A scarcity-driven society? No. A post-scarcity society? N/AWould society be better off as a matriarchy? — Benj96
On the contrary, sir – for example, (my preferred "scientific account") Being No One (or its non-technical synopsis The Ego Tunnel) by the neuroscientist, philosopher & (afaik) practicing Buddhist Thomas Metzinger. I'm sure I've cited him and his works many times in our exchanges over the years, but apparently you're still incorrigibly stuck on your 'idealist' dogma. :sparkle:Their remains no scientific account of which neural systems are able to generate the subjective unity of experience. — Wayfarer
Your silly projections aside, Gnomon: given that X is "immaterial" (i.e. not instantiable), what (non-trivial) difference does this X make (i.e. how is X consequential)? :chin:For example, ↪180 Proofhas made his implicit emotional reaction explicit, as in the post above: "@Gnomon "Im-material" = not instantiable (i.e. un-observable), ergo in-consequential." — Gnomon
Maybe not, but we can refuse to be worse by doing nothing to stop those a*holes from harming anyone. Watch out for that pacifistic false equivalence, Benj – it has only ever encouraged bullies, segregationists & fascists.If one reduces themselves to physical harm towards those that wish to do physical harm, then are we really any better? — Benj96
In 180 Proof's utopia, we'd castrate and/or lobotomize incels. Or maybe, less invasively, heavily medicate the shits with opiods & sedatives. I suppose the more bleeding-heart lefty factions would advocate for the least fiscally responsible solution: AI-Companions (age & body type-specified gynoids / androids à la "pleasure model Replicants"). However, like porn, even fully immersive VR "sex-on-demand" likely won't scratch the incel's misogynistic itch for long. :strong: :shade:How would one go about defusing that? — Benj96
Yes, property dualism (or reflexive monism) but not unparsimonious substance dualism.This is exactly why dualism is called for. — Metaphysician Undercover
What? But suppose there is both "free will" and "God"? Then "God" allows time to branch-off human time (i.e. futurity) from "His" eternity whenever we act – our gate infinitely widens but for us "His" narrow gate becomes infinitesmal. :naughty:Either there is no "free will" or there is no "God" or there is neither; therefore, there is no problem of reconciling "free will" with "God". — 180 Proof
Well, Bob, this is how I see it:No it [immaterialism] does not entail solipsism. — Bob Ross
This is just like pixels in a hologram each of which containing all of the information that constitutes the hologram (à la Leibniz's monads).If one only "knows" ideas because there are only ideas, and if ideas are properties of minds, and if each mind is an idea, then all minds are properties of each mind or, in effect, one mind. QED. — immaterialism, ergo solipsism
So is this "transcendental" conception of 'mind-dependence' also mind-dependent? :chin:... transcendental in the Kantian sense. — Wayfarer
So a starlight, for example, from distant galaxies (or the CMB) that predates by millions (or billions) of years the human species – it's capability of "mind" – is not a "meaningful idea" or a "real" (mind-invariant) referent?We can form no meaningful idea of what exists in the absence of the order that the mind brings to reality. — Wayfarer
:lol:It's a survival machine. In order to survive, it [a brain] requires information; it must construct a mental model of its world.
— Vera Mont
I think this opinion is wrong. The desire to believe, to know, and understand, is not based in what is needed to survive. — Metaphysician Undercover
I see. You're advocating immaterialism (which entails solipsism), not (just) panpsychism.Pansychism [ ... ] matter is fundamental but that matter is conscious, whereas analytic idealism is the view that mind (i.e., consciousness) is fundamental ... — Bob Ross
Only in (primitive) 'creationist'-based cultures; however, not so according to Brahmins or Daoists (or, for that matter, either classical atomists or Spinozists) for whom nature itself is eternally naturing (à la autpoiesis).Interesting how nature, once 'the created', is now imbued with the power of creating itself. — Wayfarer
Under analytical idealism, the entirety of reality is fundamentally mind and is thusly conscious: not just animals. — Bob Ross
Explain why you have not just contradicted yourself, Bob. Thanks.Analytical Idealism is not a form of pansychism. Furthermore, could you please elaborate on why you think such? — Bob Ross
Okay, a step away from talk of the "immaterial" to the "imaginary" is progress. But how do you "hold an imaginary" X? A map of Middle Earth, for example, is instantiated on actual paper, but that map does not correspond to an actual place.... to hold an imaginary ... — Mark Nyquist
This confuses me. Please clarify how an "immaterial" Y is "contained in" a material Z.... contained in my brain as an immaterial representation ... — Mark Nyquist
I am an emergentist (re: holism), not "monist" (dualist or pluralist).↪180 Proof If you are a monist ... — Mark Nyquist
Suppose "representation" is the "thing in itself" (just as the tip of an iceberg is also an iceberg) ...The physical world is representation, not the thing itself. — schopenhauer1
Using proper brain scans and algorithms one could easily observe your real-time un/conscious-states.You could observe me in either of these states, but you would not be able to know for sure whether I was conscious of what I was looking at, at the time. — Janus
Numbers are abstract objects (or structures) which are real only in so far as they are physically instantiable. I guess this view makes me more Aristotlean (hylomorphic) than Platonic-Pythagorean (supersensible).Where do you sit on the notion that maths is Platonic? — Tom Storm
Yes; ergo, IMO, a fiction.Would mathematical Platonism quality as immaterial?
Human babies develop a 'theory of mind' that is strongly correlated to their "publicly confirmable" observations of others' behaviors. As for one's own "consciousness", or subjectivity, I think it is only assumed and not observed (any more than an eye sees itself seeing). My "publicly confirmable" behavior strongly correlates to others' 'theory of mind' as applied to me (and one another) and, on the basis of the persistent circumstantial evidence, I don't have any observational grounds to doubt or disbelieve that I am (at least, occasionally) "conscious". Do you? As far as I'm concerned, 'eliminativism' is only a research paradigm which treats "consciousness" as a counterintuitive "user-illusion" that deconstructs the incorrigible basis – "conscious" – of our folk psychology (i.e. practical woo) in order to publicly investigate (an) objective physical structure of subjective information processing (i.e. experience).On the other hand, if we each know from experience that we are conscious, then it must also be observable in another sense, the difference being that this other kind of observation is not publicly confirmable. — Janus
:cool: :up:My answer to you asking the question* would be that it is not the chemicals, but the loss of the chemicals being arranged grandma-ishly that I am mourning, because I really liked the effect of the chemicals being arranged grandma-ishly. — wonderer1