Yes, it is a metaethical claim, not an ethical one. — hypericin

The virtue of this account is that it fully explains our moral notions, without need of some ontological category. — hypericin

On this account, our moral beliefs and intuitions are an expression of this cooperative system. To ask, "but what if they are *wrong*?", independently of the system, is to reintroduce moral realism, which this account leaves no room for. — hypericin

Do you just fling insults when you've got nothing better to say? — hypericin

why don't you tell me what was wrong with my previous post? — hypericin

In any case, meta-ethics has an effect on ethics. In fact we often argue about ethics via meta-ethics nowadays. — Leontiskos

All moral truths are true.
— Banno

You've already hit rock bottom buddy. — hypericin

We want to know if moral truths are expressions of individual attitudes, or if they describe conventions of social behaviour, or if they report on facts about the world that obtain even if everyone were to believe otherwise. — Michael

We want to know whether or not moral truths are reducible to natural phenomena. — Michael

The virtue of this account is that it fully explains our moral notions, without need of some separate ontological category. Introducing it anyway is simply gratuitous. — hypericin

So even if I were to disagree with Banno on this, he would not be begging the question or committing any logical faux pas. Reductio's can act on systems, including moral systems. — Leontiskos

We've gotten nowhere. — Michael

Despite Banno's comments there is more to the issue than simply whether or not some moral sentences are true. There are further considerations to be had. — Michael

Unacceptable to who? You and I might disagree over whether or not abortion, eating meat, and the death penalty are unacceptable. — Michael

This to me is a good example of an anti-realist account. Morality is a conventionalized system devised to punishes uncooperative behavior and reinforce cooperative behavior. If moral claims are to be considered "true", they are only true in terms of this system. — hypericin

It's a complex issue. It cannot simply be addressed with aphorisms. — Michael

Banno — AmadeusD

Something seems wrong here. — hypericin

Which is the case for moral truths? — Michael

Are moral truths like (1) or like (2)? — Michael

The main disagreement seems to be precisely on its objectivity. — Michael

The main motivation against moral realism, especially around here, is the naturalism that takes scientific fact as the only sort of truth worthy of the title. The notion has a strong place in pop science culture, and comes to us mainly from the logical empiricists, Ayer and Carnap and so on. They denigrate moral language as not based on scientific reality, and by extension seek to mark ethical statements as not truth-apt; as being mere opinion or taste or some such, and hence (somewhat inconsistently) as being neither true nor false. — Banno

I can hold a moral value without holding that it is true in the same way I can have a taste preference without holding that the preference is true. — hypericin

...although some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments, say to the independence of the moral facts from human thought and practice, or to those facts being objective in some specified way

4. Some moral propositions are objectively true (moral realism) — Michael

"It is true that I hold this value" is not a moral statement. It is a statement about my personal values. — hypericin

Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. That much is the common and more or less defining ground of moral realism — SEP Moral Realism

Who thinks this is realism? — hypericin

If it could be proved that I ought eat babies I still wouldn't. — Michael

Moral non-realists hold the same moral values — hypericin

One is only obligated to the trivial claim that "That I hold this value/taste/preference is true". — hypericin

Ryle’s next move seems a bit strange. “If a city-engineer has constructed a roundabout where there had been dangerous cross-roads, he may properly claim to have reduced the number of accidents. He may say that lots of accidents that would otherwise have occurred have been prevented by his piece of road improvement. But suppose we now ask him to give us a list of the particular accidents which he has averted. He can do nothing but laugh at us.” (p. 24/25) How does this relate to fatalism? His conclusion is “Averted fatalities are not fatalities. In short, we cannot, in logic, say of any designated fatality that it was averted-and this sounds like saying that it is logically impossible to avert any fatalities.” (p.25) — Ludwig V

further proclamations without support don't help — AmadeusD

Thanks for taking the time. — Tom Storm

I asked this question myself several years ago. — Michael

If Banno's view is realism, it is an extremely thin, watered down realism where "truth" is nothing more than how we use the word, regardless of what "truth" actually means. — Apustimelogist

Can any realist name any nonmoral proposition, that is neither logically derivable nor in principle empirically verifiable, that you nonetheless are certain is true? — hypericin

But his persistence in pretending his proclamations amount to 'truth-making statements' is absurd, — AmadeusD

I wonder if Banno is actually a secret theist. — AmadeusD

The cool thing about the position i hold is, is that nothing you or Leontiskos have asserted has any affect on the premise that 'There are no objective moral standards'. — AmadeusD

One can hold values, tastes, preferences, without being obligated that any of these is "true" in an objective sense — hypericin

So to be clear, the Nazis were also enacting moral truths? — hypericin

How are moral facts discovered? — bert1

Also, of they contradict ones own values, how does one choose what to do? — bert1