Comments

  • Understanding the Christian Trinity
    :100: :up:

    @universeness – Time is conventionally conceived of as consisting in past, present and future tenses and their simultaneity denotes eternity. The JCI deity is conceived of as 'eternal' which imples that all of the modes – personas – of its being simultaneously exist (like 'experiential time tense' in a block universe). 'One face, three masks' – from the believer's temporal perspective.

    Btw, the Christian Trinity has nothing on the even more ancient Hindu Trimūrti. As Nietzsche points out, theological religion is "Platonism for the masses", or an imaginative way to stimulate some degree of reflective thinking with regard to our place in 'the grand scheme' for those without the leisure or inclination to explicitly philosophize. As much as we'd like to think so, religion hasn't yet outlived its utility because the atavistic emotional need for 'invisible support' still remains for so many in so many places.
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    If the mental cannot be explained in terms of the physical then the physical cannot be explained in terms of the mental.Fooloso4
    :up:

    But the point of the hard problem of consciousness argument is precisely that no amount of objective analysis can capture the first-person experience.Wayfarer
    In other words, a map (analysis ~ respresentation) is not informationally equivalent to its territory (experience) because a territory (experience) is
    computationally irreducible (otherwise it would be a map (analysis ~ representation)). There's no "hard problem", just a typical idealist / antirealist category error.

    @Bob Ross
  • Mind over matter: the mind can slow ageing.
    Negentropy decreases entropy....Pantagruel
    :roll:

    Correction: Local "negentropy" increases global entropy.
  • Why Monism?
    You can choose to accept pluralism, like William James and simply marvel at the multifaceted aspects of the world - this is valuable and instructive especially in terms of aesthetic appreciation. But it won't get you far, it seems to me to stop the search for underlying principlesManuel
    As long as it's a dynamic, nonreductive monism, I'm cool with it. :up:
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    The brain is part of an organism. Physicalism need not be reductive physicalism. The recognition that a living organism can be conscious, is not reductive. To look at an organism as a whole is not reductive physicalism. To claim that consciousness must come from elsewhere because a physical explanation must be reductive is misguided.Fooloso4
    :100: :fire:
  • Why Monism?
    :up: :up:
  • Mind over matter: the mind can slow ageing.
    Local "negentropy" only increases global entropy. "Mind" is an effect – recursive output – of a complexity which cannot decrease (re: dissipative structure). Given that cell senescence limits replication damage and slows the development of cancers which adaptively benefits an organism, birth, as they say, is the fundamental cause of death. One day, however, technosciences – products of "mind" – might provide some means to extend self-continuous brain functioning ("I, me, mine") to a nonbiological substrate in order to escape the rapid cell senescence of somatic biology. Until then, Benj, biological aging decay death is constitutively a priori (R. Brassier) and therefore mind-invariant.
  • Why Monism?
    The concept of information refers to a formalist (i.e. computational) description of systematic transformations (i.e. entropy), the necessary and sufficient conditions of which are its instantiation in physical processes. In other words, a "ghost" (i.e. disembodied – non-instantiable – string of operations) is nothing but an empty name.

    (... an operational definition rather than a platonic reification fallacy ...)

    @Gnomon @Wayfarer @Janus @Fooloso4

    Thoughts?
  • Science as Metaphysics
    How do you respond to the claim that science is founded on a metaphysical position - that reality can be understood?Tom Storm
    I think "science is founded on" pragmatic, or working, assumptions like that one. Such a "metaphysical position", however, may be a categorical generalization that has been subsequently deduced from scientific practices and findings.

    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/739670

    Or do you view science as being less totalising than this claim and more tentative in its approach?
    Yes, IME, the results of science are only provisional (fallibilistic) and eliminable, not proven.

    So, yes, metaphysics isn't modern science, because it attempts to go beyond some of the limits of modern science.Pantagruel
    Maybe "metaphysics" only makes explicit (i.e. problematizes) "the limits" – presuppositions – "of modern science" ...
  • Science as Metaphysics
    Are 'metaphysical statements' experimentally testable? Does any 'metaphysical system' entail predictions about matters of fact? If not, then metaphysics isn't modern science.
  • Why Monism?
    Obviously. I posted that ancient Buddhist parable to support @Janus's apt reading of Pierre Hadot's work as compared to your typically biased (i.e. anti-naturalist, anti-pragmatic) misreading, sir.
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    :up:

    So in that sense noumena and phenomena can be understood to be the same thing seen under the two different aspects: in-themselves and as-they-appear.

    I remember reading somewhere that there are two schools of thought among Kant scholars: the dual world theorists and the dual aspect theorists.
    Janus
    :up:

    I'm in the dual-aspect school (à la Spinoza).
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    Perhaps I'm confused: "noumenon" (singular as per Schopenhauer) has always seemed to me the limit, or horizon, of experiential cognition (or conceptualization) as such rather than a "thing-in-itself". That things can appear seems an intrinsic property of them being things (e.g. just as mappability is intrinsic to the territory) and is not just merely an illusory or occluding add-on – construction – of our "minds" (pace Kant, pace Berkeley, pace Plato). :chin:
  • Why Monism?
    I'm sure you both of gentlemen are familiar with some version of this parable, which is very much in line with Hadot's reflections on Hellenistic philosophies ...
    As the Buddha travelled around delivering his teachings, he gathered many followers who set aside their worldly life to follow him.

    One of these men was an intellectual named Malunkyaputra, who had been inspired by the Buddha’s deep insight. However, Malunkyaputra eventually grew frustrated with the Buddha, who seems to have avoided answering basic metaphysical questions, like “is there an afterlife?” and other grasping at understanding the universe its purposes.

    One day Malunkyaputra confronted the Buddha about it, and declared that, unless the Buddha answered his questions, Malunkyaputra would give up the Buddhist life and return to his old life within society.

    The Buddha responded with a story:

    Suppose a man has been shot with a poison arrow. His friends and family that were with him rush to call a doctor to remove the arrow and administer an antidote to the poison. But, before they’re able to, the man who was shot stops them, shouting “I will not let this arrow be removed until I know — who shot me? How tall was he? Of what material was his bow made?”

    Then the Buddha asked Malunkyaputra what he thought of the man in his story, who refused treatment for his injury until his questions about the man that shot him were answered. Malunkyaputra responded: “He is a fool — his questions are not relevant to treating his injury, and he will die before he gets them answered.”

    “Similarly,” said the Buddha, “I do not teach whether or not there is an afterlife and what it is like and such. I teach only how to remove the arrow of your suffering, by revealing its origin, and the Eightfold Path to its end.”
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    No object without subject.Wayfarer
    And each subject 'appears to itself' a secondary quality presupposing that it is fundamentally also an object.
  • Why Monism?
    As I remember it (it's a while since I read the book) Pierre Hadot in Philosophy as a Way of Life understands the various ancient Greek philosophical systems as sets of ideas designed to live by, not consisting of claims to be critiqued and argued over. Philosophy under that conception has a different purpose: to provide ways of living designed to free practitioners from the unruly desires, petty concerns, existential anxieties, and worldly attachments that can make life a misery.

    A modern equivalent would be Cognitive Behavior Therapy or Gestalt Therapy: if you undertake that practice, you are not there to argue about their different metaphysical or phenomenological claims, but rather to accept the set of ideas that constitute the therapy and practice in accordance with them to (hopefully) gain the result.

    So, as Hadot points out Stoicism, Skepticism, Cynicism, Epicureanism, Platonism and Neoplatonism all had very different sets of metaphysical ideas, but they were all similar in there status as philosophical and ethical practices designed to live in better ways. Epicureanism, for example, explicitly rejects the idea of afterlife.

    So, I don't think you can cite Hadot to support any contention that it was the metaphysical ideas in the ancient philosophies that were of primary importance: it is more likely that such ideas were as diverse within the systems as were the different kinds of people with their different mindsets, that they sought to attract.
    Janus
    :clap: :fire: Excellent synopsis!
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    Although I will also observe that yours is not a physicalist account of physicalism.Wayfarer
    That statement doesn't make any sense.

    Consider this ...


    Your thoughts?
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    I've described my understanding of the methodology this way ...
    Physicalism is a paradigm for generating conjectures or models and not a theoretical explanation of phenomena.180 Proof
  • Naturalism problem of evil
    For those who find the facticity of life – Zapffe's or Camus' absurd – so abhorrent, there's absolutely nothing to keep them living on. Why bother with antinatalism? Kill two birds with one stone – Suicide is painless. :mask:

    There are no "redeemers" in foxholes.

    :death: :flower:
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    The idea that life can be explained with reference only to the laws of physics is physicalism, right?Wayfarer
    Wrong. :lol:
  • Why Monism?
    :100:

    In short, as I see it. abstractions are not primary or fundamental they are abstracted from particulars, so they are therefore secondary and derivative.Janus
    :up: :up:
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    Non sequitur. I'll take that as a concession to the points I made in my previous post. You're welcome, sir. :victory:
  • Naturalism problem of evil
    The religious narrative of mans sinful nature and possibility of redemption is more optimistic than the idea we are frequently facing evil and suffering with no reason and no redemption.Andrew4Handel
    I'll grant you that intoxication "seems more optimistic" than sobriety – if some "religious narrative of redemption" is your placebo of choice and it works for you, Andrew, then keep on keeping on. :pray:
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    The reason that I'm not a physicalist is that matter does not act.Wayfarer
    Action = energy = matter. Wtf, sir. :sweat:

    It is only acted upon.
    Newtonian laws & conservation laws – typical 'dualist', I guess you've never heard of those. :roll:
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    Idealism seems to me an example of philosophy poisoning.wonderer1
    :up:

    Phenomenology seeks to remedy this condition by returning attention to the primacy of being - the reality of lived experience - *not* as something to analyse through science or metaphysics but through attention to 'what is’ - ‘dasein’.Wayfarer
    Heideggerian phenomenology – in other words, privileging secondary qualities over primary qualities by conflating epistemology with ontology. Anthropocentric antirealism (contra Mediocrity Principle) aka "idealism". :zip:
  • The Debt Ceiling Issue
    Well, apparently, these a*holes are going to drag this nonsense out until the 11th hour and 59th minute before they slam on the brakes to stop this trainwreck. Wtf, Dems? :brow:
  • Naturalism problem of evil
    "The problem of evil" is only a problem for those theists who claim that there is an "all-knowing, all-powerful, all-loving g/G that created the world". Naturalists claim that nature was not "created" and is 'blindly' self-organizing at different, emergent levels of complexity; ergo there's nothing like a "problem of evil" for them, but rather an ethical problem of good (i.e. How is good possible and Why ought we to prefer good to bad / evil living in such a pitiless, indifferent, monstrously sublime natural world?).
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    What I'm arguing is that 'how the object appears' is dependent on the observer. 'What it is' can be specified in the case of physical objects, in terms of its quantifiable attributes, which appear to be observer-independent, but may better be thought of as 'measurably consistent for any observer' ...Wayfarer
    in other words, secondary and primary qualities, respectively. :up:
  • What are you listening to right now?
    Tina Turner (1936-2023)


    "Proud Mary" (4:57)
    Workin' Together, 1970
    writer John Fogerty, 1969
    performers Ike & Tina Turner



    original version, 1969
    https://youtu.be/5hid10EgMXE
  • US Election 2024 (All general discussion)
    :clap: :smirk:

    Putin's Bitch goes on trial in NYC for 34 felonies (so far) on 25 March 2024 during the middle of the GOP primaries. By then the NYS Attorney General and E Jean Carroll (et al) will have bankrupted Loser-1 with punitive damages fines. His "presidential candidacy" is DOA. :lol:

    Addendum.

    (Update pending on imminent US Federal indictments for Obstruction of Justice, Espionage, etc.)
  • Why Monism?
    Your silly projections aside, Gnomon: given that X is "immaterial" (i.e. not instantiable), what (non-trivial) difference does this X make (i.e. how is X consequential)? :chin: