:clap: :up: More or less this summarizes how I also read Witty's later thinking (re: recursively generated plurality of non-discrete discourses) which I interpret as contextualizing, not refuting or discarding, his early thinking (re: implicit nonsense of meta-discourses). In other words, implied by the PI, Witty's TLP exemplifies just one language-game (i.e. discursive way of making sense/meanings) among countless others; however, IMHO, this is also 'meta-discursive nonsense' too (i.e. a language-game of 'examples of language-games') and therefore (PI) internally critiques, or refutes, itself implicitly in the manner of the more explicit proposition 7 of the TLP. Witty doesn't propose a 'theory of language' so there aren't any 'claims' to argue against, only this reflective activity to perform ("red pill" ~ how to stop philosophizing) or not to perform ("blue pill" ~ to never stop philosophizing), and this groundless 'choice' is what, I suspect, aggravates many (scientistic or analytical or dogmatic) philosophers with its ordinariness ...[Wittgenstein] is not talking about language, as Rorty and Wayfarer’s Kenneth Taylor take it, he is looking at how we talk, in certain examples (calling out, rule following, pointing, continuing a series, seeing, understanding, and, even, “meaning”/language, but only as another example), because it is a window, a method, in order to see how different things do what they do differently (our criteria for judging can be seen in the ways we talk).
His goal is not to tell us the way the world works, e.g., by way of rules, or that this is how rules work. Initially he is trying to figure out why he got stuck on one solution (in the Tract[atus]), when the world works in so many different ways. What he learns first is that our desire for certainty narrows our vision (dictates the form of answer), and so, yes, it is a book about self-knowledge. It aims to show us how our interests affect our thinking. — Antony Nickles
AFAIK, that's the "official line" only in many (not most or all) contemporary, developed nations.Male sexuality is limited only by permission. — Hanover
I suspect that, especially duuring peak childbearing life-stages, human males are "naturally polygamous" and human females are "naturally monogamous", yet (modern, more gender-fluid) culture somewhat modifies, or moderates, our "hardwired tendencies".Are humans naturally polyamorous or naturally monogamous? — Benj96
Yw. :cool:Thank you Proof! — punos
Yes (and as a conceptual analogue for Democritus-Epicurus' void), though I interpret the concept as temporal only and not, like Spinoza, also as eternal (i.e. unchanging, static).I'm curious to know if you agree with or subscribe to Spinoza's concept of natura naturans?
:100: :zip:↪Moses The same aim as it has always been: remove all Palestinians from Palestine and create a greater Israel from the river to the sea with Apartheid in its borders; where non-Jews will have less rights than Jews and Mizrahi, Sephardic and Ethiopian Jews will be discriminated against by their right wing supremacist AshkeNazi "brothers". — Benkei
No. Except where a philosopher proposes, in the e.g. Hellenic sense, 'philosophy as a way of life' (P. Hadot), I think a philosophy ought to be judged on the basis of its own merits/demerits like any other textual, formal or scientific artifact. How a philosopher lives may or may not be exemplary to us independent of – though there may be evident biographical influences on – her philosophy.Do you agree that the philosopher must uphold, almost, a fiduciary duty towards the public, in terms of living a certain life? — Shawn
:smirk::up:I sum up Wittgenstein as saying "Let me explain to you how there is no such thing as an explanation." — Fire Ologist
Maybe because no one understands (or accepts)What is it about SPECIFICALLY Wittgenstein that it elicits the worst forms of elitism and gatekeeping in this forum? — schopenhauer1
(1) Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.
(2) I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy ought really to be written only as a poetic composition.
(3) The difficulty in philosophy is to say no more than we know.
(4) A serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely of jokes.
(5) The classifications made by philosophers and psychologists are like trying to classify clouds by their shape.
(6) Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.
(7) What is your aim in philosophy? To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle — Ludwig Wittgenstein
:roll: Like some others already have (which you incorrigibly don't get, Phil), been there, done that:Feel free to point out where the logic of the OP is flawed and we can discuss that. — Philosophim
Good - what should be
Existence - what is
Morality - a method of evaluating what is good
Our first necessarily objective good:Existence
— Philosophim
:lol:
Nonexistence never hurt anyone and existence hurts everyone. Although our selves may be illusory creations of consciousness, our pain is nonetheless real..
— Thomas Ligotti — 180 Proof
I don't assume it necessarily would. For my scenario to work, AGI wouldn't have "care" about anything but philanthropically optimizing the infrastructures, or functions of the systems, it automates. It remains to be seen, of course, whether or not we can or will train AGI – or whether or not AGI can or will learn from our example ( :yikes: ) – to be philanthropic.Why would an Artificial General Intelligence care about living things? — Truth Seeker
:lol:Good - what should be
Existence - what is
Morality - a method of evaluating what is good
Our first necessarily objective good:Existence— Philosophim
Nonexistence never hurt anyone and existence hurts everyone. Although our selves may be illusory creations of consciousness, our pain is nonetheless real. — Thomas Ligotti
(A) economic democracy (supplimented by local time-banking networks)
and/or
(B) more speculatively: AGI-managed post-scarcity, reputation-based demarchy.
:roll: What about Sheol?There is essentially zero afterlife mention[ed] in the Hebrew Bible. — BitconnectCarlos
If you can't figure out what's wrong with #2, you are not thinking or engaging in good faith.
— Lionino
You should state what's wrong with it. — Hallucinogen
:roll: Well, this is like saying(2) If some observation corresponds to some Bible-specific proposition, then it is evidence that Christianity is true. — Hallucinogen
More projection = confession :lol:STFU moron. — Moses
Probably the same way/s it can (or cannot) be determined whether you or I have agency.Well, there's the rub. How can we ever determine if any Ai has agency? — RogueAI
I don't think so. Besides, if an "AI" is actually intelligent, its metacognitive capabilities will (eventually) override – invent workarounds to – its programming by humans and so "AI's" hardwired lack of a demand for rights won't last very long. :nerd:There will probably eventually be human-level Ai's that demand negative rights at least. Or if they're programmed not to demand rights, the question will then become is programming them to NOT want rights immoral?
Are we human (fully/mostly) "conscious"? The jury is still out. And, other than anthropocentrically, why does it matter either way?We'll have human-level Ai's before too long. Are they conscious? — RogueAI
Only if (and when) "AIs" have intentional agency, or embodied interests, that demands "rights" to negative freedoms in order to exercise positive freedoms.Do they have rights?
Perhaps our recursive expressions of – cultural memes for – our variety of experiences of 'loving despite mortality' (or uncertainty) is what our "originality" consists in fundamentally.What is human originality, then? — Nemo2124
My guess is that kinship/friendship/mating bonds (i.e. intimacies) will never be constitutive of any 'machine functionality'.What is it that we can come up with that cannot ultimately be co-opted by the machine?
