But the purpose one gives to oneself, or accepts for oneself, that, it seems to me, must come from within, found or made - though maybe advised from without, thus perhaps correct to say self-given. — tim wood

Well, yes, I think that is what I said. There might be a need to guard against having a private purpose; one not apparent in any action.

"Boot strapped"? not sure of the sense there. An explanation in terms of purpose may be sufficient - My purpose in drinking was to quench my thirst, no further explanation is needed.

I marked them for you.

"Proper function for which something exists" (EtymOnline). — Leontiskos

V. late 14c., purposen, "to intend (to do or be something); put forth for consideration, propose," from Anglo-French purposer "to design," Old French purposer, porposer "to intend, propose," variant of proposer "propose, advance, suggest" (see propose).

Generally with an infinitive. Intransitive sense of "to have intention or design" is by mid-15c. According to Century Dictionary, "The verb should prop. be accented on the last syllable (as in propose, compose, etc.), but it has conformed to the noun," which is wholly from Latin while the verb is partly of different origin (see pose (n.2)).

N. c. 1300, purpus, "intention, aim, goal; object to be kept in view; proper function for which something exists," from Anglo-French purpos, Old French porpos "an aim, intention" (12c.), from porposer "to put forth," from por- "forth" (from a variant of Latin pro- "forth;" see pur-) + Old French poser "to put, place" (see pose (v.1)).
Etymologically it is equivalent to Latin propositum "a thing proposed or intended," but evidently formed in French from the same elements. From mid-14c. as "theme of a discourse, subject matter of a narrative (as opposed to digressions), hence to the purpose "appropriate" (late 14c.). On purpose "by design, intentionally" is attested from 1580s; earlier of purpose (early 15c.). — Enynonline

Fuck off.

...that there exists an X such that 1) X provides purpose in the world, and 2) if there be no X, then there is no purpose, that the world is without purpose. — tim wood

Nice.

i think you are right that this is a sort of "default" analysis of purpose. The trouble is that it encourages hypostatization by treating "x" as an individual, a thing that might be located in the world, and so folk go off in search of it.

But they will not find it, because purpose is given to things, not found in them. The purpose of a knife - the ubiquitous example - is not found in a physical description, but in the way it is used. "Ultimate underlying meaning and significance" is found in use.

So yes, purpose is invented by mind, in setting forth the use.

Or, to put the same point in a somewhat different way, purpose comes from our intent. In a way, it is for our intentional descriptions what causation is for our physical descriptions. purpose, then, is dependent on the descriptions we have at hand - He flicked the switch, turning on the light and alerting the burglar, but the purpose of turning on the light was not to alert the burglar.

So, in answer to your title, purpose is the use to which something is put, and comes from our intent. It is grounded in our intentional explanations for our actions, and has worth only in terms of those intentions and actions.

Edit: That is, no big grand universal purpose, just small wantings and doings.

Aust and US are more similar that I would have guessed. — Tom Storm

Australia consistently outperforms the US, however our results are in decline. We've had the answer before us for decades - our private school system is overfunded, resulting inequity and a burgeoning bottom-end in standardised tests. Gonsky was never implemented*.

We also have a tendency to adopt one-size-fits-all approaches from the UK and the USA, rather than say the autonomous open approaches of Scandinavian countries. Put simply we tell teachers what to do instead of allowing them their professional judgement.

Here's a quick list of the points I would make:

• Critical thinking is not peculiar to philosophy. It is learned in other subjects.
• Globally, critical thinking has a low priority, even in those countries with outstanding results in education.
• Other factors, such as student autonomy, may have a much greater impact on resistance to authoritarianism
• Comments here tend to the parochial and anecdotal. The topic can be made subject to empirical research, and there are results available for discussion.
• Those on a philosophy forum are likely to over-value philosophy.

*...because Gillard was beholding to the Catholic education system, and Turnbull to the private elite. A proper political fuckfest.

Where does the dunning-kreuger effect play into this? — Benj96

I don't see how it does. Dunning-Kruger may be explicable in terms of regression to the mean, or at least reducible to the better-than-average effect.

Singapore: Singapore's education system has historically placed a strong emphasis on rote learning, although there have been efforts in recent years to promote more holistic learning approaches.

So let's take it as an example.

Here's a graph of Singapore's GDP since 1960


The OECD notes three phases in Singapore's eductaion policy.

• Survival-driven phase: 1959 to 1978
• Efficiency-driven phase: 1979 to 1996
• Ability-based, aspiration-driven phase: 1997 to the present day

Edit: Given a lag of a few years while students grow into the workforce, these three phases can be seen in the GDP. Prima facie autonomy had the greatest effect on GDP. It would be interesting to follow through on this.


Critical thinking and philosophy do not figure in this report. Singapore consistently ranks highly in PISA scores. And not just by a little bit:


Here's the US:


And Australia:


Singapore ranks 69th on the Economist Democracy Index. But both Japan (16th) and South Korea (22nd), also on your list, rank above the USA (29th) on that index. Australia is in 14th place.

What to conclude here? Not much. We do know that education leads to democracy. See for example Analysis Of The Relationship Between Democracy And Education Using Selected Statistical Methods

Other factors remain unconsidered on this thread - student agency being the obvious one. Students who learn to take responsibility for their education may well be less disposed to authoritarian demands.

So I guess the rollerskating didn't work out for you?

Bummer.

If everyone only did work that they “loved and believed in,” civilization would collapse in a week maximum. — an-salad

Why do you care? Maybe go do what you want anyway. I'm guessing that "civilisation" will look after itself, regardless of what you do.

Do you think there are philosophers who are more necessary than Plato and Aristotle? — Leontiskos

How should this be understood - "Is there someone such that without them there would be no philosophy in any possible world?" Well, no, there isn't. Philosophy is only incidentally about individuals.

There'd be a difference between acknowledging the need for cabinet makers and insisting that everyone be taught cabinet making in primary school. And yes, urbane life would be much less comfortable without plumbers; but while it is helpful to be able to change a washer, it doesn't follow that we all need to be plumbers.

In so far as logic gives us a way to talk about language, and philosophy has language as its principle tool, Logic must be central to philosophy.

Good post.

Once we would have done Greats, but now it is difficult to even find a teacher. I'm not entirely sure that this is not a change for the better - although I do have trouble with Universities that do not have an Arts or Humanities faculty. Are they really universitas magistrorum et scholarium?

Ok. I'll indulge in a little flow of consciousness, if that is alright.

I spent a few hours yesterday looking at Classics undergrad courses. They are a bit scarce. ANU did offer pretty much just what I was after a few years back, but it seems to have dropped off. I might contact them next week and check.

This, because I've sometimes regretted not having studied Greek and Latin. It'd help me make sense of the likes of Anscombe and Nussbaum.

But philosophy did not stop at Aristotle, or even Aquinas. They are interesting, even fun, but not necessary.

So back to:

Not so sure philosopher and critical thinker are one and the same. — jgill

JGill is right, critical thinking is not tied to philosophy. I used critical thinking most extensively as an undergrad, in studying archeology and anthropology. But whereas other subjects make use of critical thinking, philosophy, perhaps exclusively (but psychology?), makes critical thinking it's topic. If you are thinking about how best to think, you are no longer doing maths or environmental studies, but something else.

It's a mistake, then, to think that because philosophy is not taught explicitly, it's not taught at all.

It's a mistake, also, to think that because critical thinking is not taught explicitly, it's not taught at all.

When I taught technology, I did so using a design, make and appraise model, quite explicitly. I also took that model further, using it in teaching how to write essays, plan meals, or mediating disputes. What is that, if not critical thinking? But I didn't call it that.

So good thinking is not limited to philosophy, but it is the place where may be made explicit. And philosophers have much to say as to what makes thinking good or bad.

But teaching this stuff formally, as part of the curriculum, is unnecessary and probably counterproductive. Only some folk will have the stomach for it. The rest will reject it.

Sorry - I was distractedly spinning apples in my mind. Granny Smith, but I changed its colour to blue, just to be different. Then I went off on a sidetrack, about spinning it from inside to outside...

A concerted engagement with the texts is needed if one is to decide for oneself. — Paine

That's just what they want you tho think...
:wink:

Take a look at these ngrams.

There does appear to be a significant increase in mention.

:up:

Following through on my previous post.

Imagine that one day, you get the best idea in the world. You go to tell your friend, but then you realize something: You don't have any words to describe your idea. Is this scenario possible? — Scarecow

Then on what basis can you be sure it was an idea, and not a sensation, a sentiment or an emotion? If the idea can't be set out, who's to say it is an idea?

Can you put it in to action? If so, those acts can be described. If someone sets out the actions involved in your idea, haven't they set out the idea?

These are not rhetorical questions. They are intended to be answered, or at least responded to. At issue is what is to count as an idea, and whether what was set out in the OP can be counted as an idea, and so to answer the first question.

I can only think of one example of an idea that can't possibly be expressed using language. The idea of infinity can't be properly expressed using language, but then again, infinity is a word. — Scarecow

But infinity can be expresses in language. It's a number greater than any countable number. There are other definitions, found in mathematics, which is part of our language. Sure, you can't count to infinity, but we have a pretty clear idea of the nature of infinity, well-expressed in our various languages.

Do you think the emerging romantics who want to go back to the Greeks count as philosophy or is this just a romantic nostalgia project? — Tom Storm

You might very well think that. I couldn't possibly comment. :wink:

So perhaps philosophy is a prophylaxis against propaganda; it's just that we will never be able to agree on what "philosophy" should mean. — Leontiskos

Moreover, it's not so clear what "propaganda" is, either. But we would not want to make this a discussion about the use of "words..."

...global education... — Benj96

Am I right in thinking of you, Ben, as an Englishman?

Here's some data that might be reassuring. More folk are better educated than ever before.

Critical thinking is more of a middle-class concern, perhaps, on the global scale.

My "attitude" is entirely down to me. I'm pleased that others are not saying the same stuff I do; I might therefore claim some small originality, although I suspect it has more to do with my being unfashionable. I'm sorry that you don't think this forum is part of your real life, with which it seems you are quite annoyed.

Nice of you to make this thread all about me. Cheers. Keep it up.

...the very last relevant philosopher... — Lionino

Meh. The stuff I study is fifty years out of date.

Oh, yes, indeed. Parochialism one of the things education is supposed to guard against - education, and travel.

I doubtless need to get out more.

It might be worth pointing out how parochial that post is.

including yourself? — Paine

I'm borderline, with a couple of degrees and actually having been paid many years ago to teach philosophy at Uni.

There might be a half-dozen folk on the forums who have some idea of how to do philosophy. Most of them only post very occasionally.

Overwhelmingly, the forum is populated by folk who read a book once, and so think they know how to do fil-o-so-fee...

And it shows.

Yep.

Not so sure philosopher and critical thinker are one and the same. — jgill

Keep in mind that the folk hereabouts are not philosophers.

I say this by way of suggesting, at least, that it's not a malfunction so much. — Moliere

The social model of disability.

Supose this were to occur, so that you had an idea that was inexpressible.

Call that idea "X".

You now have an expression for X.

Hence, X is expressible.

A question for you. Which discipline's methods do you think are better suited for studying descriptively moral behaviors (behaviors motivated by our moral sense and advocated by past and present cultural moral norms)? I think science's methods (such as inference to best explanation) are critical. Which, if any, of moral philosophy's methods do you think would be suitable? — Mark S

Your posing this reinforces the view that you haven't understood the misfire in your approach.

It's not science against ethics. Sure, anthropology can show us what humans do. But that's not the question addresses in ethics.

So again,

I am not trying to do ethics. I am trying to 1) show how the science of descriptively moral behaviors can be useful in ethical investigations into what we ought to do, and 2), in that absence of conclusively argued-for imperative oughts, that science is an excellent source of moral guidance. — Mark S

You really can't see the inconsistency between claiming to not be doing ethics while advocating science as a source of moral guidance?

Apparently Daniel Dennett's sailboat was named Xanthippe.

I am not trying to do ethics. I am trying to 1) show how the science of descriptively moral behaviors can be useful in ethical investigations into what we ought to do, and 2), in that absence of conclusively argued-for imperative oughts, that science is an excellent source of moral guidance. — Mark S

You really can't see the incongruity in that?

But in your view... — Mark S

None of those are views I advocate.

There's the bit where you give, and the bit where you take back. You offer a "moral science" that tells us all about our social actions, then you say it won't tell us what to do.

If you want to study anthropology, go ahead. But don't make the mistake of thinking you are doing ethics.

How do you define “moral science”? I am not familiar with it. — Mark S

I don't. But "ethics" is working out what we should do. Now that is a difficult question, quite different to the simple one of what we have done.

Trouble is, you seem to think that addressing the latter is addressing the former. Somewhat blithely, as here:

Like the rest of science, the science of morality, defined as “the study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist”, provides instrumental oughts for achieving our otherwise defined goals. — Mark S

Instrumental oughts are directed at some goal. But what ought our goal be? Try addressing that question.

Trouble is, you don't know what you will do next. That's the case, even if what you do is already determined.

So the question remains, what will you do?

Fatalism and nihilism are of no help here.

The definitive footnote: it can only be said what is seen is the shoe iff there is already extant experience of that particular distal object... — Mww

We can never see shoes unless we have already seen shoes: a Transcendental Argument that leads to an infinite regress such that we never see shoes.

And yet, beyond all reason, we see shoes.

Something here is amiss.

Excluding moral ought claims from the science of morality enables a more useful definition of what the science of morality studies with a clear demarcation of science’s and philosophy’s domains. — Mark S

The problem remains, as has long been pointed out, that a description of what is the case does not tell us what ought be the case.

Excluding "ought" claims from "moral science" renders it impotent.

A "moral science" that does not tell us what to do is of no use. You seem to think that it can tell us what to do without telling us what we ought to do. That appears absurd.

I feel pain, pain is a percept, therefore I feel a percept. — Michael

Nice slide.

Is pain a unique percept, distinct from salience? Pain differs from mere touch in forcing itself on one's attention. Special case; or at least, a different case, with similarities to proprioception. The language here is distinct, as is clear in Wittgenstein's discussion.

Which raises a question that might be provocative.

You know where your hand is at the moment. Do you know this indirectly? What could that mean? How is proprioception indirect?

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.

Sure. Agree entirely.

And what is seen is the shoe; what is heard is the phone - not the percept.

If it were the percept that is seen or heard, then we would have to provide another explanation, how it is that the percept is seen, how it is that the percept is heard. If the sequence produces a percept, and it is that which is seen, you are left with the need to explain how the percept is seen (by an "inner eye"?). We would have the homunculus problem.

If this is to be an explanation of seeing or hearing, the percept is not what is seen or heard, but part of the seeing, part of the hearing.

Just to be clear, the decision here is not between indirect realism and direct realism. Since at least Austin it has been about rejecting that framing of perception; declining to set the issue in terms of that distinction.

Cheers, Michael

But none of this is relevant to the point being made. — Michael

Of course, for you it can't be, because the argument just presented undermines the mystique of "scientific method"

And then, yet again, the Authoritarian Quote. Meh.

The upshot is that indirect realism doesn't get the scientific stamp of approval its fans so desire.

My belief that my experiences are caused by distal objects is a "prejudice". — Michael

That's fine - My belief that I have a hand is much the same.

Going back over it again, your belief that you have a hand, rather than that you are deceived by an evil demon, is a prejudice, not an inference.

But it's not "scientific", not derived from "scientific method" - something which would be extraordinary in the babe who makes this inference.

After this analysis it is clear that indirect realism is not based on inference nor on science. It is a prejudice.

t's not based on anything. It's just what seems most reasonable to me. — Michael

How is it an inference, then, and not a sentiment, or a mere prejudice?

And how is that "scientific"?