It’s just so tiresome. — Fire Ologist

I agree. Stalin is not a meme in USA culture, but was far worse in many a way, at least when it comes to sheer number of deaths. And the gulags weren't kinder than the Nazi concentration camps. And other more recent examples abound.

Please do. — Fire Ologist

To my knowledge, the UN defines hate speech as "speech that demeans or promotes violence against groups based on attributes like religion, race, ethnicity, gender, or other identity factors". The "demeans" part is too foggy to my liking; I'd much prefer "dehumanizes". And "promotes violence" I would hope is self explanatory. Quite famously by now, the Jews before world war two were first dehumanized via speech, with promoted violence against them following suit. So too were the Gypsies (about 1 million of them died too by the end of the war). The same occurred in Bosnia, in Rwanda, more recently in a place where to merely express humanitarian disapproval with mass starvation and the like is to be called Anti-Semitic and worse, with political consequences galore for many. Many are being silenced against speaking up for humanitarian ideals (and last I heard, Christ was quite the humanitarian person - as are the many humanitarian Jews now arrested for speaking their minds. As are many an atheist, and so on). And to be frank, I too now self censure myself in this political environment, just sitting on the fence with my mouth such watching what's unfolding.

So I'll go back to hypotheticals, this being a philosophy forum. If a group of people A scream out in solidarity while gaily dancing, "Death to all [people of your ethnicity]" such that group A greatly outnumbers the group to which their chanting "death to", those who claim this has no bearing on a preparation for physical violence have both a lot to evidence and a lot of history to refute.

I'm glad we do agree the Hitler was no angel. With this tinny little background given, I will contend that what makes Hitler guilty of mass murder and genocide is exactly the hate speech he engaged in. First paving the way for what eventually happened and then, or course, ordering the events.

Do you have a different explanation for why Hitler is morally culpable for unjust deaths?

Again, he never did anything else but speak.

But if all conservatives must be racist sexist pigs, what’s the point of asking their opinion on anything anyway? Right? — Fire Ologist

Right. Same can be said on behalf of liberals. BTW, never saw a bumper sticker saying "conservatives suck". I've however seen plenty saying "liberals suck", neighbors included. Myself, I'm technically more of an independent - but, at least where I'm from, the hatred of the right toward the left far outweighs the hatred, if any (which is not the same as disapproval) I've personally encountered in the other direction.

The left and the right can both be tyrannical, — Fire Ologist

Amen to that. You have Stalin (left), you have Hitler (right) and you have many another . My problem isn't with political sides and their differing views on how to improve society. Or at least I don't take one side and avoid the other in a tribalism mindset. My problem is with tyranny period. And when a majority of people in a society scream out "death to those we don't like the smell of" or some such, that is tyranny.

Trump in his own way is just as bad as Reagan, Clinton, Bush, Obama and Biden when it comes to this bullshit. — Fire Ologist

Of course. But only Trump is on record for inciting violence during his rallies.

Question is what, and are the checks and balances in place. I wasn’t afraid with Obama and Biden, and I’m not afraid with Trump. — Fire Ologist

Agreed with the first part. Pretty certain that the checks and balances in place pertain to the very community we're living in, vis a vis the community's rejection of political violence. Wherever you stand, Jan. 6th was about political violence. And all those currently in political power don't give a damn. Trump has joked about serving a third term. If this were to be (not beyond all possibility, for laws, as we know, can be changed more rapidly by authoritarian personalities and powers than by those who at least pretend to respect democratic values before the wide public), then the USA will become about as democratic as current Russia is. Putin too is an elected president, don't you know. "Afraid" might be overstating it, but I do find quite a lot to be concerned about.

Those who have no problem with speech that dehumanizes others and incites violence against them pretty much guarantee that such speech proliferates. And when it does, non-Orwellian understood tyranny follows. (The tyranny of the good, or the tyranny of truth, would be a blatant example of Orwellianized forms of the word.)

Nor sure how coherent my post is, or how well it comes through. But its late for me and I'm tired. So I'll stop short and leave it as it is. Hope I've answered at least most questions you've had.

Following a comprehensive review by the Committee on Safe Learning Environments, the Administration today announced the immediate removal of all works by and about François-Marie Arouet, generally known as Voltaire, from public school curricula and library collections. — Wayfarer

Since we are experiencing planetary cooling—well, not according to most scientists and other learned fork, but what the hell do they know—as long as we’ll have some hated books to burn in bonfires to keep us warm we should all be a’right. Brings to mind the good puritanical Savonarola days of old! Yay!

Damn leftists and their censorship of free speech, such as of books, I say! Sure, certain books such as Mein Kampf are untouched by all. But there was the censorship of Orwell and now it’s the censorship of LGTB books. What will these leftists do next? Claim that slavery was good for slaves and that history books evidencing otherwise are fake and unpatriotic? More stuff to heap into the bonfire of the vanities I guess.

If this humorously intended sarcasm of mine offends anyone then it must be hate speech, together with all “your mamma” jokes and comments about unliked hairdos. And this offensive speech of mine must thereby be legally criminalized as hate speech, or at least I must be harshly penalized and harassed until I either learn my lesson or else die. But if you find such an understanding of “hate speech” distasteful, the only remedy is for laws to not give a hoot about any speech whatsoever. Therefore, receiving death threats from anonymous strangers on your cell phone who make it clear they know where you live and other such details, that’s just free speech in the spirit of the law as interpreted by the forefathers of the constitution. Right? A death threat is just another’s humor and one then simply just doesn’t know how to take a joke. The current laws criminalizing death threats are, after all, just taking away your constitutional right to the freedom of speech to threaten others with their lives. It’s only speech, after all. Nothing more.

Yes, this sarcasm is in reply to a sarcastic post. With my sarcasm tentatively ended:

I’m guestimating here, but, maybe, just as no one is OK with having their loved ones murdered, no one would be unharmed (nothing about insulted here) by receiving repeated death threats for the remainder of their lives.

Extremes are for extremists. And I don't find the issue of free speech to be an exception.

But anyways, still wanting to hear from @Fire Ologist if Hitler was in any way morally culpable for unjust deaths.

You didn’t address the majority of what I asked you to address. So here’s a simpler philosophical question:

Do you hold Hitler morally culpable for any unjust death? And, if so, why?

Last I checked, Hitler never physically killed anyone with his own hands. All he did was say stuff. And we all damn well know that a good sum of it was vitriolically hateful - very much that speech that got him into political power to begin with. I could say more as to how I take this to relate to the non-Orwellian instantiations of what the UN has coined hate speech, but it would be contingent on what your stance might be to the above two questions, and I don’t want to jump the gun, so to speak.

BTW, though I’d be disappointed, I wouldn’t be either insulted or surprised by some stranger on the internet stating that, “No. Hitler was in fact perfectly innocent of any murder, for all he did was speak: he never once stabbed, shot, strangled, starved, etc. another human to death with his own hands.”

We need discussions and communities deciding what is good and bad. Then we need to agree on laws that support the good and laws that protect against the bad. — Fire Ologist

This then stipulates that laws should indeed be moral: hence, supporting the good and protecting against the bad. Thereby entailing that morality and politics should entwine..

But I don’t need a law telling me that “murder is bad” — Fire Ologist

How does any law against murder not do exactly that?

If a law was made saying that antagonism toward fascism will be criminalized as terrorism, doesn't this newly made law then precisely express that antagonism toward fascism is bad?

Shouldn't decrying others as subhuman - if we happen to both consider that so doing is bad - be something that is not supported but instead guarded against. No, so decrying is by no means as wrong as is lynching others on account of so considering them as subhuman. But, here is a paradox I'd like you to consider and address:

Tolerance for what is bad (including for the expressions that other humans are subhuman) can only lead to proliferation of what is bad at the expense of the good and its very tolerance, eventually to the extent of obliterating that which is good and resulting in an utterly intolerant society that is replete with bad.

As to the legal aspects of hate speech, I'm no expert at all. Granted. And yes, any word can be perversely manipulated in Orwellian manners. Still, for one example, when someone addresses blacks as ni**ers that should all be lynched (I presume most of us have heard this and worse in our lives in relation to one populace or another) and then complains about the social tyranny of not having the freedom to so express, I can readily understand this expression as hateful speech intending to incite unjust violence against other humans. It is not something I deem to merely be a stupid statement, but something which if tolerated can readily beget the lynching of black folk in the community. And, so, like deceptively yelling "fire" in a crowded theater just so as to start a stampede, I so far find such speech something that is best politically mitigated to some extent. I know you disagree. But hey, we're discussing.

Hate is a moral issue. Not a political one. [...] — Fire Ologist

Almost sounds as an advocacy for the separation of morality and politics. As though politics ought to be amoral. Is this in keeping with your sentiments?

As sometimes happens, what is your stance on a cohort of humans A articulating that a cohort of humans B consists of subhumans (which, as far as I can see, implicitly mandates that cohort B ought be treated as such with what would then be proportional rights, or the lack of such)? Of itself it is only speech. And, as with a good portion of speech in general, it intends to influence the mindsets of others.

My doubts about what you are saying are around the fact that what you call he "brute given" is only by extension something that I know about. That requires me to distance myself from the experience itself and think about it in a way quite different from the simple reaction ("Ouch!"), which does not mean "I am in pain", which requires conceptualization. — Ludwig V

Infants and nonhuman lifeforms do not have the conceptual power to articulate “I am in pain”. Yet, I so far presume, we’d both agree that they can yet experience pain. It is this which is knowledge-by-acquaintance, this for any awareness-endowed being, which, again, is in no way JTB: it is a known that is neither dependent on any type of justification nor does it require an upheld belief (a belief of what one experienced can follow the experience itself, but one does not ubiquitously first believe X in order to next experience it). It is merely a true immediate experience. One thereby knows what one directly and immediately experiences consciously—such as pain or pleasure, or color, size, and shape, or tactile texture, or such and such thought, and so forth—only by direct acquaintance. Not by conceptualizations utterly devoid of any direct acquaintance. We non-infant humans then make use of conceptualizations to express these instances of knowledge-by-acquaintance via words, which embody concepts, and can then further cognitively manipulate these concepts. But the knowing that one is in pain rather than in states of pleasure, for one example, remains a JTB-devoid knowledge-by-acquaintance—this just as much for an adult human as for a nonhuman animal.

As reference to the philosophical usage of the term, as previously provided, here is the SEP article on knowledge by acquaintance.

I think the practice is all right. When I say "I saw X in a dream", I defuse the standard meaning of "see" by adding "in a dream". That signals that I'm aware that I didn't "really" see X. — Ludwig V

I understand this, which is why the second example was provided. Just checked, and “to form a mental picture of” is an official definition of the term “see”. So as far as I can tell, in standard English, one can really see an imagined object. Besides, when the drunkard sees a pink elephant, the drunkard supposedly does not yet know in a JTB sense whether the elephant is a mental picture or else a real aspect of the external world. He merely witnesses via visual phenomenological means a pink elephant—one which, as previously expressed, might not be real or else might in fact be real, depending on context. (For example, I’m fairly sure there are drunkards in Indian festivities where pink power can be thrown on top an elephant, thereby resulting in the drunkard seeing a real elephant which is pink in appearance.)

That sounds right -- but it also means that we can't say the drunk saw a pink elephant. Seeing with the mind's eye is a metaphorical extension of what it means to see something. — J

Although “the mind’s eye” is indeed metaphorical, that doesn’t seem right to me. As one very common example, visual experiences that occur during REM periods of sleep are all seen with the mind’s eye. So then people can’t say, “I saw X in a dream last night”? Yet this is common practice. Or else, someone instructing another to visualize such and such and then asking the person, "what do you see?" (this too obviously being visualizations experienced via the metaphorical mind’s eye).

The person’s knowing that they are seeing a pink elephant is knowledge by acquaintance; it is non-inferential and so not contingent on justifications; — javra

Does that mean that you are thinking of seeing the pink elephant as introspection and so immune from mistake? I can't help feeling that applying the description "pink elephant" to whatever I am seeing is not immune from mistake. — Ludwig V

If the pink elephant happens to be a hallucination or mirage*, then hallucinations and mirages are not introspections (aka, self-examinations of one’s own being, thoughts, etc.) … but imaginings (such as can occur in daydreams) seen with the mind’s eye that a) are not willfully produced at a conscious level and b) which the person does not, at least momentarily, realize are merely imaginings seen with the minds eye. Do you disagree with this?

If you agree, then what is seen with the mind’s eye remains known-by-acquaintance as that which one so sees (here, again, with the mind’s eye): here, then, the person sees a pink elephant and knows this (thereby knowing it isn’t a pink snake or else a green elephant, etc., which is being seen). And this is so known-by-acquaintance without any inferences involved - it is brute data of experience with presents itself to the person (in contrast, most introspection that I know of is inferential in some capacity or another).

Introspection is not immune from mistakes, because it is most always inferential. That one experiences what one presently experiences is, on the other hand, a brute given. One would need to delve deep into hypotheticals (e.g., the possibility that there in fact is no "I" and hence no perceiver) to grant room for possible mistakes in the affirmation of, "I am currently seeing X" when one is in fact so currently seeing (be it with the mind's eye as is the case with imaginings or else with one's physiological eyes).

--------

* Otherwise, the intoxicated person could conceivably have seen a real elephant covered in pink powder, such as occurs at times in India during certain celebrations, in which case it would not have been a hallucination or mirage but an externally existing elephant which was physiologically seen.

In one way, I'll accept that we can imagine that the vase on my table is an alien or a hologram. But there is not a shred of evidence for either possibility, so there is no rational basis for an actual doubt. — Ludwig V

Yes, and, again, that was the entire point of the example given. One can intellectually acknowledge the possibility (not the plausibility) of being mistaken in a maintained proposition without in any way finding any rational, coherent, or else sane means of doubting anything about the proposition maintained. As I was saying to @Leontiskos in my last post, the epistemological stance of fallibility does not equate to uncertainty, of which doubt is a variant of. Same will then apply to BIV hypotheses, the hypothesis of solipsism, and so forth: "I can't prove that there's no possibility of being wrong in upholding that we are not BIVs but, all the same, I can find no rational basis whatsoever to in any way doubt that we are not."

I agree that when it comes to claims of knowledge, justification is required. On the other hand I know many things with certainty that require no justification simply because they are directly known―in these cases justification just doesn't enter the picture. — Janus

And this resembles the "A or ~A" case, where it's difficult to see it in terms of justifications. Still, I think the conclusion we ought to draw from this is that we're not quite sure what a justification is. What sorts of reasons may play a part in justification? (We noted earlier that a "good justification" is very unclear, in many cases.) If you ask me for my justification in believing "I am having thought X right now" and I reply, "I am directly observing this occurrence as we speak," have I offered a justification? — J

At least the last example overlaps knowledge by acquaintance, which is not contingent on justification, with knowledge by description, which is.

We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths. (Russell 1912: 78)

I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when I am directly aware of the object itself. When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which constitutes judgment, but the sort which constitutes presentation. In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S. (Russell 1910/11: 108) — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-acquaindescrip/#Dis

Say an intoxicated person is seeing a pink elephant. The person’s knowing that they are seeing a pink elephant is knowledge by acquaintance; it is non-inferential and so not contingent on justifications; this knowledge thereby does not equate to or else require JTB. Knowledge that the pink elephant seen is either real or not, on the other hand, will require some form of inference and, so, will be contingent on justification; thereby equating to the JTB sense of knowledge.

Finished what I had to do early, so I'll reply now.

That's also an intelligible argument, but I think it's weaker than the other one. This is because it seems to commit the error of applying the LEM to justification, so to speak. — Leontiskos

The issue I posed had nothing to do with the Law of the Excluded Middle but with contradiction and consistency, hence with the LNC. The proposition that “no ontic truths occur” can’t help but contradict itself upon analysis—for it intends to covey that which is actual and thereby specify an ontic truth. If it happens to be (ontically) true, this then directly contradicts what is affirmed. And if it’s not (ontically) true … what viable alternative can there be obtained other than that it is an untrue, and thereby a false or else erroneous, proposition? Else, how can the proposition of “no ontic truths occur” be interpreted to in any way convey a partial truth? The proposition is either completely true or it is not.

The justification provided for the proposition that ontic truths occur then serves to evidence that the stance is held knowledge. The contrarian, if they cannot provide cogent justification, then cannot claim to have knowledge in the form of JTB that no ontic truths occur. This then results in (yet fallible) JTB that they do vs. blind belief which is in no way justifiable that they don’t.

The words "infallible" and "fallible" are often used by "fallibilists" but never by "infallibilists," which makes me think they involve contentious presuppositions. — Leontiskos

As pertains to this and a good portion of the remaining comments in your post:

As you might already know, “certainty” is a very difficult semantic to adequately define. For my part, I’ve so far tried to define it as being “completely assured, fixed, and unvarying”. But since you place so much emphasis on the issue of certainty in respect to knowledge, please define what you yourself mean by the term. For example, the SEP article on certainty specifies a distinction between psychological certainty (as one example, being certain that X due to a gut feeling one cannot consciously justify) and epistemic certainty (i.e., the highest degree of certainty possible). And I presume you are here referring to epistemic certainty. You will find the article further addresses four different possibilities of what epistemic certainty might signify, with infallibility being formally introduced as one of these four possibilities addressed. If you disagree that epistemic certainty equates to infallibility (this being something that I myself disagree with), then, again, please specify what it is you believe certainty in relation to knowledge equates to.

But if "fallibility" means that we cannot be certain, then the same problem arises. — Leontiskos

As I understand it, fallibility (simply: the possibility (but not the plausibility) of being mistaken) does not equate to a lack of certainty, neither to lack of psychological certainty nor to lack of epistemic certainty. For one example, I can find no “higher degree of certainty possible” than applies to, for one example, the proposition that the ontic is, i.e. that being is. In then upholding this affirmation to be epistemic certainty, and because I don’t equate epistemic certainty to infallibility (i.e., the impossibility of being mistaken), I then can yet intellectually acknowledge the possibility (but not the plausibility) of being mistaken in so upholding. And, thereby, of the proposition being technically fallible. But this does not in any way diminish the fact that I hold the occurrence of being to be epistemically certain. No psychological uncertainty whatsoever involved here. Again, this even though I don’t take this epistemic certainty to be infallible, i.e. impossible to be mistaken, and thereby yet deem it fallible.

Well you're walking a tightrope with these sentences. — Leontiskos

I might better address this after you specify what you mean by "certainty". For the time being though, to toot my own horn: perhaps I am, but, if so, I so far find this tightrope walk to be steadfast, secure, and successful: Ontic knowledge obtains, hence occurs, when one can justify a belief which is, in fact, ontically true. A belief which in fact is ontically true is certain in the sense that it conforms or else corresponds to an actuality that is itself ontically (rather than psychologically or epistemically) certain - and, hence, is ontologically assured, fixed, and unvarying given its context, or else limitations, of space and time. For example, if a cat is on a mat at that location and at that time, this will be ontically certain, i.e. completely assured, fixed, and unvarying ontologically. If my pronouncement that "the cat is on the mat at that location and at that time" is ontically true, then my pronounced truth is as completely assured, fixed and unvarying as is the cat being on the mat ontologically. And lastly, no, I cannot conceive of there being no ontically true beliefs. If you can, please elaborate on how that might be possible.

You seem to be saying that "epistemic truths" presuppose the existence of "ontological truths"; we all believe ourselves to be uttering "epistemic truths"; therefore we are all presupposing the existence of "ontological truths"; and because of this the belief in "ontological truths" is justified.

I think that's a good account on the "game of pool" approach, but I would prefer an account that provides for knowledge of at least some "ontological truths," rather than mere justified belief. — Leontiskos

Here is a different approach to the same conclusion:

Can it be in any way validly justified that no ontologically occurring truths occur? If one believes that this is the case, what does one intend to express by the proposition of “no ontically occurring truths occur” if this proposition is not meant to conform/correspond to the actual states of affairs of the world and, thereby, of itself be an ontic truth? Thereby contradicting the very proposition made. Therefore, there is no justifiable alternative to the proposition that ontic truths occur.

As to providing knowledge of some "ontological truths", this, again, is what our ability to honestly and cogently justify offers us the possibility of. It just that our JTB knowledge will not, by a fallibilist account, be infallible. (Fallibiilty does not equate to being wrong.)

Then on the premise that we know that every p (epistemological truth) could be false, we cannot know any p. — Leontiskos

Remember that the JTB model of knowledge was presented by an Ancient Skeptic. If one presumes knowledge to be infallible, then this quote holds. If one presumes knowledge to be fallible, then it does not.

On all of these conceptions certain knowledge is impossible, and knowledge is traditionally understood to be certain. — Leontiskos

By everything I've so far stated, there then can occur ontically true beliefs which we can justify at will. These then will be instances of ontic knowledge, which is certain. Because we can only hold epistemic appraisals of what is ontically true, though, everything we uphold as knowledge will be epistemic knowledge, rather than ontic knowledge - which, as with epistemic truth, is less than "completely assured, fixed, and invariable."

I'll be back tomorrow.

Is there a contradiction? — Leontiskos

Not as far as I know.

Consider this proposition as if it were itself a truth:

<Ontological truths (which are absolutely certain and not possible to be wrong) do occur all the time.>

Is this "truth" an "ontological truth" or an "epistemological truth"? Because if it is an "epistemological truth," then it is not certain, and if it is an "ontological truth," then your appraisal is not fallible. This is why I'm not sure the way you are dividing up this territory is ultimately coherent. — Leontiskos

To be clear, I'm not here writing a formal philosophical thesis but a forum post intended to address a specific issue. That mentioned:

The truth of the proposition here quoted would of course of itself be an epistemic truth. One which I so far find thoroughly justifiable: To keep things short, I so far find that there can be no epistemic truth in the absence of an ontically occuring truth it aspires to express. Can you, or anyone else, cogently justify the occurence of an epistemic truth that does not claim to be or else intend to conform to an ontic truth?

If not, then it remains cogently justifiable that ontically occuring truths do occur. Conversely, it then becomes unjustifiable that ontically occurring truths do not occur. (The "all the time" part I'll cut off for now, for it would require a great deal of further justification.)

* The monkey wrench is logical and other putatively analytical truths. [...] There's something odd about asking whether "If A, then not (~A)" is a belief, or how we might justify it. But I'll leave that for others. — J

A prime example of this (and it does regard what can well be considered hinge propositions) are those who take dialetheism to be true. We thereby now have an inconsistency between the principle of noncontradiction being true and dialetheism being true. And this inconsistency as to which in fact conforms, or else corresponds, to the actual states of affairs can only be resolved via optimal justifications. Yes, maybe for now these are lacking, but, short of aggressions of each camp toward the other such that “might makes right”, what other avenue is available to us toward discerning what is true in respect to this aspect of ontology (what might possibly be termed the ontology of valid reasoning or of valid logic … or, maybe more esoterically, of logos)?

You make repeated mention of skepticism. Of a Cartesian or of a Ciceronian variety? (the latter being a good example of an Ancient Skeptic—in both his theories and his lifelong praxis) The two versions staunchly contradict. But maybe that’s a separate issue.

As to this,

1. Truth is always known via justification, and ensured by justification
2. Justification can never overcome the possibility of the one-in-a-million anomaly
3. Therefore, truth is never certain — Leontiskos

Item #1 I find blatantly wrong in so far as, for example, I know the truth of the color of an object as it appears to me not by justification but by brute awareness/experience. But yes, successful justification wherever needed validates that what we take to be (ontically) true in fact so is.

Item #2 might be a less cordial way of saying that all justification is to some extent fallible. As per my posts here and here, I do uphold this.

Lastly, item #3 clashes with what I’ve stated in my posts. When differentiating the ontological from the epistemological, ontically occurring truths (which are absolutely certain and not possible to be wrong) do occur all the time. But our epistemic appraisals of what are and are not ontic truths (the latter, again, do occur) will be fallible to some measure.

Therefore, ontic truths are always (completely) certain, and are that toward which we (at least some) ideally aspire. This by optimally (which is different from “perfectly”) justifying our beliefs (by my count, with each belief being in essence a psyche’s ascent (conscious or otherwise) to that which is in fact actual—such that to believe that X is to believe that X is true, i.e. corresponds/conforms to what ontically is).

Hence, in one possible summation of what I previously expressed: Ontic truths are, and are always certain. Our epistemic appraisal of what are and are not ontic truths, however, will always be to some extent liable to being wrong. Call the latter "epistemic truths". And it is for this reason we then honestly seek to justify our epistemic turths whenever required: if our justifications remain consistent given all available data and reasoning, there then is no reason to conclude or even assume that our beliefs of what is ontically true are in fact mistaken, thereby allowing us to maintain that our beliefs are ontically true (only when our justifications become inconsistent with data or coherent reasoning, and are thereby endowed with contradictions, can the honest person conclude that their belief of what is ontically true is in fact mistaken and, hence, ontically untrue).

Ontic truth is always certain, in the sense of "completely assured, fixed, and unvarying". Epistemic truth, while aspiring to be one and the same with ontic truth, is however not "completely assured, fixed, and unvarying", for it might in time change with new data or reasoning.

This is a very helpful analysis. It sharpens the question, — J

I’m very glad to hear it was helpful at least to some.

I don't know whether every proponent of JTB would be happy with this, though. — J

I know (in the JTB sense) that some out there are quite uncomfortable with the implications of fallibilism for issues of JTB.

To try to reduce possible confusion, how this works in practice: “I know that the planet is physical and roughly spherical,” is a claim of JTB. — javra

Here, I wonder whether you misstated your target sentence. Are you talking about a JTB claim for "The planet is physical and roughly spherical" or for "I know that the planet is physical and roughly spherical"? A great deal depends on this, so I'll wait until you reply before going on. — J

Trying to save some space, what I intended by what I wrote is that the proposition of “the planet is physical and roughly spherical” is taken to be an instance of knowledge, thereby being JTB claim (the first option you present). But, yes, it could have been better written.

Again, in fallibilism, no justification (which is always epistemological in its nature) can guarantee the ontological occurrence of some given truth in question. — javra

That's a bit sweeping, isn't it? Certainly, an absolute guarantee of an empirical truth seems to be built in to their definition as contingent. But, if the conditions are met, surely we can guarantee the truth. Then there are the embedded or hinge propositions, which seem beyond the possibility of any coherent or rational doubt. Perhaps our choice is not between fallibilism or infallibilism across the board. After all, not all propositions (candidate truths) are of the same kind. — Ludwig V

I did provide some justification for the claim in my previous post. That justification can either be infallible or fallible presents two alternatives that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Or can anyone show this wrong by producing a third alternative alongside that of infallibility vs. fallibility?

Also, why would “seeming to be beyond the possibility of any coherent or rational doubt” completely/absolutely guarantee the truth of the matter such that there remains no possibility, irrelevant of how small, of being wrong?

As one banal example, why must something which by all accounts appears to all everywhere to be a vase on a table in fact necessarily be a vase on a table—such that it being a vase is true—rather than, say, being an extraterrestrial alien which is camouflaged as a vase, or else an advanced hologram (which maybe operates on all senses, such as that of touch, rather than only on sight), or some such alternative to the truth of it being a physical vase? Despite these possibilities, that it is a physical vase remains beyond the possibility of any coherent or rational doubt (given all the data and justifications available to us).

As I previously said, and as far as I know, all our justifications are always only good enough for the purposes at hand given the time limitations for the justifications we engage in—but they do not ever obtain a state of perfection wherein all possible questions or else issues have been consistently accounted for. And this thereby makes our justifications (here, implicitly understood, justifications for that which is true) less than infallible. They are thereby fallible in the strict technical sense of the word (i.e., liable to some measure of being wrong, irrespective of how small the possibility might be).

It's not enough, for the sentence to be known, that we believe it to be true. It must also be true. — Banno

What bothers me is the interface between belief and reality. "It must be true" is the something more that is required. But once I have assessed the evidence, what more could there be? so I have difficulty in seeing what this amounts to. The best I can come up with is that claims to knowledge, like any other claim, have to be withdrawn if they turn out to be false. There may be cases in which the truth or otherwise of the proposition in question is finally and conclusively determined, but most of the everyday stuff doesn't come up to that standard. So the caution remains in place. — Ludwig V

But Q1c was not about belief, but rather truth. Yes, it follows from believing something that I also believe it to be true, but that's not a reply to Q1c, which asks "Is it true?" Nothing I believe can supply the answer; it depends on the facts.

JTB is supposed to help us evaluate knowledge claims -- keep us epistemologically honest. And on this construal, it can't.
— J
It doesn't tell us if they are true or not, so much as if they are known or not. — Banno


That's what I don't see how to separate. We both agree that only true things can be known. So if JTB tells us that X is known, it must also tell us at the same time that X is true. — J

I find that it helps out a lot to differentiate between the ontological and the epistemological in these matters:

Whether or not a belief is in fact true, and (given our ability to justify it) furthermore known, is a purely ontological issue. The occurrence of a truth—be "truth" defined as a correspondence to that which is actual, a conformity of belief or psyche to what is actual, or in some other such way—is either ontically actual or it is not.

Yet our only means of appraising what is ontological (or else ontically actual)—in this case, the reality of a truth—will be via some form of epistemology; and our utilized epistemology can, in at least theory, be either infallible or else fallible (with no other possibility being available to us).

If our epistemological appraisal of what is ontological happens to be infallible, there then is no possibility that we could be in any way wrong when we appraise a belief to be either true or not.

If—as any fallibilist will maintain—all possible epistemological appraisals can only be fallible, then our appraisal of a belief being either true or not will always be liable to some possibility of being wrong (with the likelihood of this possibility varying by degrees). And this is where (fallible) justification becomes paramount to our appraisal of what is (ontically) true: The quantity of justifications we can engage in can only always be temporally limited: There will always remain some yet awaiting potential “why” which goes unanswered in all that we justify—granting that we do not somehow obtain infallible justifications; our justifications are thereby always good enough for the purposes at hand, but can never be perfected in infallible manners.

Then, if we believe X, entailing that we thereby uphold our “belief that X” is in ontological fact true, and we can justify the X in question which we believe (at least with the epistemological honesty to recognize when our justifications no longer are sound, if they ever so become unsound), then we hold no grounds by which to presume that the truth of X is not in fact an ontologically occurrent given.

Again, in fallibilism, no justification (which is always epistemological in its nature) can guarantee the ontological occurrence of some given truth in question. One would need to have an infallible epistemology to do so. But, so long as one can soundly justify X at will as time permits irrespective of the data and possible counter-reasonings that might eventually surface, one then has no reason to suppose that one’s "belief that X" is not in fact ontologically true.

In short, when a truth occurs, it occurs ontically—and that which ontically is is not subject to the possibility of being wrong, i.e. fallibility. But we can only appraise what ontically is epistemologically, which will always be to some extent fallible.

As with the issue of truth, so too with the issue of knowledge as JTB. Knowledge can be ontologically had: if one’s belief is (ontically) true and one can justify it, one is then ontically in possession of knowledge (which can never be untrue and so can never be mistaken). But figuring out whether or not this is so will always be epistemological—and one’s applied epistemology, again, can either be infallible (in at least theory) or else can only always be fallible. So long as we can soundly, but yet fallibly, justify our “belief that X” to be ontologically true, we then have fallible justification for our “belief that X” to in fact be ontologically occurring knowledge.

To try to reduce possible confusion, how this works in practice: “I know that the planet is physical and roughly spherical,” is a claim of JTB. The justification—although always only good enough for the given purpose and always in some extreme philosophical sense yet fallible—for the belief that I hold being in fact ontologically true has so far always been sound. I thereby have no epistemological reason to presume that this belief which I can soundly justify at will is untrue (ontically). I thereby then have all the reason I need to conclude and uphold that my proposition is an (ontically) true belief I hold which I can (soundly) justify at will—and that it is thereby something I know as an ontological state of affairs, this in the JTB sense of “know”. Still, because this appraisal of what is ontically the case is wholly epistemological and not infallible, I can yet acknowledge that my appraisal of what I in fact know to be the case could in principle—at least hypothetically—be someday discovered to no longer be soundly justifiable, say due to new data. If this day ever arrives such that this proposition cannot at that point be honesty justified, then this belief will be evidenced to in fact be untrue (ontically): it will not in fact conform to that which is actual. And if in fact untrue, then I in fact do not (ontologically) know that which I so far deem to be knowledge.

You can replace the proposition given with any other, and the same will hold. For one example: “I know that 1+1=2”. If pressured, I might not be able to justify why this belief must conform to what is ontically actual in all possible cases (including all possible worlds), but if I can honestly justify it regardless without inconsistencies and if it does indeed happen to conform to that which is ontically actual in all possible cases, then this proposition will yet ontically be knowledge I hold. Same with “I know that I am not a brain in a vat”. Or else more trivial things, such as “I know that tomorrow it will rain”.

I don't deal well with dishonest people - for I don't in any way respect them.

You have a penchant for ignoring the parts of a post that are more crucial. For example, you said:

I would ask you to express which part(s) of it you, in fact, find to be invalid. — javra


But you had already ignored the answer given, namely:

There are different problems, but I think the primary one is the idea that if something does not fulfill some end then it doesn't have that end as a final cause. For example, on that reasoning if an acorn does not grow into an oak tree then it does not have the final cause of an oak tree. But I don't see how that could be right. A teleological ordering does not depend on each individual reaching the end in question. — Leontiskos — Leontiskos

This is not what you originally posted and what I replied to. You might notice that even clicking on the link, as of now, leads one to a post in which no such thing is stated.

Shame. Or maybe the lack of it.

And similarly, in this case you chose to ignore this:

And who cares whether or not it is "ultimate"? Does Aristotle or Aquinas somewhere claim that "ultimate" (whatever that means) ends are not able to be frustrated? — Leontiskos — Leontiskos

Whom else but Aristotle originated to concept of an "unmoved mover"? And this asked of someone whose supposedly an authority on "classical" theology?

Have your last say to make yourself look righteous at the expense of others. I'm done here.

I'm exceedingly serious. As for real arguments ... wake up some. The unmoved mover is the only ultimate telos that there can rationally be - beyond which no other telos occurs.

That's a pretty standard ad hoc response. If an oak tree is not an acorn's ultimate end, then what is? And who cares whether or not it is "ultimate"? Does Aristotle or Aquinas somewhere claim that "ultimate" (whatever that means) ends are not able to be frustrated? — Leontiskos

OK, you. The fully grown acorn become tree is in and of itself a/the unmoved mover of all that exists. You got me.

Dude - or your royal highness, whichever title you prefer going by - acorns becoming trees is NOT an ultimate telos/end. News flash though this might be. God, and only God, is defined as that which is the ultimate end/telos in "classical" theology. But no, there no point in explaining this, especially for one who presumes to be so astute in the subject matter. But wait, this must be "irrationality" on my part.

And here I thought you favored rational discourse. It looks otherwise. So be it.

See, I don't find this argument to be valid. Therefore I would ask you to spell it out further, rather than me guessing at what might get us to the conclusion. — Leontiskos

I already spelled out the argument here:

If eternal hell/damnation in fact does occur, then God cannot logically be the ultimate telos/end of all that exists/occurs - for those eternally damned cannot ever, for all eternity, approach God teleologically as their ultimate end, and this irrespective to changes in their psyche’s constituency and character that might occur over the span of eternity. — javra

Since its you who does not find this argument valid, I would ask you to express which part(s) of it you, in fact, find to be invalid. To be blunt: since you explicitly affirm that you deem the argument to not be valid, then you must know why you deem it invalid.

Is there a particular part of my post that your interpretation is seizing upon? — Leontiskos

Yes, the main part:

On the issue of Hell and punishment there has been a tectonic shift since the 19th century. See for example, "Universalism: A Historical Survey," by Richard Bauckham. What this means is that the propulsion in an anti-Hell direction is more cultural than rational, and the recent works on the subject produce more heat than light.

Here is a basic Thomistic approach:

Article 3. Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment? — Leontiskos

... With all four objections to eternal punishment being if not refuted then denounced - with many offerings of certain portions of scripture.

This is what the "am I reading this right?" question was addressing.

--------

So again, logically, if eternal punishment does in fact occur, is God to then be understood as not being the ultimate telos/end of all that exists?

Interesting. So, in respect to the topic of the OP, this being eternal hell/damnation - rather than any transient period of hell or purgatory, irrespective of how long the latter might end up being:

If eternal hell/damnation in fact does occur, then God cannot logically be the ultimate telos/end of all that exists/occurs - for those eternally damned cannot ever, for all eternity, approach God teleologically as their ultimate end, and this irrespective to changes in their psyche’s constituency and character that might occur over the span of eternity.

Am I reading this right?

You can even see this in church decoration, with the most obvious single item in most Western churches being a crucifix right at the center of the church where all can see, whereas the images that dominate Eastern churches will be Christ Pantocrator (Christ Almighty, Ruler of All) on the central dome of the church (surrounded by icons of the prophets and saints), and at the center of the iconostasis the image of Mary the Theotokos (the Incarnation) and Christ as man (or the "Royal Doors" will also have the Annunciation, Gaberiel announcing the Incarnation to the Blessed Virgin). By contrast, May will be off to the side in a Western Rite Roman Church and generally wholly removed (along with any imagery except for the crucifixion) from most Protestant churches. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To me one very interesting semi-exception to this is Michelangelo’s depiction of the Last Judgment in the Sistine Chapel – this being an aspect of the west rather than the east. It has symbolism galore (including that of the entry into Hell being placed right behind the space where the Pope is meant to stand – maybe as a reminder of why the Pope ought to be and remain someone of virtue and not succumb to corruption) but, maybe most pertinent: if one focuses on the empty spaces of blue rather than on the details of individuals one will make out the outline of a skull – hence of death, or more spiritually appropriate, of the death of ego (this in its dualistic sense wherein there is distinction between self and other - without which there can be no existent corporeal life). God, the Highest Good, being often enough deemed to be egoless awareness of infinite being and understanding which grounds all that exists.

There are three broad paradigms I think one can identify here: infernalism (Hell as temporally unending punishment), annihilationism (the eventual destruction of unrepentant souls, also an "eternal punishment" in that it never ends), and universalism (the eventual reconciliation of all and total destruction of all sin) All seem to be very old and each have been advocated for by some of the universal Fathers and Doctors of the Church (the more influential saints). Notably, most ancient universalists, unlike modern ones, still think people go to Hell, just not forever. Indeed, they tend to think virtually everyone goes to Hell for purgation for some time, Mary and Christ might be the only sure exceptions (and Christ still goes for the Harrowing). And they tend to think salvation and deification come exclusively through Christ (so they would be exclusivists in modern terms). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I won’t here comment much on infernalism – although it can be noted that even certain Buddhist schools of thought share the same roundabout notion of temporary Hell(s) that can occur for some (just as they share the idea of Heaven(s)) – but as to annihilationism and universalism, I’ll present the following hypothesis:

Iff God is the Highest Good as infinite intellect devoid of ego and also ultimate end/telos of all that exists, then the closer the cosmos at large approaches God:

a) The more the identity (here in part defined by the intentions of the individual) of “sinners” (e.g., he who willfully and gleefully commits crime(s) again humanity or it’s parts: as a sub-example, a guy who robs a liquor store at gunpoint simply for the thrill of getting away with it, thereby committing a crime against his fellow men) will by entailment vanish from the cosmos – thereby speaking for annihilationism – for the closer the cosmos at large approaches God’s being the less willful deviation from God’s being of the part of individuals will occur, this by entailment of cosmic proximity to God.

b) The more those who have been and remain relatively aligned with the Highest Good will become increasingly selfless, hence non-egoistic, hence egoless, this until that very ultimate point is reached wherein all perfectly unify with the Highest Good in so becoming perfectly selfless, resulting in a final state of divinely simple, all-encompassing, completely unified, and infinite intellect-endowed-awareness that is utterly devoid of (dualistic) ego. Here, while the identity of sinners irrespective of their degree in so being will all vanish – to include their tendencies of intention (and I presume we can all acknowledge ourselves to be less than completely and perfectly good, hence to engage in some measure of "sin" at least at times), the very essence of their/our being, the very core of who we are so to speak, shall nevertheless persist in living in perfect and complete unity with God. Thereby speaking of universalism.

To be clear, this can only logically apply when assuming the premises of non-physicalism and of the reality of God as the ultimate telos of the Highest Good and the ground of all being as pure, divinely simple, egoless essence of infinite intellect.

But, given these two premises, then annihilationism and universalism seem to me to both be equally entailed in the process of a closer cosmic approach, and hence proximity, to God. And ultimately, likewise, in a complete and perfect unification with God. Within this context of presumptions, there will be a cosmic death of all empirical egos bar none which, in turn, will give birth (so to speak) to the utterly blissful and timeless life of an infinite and divinely simple pure/transcendental ego whose understanding of being (of its own nature) becomes absolute/complete. (Maybe needless to add, at this juncture, then, all forms of infernalism that might have previously taken place for some can only then cease to occur.)

I grant this is utterly different from conceptualizations of being placed either into an Eternal Heaven or else an Eternal Hell after one’s death by an overseeing deity. Also, although it addresses the cosmos at large, there is nothing in any of this to nullify the possibility of a multitude of potentially awaiting non-eternal heavens or hells – this on the way toward the ultimate end of a perfect and complete unification with God.

I mentioned all this to provide my own outlined perspective – be it idiosyncratic or not – regarding the OP’s request for personal thoughts regarding the matter.

----

p.s. Although not customary for Abrahamic religions, there is no cogent reason for why reincarnations in the ream of corporeal being cannot also occur given the premises just addressed. And as we all might know, sometimes, for some, Heaven and Hell are different places on Earth in the here and now.

p.p.s. Forgot to mention, all such proximity to God being then contingent on the free will of individuals, both individually and collectively.

Sorry, that was a joke. — unenlightened

Right. Nothing to look forward to and strive for on the horizon ... because its all nihilism. He, he, and a ha, ha. I'm not laughing, though. After all, this very perspective sort of entails its own meaninglessness.

We don't have many planets, so the Axelrod scenario doesn't apply. — unenlightened

Thee heck are you talking about???

Bearing mind that both Du Chardin and Peirce were believers. — Wayfarer

Yes, very much so.

Peirce obviously not of a conventional type, but makes it clear often enough that he has no intention of disputing the reality of God (per his book A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God). — Wayfarer

From my scattered readings, Peirce equated God to necessary being - such that God thereby occurs throughout all of existence and time, being for one example an aspect of us humans. This rather than being an intentionally creating intellect which served as first efficient cause to existence, and hence to existence's being, at large - one that thereby created us and is therefore as separate from us as we are from a scissor of our own creation and design.

If there are any references to the contrary, I'd be grateful to learn of them.

That said, neither was Teilhard Du Chardin much of the conventional type, devout Christian though he was. As an aside to this, I find interest in his notion of the Omega Point - which gets defined by him as, generally speaking, an ultimate single point of global consciousness devoid of anything else that becomes perfectly unified (for him, furthermore, in perfect convergence with Christ) - which at least seems to share many an aspect with the Neoplatonic notion of the One. It would be differently interpreted, of course, and this in a manner that encompasses the sciences known in his day, that of biological evolution much included, but - at least arguably - both the One and the Omega Point might as terms and concepts hold as referent the same ultimate ontic (though non-physical) reality of "pure/transcendental ego as perfectly unified and sole essence". Anyways, for what its worth, thought I'd mention this.

And, of course, one can easily translate both their metaphysics into one of cosmic logos - a cosmic logos, however, that can at the very least just as well be utterly devoid of a first efficient cause as designer.

You are right and I'm mistaken. My bad. Sorry. — tim wood

Cool, but no need to be sorry. Even a broken clock can be right twice a day, as the saying goes.

Dude, I'm not gonna argue with you as to whether you should be reasonable. Be as unreasonable as you want. To each their own, and their own consequences of belief.

You asked as to where the Principle of Sufficient Reason originated. And to this I replied.

On the assumption you buy your own argument as valid - not a good look for you - what, exactly, do you think you've proved? — tim wood

That if we accept the PSR as a valid first principle of metaphysics, then we infer the existence of a designer and of a first cause with inherent existence (which may or may not be the same). — A Christian Philosophy

The OP does not evidence this claim.

For instance, try to evidence that natural laws are not in fact the global result of all cooccurring existents acting as their material, bottom-up, cause – which, as global laws, then simultaneously in turn formally cause their respective constraints to apply in a top-down fashion to all individual existents in the cosmos.

Note that this reasoning for the occurrence of natural laws dispels the requirement that natural laws occur due to the intentional creation of an intellect – just as it dispels the requirement for a first efficient cause to all that exists as their reason for being.

While it might be true that humans design things, so too do some species of termites intentionally create termite mounds, intentional creation being a from of designing (the list of intentional creations in the spectrum of lifeforms is vast).

And there is no noted reason for why evolution cannot of itself serve as sufficient reason for this ability to intentionally create within the domain of life. If one likes, one can then find reason to expand this same notion of evolution to the cosmos itself – such as via the notion of a cosmically evolving logos. Teilhard’s metaphysics serving as just one example of such an understanding of cosmic evolution; in Teilhard’s view, this cosmic evolution moves toward the omega point. C.S. Peirce’s metaphysics of evolution via Agapism, replete with the evolution of natural laws as cosmic habits, as yet another example of such a perspective. Neither of which logically require there being such a thing as a first efficient cause as intentionally creating intellect to all existents, one that is thereby itself other relative to these existents. (Teilhard's notions are more akin to God being within all beings throughout all time as a perpetually driving force of cosmic evolution toward the omega point). *

As to the question of how it all began, I’ll again mention the possibility that – although the cosmos might have a contingent end as per, for one example, Teilhard’s notions of the omega point – it could nevertheless potentially be utterly devoid of any beginning: such as would be the case were this known universe to be just the latest iteration of a Big Bounce process.

----------

* to make this more explicit:

Teilhard de Chardin wrote two comprehensive works, The Phenomenon of Man and The Divine Milieu.[29]

His posthumously published book, The Phenomenon of Man, set forth a sweeping account of the unfolding of the cosmos and the evolution of matter to humanity, to ultimately a reunion with Christ. In the book, Teilhard abandoned literal interpretations of creation in the Book of Genesis in favor of allegorical and theological interpretations. The unfolding of the material cosmos is described from primordial particles to the development of life, human beings and the noosphere, and finally to his vision of the Omega Point in the future, which is "pulling" all creation towards it. He was a leading proponent of orthogenesis, the idea that evolution occurs in a directional, goal-driven way. Teilhard argued in Darwinian terms with respect to biology, and supported the synthetic model of evolution, but argued in Lamarckian terms for the development of culture, primarily through the vehicle of education.[30]

Teilhard made a total commitment to the evolutionary process in the 1920s as the core of his spirituality, at a time when other religious thinkers felt evolutionary thinking challenged the structure of conventional Christian faith. He committed himself to what he thought the evidence showed.[31]

Teilhard made sense of the universe by assuming it had a vitalist evolutionary process.[32][33] He interpreted complexity as the axis of evolution of matter into a geosphere, a biosphere, into consciousness (in man), and then to supreme consciousness (the Omega Point). Jean Houston's story of meeting Teilhard illustrates this point.[34] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Teilhard_de_Chardin#Teachings

... of note, for Teilhard, who was a devout Christian, this omega point was interpreted a cosmic unification with Christ.

As to Agapism:

In 1893, the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce used the word "agapism" for the view that creative love is operative in the cosmos.[2] Drawing from the Swedenborgian ideas of Henry James, Sr. which he had absorbed long before,[3] Peirce held that it involves a love which expresses itself in a devotion to cherishing and tending to people or things other than oneself, as parent may do for offspring, and as God, as Love, does even and especially for the unloving, whereby the loved ones may learn. Peirce regarded this process as a mode of evolution of the cosmos and its parts, and he called the process "agapasm", such that: "The good result is here brought to pass, first, by the bestowal of spontaneous energy by the parent upon the offspring, and, second, by the disposition of the latter to catch the general idea of those about it and thus to subserve the general purpose."[2] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agapism

---------

All this isn't to argue for any specific metaphysics, but, again, to illustrate that the OP does not evidence the necessity for a first efficient cause as designer of existence. This very much granting the reality of the PSR.

Question: how is it that, what it the reason, I can walk on the sidewalk? Ans.: because it's solid ground. And that's a perfectly good reason. Except it is not true, not even a little bit. Most folks know that atomic-scale spaces are profoundly empty, — tim wood

You're living the grand illusion, I see. Corporeal you, here, being utterly unreal to begin with, this physically, as equally applies to everything and everyone else. Save for the reality of the atomic-scale "spaces of profound emptiness". Okay. Just as long as it ain't spiritualish in its implications, such as might apply to the Eastern notion of maya, right?

-------

Further, if the Principal under discussion is the one attributed to Leibniz, and his reads, "nihil est sine ratione, which I believe is accurate, then from where exactly came the "sufficient"? Because "sufficient" is no part of the PR.

If the PSR is a separate and distinct principal, then by whom and what did he or she have to say about it in terms of any justification. A reason for Leibniz, it seems, was evaluated on practical grounds. — tim wood

Here are some not too hard to look us references for this information:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/
more specifically as to Leibniz and sufficient reason:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/#Leib

Or, as a far more laconic article:

The principle of sufficient reason states that everything must have a reason or a cause. The principle was articulated and made prominent by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, with many antecedents, and was further used and developed by Arthur Schopenhauer and William Hamilton. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_sufficient_reason

At least according to these two references, the PSR was indeed endorsed as such by Leibniz, as per:

In the Monadology, he says,

Our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles, that of contradiction, in virtue of which we judge false that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false; And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known by us (paragraphs 31 and 32). — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_sufficient_reason#Leibniz's_view

Meh. Silly stuff. — Banno

I'll ... um ... endeavor to more strictly communicate which those who are reason-able and thereby give importance to rational thought, this from here on out. Good day, Banno.

no one has provided a reason to think that everything has a reason….


Show me to be mistaken. Set out why every whatever must have a reason.

After all, there must be a reason… — Banno

This, its now worse than rubbish, its bullshit.

Reason provided here.

Unanswered question to justify the point is as follows:

In sum of what ought to not be so readily overlooked, in theoretical principle only, if so much as one occurrence can occur and/or cease occurring in manners devoid of any determinants and hence reasons, then:

By what means can you conclude that the occurrence or disappearance of anything whatsoever is not in fact the same feat of pure nonsense (here, "pure nonsense" being shorthand for an event that holds no determinants, and hence reasons for occurring, whatsoever)? — javra

I can't, and won't, spoon feed you any more than this. Thinking is sometimes far easier said than done.

↪javra
rubbish. — Banno

Is what your reply is. You all of a sudden conflate ontology and epistemology as thought there would be no difference whatsoever between them. And then, instead of giving a reasoned answer to the question placed, reply with what essentially equates to an emotivist "boo".

Yea, rubbish. (I can be emotive too, don't you know.)

---------

Saying this at large and not to Banno:

If not yet amply clear, the Principle of Sufficient Reason no more entails the necessitarianism of causal determinism than it does there being a "first cause" - which is nil. This as per the previously mentioned example of how tychism (i.e., ontic randomness) in a game of soccer can well occur within a cosmos wherein the PSR applies - as it only can for those who maintain any coherent form of rationality.

Why? — Banno

This very question - the act of asking and expecting a cogent answer or else refusing the offered premise - entails and screams out the underlying presumption of the PSR. Else, there'd be no reason to ask.

The movement of an electron to the right instead of to the left is inexplicable, and yet the world has not ended, explanations have not collapsed.

You seem to think that one absent reason implies that there can be no reasons at all. Why? Prima facie that just does not follow. — Banno

What I've done is provide a reason for the Principle at hand, and not purport to thereby know the reasons for each and every last occurrence that is, has been, or will be. An extremely major difference in scope.

In sum of what ought to not be so readily overlooked, in theoretical principle only, if so much as one occurrence can occur and/or cease occurring in manners devoid of any determinants and hence reasons, then:

• By what means can you conclude that the occurrence or disappearance of anything whatsoever is not in fact the same feat of pure nonsense (here, "pure nonsense" being shorthand for an event that holds no determinants, and hence reasons for occurring, whatsoever)?

The supposed principle is let down by three ambiguities. "What is it that it seeks to explain?" "What counts as sufficient?" And "What counts as a reason?". — Banno

A reason is an “aitia”: an account of why, irrespective of the type of account it would be: e.g., causal, teleological, constitutional, or else formal. More technically, one could also address a reason as an account of what determinants (again, irrespective of type, as per the aforementioned examples) in part or in whole determined that addressed – thereby being the reason for the presence or occurrence or being of that addressed.

What is sought to be explained is whatever exists, in particular or in general, in the abstract or in the concrete – this in the present, in the past, in the future, or else atemporally (with natural laws being a possible example of the latter type of existence, this if they indeed never change throughout all of time (not my own point of view but all the same)).

“Sufficient” specifies the following when it comes to causes:

Sufficient causes
If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the subsequent occurrence of y. However, another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the prior occurrence of x.[20] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality#Necessary_and_sufficient_causes

... here, replace "cause" with "reason" and remove the implied necessity that the determinant precedes that which it determines (this not being the case for final causes, material causes, or formal causes). The meaning of "sufficient" will then remain the same for the context of "sufficient reason".

If the PSR does not apply, then at least some occurrences can occur and cease occurring in manners utterly devoid of any conceivable determinants – this irrespective of appearances and beliefs to the contrary, for the latter too could of themselves then be events that hold no conceivable determinants for being or ceasing to be. If this were to in fact be the case, then, quite rationally, the only cogent conclusion is that all epistemology would eventually implode when analyzed: There would then be no means of establishing what, if anything, occurs via some determinants rather than occurring in manners that are utterly “magical” - to use the pejorative meaning of the word. No justification would then rationally hold any water or carry any weight – for that which constitutes the justification could itself in fact be devoid of any substance and, hence, not capable of justifying anything. There could then be no declarative truth, which relies upon justifiability. And there could then be no grounded knowledge or understanding of any sort regarding reality or any aspect of it.

If the PSR does apply, then epistemologies can hold, and thereby knowledge and understanding of what is in fact real and what is not. As too can tychism then cogently hold: the randomness of some events too here will have their reasons, i.e. explanations: for one relatively easy to express example of this, the degree of randomness, if any, in a soccer game’s outcome will be determined by the skill of the respective team members of each team, with each team’s actions being of itself in large part teleologically determined by the final cause – here, more specifically, aim – of winning the addressed game.

To chose against the PSR is to shoot oneself in the foot in terms of reasoning, philosophy, knowledge, and the like. Or, at best, is to revert to a literal interpretation of "it is so because I so state it is" - which is not any better.

----------

That offered, the PSR says nothing about there needing to be a first cause to all that is – existence could just as conceivably be devoid of any ascertainable beginning, with our current physical universe being only the latest iteration an any number of prior Big Bounces or the like – to not even start on the PSR saying nothing about the notion of a grand omni-this-and-that “designer” deity.

So why on earth would someone explore deeply into their tradition of inherited norms to determine how to best act? It would arise from a respect of tradition and a recognition of the successes such a tradition has previously yielded. — Hanover

I've acknowledged the importance of tradition previously via the Crane quote.

But this then can raise the question of whether - for one example currently pertinent to the ethics of the US populace - such a thing as Christian Nationalism's desire to hold onto its Christian traditions ethically outweighs the very teachings of Jesus Christ himself - the latter, more often than not, stand in direct contradiction to the ethos of the former. A Christianity that holds no respect for what its official founder honored and desired ... sounds exceedingly vacuous - as something that JC's spirit might itself be utterly antagonistic to and angry about - at least to me.

And then you have various other traditions from all over the world, Judaic, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Inuit, and so on; none of which can cohabitate peacefully were each tradition to vie for a power over all others, this so as to remain in no way altered by any other, believing itself the sacred pinnacle around which all of life and sacredness and morality revolves.

Via examples such as these I then uphold that: Yes, tradition of course has its importance, but it ought not be the be-all and end-all to ethics and ethical conduct, very much including in relation to the so called "righteousness of rules".

To use previously addressed concepts and terminology: tradition does not of itself equate to that which is the Good - also addressed as "God" by some - and tradition, irrespective of what it might be, can only be good when it is aligned with the latter.

So when we have lots of crises with human induced climate change, we might learn to deal with it, eventually. — unenlightened

One can only hope. But it is certain not to happen devoid of involvement, and maybe even commitment, on the part of most members of humanity in sharing at the very least this common cause. And, although the details might be lacking, such can only then signify a global governance of one form or another. May it indeed be one of moral rectitude.

I of course grant a good portion of what you say. Yet to my knowledge there are many variants of Judaism, with Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform branches being only very general examples of these. And if we for further example go back into antiquity, prior to the Maccabean Revolt, there were great sums of Hellenized Jews in Judeia.

As to the first question as to how one would not make the two compatible, would be someone who accepted a very strict divine command theory, where textual support or reference to oral tradition is analyzed for the rule one is to follow.

That tends to be the approach of orthodox Judaism, as an example. — Hanover

Slightly bringing this back into the purview of the general notion of the Good / the One: Kabbalah teachings, including those of the tree of life, are pivoted upon the Ein Sof - which holds the very same attributes as the Good (as previously discussed in this thread). This says it better than I can:

Ein Sof, or Eyn Sof (/eɪn sɒf/, Hebrew: אֵין סוֹף‎ ʾēn sōf; meaning "infinite", lit. '(There is) no end'), in Kabbalah, is understood as God before any self-manifestation in the production of any spiritual realm, probably derived from Solomon ibn Gabirol's (c.1021–c.1070) term, "the Endless One" (שֶׁאֵין לוֹ תִּקְלָה šeʾēn lo tiqlā). Ein Sof may be translated as "unending", "(there is) no end", or infinity.[1] It was first used by Azriel of Gerona (c. 1160 – c. 1238), who, sharing the Neoplatonic belief that God can have no desire, thought, word, or action, emphasized by the negation of any attribute. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ein_Sof

This then being - or at least gives all indication of being - the very same ontic reality interpreted via different filters of culture and reasoning.

I know it can get complex, but this reference for example illustrates that the Kabbalah and Orthodox Judaism are by no means two separate belief systems. Nor does the Kabbalah seem to in any way be a fringe system of beliefs in respect to Judaism at large, including when considering Orthodox Judaism.

Here, then, there appears to be a good amount of theological reasoning involved in relation to the nature of God and reality to total - and this in respect to Orthodox Judaism.

It so far feels like you are unfairly pigeonholing most of what Judaism consists of.

While this last suggestion might seem odd, it does to some degree describe the Judaic view, where faith in the existence of God is really not all that important from a daily living or eternal reward perspective. What is important is knowing the rule, studying the rule and following the rule. Faith, under this system, is in the righteousness of the rule, not in the existence of God himself. But always most important in not what you beleive and why you believe, but what you do. — Hanover

This is very easy to say, but exceedingly difficult to in any way comprehend. Should one understand that "duty and adherence" to "the righteousness of the rule" is done for no reason, motive, whatsoever? Unless what one addresses are automata - rather than sentient people - this can only be utter nonsense. And if there is some motive for so doing, this motive has nothing to do with "the existence reality of God" playing an important role in "a daily living or eternal reward benefit perspective"??? What other plausible reason could there be for "the righteousness of the rule"?