I made a case. You're not addressing it. You're just telling me your opinion.

As for the cause and effect existing simultaneously, it fails to fulfill a criterion for causality viz. that the cause must temporally precede the effect — Agent Smith

That's flagrantly question begging. I gave two examples (one from Kant) that appear to involve simultaneous causation. So, those examples constitute prima facie evidence that simultaneous causation is coherent.

In your ball & cushion example, the ball exists before the depression in the cushion. — Agent Smith

No it doesn't. Read the example again.

Dennett is an idiot. He's barely discussed in the free will literature. All he's contributed is the phrase 'free will worth wanting'.

He's not really a compatibilist. He says he is. But he isn't. This is because a real compatibilist is someone who thinks responsibility-grounding free will is compatible with determinism. Yet all Dennett does is point out that agency is compatible with it being utile to punish some people and not others. Which is beside the point. Even incompatibilists accept that.

Here's the thing: free will (which essentially makes one deserving of punishment) requires self-creation or at least absence of external creation. Whether determinism is true or not is beside the point.

And it isn't true, because it doesn't make sense. Determinism is the thesis that every event that occurs had to occur. That is, it is the thesis that every event occurs of necessity. However, necessity doesn't make sense as a concept. There is no such thing as necessity. Thus, nothing occurs of necessity.

The same applies to contingency (the opposite of necessity). Contingency, defined as it is in terms of necessity, also makes no sense.

What matters where free will is concerned is that one is the ultimate source of what one does. And that requires self-creation or absence of external creation.

What on earth are you on about?

I said causation implies change. I did not say "before" and "after". Idi not say cause precedes effect. — god must be atheist

Causation does not imply change (I said above that I do not believe that causation entails change).

You don't seem to have fastened onto the relevant issue. Do causes have to precede their effects? That's the central issue here, not whether causation entails change.

In the cushion case we do indeed have causation without change. But that's not the point the example is being used to illustrate. What it is being used to illustrate is that there can be simultaneous causation.

Note, the other example I deployed - the example of substance causation - does (or can) involve change. The point in that case is that the change occurs simultaneous with what causes it.

Do try and focus on the relevant issue.

No. I submit that self-creation is impossible because I never participated in either a decision to exist, or a decision who to exist as. Or, stating it in a different way, Self-creation would require an absolutely free will, which is impossible. — charles ferraro

My claim that self-creation is possible does not entail that you created yourself. If I say that it is possible to be a billionaire, it is no objection to point out that you yourself lack a billion.

But anyway, you have things back to front. If we have free will then we have created ourselves (or we are uncreated). And so free will implies self-creation. And as we do have free will, we can conclude taht we have indeed created ourselves (or that we have not been created).

If you insist that there can be causation without change, then you could say that an object existing without change keeps on causing itself form moment to moment. Which is absurd. — god must be atheist

Where did I say there can be causation without change? I think there can be, but I never said any such thing.

My claim is that there can be simultaneous causation - that the cause and effect can occur at the same time.

And, if that's correct, then self-creation is possible, for the only reason to think it impossible is the conviction that causes must precede their effects.

The whole point is that the ball is clearly causing the depression even if there was never a time when the depression did not exist.
What you're doing is taking the dogma that causes precede their effects and applying it to this case and getting the conclusion that the ball is not causing the depression.
The ball is causing the depression. There was never a time when the depression was not there. Thus the cause did not precede the effect. Thus the dogma is false.

Anyway, do you agree that if simultaneous causation is coherent, then self-creation is possible?

I don't deny this, I think pretty much all use of words is dogmatic conviction. However, that's how we understand things, through such convictions. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that's quite wrong. You seem to think that our convictions determine how things are with reality. No.

'm still waiting for you to demonstrate this. So far, what you've produced seems very incoherent to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

Substance causation is causation by a substance rather than an event. But when a substance causes an event it does so directly. There is not some prior act on the part of the substance that causes the event. The substance causes the event. Thus the causation is simultaneous. If you think it isn't, then I think it must be because you are confusing substance causation with event causation.

As I said, this is incoherent. Balls and cushions are contingent things, they come into being, they each have a beginning in time. This simple fact is contradicted by "the ball was always on the cushion". — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not incoherent! Look - either time had a beginning or it did not. Or do you think there's some other option?

If time had a beginning, then suppose that the ball was on the cushion from the beginning of time.

if time did not have a beginning, then suppose that the ball was on the cushion for past eternal.

Also, you are confused about contingency - a contingent thing is a thing that 'can' not exist. It doesn't have to have not existed at some point. It is sufficient that it is metaphysically possible for it not to exist.

This is a faulty description. The cause of an event is prior in time to the event itself. You can call that "dogmatic conviction" if you want, but it's simply the convention we follow as to the meaning of "cause". You go outside the convention and you start to sound nonsensical. Simultaneous events are better known by the term "coincidental", not "causal". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it is a dogmatic conviction. You can show me to be wrong by providing an argument for what you have just asserted.

Substance causation is coherent. And when a substance causes an event, the event is simultaneous with the cause.

This is what is incoherent. Your phrase "there was no time when..." implies that the described scenario was real when there was "no time". — Metaphysician Undercover

You're confused. Time either had a beginning or it did not. Those exhaust the possibilities. Now, I have a view about which one is correct, but I don't need to say or defend my view here. For the simple fact is that whichever one is true the ball was always on the cushion.

I presented an argument for the coherence of self-creation in the OP. You're not saying anything that addresses it.

Is it correct, for instance, that the only reason to think self-creation is impossible is the assumption that a cause must precede its effect? If the answer is 'yes', then it seems we have no reason to think it is impossible as simultaneous causation seems perfectly coherent.

No, by 'innocent' I mean 'not deserving of harm'.

You, I think, must be assuming that babies are innocent. And this, I imagine, is because you also assume that babies do not contain the souls of those who did wrong in another place, but rather that souls come into being at the same time as the baby body, or thereabouts.

Those assumptions of yours are false if God exists. For God would not deal with anyone unfairly - someone who thinks otherwise is simply conceptually incompetent.

Yet clearly it would be unfair - unjust in the extreme - to subject an innocent baby to life here, in a world such as this one, surrounded by idiotic evil doers, yes?

So he hasn't.

So babies are not innocent, then.

We're obliged to assume they are - I do not dispute that. Prisoners in a prison are obliged to treat the other inmates 'as if' they are innocent and that is precisely what our situation is (if God exists). But they are not actually innocent. For it is absurd to suppose God would put an innocent soul into a pathetically incompetent body and then push it through another person's grotty parts and into a world of arseholes, is it not? That is not the behaviour of an even half-way decent person, never mind a morally perfect one.

Needless to say, my view prompts ghastly righteous indignation from many, who think it a terrible thing to say that babies are not born innocent. Yet invariably these self same folk have themselves forced what they believe to be an innocent person into this world - a world of rapists and murderers - despite knowing full well what kind of a world it was (and thereby demonstrating that they themselves deserve to be here).

They are here, aren't they?

I am taking God's existence for granted. Then I am reasoning like a boss.

God would not allow anyone to piss in your milk or steal your honey if you were a nice innocent person. Yet here you are living in a world in which anyone can piss in your milk and steal your honey at any time.
Therefore you are not a nice innocent person. Nor is anyone else here.

Let's say Roger and Tim have free will and that Tim is perfectly innocent and is a good person. Roger has announced that he is going to piss in Tim's milk. Now, surely if you are a good person and can prevent this from occurring, you would? Thus, so would God.

Free will is unquestionably valuable, but that doesn't mean that good, powerful people let other people use it to visit great harms on others. They intervene and stop it.

Note, we exercise free will over our decisions and Roger got to make his decision to piss in Tim's milk, even though God would intervene and prevent the actual pissing from occurring.

We live in a world in which people get their milk pissed in all the time. God would not knowingly allow that to happen to good, innocent people. So we're not innocent good people then. God isn't allowing all this milk pissing and honey stealing to go on out of respect for our free will. God is allowing it to happen because we're all a bunch of milk pissing honey stealers who deserve to languish in each other's rotten company.

Er, what? None of that made any sense at all.

Philosophy is essentially concerned with the nature of reality. Philosophers, then, assess the likely truth of a view that attempts to describe reality.

That's not what a theologian is doing. Religious worldviews are views about the nature of reality. But theologians do not assess how likely it is that they are true. If they do start doing that, then they're a theologian who is doing philosophy

Not really following this are you?

If God exists, then God isn't treating you unfairly. No matter what happens to you, God wasn't being unfair in allowing it to happen.

Why? Because God is omnibenevolent. So he doesn't treat anyone unfairly.

So, again, when someone pisses in your milk and steals your honey, God wasn't being unfair in allowing that to happen.

When might a good person allow someone else to piss in someone else's milk and steal their honey? Why, when the person in question is themselves a milk pisser honey stealer.

Now, look around you: you live in a world of milk pisser honey stealers. So guess what you might be? What, you think you're a saint? You think you don't deserve to have your milk pissed in and honey stolen? Think again boyo.

If there is piss in your milk and someone steals your honey and God exists, then it was fair for God to allow someone to piss in your milk and steal your honey. How could that be? Well, what if you're the kind of person who pisses in other people's milk and steals their honey? Does a good person care that you've had your milk pissed in and your honey stolen? Does a good person go out of their way - at cost to themselves - to make sure no one pisses in the milk or steals the honey of the milk pisser honey stealer?

By hypothesis God is omnibenevolent. 'God' with a capital G denote a person who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.

If such a being exists, then God is not treating us unfairly. Whatever happens to you, God was not being unfair in allowing it to happen to you.

Some have difficulty accepting this because they're already convinced that they're loveable good people who deserve nothing but milk and honey.

It is unclear to me how you are addressing the OP. Do you think self-creation is possible?

That's an incoherent sentence. The ball and cushion are observed to be in a situation now. In the time before now, the ball and cushion are presumed to have been in the same situation. You are proposing that before that, there was "no time", and the ball and cushion were in the same situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're changing the subject. I am taking no stand on whether time began or not - not for the purposes of this debate. I am pointing out that it is irrelevant. For whether time began or not, there was no time when the ball was not on the cushion.

The idea that there is an event which an object causes, which is co-existent with the object it itself, is incomplete, and does not account for the existence of the object nor the existence of the event. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't follow you. Substances can cause things. If one denies this, then one will be off on an infinite regress.

Now, 'when' does a substasnce cause an event? Well, at the time at which the event occurs. So substance causation is simultaneous causation. The only reason to deny this is a dogmatic conviction that the causation must precede its effect.

There's no assumption of infinite time. When there was no time, the ball was on the cushion, causing the dent.

Note, if you think that all cause must precede their effects, then you would have to assume infinite time or else admit that there can be effects that are not themselves caused by a prior event. But if you admit - and I think we all should - that there can be causation by objects rather than events, then you should also admit that there can be simultaneous causation. For the event that the object causes would occur at the same time as the object causes it.

You are doing things the wrong way around.

Suppose God - an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person - exists.

Well, by hypothesis, they are fair in their dealings, for they're morally perfect.

Thus they are fair in their dealings with us.

If that seems inconsistent with what you think is happening to you and to others, then you have faulty beliefs about what is happening to you and others.

Contradictions being possible is a contradiction, namely because contradictions literally /are/ impossible. — Kuro

What total rubbish. All you're doing is insisting - not arguing - that the law of non-contradiction is necessarily true as opposed to just 'true'. I think it is just 'true', not 'necessarily' true. This is going to get you all hot under the collar and all you are going to do, I anticipate, is tell me over and over that if it is possible for a contradiction to be true, then it is true. Which is, as I say, to keep confusing possible with actual.

God is not bound by the laws of logic. And thus God can do anything. And thus there are no necessary truths. For any truth God can make untrue if he wishes. That doesn't mean there are no truths (you will make this mistake). It means there are truths, it's just that they're capable of being false. And that includes the truth that says there are no true contradictions.

Now, in saying that it is true that there are no true contradictions, I am not contradicting myself. If you think I am, explain. Generate the contradiction, do not just assert it like a dogmatist.

I don't care if he's one of the great minds of all time. I'm mainly making a comment with regards to words and their usage in the sense that the most common philosophical understanding of omnipotence is actualizing whatever is logically possible. — Kuro

You don't seem to understand what omnipotence means. It means 'all powerful' (omni - all - potentia - power). That's what everyone - everyone - understands it to mean. Some then 'argue' - not define, but argue - that this amounts to being able to do all things logically possible. They 'argue' that it is no lack of power to be unable to do the impossible.

I am arguing that their view is false. Tom is more powerful than Roger if he can do more things. That's true, yes? Now, if God is in charge of the laws of logic - if they're his to make or unmake as he sees fit - then he is not bound by them and thus can do things the laws forbid. So, wait for it, that makes him 'more' powerful than a god who is bound by the laws of logic, yes? And so as God is 'all powerful' and it is a manifest contradiction to assert that a person who can do fewer things is more powerful than one who can do more, 'God' can violate the laws of logic and make square circles etc.

The case for thinking he can't relies entirely upon one thing: that the laws of logic forbid these things. And that's all you're going to be able to do - you're just going to say 'modal this and noodle that' , when I know already that the laws of logic forbid what I am saying God can do. That's the point!!! That's what being all powerful involves: it involves 'not' being bound by those laws. I mean, what do you think those laws are? Weird webs that prevent God from doing things? Forcefields? What? You think God is 'bound' by something? Then you're just confused: you don't know what you're talking about. It's like insisting that there is a man taller than the tallest man. No there isn't: he's the tallest man. And likewise, there is nothing 'binding' God - there is no cosmic glue or straightjacket he's stuck in. He is the author of the laws of logic - they're his dictates and express his power - and as such he is not bound by them. This it not hard to understand: how can someone make a square circle? Well, the first thing they need to do is 'not' be bound by the laws of logic - and how can someone do that? Well, they can be the author of those laws.

Although I don't find anything necessarily wrong with this, I want to clarify that epistemology does not solely pertain to what exists or does not exist (if that is what you are referring to by "is, or is not the case"): it is also whether something could exist. So, given your lottery example, I would state that the consideration of (1) the lottery numbers could be 1,2..., (2) the lottery is 1,2..., and (3) the lottery is not 1,2... to all be epistemic claims. If that is what you were stating by "is, or is not the case", then we agree here. — Bob Ross

Epistemology is about knowledge. To say that something is 'epistemically' possible, is to say something about our state of knowledge. So, I can be certain that I exist. My non-existence is therefore not epistemically possible (not for me). Nevertheless, it is metaphysically possible and logically possible for me not to exist.

So, when I say that square circles are possible, I am not thereby expressing the idea that 'for all we can tell' there are some. No, for I accept that it is not epistemically possible that there are any - we can know for certain that there are not (which is all it takes for it to be the case that something is not epistemically possible).

When I say that square circles are possible, I mean that they are metaphysically possible. It is possible for them to exist. I say that about anything - it is metaphysically possible for anything to exist.

It is not logically possible for square circles to exist, as the idea contains a contradiction and that violates the law of non-contradiction. But it is metaphysically possible for them to exist, for God is not bound by the law of non-contradiction and thus can create some if he so wishes.

Although I understand better what you mean now, my problem with this is that it isn't clearly defined. — Bob Ross

It was clearly defined. For something to be metaphysically possible, is for it to be capable of existing. There really is no way I can make that any clearer.

When I say that it is not epistemically possible for there to be square circles, I am simply expressing the idea that we can be absolutely certain there are not any in reality.

So: there are certainly no square circles in reality. It is possible for square circles to exist. I really have no way to make these notions any clearer.

If I am understanding you correctly, you are essentially positing that there is a metaphysical instantiation of the physical world, which is governed by God, and thusly is the origin of the "laws of logic" — Bob Ross

That bears no relation to anything I've said. I haven't mentioned the physical world once! I believe God exists. I believe God is the author of the laws of Reason. Those laws constitutively determine what is and is not possible. Thus God - as author of those laws - is not bound by them and can do anything.

You are claiming that there is a metaphysical reality, so to speak, where it is not a contradiction to hold that square circles are possible — Bob Ross

No. You're making stuff up! It is 'possible' for there to be square circles is not equivalent to 'there is a metaphysical reality where there are square circles'. There's just reality. When it comes to things existing, the things that exist constitute reality. And there are no square circles in existence. So, there is no reality where there are square circles.

Reason is not strong with this one.

Yes, but you are not engaging with any argument. Obviously an omnipotent being can kill itself. An omnipotent being can do anything. That includes that. Obviously. If you think an omnipotent being can't kill itself it must be due entirely to you not grasping the concept of omnipotence.

You didn't mention 'invisible friend' in your hackneyed philosophy free rant.

God. Capital G God. Which is convenient shorthand for a person with the three omni properties. Unless one is speaking to someone incredibly ignorant, of course. Then one has to keep telling them what it means and they think something terribly important hangs on this rather than that they just don't know what they're talking about. You just don't know what you are talking about. Surprise me and draw that conclusion.

It's what the word is used to mean. If you don't want to use it that way, that's fine. But in philosophy the default is it stands for someone with those three properties - omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence. Now, I am not going to keep typing out those three words just because you don't know what a word means. But anyway, someone who characterizes God as a dictator is simply showing conceptual incompetence. They are akin to someone who thinks life in heaven would be boring. The latin is totalium idiotium.

Person, likely not. People are weaklings and lack insight. The anthropomorphic version of God should n't be a weakling, so your description of God isn't applicable. — Book273

A mind. A person is just a mind. If you are using the word 'God' to mean something other than a person, then you're just not talking about what others are talking about.

Look, I can prove God. God is a peanut. Here is a peanut.

That's stupid, yes? So, God is a person who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Note, 'knowledge' is something only a person can have. So if someone believes in an omniscient 'thing', then that thing is a person or that the believer is an idiot.

These individuals make up the majority of how omnipotence is understood, from Thomists to Avicenna to many others. Descartes seems to be the only prominent philosopher in dissent here. — Kuro

So what? Incidentally, if Descartes thought I was right, that's pretty damn good indirect evidence that I am. You do realize he's one of the greatest minds of all time?

Now, rather than citing, let's argue. For you seem more keen to tell me things I already know than to engage with my case. What matters is what is actually the case, not what labels you put on it.

If Tom can do more things than Roger, then Tom is more powerful than Roger, yes?

Now, a god who can do anything whatsoever - including things the laws of logic say cannot be done - is more powerful than a god who is bound by those laws. That's obvious, I'd have thought. ("Oh, oh, but Thomywombists would say that something forbidden by the laws of logic is 'no thing' and thus not being able to do it is no problem". Yes, and that's called 'begging the question'. Note, I do not deny that square circles are forbidden by the laws of logic. I deny that this makes them impossible. It makes them logically impossible - for label lovers - but it does not make them 'metaphysically impossible'. Why? Because God is not bound by the laws of logic.

Why?

Because they're his laws.

Why?

Because a) they are someone's and b) the person whose laws they are would not be bound by them, and thus that person would be able to do things logically forbidden.

Remember Tom and Roger? Now the Thomywomby god is bound by the laws of logic and so can't make a square circle. Pathetic. My god can. So my god is.....more powerful than the Thomywomby god.

Contradictions aren't true, are they? So, if my god is more powerful than the Thomywomby god, then the Thomywomby god can't be the omnipotent one, can he? For that would be to affirm a contradiction.

It is deeply ironic that though I seem to be the only one here who thinks that contradictions are capable of being true, I am also the only one who makes sure not to affirm any.

There's no confusion. — Kuro

Yes there is!

Ability to do something entails that it can possibly occur, not that it actually occured. So God being able to change the laws of logic or create contradictions does not mean he already did so, but can do so if he wants to i.e. it is possible that this can occur. You've done nothing but misrepresent what I said. — Kuro

Yes, so, once more, no contradictions are actually true. You said that if there was a god who could make everything not make sense, then nothing actually makes sense. So you're just flipping and flopping.

God can make a square circles. There are no true contradictions. See? Things make sense. It is possible for them not to. They do though. See?

No such proof can exist because you can never trust any absolute rule of reason, because any absolute rule of reason can be possibly false in the presence of a God that can possibly change these rules of reason if he wishes to do so. — Kuro

Ah, so you're a dogmatist. You know already that there is no proof of God. Good job! There is.
And once more with the same mistake (am I the only one who doesn't commit it? What is it with you people??). 'Can be mistaken' doesn't mean 'is mistaken'. Christ almighty.

If you go the Cartesian route, you get the Cartesian result. — Kuro

Er, what?

I don't disagree with this, I elaborated in my earlier comment that I called it Frankfurt style free will not because I'm referencing Frankfurt style cases themselves rather I'm saying that it's Frankfurt style free will precisely because Frankfurtian notions (including Frankfurt cases as well as theory of volitions, which I highlighted as /different avenues/ meant to support the conclusion, not as one thing) are most often what is employed to support that conception of free will. — Kuro

Then you're misusing terms. You did reference Frankfurt-style cases. And you said that libertarianism is incompatible with them. It's not. It's not even clear that Harry Frankfurt himself is not a libertarian. He's never, to my knowledge, said explicitly that he's a compatibilist. And if you say introduce 'frankfurt-style free will' after having mentioned Frankfurt style cases, then you're inviting us to think that by 'frankfurt-style free will' you mean free will taht does not require alternative possibilities, yes?

Anyway, that's by the by. God has free will regardless of which theory about free will is true. For his will makes whichever theory is true, true. And free will - whatever it turns out to involve - is morally valuable. So that means God values it, for God valuing something is what makes it morally valuable. And so God values free will. And God is omnipotent, so he can reasonably be expected to have it himself, as it is unreasonable to believe God would deny himself anything he valued having.

If a being is 'able' to make a square circle, then it is epistemically possible for a square circle to exist. — Bob Ross

No, it is not epistemically possible for a square circle to exist. You are confused. It is metaphysically possible for a square circle to exist if an omnipotent being exists. It is not thereby made epistemically possible. For instance, it is certain I exist. I, anyway, can be certain I exist. But it is metaphysically possible for me not to exist. So, you are confusing different sorts of possibility.

Now, I literally believe in person who can do anything. Show me how I am committed to affirming an actual contradiction. Don't keep pointing out to me that square circles involve a contradiction - I know they do. But I don't think any exist - so I am not affirming any actual contradiction. THis is unlike those who insist that an all powerful being can't do some things - they are saying something that is actually contradictory and thus being totalium idiotiums.

I am not following you here. "being has actually realized a contradiction"? The realizations of a being have no effect on the fact that it will never be able to conjure up a square circle. — Bob Ross

What i mean by that is that you must no invalidly go from 'metaphysically possible that x' to 'x' . So, it is metaphysically possible for God to make the law of non-contradiction false. That does not mean it is false. What you are going to do is continually make this mistake.

Now, you asked, I think, whether God could commit suicide, to which the answer is a straightforward 'yes'. You have not yet explained why this answer is false.

A square circle is a logical contradiction epistemically and metaphysically: metaphysics is simply the extrapolation of the overlying instantiation of the physical world via reason which abides by logic (which are epistemic claims, unless you aren't claiming to "know" the metaphysical assertions you put forth, then it may just be beliefs). The shape of a circle cannot be that of a square, a "square circle" is a contradictio in adjecto. When you say it is metaphysically possible, what exactly do you mean? Likewise, what do you mean by epistemically impossible? When you say "we can be sure none exist", that is an empirical claim (pertaining to the objects) and a claim pertaining to the mind (a circular triangle, for instance, can't exist in the mind either), but it is important to note that we can only obtain metaphysical claims via logic and reason. Metaphysics is directly constraint to the basic principles of logic. Furthermore, if you agree that we "know" there cannot be square circles (which would be an epistemic claim), then God can't instantiate one in the universe (we "know" this). — Bob Ross

For something to be epistemically possible, is for us simply not to know whether it is, or is not the case. It is epistemically possible for next week's lottery numbers to be 1,2,3,4,5,6, for instance. When I say 'metaphysically possible' I simply mean that nothing stops it from being actualized in reality. I would use 'logically possible' to describe what the laws of logic permit.

Now, God is the author of the laws of logic. How do I know that? Well, two ways, but one will suffice here. I know it because the author of the laws of logic can do anything, including things forbidden by those laws, for they are her laws to make or unmake as she sees fit. And a person who is not bound by the laws of logic - not bound to be able, at most, to do all things logically possible - is a person who is more powerful than one who is. And thus God, as an omnipotent being, will be the author of the laws of logic. And thus God can do anything, include making square circles. And you can point out that a square circle violates the logical laws until you are blue in the face, the simple fact is that those laws do not bind God. And thus though logically impossible, square circles are metaphysically possible, for God could make one if she so wanted.

Incidentally, 'empirically' means 'by means of the senses'. When I said that we can be sure no square circles exist - an epistemic claim (epistemionium claimonium) - it was on the basis of just how strongly our reason represents them to not exist (nonium existio). It was not because I have looked, smelt, touched, listened to and tasted everything and concluded that no square circles exist.

This is just as the same Cartesian doctrine I was speaking about earlier. Yes, I said that /unless/ you're a Cartesian, you'd generally tend to think that omnipotent agents cannot actualize any potential that is non-logical because such potential does not exist in the first place, or bring about a contradictory state of affairs because it is not possible in the first place. Of course, a Cartesian takes the opinion that is otherwise, hence why I mentioned this in my initial comment as I am in perfect recognition of this position. — Kuro

What's in a word? Yes, one can label positions and one can say that some would define 'omnipotence' as 'being able to make a cup of tea'. But if one is merely able to make a cup of tea, then one is not able to do anything, but just make a cup of tea. And someone who can make a cup of tea and do a whole load of other things is 'more powerful' than the mere tea-maker. So, someone who is able to do anything is more powerful than someone who is able to do most things, bar contravene the laws of logic. Thus, if we are talking about a person who has the most power possible, then we are talking about a person who can do anything whatsoever. Those who are using the label 'omnipotent' to denote a person who is not able to do everything and anything are simply using the word in a misleading way - which is, of course, their right. But it is misleading and it is not what God is. God is all powerful (omni - all - potentia - powerful: omnipotent). Again, one can use the word 'omnipotent' to mean 'a person with red hair' if one wants, but it will then not be being used to describe a defining property of God.

So, you and i both know full well that some 'define' omnipotence as being able to do all things logically possible. But when it is used in that way, it is not being used to describe an 'all powerful' being, but a being who is able to do some things and not others. Which is fine - but it is now not being used to describe 'God' and it is also, of course, not being used in a way that accords with the original meaning of the term (which means 'all powerful').

I believe in God precisely because I believe in an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good person. And an all powerful person can do anything - because it is contradictory to maintain that an all powerful person lacks the power to do some things.

I'm of the opinion that it is not sensical to speak about any agent who is purportedly omnipotent in the Cartesian sense, because they can undermine any primitive conceptual schema we commit to (including the very idea that it can actualize any potential). — Kuro

That's because you are confused and have once more conflated being 'able' to do something with actually doing it. He has not actually undermined anything, has he? So everything still makes sense. And thus it is not nonsensical to talk of a person who has the ability to make everything cease to make sense (unless you are supposing him actually do have exercised the ability in question - which he hasn't). This is what you have to do to generate nonsense - to generate actual contradictions. You have to suppose him to have done what he merely has the ability to do. Ironically it is those who think an all powerful being cannot do some things who are affirming a contradiction and thus talking actual nonsense.

To be more clear, it is that I think supposing this kind of agents poses a bigger epistemic problem in virtue of the very claim supposing it (and any other claim). — Kuro

That's just an article of faith on your part. What if I could prove to you that such a person exists? Would you decide, in advance, that no such proof exists? Is your agnosticism unreasonable?

I'm referring to Frankfurt style /free will/, where free will is interpreted to be the actualization of whatever is in accord with an agent's higher-order volitions such that an agent can be free without being able to do otherwise. — Kuro

You seem to be confusing Frankfurt-style cases with Frankfurt's heirarchical model of moral responsibility. Someone can accept that Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities without thereby being committed to Frankfurt's heirarchical model of moral responsiblity. And the reverse is true too, for one could accept Frankfurt's heirarchical model of moral responsibility but see it as a necessary condition, not sufficient and add to it the requirement that alternative possibilities be available to the agent at decision making moments.

Anyway, Frankfurt-style cases, if they work, refute the principle of alternative possibilities. They do not thereby demonstrate compatibilism to be true (even if they help that cause) and so they do not demonstrate incompatibilism to be false (and so tehy don't demonstrate libertarianism to be false).

The sourcehood condition is neutral between compatibilist and incompatibilist conceptions of free will. That's precisely why a Frankfurtian might nevertheless be a libertarian (or incompatibilist).

I can refurbish my statement as "it is equivalent to holding that a square circle is possible" and nothing changes in my argument. — Bob Ross

On the contrary, your argument now fails. For you can generate no actual contradiction from that claim. I claim that it is possible for there to be square circles. Not epistemically, of course - we can be totally certain none exist, for their existence would constitute an actual contradiction and we can be sure there are no actual contradictions. But it is metaphysically possible for there to be some, for God exists and God can do anything.

However, a being that is literally an omnipotent being is self-contradictory — Bob Ross

No it isn't. This is the point: to generate an 'actual' contradiction you're going to have to make the mistake you previously made: you're going to have to confuse being 'able' to do something with actually doing it. There is nothing contradictory about an omnipotent being. If you think otherwise, show it without assuming that the omnipotent being has actually realized a contradiction.

Sounds like an essay question. You know it would be easier to do some research yourself and think about what the answer might be than try and piece together an answer from the responses of people here, most of whom will know far less than you do about the matter. I mean, how will you discern a plausible answer from total and utter confused nonsense? You won't be able to - and thus your essay answer will be appalling.

You like having arguments. I prefer talking. — EugeneW

Then you need to find a talking forum, not a philosophy forum. Philosophers use reasoned argument to try and figure out what's what. They don't just squawk. Isn't twitter designed for people like you? That is, people who have nothing substantial to say but still want to tell everyone else about their inane thoughts?