise, sometimes taking extreme forms. Which in turn leads to even more bad parenting.

Justice here is no longer that which is seen as applying to all equally (justice for all) but, instead, is that which empowers one’s own agendas so as to conquer all those that oppose your own will, this irrespective of the double standards involved.

The next generation of adults then hold these attitudes that were accumulated during their formative years, and then they vote, often this to empower authoritarian causes.

Then, there’s the vested interest of the authoritarian powers that be – political, economic, makes no significant difference – that the plebs at large are as uneducated and as fragmented as possible (no sense of community or solidarity among the plebs). Not only does this deprive commoners of any nobility of being but, more to the point, it facilitates greater capacity for authoritarian power-over and the financial wealth thereby accumulated – this, again, by the authoritarian powers that be. And all this is pivoted on an economy that is a global Ponzi scheme of sorts: a global economy that assumes infinite growth via infinite resources (by which new entrepreneurs supposedly have a chance to themselves get as big as the the biggest). And, as with all pyramid schemes, it will eventually go bust – but, here, on a global scale of economic devastation.

I wish I’d be – or at least find reason to be – more optimistic about the times we’re living in. I’m not. And I haven’t even started on the increasing calamities which will accompany increased global warming.

Unless a global cataclysm – e.g., a nuclear catastrophe, but there are other means of accomplishing the same cataclysm – reverts all of humanity back to segregated hunter-gather tribes of a dozen people or so – this being something which seems extremely unlikely, to not mention utterly undesirable, such as due to all the advances that will then be lost – in time there will indeed be a global governance. I’m thinking in terms of a few generations from now, more or less – but not in terms of millennia. Like the notion of not, it’s inevitable – this given our ever increasing interconnectedness via technology, economy, and the like. That stated, the concern here is that this global governance will not be a democratic republic, one that thereby aims for optimal justice for all citizens of the planet and seeks to give all citizens an equal voice in how they get to be governed. But that, instead, this global governance will turn out to be fully Orwellian, with pervasive fascistic structures and with injustices galore. And if such authoritarian power is ever acquired over all others on a global scale, it will be unimaginably hard to do away with.

As backdrop to this forethought, as things currently stand, globally, governments are turning increasingly authoritarian – this, obviously, on the backs of many who then unjustly suffer or else unjustly die.

I don’t mean to bum you or anyone else out by all this – and I’m sure some will find the just stated an all too laughable fantasy or, else, see no problems with authoritarian governance to begin with. It’s just that, while I view some humanitarian causes lost in the relative short-term, in the long-term I yet find that there is yet much to struggle for. This, at least, for those who care about future generations of children and the like.

OK, but then you might want to explain what “subjective awareness” can possibly mean when completely devoid of any kind of tacit understanding*.

* By “subjective” I so far understand there being the minimal requirement of these two types of tacit understanding on the part of the subjective awareness in question: a) a tacit understanding as pertains to what is and is not self (this sense of self being the subjectivity in question), and b) a tacit understanding of this self as to whether this self experiences something of significance to it in its environment (rather than, for example, experiencing nothing of significance). Neither of which necessitates the occurrence of memory, btw.

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I’m not antithetical to panpsychism, btw, but if it were to be real, I don’t so far deem it possible that a rock, for example, would have a subjective awareness of its own and thereby be endowed with subjectivity - this for reasons previously mentioned. (Not that I currently have any informed understanding of how panpsychism might in fact work.)

The Mind/mind to me is not a set of thoughts, ideas, percepts, etc. — MoK

Nor did I explicate that that's all which mind is, but these are certainly what I consider to be aspects of mind, rather than aspects of mater.

This then seems to me the crux of where we differ.

Mind, to me at least, consists of both (agency-endowed) awareness - not all of which pertains to consciousness - and, to simplify, the immaterial means via which these awarenesses (the awareness of consciousness, which is distinct from the awareness of one's conscience, from the different agencies - each awareness-endowed - of one's unconscious mind, etc.) then interact, combine, diverge, and communicate.

Differently approached, the term "mind" etymologically stems from the notion of memory, and memory too is a bundle of percepts - perceived by oneself as conscious awareness, which is thus aware of the memories one has.

All these thoughts, ideas, percepts - which are immaterial rather than being mater - are themselves experienced by what else than awareness (be this awareness either consciousness or not)?

This then will speak to the following:

I think that is the Mind/mind that perceives the state of pure awareness and Maya. — MoK

Do you feel safe? Do you care about justice and freedom of speech? — Athena

Wanted to say thumbs up to the OP. To the first question, for now yes; issue though is about the soon-to-become-present future. And here I am very concerned. To the second question: yes.

Seems to me that those who don't feel safe will not speak up against authoritarianism and fascism because of this very concern or else fear. Whereas those who don't see any problems with authoritarianism and fascism - maybe due to believing these to work in their favor - will not have any reason to speak up against them.

To my understanding, Maya and pure awareness are different modes of experience, so essence dualism refers to a duality—maya versus pure awareness—whereas substance dualism is the fundamental model of reality. — MoK

Again, no problem if the use of essence rather than that of substance doesn't work for you. But to address this quote: pure awareness would here be non-illusory essence which is that via which maya (illusory essence) is experienced. All that is not pure awareness - to include both mind (thoughts, ideas, percepts, etc.) and matter (rocks, atoms, etc.) - is thereby different aspects of the same maya as illusory essence - a sort of property dualism of maya.

So yes, there is a duality of essences here, but it is not a duality between "different modes of experience": all experience of maya being contingent on and originating from the non-illusory essence of pure awareness (also termed "witness consciousness").

Are you then maintaining that "consciousness in its most fundamental sense" can well be fully devoid of all understanding/comprehension - irrespective of how minuscule - regarding that of which it might be aware/conscious of?

Depending on definitions, many or all species are intelligent, though none with our abilities. So there can be consciousness without our intelligence on par with ours.

I think intelligence and consciousness are different things. I think all conscious things are conscious of whatever intelligence they possess. — Patterner

Although its been a few days now, you might want to reread my post: I said nothing to the contrary of this.

I did not address intelligence but the faculty of understanding innate to consciousness - which can be of greater or lesser magnitudes when comparing one being or species of such to another. And, in a breaking away from traditional conceptualizations going all the way back to Aristotle, I stated that this faculty of understanding (e.g., an ameba understands, however minusculely, differences between predator and prey when faced with another ameba in its environment) goes by the synonym of the intellect, i.e., that to which things are intelligible. To then be explicit, thereby granting an ameba a minuscule degree of intellect (which is not a synonym for intelligence - ameba don't understand and then apply principles, for example - although, in lifeforms, intelligence will itself be contingent on the degree or magnitude of this faculty of understanding which, again, is intrinsic to all consciousness)

As to intelligence and consciousness being different things as exemplified by AI, I've already mentioned the same in my initial post in this thread:

An AI program could well be argued to be of greater intelligence than a human, to at least have the capacity to simultaneously apprehend far more information than a human, and so forth … but, until it obtains the faculty of understanding, if it ever will, it will not be defined by consciousness. Thereby making the human of a far greater higher consciousness than the AI program, despite having a lesser intelligence, etc. — javra

Finite essence is a constraint in being, the being of things a particular constrained act of being. Fr. Norris Clarke refers to the "limiting essences" of things. God meanwhile, is not a thing, but being itself, and God alone is subsistent being (ipsum esse subsitens). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for this. I greatly like the terminology of "limiting essences" or else "finite essence" - this in contrast to what would then be pure ousia as "limitless, boundless, else infinite essence". Although I personally don't univocally associate the latter - this tmk being the quintessence of priority monism - to "God" for various reasons: one of these being that God is often construed to be a deity which, as a psyche, would itself then necessarily be in dualistic standing to all other occurring psyches (and hence not be limitless, etc.). But, yes, it's fully contingent on how the term "God" gets to be understood. To each their own. :smile:

My views changed as I contemplated the idea of higher consciousness, as it relates to various fantasy/sci-fi beings. Like Star Trek's Organians, Metrons, Q, Prophets of Bajor, etc. Such beings are often said to be of higher consciousness. I wondered what that might mean. Greater intelligence doesn't seem to equal greater consciousness. Nor do more extensive sensory capabilities, abilities to mentally manipulate reality, or an awareness that might be said to encompass a larger area.

I came to think there's no such thing as higher consciousness, and I don't think I have higher consciousness than anything else. I am just conscious of things, capabilities, I possess that other things do not. — Patterner

Wanted to address this notion of higher consciousness.

An intrinsic aspect of consciousness – at the very least as we humans experience it – is that faculty of understanding via which information becomes comprehensible. It is not that which is understood, like a concept, but instead that which understands. And can be deemed a synonym for the intellect, that to which things are intelligible. This faculty of consciousness, the intellect, can at least metaphorically be stated to have its non-quantitative contents – non-quantitative because in truth all such contents which could be individually addressed are unified in a non-manifold manner.

As an example of such content, one which typically remains tacit within our consciousness but is nevertheless understood or else known: we all understand, else know, ourselves to be human Earthlings, rather than Martians or some other type of extraterrestrial alien. (This again, is typically not declarative knowledge but, instead, an understanding intrinsic to us as conscious beings.) Likewise can be said of our not being brains in vats, or our being of this or that ethnicity, of this or that gender, etc. Most of the time all these are tacitly understood without being declaratively, else explicitly, known.

A frog, too, will have this faculty of understanding – such as might regard what is food and what is not.

And, when contrasting a frog’s faculty of understanding and a typical human’s – both of which are intrinsic to the consciousness of each – the human’s consciousness will be far greater in a) its capacity of such understanding and b) its contents of such understanding.

In so being, a human will then have what goes by the name of “a higher (more technically, greater) consciousness” than will a frog. And this notwithstanding that a frog might have intelligences of its own that humans might not be aware of, might have capacities of sensory experiences that exceed those of humans, and so forth.

An AI program could well be argued to be of greater intelligence than a human, to at least have the capacity to simultaneously apprehend far more information than a human, and so forth … but, until it obtains the faculty of understanding, if it ever will, it will not be defined by consciousness. Thereby making the human of a far greater higher consciousness than the AI program, despite having a lesser intelligence, etc.

Or, as another example, a good Jeopardy player might be of far greater encyclopedic intelligence than a bad Jeopardy player, while it is at least conceivable that the bad Jeopardy player might yet be endowed with a far greater capacity of understanding than that of the good Jeopardy player – here, then, denoting the bad player to be of a (at least somewhat) higher consciousness than the good player.

And this same faculty of understanding can fluctuate in magnitude within any single human. Contrast the difference in acuteness of understanding when one is “healthy, full of vitality, and in the zone experiencing cognitive flow” and when one is bedridden with migraines and stomach aches (or such) from a flu virus. Most always, one will be of higher consciousness in the first scenario but not in the second.

For reasons such as these, I don’t think the notion of “higher consciousness” – when understood as the non-quantitative content and capacity of understanding, which can hence be of greater magnitude in one being by comparison to some other – can be easily ruled out.

And, of course, unless one views humans as the end all and be all of this very faculty of understanding, more evolved species of life can well then be postulated to potentially hold far greater magnitudes of consciousness than any human has ever been endowed with. Just as a frog from the distant past could not fathom its future evolution into a human, so too can a human not fathom his/her future evolution into a being of significantly greater consciousness (forethought will always have its limits).

Glad to know. Thanks.

I wouldn't rule it out, but intuitively it seems like monism or dualism isn't even the right way to talk about it, because substances are an afterthought of being, — ChatteringMonkey

I think this gets back to the OP. In the case of priority monism - such as can be found in "the One" of Neoplatonism - there is no substance involved in the definition of the monism addressed. Rather it is being itself - as being beyond both existence and nonexistence. The Ancient Greek "ousia". Which both "substance" and "essence" are Latin translations of, but with only the latter nowadays yet holding some clear semblance to what the Ancient Greek "ousia" most typically signified in philosophical discourse.

All this to say that in priority monism, the monism addressed does not specify any type of substance whatsoever but, instead, essence itself: the One in Neoplatonism being quite literally quintessential - the ultimate essence of all that is. If Heraclitus had in mind a priority monism prior to there being words for the concept, the only substance he would have specified would have been the logos/fire - this being "stuff" - but by "Zeus / wisdom which is one" he would have intended and done his best to express in this own time "a nondualistic being/ousia - such as the Neoplatonic "the One" - upon which all existence and hence substance is dependent". Or at least something to the like. Hence making sense of fragments such as this (as previously addressed):

(110) And it is law, too, to obey the counsel of one. R. P. 49 a. — Heraclitus

Just checked. Couldn't find any fragments to the effect of light equating to the "only one" - wanted to say my bad for this - but there are fragments and interpretations such as this:

(74-76) The dry soul is the wisest and best.[31] R. P. 42. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_118

with the following footnote:

31. This fragment is interesting because of the antiquity of the corruptions it has suffered. According to Stephanus, who is followed by Bywater, we should read: Αὔη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη, ξηρή being a mere gloss upon αὔη. When once ξηρή got into the text; αὔη became αὐγή, and we get the sentence, "the dry light is the wisest soul," whence the siccum lumen of Bacon. Now this reading is as old as Plutarch, who, in his Life of Romulus (c. 28), takes αὐγή to mean lightning, as it sometimes does, and supposes the idea to be that the wise soul bursts through the prison of the body like dry lightning (whatever that may be) through a cloud. (It should be added that Diels now holds that a αὐγή ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ αρίστη is the genuine reading.) Lastly, though Plutarch must have written αὐγή, the MSS. vary between αὕτη and αὐτή (cf. De def. or. 432 f. αὕτη γὰρ ξηρὰ ψυχὴ in the MSS.). The next stage is the corruption of the αὐγή into οὗ γῆ. This yields the sentiment that "where the earth is dry, the soul is wisest," and is as old as Philo (see Bywater's notes).

Which may or may not speak to the same thing? Don't know.

Upon further reading I think he may be using Zeus as a symbol for daylight, the other thing he commonly stands for. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't see how it could be physical daylight since this is of itself an aspect of logos/fire, of the universe in total - with night/darkness as its dyadic opposite. I instead interpret his references to light (and dryness) to be metaphors for wisdom ... which is in keeping with a) traditional western metaphors of light being wisdom and b) with the fragments I've previously referenced. Again:

(65) The wise is one only. It is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus. R. P. 40. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_32

(19) Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things. R. P. 40. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_41

It then seems plausible enough to infer from his total known fragments that for Heraclitus becoming has at its ultimate end this addressed "wisdom" which is "one only" and can go by the name of "Zeus" (although imperfectly). — javra

This sole nondualistic one - addressed at different times as Zeus/God/wisdom/light - then being the source of (what I so far find to be) a plausible priority monism, thereby being that "one only" from which the universe in oppositional total as fire/logos takes its form and attributes and which, as wisdom which is one, "knows the thought/logos by which all things are steered through all things" (with knowledge here, to my mind, clearly not being declarative knowledge - which requires changes via argumentation/justification, to not mention declaration - but more in keeping with notions of a complete understanding).

becoming does not logically entail a completely permanent relativism wherein there is nothing for all of this becoming to eventually become. — javra


This universe, which is the same for all, has not been made by any god or man, but it always has been is, and will be -- an ever-living fire, kindling itself by regular measures and going out by regular measures. — Heraclitus


It doesn't logically entail it no, but Heraclitus seems to have thought otherwise. — ChatteringMonkey

In all references I so far know of (e.g. 1; and e.g. 2), the Heraclitus fragment you've mentioned is devoid of the hyphenation between "be" and "an". This can change tthe meaning of the fragment significantly - so that the fragment can indeed be aligned to a notion of priority monism: All that is is therefore not made by any man or god - both being aspects of the logos/fire - such that for as long as the universe/existence is "it always has been is and will be an ever-living fire (etc.)". This with the "one" previously mentioned yet referencing its ultimate origin in a priority monism fashion.

But please do reference the fragment with the given hyphenation inserted if you believe the hyphenation is original, or else essential, to Heraclitus's fragment.

I haven't read Heraclitus's fragments in full for some time, BTW, but I don't remember reading anything that would contradict this plausibility of him being a priority monist. That said, I might of course be wrong.

Does the personification mean anything, in the sense of having agency or will? Or is it rather a naturalistic/pantheistic god?

"unwilling and yet willing"? — ChatteringMonkey

It's again speculative inference - a best conjecture based on his fragments - but if Heraclitus in fact did have in mind a priority monism, then this "God / Zeus' he addresses would not be any deity whatsoever but, instead, would be in general keeping with what the Neoplatonists addressed as the One as the source of all things.