I am not sure I see a problem. There are normative reasons - moral and instrumental being the kind we are concerned with here - and there's what we have overall reason to do (which will be a function of the force the different reasons present have).

We can call what we have overall reason to do, 'rational'.

I think moral reasons do trump others and that's partly what is distinctive about them. They can conflict with each other, but they override other reasons.

When what we have overall reason to do has been determined by moral reasons, the rational requirement is a moral one.

Failure to do what is rational is simply irrational. Failure to do what is morally required is immoral and makes one blameworthy and deserving of harm.

When it comes to self interest, sometimes the fact that doing x would compromise your interests can operate to prevent other facts from generating moral reasons. So we do not have moral reasons being overcome by instrumental reasons, rather we have some facts preventing other facts from generating moral reasons.

As for the supererogatory - well, these are acts that are not morally required but have features that make them good and thus praiseworthy. I don't yet see a problem with them. They possess good making features, and it is those that make them praiseworthy. (Though failure to perform them does not make one blameworthy).

Perhaps there is a problem explaining their rationality. For it seems correct to say that such acts are rational. Yet it seems odd to say that their rationality is due to us having instrumental reason to perform them. But to deal with this we can say that there are some acts that one has no moral reason to perform until one performs them - that is, they rationalize themselves.

I gave an argument in support of it. It's to do with what it takes for something to have representative contents. It has nothing to do with introspective indiscernibility. It has everything to do with what it takes for something to 'represent' something to be the case.

Like I say, read it when you can understand it, and then address it.

I gave an argument in support of premise 1. Read it after you've acquired the necessary intelligence to understand it. THen say something in criticism of it, or go away. Don't mention indiscernibility again.

No point continuing this, InPenentrablyS.

Premise 1 establishes that in order for us to be aware of anything our mental states would need to have feature P.

Premise 2 establishes that we are aware of some things.

We thereby establish that some of our mental states have feature P - a feature incompatible with our mental states being the product of unguided evolutionary forces.

Deal with it.

So, here it is again... how do you know you're aware? — InPitzotl

See the defence of premise 2. Although given how badly you reason there's not much point.

Do you now see that there is no contradiction? I can know that I have a real banknote in my pocket even though it is possible for there to exist a visually indiscernible note that is not real. See?

You really are InPentrablyS!

If 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from belief, and:
If that's correct, then surely this applies to all of the beliefs that one acquires?
— Bartricks
...then 'belief' that you're aware is introspectively indiscernible from belief that you're aware.
in this case that your belief that there is a pie in the oven does not constitute knowledge that there is a pie in the oven.
— Bartricks
...and 'belief' that you are aware does not constitute knowledge that you are aware.

So:
We do know we exist and a whole lot else, of course.
— Bartricks
...how do you know you know, given you could just be dreaming you know? Introspection is the wrong answer, because knowing cannot arise from 'belief', and belief and 'belief' are introspectively indistinguishable. — InPitzotl

Does 'X is introspectively indiscernible from Y' entail that we cannot know whether we have an X on our hands or a Y?

You think it does, right? (It doesn't - as I keep explaining to you, again and again and again and again - all to no avail).

That's the only way you could possibly think my claim that we can know we're aware contradicts my claim that it is metaphysically possible that all our states of awareness are fake.

C1. Not all discourse that relates to the question of what we ought to do is moral discourse. There is also discourse about the more casual sorts of ought claims that fall under the category of what is commonly called “self-help” philosophy. This might relate to questions regarding what kinds of relationships you should form in your life or what kind of diet you should have or how should you manage your finances. — TheHedoMinimalist

There are different senses of the word 'ought', but in moral discourse the 'ought' is the normative ought. That's the same as in self-help books. The difference is that self-help books are appealing to 'instrumental' normative reasons, whereas in moral discourse we are appealing to 'moral' normative reasons. But both kinds generate normative oughts.

What is taken to be distinctive of moral oughts - and it's in dispute whether this really is what makes them distinctive - is that they override others. In other words, moral reasons have more oomph than instrumental reasons, and thus if Xing is maximally in my interests, but Xing is wrong, then I have overall normative reason 'not' to X.

C2. The existence of moral duties implies the existence of a “special” sort of reason that overrides self-help type of considerations. — TheHedoMinimalist

I take it that what you say here simply expresses what I have said above, namely that moral normative reasons trump other kinds of normative reason. It is more important - that is, we have more reason - to do the right thing, than anything else.

So far that sounds correct. It seems like a conceptual truth that whatever it is morally right to do in a situation is that which we have most reason to do. ("I can see that Xing in these circumstances is what it is morally right to do; but what do I have most reason to do?" sounds confused).

C3. The existence of “special” moral reasons implies the superiority of moral philosophy over self-help philosophy. This superiority makes the notion of a decision failing to be bound by duty for being too demanding on your personal life seem implausible and repugnant. — TheHedoMinimalist

I don't understand how you get to the second claim from the first. The fact that moral reasons are not instrumental reasons means that it is always going to be possible that the moral life and the life it is maximally in your best interests to lead will not be the same. Sometimes we may be morally required to do something that it is not in our interests to do.

But you're making the much stronger claim that this entails that morality will be too demanding. I don't see how that follows. For instance, that instrumental reasons and moral reasons are not the same does not prevent instrumental reasons affecting what we have moral reason to do. If Xing would not frustrate too many of my ends, then I may have an obligation to do X. But if Xing would frustrate many of my ends, then it may be that I do not have an obligation to do X. For instance, it seems to me that I am entitled to do pretty much anything if my life is at stake and I am not responsible for it being so. If an innocent person is about to explode and kill me and the only way I can prevent them from exploding is to shoot them dead, then I am entitled to do so. And if there are ten such people I am entitled to shoot the lot of them. Normally, of course, one is not entitled to shoot innocent people for the sake of one's own interests. But under these circumstances one is. So these sorts of cases are ones in which instrumental reasons are radically affecting what one is morally entitled to do.

Anyway, those are matters of some dispute, no doubt. But the point is that you've fallaciously inferred that as moral reasons are 'special', they cannot be informed by and responsive to our instrumental reasons.

It seems to me, then, that all you're entitled to conclude is that what we have moral reason to do is to some extent responsive to what we have instrumental reason to do. I don't see how you get to the conclusion that we have no moral duties or that all moral duties are such as to be over-demanding due to their being distinctive and overriding.

Similarly, the idea that all of our apparent states of awareness are in fact fake, contains no contradiction either. But once more, we would be confused if we ever thought it a reality.
— Bartricks
Quite the opposite apparently:
(where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one).
— Bartricks — InPitzotl

What? You keep doing this - you keep quoting me saying entirely consistent things and then just insist they contradict. I am not going to do your work for you, so kindly explain how the hell those two claims contradict!

Frankly, I'm a bit neutral. It sounds like it intends to be self-evident much like the other premise. Are you asking if I'm hearing something I must be deliberately using my ears? — Cheshire

I think it is self-evident, but I also illustrated its credibility with examples. I don't think you appreciate how my argument - and so arguments in general - work. You just veer from telling me I've contradicted myself to refusing to say clearly which premise you dispute. I ask you what objection you have to premise 1 and you give me concerns that only make sense as concerns about premise 2. You're all over the place.

Now, premise 1 first. Premise 1 says:

1. If our faculties of awareness are wholly the product of unguided evolutionary forces, then they do not give us an awareness of anything — Bartricks

What problem do you have with it? I defend it with examples. And you now reveal that you're neutral over its credibility.

Right - so are you neutral about the sky 'writing'? Are you being told there's a pie in the oven by the clouds? If you're sane, then you agree that you're not being told there's a pie in the oven by the clouds.

Why? Because clouds aren't agents. Nor are pies. They're not 'telling' you anything.

Now, round and round in circles we go. For god's sake recognise that the correct analysis of why hte clouds are not telling you anything is that they're not agents.

Now, apply that more generally. And now you'll find that premise 1 is true. No representation without a representer.

Don't waffle on about something orthogonal to this issue. Just focus. Focus on premise 1 and its incredible plausibility. It isn't open to reasonable doubt. To doubt it is to think that there can be representations that lack a representer. And that's to think that the clouds could be telling you about a pie in the oven.

Once you've appreciated how unbelievably plausible premise 1 is, move on to premise 2.

Premise 2 is not open to reasonable doubt either. You seem to think that I think it is. I don't. See the OP. I don't think it is open to reasonable doubt. It is metaphysically possible that all - all - our apparent states of awareness are fakes. But it is not open to reasonable doubt that some are, in fact, real states of awareness. Hence 2 is true. If you have trouble understanding this, I gave you an example to illustrate: it is metaphysically possible for me not to exist; but I am not able reasonably to doubt my own existence. Don't try and come up with another example of your own - you're not good at it. Just reflect on mine.

Once you've noticed that 1 and 2 are not open to any reasonable doubt, note how 3 follows from them.

If you didn't think 3 was true, revise that view. You've just been shown it is.

The point of my first syllogism is to show that there are values built into nature. — Herg

So you think the mindless natural world values things? How does that work?

I value things. You value things. My chair doesn't. That rock over there doesn't.

And does 'nature' issue prescriptions as well? This is the stuff of madness.

Your first argument does no such thing, incidentally. It's first premise is ambiguous between a substantial moral claim and a claim about how people use a word (that is, you want both to say how the word 'appropriate' is used, and help yourself to actual appropriateness). EIther way it doesn't show that 'values' are built into nature.

Aa I say, it's a thesis about how 'bad' is actually used. I don't think that's helping myself, I think I'm just reporting a fact about language use. — Herg

Oh, in that case your argument is unsound, as premise 1 is obviously false. "That's morally bad" does not mean "a lot of people use the word 'inappropriate' to refer to it".

I should explain why morality is subjective.
To say that something is objective is to say something about its mode of existence. More specifically, it is to say that it exists outside a mind's mental states. So, the 'objective physical world' denotes a place that exists outside anyone's mind.
By contrast, if something is subjective, then it exists inside a mind or minds- that is, it exists as mental states; states of a subject.
Morality is subjective because morality is made of prescriptions and values. But only minds can issue prescriptions or value anything. Thus morality exists as the prescriptions and values of a mind. And thus it is subjective.

Morality is subjective. But 'relative' is not an alternative to objective or subjective. The opposite of relative is 'absolute'. So there's whether morality is objective or subjective. And then there's a different question - is it relative or absolute. The answer to the former can help answer the latter, but they're distinct questions.

Your argument presupposes moral truths and so doesn't tell us whether morality is objective or subjective. Premise 1 in your first argument helps itself to appropriateness. But to say it is appropriate to have this or that feeling is to say it is right to feel it.

You've managed to get to 35 with reasoning and comprehension skills like those? Blimey! You must be very lucky.
God can do anything. Thus God can change the laws of logic. Why? Because he can do anything.

Really? I assumed it was in reference to an awake person asking some one obviously asleep if they were sleeping. Yes, I am sleeping would be an unanswerable form of awareness. Smells the same. — Cheshire

I don't know what you're on about now. Look, my example was just to illustrate something - to illustrate how we can acknowledge that something is metaphysically possible at the same time as acknowledging that it is epistemically impossible for it to be the case. What's the point in coming up with other examples when mine does what's necessary? I mean, can't you see that it is both metaphysically possible that you not exist, but epistemically not possible? If not, doesn't matter. The point is that it is metaphysically possible that all of our apparent states of awareness are fakes, but not epistemically possible.

But anyway, do you have any objection to what I argued in defence of premise 1? That is, do you agree that for something to be a representation, some agency needs to be using for that purpose?

No, as in imprecise or conceptually different? — Cheshire

Different. The idea that I do not exist contains no contradiction. Yet I am confused if I think the idea a reality. Similarly, the idea that all of our apparent states of awareness are in fact fake, contains no contradiction either. But once more, we would be confused if we ever thought it a reality.

Then you say, for god knows what reason,

Is that analogous to being unable to answer the question "Are you sleeping" in the affirmative? — Cheshire

No, for it is both metaphysically possible that I am sleeping right now (and thus that this is a dream) and I can believe it coherently. I may even acquire evidence that it is true (if, for example, I suddenly find that I am a horse or something). So just not the same at all.

Why insist on calling something by a negated state? Not Unguided means guided, correct? — Cheshire

Stop being tedious.

Okaaay Gwegowy.

Is that analogous to being unable to answer the question "Are you sleeping" in the affirmative? — Cheshire

No.

And what I argue is that for a mental state to have representative contents, it has to be being used by an agent for the purpose of representing what it is representing.
— Bartricks
It's less clear how this informs one about the nature of evolution. — Cheshire

Because if true, then in combination with premise 2 it tells us that the evolutionary processes that have furnished us with our faculties of awareness have not been unguided.

God is Reason and so God can do anything. It's that way around. In virtue of being Reason, God can violate the law of non-contradiction, for it is his law and thus does not bind him. That does not mean he does violate the law of non-contradiction. It does not mean the law is false (this is something you and Banno seem unable to grasp - being 'able' to do something does not mean you're doing it).
But anyway, you're more of a pronouncer than an arguer, so there's not much point in me explaining any further is there?

I still do not follow you. There's what's true, and there's what's false.

I am assuming that you think the bible is the word of God and thus that its creation story is the true one (and that all others are false).

Well, that creation story is consistent with science, first off. For scientific claims are always attended with an 'other things being equal' clause that is not met if God exists and created the universe in the manner outlined in the bible. (So, scientific discoveries imply that the world is 4.55 billion years old 'other things being equal' - well, if the bible story is correct, then the world is actually 4-6,000 years old. That doesn't contradict the science, precisely becasue other things are not equal in this case).

Perhaps that creation story contains apparent contradictions, such as claiming that X was created before Y, and then that Y was created before X.

That would seem to be inconsistent with Reason, not science. Until, that is, one remembers that this is God we're talking about, and God isn't bound by the laws of Reason, for God is Reason and can do anything.

I am not sure I follow. To be irrational is not to follow Reason.

However, one is not failing to follow Reason if one reasons that as God can do anything, there are no necessary connections between anything. One is following reason - one is being rational. It is rational to think that if there exists a person who can do anything, then nothing that exists exists of necessity (for a person who can do anything can destroy anything and everything at any moment)' and likewise to think that there are no necessary connections between things. Nothing 'has' to produce light and light can exist by itself.

If there is a being who can do anything, then nothing 'has' to be the case. There's what is the case and what is not the case. But there is no such thing as what 'has' to be the case.

That is not an irrational belief, but the opposite. It is the rational implication of there being a person who can do anything.

If one has independent reason to think the bible is the creation of that person, and in that book this person says that they created light before the sun or whatever, then there is no reason to think that this was not what they did.

And if the book says that the person in question - God - created X before Y, and Y before X, then once more it is rational to think that this is what happened, for the person who has said this is the one person capable of doing anything at all.

So, it seems to me that insofar as one thinks there are problems here - problems reconciling the bible account of things with this or that received view about how things are or how things have come to be - one is suffering from a rational failure: a failure to appreciate what omnipotence involves.

God, unlike us, is not a prisoner of Reason. God is Reason and so God can do anything, including violating the laws of Reason (for they're his laws). Appreciating this - properly appreciating it - means appreciating that what would be a problem if premised of anyone else, is not a problem when premised of God.

That's premise two (and it is not that awareness is the only possible state of affairs; it's that we are never justified in believing we are wholesale unaware. For an analogy - it is possible for me not to exist, but I am never going to be justified in believing such a state of affair obtains).

But anyway, that's my defence of premise 2, not 1. Premise 1 turns on what it takes for a mental state to have representative contents. And what I argue is that for a mental state to have representative contents, it has to be being used by an agent for the purpose of representing what it is representing.

What was my argument in support of premise 1?

Like I say, you don't know what my argument is. Read the op and try and understand what my argument for premise 1 is. Then address it.

I obviously have a problem with premise 1, why would you think otherwise? — Cheshire

Because you haven't said anything to address the argument I gave in support of it.

I mean, what do you think my argument is?

I defended premise 1. In the OP.

Premise 1 doesn't 'look like' an 'if...then' statement. It is one. Not looks like. Is.

The 'conclusion' of the syllogism is that our faculties are the real deal, do create states of awareness, and are not the product of unguided evolution.

The conclusion doesn't follow from 1 alone. It follows from 1 and 2.

So, if you have a problem with premise 1, address the argument I gave in support of it. You haven't.

If you have no problem with premise 1, but have a problem with the conclusion, then you need to address premise 2 and what I said in defence of it.

Do one or other of those things.

I haven't disproved science. What are you on about? You've just plonked an arbitrary video about evolution addressing a straw man argument that I haven't made and blown some kisses at me and then sneered.

Read the OP. Marvel at its brilliance. Address the argument.

No it isn't. That's the point. See the OP for details.

What the hell are you on about?

If X then Y. That's called a conditional. It doesn't assert X or Y. It just says 'if' X, then Y.

So, if I deny "If X then Y" I am not thereby denying either X or Y.

Christ.

Now, I haven't contradicted myself at any point.

Address my argument. Read the OP. And address the argument.

And you don't think clearly either.
"X presupposes Y" is false. X and Y may be the case. But X does not presuppose Y.

Look, you don't even know how to address my argument, do you?

What the blue blazes are you on about? If you say X 'presupposes' Y and I say it doesn't, that doesn't mean I am saying Y is not the case, does it?

Where's the contradiction? It's just waffle. Identify two statements by me that contradict each other.

Presumably you think you've already done that. You haven't. If you say "X presupposes Y" and I say "No it doesn't" that doesn't mean I am saying Y is not the case.

Me: I have a cake and a coffee.

YOu: If you have a coffee, that presuppose you have a cake.

Me: No it doesn't.

You: So you don't have a cake. That contradicts your earlier statement.

Me: No it doesn't. I do have a cake. But having a coffee does not presuppose possession of a cake.

You: you contradicted yourself.

Me: No I didn't.

You. You did.

Repeat a 1000 times

So you agree that he doesn't know there is a pie in the oven (for in a Gettier case the agent doesn't know a true proposition despite the belief in its truth being justified).
So what's questionable then?

Where do I contradict myself? I am not doing your working out for you - identify the contradiction.

What's questionable? Do you think he does know the pie is in the oven?

You are confusing the simplicity of a thing with the complexity of its states. Thoughts are states of mind. They can be as complex as you like. That won't make the thing that has them complex.

Minds - all minds, not just God's - are simples. That is, they have no parts. That's why the idea of a half a mind makes no sense.

That does not mean that God is a simpleton. Consider a lump of ice and now consider that lump of ice transformed into a very complex sculpture. Well, as a stuff it is no different to before - it is a complex of hydrogen and oxygen molecules, or whatever. But now it has an extremely complex shape.

Likewise, the simplicity of a mind does not entail that teh mind will be in simple states. There is no upper limit to how complex the thoughts of a simple mind can be. The whole external world could exist as the complex thought of a simple mind. And probably does, if Berkeley is correct.

Of course there is a sort of reductionist argument that answers the omnipotence problem:

Simply put it means saying yes to every question about God.
Can God destroy Himself Yes
Can God destroy Himself and still exist? Yes
Can God destroy Himself and still exist but not exist? Yes
Can God exist and not exist? Yes.
Can God be eternal and die? Yes

Take your pick. In any case I am discussing a set of writings fixed in time and space, about which a limited number of rational statements are possible. — FreeEmotion

I do not really follow your point. What you say is quite right - God, being omnipotent, can do anything and so to any question "can God do..." the answer is an unambiguous 'yes'. Well, there we go. That's quite right.

And so can God make it the case that everything in the bible is true? Yes. No problem. Can it be true that God made the animals before man, and man before the animals? Yes, because God can do anything. It is no condition on God being able to do a thing that we be able to understand how.

Can God destroy himself? Of course he can. And note, that is compatible with him existing eternally. So you have reasoned fallaciously in concluding that God cannot destroy himself becasue he exists eternally. To exist eternally, you just need to exist forever. That's consistent with having the ability not to exist at any point. (Note too that existing eternally is not an essential feature of God. Omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence are. Existing eternally is not, or at least I cannot see why it would be).

The mistake many theists make is to confuse existing eternally with existing 'of necessity'. God does not exist of necessity (for if he did, then there would be something - some weird existential glue - holding him in existence, and that's incompatible with his being all powerful. To put it another way, there would be something beyond God, something outside God's control that determines his continued existence). But existing eternally and existing of necessity are not the same. God exists eternally, but he does not exist of necessity.

Another mistake is to confuse existing with certainty, and existing of necessity. God exists with certainty. But he does not exist of necessity.

In a way, the issues you're grappling with - apparent internal inconsistencies in the bible and supposed inconsistencies with science (there are none, but as I have said, scientific claims come with an implicit 'other things being equal' clause which is not going to be satisfied if the bible is true) - are red herrings.

The big issues are whether God exists and whether the bible is a work of God's. If God exists and the bible is a work of his, then there are no problems at all - there can't be, for God can do anything.

↪InPitzotl
Start by telling me either how one can have a faculty of introspection without awareness, or what it means for things to be introspectively indistinguishable without such faculties.
— InPitzotl — Bartricks

So, you asked me how one can have a faculty without having any awareness, yes?

I then answered that stupid and irrelevant question (irrelevant because it in no way bears on the credibility of my argument). If I have a faculty of sight but my eyelids are sealed shut, then I have a faculty of sight, but no visual awareness. So one can have a faculty without having any of the awareness the faculty is in principle capable of giving you.

Your question showed that this did not occur to you. That, as far as you are concerned, having a faculty of awareness involves being aware of things. That's a mistake, as I have just shown you. It's also irrelevant to my argument - but it is a mistake. A mistake on your part. Consider that a big punch on the nose.

So let's suppose there's a bot-built entity:
— InPitzotl

What I am arguing is that if all of our faculties are bot-built, then they won't create any beliefs, just 'beliefs' (where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one).
— Bartricks — InPitzotl

...that you're describing here. Either the bot-built entity has a faculty of introspection, or it does not have a faculty of introspection. In the former case, the bot-built entity is capable of awareness. In the latter case, it's meaningless to discuss introspective discernibility. — InPitzotl

Not really following things are you? It doesn't have a faculty of introspection. It has a 'faculty of introspection' - that is, a faculty that will generate in its possessor states that are introspectively indiscernible from states giving introspective awareness.

And no, it is not meaningless to discuss introspective indiscernibility in that case, for......and for God's sake will you please grow the relevant part of the brain needed to grasp this simple point - whether two states are introspectively indiscernible or not does not depend upon anyone failing introspectively to discern them. Christ! The creature in question will not have a faculty of introspection. They will have a 'faculty of introspection'. And they will not have any introspective awareness of anything. They will be in states that are introspectively indiscernible from states of introspective awareness. But they will not be in any states of introspective awareness. This isn't hard.

The rest was just the failure to recognize this simple point made over and over again.

Now, once more, you haven't actually objected to anything I have argued. What is your objection to premise 1?

Point? Do you have one?