I didn't ask you to evaluate the claim only for the meaning of "illusions" in your statement. What you're reply says is nothing but 'I don't like the sound of it'. :roll:

I didn't ask you to evaluate the claim only for the meaning of "illusions" in your statement. What you're reply says is nothing but 'I don't like the sound of it'. — 180 Proof

I was reading a paper by Chalmers last night in response to your reply. You might be interested in it.
https://consc.net/papers/debunking.pdf

I'm no longer interested in Chalmers. You can't answer my question, so your statement remains meaningless to me.

A cryptic answer to my question. I'm not sure I follow you. — Tom Storm

Do you agree that, for pragmatic reasons, most humans act as-if Matter is Reality? If so, how do you explain the behavior of a few feckless philosophers, or romantics, who act as-if there is a realm of Ideality, apart from the tangible substances they know from hard experience?

For example, even an officially idealistic philosopher knows better than to try to walk through a brick wall with no door. And yet, he can imagine such an unreal event. The Marvel movie heroes have been performing such unrealistic tricks on the silver screen, and in rag mags, for decades. So, apparently a lot of people like to imagine that magical powers could be employed to battle the hidden forces of personified Evil. Some people are motivated by Ideals, that go far beyond immediate Pragmatic concerns : e.g. why make long-range plans to go to Mars?

What "practical changes" do you think such unfettered imagination would initiate in their behavior? Do you see young people, at a Cosplay meeting, imitating the magical powers of their heroes*1, in addition to modeling their heroic costumes & postures? Maybe a psychotic few will try to fly from tall buildings. In the movies, downtrodden outcasts suddenly discover the power to project energy/chi from their fingertips. Why don't the Cosplayers do likewise? Perhaps, because they know the difference between romantic Fiction and realistic Facts? Maybe a few of them even understand the difference between Science & Religion, Physics & Faith, but choose the latter because it offers something that Science cannot. "Man cannot live by bread alone".

Apparently, unlike animals, humans can imagine "things that never were", but could be in an ideal world. So, they are not as concerned with boring Pragmatism as you think they should be. Would you expunge that mental creativity from human nature? Personally, I am basically a humdrum Pragmatist & Realist. So I have to depend on others to let their imaginations run free from the bonds of physical laws. Except, that is, on a Philosophy Forum, where I can tentatively, and impractically, imagine where freedom from physical bondage might lead. :smile:

PS__For a direct answer to your question --- "Out of interest - let's assume we do accept analytic idealism as our ontological situation - what practical changes would this initiate in terms of human behavior?" --- None : analytic Idealism is not practical, it's philosophical.

*1. Real light saber : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LTRjkAWz-M4

I was reading a paper by Chalmers last night in response to your reply. You might be interested in it.
https://consc.net/papers/debunking.pdf — RogueAI

FYI, is not interested in Philosophical opinions, only Physical facts. :joke:

That's a position you still see a lot these days, but I think it's on the decline.

It's not meaningless, you just don't agree with it. Do you think consciousness is an illusion? Chalmers demarcates soft illusionism and hard illusionism in that paper I linked. At least read the first couple of pages.

↪180 Proof It's not meaningless, you just don't agree with it. — RogueAI

I don't disagree with anything because you haven't explicated anything. Your claim, Rogue, is opaque to me for the reason given previously.

I see what you mean, but I would ask, and referencing Russell, doesn’t the plethora of white things simultaneous with our naming practices and awareness of each of them as such over time, antecede the “whiteness” of which all white things partake? What if there was only a single instance of a thing with whatever quality, what universal can be attributed as the being of which a single thing partakes?

If that works, then it is possible for the particular and the universal to be identical, and if the particular is subject to human cognition as an object, then so is the universal, a metaphysical/logical contradiction.

I agree universals proper are not within the purview of human cognition as propositional predicate in a judgement (all white x’s possess whiteness), rather merely designating a relation, but I might hesitate to put them before the particular, re: your, existing in their entirety prior to (…).

Or not…..

Hello Janus,

The existence of things in themselves is an inference from the invariance and intersubjective commonality of sensations.

This concedes my point about Kant: he is using phenomena to reverse engineer that there are things-in-themselves while claiming that phenomena do not tell us anything about things-in-themselves.

And I submit to you that all ideas of substance are groundless. The world seems physical and substantial and from that experience and the reificational potentiality of language we naturally extrapolate the notion of substance. We really have no idea what either physicality or mentality are in any substantial sense.

They can’t be groundless if you consider reason a valid method of gaining knowledge, which you will have to if you agree with science. In that case, we can extrapolate insofar as safely can. For example, we can know that two substances would not have interaction with each other, and this is only via pure reason. I don’t think that claim is groundless.

Bob

Hello Tom Storm,

Out of interest - let's assume we do accept analytic idealism as our ontological situation - what practical changes would this initiate in terms of human behavior? How much changes in terms of morality, human rights, climate change, political discourse, in short, how we live?

There’s the answer Kastrup will tell you, and there’s a grimmer answer I will tell you.

Kastrup’s:

Morality stems from our understanding that we are fundamentally hurting ourselves when we hurt others, because we are of the same mind—so why do that? Morality for Kastrup is likewise objective, as there is Telos to the world, and something we should commit ourselves to.

He argues that physicalism leads to nihilism, whereas idealism leads to happier, more fulfilled lives.

He argues that politically we should be aiming to slower preserve all life, because consciousness is all that ontologically exists and we are a part of the same mind.

My answers (in summary):

There is no morality beyond what you hold yourself to—what lies in the depths of your heart.

Any view can lead to nihilism, although some more than others, and anyone can be happy under any of them—nihilism is a reflection of one’s psychology and nothing more.

One’s political views are going to be dependent on one’s morals and amoral goals—no metaphysical view in-itself tells us what to do here, but it can end up being what formulates our morals (e.g., if we shouldn’t hurt what is a part of ourselves and we are of the same mind, then we shouldn’t hurt eachother).

Bob

Hello Mww,

Things-in-themselves can be inferred the possibility of sensations in general a priori. The thing as it appears, and from which sensation is given, makes the non-existence of that particular thing-in-itself impossible

I see. If this is true, then how is it inferred therefrom that there are multiple things-in-themselves and not a thing-in-itself?

However, I still would like to push back a bit: how can you infer that it is impossible that appearances aren’t of nothing? Is that simply absurd to you?

Transcendental analysis of the conditions for human knowledge doesn’t care about ontology; all that is represented exists necessarily, all we will ever know empirically is given from representations, therefore all empirical knowledge presupposes extant things.

I still struggle with this because, to me, I infer that the appearances are representations by comparison of other appearances (e.g., they inject me with a hallucinogen drug and my representations becomes significantly different than when I am sober, etc.). But if representations tell us nothing about things-in-themselves then it is odd to me that it can even be inferred that there is a dynamic of representations vs. things-in-themselves in the first place.

The only reason for positing the thing-in-itself, is to grant that even if things are not perceived, they are not thereby non-existent.

How do you know this if representations tell you nothing about things-in-themselves? Also, why not hold that all the “things” of appearances of one thing-in-itself?

It is meant to qualify the semi-established dogmatic Berkeley-ian purely subjective idealist principle esse est percipi, by stipulating that it isn’t necessary that that which isn’t perceived doesn’t exist, but only for that which is not perceived, empirical knowledge of it is impossible. It just says existence is not conditioned by perception, but knowledge most certainly is.

I agree with you here; but under Kantianism, how does one know there necessarily are things-in-themselves? It seems like Kant is just ruling out the alternatives because they are “absurd”.

Oh, that’s easy: once this thing, whatever it is, appears to perception, that thing-in-itself, whatever it was, disappears, that thing no longer “in-itself”, as far as the system is concerned.

Oh I see and agree—I thought you were saying something else there.

Can’t be substance, insofar as substance is never singular, which implies a succession, which implies time, which is a condition for knowledge, and by which the imposition makes the impossibility of knowledge contradictory.

I am a substance monist, so I am unsure by what you mean by “substance is never singular”: could you elaborate?

Permanence is that by which the thing-in-itself, is of. Which makes the notion that if I’m not looking at the thing it isn’t there, rather foolish.

How do you know they are permanent simply because they are beyond your representation of them?

The real world for us, is just how we understand what we are given. The world is only as real as our intellect provides. Whatever the world really is, we are not equipped to know, and if it really is as we understand it, so much the better, but without something to compare our understands to, we won’t know that either.

So would it be fair to say that you think we are barred from metaphysics (other than transcendental inquiries)?

If it’s not a thing, why does it have to exist in a thing? That which exists in a thing is a property thereof, and logic is not a property. All I’m going to say about it, is that logic resides in human intelligence, and attempts to pin it down in concreto ultimately ends as illusory cognitions at least, or irrational judgements at worst.

It has to exist in a “thing”, in the sense of of a substance and of an entity, because otherwise I don’t know what you mean by “existing”. How is logic not a property of an entity? If it isn’t a property, then I don’t have the ability to do logic because that would be a property of my mind, would it not?

There’s no legitimate reason to think that, insofar as it contradicts the notion that the universal mind does no meta-cognitive deliberations, which it would have to do in order to determine what laws are, and the conditions under which they legislate what it can do, which determines what it is.

I apologize, that was a poor choice of words: the Universal Mind does not “adhere” to the laws but, rather, sustains them.

In other words, the Universal Mind, if it doesn’t exist, cannot be legislated by law, which means if it is legislated by law it must exist. Which means it cannot be merely an idea.

The universal mind is not an idea, it is mind that has ideas and those ideas are the Platonic, eternal forms which are expressed within space and time, which are conditions of our minds.

But all universals are ideas……AAAARRRRGGGGG!!!!!!

Correct, but I am saying that those ideas are within an eternal mind.

Bob

Out of interest - let's assume we do accept analytic idealism as our ontological situation - what practical changes would this initiate in terms of human behavior? How much changes in terms of morality, human rights, climate change, political discourse, in short, how we live? — Tom Storm

In order to always have a secure compass in hand so as to find one's way in life, and to see life always in the correct light without going astray, nothing is more suitable than getting used to seeing the world as something like a penal colony. This view finds its...justification not only in my philosophy, but also in the wisdom of all times, namely, in Brahmanism, Buddhism, Empedocles, Pythagoras [...] Even in genuine and correctly understood Christianity, our existence is regarded as the result of a liability or a misstep. ... We will thus always keep our position in mind and regard every human, first and foremost, as a being that exists only on account of sinfulness, and who is life is an expiation of the offence committed through birth. Exactly this constitutes what Christianity calls the sinful nature of man. — Schopenhauer's Compass, Urs App

The world as prison... Not sure that quote helps.

I've been reading the Google preview of that book, and have just now ordered the hard copy. It is an account of Schopenhauer's reading of the Upaniṣads, of which he had a Latin copy, translated from a Persian edition. According to this book, published 2014, they along with Plato and Kant were the major formative influences on Schopenhauer's mature philosophy.

As far as the world being a prison, Plato of course preferred another analogy, that of a cave, in which we are held captive by the chains of ignorance. The East speaks of the human condition in terms of avidya, ignorance (or nescience in some translations), whereas the Biblical traditions depicted it in terms of sin, which is of course the most politically-incorrect term in the English lexicon. But the underlying philosophical point is mistaking the illusory for the real, although of course for that to be meaningful, there must be some kind of inkling of a higher reality, which is also pretty non-PC in today's culture.

Any view can lead to nihilism, although some more than others, and anyone can be happy under any of them—nihilism is a reflection of one’s psychology and nothing more. — Bob Ross

I agree.

But the underlying philosophical point is mistaking the illusory for the real, although of course for that to be meaningful, there must be some kind of inkling of a higher reality, which is also pretty non-PC in today's culture. — Wayfarer

I understand the lineage of this this view, I'm just wondering how it helps to think this way.

Wouldn't be much of a leap to take the view that the world is malignant, that birth and children are a curse and take up a position wherein nuclear annihilation might be a useful way to demolish this metaphysical Bastille. Isn't climate change ultimately coming to liberate us from the cycle of death and rebrith? Why act to prevent it?

One’s political views are going to be dependent on one’s morals and amoral goals—no metaphysical view in-itself tells us what to do here, but it can end up being what formulates our morals (e.g., if we shouldn’t hurt what is a part of ourselves and we are of the same mind, then we shouldn’t hurt each other). — Bob Ross

I hope it's the latter and not just business as usual. Which I guess is a Christian view - love your neighbour as you do yourself. The reason being we are all the same being... :wink:

I personally can't identify reasons to change how I interact with the world, regardless of the metaphysics or ontology posited. So I am wondering how useful it is to even have views on ontology, other than a common sense account, which may not be true, but has the virtue of working well enough as a frame.

I've been reading the Google preview of that book, and have just now ordered the hard copy. It is an account of Schopenhauer's reading of the Upaniṣads, of which he had a Latin copy, translated from a Persian edition. According to this book, published 2014, they along with Plato and Kant were the major formative influences on Schopenhauer's mature philosophy. — Wayfarer

How do you account for Schopenhauer's formulation of antinatalism, pessimism and negativity? Do you think his worldview (presumably acquired via his reading) was reasonable or extreme?

This concedes my point about Kant: he is using phenomena to reverse engineer that there are things-in-themselves while claiming that phenomena do not tell us anything about things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

No, Kant is merely saying that if there are appearances, then logically speaking, there must be things which appear, whatever the in itself existence of what appears might be.

We know there are things which appear as phenomena, but we also know that these appearances are not the things, and that we cannot know what the things are apart from how they appear to us.

They can’t be groundless if you consider reason a valid method of gaining knowledge, which you will have to if you agree with science. — Bob Ross

No, I won't have to concede that, because I don't think reason without sense data produces knowledge. It is not a valid inference from the fact that sense data combined with reason produces knowledge to a claim that reason on its own can produce knowledge.

I heard Bernado Kastrup say (some YouTube interview) that Kant is not an idealist. What do you think?

No, I won't have to concede that, because I don't think reason without sense data produces knowledge. It is not a valid inference from the fact that sense data combined with reason produces knowledge to a claim that reason on its own can produce knowledge. — Janus

:fire:

Modern philosophy with its psychologized idealism is not my cup of tea. I lean towards Platonism. I wrote a now deleted post on symbology, which sums up my perspective. I think ideas are an immaterial, but fundamental quality of the cosmos. They do not exist, but they are the necessary conclusion of the laws of nature. The laws of nature are not ideas, but the the qualities of stuff. Stuff isn't made by ideas, and stuff doesn't make ideas, ideas are the essence of anything real. The modern psychologizing of idealism is an absurd focus on the brain and head as a predominant symbol, in a much more complex web of symbols that construct perception. To give so much primacy to the mind ignores the symbols codes and ways of thought that it learns to think about. An idea is independant of the brain but it does not exist. In the metaphor I presented about the mirage in the hourglass is the mirage outside your brain or inside your brain or is the mirage a web of symbols and your head is just one of them that you are decieved into giving primacy?

I heard Bernado Kastrup say (some YouTube interview) that Kant is not an idealist. What do you think? — Tom Storm

Kant says he is an empirical realist and a transcendental idealist. I think for Kant sensory appearances are real.

Kant says he is an empirical realist and a transcendental idealist. I think for Kant sensory appearances are real. — Janus

So to break this down, Kant seems to be saying we have no choice but to accept empiricism even if it isn't a reflection of things as they are in themselves?

I'm not quite sure how sensory experiences are 'real' given his model - does this mean they are all that is available to us and produced by our interaction with noumena which are real? The reality of sense data seems to be a 'translation' or interpretation of the real.

Modern philosophy with its psychologized idealism is not my cup of tea. — introbert

Interesting point. Are you thinking of forms of phenomenology here?

Not really. I am more of a general philosophy thinker. I think the ways things are defined are important and are designs against the opposing analog. So Kantian transcedental idealism is something like psycholigy structures perception of universe, which is opposed to the analog of the psychlogized transcendental idealist who is a social deviant. It formulates a psychologism and a subjective constructivism over phenomenon while superimposing another understanding of the social phenomenon which is to be treated by psychiatry as abnormal structures of perception. Phenomenology is part of the same line of development, but on the practical side is a science of understanding an individual's subjective experience through a very well developed discursive style.

:up: Too complex for me, but I get the drift.

Isn't climate change ultimately coming to liberate us from the cycle of death and rebrith? Why act to prevent it? — Tom Storm

I take it the difference between what I was pointing to and nihilism is the implicit understanding of there actually being release from the cycle of birth and death. It’s as if we’re impelled to exist by craving, and the way to overcoming it, is by the cessation of craving. Without that, even those who seek not to exist or regret having come to exist, will always be bound to existence without knowing why. That element is common to both Indian philosophy and Schopenhauer.

:up:

Things-in-themselves can be inferred the possibility of sensations in general a priori. The thing as it appears, and from which sensation is given, makes the non-existence of that particular thing-in-itself impossible, re:

“…. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd….”

Transcendental analysis of the conditions for human knowledge doesn’t care about ontology; all that is represented exists necessarily, all we will ever know empirically is given from representations, therefore all empirical knowledge presupposes extant things. — Mww

But there's something else, and it's right there in your quote. (Is that Kant?)

What we know about the somethings the existence of which we infer from the possibility of experience, is that they are the sorts of things that can appear, and, in particular, can appear to us. That deduction works both ways: Kant had the idea that we can treat the objects of perception and knowledge as conforming to us, rather than us conforming our minds to them, and that's fine, but it also means that those objects must cooperate, must be capable of cooperating, of appearing to us, of revealing themselves to us or being revealed to us. Not as they are "in themselves", of course, but we know better than to expect that; but if things appear for us, then they must be things that can do that, and do.

There is moment here, of elevating epistemology to first philosophy, and leaving ontology as, at most, the matter of what is only formally posited by the theory of knowledge. I'm not convinced that works out. Look at what is posited. It is not the empty place-holder it was supposed to be, but is rich with its own structure of revealing and concealing, without which the formal description of knowledge hangs in the air.

So to break this down, Kant seems to be saying we have no choice but to accept empiricism even if it isn't a reflection of things as they are in themselves?

I'm not quite sure how sensory experiences are 'real' given his model - does this mean they are all that is available to us and produced by our interaction with noumena which are real? The reality of sense data seems to be a 'translation' or interpretation of the real. — Tom Storm

The way I understand it, sensory experiences are real, in fact it is from sensory appearance that the notion of reality is derived. But since we don't know what is "behind" sensory experience, and since we cannot but think that what appears to us has its own existence independently of us, and since that existence cannot be the same as the appearances, we should acknowledge that the in itself nature of what appears is unknowable to us. although it's nature as it appears to us is of course knowable.

I think when Kant says that the empirical, what is perceived, is real, and the transcendental is ideal, he means that sensory experience is real for us, in fact it is the very prototypical exemplar of reality, and that the in itself, which is transcendental to sensory experience can only be ideal for us, meaning that we can only have ideas about what it might be, and all of those ideas are groundless. This is looking at it from our perspective.

If we try to think from an absolute perspective, and having acknowledged that what appears to us is conceptually shaped by us, this could be reversed; the empirical as we understand it then would be ideal (insofar as it is mediated by ideas) and the transcendental (about which we can have no cogent idea at all beyond that it must somehow be) would be the real. Though Kant didn't present this reversal as far as I know.