My point is that your theory and your sense of its importance is self-flattering. You seem to be casting yourself as the 'favorite son' of the Goddess Reason. — joshua

Ah, I see. Well, that's false - but whatever. Just focus on the argument and stop trying to analyse me or I'll tell my mum.

I counter that a sane person who thinks an argument establishes the truth of divine command theory would instead look for the mistake in that proof (find out its sophistry.) — joshua

That's exactly what I'm bloomin' well doing! Literally. Here. Now. I'm presenting the argument in the cold light of day on a philosophy forum to see how it fares. Answer: hasn't even been dented.

You're an internet-tough-guy theologian — joshua

Yes, I'm the pope. I have to be nice to losers all day long so I unwind by being really nasty to some on the internet in the evenings.

But that's because this is where the essence of your position is manifest.
It's the ancient game of projecting yourself as daddy. And you are playing a retro version, where you (little daddy) are 'proving ' the existence of big daddy classic, no doubt created in your image — joshua

Hmm, thanks Freud. And yes, I do find my mum sexy - what of it?

Nothing that is important is self-evident. — Valentinus

Why do you think that's true? Surely the truth is that some important things are self-evident and some important things are not?

It is self-evident - that is, evident to our reason - that thoughts, desires, observations and such like - require a mind to bear them. A desire that is the desire of no mind makes no real sense. Desires are always someone's desires, and thoughts are always someone's thoughts, and observations are always someone's observations.

That is self-evident and it also seems important, for it follows from it that if you are thinking, then you - a thinker - exist.

That may contradict what a Buddhist says. So then you have a choice: do you listen to a Buddhist, or do you listen to Reason? If you listen to Reason, then you will conclude that you do have a self, a mind. If you listen to a Buddhist, then you've entered a rational fly-bottle that it'll be very hard to get out of.

Minds are not observations. They can make observations - that is, they can observe things, for to be observing something is to be in a certain sort of mental state, whatever else it may involve. And minds and only minds can be in mental states. So, minds make observations. But minds are not observations.

It is also self-evident that minds - observers, that is - lack sensible properties. For questions such as "what colour is my self?" or "what does my self taste of?" make no sense.

And it is equally clear to our reason that those objects that do have sensible properties - so, objects extended in space - do not have mental states. I can sensibly wonder what you are thinking right now, but it makes no sense for me to wonder what my tub of hummus is thinking.

So, if we listen to Reason and not Krishnamurti or Buddhists, then we learn that we are minds and furthermore that we, we minds, are not extended objects. We are objects, but we are not physical things.

And so on - in this way we can slowly build a picture of our situation, but it requires careful thought, not sitting around thinking nothing and then putting on an off-the-peg worldview designed by a guru.

I interpreted it to mean that the observer is made of observations - that what the observer observes constitutes the observer.

That's not a 'puerile' reading - it is just what those words in that combination mean.

You offered what manners say I must restrict myself to calling a 'bizarre' interpretation - that what he meant was that if you are greedy, you are greed.

But that interpretation is as nonsensical as my literal one.

The world is full of bullshit artists. He is one. Philosophy - the real deal, not a pose - is about figuring out what's actually true. It is about using reason, not sitting at the feet of bullshitters and letting them shit all over you. I mean, have you read anything of quality - have you read Plato? Have you read the Apology? If you really need to follow people - and heaven's knows you shouldn't - at least follow someone clever, not a total nincompoop like Krishnamurti. The only sensible thing he said was not to follow people - but that clearly backfired.

They do - they illuminate a bit too well!
I took that quote, the one you and others think is profound and worth marvelling at - and I showed that it was complete junk.

"The observer is the observed" Krishnamurti.

No. That's simply false. Test it. Open the cutlery draw and observe a fork. Are you a fork? Now look at a teaspoon. Are you a teaspoon? Do you miss being a fork?

It's just silly.

Oh, I think I've captured it pretty bloody well, if I do say so myself.

Politeness - and I am polite to a t - led to circumstances arising in which I had to endure watching a Krishnamurti video. I know nonsense when I hear it, and I had to hear 2 bloody hours of him talking gibberish and asking 'but why?' over and over again to an eminent physicist (clearly one can be good at physics and utterly shite at philosophy) and some keen but stupid psychologist.

So I know the sort of nonsense Krishnamurti says - like I say 2 bloody hours of it - and I know the kind of people he appeals to, and I was incensed that others considered him a 'philosopher'. He is not a philosopher and he makes no arguments.

It's all nonsense. If your marriage is falling apart, if you're desperately unhappy, or if you've recently had a lobotomy, then I can see its appeal. But otherwise, no.

Ah, you took up meditation eh? Isn't that what those of us with greater self-awareness and less self-importance call "sitting around doing nothing"?

I too find parallels between Krishnamurti's thought and Buddhist thought. It is thoroughly incoherent and won't withstand a moment's scrutiny. Both deny the obvious by appeal to the obviously false at the same time as promising tranquillity to those who will just suspend their reason and go along with it all. Consequently, such systems of thought - if we can even justify calling them that - appeal to the same basic constituencies: the dumb, the unhappy, and the intellectually lazy.

The self exists. Deal with it. Anyone who has powers of reason can discern that they themselves exist, for if anything is being observed, or thought, or desired, or felt, then there is a mind - a self - who is doing the observing, bearing the thought, undergoing the desire, or having the feeling. Hence why virtually everyone believes in themselves. And they can discern that they - this self - is not one and the same as the thoughts, desires and such like that it is bearing. For it is clear to reason that if we go from thinking one thing to another, we do not thereby cease to be.

Philosophy isn't therapy. Buddhism is. Krishnamurti-ism is. That is, they are worldviews whose appeal resides not in their credibility, but in the fact they promise tranquillity to those who can bring themselves to believe in such nonsense.

No wonder Buddhists are so keen to encourage us to try and think nothing.

Oh, I see. I took "the observer is the observed" to mean the observer is the observed, a thesis that would have the upshot that a moment ago I was a tub of hummus and that now I am a computer monitor.
But what he actually meant - because wo betide we come to the conclusion that our guru is a total idiot who utters nonsense and contradictions to other total idiots who are then able to read-into what he has said anything they fancy - is that if you are greedy you are greed.

Right, okay, let's put that idea under Reason's microscope and see what we see, even though no-one in their right mind would ever use the words "the observer is the observed" to express it.

Hmm, if I am greedy - and I am - am I greed? No. I am greedy, but I - the one who has the quality of being greedy - am not greed itself. After all, if I stop being greedy I am still me, yet the greed has gone.

Score

Bartricks 2. Krishnamurti 0

Krotona walked around you.

Is the dude chilly, or does the chilly dude?

What is follow? Tell me, do we follow, or is follow we?

The talker is the talking. Will you follow me now?

Not sure what you're talking about.

Someone quoted someone and said of the quote that it was a gem of wisdom.

Yet what it said was quite absurd. Manifestly false. The observer is not the observed.

Do we need to go through it again?

I am observing a computer monitor.

I am not a computer monitor.

I - the observer - am not the observed - the computer monitor.

Now, if you think that what I said was problematic, whereas what Krishnawhatever said was profound and insightful then I simply wish you the best of luck in whatever cults you join and hope you meet some good lawyers along the way.

I am observing the computer monitor. Am I that computer monitor?

Answer: no.

Score: Bartricks 1. Krishnatmurti 0.

Yes. And?

I observe some fingers on a keyboard. Am I some fingers on a keyboard? No. I am an observer - a mind - I am not some fingers on a keyboard. What I observe, and what I am, are not necessarily the same.

You have pointed out that I just made an observation. Yes. I am not denying the existence of observations. Observations happen - I am observing, right now, some fingers on a keyboard. But the important point is that I, the observer - the one doing the observing - am not necessarily that which I observe.

And in fact, when we reflect further on the nature of the self, it will become apparent that selves, observers, are not, in fact, things that can be observed at all.

So, what Krishnamurti said 'sounds' wise and profound and insightful. But upon inspection, it is total and utter rubbish. Unless he's just looking in a mirror and, after confusing his body for himself, saying "the observer is the observed" (when what he really meant is "the observer is observing himself"). But I don't think that's what he meant, do you?

I think he meant that observers are observations, which is silly but apt to impress those who refuse to think.

The observer is the observed. — Wallows

So, erm, I am currently observing a pair of hands on a keyboard. That means I am a pair of hands on a keyboard?

I mean, I'm not. So what he's said is just plainly false as anyone who thinks about it for a second or two can surely recognise.

Sorry to bring some cold hard reason to this kumbaya party, but "the observer is the observed" is not a gem of wisdom, it is a smelly little blob of ignorance.

An observer is a mind, a subject-of-experiences, for 'observing' is something minds and minds alone can do. By contrast, 'the observed' is simply that which is being observed.

In fact, observers, being minds, do not seem to be observable at all.

Unfortunately, you are the only one here who thinks so. — Echarmion

So? Philosophy isn't diplomacy and the truth isn't democratic. None of the criticisms offered thus far work. Not my fault, they just don't. Demonstrably don't. If you took a vote on it, I wouldn't win. But that's because most of the voters have made the poor criticisms in question. You have to show a criticism to be good, not just show that a lot of people whose powers of rational discernment have in common that they all seem poor, think that it is good.

I concede that reason self-checks when we are crafting an argument in our minds. But, crucially, this process is open to the reason of other people, who can run it in their minds and tell us their conclusions. That's what differentiates an argument from intuition. I can transmit the argument to someone else, but not the intuition. — Echarmion

I fail to see the distinction you are drawing. Certain chains of thought are valid, and their validity consists in them being chains of thought that Reason approves of. Reason approves of thinking that if P entails Q, and P obtains, then thinking that Q must obtain. She approves of that - tells us to draw that conclusion - and her telling us to do so is what its validity consists in.
How do we know which chains of thought are the ones Reason wants us to engage in and which she does not? We consult our reason and the reason of others. And in consulting our reason we are doing no more than seeing what rational intuitions it generates about the matter. If our rational intuitions are corroborated by the rational intuitions of others who have sincerely engaged in the same process, and we have no independent reason to think our faculties of reason have been corrupted on this particular matter, then that's good evidence that the rational intuitions are accurate. That is, that Reason herself really does approve of it. And how do we know that? Because it is what our faculties of reason say is the case.

Anyway, if you consult your reason and resist any squiggling and squoggling urges, it will be evident that this argument is valid:

1. If I am morally valuable, then I am featuring as the object of a valuing relation (if P, then Q)
2. I am morally valuable (P)
3. Therefore I am featuring as the object of a valuing relation (therefore Q)

And both of those premises also seem supported by reason. It is by reason that we are aware of our moral value and the moral value of others. And anyone who thinks that being morally valuable involves something other than being the object of a valuing relation, they have the burden of proof.

This too is valid:

1. Subjects and only subjects can value things
2. I am valued
3. therefore I am valued by a subject.

So, if I follow reason I now get to the conclusion that my being morally valuable consists in me being valued by a subject - a subject of experience, a mind.

I am one of those myself and there are billions of others. But upon reflection it is simply not plausible that I am the subject in question:

1. if I am the subject whose valuings constitute moral valuings, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore I am not the subject whose valuings constitute moral valuings.

That argument works for you too and, I suspect, all other human subjects. And once more, Reason says not jus that the argument is valid, but that it is sound - that its premises are true.

Moral values, then, are the values of a subject, but the subject is not you or I, but someone else. Who? Well the question presupposes that we have to locate her among other subjects - that's absurd. We don't. She is who she is. And who is she? She's the one whose values constitute moral values and whose prescriptions constitute moral prescriptions. She's Reason herself. For moral prescriptions are - as Kant held - simply a subset of the prescriptions of Reason. Well, if moral prescriptions are the prescriptions of a subject, and if moral prescriptions are a subset of the prescriptions of Reason, then Reason is the subject in question.

There. That's the argument again. It is valid all the way through and each leg consists of arguments whose premises seem themselves to be manifest to reason.

The only challenge that this case faces, comes from this argument, one that no-one has yet pressed;

1. If I am morally valuable, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me
2. I am morally valuable
3. Therefore I am morally valuable even if no subject values me.

That too is valid, and that too has premises that are manifest to Reason. Yet it seems to contradict my case.

The problem is that you seen impervious to criticism of either the form of your arguments or the content of their premises. You are unwilling to subject your arguments to the reasoning of other people, claiming instead that their premises are given by unchallengeable rational intuition. That's not convincing, and the way this thread has devolved should be ample evidence of that. — Echarmion

No, completely false. Your criticisms have been poor. You have gone to great lengths to try and show that my argument is invalid. You failed. The argument is valid.

Now, that doesn't mean I am impervious to criticism. It means your case against me failed. Simple.

You are impervious to criticism because you're never going to accept that you're wrong. You've already decided I'm wrong and no matter how good my arguments are, that's your position and you're sticking to it.

The fact is you haven't raised a reasonable doubt about anything I have argued.

How can something test itself? I allow there are basic principles, logic itself, which can not themselves be subjected to reasoning. — Echarmion

If you want to know if an argument is valid, you consult your reason and the reason of others, yes? And what is an argument apart from a prescription of reason? So, that is an example of us using our reason to confirm what our reason says.

if you want to know about me, who's the best person to ask? Me. For you that's some kind of contradiction - how can I be the best source of information about me?!? Well, I can and am, obviously. I mean, the real question is why would anything think otherwise?

Likewise, if you want to know what Reason says, who's the best person to consult? Reason. And how do we gain insight into what Reason says? By means of our reason. And how do we know that? By our reason.

There's nothing problematic about that. But anyway, if the only way you can raise a doubt about my argument is by attempting to dismiss the whole project of consulting reason, then my argument must be incredibly strong. Which it is!

But looking only at the argument above, the moral values belong to something like the community. — joshua

No, that view is the least plausible of all. For a community is not a subject and so it cannot value anything. Second, this argument adds another head-shot to an already dead head:

1. If moral values are the values of my community, then if my community values something necessarily it is morally valuable.
2. If my community values something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of my community.

It looks to me that history is largely about the modification of our conceptually mediated moral intuitions. The 'divine commander' looks organic, like a kind of mist thrown up by our doings. We remake the world, and the changed world forces us to remake ourselves. Repeat until we run out of world — joshua

Well, that's just false as my argument demonstrates. You need to follow reason, not your pet theories.

So 'Reason' establishes her own divinity through her favorite son. But we already knew she was divine. The fact that you chose to establish her via an argument says it all. — joshua

I have no idea what you're talking about. Are you drunk?

People are bringing up God because many of us have been exposed to quite a few "philosopher's gods" over the years — joshua

Aw diddums. Philosophy isn't therapy and the truth sometimes hurts. The argument establishes the being of a god, regardless of how that may or may not impact your psychology or anyone else's.

The 'philosopher' is the Reason-whisperer — joshua

The what now?

Citation please.

Er, yes, I did not use the word 'non-ampliative' there, did I? I don't know what it means. Is a non-ampliative argument a very quiet one? But my point stands: I think Aletheist thinks that all valid arguments (those are the kind I make) are question begging. That's why I predict you'll both get on well together.

Is there a symbol for 'crappy' in your pigeon logic language? It just strikes me as odd that someone who clearly fancies themselves as a logician - and managed to dupe others into taking that possibility seriously, for they mooed back at you in kind - deems my argument 'crappy', when it seems to be a sound argument with an astonishing conclusion. It's just a very odd use of the word 'crappy' that's all.

Anyway tell us again how a definition of non-ampliative implies question begging. — Happenstance

I would never say such a thing, given I haven't the foggiest what 'non-ampliative' means. I don't use words I don't understand. No doubt you'll try and tell me, but please don't bother as I'm running out of room on my buttocks.

Yet I can argue and you can't.

Let's remember that you were sure - quite sure - this argument was invalid:

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something it will necessarily be morally valuable
2. if I value something it is not necessarily be morally valuable
3. therefore moral values are not my values.

Yet it is valid. Obviously.

Your worms and squares - whose behaviour you understand so well - did not help you to see this. Far from it.

Then you conceded that it was indeed valid - something that would have been obvious to anyone who just thought about it - and instead insisted that it established something trivial.

That's wrong too. Not remotely trivial. An argument that seems to establish the truth of a divine command theory of value cannot - by any sane person's estimation - be considered trivial.

But I wormed and squared it for you! No gratitude some people.

Well, that seems entirely fitting to me, for I shit all over everyone.

Once more, your only hope - and obviously I think it is a vain one - of refuting my case rests with this argument:

1. If I am morally valuable, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me.
2. I am morally valuable
3. Therefore I am morally valuable even if no subject values me.

But presumably you can't see that until I turn it into some worms and triangles and squares. Here's my best attempt:

1. wormy triangle square. Wall. Square. Two more worms.
2. worm and a lopsided v.
3. Therefore,worm square lopsided v, square, wall, triangle, worm, worm. bee. snail.

There, that make more sense to you?

Crayon. Fist. Application form. The front line of a war somewhere is crying out for you.

Didn't catch this reply earlier:

And it refutes all subjectivist views bar mine.
— Bartricks

But no-one claims that:
being morally valuable is one and the same as being valued by me,
— Bartricks

That would imply me liking cats more than dogs is a moral stance, but it clearly isn't. What this argument establishes is trivial. — Echarmion

No, it establishes its conclusion - it establishes that moral values are not my values. Or yours. Now run the same argument for all 7billion people on the planet. It is sound in all of their cases too.

So, what you are now admitting is that the argument establishes - proves - that moral values are not the values of any one of us.

And the same argument works for a group, if a group could be a subject (which it can't be).

So, what you are now admitting is that moral values are not the values of any one of us, or any group of us.

Good. That's, you know, what I was arguing. Arguing it with a valid argument that you could not see was valid, despite its validity being obvious.

Now you're just pretending it doesn't matter - that you I believed that all along or that everyone already does! Really? Okaaay. Whatever you say!

So, to recap, this argument is valid and apparently sound:

1. To be morally valuable is to be the object of a valuing relation
2. Subjects and only subjects can value things
3. Therefore, to be morally valuable is to be the object of the valuing relation of a subject

That seems to establish the truth of moral subjectivism. But moral subjectivism is a family of views, not just one. I am a subject. You are a subject. There are literally billions of them.

However, this argument is valid and sound:

1. If being morally valuable consists of being the object of my valuing attitudes, then if I value something necessary it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable.
3. Therefore, being morally valuable does not consist of being the object of my valuing attitudes.

That argument works just as well for any subset of my valuing attitudes. And it works just as well if we swap you for me, or anyone else for me.

So moral values are not the values of any of us. Whose values are they, then? Well, the subject whose values they are. Reason. Her. She isn't me, she isn't you, she is herself.

Is that trivial? Er, not by anyone's wildest dreams. If you think that's a trivial conclusion then you have no grasp whatsoever on the concept of triviality. What you mean by 'trivial' is 'sound'. The argument is 'sound' and it establishes an astonishing conclusion.

All of your attempts to show my case to be invalid have failed. The argument I have laid out is simple and obviously valid to anyone who reflects on it. You have had to change the argument - desperately play around with the placement of key terms, or try and blind everyone with symbols. But it won't work - the argument is valid and so unless fault can be found with a premise the conclusion must be accepted.

The only real challenge to my view comes from this argument, as just noted in my reply to your fellow logic garbler, Happenstance.

1. If I am morally valuable, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me
2. I am morally valuable
3. Therefore I am morally valuable even if no subject values me.

That is valid and it seems as sound as my argument. Yet it contradicts it and thus raises a reasonable doubt about the truth of its premises.

So two meals can't be identical? It is called qualitative identity rather than quantitative identity.

Imagine two acts that are identical in terms of the intentions with which - nope, not bothering. I've written it umpteen times and your comprehension skills are just below the level needed to grasp this kind of thing.

Again, have you considered the army? Pick up a crayon, put it in your fist and fill out an application form. It's all yes/no questions, or you can just put in a smiley face for yes, and a sad face for no.

Squiggle squoggle. Gibberish.

By your own admission you never took logic 101. Here's that quote from you that I am currently having tatooed across my buttocks:

would it interest you that I've never actually took a course in formal logic? — Happenstance

My argument is valid. You can squiggle and squoggle it to your heart's content - you can try your utmost to translate what I said into your squiggle-squoggle language and then declare that according to your squiggle-squoggle language my argument was not a valid squirt, or a transitive modal. But that won't stop it being valid.

To be perfectly honest, I don't think you have anything to say. Nothing apart form insults, anyway. And that would be starkly apparent if you used English -as you briefly did earlier - so you have to squiggle and squoggle instead and then other like-minded squiggle squogglers can approving squiggle and squoggle in turn. To my ears, however, it is just a herd of cows mooing at each other.

Anyway, the argument is valid. And it establishes that moral values and prescriptions are the values and prescriptions of a subject, a mind, a person.

That is inconsistent with the thesis that moral values and prescriptions are mine. So it is inconsistent with individual subjectivism, if the individual is identified as me. Likewise if the individual is identified as you or anyone else among us, including a group of us (if, that is, a group of us is a subject - which it isn't). So it refutes the metaethical theories known as 'individual subjectivism' and 'inter-subjectivism' respectively (views that no-one takes seriously anyway).

It is inconsistent with non-cognitivist views.

It is inconsistent with objectivist views (so inconsistent with objectivist naturalism, and inconsistent witwh objectivist non-naturalism).

It is, in other words, inconsistent with all metaethical theories bar one: my one. The one described in the conclusion. So. It. Refutes. Them. All. Something you can never recognize - never - because you have already decided in advance, so sure of yourself are you, that anyone who claims to have done such a thing is deluded.

If you want to refute my argument the only hope - the only hope - rests with this argument:

1. If I am morally valuable, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me.
2. I am morally valuable
3. Therefore I am morally valuable even if no subject values me.

For that argument is also valid and its premises appear every bit as powerfully self-evident as any premise of mine, yet its conclusion is inconsistent with the conclusion of my argument.

It isn't sound. But it does appear to be.

Omg, this is just too painful. No, there can't be 'other factors'. The whole point is that the two acts are identical in every way apart from that one is right and the other wrong.

Now that, to most people, is impossible. Two acts cannot be identical in every way apart from morally.

If two acts differ morally, then they must differ in some other respect as well - they must have been performed with different intentions, have slightly different conseequences and so forth.

You are confirming this without realizing that you are.

You have the internet. Do some research.

Oh my goodness!! Focus.

First, a wholly non-moral example. Imagine two physical objects. Two, note, not one. But imagine that these objects occupy the same amount of space and have the same composition and the same colour.

Do they have to have the same shape? That is, if two objects occupy the same amount of space, do they have to have the same shape?

Well, no. Obviously not. Two physical objects can be identical in every way apart from having different shapes, yes?

Now, imagine two actions. These two actions have the same consequences (they both result in an innocent person's death, say). They are both performed with the same intentions. Now, do they both have to have the same morality? That is, if one is wrong, must the other be wrong too?

Don't - don't - say "oh, but one might have an extra consequence that the other didn't" or 'oh, but one was performed with a different intention". No, I have stipulated that this is not so, just as I stipulated that the two physical objects occupy the same amount of space.

Now, given that they are identical in terms of their intentions and consequences, must they have the same morality?

Virtually everyone - I mean, virtually everyone - gets the rational intuition that they do. And this is expressed in the following way: two acts that are identical in all of their non-moral features will be morally identical as well.

What does this tell us - or seem to tell us? Well, it seems to tell us that actions have their morality of necessity, not contingently.

Return to shape - two objects can be identical in every way apart from shape. That is, there can be brute shape differences. We can say of A and B - well, they are identical in every way, apart from shape.

But we can't do that in terms of moral properties. We do not seem able coherently to say that two acts can be identical in every way apart from that one was right and the other wrong.

One act can be wrong and the other right, but there must be some non-moral difference between them to account for that difference.

So, if act A is right and act B is wrong, then either act A was performed with a different intention or it had different consequences - and that explains why it is right whereas B is wrong.

But someone who said "no, A and B are exactly the same apart from morally" seems to be confused.

Also, try and follow the dialectic here. The thesis above - the thesis that two acts cannot differ in their moral properties alone - is a thesis that poses a serious problem for MY view.

it is the thesis whose truth undergirds the Euthyphro problem.

For if moral properties are necessary properties, then my view is in trouble, as if my view is true then moral properties are contingent properties.

If you are already convinced that moral properties are contingent properties, then you cannot consistently think that the Euthyphro criticism works. And in that case I simply refer you to the arguments I used to establish the truth of my view - a view you now have no basis for rejecting.

On the other hand, if you think that moral properties are indeed necessary properties, then you will think the Euthyphro criticism is a good one.

I agree with the reason bit, but I think what makes moral stances a unique is that they are not just intuitions, which you can only assert, but are reasoned from principles. You can make arguments for and against them, so they aren't just intuitions — Echarmion

Yes, moral intuitions - a subset of our rational intuitions - are 'about' morality, but they are not morality itself. Just as I cannot make an act right - not of necessity, anyway - by just ordering myself to do it, or make it valuable - not of necessity anyway - by valuing it, likewise I cannot make an act right or good by simply having the rational intuition that it is.

So, having the rational intuition that something is the case - that an argument is valid, or that a course of action is enjoined, or that something is morally valuable - does not constitute its validity or its being enjoined or its being morally valuable.

Nevertheless, rational intuitions are prima facie - that is, default - evidence that what they represent to be the case, is the case.


But then you say this:

It seems to me getting the right answers would merely be a matter of having the right intuitions, no arguments required.

And if there are no arguments required, there is no way to test the rational intuition. There is no way to know, under this system, whether you actually have a rational intuition or just imagine it being so — Echarmion

This simply does not follow. If you allow - and you must on pain of being unable to argue for anything at all - that rational intuitions have probative force, then we do - absolutely do - have a way to test rational intuition. Rational intuitions!

So, you've on the one hand accepted the probative force of rational intuitions only to in the very next breath deny it! Rational intuitions count. Ultimately they're the only thing that counts, because they're our only source of insight into what Reason prescribes and values, and Reason is our ultimate source of insight into what's true.

The whole of philosophy - proper philosophy, that is - is premised on this. I mean, am I not doing philosophy? You think that in presenting this argument, I am not doing philosophy:

1. If something is morally valuable, it is the object of a valuing relation
2. Only a subject of experiences - a mind - can value things (that is, can be the bearer of the valuing attitude)
3. Therefore, if something is morally valuable, it is the object of a subject-of-experience's valuing attitude?

That is an argument. It is valid. That is, our reason seems to tell us - not just me, but virtually everyone who consults their reason - that the argument is valid. That is, that reason says the conclusion will be true if the assumptions are. And reason also seems to say that those assumptions are true. So it appears to be sound.

Others may dislike the conclusion, but disliking something is not evidence it is false. Those who wish rationally to reject its conclusion must find something else reason seems to say that contradicts what this argument entails.

And that is precisely what I have done - there do indeed seem to be some other things that reason seems to say that, in combination with other things she seems to say, contradict the conclusion of the above argument.

So this too appears to be a sound argument:

1. If I am morally valuable, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me.
2. I am morally valuable
3. Therefore I am morally valuable even if no subject values me

The conclusion of my first argument says that for something to be morally valuable, it needs to be featuring as the object of a subject's valuing attitude. That is, for something to be morally valuable, someone needs to be valuing me. Yet the conclusion of this argument contradicts that.

That is where we are at. Reason seems to be telling us contradictory things. I think there's a way through.

I think that this premise: "If I am morally valuable, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me" is actually false. And I think I can show it to be false without begging any questions.

no it doesn't. It just means that when I stipulate that the two acts are identical in all respects apart from spatially and/or temporally I am not stipulating that they are morally identical. They are the same in terms of their intentions and consequences. Now if one is wrong the other will be too. Or so says the reason of those capable of imagining such thing. Two acts that are non-morally identical will be morally identical too.

and 'witless' means foolish and irrational

such wit.

Yes, don't quote yourself - not a reputable source and just a little bit narcissistic. Anyway, I am now off to play a game of chess with a cat - which I think will be more rewarding than trying to reason with you.

Like I say, I can't argue with someone like you. That's not to your credit - it jus means you're not sufficiently aware of the norms of consistency for it tot be anything other than a headache. You change your position in every post.

Rational intuitions have probative force. They're the only thing that does. All appeals to evidence are appeals to rational intuitions.

They don't always agree. That's why we have arguments in which we try to find clearer rational intuitions from which we can rationally infer the answer to contentious issues - issues where rational intuitions conflict.

It is called reasoning. But I can't do it with you, you're just not consistent enough and you reserve the right to change the rules at will. One minute rational intuitions are going to count, and the next they won't for no better reason than that I've shown that some of them stack up against whatever view you're defending.

It isn't worth the keystrokes.

You may have been over this, but what standing do rational intuitions have compared to rational knowledge? — Echarmion

I don't know what you mean by 'rational knowledge'. But a rational intuition is another name for a representation of the faculty of reason.

Take the validity of this argument:

1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore not P

Well, how do we know it is valid? We don't see it with our eyes, or smell it, or taste it, or hear it, or feel it. Validity doesn't have an appearance, smell, taste, sound or texture.

So how do we know it? Well, because our reason represents it to be valid - that is our reason effectively tells us that if assumption 1 is true, and assumption 2 is true, then 3 must be true.

I don't decide it is valid and that makes it so. I don't believe it is valid and that makes it so (though I do believe it is valid, but it is not my believing it that makes it so).

It is via our rational intuitions that we are aware of morality. I mean, morality is not something that our senses give us insight into. That's why it is not studied by the empirical sciences. It is not an object of sense. But we - most of us - are aware of moral norms and values. And our fundamental source of insight into moral matters is our reason.

Anyone who thinks otherwise is a) wrong and b) thinks moral philosophy is a waste of time, for moral philosophy just is the practice of applying our reason to moral questions.

So, I'd have thought that here - of all places - it should be agreed that it is via our reason that we are aware of morality.

But a rooky mistake in this area is to confuse rational intuitions - especially those that have moral representative contents (so, moral intuitions) - with that of which they give us an awareness. That is, to confuse the intuition that X is wrong, with its wrongness. A mistake that leads many quickly and confidently to conclude that morality is made of their own subjective states - and due to the staggering arrogance and ignorance that infects most people they will then never, ever, ever, change their position.

Anyway, ultimately all appeals to evidence are appeals to representations from our faculties of reason. For one thing is not evidence for the truth of some proposition until or unless it is generating some reason - epistemic reason - for us to believe the said proposition. And it is only by our faculties of reason that we can be aware of epistemic reasons to believe things.

So someone who denies the probative force of rational intuitions is someone who denies there is any evidence for anything. Although someone who denies the probative force of rational intuitions is almost invariably so confused a thinker that they won't realize this and will simply deny the probative force of intiuitions they find it inconvenient to acknowledge. The technical term for such people is 'fools'.