The fact that two people could exchange information about their minds without also exchanging information about their brains suggests minds aren't brains.

And, generally that's correct about colors/ There are numerous pathways that are used to interpret sight, the thalamus, a couple visual cortexes, and the occipital lobe all work togethor to piece things to gather rapidly in accordance with the natural properties of that being processes in sight. — Garrett Travers

What is your position on Mary's Room?

A disappointing response.

Brain states are mental states. — Garrett Travers

Imagine we have two ancient Greeks conversing about their mental states. They talk about being happy to see their kids grow up, and about the aches and pains of being old. You would agree they are exchanging meaningful information about their mental states with each other, right?

Now, let's stipulate that these ancient Greeks had no idea what the brain does. Even worse, they believe the function of the brain is to cool the blood. And yet, if mental states are brain states, and the two Greeks are meaningfully exchanging information about their mental states, it follows that they are also meaningfully exchanging information about their brain states. But that is clearly impossible, since they have no idea what brain states even are, and are clueless about what the function of the brain is.

Brain states are mental states. — Garrett Travers

Are you saying mental states are identical to brain states?

But you are adding an additional premise, namely that there is only one mind. — Bartricks

But that premise solves the question of where moral imperatives come from: there are no moral imperatives. If all that exists is one cosmic mind, how is there any morality? Does the one mind have moral imperatives as to how it treats itself?

Adding that premise would not challenge the conclusion that divine command theory is true, it would just mean that you yourself are God.

Right.

Yet of course, you have good evidence that you are not God, for you do not appear to be omnipotent, omniscient or omnibenevolent. Moral norms, and the norms of Reason more generally, do not seem to be emanating from you. So the additional premise seems unjustified.

It is very counter-intuitive. However, it doesn't seem impossible that a god could choose to experience things in a very limited way. If the goal is to experience as much as possible, then retaining the attributes of godhood would limit the experiences a god could have. I mean, a god can't very well experience things as a lowly human like me unless it becomes a lowly human like me (and bacteria, and virus, and aphid, and all the other limited things that are capable of having experiences).

The solipsist version of idealism you refer to is not characteristic of idealism per se. Idealism doesn't imply solipsism.

Right.

↪SwampMan I am a divine command theorist. I arrived at the view after reflecting on the following argument:

1. Moral imperatives are imperatives of reason
2. Imperatives of reason have a single source: Reason
3. Only a mind issues imperatives
4. Therefore, moral imperatives are the imperatives of a single mind
5. The single mind whose imperatives are the imperatives of reason will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God).

What mistake have I made? — Bartricks

As an idealist who believes that there is only one cosmic mind (and we are dissociated aspects of it- separateness is an illusion), I would argue there are no moral imperatives, there is only a single cosmic mind dreaming and experiencing. Some of the dreams are horrific, but are bad dreams immoral? Is there a moral imperative for God to dream nothing but good dreams?

:up:

Sounds like you are already a believer but I wonder if this is an argument from ignorance at work. Personally I am sympathetic to mysterianism. The question of climate change and other physically understood problems will matter a lot more in this timeframe than resolving the consciousness puzzle. Are you an idealist along Kastrup lines? — Tom Storm

Pretty much, and I admit that if science can't solve the hard problem, the needle may never swing further than mysterianism, but deep down, I don't think people will accept that as an answer. I think idealism and dualism will become more popular with a corresponding dip in materialism. That could be my own bias.

I like a lot of what Kastrup says.

I know this is not to me but... do facts run to a stopwatch? :wink: What if it takes 200 years? And it isn't just science that hasn't resolved these questions- - there is no agreed upon account outside of science or physicalism either. If we still can't explain consciousness using a superphysical explanation in 100 years, will people start questioning the assumption that consciousness is magic spirit? — Tom Storm

Facts don't run on a stopwatch, but explanations do, to some extent. For the longest time, dark matter was thought to be some type of particular. It still is, but you're seeing more and more people kicking around the idea that it's not a particle. As the failed dark matter experiments pile up, the theory that dark matter isn't a particular becomes more and more popular.

In the case of consciousness, if science can't explain it 1,000 years from now, I fully expect people to have abandoned the assumption that mind comes from matter. It will happen a lot sooner than that.

Progress on the easy problem is made, sure. On the hard problem? What progress is there? Integrated Information Theory is all the rage, but it's still just that: a theory. Suppose that in 100 years, IIT is still just a theory. 1,000 years? At what point do we start questioning the assumption that consciousness comes from matter?

You claim that computer consciousness is a possibility, and you have an explanation for how computers might be conscious, but how would you verify whether that explanation is true or not? For example, you would claim that that computer over there is conscious because xyz, while I would claim that it's not conscious because abc. If both of our explanations are coherent, how do we determine who is correct?

Some claim that consciousness or intelligence is fundamental, but at present we have no way to settle the issue one way or the other. We cannot even come to agreement on terms. What does it mean to be conscious? What counts as evidence of consciousness? It the self-organization of matter an intelligent process? Is the ability to complete complicated tasks an indication of intelligence? — Fooloso4

Do you see this as a problem for science? If science still has not made progress on these fundamental questions, say, a century from now, do you think people will start questioning the assumption that consciousness can come from matter?

You're not being honest.

The arguments as to why this is a good thing are still lost on me. — NOS4A2

Imagine a society that is 99% white and 1% black, but which has an all-black Supreme Court. What would you infer about that society?

Great post.

Fair enough. I enjoyed our conversation!

:100:

Gradual uploading: Here the most widely-discussed method is that of
nanotransfer. One or more nanotechnology devices (perhaps tiny robots) are
inserted into the brain and each attaches itself to a single neuron, learning to
simulate the behavior of the associated neuron and also learning about its
connectivity. Once it simulates the neuron’s behavior well enough, it takes the
place of the original neuron, perhaps leaving receptors and effectors in place and
uploading the relevant processing to a computer via radio transmitters. It then
moves to other neurons and repeats the procedure, until eventually every neuron
has been replaced by an emulation, and perhaps all processing has been uploaded
to a computer
http://consc.net/papers/uploading.pdf

What do you think would happen to your consciousness if you had that done to you?

Suppose we make a functional equivalent to a working brain out of transistors, rheostats, and other electronics. Would it be conscious?
— RogueAI

No. — Garrett Travers

ETA: Scratch what I just said.

I'm an immaterialist. I don't agree the comic, but I've had discussions with computationalists who do. Your position sounds like computationalism, but you seem uncomfortable exploring what a conscious computer would entail.

Let's talk about functional equivalents. Suppose we make a functional equivalent to a working brain out of transistors, rheostats, and other electronics. Would it be conscious?

The logical equivalent of your line of inquiry is asking me if I'm talking about heat-sinks, or circuits. — Garrett Travers

"In the digital world, a transistor is a binary switch and the fundamental building block of computer circuitry."
https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/transistor#:~:text=In%20the%20digital%20world%2C%20a,or%20even%20billions%20of%20transistors.

Ok, let's move away from switches, since they obviously have nothing to do with computing :roll:

Check this out:
https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php/505:_A_Bunch_of_Rocks

What part do you disagree with?

At the heart of a computer is the microprocessor, which is a collection of transistors, which is to say that the heart of a computer is a bunch of tiny switches.

Hey, you're the one that said computer consciousness is possible.

Really now, Garrett. Are you claiming transistors have nothing to do with computers?

You know, not switches and stuff. — Garrett Travers

Transistors?

What do you mean by "computer"?

No. That's not what I'm saying. Not in any conceivable manner could I possibly have been misconstrued to have said such a thing. — Garrett Travers

A computer is not a collection of electronic switches?

Are computers ever going to be conscious?
— RogueAI

Not anytime soon, but possibly. — Garrett Travers

So you believe computer consciousness is possible. That is to say that it is possible that a collection of electronic switches is conscious. Is that correct?

How it works was told to you. Why it works, is an anthropomorphization of reality. There is no why, there is only how. Organs are themselves specialized structures not designed to produce such activity. The way those organs were specialized through genetic information exchange and adaptation, is the same process by which the brain is specialized through genetic information exchange and adaptation. The result of billions of years of chemical interactions.

As far as these questions: What is so special about neurons? Would a brain with 70 billion neurons produce consciousness? 7 billion? 7 thousand?

What's not special about neurons? What brain has only 70 billion? Do they have consciousness? These are questions for you to answer with the info you've been given, and the info broadly available to you. I'm a philosopher, in particular an ethicist, not a neuroscientist. You're asking the wrong person. — Garrett Travers

Let's focus on computers. Would a computer running a simulation of a working brain be conscious? Are computers ever going to be conscious? Are any computers now conscious? How would you test for computer consciousness?

Through chemical interactions across 80 billion neurons. — Garrett Travers

How does that work? Why do chemical interactions across 80 billion neurons produce consciousness, but chemical reactions in other organs don't? What is so special about neurons? Would a brain with 70 billion neurons produce consciousness? 7 billion? 7 thousand?

Consciousness is actually NOT only associated with some parts of the brain, but all of them working in unison.

But damage to the brain (e.g., minor stroke) doesn't always result in a change in consciousness. And some damage to the brain causes extreme changes in consciousness. Some parts of the brain are clearly more involved in consciousness than others. And some brain activity is completely unconscious. Why is that?

If it were truley functionally equivalent in reality, yes.

So suppose we set up a huge system of pumps, valves, and running water and it was functionally equivalent to a working brain, and we ran it for a second. Would it be conscious? If so, how is that not magical thinking?

What about a simulation of a working brain? Would that be conscious? Can computers be conscious? Are any computers today conscious? How would you test for computer consciousness?

How does the brain cause mental states? Why is consciousness only associated with some parts of the brain? Would something that's functionally equivalent to a brain also be conscious? What about a simulated brain?

All states, short of illnesses of certain types, are produced by the brain. Mental states are a result of neural activity in association with chemicals that are part of the intrinsic function of the brain. — Garrett Travers

But are mental states identical to brain states? It sounds like you're saying mental states are caused by brain states.

I've regarded consciousness as a neural function that is emitted, or generated as a result of all the functions of the brain working as a synchronized catena of systems. — Garrett Travers

Do you think mental states are identical to brain states? Or mental states are caused by physical states?

The problem is, we have no idea whether they can take on arbitrary values, or indeed whether they can even take on any values other than the observed ones. — Seppo

The current thinking is that the values could have been other than what they are. They are not derivable, at present.

Some thoughts.

First, what does this have to do with the multiverse? — T Clark

Going back to the sharpshooter analogy, you seem to agree that it's reasonable to conclude the shooters missed you by design. The execution was "rigged" in your favor. But pretend that instead of just you being executed, you live in a huge multiverse and there are 100 bazillion (where "bazillion" is a very very large number) you's being executed by sharpshooters at the same time. In a big enough multiverse, just by random chance, there will be a few worlds where the sharpshooters all DO miss by random chance and/or suffer simultaneous equipment malfunctions. In those cases, it now becomes reasonable to believe in the following disjunct when you find yourself alive after the order to fire is given: either they all missed on purpose OR I live in a very large multiverse, and I happen to be in a world where they all missed on accident. That's how the multiverse defeats the fine-tuning argument.

[joke]Second, for 100 shooters to be 10 feet away, they would have to be in a circle with less than a foot of space to stand each. If they shot at you, they would be very likely to hit each other. Clearly they all shot in the air or into the ground. [/joke]

Seriously - Sure. I know about how likely it is that one shooter, much less a hundred, would miss me, so I would assume a non-accidental reason. But I have no idea what the probability of a universe which could support intelligent life is. The only way we could know that is if we had more than one universe to look at. A sample size of one provides absolutely no information about the frequency of the relevant property except that it is greater than 0.
3 hours ago

I think we can make some reasonable assumptions that a universe with no atoms would not support life, nor a universe that exists for a second before collapsing in on itself, nor a universe with no stars, etc.

Getting the multiverse involved is meaningless and confusing. — T Clark

I don't think so, and a great way of showcasing this is the following analogy:
http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/Nave-html/Faithpathh/Leslie.html


I think two things happen if you're still alive after a bunch of sharpshooters try and shoot you: you'd be surprised by your existence and you would conclude it wasn't an accident that you're alive. I think it's directly analogous to the fine-tuning argument.

In Bayesian terms, Pr(E/H) would be very low, where E is your existence and H is "all sharpshooters just happened to miss". Pr (E/~H) would be through the roof (~H being the design hypothesis: "all sharpshooters missed by design" (on purpose))

Benatar is assuming that there can be moral value in the absence of any and all valuers. And that makes no sense. — Bartricks

I agree. It's hard to see how morality exists in a personless universe.

:100:

How does the relation "X is west of Y" exist in a universe with no minds? What's the ontological status of that relation?