Nah, I ain't no solipsist or narcissist."don't it make you sad to know that life, is more than who we are?" — TiredThinker
I suppose "the purpose" of any one's life is whatever task or exercise or practice one is committed to that provides an end (in one's own mind) which 'justifies' all or most of one's means (i.e. choices). In other words, whatever one lives for, or cannot endure living without doing, seems to me to be one's "life purpose". One can only answer this question for one self – each one of us is, paraphrasing Sartre, condemned to be free to choose our own purpose/s.I would like to ask the question "what is the purpose of my life?" — Average
If it's only the recall of being conscious that is either "lost" or "altered" and not "consciousness" itself, then "consciousness" is like embodiment persisting independently of the state of one's awareness, or lack thereof, of one's own bodily condition. Assuming this scenario is the case, 'being conscious' seems redundant to, or synonymous with, 'being embodied', and eliminativists (i.e. physicalists), not mind-body dualists or panpsychists, are the parsimonious and conceptually coherent ones. To paraphrase Witty: bodily movement is the best picture of 'consciousness'. And Spinoza as well: 'being conscious' is the body's idea.It isn't lost. The self is lost. Content is altered, but not consciousness. — bert1
https://youtu.be/vtx5NTxebJkI've got a word or two
To say about the things that you do
You're telling all those lies
About the good things that we can have
If we close our eyes
Do what you want to do
And go where you're going to
Think for yourself
'Cause I won't be there with you
I left you far behind
The ruins of the life that you had in mind
And though you still can't see
I know your mind's made up
You're gonna cause more misery
Do what you want to do
And go where you're going to
Think for yourself
'Cause I won't be there with you
Although your mind's opaque
Try thinking more if just for your own sake
The future still looks good
And you've got time to rectify
All the things that you should
Do what you want to do
And go where you're going to
Think for yourself
'Cause I won't be there with you
Do what you want to do
And go where you're going to
Think for yourself
'Cause I won't be there with you
Think for yourself
'Cause I won't be there with you — Think For Yourself (1965)
:100:Either our decisions are determined by some prior cause or they occur spontaneously, neither of which seem to satisfy libertarian free will. — Michael
An 'ethno-nationalist state'? :eyes:BTW, the more egalitarian and inclusive the US becomes the less it would be a nation-state. A nation is usually a group of people who have ethnicity in common. — frank
:cool: In gratitude for your generous recommendation, Manuel, I reciprocate in kind: the 'metaphysically haunting' duology The Passenger & Stella Maris by Cormac McCarthy. Enjoy!@180 Proof@Jamal
I think both of you will most surely enjoy Novel Explosives — Manuel
:clap: :up::lol: "Compostmoderns" ...the incontinental tradition vs the anals; both have produced a lot of shit and fostered normative correctness in their different ways..." — Janus
A stoic (no doubt, an "elitist") might have said "I don't pretend to be a man of the people. But I do try to be a man for the people." :fire:Philosophy that is of no significance to everyman is nought but an elitist hobby.
Not for scarcity-exploiting nation-states. As you say "communism doesn't scale well". Why? I think because, simply put, material scarcity amplified by increasing population pressures – radical alienation – and all that this existential condition entails individually and collectively. Of course, in a post-scarcity world, "communism" would be unnecessary.Is communism realistic/feasible? — jorndoe
:fire:Be realistic, demand the impossible. — graffiti on buildings in Paris, May '68
Am I? I wrote "one", not you or him/her or people or them. Also, I took your comment about "rational intuition" to be philosophical, not sociological, so it was (meant to be) prescriptive as well as descriptive.Sure, but you're looking at the life in question from the outside. — Janus
"Memories" are functions, not "phenomena".We know that we have memories — Andrew4Handel
This 'voluntarism' seems to beg the "intuition" question. I'm with Freddy here: judge by example – how one actually lives, particularly one's manifest habits insofar as they embody some "kind of vision" one lives by – practies before principles.So, for me the real issue is an ethical one: how do I want to live and what kind of vision do I want to live by? — Janus
The brain itself does not have 'senses' of its own so "phenomena in the brain" – humuncular theory – does not make sense.What phenomena are in the brain and if so how? — Andrew4Handel
I don't know. My guess is that "platonic ideas" (universals) are quixotic (mis)uses of language rationalized whereby (formal and nonformal) abstractions are fallaciously reified. We share 'semantic illusions' discursively as a matter of course – "mirror neurons", I think, only play a significant role in prelinguistiic cognition (i.e. before babies habitualize language-use).And mirror neurons might give us that strong illusion of sharing platonic ideas and the same sensations ? — plaque flag
Yeah, novelty usually pricks one from one's mneumonic slumber.Attention is drawn to surprise, right? — plaque flag
... or metacognitive bias (via neo-natal bonding + mirror neurons —> developing 'theory of mind'). :chin:How about the self as a social habit... — plaque flag
:fire: re: Homo [confabulator]!I suggest that we drop the ocular metaphor and talk about dancing. In other words, we perform 'universals' in the way we trade marks and noises. This 'seeing' of 'form' (this metaphorical interpretation of our situation) has its pros and cons. It's helped us trick ourselves into believing in ghosts. — plaque flag
:up:Platonism sometimes seem to merely assume its own conclusion. — plaque flag
:clap: So on point – brilliantly succinct!Selves also are almost logical absolutes. The tradition of a ghost in the machine of the body, which is held responsible for telling a coherent story, seems unavoidable. A culture without selves like this would be like a culture without wheels or fire. It's a technology so basic we think it came from god. — plaque flag
:100:Neurath's boat. One part of us questions another part of us. We also make tacit norms explicit, draw out concepts. This is the hermeneutic circle. We 'know' what rationality and being are, but we aren't done knowing what they are. — plaque flag
I'm confused here by what you mean by "philosophy" and what you mean by "religion" and "science" as well. Some clarification would be helpful.The philosophy of stoicism was the religion of Marcus Aurelius. Philosophy was the religion of Boethius, who wrote “The Consolation of Philosophy.” Religion for the common people consisted largely of myths and gods.
I think science united with philosophy addressing ultimate questions might produce a religion ... — Art48
Maybe it's always been this way and that the secular modernity of recent centuries helps to make these 'cultural' differences more explicit. Ergo, the waxing of various reactionary fundamentalisms (especially, though not exclusively, among the Abrahamic "axis of evil") in the last several decades.• make-believers (most)
• unbelievers (many)
• true believers (few)
• disbelievers (fewer)
:up: :up:Is it possible some philosophers when writing run out of ideas, but continue writing?
— jgill
For some, it seems to me, it is as if their words are in search of ideas. If they keep writing sooner or later they will stumble across something to say.
And there are some who just recycle the same idea. — Fooloso4
:yikes: Which part?Insofar as "Hegel may have been trying to update Spinoza", I think he reconceptualizes one of Spinoza's infinite modes ("the world") as a 'meta-historicizing teleology' according to his own idealist dialectic ("Geist").
— 180 Proof
Could you elaborate on the bold part? — plaque flag
I prefer Democritus-Epicurus' Void.I first define the concept of ultimate ground of existence as that which underlies physical existence. [ ... ] At this point, it’s a philosophical concept, not unlike Kant's Thing-in-itself or Schopenhauer's Will. — Art48
How can promixate beings with proximate perceptual capabilities and frames of reference "experience" "ultimate" anything? This assertion doesn't make sense to me. It's more likely "mystics" are mistaken about their ineluctable cognitive (experiential) limits and confabulate an "ultimate" – X-of-the-gaps – that transcends them.Does the concept of ultimate ground of existence refer to something real? It may not. But mystics often describe their experience as experience of ultimate reality, which gives some support for the idea.
I did, and that's why I still want (more) compelling reasons. If that's all you've got, well okay, Art, ... whatever.See my response to Banno ... — Art48
I think so, and he more or less says as much ...I think Hegel may have been trying to update Spinoza. — plaque flag
... and he considered himself a (great world-historical) philosopher, ergo "Spinozist".You're either a Spinozist, or not a philosopher at all. — GWF Hegel
This is too pantheistic, even for Hegel (a christian pan-en-theist). As he (with Maimon) points out, Spinoza's metaphysics is acosmist. Insofar as "Hegel may have been trying to update Spinoza", I think he reconceptualizes one of Spinoza's infinite modes ("the world") as a 'meta-historicizing teleology' according to his own idealist dialectic ("Geist").The World is God, and We are God's eyes, God's spies, God's neurons. — plaque flag
Agreed. I'm also not a fan of either dada-like compostmoderns or analysis-for-analysis-sake "specialists".Indeterminacy is as old as philosophy itself, but it seems as though some today think it is their job to create indeterminacy. As if trying to navigate a ship on stormy seas so as not to run ashore will be benefited by making the landmarks indistinguishable. — Fooloso4
