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Logical NihilismHow common would this be and how do we determine which logic to employ? — Tom StormCould we end up with an infinite regress? — Tom Storm
Both interesting questions. I don't have an answer - this is a developing area of enquiry.
Russell borrows lemma incorporation from Lakatos, who was student of Popper and involved in a notary altercation with Feyerabend. In the process she is inviting comparisons between the logic of scientific discovery and meta-logic, and perhaps anticipating a response along the lines of Feyerabend's "Anything goes".
Where that leads, well...
From the SEP article:...dialetheism... — frank
And that is where we stand. Presuming that there is one true logic is no longer viable.Since Aristotle, the assumption that consistency is a requirement for truth, validity, meaning, and rationality, has gone largely unchallenged. Modern investigations into dialetheism, in pressing the possibility of inconsistent theories that are nevertheless meaningful, valid, rational, and true, call that assumption into question. -
A challenge to Frege on assertion
It's where I came in. "One might see this as setting aside the "assertoric" aspect of the sentence in order to deal with other aspects of its structure - what it is about." We can seperate the content from the intent. -
Logical NihilismCheers. Leon. Sometime, take a read of the Russell article and maybe address it.
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A challenge to Frege on assertionPerhaps.
In part it come back to the place of the "⊢"....
"We know that..."
"It might be that...."
"We believe that..."
Just trying to get back on task. -
A challenge to Frege on assertion
Continuing:The SEP article that frank introduced has arguments - section 1.2 - for the need to introduce states of affairs. — Banno
The basic idea seems to be that modal statements say something, and can be true, so there must be a something to which they correspond - and hence the need for "states of affairs" that can be what modal statements are about while not being how things are - not facts.
A state of affairs as how things might be.
But in most case we can keep track of what is modal and what is actual.
And drop the correspondence. -
A challenge to Frege on assertion
That confusion was addressed in PI. But on that, as I recall, you disagree.That’s why Tractatus is confusing. It posits an ontology but doesn’t want to remain there too long. Objects, state of affairs. Call them “real” or tokens, but they are something that he is “corresponding” with propositions. — schopenhauer1
The SEP article that @frank introduced has arguments - section 1.2 - for the need to introduce states of affairs.
Hmm. Streetlight, of loving memory. Up until that thread I had refused to use "proposition", but Street convinced me of its utility. -
A challenge to Frege on assertionBanno began by claiming that talk of states of affairs is redundant and superfluous, — Leontiskos
Well, no, I didn't, and the folk here are competent enough to understand the difference between "It's far from obvious that states of affairs are helpful" and "states of affairs is redundant and superfluous". Your misrepresentation of those with whom you disagree is by now well understood.
What we might do well is to avoid is inserting a third entity between the world and the statement. A state of affairs is not a something apart from how things are.
Folk are welcome to talk about states of affairs, but might do well to remember that they are a turn of phrase, not a piece of ontology. -
A challenge to Frege on assertionYep.
I commented earlier that the emphasis hereabouts is Tractarian. The picture sitting between the statements and the world. It doesn't solve the problem of replace the picture with the state of affairs.
But we can be pretty confident that we have the statement on the one hand and how things are on the other.
All this by way of hoping to avoid "states of affairs" becoming part of our ontology. -
A challenge to Frege on assertionThe statement describes or names a particular situation in the world. This is done using words. What I'm calling a "particular situation in the world" (aka "state of affairs") is non-linguistic. — J
Well, yes. What a statement sets out is a particular situation in the world. Do you then have three things, the true statement, the situation in the world and the fact? Or are we multiplying entities beyond necessity? -
A challenge to Frege on assertionSO how does a state of affairs differ from that which a statement sets out?
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Can we always trust logical reasoning?All non-trivial logical premises ultimately involve empirical inferences made from observations of the real world. — T Clark
This is presumably non-trivial. What empirical inference made from observation of the real world is involved? -
A challenge to Frege on assertionHave you ever noticed that when someone sets out a state of affairs, they do it by setting out a statement?
It's far from obvious that states of affairs are helpful, rather than just yet another thing to puzzle over. -
The Biggest Problem for Indirect RealistsYou're welcome.
(I've had a look around your recent essay - respect for putting the effort into an extended argument such as that, and taking the time to get the prose right. Good work. My cynical quips about speculative physics would be misplaced.) -
The Biggest Problem for Indirect RealistsPerfectly clear to me — Wayfarer
That god is but doesn't exist? Just shows how very special you are... -
Philosophy ProperSure, all that is so. But 24 out of 1733.
Here's the data, specifying not just the target group, for those specialising in continental philosophy in Europe. Conceptual analysis comes out higher than the general population. And curiously, linguistic philosophy is popular with European continental philosophers.
22 respondents.
All this by way of positing that if we restrict ourselves to thinking in terms of an analytic/continental divide, it might no be the analytic side that is in difficulty.
So is there any alternative data? A similar survey of the supposed vast ranks of continental philosophers? -
The Biggest Problem for Indirect RealistsThe thing-in-itself is a cousin of Antigonish.
The poem folds word over on themselves, talking about that about which we can say nothing.
Quite witty, and an object lesson for those philosophers who write page after page about that of which they cannot speak. -
The Biggest Problem for Indirect RealistsSomething exists if it is in the domain of discourse. Frodo walked into Mordor, therefore there is something that walked into Mordor.
Something is real in contrast to things that are not real - is it real money, or counterfeit? Is that really water, or a mirage? Is that a real argument, or just a vague rant?
Other uses are parasitic. -
Philosophy ProperThe PhilPapers survey asked about method, allowing multiple choices... Out of 1733 respondents, fully 24 mentioned phenomenology. Make of that what you will. — Banno
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Atheism about a necessary being entails a contradictionThat's based on dictionary definitions of "God" and "theism" — Hallucinogen
The only being that exists in every possible world is the oxymoron. -
Abortion - Why are people pro life?You're fixed on essentialism.
This argument does not rely on essentialism. One ought not need an agreed definition of the essential characteristics of a person in order to see that a bag made of a few cells does not have the same value as a person, be they an infant, a mute, deaf, or even, in the extreme, a woman. — Banno
It is clear that, ruling out mysticism, a blastocyst is not a person. Abortions on demand at least in early pregnancy are not morally problematic. We can have further discussion as to when pregnancies ought not be terminated, but your position has already been bypassed.
Late gestation pregnancies might be needed because of foetal abnormality, or if symptoms of pregnancy were not clear, or if there were reproductive coercion, difficulty accessing abortion, illness during he pregnancy or other difficult personal circumstances. For these reasons an arbitrary cut-off date is problematic, and a case-by-case approach is preferable.
Data collection varies, but over 90% of abortions occure in the first few weeks of pregnancy, and about 2% after 20 weeks. -
Abortion - Why are people pro life?
Odd, this turn of phrase. Lucky for me? No. Since I am here it is inevitable that some zygote survived. No luck involved, just bland necessity. Any other zygote would not have resulted in me, but someone else. Lucky for the Zygote? It should have bought a lottery ticket? Happenstance, not luck.Luckily no one treated you with such disregard. — NOS4A2
Let me know next time you are in Canberra.
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Abortion - Why are people pro life?Well, ethics is about what we do. And I'm off to an art exhibit and lunch with friends.
Not something that can be done with a zygote. -
Abortion - Why are people pro life?Oh, you are talking about the images? Yes, four different images. Images do not generally have rights, I believe - but you would know more about that.
Might be. -
Abortion - Why are people pro life?They share some rights. In some, they may differ.
Why do you ask? Do you disagree with
??They are not the same — Banno -
Abortion - Why are people pro life?Dude, nothing in what I said limits abortion in that way.
I would agree with "on demand" in at least the first trimester, and leave further restrictions to an open consensus.
But it seems you agree with the argument:They are not the same. — Banno -
Abortion - Why are people pro life?
Yeah. That sentence is about you.I don't think you have a good argument. — frank
Here is a person:
Here is an embryo:
They are not the same.
The ethical standing of the woman is apparent. That of the cluster of cells, not so much.
Clear enough? -
Abortion - Why are people pro life?Which casts into doubt your capacity to recognise a good argument.
We (you and I) seem to be mostly in agreement as to what ought be done. But you variously complain that we ought express our feelings honestly, and also that we ought to provide justification for those feelings. Seems to me you are a tad confused, or just looking to be contrary. -
Abortion - Why are people pro life?Poor .
Hanover assumed my argument was essentialist. It isn't. I did not claim all pro-lifers are religious, but pointed out the correlation. I am using the extreme example of a blastocyst because it is the case in which the conceptus is most different to a human. -
Abortion - Why are people pro life?But if you agree that they are wrong, why would I need to justify that assertion to you?
This thread has been predominately esoteric declamations about personhood and humanity. You advocated honesty in the language being used. I say that a bag of cells has less value than an adult human. You agree. Some here do not. Ergo, we both think that they are wrong. -
Abortion - Why are people pro life?
Somewhat ableist, don't you think? You could, after all, learn sign language. Or simply write them a note.What you just argued is that we don't give as much moral weight to people that can't communicate with us. What about deaf and mute people? Do they have less rights?!? — Bob Ross -
Abortion - Why are people pro life?
You have the argument arse-about.If there are those who hold views to be in step with God, that doesn't mean their views are suspect. — frank
It's not that their views are wrong becasue they supposedly come from god - although I would also support that view. It's that their views are wrong. Their views also are incited by an irrelevant mythology, a curious piece of biography that partially explains their motivation.
Banno
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