Ok, I need to ask you several clarification questions here. So, what exactly is a prescription of reason? Would you mind explaining that concept a bit more to me. Because it seems rather counterintuitive to me to think of reason as a command or a prescription. — TheHedoMinimalist

But I didn't say 'reason is a prescription'. Reason is the prescriber. Big difference.

I am a prescriber. I am not a prescription!

There are prescriptions of Reason. They're often called 'norms'.

For instance "if an argument is valid and its premises true, then believe its conclusion is true" is a prescription of Reason.

Laws of logic are prescriptions of Reason.

Epistemic norms are prescriptions of Reason.

Moral prescriptions are prescriptions of Reason.

Instrumental prescriptions are prescriptions of Reason.

They're subtly different, but they're all prescriptions.

A prescription, note, is some kind of a directive, a telling, an expressed favouring.

Again, the claim is not that Reason is a prescription. The claim is that there are prescriptions of Reason. And that isn't counter-intuitive - how could it be? For rational intuitions are themselves about such prescriptions.

On the other hand, there are some spoiled brats who live with their parents at the age of 30 and they feel that it’s unfair for their parents to not buy them a new car for Christmas. — TheHedoMinimalist

I don't think they're spoilt. Parents owe their children everything. I didn't choose to be born. My parents should pay for everything. They had me, they're responsible - if I need a car, they should buy me one. A house - one of them too. All my food. Everything. It's the least they can do. I owe them nothing; they owe me everything. Where's my mistake?

First, you are changing the example and attacking a straw man.

By hypothesis the amounts of happiness and suffering are equal in both worlds. So it is no good saying 'ah, but it depends how much happiness and suffering there is'. It's equal. That does for the god too.

In addition, I’m not sure if we are imagining 2 worlds across their entire span of their existence or if we are imagining 2 worlds across a particular period of time. — TheHedoMinimalist

The former. Again, they contain equal amounts of happiness and suffering.

The only difference - only difference - is in its distribution. Distribution, not quantity. It's no good pointing out that distributions can affect quantity - yes, often they can. But by definition, not in this case. In this case the distribution - not the quantity - is the only difference between the worlds.

It's also no good adjusting the theory to deal with the counterexample, for that misses the more general point. Which is this. If you have to adjust your theory to accommodate intuitions, why not just follow intuitions? That is, what's your theory adding?

You can make your hedonism as complex as you like. The complexity will be to accommodate intuitions. And that's what makes the theory pointless. Just consult your intuitions and the intuitions of others, and discount those intuitions that we have good independent reason to think are unlikely to be accurate (such as those for which a wholly evolutionary account would be the best explanation - which applies, of course, to those intuitions that say procreation is morally ok).

Sometimes pleasure matters, sometimes it doesn't. Sometimes pain is bad, sometimes it isn't. Sometimes we ought to give someone what they deserve, sometimes we ought not. Sometimes it is more important to be a certain sort of person than it is to bring about a certain state of affairs. Sometimes the reverse is true. And on and on.

How do we figure out what the right thing to do is, then? Well, the method most people actually use: we consult our intuitions.

Of course, that should not be done unthinkingly either. There are - as I have explained - a lot of intuitions that we have good independent reason to doubt are accurate.

But that method - trusting our intuitions until or unless we have reason to doubt a particular deliverance of our intuition - is far superior to assuming (and that's all it is, just a brute assumption) that morality is fixed and patterned and then setting about trying to describe the pattern.

We agreed this consent issue is insufficient to justify antinatalism. — boethius

er, where? No, the fact procreative acts are ones that those who are created by then have not consented to is a fact that makes them 'prima facie' wrong - 'default' wrong. That is, they will be wrong unless there is some other feature they possess that either annuls or overcomes the wrong-making power of the feature I have identified. So, arguing that the Kantian feature is prima-facie wrong making is consistent with believing it is sufficient to make acts that have it wrong overall.

Now that you've changed your position I'll restate again my criticism. — boethius

Er, what!? I have not changed my position one iota!! I mean, where have I changed my position? I think the problem here is that you don't understand my position or you're wilfully misinterpreting it.

The Kantian case is, I suspect, sufficient by itself to show that antinatalism is true. But by itself it would leave open a very reasonable doubt about the matter. Just as, by analogy, one witness statement saying that Boethius robbed the bank provides us with good reason to think you did it, while leaving open a very reasonable doubt about it. By contrast, three or four witness statements saying you did dit would make it far more reasonable than not to believe you did it. The Kantian case is equivalent to one witness statement.

I am so far not satisfied that you fairly apply your principle of consent to all ethical issues where it would seem relevant to do so. — boethius

You have no evidence to support that - it's just wishful thinking on your part. Again, you need to provide real evidence that this is the case, not simply point to the brute possibility. Pointing to cases that seem relevantly dissimilar to acts of procreation - cases, for instance, where doing something to someone without their consent was necessary to prevent them from coming to a great harm - and pointing out that such acts often seem justified is not such evidence, for reasons I explained.

But because I'm a patient kind of a guy, I'll explain again. If a kind of act - such as an act that significantly affects another without their previously having consented to it - is prima facie wrong, then one is consistent if one default assumes those acts that are of this kind are wrong until or unless one has some reason to think that, in a particular case, the act possesses some other feature or features that either annul or overcome the wrongness inherent in such deeds.

You haven't done this. All you've done is point out that sometimes acts of this kind are not wrong. Again - I know. I know, I know, I know. But the acts of that kind that are not wrong have features that are either overcoming or annulling the wrongness otherwise inherent in them. And - importantly - those features are not present in most procreative acts.

You say, "well, consent doesn't matter if it prevents harm", b — boethius

Totally dishonest. That's not a quote from me! Those are your words, not mine! I am not an absolutist and I don't believe there are any hard and fast moral rules. I've thought that for years and years so I would nowhere here say that consent doesn't matter if it prevents harm, rather I'd say the more nuanced "consent sometimes does not matter, and sometimes does matter but is eclipsed by other considerations that - in the given context - are mattering more".

You seem to have difficulties with subtleties like this. If I say that in some contexts the fact an act will prevent some great harm eclipses the importance of getting a person's consent, then you take that to mean that if an act will prevent some harm then consent doesn't matter, or will always be eclipsed by the significance of the harm it prevents (that is, that preventing harm is lexically more important than respecting consent). I do not believe such things.

It will be inconvenient for your objections, but my view is that lack of consent is a prima-facie wrong-making feature. That does not mean it is always a wrong-making feature. Sometimes it doesn't matter. And sometimes it matters but other things matter more. Note the 'sometimes'.

The point, however, is that it 'default' matters and so if an act is an act of such a kind, then it is reasonable to suppose it is wrong until or unless we have evidence that some other feature also present is either annulling the prima facie wrongness of the lack of consent involved, or eclipsing it.

I’m using a lecture I heard on YouTube as the source. The lecture is called “Intuition in Philosophy 2” and it is given by a philosopher named Kane B. — TheHedoMinimalist

That's not a reliable source. It isn't peer reviewed. He could be anyone. It's really no different to using a post here as a source.

Well, I don’t share your assumption that our intuitions are somewhat close to reliability to our eyesights . Unlike our intuitions, our eyesight doesn’t get influenced by the place and time period that we grew up in and almost nobody sees something that no one else sees. — TheHedoMinimalist

This misses the point. I have already explained that our faculty of reason does indeed operate differently to our sight. It is a 'faculty' like our sight, but it doesn't operate in the same way. It is operates like a library catalogue.

And obviously it can be affected by cultural factors. I mean, that's another basis upon which I would discount lots of intuitions.

You asked me to say when an intuition is debunked. I explained that an intuition is debunked when the best explanation of why we have it does not have to presuppose the reality of its accuracy conditions.

So, let's say Boris has been brought up in culture A in which they believe women are inferior to men. Boris is not an analytic philosopher - he has no tradition of ruthlessly applying reason to his beliefs. Like most people, he only applies reason to them in a very limited way, and so is likely to simple accept whichever worldview is prevailing and interpret everything through its lense. And he has been told time and time and time again that women are inferior to men - a widespread belief in his male dominated culture - and he lives in a culture in which women are systematically treated 'as if' they are inferior.

Okay, well, would it be remotely surprising if Boris now has the intuition that women count for less than men? No, of course it wouldn't. We'd positively expect it. For we know that our faculties are corruptible. All of them are. In different ways, granted. But none of them are infallible - including our faculty of intuition.

So, what's the best explanation of why Boris has that intuition about women? Is it that women are actually morally inferior and Boris's faculty of reason is reliably informing him of this? No, of course not. The best explanation is that he is getting that intuition becusae he's been brainwashed. Does that explanation have to say anything about the actual moral status of women? No. So, Boris's intuition is undermined.

I don’t think that’s true. I had heard that studies in experimental philosophy had revealed that most people in East Asian countries think that the agent has knowledge in Gettier cases. — TheHedoMinimalist

You can't just ask anyone these questions and cultural variation is to be expected to some extent. But among analytic philosophers the overwhelming consensus is that the agent does not have knowledge in such cases.

Now, there is far less reason to think that cultural factors are playing a huge rule among that constituency. Why? Because analytic philosophers are ruthless followers of reason, rather than culture. They know how to think. They know not to simply defer to whatever worldview is dominant in their culture.

You don't just ask anyone their opinion about the mole on your forearm. You ask medical professionals. And you don't just ask anyone's opinion about the epistemic status of the true beliefs of a victim of a Gettier case.

Anyway, all you're really doing is playing the extreme scepticism card. I appeal to intuitions - as must anyone who is arguing for anything at all - and you're now questioning the probative value of all intuitions. All of them.

Intuitions are not default inaccurate. They're default accurate. So, if you think some are inaccurate, you have the burden of proof.

Now, I have explained why we have good independent reason to think some - indeed, vast swathes - of our intuitions are inaccurate. My explanation did not appeal to the theory I am seeking to defend.

But by contrast, you have not provided me with any explanation of why those intuitions that axiological hedonism runs foul of should be discounted. Until or unless you can provide such an explanation - and the explanation needs not to appeal to the supposed truth of axiological hedonism, or to the supposedly fixed character of morality (for that would be circular) - you are simply dismissing intuitions on no justifiable grounds.

Again, it is no good then saying 'no intuitions are reliable' - for that's to give up the investigation into reality in favour of a comfortable dogmatic scepticism. And it is to do so arbitrarily - you are becoming a radical sceptic whenever you're confronted with evidence your theory is false.

But we still have a concept of reason - what the idea of reason distinguishes, describes
and then
we have the faculty. — Coben

A 'concept' is just another word for 'idea'.

Concepts (ideas) are always 'about' things (their 'objects').

So, the concept of cheese is about cheese. That is, it is the idea of cheese.

A common mistake - made, it seems, by virtually everyone here - is to confuse concepts with their objects. That is, to confuse the idea - concept - of cheese with cheese itself.

Apart from the concept of a concept, concepts are not identical with their objects. So, the concept of cheese is not itself cheese. It is idea - it is just the idea 'of' cheese.

Likewise, the concept of Reason is not itself Reason. It is 'of' Reason - the idea of Reason.

So, there's Reason. Then there's our idea of Reason - the concept of Reason. Then there's the faculty by means of which we are aware of Reason's prescriptions - a faculty that we also (confusingly) call 'our reason'.

Fair enough, but are you willing to grant that those deeper intuitions matter as well? — TheHedoMinimalist

That's question begging. They're not 'deeper' - I don't know what that means in this context. There are just rational intuitions. Some are suspect, some are not.

it must be pointed out that moral particularism itself is counterintuitive to most people. — TheHedoMinimalist

How can it be when it says no more or less than to listen to your rational intuitions rather than the biddings of a theory? Note, moral particularism makes no claim about which particular acts are right or wrong - so how can it possibly conflict with anyone's intuitions?

In addition, I think the majority of people also find your non-religious divine command theory to be counterintuitive as well. — TheHedoMinimalist

I think you are misusing the term 'intuitive'.

Note too that my theory is entailed - logically entailed - by claims that are self evident to reason. If you think otherwise, then you need to tell me which claim is not self-evident to reason - that is, which one does not have intuitions representing it to be true?

For example, there are prescriptions of Reason - that's something our reason (a faculty) tells us. That is, it is intuitively clear that there are prescriptions of Reason.

It is also intuitively clear that for any prescription that exists, there must be a person who has issued it.

It is also intuitively clear that it follows from those two claims that all of the prescriptions of Reason must be the prescriptions of some person or the other.

It is equally intuitively clear that the prescriptions of Reason are not prescriptions that you or I are issuing.

And it is intuitively clear that the prescriptions of Reason have a single source.

It follows from these intuitively clear claims that the prescriptions of Reason are the prescriptions of a single person.

You can't say that that's counter-intuitive until or unless you locate something in the above that is counter-intuitive.

The 'processes' you talk about are referred to not as 'reason' but as 'reasoning'.

We use our 'reason' - and in this context the word refers to a faculty - to engage in reasoning. That is, 'reasoning' is the activity of consulting one's reason. One's reason is the faculty, 'reasoning' is the act of using it.

Absolutely. I’ve harped on this forever.......reason cannot explain itself without being used to explain itself. No one is going to take seriously anything to patently circular. — Mww

Circularity is not always a problem. For instance, I - Bartricks - exist, and I am a person. Are you now justified in believing that there is a person, Bartricks, who exists? Yes. Yet the basis upon which you are justified in believing this is that a person, Bartricks, told you.

The fact, then, that we cannot learn anything about Reason apart from by listening to her does not, in and of itself, indicate a problem.

The term 'reason' is multiply ambiguous.

For it is sometimes used as a synonym for 'explanation' (for instance "what's the reason this is happening?").

Sometimes it is used to mean 'normative reason', where a 'normative reason' is some kind of preference of Reason.

Sometimes - as in the sentence above - it is used to refer to the source of the preferences just mentioned (a capital 'R' is typically used in such cases).

And sometimes it is used to refer to the faculty by my means of which we are made aware of normative reasons.

There may be more meanings to the term than this, but those are some commonly recognised ones.

It's in no way absurd. Plenty of people have written thousands of words to make an argument. — boethius

I like the way you don't actually address the point I was making. There's nothing wrong with using thousands of words to make a case. But there is something wrong - or at least unwise - in making one's OP thousands of words long.

And again, my other point was that you have not done anything to challenge my Kantian case. All you've done is point to different cases - cases that do not share relevant features with cases of procreation - and point out that in those cases it is overall justified to do something to someone else without their prior consent (something I have never disputed).

You also do not seem to understand how cumulative cases work. Now, I think the Kantian case is strong just by itself. And the same for the other cases. But let's imagine that each one is relatively weak by itself - that is, let's say that, taken individually, they only create a 1 in 6 epistemic probability that the act of procreation is wrong. Does that mean that the cumulative case - that is, the combination of all of those three cases - creates a 1 in 6 epistemic probability that the act of procreation is wrong?

No, obviously not. I mean, take a dice. If you roll it you have a 1/6 chance of getting a six. But what's your chance of getting a six if you have three attempts?

I guess Im not necessarily ready to forego the "prior existence" condition.

On the following basis:

It seems to me that there needs to be a certain sort of temporal symmetry when you affect someone.
The two agents need to exist simultaneously, in the same temporal reality before we can talk about any party affecting the other one. — Emind

They do exist simultaneously. The act of procreation is the act of bringing into being a person - so the person exists at the same time as the act does. The person does not exist prior to the act, but they do exist concurrently with it. And note that is all the existence condition requires. It is the 'prior existence condition' that requires prior existence - yet that condition simply seems false. For what would evidence of its truth look like? Well, the evidence would be that acts of procreation do not seem to affect those they bring into being. Yet acts of procreation clearly do seem to affect those they bring into being, for Trudy harms the baby by creating it (else why is her act so wrong?), and to be harmed is to be being affected.

So, there's positive evidence that the prior existence condition is false.

Can something/someone nonexistent be affected by something/someone else? — Emind

No, something non-existent cannot be affected by someone else. But if you create someone, then that person exists.

So, although the non-existent cannot be affected, the act of procreation affects someone existent: namely, the person who has been created.

Our rational intuitions support this. For example, most people are grateful to their parents for having created them. What's one grateful for if the act did not affect one?

Plus, consider this case: imagine that Trudy knows that if she has a child, it will be born in agonising pain and die shortly thereafter. Now, surely Trudy does wrong if she has that child, and does wrong because of the harm her act causes to another. Yet if, to be affected by an act one needs to exist prior to the act being performed, then Trudy did not affect the child by creating it - and the first agonising moments of its existence will also not affect it. Yet that seems obviously false.

So it seems that although you need to exist to be affected by an act, you do not need to exist prior to the affecting act.

It seems to me, then, that you are conflating the 'existence condition' (which says you need to exist in order to be affected) with what we might call the 'prior existence condition' (which says you need to exist prior to an act in order to be affected by it). The 'existence condition' is true (I think), but the 'prior existence condition' is not.

Well, in that case, you must have very unusual arguments for the existence of god. — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, I do. The argument is simple: there are prescriptions of Reason; only an agent can make a prescription; therefore Reason is an agent. And that agent is a god, because the agent who is Reason has the power and knowledge of Reason, which is more power and knowledge than anyone else.

So, a god definitely exists. Should we attribute the external world to her? Well, like I say, that doesn't seem reasonable given that we have reason to believe she's benevolent and that no benevolent person would create a place like this and then force innocent others to live in it.

My case is, of course, frustrating to most atheists as their standard responses aren't going to work against it!

I think the burden of proof is shared here because almost every philosopher thinks that some intuitions count for more than others(including yourself). We just have different theories about which intuitions count for more. — TheHedoMinimalist

But I have already agreed to that. Anyone who thinks that some intuitions count for more than others has the burden of proof. I have shouldered that burden, though. I have provided a case for thinking some - such as those for which a wholly evolutionary explanation is the most reasonable - lack evidential clout. But so far as I can tell, you have not shouldered the burden - you have not explained why the intiuitions you want to dismiss lack probative force.

But, how do we determine which explanations for the intuition are debunking? — TheHedoMinimalist

There's no rule for this - by asking me for formulate one you are begging the question. But as a rule of thumb, if the best explanation of why we get some impression or other does not make mention of that impression's accuracy conditions, then the impression lacks probative force. Why? Because we can explain why we get the impression X exists without having to posit X itself.
Let's say Greg has been taught repeatedly that there exists a holy pig who controls all aspects of reality and that this pig will sometimes visit people in dreams and give them messages. Greg subsequently sometimes dreams of a holy pig who gives him messages. Now, the best explanation - surely - of why Greg has started having dreams of a holy pig who is giving him messages is not that there is a holy pig who is using dreams to give Greg messages, but that Greg has been told repeatedly that this will happen and - as we already know - minds are suggestible things. That's the best explanation - and note, it is an explanation that makes no mention of an actual holy pig. Thus, Greg's dream impressions of a holy pig do not constitute good evidence of such a pig's existence.

Likewise, the best explanation of why so many of humans get the impression it is morally alright to procreate is the evolutionary one. That explanation does not have to make mention of the actual morality of procreation, and thus it is an explanation that discredits the impressions in question.

If you believe a bunch of arguments together justify antinatalism, I suggest you make a new thread with this "cumulative" argument and referencing the arguments that accumulate; either debates such as this one, which, though insufficient to justify antinatalism on its own, play some part in the cumulative argument scheme or then new debates that will to occur in the context of your cumulative structure. — boethius

No, that's an absurd suggestion. To make a cumulative case one would need to show that each argument had some probative force, and that would require making each argument. And so the opening post would then have to be thousands of words long.

Let's say I was writing a book on procreation - what would I do? Would I make the cumulative case in chapter 1 and spend the rest of it dealing with objections? No, that would make chapter 1 ridiculously long. I would devote a chapter to each argument and deal with objections to them as they arise. Likewise then, it is sensible here to make a case for each argument, rather than presenting them all at once in an overlong OP that no-one would read.

So anyway, what you should do is focus on the argument in the OP, which is a perfectly respectable argument. Pointing out repeatedly that the argument only establishes that it is 'prima facie' wrong and that sometimes an act can be justified overall even though it is one that was not consented to - and to represent that point as if it were a refutation - is ridiculous (yet that seems to me to be all you've done). No, what you should do is try to find a case that is relevantly analogous to a case of procreation - that is, an act in which something very significant is done to someone else without their consent - and that seems nevertheless overall justified by other features that are also present in cases of procreation. That you have not done, so far as I can tell.

Being unable to defend many arguments does not a stronger argument make. — boethius

I can - and have - defended each one! But all you do, when I make one argument, is point out that the argument does not entail that procreation is wrong. Er, I know. In each case we have an argument that implies procreation is prima facie wrong. And together they constitute a very powerful case. That's how cumulative cases work.

There's a Kantian case; there's a consequentialist case; and there's a virtue-ethics case.
All you've done, so far as I can tell, is respond to the Kantian case - a case that appeals to the fact we cannot chose to be born - by pointing out something that I accept and that poses no problem for my argument, namely that sometimes it is morally ok, even morally obligatory, to do something to someone without their prior consent.

I don’t think that the 2 actions are equally bad. I actually think that it’s worse to harm yourself than it is to harm others. This is because there is a higher probability that someone has some reason to avoid causing themselves to suffer than the probability that someone has some reason to avoid causing others to suffer. — TheHedoMinimalist

But that's surely not what your intuitions say? Even if it is, it is certainly not what most people's intuitions say. It is normally far, far worse to hit someone else than to hit oneself, other things being equal.

But you've judged that hitting yourself is worse because your theory says so. My whole point is that this is a topsy turvy way of doing moral philosophy. You're appealing to your theory rather than trying to respect intuitions. Yet any credibility your theory has will ultimately rest on how well it respects intuitions. So why not just cut to the chase and appeal to intuitions about each case, rather than appealing to theories?

But, I think that there is a greater likelihood that it is correct than any other value theory that I had encountered. But, it’s still probably wrong to some extent and maybe even completely wrong. — TheHedoMinimalist

See, I just don't understand that. These arguments refute hedonistic theories:

1. if moral hedonism is true, then hitting myself in the face is as bad as hitting someone else in the face, other things being equal.
2. Hitting myself in the fact is not as bad as hitting someone else in the face, other things being equal
3. Therefore moral hedonism is false.

1 is a conceptual truth. I mean, how are you going to deny it? If you're a hedonist, you think happiness is morally valuable, yes? And equal amounts of happiness matter equally, yes? So its location doesn't matter - it doesn't matter whether it is your happiness or someone else's. Now, given those truths, it follows that 1 is true.

And 2 is overwhelmingly well supported by rational intuitions. You can deny the probative force of all rational intuitions if you want, but by definition you'll have no way of arguing that case. You can deny the probative force of these particular intuitions - but then I want a case for denying their probative value, a case that does not - not - appeal to the supposed truth of hedonism (for that would be circular and would therefore express a commitment to the theory, rather than following evidence).

So the theory is decisively refuted by that argument.

And then there's this argument (made by W.D.Ross):

1. If hedonism is true, then two worlds that contain equal amounts of happiness and pain are necessarily equally good
2. Two worlds that contain equal amounts of happiness and pain are not necessarily equally good
3. Therefore hedonism is false.

Once more, premise 1 is a conceptual truth. And premise 2 is supported by intuitions. For example, imagine that in one world all the happy people are virtuous and all the pain is experienced by vicious people, whereas in the other the reverse is true. Now clearly the two worlds are not equally good - if one were a god and one could create one of those worlds but not the other, then clearly a good god would create the first and not the second. If you deny this, it is only because that's what your theory commits you to - that is, your theory commits you to denying the probative force of those intuitions that conflict with it.

And there are lots of other refutations.

Philosophy is really complicated and so our theories should be really complicated as well. This is our best chance of not having a terrible theory. — TheHedoMinimalist

That doesn't follow. Plus it is not at all clear what 'complex' and 'simple' mean in this context. For instance, is moral particularism complex or simple? In one sense it is simple, for it denies the truth of any fixed moral rule. But in another sense it is the most complex of all normative theories, for it allows that anything - anything - can, in principle, be morally relevant, which is precisely why rules - which, by their very nature deny this - should be taken with a pinch of salt.

So, I have 2 questions:
1. How do you know that god or gods are benevolent?
2. Did god or gods create the universe which allowed for sentient life? — TheHedoMinimalist

In answer to 1, the god is Reason (moral imperatives and values are imperatives and values of Reason - it is just that Reason is a person), and I think we have grounds for believing she's benevolent because of the nature of her injunctions. For example, although our rational intuitions are not infallible, there are some whose accuracy we cannot reasonably doubt. Take the injunction to default believe in the accuracy of appearances. Any attempt to raise a doubt about that injunction of Reason would have to appeal to some other apparent injunctions of Reason, and so would be self-refuting. This rational intuition therefore cannot be debunked and so can safely be taken to be accurate.

The can know, then, that to some extent, the god wants us all to do what is in our individual best interests. That, it seems to me, implies that she is benevolent. For 'being benevolent' essentially involves wanting others to do what is in their best interests, other things being equal. And that's what that rational intuition implies about the god.

In answer to 2 - I am not sure, but it would seem not. For the god is benevolent (see above) and a benevolent being would not have created a world like this one and then forced innocent creatures to live in it. Most humans do that, of course - they're well aware of what the world is like, well aware that they themselves did not choose to live in it, yet think nothing of forcing innocent creatures to live in it, partly, no doubt, out of a desire to be admired and loved and worshipped - but I don't think a truly benevolent being would do that. Hence, I conclude that the god who exists, Reason, has not done so. But I am not sure, of course, it is just what seems to be implied by the evidence.

Yes, you understand right here but why do you not think that we should privilege intuitions that imply the truth of a deeper principle? Why assume that intuitions have no levels and could only be dismissed if they are deemed to be as a result of some bias? — TheHedoMinimalist

Because that's the default. If you think some rational intuitions count for more, then you have the burden of proof. Note, I too think some rational intuitions count for more - namely, those that are not exposed to debunking explanations - but I explained why I think that. Those rational intuitions for which a wholly evolutionary explanation seems sufficient to explain why we get them are rational intuitions that lack probative force. This is because we can fully explain why we get them without having to appeal to the actual existence of their accuracy conditions.

By contrast, you want to say - it would seem - that rational intuitions that lend themselves to systemisation by some kind of rule or principle carry more weight than those that do not. I simply see no good reason to think that's true. I can understand that we might want it to be true - it would be damn useful if it were true - but that isn't any kind of evidence that it is true (indeed, if anything it should make us even more wary of its truth, given our tendency to engage in wishful thinking).

Re the philosophical community - I agree that there is a general pressure to be conservative, though it should also be noted that one can do very well in the academic philosophical community by defending very ably extremely controversial views. So, being associated with extremely unpopular views is - in academic philosophy - as likely to be beneficial as harmful. Note too, that such pressure is only going to be acute for young wannabe academic philosophers, not for those with secure positions (which is going to be the majority, I'd have thought).

But, Peter Singer did not express his most controversial viewpoints until he became popular for his less controversial viewpoints. — TheHedoMinimalist

That's false. He was controversial from the get-go and his first book - Animal Liberation - was written when he had just completed his PhD and was not known or secure academically.

But anyway, the more general point is that whether one is defending a controversial or uncontroversial, the method is basically the same: appeal to rational intuitions. Singer does this as much as anyone (and I agree with a lot of what Singer says and have considerable admiration for him - and note that he thinks that many of our rational intuitions are false and can be debunked by evolutionary explanations of their origins).

I’m actually not sure if they actually do agree with you more here. — TheHedoMinimalist

Well, I certainly agree with that! I think very few agree with me here about anything. But anyway, there can be widespread intuitive agreement, yet differences of view about what the intuitions imply. For instance, in the debate over Gettier cases in Epistemology virtually no one has the intuition that the agent involved possesses knowledge, but there is disagreement over the correct analysis of why the agent fails to possess knowledge.

I have challenged your moral particularism above by expressing my pessimism in people’s ability to do philosophy well while arguing that this pessimism doesn’t suggest that we shouldn’t devise philosophical theories. — TheHedoMinimalist

I do not see how that's an objection to moral particularism. My case does not assume that people are good at doing philosophy, only that they have fairly reliable faculties of rational intuition (just as I assume people have fairly reliable faculties of sight - and so if the vast bulk of people see a mugging, that's good evidence there was a mugging).

The deeper reason he gives for believing this is because he thinks that God would disapprove of it. — TheHedoMinimalist

I have replied to your replies in the wrong order, as I read the last one without realizing there was one before it.

Anyway, I still do not know what you mean by 'deeper' and in your example you seem to be attacking a straw man.

I am not a moral particularist solely because I am a divine command theorist. I think moral particularism is implied by the evidence of our rational intuitions.

There's more than one way to skin a cat and one of my arguments for moral particularism is that it appears to be true. That is, any feature that makes one act right, can be found to make another act wrong. Note, that argument does not appeal to the putative truth of divine command theory, it just appeals to rational appearances.

Anyway, I reiterate that I do not know what you mean by 'deeper' and 'shallower' intuitions in this context. I assume that you probably mean by 'deeper' those intuitions that, if taken in isolation, would imply the truth of a principle and by 'shallower' you mean intuitions about particular cases. But I simply see no reason to accord one more probative force than another.

Note too that the philosophical community seems to be largely on my side, for if someone proposes some moral principle what happens is everyone then tries to imagine a case in which the principle would force us to judge an act wrong that is intuitively obviously right. When such a case is imagined, it is taken to be a counterexample to the principle, and depending on how clear and widely shared the intuitions are, the counterexample will often be held to refute the rule. So, what you would call 'shallow' intuitions that are, in fact, the ultimate test of credibility that any moral rule is held up to.

Axiological hedonism is easily refuted - there are abundant refutations of it. For instance, here's one:

1. If Axiological hedonism is true, then it is as wrong for me to cause myself harm as it is to cause someone else an equal amount of harm
2. It is not as wrong for me to cause myself harm as it is to case someone else an equal amount of harm. (For instance, if I hit myself in the face that's not as wrong as hitting someone else in the face, even if the amounts of pain the act causes - both physical and emotional - happen to be identical)
3. Therefore axiological hedonism is false. — Bartricks
I would argue that both premise 1 and 2 of your argument are false. — TheHedoMinimalist

You haven't provided any evidence that either are false. You have talked about degrees of betterness. But read premise 1 again. It says it is 'as' wrong for me to cause myself a harm as it is to cause someone else an equal amount of harm. So, act X causes person A 10 dolors of harm, and act Y causes person B 10 dolors of harm. As an axiological hedonist how can you possibly insist that one act is more wrong than the other? You're committed to saying they're equally bad, other things being equal. Now, how can it possibly make a difference who the agent of the act is? It can't.

You can bring in other factors, but the whole point of the example is to equalize those. You're not equalizing them - you're changing the example. You need to hold other things equal.

So, Tim knows that if he hits himself it will cause 10 dolors of harm. And Tim knows that if he hits Jane, it will case 10 dolors of harm. Don't insist that Tim's act of hitting Jane will actually cause more dolors of harm - that is to change the example. No, in the example both acts cause exactly the same amount of harm. That's why, as a hedonist, you're committed to having to judge them both equally wrong. Yet they're obviously not. Hence the theory is refuted.

So the first premise cannot be denied. And as for the second, it seems to me that you provide no evidence against it, you just raise the spectre of scepticism.

It is clear, is it not, to the rational intuitions of virtually everyone that hitting someone else is - other things being equal - much worse than hitting yourself? On what rational basis are you rejecting those intuitions? You can't just reject them because they are inconsistent with your theory - for that outs you as a dogmatist rather than a follower of evidence. And you can't selectively use scepticism to reject them, for that is once more arbitrary - you are only a sceptic when it comes to the probative force of intuitions that are inconsistent with your theory, but not otherwise.

Well, your phrase here that hedonism “flies in the face of “powerful” and widely shared moral intuitions that we have “no reason to discount”” seems to demonstrate why I think your approach to moral philosophy is extremely prejudice against unpopular opinions like the one I happen to uphold. It’s almost like I have to fight an uphill battle for you to even consider my arguments. — TheHedoMinimalist

Your arguments are simply question begging. You are simply assuming that morality must have a fixed pattern and that you've discovered it.

I have provided arguments against you.

Again, you can't deny the probative force of rational intuitions without giving up on all arguments for anything, including your own view.

So, rational intuitions have prima facie probative force.

Now, as just about everyone will affirm, what makes one act right can make another wrong. Causing pain is sometimes a feature that makes an act wrong, sometimes a feature that makes an act right.

And as just about everyone will also affirm, acts that seem to us today to be wrong, have seemed to others in the past to be right.

So, if rational intuitions have prima facie probative force, and if what makes one act right can just as easily make another wrong, and if what has appeared right to most people in one age has appeared wrong to most people in another, then we have good prima facie evidence that moral particularism is true.

Why? Because that 'just is' moral particularism. So, until or unless you challenge that argument, your view is refuted.

There is also independent reason to reject your view: the refutations I gave, and plenty more besides. You simply denied the premises - but you need to provide actual evidence they're false, not just play the scepticism card and/or reject them due to their conflicting with your theory (that's to render your theory unfalsifiable).

Also how can you possibly say that I am prejudiced against views that fly in the face of popular opinion?!? I am an antinatalist, for goodness sake!

You are confusing moral particularism with moral conservatism. I am a moral particularist, but I am not by any stretch of the imagination a moral conservative, as a moments reflection on the view I am arguing for should reveal!!

I have studied the topic of Axiology extensively by reading lots of academic journals on the topic and related topics. I have also spent about 2-3 hours a day in the last 4 years philosophizing about this topic and other philosophical topics. I’m not even claiming to be right about my views on Hedonism though. There are plenty of really good Axiologists who are more dedicated than I am who might have really good objections to my arguments. But, I find it laughable that my arguments could defeated by normal people who never even heard of my arguments or philosophized about the topics that I have philosophized about. — TheHedoMinimalist

Clever people defend false views all the time. There are umpteen normative theories and umpteen metaethical theories under debate in the literature - they can't all be true. They can all be false, but at best only one normative theory can be true, and only one metaethical theory. So, as things stand, we know already that most clever people's theories about these matters are false.

Now back to my refutations of axiological hedonism - I think it is undeniable that their first premises are true, for they are conceptual truths. And it is undeniable that their second premises are supported by most people's rational intuitions. So, the view is refuted unless, that is, you can provide 'independent' reason to doubt those rational intuitions. Not mere possibilities, note. Just pointing out that it is 'possible' the intuitions are mistaken is lame. It is possible Lee Harvey Oswald didn't assassinate Kennedy, possible that all the 'evidence' implicating him was cooked-up, and so on. But that mere possibility is not good evidence that he didn't do it. Likewise, the mere possibility that the intuitions in support of the second premises are false is not good evidence that they are false.

So I think axiological hedonism has been refuted - refuted by the arguments I gave and refuted as well by the fact that any wrong-making feature can become a right-making feature in another context, or another time.

I think there are other things that all blue things have in common:
1. All blue things are made of atoms
2. All blue things exist in the same universe(if there are no other universes with blue things.)
3. All blue things could be perceived by humans who are not color blind as being blue.
4. All blue things reflect light in a similar manner and this is why they are all blue.
5. All blue things are not mental states
6. All blue things are not mathematical equations
7. All blue things are not red things — TheHedoMinimalist

This misses the point. For nothing is blue rather than another colour due to these things, and thus you cannot get any principle from them.

I mean, one could point out - trivially - that one thing all right acts have in common apart from being right is that they're all actions, and they all happen in time, and so on. But you can't get a normative theory from that. They're just conceptual truths.

So, of course I agree that all right actions are actions, and all right actions are performed by agents, and so on. But the rightness is not 'supervenient' or resultant from these features, and thus such observations cannot provide a basis for a substantial normative theory.

What you need is to find something that all right acts have in common and from which their rightness can be said to derive. Then and only then will you be able to formulate a normative principle.

The moral particularist denies that there are any such features. The moral particularist does not deny that right actions are all actions, or that they are all identical with themselves, or that they are all performed by agents, rather they deny that their rightness derives from something they all have in common apart from their rightness.

Is there such a thing as “assumption-free evidence”? — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, lots. It appears that hurting another for fun is wrong. That is, my reason represents me to have reason not to hurt others for fun. This is not an assumption, but an appearance. And appearances are prima facie evidence in support of their representative contents. That too is a rational appearance.

These are appearances, not assumptions. To illustrate the difference, take one of those well-known optical illusions concerning shapes - you know, the sort where there are two objects that appear to be different sizes but are in fact the same size. Now, because these are familiar to most of us, we 'assume' the two objects are the same size. Yet they 'appear' to be different sizes. I mean, mere familiarity with these illusions does not prevent the objects featuring in them from appearing to be different sizes. Likewise, hurting others for fun appears to be wrong. That's not an assumption. It is how things appear (and appear to virtually everyone). Not everyone believes in the accuracy of such appearances (nihilists do not, for instance). But even those who do not believe in their accuracy - so, nihilists again - still typically get the impression the acts are wrong (they just don't assume they actually are).

So, there’s always some assumption that you can claim that a piece of evidence is making and so there simply isn’t such a thing as “assumption-free evidence”. — TheHedoMinimalist

No, that's just plain false and amounts to a form of the most extreme scepticism.

As I have stated earlier, I believe that intuitions that occur within a deeper level of argumentation are better than intuitions that occur at more shallow levels. — TheHedoMinimalist

I do not know what you mean by 'deeper' and 'shallower' in this context.

Ok, now I think you just both defeated your arguments for moral particularism and your arguments for antinatalism. Divine Command theory is a normative ethical theory which argues that right and wrong actions are the prescriptions of God. — TheHedoMinimalist

No I haven't and no it isn't. Divine command theory is a metaethical theory, not a normative ethical theory.

And it is not the theory that morality is the commands of 'God'. That's one particular kind of divine command theory - the kind associated with Christianity and Islam. But divine command theory is the theory that morality is the commands of 'a god or gods'. It isn't a religious view, but a metaethical view - a philosophical theory.

It may help if I point out that I am not religious and neither know nor care what Christianity or any other religious says about anything.

Note too, that a normative theory is a theory about what's right, not about what rightness itself is. A metaethical theory is a theory about what rightness itself is.

As an example, utilitarianism is a normative theory. It says "The right act is the one that maximises happiness". Divine command theory does not contradict this, and is thus not a rival view. For it says that 'a right act is one and the same as a prescription of a god". That says nothing about the content of the prescription. So, it is consistent with utilitarianism (and deontology, and any other normative theory you care to mention).

Having said this, Divine command theory does, I believe, imply moral particularism at the normative level, but that does not make it a normative theory (a theory that has normative implications is not thereby a normative theory; for example, nihilism is a metaethical theory with normative implications - it implies nothing is right or wrong - but that doesn't make it a normative theory).

I suppose you would then argue that moral particularism is simply a method of figuring out what God’s prescriptions are. In that case, why couldn’t my degree of certainty argument and my incomeasurability requirement argument be a better method of figuring out God’s prescriptions? — TheHedoMinimalist

No, because it is implausible. Your normative view is entirely compatible with divine command theory, but it nevertheless has no good evidence in its support, I think. If you drop your assumptions and just inspect people's rational intuitions they vary from case to case, yes? There's a rough shape to them, true. But nothing very fixed and definite. So, moral particularism is implied by the actual evidence - by rational intuitions.

Note too how moral particularism - as well as being independently supported by the direct evidence of our rational intuiitons - is also implied by divine command theory. If divine command theory is true, then what's right is determined by a god's commands, yes? Well, are they fixed? No, or at least, there's no good reason to think they would be. I mean, if I command you to do something in one context, I am not thereby committed to commanding you to do it in another, or even in the same context on another occasion. So, what goes for me surely will go for a god as well.

So, if divine command theory is true - and it demonstrably is - then we would expect moral particularism to be true. And moral particularism does appear to be true. All roads lead to moral particularism.

Another question I have now is if there is a benevolent God then why would procreation be immoral? — TheHedoMinimalist

It's 'a god' rather than 'God'. If you say "God" you associate my views with religious ones that I neither know or care about. Understanding my view requires taking seriously that I am not religious and that I am not talking about 'God'.

Bearing that in mind, why would a benevolent god be opposed to us procreating?

Well, would a benevolent god have created a world like this one and then forced innocent creatures to live in it? No, of course not. Why? Because that would be a shitty thing to do.

There are loads of people who recognise this - who recognise that no good god would have done such a thing. Yet they then do it themselves!! They know how dangerous the world is, they know no benevolent god would have suffered innocents to live in it, yet they then suffer innocents to live in it.

A benevolent person does not bring an innocent person into a world like this one. If you find yourself locked in a prison, it is not okay to force some innocent people into it to keep you company. That's not what a benevolent person does. They do their best to get along with those who are already suffering the same fate as themselves, rather than selfishly summoning others in to join them.

Would a benevolent spectator be in favour of this prisoner forcing innocent others to join them in prison? No, of course not.

So, one major reason why a benevolent person would not be in favour of us procreating is that benevolent people are not in favour of subjecting innocent people to life in a dangerous world. They would be in favour of us being kind to each other, to promoting each other's happiness, and so on. But they would not be in favour - or it seems highly unlikely that they would be anyway - of us making innocent others join us.

Also, it is quite clear from our rational intuitions that the god who exists seems, in the main, to be opposed to imposing things on people without their prior consent. I mean, doing that - even when what one imposes is beneficial - seems wrong in many circumstances, and even in those where it is overall justified, it seems regrettable nevertheless. I find it hard to think of a much more significant thing to impose on someone than a life here. So, given she seems so opposed to imposing significant things on others without their consent, it is reasonable to suppose she'd be very much opposed to procreation on those grounds too.

It’s possible that people have moral disgust towards the torture of Tom because human beings evolved to experience moral empathy towards someone getting tortured while not evolving to experience extra strong happiness towards billions of happy people that come as a result. This is because our pre-historic ancestors had no survival advantage by being happy about a world full of billions of happy people who are not their relatives. On the other hand, they had evolved a capacity for empathy towards the pain of a stranger because it made them better at forming cooperative relationships. So, there could actually even be an evolutionary explanation for the disapproval of Tom’s torture as well. Even if there isn’t an evolutionary explanation, we could argue that the gut instinct was simply what Steven Jay Gould might call a spandrel or an accidental by product of the right genes coming together at the right time to form the dislike of using Tom to make everyone happy. As long as this dislike is not harmful to survival and reproduction, it’s possible that an accidental evolutionary trait ends up lasting. — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, I agree with all of that. But I said that if the 'sole' explanation for why we get a moral intuition is an evolutionary one, then that debunks the intuition. If, however, the evolutionary explanation is only partial, then the intuition may retain its probative force.

For example, imagine a divine command theory is true (which it is). That is, imagine that moral rightness and wrongness are prescriptions of a god, prescriptions that our rational intuitions give us some insight into.

Now imagine that the god is benevolent (which she is). Well, it seems reasonable to suppose that a benevolent god would issue prescriptions that would benefit us: that is, that she'd want us to do thrive and form meaningful relationships and all that stuff. If we follow prescriptions of that sort, then we're also likely to be more reproductively successful than those who did not.

In this case, then, we have a divine explanation for why it might be that living in accordance with many moral prescriptions has, in the main, proved to be adaptive. And in this case the explanation does not debunk the intuitions at all.

It seems that your view does not argue that morality is unpatterned. If it was truly unpatterned then I don’t think it would be possible for you to formulate a moral hypothesis. This is because the formulation of an educated guess requires some sort of pattern recognition. Are you not observing patterns in the intuitions of other people regarding moral cases? — TheHedoMinimalist

I am not assuming that morality is patterned, but my approach is one that can recognise a pattern if pattern there be. So, there certainly appears to be a rough-and-ready pattern. But there does not 'have' to be, and my evidence that there is a pattern-of-sorts is that there appears to be. We can make fairly reliable generalisations, such as that if an act is one that will significantly affect another party and the other party has not consented to it, then it's probably wrong. For most acts that have that feature do seem to be wrong, or at least worse than they would be if they lacked it.

So again, I do not 'assume' a rigid pattern, but that's not equivalent to denying patterns if patterns there appear to be.

When we look at the evidence - and look at it 'assumption-free' so to speak - then morality appears to be roughly patterned, but not rigidly so. It doesn't 'have' to have a pattern, but it seems to have a pattern of sorts.

Now that's very different from assuming that it must have a pattern and then setting about describing it. Someone who does that - someone who assumes the task of moral theorising is to describe some once and for all moral rules or principles - is someone who has positively rendered themselves morally blind to a distinct possibility: namely that morality has no rigid pattern. For all the evidence in support of that thesis - and there's an abundance of it - will be rejected on the question-begging ground that it simply conflicts with the rule or principle.

Again, that strikes me as a bizarre way of doing normative ethics. It is 'the' standard way, of course. But it is no less bizarre for that.

I think your approach to morality actually makes it very difficult for a Galileo of moral philosophy to come along and challenge everyone else’s gut instincts towards moral cases. This is because he will be continuously dismissed by philosophers like you for arguing for an unpopular opinion regardless of how good his own arguments are. — TheHedoMinimalist

That's clearly false - I am your evidence for the falsity of that statement. I am and have argued that antinatalism is true. That is a view that flies in the face of most people's moral intuitions. Yet here I am defending it! How ironic! You think that unless we cleave to moral rules no moral radicals will emerge. Yet here I am, denying moral rules and arguing for a view - antinatalism - that is about as morally radical as it gets.

Going back to your analogy between the library catalog and what you see as “rational intuitions” about moral cases, why assume that people’s moral intuitions are like a relatively good library catalog instead of an extremely misleading one? — TheHedoMinimalist

Because the only rational basis upon which one could distrust the catalogue, is on the basis of something in the catalogue.

All cases for anything and everything must appeal to rational intuitions. I mean, how else do you argue for something?

So, it is incoherent to think that one could ever have a rational basis for doubting the catalogue's reliability wholesale. It is only because the catalogue itself tells us not to trust our own copies infallibly, that we see reason sometimes to doubt what our catalogues say.

Of course, I actually don’t think that people even have intuitions about cases like the torture of Tom. Rather, they either have intuitions about the deeper reasons for why they think Tom’s torture is unjustified or they simply have a negative gut reaction towards it. There doesn’t seem to be any kind of a “rational mental representation” that people have towards moral cases of Applied Ethics. — TheHedoMinimalist

I do not understand you here. The intuitions about 'deeper reasons' are going to be rational intuitions, and I do not know what you mean by 'deeper' in this context.

Most of us do have rational intuitions and moral philosophers are always referring to them and designing thought experiments with the sole end of eliciting them. So it is simply false that there do not seem to be such representations. Humans are subject to rational representations - we understand the language of reason because we have a faculty of reason (most of us, that is). And among its representations are representations about what to do - about how to behave and what sort of person to be.

If you think that all we have are feelings then that's both false (it may be true of 'you', but it clearly isn't true of most people as most philosophers - now and throughout the history of the subject - have appealed to such intuitions and it is beyond implausible to think that there are no such appearances), and it also means that you're no longer doing moral philosophy, instead you'll just be describing feelings.

If my arguments for Hedonism do not work to make my theory plausible, then I might also be wrong about individual relativism. So far, I have never heard a good objection to my views on Axiology so I have no reason to suppose that my arguments do not work to properly support Hedonism. — TheHedoMinimalist

Your argument simply assumes that morality is patterned, it does not establish it.

Axiological hedonism is easily refuted - there are abundant refutations of it. For instance, here's one:

1. If Axiological hedonism is true, then it is as wrong for me to cause myself harm as it is to cause someone else an equal amount of harm
2. It is not as wrong for me to cause myself harm as it is to case someone else an equal amount of harm. (For instance, if I hit myself in the face that's not as wrong as hitting someone else in the face, even if the amounts of pain the act causes - both physical and emotional - happen to be identical)
3. Therefore axiological hedonism is false.

Here's another:

1. If axiological hedonism is true, then equal amounts of pleasure matter equally
2. Equal amounts of pleasure do not matter equally (for example, if two people - one innocent and the other guilty of horrific crimes - are equally happy, their happiness is not equally good, indeed the happiness of the guilty party is arguably positively bad)
3. Therefore, axiological hedonism is false

I think it is undeniable that in both cases the second premises enjoy overwhelming intuitive support and the only basis you are going to find to reject those intuitions is that they conflict with axiological hedonism (which is question begging).

So axiological hedonism is easily refuted. The same is going to be true of any other normative theory that attempts to reduce morality to one simple principle.

I think we shouldn’t confuse my approach regarding normative ethics with my approach regarding meta-ethics. — TheHedoMinimalist

I have not done that. I take a 'normative theory' to be a theory about what all morally right/wrong acts (and good/bad deeds, traits and states of affair) have in common - if anything - apart from being right/wrong. My moral particularism is the view that they have nothing in common apart from being right/wrong. That's a normative theory, at least on my usage. By contrast a 'metaethical' theory would be a theory about what the rightness itself is.

For an analogy: we can ask "is there anything all tasty things have in common apart from being tasty?" and we can ask "what is tastiness?" - these are quite distinct questions.

So, anyway, my moral particularism is the view that there is nothing all right acts have in common apart from being right. I have made a case for it. Take any feature you like, apart from 'moral rightness' and we can - with a bit of imagination - conceive of a case in which that feature seems to be operating as a moral positive, and a case in which it seems to be operating as a moral negative.

That is prima facie evidence that moral particularism is true.

First of all, I’m not sure what you even mean by pattern here. I would define a pattern as being something that allows us to make inferences about something else. In that sense, I do think that there is a pattern to morality but you seem to think that there is a pattern in that sense as well. — TheHedoMinimalist

You just did that - if you are not a moral particularist, then you think that morality has a fixed pattern, for your normative theory is an attempt at describing it.

To clarify what I mean by a 'pattern' to morality: you believe there is a 'pattern' to morality if you think that there must be something that all right acts have in common apart from being right.

For instance, a utilitarian believes that what all right acts have in common apart from being right is that they maximise happiness.

A Rawlsian deontologist believes that what all right acts have in common apart from being right is that they are acts that could be rationally consented to by relevantly ignorant impartial deliberators.

And so on.

A moral particularist believes there is nothing all right acts have in common apart from being right.

So, there is no more a pattern to morality than there is to, say, colour. Some things are blue. Is there anything all blue things have in common apart from being blue? Nope.

Note, we can still make inferences about the colour of things we cannot see on the basis of those we can. If there is an object that I can feel but not see, and the object feels square - and to date all the square things I have seen have been blue - then it is reasonable, at least as a default, to assume that the object I am feeling is probably blue. In making that inference I am not committed to accepting the principle "If an object is square, then it is blue". So, we do not need to assume rigid patterns in order to be able to make reasonable inferences. All we need in order to be able to make inferences is a faculty of reason - and we can just trust it to tell us when and what inferences are justified.

Anyway, if, then, you think that there just must be something - some underlying feature or features - that all right acts have in common apart from being right (and you clearly do, for otherwise in what sense are you an 'axiological hedonist'?), then you believe in a pattern.

If you do not, then you are a moral particularist and we agree and our disagreement has been merely apparent, not real.

If you are a moral particularist, then you should agree that the best method for finding out whether an act is actually right or wrong is to consult our rational intuitions.

If you're not a moral particularist, then you're going to adopt a bizarre two-step procedure instead, in which one first assumes that there is must be a fixed pattern to morality and then one infers from some selection of our moral intuitions what that pattern is - in your case 'axiological hedonism'. And then one simply applies that principle to a situation and bingo you find out what's right in any and all situations.

Like I say, I think that's wholly unjustified and just bizarre. The core assumption is unjustified. Why assume that all right acts will have something in common apart from being right? They may do - by why assume it as an article of faith at the outset? And given that any pattern one thinks there may be is going to be justified - to the extent that it is justified - by its being implied by some of our intuitions, it is bizarre to then subsequently ignore the probative force of those that do not imply it.

So, I think your axiological hedonism is false on its face - it flies in the face of powerful and widely shared moral intuitions that we have no reason to discount. Furthermore, the whole approach - the approach of assuming there must be a pattern and then doing one's best to describe it - is unjustified and bizarre. Or so I have argued.

This post is becoming too long, so I will write another addressing what you've said about evolution.

I understand that you wish to avoid talking about the emotive issues but I’m actually kinda curious about what reason would you have to dismiss the intuitions of past people regarding slavery. You managed to dismiss the intuitions that people have about procreation being permissible and the intuition that people had in the past about homosexuality by appealing to something akin to an evolutionary bias explanation for why people hold that intuition. It seems that you can’t use the evolutionary bias explanation for dismissing the past intuitions that people had about slavery. At the very least, it is not entirely obvious that thinking that slavery is permissible has evolutionary advantages. — TheHedoMinimalist

To say too much on this would be off topic, but there are all manner of debunking explanations possible, not just evolutionary ones. For instance, if something is very much in someone's interests, then there is likely to be strong tendency to ignore intuitions that represent it to be wrong, and in time such intuitions may disappear altogether. Consider that most contemporary people think there's nothing wrong with buying meat, despite the fact the practice of rearing animals to kill them for fun (which is what killing them in order to eat them is) is quite clearly wrong upon reflection. I am sure that future generations will look back at our meat eating practices with horror, just as we do upon the slaving practices of our ancestors.

Well, if we are going to make an analogy between eyesight and “moral sight” then morality is not only relative to the time period and the culture in which you live but also the immediate space around you. — TheHedoMinimalist

It was only an analogy, designed to reveal the odd nature of most people's reasoning about variation in moral intuitions across history (we don't, for instance, think that because rivers exist externally to our own subjective states that therefore they are fixed across time; yet many think that if morality exists externally, then part and parcel of that externality involves it being fixed, such that evidence of a lack of fixity somehow implies that morality exists in our own minds - bonkers reasoning). So the point of the analogy was to show that there is no necessary connection between morality being 'fixed' and morality being 'external'. Morality is external - whether an act is right or wrong is not a individually or collectively subjective - but this does not mean it is fixed, and if we find that rational intuitions about what's right and wrong have changed over time, then this is prima facie evidence that morality itself has changed.

Anyway, there are important differences between how our faculty of reason - the source of rational intuitions - works and how our sensible faculties work. To borrow an example from Bertrand Russell, take a library catalogue. A library catalogue tells you what works are in a library. It may - almost certainly will - contain some mistakes. Nevertheless, if you want to find out whether a work is in the library, consulting it is a good bet. However, let's say I go to the library and steal a book. Well, the catalogue won't immediately change to reflect the change in the contents of the library.

Now, I suggest that this is how our faculty of reason works. It is equivalent to the library catalogue, and the moral norms and values are equivalent to works in the library. It is not a sensible faculty. For a sensible faculty provides one with direct - or near direct - reports about one's surroundings. But our faculty of rational intuition does not provide us with direct reports on our normative and evaluative surroundings. Nevertheless, if you want to find out whether a work is in the library, it is still a good bet to consult the catalogue. And in this particular case, our catalogue and the catalogues of others are the only things we have to go on.

Imagine that the catalogues from our era represent the moral library - a library we can never visit directly - to have slightly different contents from those from a previous era. What should we conclude? Well, if the representations are systematic - so virtually everyone's catalogue from one era represents a certain book to be present, whereas virtually everyone's catalogue from another era represents it to be absent - then a reasonable conclusion to draw would be that the book used to be in the library but is no longer there.

This would imply individual moral relativism instead of cultural relativism. — TheHedoMinimalist

It doesn't imply it, it merely allows this possibility to be one we can confirm. Note too, I am not arguing for cultural relativism - I am arguing that it is possible that morality varies over space and time. I am not - absolutely not - arguing that if a group thinks Xing is right, then Xing is right.

Imagine a detective says that his approach is to look at the crime scene and follow the evidence. Does that approach imply that everyone is guilty? No, of course not. But it does not foreclose the possibility that anyone is guilty, that's all. Not foreclosing such a possibility is not at all equivalent to implying it.

My approach - which is just to use our moral intuitions as our guide (except where we have good independent reason to discount the moral intuitions in question) - is like the detective's. It is true that such an approach does not foreclose the possibility that some form of individual moral relativism may be true. But that is not equivalent to it 'implying' it.

And in fact it is a great virtue of my approach that it permits the truth of such views to be discovered, if true they be. Compare that to your approach - you have assumed such views are false, and so your whole approach will never be able to recognise their truth. That's a serious flaw. Not because individual relativism is true - I am not saying it is true - but because it 'may' be, and your approach has put its falsity beyond negotiation.

Is individual relativism true? Well, not for the most part. But sometimes it does seem to be, precisely because the relationships we come to share with others can give rise to us as individuals having moral responsibilities that others do not. This is something our intuitions tell us. But many norms are universal in nature, as our intuitions themselves tell us. So, by following our intuitions and resisting the urge to formulate rules, we do not commit ourselves to individual relativism at all - we merely open ourselves us to recognising when and where individual relativism applies.

When someone says that it would be wrong for TheHedoMinimalist to torture Tom to make everyone happy, they are really just saying that it’s obviously wrong to them. — TheHedoMinimalist

I just don't think that's very plausible. Again, I don't deny that it is 'possible' that it is morally ok for you to torture people and wrong for the rest of us to - for I don't decide in advance what shape morality has. But if we stick to the actual evidence, rather than hypothetical evidence, then it is fairly obvious to most that we 'all' have a moral obligation not to torture innocents for fun. Some may not have that intuition - but then it is more reasonable to think that's because their catalogue contains an error than to think that the catalogues of the rest of us contains the error and that theirs is the correct edition.

So, again, a) why assume that Xing must be wrong for everyone if it is wrong for anyone? b) follow the actual evidence: if the evidence (the intuitions) represent Xing to be wrong for everyone - that is, if the moral intuition does not mention anyone by name - then that's good evidence that it is wrong for everyone.

I think you are once again confusing what a theory permits, with what it implies. Many of our moral intuitions represent the norms they tell us about to apply universally, not individually. Morality does not 'have' to be universal - it's prescriptions do not have to apply to us all - but most of them do seem to have that character, and the evidence that they do is that they appear to.

Well, you seem to be assuming that intuitions about cases of applied ethics are the most important cases for determining morality. I had already given you my argument that certain normative aims are more plausible than others if they have better comeasurabity. If my argument for “The Comeasurability Requirement” is plausible then any moral position which is incompatible with that value theory intuition is false. — TheHedoMinimalist

It isn't plausible and I've already argued for my view. You must just make an assumption - an assumption that there is a fixed pattern to morality - and go from there, but that assumption is precisely what I dispute. There is no evidence that there is such a pattern (if there was a fixed pattern, why has no one discovered it?). There is, by contrast, prima facie evidence that morality is unpatterned. Namely, it appears not to be patterned. The appearances in question are 'intuitions'.

I do not 'assume' that intuitions are our most important source of evidence. I have argued for this. Here is that argument. First, it is by intuition that we are aware of moral norms and values in the first place. We do not see, touch, smell, taste or hear morality, do we? It is by reason that we are aware of it. That is to say, by rational intuition. So, given that this is how we are primarily aware of morality, this is our most important source of evidence into the morality of an action.

I’m still not understanding the distinction. It seems that negative attitudes are also mental representations. — TheHedoMinimalist

A mental representation 'represents' something to be the case, and is thereby capable of being accurate or inaccurate. By contrast 'disliking' something can't be accurate or inaccurate. So, although negative attitudes - such as dislike - are mental states, they are not 'representations'.

An 'intuition' is a representation. Moral theorizers are not appealing to feelings - for that would make moral philosophy a branch of psychology - but to intuitions.

I think you are misunderstanding my argument. I’m saying that all moral theories must make evaluative judgements. This is also true of deontological and other non-consequentialist theories. For example, A non-consequentialist philosopher like yourself likely does not believe that all wrong actions are equally wrong. This means that there must be a non-arbitrary way for you to say that some actions are more wrong than others. — TheHedoMinimalist

It is intuitions - rational representations - that provide the non-arbitrary basis for my theory. My theory, note, is an anti-theory. (And a highly respectable one at that - it is known as 'moral particularism'). Those other theories arbitrarily alight on some moral intuitions and then ignore others (namely, those with which their theories conflict). I don't arbitrarily ignore any, I just non-arbitrarily resist the temptation for formulate moral rules. So moral particularism is an anti-theory normative theory: it is a theory that has no substantial normative content, for we resist the urge to impose ourselves on the moral landscape and instead we just urge people to observe it.

So, what's the best evidence that killing an innocent for fun is wrong? Is it that so-and-so theory says it is wrong? no, it is that it appears to be wrong. I have arrived at the conclusion that killing an innocent for fun is wrong on a non-arbitrary basis, then. I have appealed to no theory, just to intuitions (which is what any normative theory worth its salt will do as well, it is just that the theory will 'arbitrarily' appeal to some and ignore others).

I argued that you do not have a non-arbitrary way of saying that the wrongness of torturing Tom is more wrong than the wrongness of something like lying to your boss about being sick to avoid work. — TheHedoMinimalist

I take it I have just answered that. Yes I do - I appeal to intuitions, which is non-arbitrary. It is those who theorise who are guilty of being arbitrary, for they arbitrarily appeal to some intuitions and not others.

Having a nice neat theory does not prevent one from being guilty of arbitrariness. Here's a theory: if it is Tuesday, it is wrong to kill innocents. If it is Wednesday it is right to do so. Now, that's a theory and it delivers consistent verdicts, but it is doing so in an arbitrary fashion.

I think you are assuming that until or unless one appeals to some kind of principle or rule one's judgements will be 'arbitrary'. That's just false. Rules do nothing whatsoever to prevent one's judgements from being arbitrary.

I am being non-arbitrary precisely because I appeal to intuitions about cases, not arbitrary rules.

You seem to think that the extent of wrongness of an action could be reasonably hypothesized by a weird mixture of people’s combined intuitions and a possible dismissal of some intuitions if they gave our ancestors an advantage in replicating their DNA in the past. — TheHedoMinimalist

The word 'weird' in there is expressive. You're not arguing against my thesis, just expressing your disapproval or surprise at it.

Also, that's not my view. The wrongness of an action is not made of intuitions. It is rather something our intuitions give us insight into. Our faculty of intuition, however, is not infallible. And sometimes we have good reason to be sceptical about what our intuitions represent to be the case.

Now, that's not a 'weird' thesis. It is sensible. It is the thesis any reasonable person has about other faculties, such as 'sight'. Our sight gives us insight into our sensible surroundings, yes? But it is not infallible and sometimes we have reason to think that what our sight is telling us is not accurate. If, for instance, everyone has just taken a hallucinogen, then the subsequent reports of our sight are not likely to be accurate. So, although visual representations provide prima facie evidence of what they represent to be the case, they do not invariably do so and circumstances can arise in which it would be quite irrational to accord them any eight.

Apply that to moral intuitions. Moral intuitions provide prima facie evidence of what they represent to be the case (if an act appears wrong, that is prima facie evidence that it is wrong). But sometimes - not always and not by default, but sometimes - we have reason to think that a moral intuition, though widely shared, does not have any probative force.

Note, no theory is needed here. And most people - I mean, everyone I have met to date - lack normative theories, yet seem perfectly good moral judges.

Anyway, getting back to what might discredit a moral intuition: it is widely (though not universally) acknowledged that if we can provide a wholly evolutionary explanation of why we are subject to certain intuitions, then this casts doubt on their probative force. Again, that's not a weird thesis, but is rather one that is capable of sophisticated defence. I did not provide that defence, I merely gestured at it.

But here is the basic idea. Take a sense of the divine. It's near universal among humans. Why? Well, one explanation is that being disposed to get the impression there's a divine purpose to things confers an evolutionary advantage upon those who have it. Those who believed in such things would be happier and thus more reproductively successful. Thus the disposition to get the impression of a divine purpose is passed on.

Do we have to posit any actual gods in order to explain why a sense of the divine conferred an advantage? No, it would seem not (maybe we do - but I am just going to assume we do not for the sake of illustration). Thus, this evolutionary explanation - if accurate (and I am not saying it is) - would serve to discredit the sense of the divine. It might - might - still be accurate, but it would be pure luck if it was.

We can apply this to the hallucinogen example as well. Imagine everyone has just taken a hallucinogen and then everyone starts seeing monsters. Well, in this case the best explanation of why everyone is seeing monsters is not that there are monsters, but that their sight is malfunctioning due to the hallucinogen.

Now apply this to some moral intuitions. A moral intuition that procreation is morally okay is one that is likely to be selected for (as those - such as myself - who get the intuition that it is not okay, tend not to procreate). If - if - that is the full explanation of why most humans get that intuition, then it serves to undermine it. Why? Because the act's actual morality plays no role in the explanation. The intuition may be accurate, but it would be pure chance if it was. And thus it no longer has any evidential force.

This does not, I think, apply to all moral intuitions, just some (just as it would be ludicrous to dismiss all visual reports just because 'some' are unreliable). And thus it enables a moral particularist such as myself non-arbitrarily to dismiss some moral intuitions and not others.

but "there is no answer" is quite different from "there is no way of knowing the answer".
There are answers to all of them. Some are clear, some not.
For instance, there is an answer to the question "what was Caesar's favorite breakfast" even though we may never be able definitively to answer it. Some moral questions may be like this too.

This seems to pose a contradiction to your argument though. This is because the view that something like slavery was permissible in 1800 but not permissible today is highly counterintuitive to the vast majority of people living in the 21st century. — TheHedoMinimalist

First, I'd want to say that I think slavery has probably never been morally ok, but as I take the point and do not want emotive issues to get in the way, I will talk about 'activity X' instead (where 'activity X' refers to some activity that was once judged right by virtually everyone - and where we have no special reason to think that everyone's intuitions about that matter were mistaken - and is now judged wrong by virtually everyone, and we have no special reason to think our intuitions are mistaken).

So, by hypothesis, Xing seems wrong to virtually everyone today. Now - given my view (the view that morality can and does change over time) - that is excellent evidence that it is wrong today. Note, then, that I am not dismissing contemporary intuitions about the morality of xing - far from it, I am respecting them.

Note too that our moral intuitions give us insight into the current morality of actions. Just as my eyesight tells me about what's around me 'at the moment' and not last century, likewise our moral intuitions give us insight into what's right and wrong today, not right and wrong last century. To deny this is to beg the question. That is, it is to just assume - as an unargued for datum - that morality is fixed and thus that old intuitions are as good today as contemporary ones.

Most people, of course, are likely to insist that Xing was 'always' wrong. But here, I think, they are simply giving expression to how obviously wrong Xing currently is. Words like 'always' typically function in that way. We say "it is 'never' acceptable to behave in that way" as a way of emphasising our opposition to it. Likewise, when an activity is obviously wrong - and by hypothesis, Xing is obviously wrong - then we can expect most people to express this by saying "it's always wrong". After all, what harm is done by saying this? The bottom line, after all, is doing what's right now, not in the past. So although what they are saying is strictly speaking false, it doesn't particularly matter.

There's another way of bringing this out. Take my view. Many people, upon hearing it, ask me about slavery and homosexuality - examples that you too have used. And they point out to me that, given my view, it would seem I'm committed to having to say that slavery was morally ok in the past, and that homosexuality was morally wrong in the past.

That's false, of course. But even if it were true - I mean, let's imagine I agree and insist that slavery was indeed fine in the past, and that homosexuality was wrong in the past - most are going to think that this implies that I am not that opposed to slavery, and that I am a bit homophobic. That is, if you admit to thinking that morality changes, then people think you are not as opposed to things as if you'd said instead that they were 'always' wrong, or 'always' right.

So, I think slavery is wrong and that homosexuality is fine. I am very confident about both matters. But if I admit to thinking that slavery used to be fine, and homosexuality used to be wrong, most people will not think I am confident about their current moral status. How, then, do I transmit to others my confidence in the wrongness of slavery and the moral benignity of homosexuality? I say "slavery is wrong today and has always been wrong!!" and likewise "homosexuality is morally benign and has always been so!!"

The fact, then, that many people will agree that Xing is 'always' wrong is not good evidence that it is always wrong. It is good evidence that it is currently clearly and distinctly wrong.

So that's what I'd say. But now consider what 'you' have to say - or what someone who thinks morality is fixed has to say, if that's not you.

In the past it was intuitively obvious to virtually everyone that Xing was right. Now it is intuitively obvious to virtually everyone that Xing is wrong. Now, given your view one group is mistaken. Which one? Well, it would be quite arbitrary to just assume the past group was the mistaken one. I mean, why think that?? It is just as likely to be those around today who are mistaken. After all, given this variation across time - variation about something fixed - we know that our moral intuitions are quite unreliable. So, you - it seems to me - are now committed to having to say that it is just as likely that Xing today is wrong as it is that it is right.

Applied to something more emotive, then, such as slavery - if it was true that slavery appearing right to those in the past, but wrong to us today, then you must judge, if you are epistemically responsible, that it is just as likely right as wrong today. You are certainly not justified in being confident that it is wrong. For if morality is fixed, then a) you know from the variability of people's intuitions that intuitions are unreliable and b) you know that about this very issue entire populations got the intuition it was right, populations whose moral intuitions you've no reason to think any less reliable than ours today.

So, you have to be open minded about the morality of slavery under these circumstances. Compare that to me. Because I think morality varies, I am entitled to be confident that slavery is wrong. For it appears to virtually everyone today to be wrong. And although people in the past may have had the intuition it was right, those intuitions are completely irrelevant.

I would like to point out that a similar type of explanation could be given for the view that the torture of Tom is unjustified. In some countries like China, Colombia, and North Korea, most people would likely think that the torture of Tom is justified. — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, but if that's true then that's good evidence that morality varies across space too. Now I'm sure we can debunk those intuitions. But let's imagine we can't. I stress, I think we can. But let's imagine we can't. That is, let's assume there is no reason whatsoever for thinking their intuitions about the morality torture are any less reliable than ours. That is, let's imagine that most of those in North Korea get the intuition that torture is justified in a far richer variety of circumstances than we in the west do. Okay, if that's true then I think that's evidence that torture isn't as wrong in some places as it is in others.

But what does someone who insists morality is fixed have to say? Well, they could just dismiss the intuitions of the North Koreans. But on what basis? Looks like a prejudice, plain and simple. By hypothesis, there is no more reason to think their intiuitions are unreliable than to think ours are. So, if morality is fixed and you are epistemically responsible you will have to conclude that torture may well be far more justified than we in the west typically think.

Ok. I'm just curious what basis you would have to disagree with someone on a moral question then. If there are no hard rules, only rough and ready generlizations then how can you tell someone "Murder is wrong" if they just disagree. What basis do you have to have an arugment upon — khaled

Well the 'controversial' cases are, by their very nature, ones about which we have conflicting moral intuitions. For example, torturing an innocent person for fun is intuited to be wrong by virtually everyone, which is why there is no serious dispute about its morality. But abortions, for example, are cases about which people have no very clear intuitions and thus are cases where people typically appeal to theories rather than intuition. As equally plausible theories deliver conflicting verdicts about such cases, disagreement reigns.

What to do? Well, we can't appeal to intuition, because intuitions are not clear. But we can appeal to imaginary cases (or real cases) that seem sufficiently similar and that elicit from us clearer intuitions. We can then infer from their similarity a conclusion about the controversial case.

I believe that normative aims with superior comeasurability are more likely to be non-trivial aims to pursue. — TheHedoMinimalist

I do not see any reason to think that's true. You're assuming from the get go that morality is 'measurable'. Why make that assumption? Is it a self-evident truth of reason?

When it comes to any normative theory, if it is to be defensible it needs to appeal to our moral intuitions and show how it respects and unifies a large number of them. But then - and here's the rub - there will (for there has always been to date) some that it cannot accommodate. Either at that point you dismiss those intuitions on the grounds that they do not fit with your favourite theory (in which case the theory has taken over from the evidence), or you accept that the theory is false (and to date the majority of moral philosophers have considered every proposed theory false, and false precisely because of a failure to accommodate important and clear moral intuitions).

If one accepts that the theory is false on the basis of moral intuitions, then we didn't need the theory. We can just follow our moral intuitions. Normative theories are, then, at best redundant, and at worst positively misleading (for there will always be some - often many - who are seduced by the theory and the desire for neatness and so start following it, rather than the evidence).

So, again, why not just follow the intuitions? Why decide in advance that morality is neat, predicable, and amendable to codification? Those assumptions seem explicable in terms of human psychology, but they do not seem to be ones for which any good evidence can be provided.

If I did not fulfill my burden of proof requirement, then what would I need to do to fulfill that requirement? — TheHedoMinimalist

You need to find a rational basis for dismissing the widely shared intuitions I was appealing to. Consider a ufo sighting. A lot of people report seeing a UFO in the sky. Well, it would be dogmatic to insist that their visual faculties are malfunctioning on the grounds that 'there are not any UFOs'. But what if one found out that due to some error at the waterworks everyone in that area had just ingested drugged water, likely to induce hallucinations and to make people extremely suggestible? Well, now we have good reason to doubt the reliability of those visual reports, because although there are lots of them we have a better explanation of why they occurred.

Not all moral intuitions are created equal, and so when encountering some that seem incompatible with one's theory then what one needs to do is provide independent reason for being sceptical about their probative force.

Now my own view - that it is prima facie wrong to procreate - is one that I accept is counterintuitive. Most people, I think, have the rational intuition that there is nothing wrong with procreation, at least in regular cases. However, I think a good case exists for thinking those intuitions are of doubtful credibility. I accept that I 'owe' such a case, but I think there is one.

I would like to point out that the intuitions that are commonly shared differ across different periods of time. In the past, people widely shared the intuition that homosexual sex was wrong. Today, much fewer people share that intuition. If you lived in the past, would it be your burden of proof to show that homosexual sex is not wrong? — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, moral intuitions have varied across different periods of time. That's the basis upon which I believe morality has varied over time. If 'acting in manner X' seemed wrong to most people in 1800, but seems right to most people now, then that's good evidence that it was wrong in 1800, but right today.

Obviously in many cases the intuitions that vary are ones whose probative force is doubtful. For instance, I would not argue that homosexuality was wrong in the 1950s but morally fine today. This is because I think the anti-homosexuality intuitions are ones we have independent reason to be sceptical about (the same kind of independent reason as casts doubt on the probative force of people's intuitions about procreation). So, I think that - most likely - homosexuality has always been fine, and intuitions to the contrary are of doubtful probative force.

The larger point, however, is that we should follow evidence, not theories. The idea that morality is fixed across time is a theory. The evidence indicates that it varies across time.

What is the difference between unpopular and counterintuitive regarding cases of applied ethics? — TheHedoMinimalist

An intuition is a mental representation. But for something to be unpopular is simply for people to be adopting a negative attitude towards it. My dislike for torture is not evidence torture is wrong. My intuition that torture is wrong is evidence it is wrong.

Our intuitions can be influenced by our feelings and vice versa. But they're distinct kinds of mental state.

How do you go about discrediting their intuitions then? — TheHedoMinimalist

I appeal to their adaptive value. Humans who have the moral intuition that procreation is morally okay will most likely procreate. That, I think, is the best explanation of why most humans have the moral intuition that procreation is morally okay.

There are prescriptions of shit; only a person can issue a prescription; therefore shit is a person. — creativesoul

Er, no there aren't. I mean, what's a 'prescription of shit'? Have you been hitting the home brew again? (But on a positive note, that argument was valid. It's just it was rubbish, due to the first premise being false/incoherent).

I would like to point out that you also believe in many things that are counterintuitive to most people that you would regard as ”reasonable” — TheHedoMinimalist

Not many things and not most people. I believe in free will. So do most people. I believe in the soul. So do most people. I believe in a god. So do most people. I believe in morality. So do most people. I admit, I also believe that it is wrong to procreate, whereas most people - if they think anything about its morality at all - believe it is permissible to procreate.

For example, antinatalism is itself counterintuitive to most people. In fact, it is sometimes used in thought experiments to argue against other viewpoints. — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, I agree. That is, I agree that the intuitions of most people probably represent procreation to be morally okay. Now, I don't think those particular intuitions count for very much. But I accept that it is reasonable to appeal to them and I accept that I have the burden of proof on this issue, precisely becusae procreation appears morally okay to most people.

Frank makes an argument that life contains more badness than goodness and starts that argument by making an argument for Axiological Hedonism which states that the goodness of life should be defined only as the combined pleasure of life and the badness of life should be defined as the combined suffering. — TheHedoMinimalist

Frank's case will not be a very powerful one. Hedonism isn't very plausible.

But again, I stress, antinatalism is the view that procreation is prima facie wrong. It is not the view that life contains more bad than evil.

I think we can both agree that the unpopularity of Antinatalism doesn’t provide any evidence against it. — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes. Although you seem to be equating 'unpopular' with 'counterintuitive'. Antinatalism is counterintuitive. And that - that, not its unpopularity - is prima facie evidence against it.

I should emphasise a few things. I am an antinatalist. But I am not a hedonist and I do not believe that life contains more bad than good. On the contrary, I think that - on the whole - it contains more good than bad.

I am an antinatalist on the basis of numerous pieces of evidence, not one. And although I accept that most people have rational intuitions that conflict with my antinatalist conclusion, I think those intuitions can be discredited.

Rather, I’m trying to argue that the intuitions about applied ethics cannot inform us about normative ethical questions. — TheHedoMinimalist

But where is your argument? It sounds like an article of faith. When it comes to any normative ethical theory, its credibility depends on how well it accords with our rational intuitions. Of course, some of those intuitions may be ones we have reason to be sceptical about. But then the credibility of a normative ethical theory will depend on how well it accords with those rational intuitions that we have no reason to be sceptical about.

I think we are getting closer to it since this discussion is getting more Epistemic in nature. — TheHedoMinimalist

I do not know what you mean by this. Again, our main source of insight into an act's morality are our rational intuitions. Some things seem, virtually to everyone, to be wrong. That's our evidence they're wrong. What other evidence could there be? You don't need to have read any Kant to know that rape is wrong and that it is wrong in no small part due to the fact the other person has not consented to what's being done to them. You don't need to be acquainted with utilitarianism to know that it is generally good to maximise happiness, and generally bad to promote pain.

Do you think that the unpopularity of antinatalism could be used as an argument against Frank’s view that life contains more badness than goodness? — TheHedoMinimalist

I would need to hear the argument. What's the argument? "Unpopular" doesn't mean "wrong", or even "appears wrong". So I am not clear what you're arguing.

Note too, antinatalism is not the view that life contains more bad than good. Some antinatalists may believe that. But it is not essential to the view and so you're attacking a straw man if you equate the two. For the record: I think life (in the main, anyway) contains more good than bad. But I still think it is wrong to breed.

I think you need to have a deeper epistemic foundation that could demonstrate the reason why your intuitions about morality are more plausible than mine or anyone else’s — TheHedoMinimalist

you keep attacking a straw man. Where on earth - where - did I say, or imply, that my intuitions are more plausible than anyone else's? That's clearly not - not - my view. I described my view. I explained how the intuitions are widely shared. That's why they count. Not because they occur in my mind. But because they occur in my mind and are widely shared by others who reflect on the same cases. It's you - you - who seems to think that if you don't share the intuitions then that's sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about their probative force.

There's a difference between trying to figure out what's true, and trying to figure out what your own opinions are. Now, what's actually true - that it is morally right to torture one person if that's the only way to maximise the happiness the others, or that it is wrong to do so?

Well, if the bulk of people who reflect on this kind of case in a disinterested way get the rational intuition that it is wrong, then that's extremely good evidence that it is wrong. If you get the intuition that it is right, then that's good evidence your faculty of intuition isn't 100% reliable (which is surely something you knew already because none of our faculties of intuition are 100% reliable).

This is the standard way of proceeding in matters ethical. What's your alternative? Arbitrarily alight on a principle that sounds good and then just apply it to cases?

I would like to start by biting the bullets on the thought experiments that you had introduced to me. I actually think that it would be justified to subject Tom to a life of endless torture if it minimizes the combined suffering of — TheHedoMinimalist

That's not the example I gave. Preventing suffering is different to promoting happiness and is typically much more important (which is partly why antinatalism is correct - more important to prevent the pain that a life contains than to promote its pleasures). So it may well be that torturing one person to prevent others from similar torture 'is' justified (though again, it would all depend and we must resist the urge the formulate a cast iron rule and trust our judgement instead).

In my example what we can do is maximise happiness by torturing one person. And now it seems to many that this would not be justified, and it really doesn't matter the number of people whose happiness will be maximised. A thousand, a million, a billion - keep adding noughts, and it makes no difference.

The example shows that sometimes the numbers don't count and so figuring out what's right is not - or not necessarily - a simple matter of summing the good versus the bad outcomes.

I agree, then, that it would be good if people stopped breeding, but my intuitions say that it would be wrong to subject a person to life here even if one knew that by doing so one could prevent others from doing so.

So, how should we continue this discussion if I have different intuitions than you do? — TheHedoMinimalist

Because morality isn't something we make up. It isn't made of your intuitions, or mine. It is something we have intuitions 'about'.

Now, most people do not share your intuitions about the kind of case I described (and note - you changed the example and told me your intuitions about the changed case, not the original). How do I know that? Because it is a common example used in the philosophical literature - it's taken from a book called 'The ones who left Omelas' or something like that - plus I've asked lots of people for their intuitions about such cases and they confirm that it seems to them wrong to subject one to endless torture even if will result in maximising the happiness of others.
Note, even those - such as hard-line utilitarians - who think one ought to torture the one to maximise the happiness of the many - accept that majority intuitions say otherwise (and they seek instead to discredit those specific intuitions).
So, it is beyond a reasonable doubt that most people's intuitions - most people who think soberly about such matters, are capable of understanding, and who are not in the grips of a dogma - deliver the verdict that it would be wrong to torture one to maximise the happiness of the many.

That doesn't mean they're right. But it is very good evidence that they're correct.

So how do you proceed? Well, first, conceding is proceeding. A true philosopher will change their view in light of reasoned argument. Many philosophers thought the 'justified true belief' view about when an agent has knowledge was true until counter-examples were developed that challenged that idea.

But anyway, what you need to do is try and discredit the intuitions I am appealing to. Not all intuitions. That's silly. But the specific intuitions I am appealing to. It is not enough simply to say you don't share them. The majority do share them, and so unless you think your intuitions are special, you need to provide good reason to think their intuitions do not count (as opposed to just appealing to your own).

Yes. Moral questions have correct answers (the proposition "This act is morally right" is either true or false) . But I am sceptical that there are any moral rules.

This is what I think about psychological questions as well - there are correct answers to questions about what psychological state someone is in, but I do not think there are any rules about what psychological state person is in, only rough and ready generalizations.

The evidence that morality is like this is that it appears to be. Sometimes consequences matter, sometimes they don't. Sometimes numbers matter, sometimes they don't. That is, sometimes an act is right because it brings about more good than the alternative; but sometimes an act is right regardless of whether it brings about more good than the alternative. It all depends on the situation.

I don't rule it out, I'm just sceptical that there is any such rule. I mean, I take it that a 'rule' that ends up just describing what is right or wrong in every particular situation is not, in fact, a rule (it is just a description). A rule needs to apply to a range of cases. I am sceptical that there is any such rule about the distribution of moral properties because I don't think moral truths are fixed across time and space.

What's the difference between an explanatory reason and a normative reason? Come on know it all - what's the difference?

Where have I equivocated over the term reason? Don't tell me what equivocation involves - I know what it involves. Locate where I have done so. (you can't, can you?)

We're in disagreement for all sorts of reasons...

...not all sorts of people. Moron. — creativesoul

Er, what? Are you calling me a moron?

You are equivocating the term "reason" because you are using it in more than one sense in the same argument. This can be easily proven by means of substitution. The same practice will also clearly show that Reason is not a person.

Oh look! There it is directly above! — creativesoul

What the hell are you on about? Do it. Show the equivocation. Stop playing for time while you desperately look up the different meanings of the term 'reason'.