Saying "I don't know what your talking about" is an evasive dismissal; instead of accusing you of this crime I gave you the benefit of the doubt. Your first premise is non-sequitur by your own admission. — Cheshire

No, it is just true. And i haven't admitted anything about my first premise - again, what are you on about? My first premise is true, and I provided argumentative support for it. You've said nothing to address anything I have argued. Nothing.

IF you can't discern between the products of guided or unguided evolution, then it does not follow you can state with certainty the effect it has on awareness. — Cheshire

Where did I argue that you can't discern them? The argument itself establishes that our mental states are 'not' the product of unguided evolution. There: they are discerned from states that would be introspectively indiscernible from them but would provide no awareness if the produced by unguided evolutionary forces.

Again: we 'are' aware of things. SO we are sometimes in states of awareness. Those states are 'introspectively' indiscernible from states that are not states of awareness. But so what?

Start by telling me either how one can have a faculty of introspection without awareness, or what it means for things to be introspectively indistinguishable without such faculties. — InPitzotl

You can have a faculty of introspection without being aware of anything, just as you can have a faculty of sight without seeing anything (I explained above - I don't know to which of you bozos I explained it, as you've all congealed into one big mass of stupid in my mind - but if my eyelids are sealed shut, then I would still have a faulty of sight, but I would not be seeing anything with it).

But anyway, as I keep stressing - and the point seems too subtle to register with you (and it is not very subtle) - for two mental states to qualify as introspectively indiscernible, no one needs to be failing introspectively to discern them. So, the claim that a mental state is introspectively indiscernible from another does not presuppose that there are people with working faculties of introspection. This is not a hard point to grasp.

My argument is that if our faculties are built by unguided natural selection, then they will not create in us any states of awareness, just states introspectively indiscernible from states of awareness. Under those circumstances - circumstances I have argued do not obtain - no-one would have a faculty of introspection, just 'faculties of introspection'. That's not a problem. That doesn't indicate some incoherence in my claim.

I have suggested that you must think otherwise and that this silly point is somehow at the heart of your mysterious objection. But you have replied that you accept this. Yet you persist in pointing out that if no-one has a faculty of introspection, no one will be failing to introspectively discern that which is introspectively indiscernible.

So again, I do not know what your objection is. I don't think you have one. Lights out.

Okaaaay. There's an old guy in my local who says - well, slurs - things like that. He looks like the Shy Peasant by Ilya Repin. That's how I imagine you, given you have told me how you imagine me (quite wrong btw).

Well, that's a bit out of leftfield. And it's wrong.

what inconsistency?

I have literally no idea what you are on about. Are you trying to question premise 2 now?

Get in the ring and get your smacking. Come along.

So he can do anything. But not some things?

Being irrational is a thing. You are being irrational. You think God can do anything, but not do the irrational things you do?

Destroying oneself is a thing. You think God can do anything, but he can't destroy himself?

You understand what a contradiction is, yes? (No, clearly).

So, Gwegowy, you think God - or 'God' - can't do a whole bunch of stuff.

Would someone who can do everything 'God' can do and all the things he can't do, be more or less powerful than 'God'?

What do you think, Gwegowy?

How so? Look, I can't punch a cloud. Say something substantial so that I can knock its lights out.

And your objection is....

So, myself, Descartes and Jesus all think that God can so anything. And that, according to you, makes us nuts and not very good at philosophy.

You think God can do anything and not some things.

I think you don't have a clue about anything.

No, it'd be guided. You have just said that Peahens are agents. So some of their behaviour is now guided. By themselves. Yes? It expresses their sexual tastes. So why did you then say that by my definition it'd be unguided?

No it doesn't.

Look, I don't think you have a clear objection. Why don't you read what I said in defence of 1?

Awareness requires being in a mental state that has representative contents. Or do you think otherwise?

And a state can only represent something if it is being used by an agent to do so - no representation without a representer. Or do you think otherwise?

Yes. What is your objection to premise 1?

Yes. What is your objection?

I have told you what I mean by unguided. I want to know what your objection is to the argument I made in support of my premise.

I don't know what you are talking about.

It is what it is. I don't exactly know what 'secular' evolution is. But if it expresses the idea that evolutionary forces do not express the will of an agent, then yes.

We can categorize views all day. It is the view itself that is important, not what label you put on it. Now, I have told you what I mean by unguided evolution. What is your objection to the case I made in support of premise 1?

Just to be clear - because I didn't have a clue what any of that meant - you think God can do anything, but he can't do some things. Again: you think God can do ANYTHING and he can't do some things.

I say in the OP. Unguided by any agency. So, not expressive of an agent's intentions.

Do you think a being who can do anything can't do some things?

And what does that mean when it's at home?

I think most contemporary theist philosophers would indeed think my understanding of omnipotence is crazy. But they're boring hacks. And there is at least one contemporary theist philosopher who thinks my understanding is correct: me. I also have Descartes and Jesus on my side. Descartes wasn't a fool. And Christians who care what Jesus said should all agree with me.

The rest of what you said was utter nonsense. You, like Banno and others, do not seem able to distinguish between a metaphysical possibility, an epistemic possibility, and an actuality.

All things are metaphysically possible with God. So God can destroy himself. He isn't stuck in existence. That doesn't mean there is any epistemic possibility that he does not exist. His existence can be established with certainty. So, it is metaphysically possible for him not to exist (he would not be all powerful otherwise). But it is not epistemicalky possible.

An example to illustrate: it is metaphysically possible for me not to exist. But it is not epistemically possible. For I can be completely certain I exist.

And saying that something is metaphysically possible does not at all mean that one is asserting its actuality. It is possible for God not to exist. But he exists. It is possible for God do divest himself of power. But he hasn't. It is possible for God to make the law of non-contradiction false. But it is true. And so on.

None of this is nuts. Quite the contrary, it is just to apply reason to omnipotence. It is those who think an omnipotent being has to be constrained who are, well, not nuts so much as very stupid. For they think being who can do anything can nevertheless not do this and not do that. A clearer case of a contradiction is harder to conceive of.

What is the error, Banno? That I didn't mention actions does not mean that I do not think normative reasons apply to them. You think it does, right? That's appalling reasoning on your part. I didn't mention aesthetic reasons either - they're normative reasons. Does that mean I don't think that aesthetic reasons are normative reasons? By your logic, yes. Your logic is shit. Bartricks didn't mention actions, therefore Bartricks thinks normative reasons don't apply to them?!? Absolute howler.

Here's something else I didn't mention - I didn't mention that this:

1. If P, then Q
2. Q
3. Therefore P

is fallacious. Applying Banno-logic that means that I think the above argument is 'not' fallacious. Yes? Ludicrous.

Normative reason are justifying reasons. They apply to actions and beliefs. You said - mistakenly - that they apply to actions alone. No, they apply to actions and beliefs.

There's one class of normative reasons - a class I highlighted - epistemic reasons that apply exclusively to beliefs.

Note too that the OP is about justifying beliefs. Hence it is entirely understandable why I would talk exclusively about beliefs and not actions as well, even though normative reasons apply to actions too.

Look matey, you don't know your stuff. I do. There's no error in anything I said above, there's just some appalling reasoning on your part. I defy you to find an error. You made one: you said normative reasons apply to actions, not beliefs and that somehow i was really confused in focussing on beliefs. They apply to both. And my focus on beliefs was entirely explicable given the context. Look at the OP. Look at the question posed. Then drop your working assumption that I don't know what I am talking about. You might learn something.

Well then you are in a strange world where science is doubted — Gregory

No it isn't. How is it doubted? There is no non-question begging way for a scientist to arrive at the conclusion that the world is older than the bible says it is. But a scientist could accept what the bible says and still do science in the same manner as any other. (As could a last-thursdayist who believes taht everything popped into existence last thursday).

What the science shows is that, other things being equal, the world is 4.5 billion years old give or take. But other things are not equal if the bible is true. That's the point.

Your finite female god with infinite thoughts and infinite power is not the Christian god — Gregory

I am not a Christian and I haven't read the bible. But the God I believe in and have described above is the God of the Abrahamic religions - that is, a person who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. So a Christian believes in an all powerful person. And they believe - as I understand it, anyway - that the bible was written, indirectly, by that all powerful person. Now, the Christian should surely not be troubled by any apparent inconsistencies in the bible, for by hypothesis an all powerful person can do anything. If they are troubled by them, they show by their being so that they do not appreciate what omnipotence involves.

Again: I am not a Christian or a biblical literalist. But it seems to me that once one grants that the bible is the word of God, there is no possibility of the bible being self-inconsistent. So I think that if I thought the bible was the word of God, I would be a biblical literalist. After all, the default is that it should be taken literally, I'd have thought.

I said it above, liar. They apply to actions and beliefs. There's what you should do, and there's what you should believe. These are normative questions.
If I was previously talking about beliefs that does not imply I think normative reasons apply to beliefs exclusively. Only someone quite dumb would think that.

Now, you said they apply to actions and not beliefs. What about epistemic reasons? They are normative reasons. And they apply exclusively to beliefs. (And all of the other kinds can apply to actions and beliefs).

What 'error' Banno? Identify the error in what I wrote.

You made one. A howler. You said they apply to actions, not beliefs. No. They apply to both. Apart from epistemic reasons. They apply to beliefs exclusively. As you know, of course.

Er, those confirm what I said. Normative reasons apply to actions and beliefs. You said they apply to actions alone and that I was confused. I am not. They apply to actions and beliefs.

Some, however, only apply to beliefs. Epistemic reasons - which are a kind of normative reason - apply to beliefs alone.

The person of God can do anything, including becoming evil. But so long as the person of God remains God - which is, of course, entirely up to her - she will not do evil, for to do evil is to go against God's will, and God is not going to go against her own will. She could - for she can do anything - but she isn't.
And yes, I know I am a moral relativist. One has to be if one believes in God, for God can do anything and thus there are no necessary moral truths. All moral truths will be contingent on God and thus relative, not absolute.
My point is that there is no non-question begging way to argue against the biblical literalist. (Not endorsing it, just making a philosophical observation)

God can do anything, right? So everything in the bible - even the contradictions, if contradictions there be - is self-consistent. For God can do anything. Thus God can make it the case that she created the animals before man, and man before the animals.
If I wrote a book in which I said that I created A before B, and B before A, then you would be justified in thinking I was joking, or was confused, or that it was a typo, for such a claim violates an apparent law of Reason according to which that which is before cannot also be after. But if God wrote a book in which she says that she created A before B, and B before A, then although this claim violates that apparent law of Reason no less starkly than if I'd written it, the fact is God has the power to violate laws of Reason. And thus what provided you with excellent reason to reinterpret what I had written, provides you with no reason to reinterpret what God has written.

So, as far as I can see, the bible is going to be self-consistent no matter what it says, for it is - by hypothesis - the work of a being who has the power to do anything.

(D) is wrong; I think no such thing. (A) does not imply (C) is wrong. Therefore, (B) is wrong; (B) does not address (A), (B) addresses your confusion about (A). — InPitzotl

Oh, that's soooo clear. Jesus. Let's unpick that mess, shall we? (Bet you hoped I wouldn't).

So, you have said that D is false. Thus, assuming you understand English (which is bloody generous of me) ,you do not think that 'introspective indiscernibility' requires that any introspection be occurring. Thus two mental states - X and Y - can be introspectively indiscernible, even if no one is failing introspectively to discern them.

And thus if no one has a faculty of introspection capable of generating any states of awareness, that is entirely compatible with there existing mental states that are introspectively indiscernible from states of awareness.

So that's what you think, given you have just said that D is wrong. And it's what I believe too.

Then you say that A - the claim that the notion of introspective indiscernibility is coherent - does not imply that there needs to be someone who is failing introspectively to discern them.

Er, I know. I said that. Thanks for saying what I said a whole order of magnitude less clearly. Your point??

But then you say - bizarrely - that therefore B is wrong. That is, that somehow what you just said above shows that you did read and understood what I said. No, how on earth does that follow?

Now, once more, what is your actual objection to what I have argued? This?

The problem is that introspection in and of itself presupposes awareness just as vision in and of itself presupposes sight. — InPitzotl

Yes, so? Introspective indiscernibility - as you have now acknowledged - does not require that anyone actually be failing introspectively to discern anything. So what on earth are you challenging with this banal claim? Be clear: what are you challenging?

I presented a syllogism in the OP. What is your objection to it? WHich premise do you deny and why?

No, they're for actions and beliefs. And it is not confused, its incredibly clear. You an expert on this stuff are you? Who've you read recently on normative reasons?

The internet. I don't use it myself. But I am sure that if you look up either normative reasons or justifying reasons you'll find that they're the same.

Anyway, a normative reason is typically characterized as a favouring relation. So, to have a reason to believe something is to the object of a favouring relation. It is to be 'favoured' believing it. Thus normative reasons are not things, per se. They are relations between things.

There are different kinds of normative reason - instrumental, moral, epistemic (more than this, but these are the main kind). But they're all justifying reasons. Sometimes we are justified in believing something on instrumental grounds - that is, there is overall instrumental reason to believe it; sometimes moral grounds - there is overall moral reason to believe it; sometimes epistemic grounds - there is overall epistemic reason to believe it. But evidence is made of epistemic reasons (having good instrumental or moral reason for believing X does not amount to there being evidence that X is true - Buddhists, for instance, will typically only offer instrumental reasons for believing in the truth of their stupid worldview, but even if such instrumental reasons do exist, they will never constitute evidence that the view is true....which is why serious philosophers don't tend to take Buddhism seriously).

So, all normative reasons justify and 'justifications' - all of them - are made of normative reasons. "I am justified in believing X, but there is no normative reason to believe it" is a contradictory statement. But philosophers - true philosophers - are only interested in uncovering what epistemic reasons there are, for those are what evidence is made of. (To have 'evidence' that X is true is one and the same as there being epistemic reason to believe X).

Anyway, to be justified in a belief is for there to be overall normative reason for you to believe it. That's a conceptual truth.

To 'justify' a belief, however, is different. That's to do something - that's to attempt to show that there are normative reasons for the belief in question.

So, the former is a status, the latter is an activity.

For an analogy, take being hated. That's a relation. Hate is not a thing, but a relation between things. And to be hated does not require that one do anything or know that one is hated. You are hated just if someone hates you. Maybe you know that they hate you, have some idea that they hate you, or have no idea at all.

Likewise, for a belief of yours to be justified is for your possession of that belief to be something you are favoured believing. Perhaps you know that you are favoured believing it; perhaps you have some idea you are; or perhaps you have no clue. Those are all compatible with you being favoured believing it (just as having no clue you are hated is entirely compatible with you being hated).

Justifying a belief is different, as already mentioned. Justifying a belief is an activity in which one attempts to show that one has normative reason for believing what one does.

That's not to deny that sometimes an attempt to justify a belief can result in that belief coming to be one that one is in fact justified in believing. That is, sometimes we may be justified in a belief precisely because we attempted to justify it and would not have been justified in it otherwise. (Just as, by analogy, one might come to be hated because one believes everyone hates one). The point remains, however, that to be justified in a belief is not of a piece with justifying it. And thus one can be justified in a belief even if one is unable to justify it.

This we can see both from an analysis of normative reasons themselves, and independently. For we can know that not all beliefs need justifying else we would not be justified in any of our beliefs (being so requiring that we have previously accomplished the impossible task of providing an infinity of justifications).

For a belief to be justified there needs to be a compelling reason to believe it. — Wheatley

No, for a belief to be justified is for there to be a 'normative' reason to believe it. They're also called 'justifying reasons' for that very reason.

Look them up if you don't believe me.

Whether or when you need to be aware of the normative reason/s in question is another matter.

For a belief to be justified is for there to be a normative reason to believe it. That's a conceptual truth (normative reasons are sometimes called 'justifying reasons'). They are what justifications are made of. (There are different kinds of normative reason, and the ones that philosophers are interested in are 'epistemic' reasons, as these are what 'evidence' is made of. Note: one can be justified in believing something there is no evidence for, precisely because justifications are made of normative reasons and not all normative reasons are epistemic reasons).

But it does not follow from this that you have to justify all your beliefs. A belief can be justified without you having to justify it. After all, if we had to justify all of our beliefs, we would find ourselves unable to justify any of them, as every justification would appeal to some yet more basic claim that would itself require a justification, and so on. So you do not have to justify a belief in order for the belief to be justified.

As for your question - why do my beliefs need to be justified? - it cannot sincerely be asked. For you are asking to be provided with a justification, are you not? So in asking the question you acknowledge the importance of justifications.

Agree or disagree aside, do you understand my complaint? — Cheshire

Nope, still haven't a clue what you're saying. The OP starts by presenting a syllogism. Which premise are you trying to take issue with?

This really confuses you? I'm aware that I have thoughts. Whether or not the thoughts are awareness, being aware of thoughts is in and of itself awareness (of thoughts). — InPitzotl

No, I don't know what you're arguing. You are confused. Not me. You. I don't think you have a criticism.

But both require having a percept. — InPitzotl

No. A belief is not a percept. Yet if I believe I am perceiving something, then my situation is introspectively indiscernible from what it would be if I was in fact perceiving something.

That's not where the incoherency lies. "Introspective indiscernibility" is perfectly coherent. What's incoherent is the suggestion that you can introspect about something without awareness. — InPitzotl

Why don't you actually read what I take the trouble to write? I addressed this stupid and irrelevant point earlier. Here:

Note too that to say two states are introspectively indiscernible, is not to suppose that there is someone who is failing introspectively to discern them. You seem to think it does suppose that (Christ knows why - that's like thinking that the claim there can be a visually indiscernible Sunflowers painting that is not by Van Gogh supposes that there is someone who is visually failing to discern them). — Bartricks

So once more, InPenetrablyS, what - just what - is your objection? You don't have one, right?

Read the OP again. Then challenge a premise of my syllogism by presenting some reason to think there can be representations absent a representer.

↪Bartricks Does your "theory" take into account the most recent discovery of a human species more closely related to humanity than Neanderthals? No, it was released today. Do you see the issue? Fact/Researched based evolution is always catching up with itself; but you presuppose an entire understanding of unknown information, then "deduce" the effects of a change to it. It can't be done under any logical framework. Did God effect evolution? Dunno, too many variables. Imposing an anthropic framework over a reverse inductive argument with the confidence of an eye surgeon denotes mistakes were made. Handle it. — Cheshire

I have literally no idea what you're on about. Here's my argument from the OP:

1. If our faculties of awareness are wholly the product of unguided evolutionary forces, then they do not give us an awareness of anything
2. Our faculties of awareness do provide us with some awareness of something
3. Therefore our faculties of awareness are not wholly the product of unguided evolutionary forces — Bartricks

I then defended 1 and 2. Now, which premise are these Neanderthal cousins questioning? (Perhaps InPitzotl can help us out)

It's the same essential objection as the one three days ago. — InPitzotl

Well, it hasn't improved with time. I mean, I don't know what you objection is. You just keep saying that there is something incoherent in the idea of, well, what? Two mental states that are introspectively indiscernible, but one of which is a state of awareness and the other not?

I have said what I need to about that. There is nothing remotely incoherent about it, as countless examples show. I can keep coming up with them until the cows come home.

I mean, what the hell do you think is going on in a case of hallucination? It's possible you're hallucinating right now, yes? Well, there's quite a big difference between a case of hallucination and a case of veridical perception. There's a debate over exactly what the difference is, but the fact remains that a case of hallucination is introspectively indiscernible from a case of veridical perception. So the notion of introspective indiscernibility is a coherent one, else we could not even make sense of the possibility of hallucinatory experiences.

So I don't think your objection can really be that the notion of introspective indiscernibility is incoherent, for it just so plainly isn't. I am at a loss, therefore, to understand what your objection is. You seem very confused to me. Yet at the same time you seem very confident that you've got some stunning objection to me. I really don't see it.

I want a justificatory reason, not a causal reason. Anyway, you're clearly not one for doing too much thinking, so tara.