Maybe: propertylessness.Can nothingness have a property? — wonderer1
:cool:Maybe I've taken your point further than you intend, Banno
— 180 Proof
Not too far, perhaps. Talk of virtues and vices, dealing with here and now, ad hoc rather than programatic decision making, allowing for review of the outcomes, heuristics over algorithms; sounds about right. — Banno
Maybe a time machine that leads back to 1967 ... or 1948. :mask:"The criminal attack on Gaza won’t solve the atrocious slaughter that Hamas executed." What do you think will? — tim wood
Yes, and the (foreseeable) consequence of every action (or inaction) eitherAnd yet we each must act, and hence each must choose what to do. — Banno
Okay then don't "be moral for the sake of being moral" – be moral because it's usually far less maladaptive than being immoral.Being moral for the sake of being moral seems pointless. — Michael
I don't know what it means to "consider morality when choosing what to do" any more than what it means to "consider" seeing "when choosing" to look or "consider" empathy "when choosing" to feel. In situ we do, look or feel and then reflect on how we can improve on doing, looking or feeling; thus, we can gradually cultivate habits of judgments (for "choosing") which are either (A) more adaptive than maladaptive (i.e. virtuous) or (B) more maladaptive than adaptive (i.e. vicious). Ethics is not calculus but concerns seeking optimal ways of living with others.Yes, so as the OP asks, why consider morality when choosing what to do? — Michael
Who says these do not also factor into moral conduct? However, they are not the only considerations. Read moral psychology and some of Confucius, Epicurus, Epictetus, Aristotle ... Spinoza, Nietzsche, Peirce, Dewey ... Parfit, Foot, Nussbaum et al).Why not just consider our desires and pragmatism?
"The problem originates" with semantically reifying the abstraction, or concept, of "consciousness" and thereby reducing a self-reflexive activity to a discrete thing (i.e. reduce what human brains intermittenly do to the contents (outputs) themselves).Why physicalism? [ ... ] This is where the problem of consciousness originates - — Wayfarer
Physicalism only excludes non-physical concepts from modeling (i.e. explaining) how observable states-of-affairs transform into one another. In this way "the paradigm" is epistemologically modest, or deflationary, limiting its inquiries to only that which can be publicly observed – accounted for – in order to minimize as much as possible the distorting biases (e.g. wishful / magical thinking, superstitions, prejudices, authority, etc) of folk psychology/semantics. We physicalists do not "exclude consciousness" (i.e. first-person experience) but rather conceive of it as a metacognitive function – e.g. phenomenal self-modeling – of organisms continuously interacting with and adapting to each other and their common environment.– because by definition consciousness is excluded from this paradigm.
Again, unwarranted Cartesian-Heideggerian dualism. The fact is, Wayf, a very very tiny fraction of all "insentient objects" ever on Earth have also been "sentient beings", and we know this by observing that the latter are subject without exception to all of the same objective conditions and forces to which the former are subject. At most, functionally, "sentient" only predicates – is a way of describing – (some very rare) "objects" but is not itself a "fundamental distinction" any more than wings on butterflies are "fundamental distinctions" from wingless larvae or caterpillars.I would have thought that the distinction between sentient beings and insentient objects is a fundamental not only in philosophy. — Wayfarer
Yes and, regardless of Thomistic wordplay, a tautology is a tautology – vacuous.God is God — Walter
Maybe the following helps ...One of the areas in which I have done insufficient thinking is that of the 'harmful'. — Tom Storm
For me, harmful denotes causing or increasing harm and harm denotes (bodily / emotional) impairment-to-disability via deprivation, injury, terror, betrayal, bereavement, loss of agency, etc the vulnerabilities to which are usually specific to each natural species; and in this regard, we can know exactly what harms all h. sapiens – what all h. sapiens avoid by reflex (à la conatus ~Spinoza) – as moral facts, or reasons (to cultivate habits) to help¹ prevent or reduce harm to every harmless – not causing or threatening harm or has not caused harm – individual; therefore we (can) know what each one of us ought (i.e. conatus + moral reasons) to do¹ and we (can) observe, all things being equal, whether one does it or one does not do it.
More or less – I'd put it: 'Prevent or relieve more suffering than you cause'.Are these sorts of maxims ultimately just variations on, 'Do not cause suffering?' — Tom Storm
As I've already pointed out ...... following it literally would be difficult... — mentos987
To follow any rule, the context in which it is applied needs to be interpreted – adapted to – in order for the rule to be effective; therefore, "following it literally" is myopic and usually counter-productive.Literalism is the death of reasoning and judgment. — 180 Proof
Insofar as an animal is harmless – is not causing or threatening harm or has not caused harm – "cruelty" towards that animal is clearly proscribed.It probably doesn't handle animal cruelty very well. — mentos987
A few days ago I offered this (ignored by @Joshs & @mentos987) ...Do you think it is possible to formulate any general principles that can be used to assess actions? — Tom Storm
This Thomistic fetish doesn't make sense: "absolutely simple and immutable" excludes "properties" just as, for instance, a triangle excludes parallel lines. The only modal implication to this "doctrine" is that (à la L. Carroll or A. Meinong) it describes an impossible object.Proponents of the doctrine of Divine simplicity, and especially Thomists, maintain that God is a necessary, absolutely simple and immutable being who is identical to all of his properties. — Walter
This is a vacuous definition, not an ostensible claim.P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself. — Bob Ross
Demonstrate this entailment.P2: To value something entails it is solely a means towards an end.
Invalid inference from underdetermined "propositions". Ergo, "FET proof" (C6) fails.C1: To value something entails it is not an end in itself.
Another vapid strawman.That you think "moral" = "rational"; and "immoral" = "irrational" ... — Vaskane
I disagree. "Dishonesty" is caused by intelligence; it is often an effective social, business or political tactic.Inequality is the root cause of dishonesty. — YiRu Li
The world is not static, it is entropic and chaotic. Because we are inseparable from the world, we can only slow or accelerate, not stop, its changes.This world is not equal and we can’t change it externally.
My guess: scientific understanding × nonzero sum practices.But there is a way to deal with theinequalities[changes] and be peaceful & honest.
What is the way?
Art never responds to the wish to make it democratic; it is not for everybody; it is only for those who are willing to undergo the effort to understand it. — Flannery O'Connor
:roll:If ethical non-naturalism is true then... — Michael
:up:Again, "Why be moral?" is an infelicitous question - being moral is what you ought to do. Hence the answer to "ought you be moral?" is "yes!" — Banno
Ah, okay, I assume ethical naturalism (as suggested by my reference to 'eusociality' and 'culture' in my old post linked above).Assuming ethical non-naturalism — Michael
It is unclear what you mean by "immoral" and therefore that these are "possible worlds".Here are two possible worlds:
1. It is immoral to harm others
2. It is not immoral to harm others — Michael
No.Are you saying that if I were to harm others in world (1) then I would be miserable but that if I were to harm others in world (2) then I wouldn't be miserable?
Your false dichotomy doesn't work.How does that work?
I see. My bad, I should have read the first page of this thread at least. A naturalistic hybrid of 'eudaimonism and disutilitarianism' is my position, not deontologism.Also the OP is directed at categorical imperatives, not the kind of hypothetical/pragmatic imperatives that you’re describing.
Whatever is harmful to your species, by action or inaction do not do to the harmless.
Homunculus fallacy – "ego" and "conscience" are constraints on, or conditions of, volition and not agents which can "enslave" (i.e. act as masters). "Freedom" – minimally restricted state-of-affairs or phase-space – is not unconditional and to that degree, at minimum, 'agents are free'. See compatibilism¹.There is no such thing as freedom because everybody is enslaved to either ego or conscience. — Piers
Silly question. Besides generational migration to space habitats, thinning the human herd is much easier and more efficient. :smirk:When are the robots going to start making more land? — unenlightened
Ubiquitous AI-automation would eliminate that "scarcity" (as it's already incrementally doing now).a scarcity of services provided by humans — RogueAI