Nice. They will probably go after @Jamal rather than you, but good luck finding him; he'll just retreat to his Moscow basement.

Or you could present the relevant arguments. Even a time would be of help. Depends on your purpose.

You want we should sit through over an hour of that? Trouble is, one would already have to be a devotee...

I probably have a photocopy (anyone remember those?) filed away.

These?

Bottom of each post is a secret, invisible "↩︎". Hover near the ellipsis.

For sure, they are not going to do you any good.

Thanks for having a look. I suppose that tells us something of its effectiveness.

I'm not in favour of treating awareness as a thing. Might lead to qualia.

That is the Aristotelian view. — Paine

Ok. Is it the right view?

What?

The idea is to determine what about me is enduring (or, at least, relatively enduring). — Art48

Your teeth, as I understand from a peripheral interest in Archaeology.

It is not clear that endurance is a suitable criteria for aspects of self. Why shouldn't self be ephemeral? That seems to fit the facts.

, I suspect we have common foes, if for different reasons. It is perhaps those who have poorly read Kant who are most apt to paint him as an antirealist. Kant is not in Austin's sights, except indirectly, and then only the sensible manifold and vorstellung, with great care. Austin has little to say about Kant, as do I.

And yes, Ayer is very much Austin's mark here, but the arguments used have much broader application. , I linked above to the text that is Austin's target.

, I understand that historically Ayer's approach derived from Russell's, and so Logical Positivism was an attempt at reinvigorating Logical Atomism, a continuation of British Empiricism.

Ayer's reply to Austin is found in “Has Austin Refuted Sense-data Theory”, which I was unable to find free on line. (?) Needless to say, I don't think Ayer's rebuttal carries much weight.

Supposing that we have them at all (see Davidson), do we perceive our word views or do we discover or construct them? At best the notion of their being perceived is a metaphor, and not in the scope of these notes.

, Austin is not claiming that we never perceive things indirectly. He gives examples of where it is appropriate to make such a claim.

His target is the idea that we only ever see things indirectly. In giving a wide range of examples he shows that such a proposal would be problematic.

, yes, if someone were to maintain that we only ever see things indirectly, it cannot be in the sense that is being used in reference to telescopes, hearing aids and periscopes. The onus might be placed at their feet, to show the sense that they are using.

There is a further point, that in cases in which we correctly say someone sees something indirectly, there is an implicit contrast to cases of direct seeing. We understand that seeing the door in the mirror is indirect, compared with turning and seeing it directly; that hearing the music on a recording is indirect, compared with hearing it live. In each case, what it means to perceive indirectly is clear in virtue of our understanding of what it means to perceive directly.

And there remains the obscurity of smelling indirectly.

To give myself a different challenge... — Richard B

If it's a challenge for you, you should provide the answer. I've set my own task here.

II.
There's a copy of Ayer's Foundations at https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.46395/ . In the section quoted Ayer is introducing the Argument from Illusion,

Some mirth has been found in Austin's use of "the ordinary man" - as if such as he would have any idea... But notice that the contrast between philosophers and ordinary folk is borrowed from Ayer. Austin uses it to draw out the idea of ordinary language which is central to his approach. I'll adopt "folk" by way of avoiding issues of gender.

The points against Ayer here are:
1. It's not the case that ordinary folk see themselves as always perceiving material objects they see shadows and rainbows and such, and understand that these are different to pens and cigarets; further, it is far form clear what a "material thing" might be, outside of a discussion of the sort being had here.
2. it is not true that not seeing a material thing is equivalent to being deceived by one's senses.
3. There's more than a hint that common folk are naïve in not being critical of the objects of their everyday perception.
4. That there is not a place for doubt here, or at the very least, that if there is to be a place for doubt, it is not obvious.
5. We don't attribute truth and falsity to what we see, but to what we make of what we see. Further, and importantly, talk of deception only makes sense against a background in which we understand what it is like not to be deceive.

All these come together to show that seeing things is a far more complicated and indeed complex process than is supposed in Ayer's text, and indeed in fairly simple accounts given elsewhere. Seeing a cup is not the same as seeing a rainbow or as seeing a shadow or a headless magician's assistant on stage.

The use of "directly" in "seeing directly" takes its meaning in contrast to the meaning of "indirectly" in each case. Do you see the ship directly or through a periscope? Do you see the door directly or via a mirror? This is a standard critical tool for Austin, used elsewhere and later to show philosophical abuse of "real".

In the spirit of taking on as wide a field of examples as possible, Austin draws attention to the examples being dominated by sight. What might it mean to hear something indirect? What sort of thing is an indirect smell? "For this reason alone there seems to be something badly wrong with the question, 'do we perceive things indirectly or not?'"(p. 17)

Other examples follow. In the other direction, are we to say that we saw the guns indirectly if we see the flash of their firing? The cloud chamber example is perhaps dated, a more recent equivalent might be to ask it we saw the Higgs boson, or did we see signs of it's passing? The cloud chamber is more direct... :wink:

Whatever our philosopher is doing in talking of "direct perception" is very different to what the rest of us might be doing. So much the worse when the philosopher is going to claim that the something could never be perceived directly.

Cheers!

I.
The first lecture is introductory, of course. Austin notes the tendency to back down on stronger versions of the doctrine - "Theres the bit where you say it and the bit where you take it back".

Austin calls the doctrine "Scholastic", ironic language coming from a man who obsessed over detail and dictionaries. But here we have the first of the critical tools of which he makes use; part of my plan for this thread is to draw explicit attention to these. Austin points out that philosophers are incline to consider only a limited number of cases in their musings, to "oversimplification, schematization, and constant obsessive repetition of jejune 'examples'. ...our ordinary words are much subtler in their uses, and mark many more distinctions, than philosophers have realized".

Yes, I am aware that I am guilty of this. The tool being advocated is the broad consideration of the full range of uses for the terms at hand. Ruminating on limited cases will lead to limited rumination...

Austin makes clear that his intent is not a defence of realism. In the terminology he uses, he is not advocating a preference for material things over sense-data; in the terminology used more recently, he is not defending realism against antirealism, but rejecting the very distinction between these two.

The reason is simple: "There is no one kind of thing that we perceive, but many different kinds" (p. 4, emphasis in original).

So there's the argument of the text in outline.

In any event, it seems wrong to say that language would be the limit of our world. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To be sure, that's not what Wittgenstein said; it was “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (“Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt”). These are perhaps his most misunderstood words. In context, it's not placing a limit on our capacity to make sense of the world. We expand our language, and in so doing, our understanding.

Yep. thanks for clarifying my recollection.

Dewey might be thought of as addressing belief rather than truth. His concern was not so much to explicate truth as to decide what is true and what isn't, what we ought believe and what we ought not. And pragmatism is a good guide to what it is worth believing. But it remains that what is useful is not the very same as what is true. And hence it remains worth retaining the distinction that would minimise.

In particular, "really, really what differs fact from belief is how many of us accept them as such" is a recipe for populist delusion. It's dangerous.

What alternative impresses you more? — Patterner

It's not that clear to me what the OP is seeking. But I'll take this as my starting point:

What we call a coffee mug, for instance, is a bundle of visual and tactile sensations. — Art48

I choose the coffee mug I want from the several in the draw, I put it on the bench, make the coffee and then pour the coffee into the mug. I carry the mug out to my cahir, place it in the coffee table next to me. i wait for it's contents to cool somewhat, a preference acquired from teaching. Then I will hold it and sip, slowly. Later I will carry it out to the dish washer, place it on the middle shelf. After cleaning I return it to the draw.

While these steps involve sensation, it's clear that the coffee mug is different to the draw, to the saucepan in which I make the coffee, to the bench and the table, and to the dish washer. Further there is more to each than how they look and feel; there is a profound difference between what I do with each. Further still, that the mug is a mug and not a cup or a spoon or a glass concerns what is done with it. Consider the distinction between a drinking cup and a measuring cup.

What constitutes the mug is far more than just the associated visual and tactile sensations; "the mug" is far more complex than just that. We can take a similar view to the nature of the self. That's the attitude found in Psychology, where the notion of self has never quite been settled.

I'm not saying that Art's suggestion is wrong - of course the mug is a bundle of sensations*. But that is only part of the story.

Another thread in the OP is the ubiquitous notion that the only thing of which we can be certain are our sensations. I don't agree with that, and I'm confident that others will only agree with it,a s Art themselves suggests, while writing posts for TPF. Their certainty will return as they push the "Post Comment" button, setting aside any doubts they may have about the existence of their screen, the internet, and the many folk who will lap up their words of wisdom. Doubt only takes place against a background of certainty, it is part of a frame in which we are confident. And there is far more to this frame than just the things we sense.

My own meditative practices had a somewhat different outcome. I glimpsed the ecstasy of which Art speaks, and have no doubts of its attractiveness. This is presumably what draws those who continue to meditate in to the habit, a conviction that the meditative state allows access to a higher reality, or some such story. those who meditate see the experience as real. But what of those who do not continue with meditative practice? I found the experience more a removal from reality, similar to other experiences that were chemically induced. The salient point here is that our experiences are not always real - as idealists themselves are prone to point out. That the ecstasy is experienced as reality does not imply that it is indeed reality.

There's much more that could be said, and a literature of considerations that mitigate against the ubiquitous idealism of the philosophical novice. Unfortunately in these fora the arguments rarely get a start. It's good to keep in mind that despite their having differing opinions on almost everything, professional philosophers are overwhelmingly realist with regard to the existence of the world around us.

Of course, whatever gets you through the night, but this is a philosophy forum, and part of that is taking a critical eye to what is said here. While Art is welcome their view, I'll not appologies for critiquing it.

* Even that is not quite right. The sensations are also spoken of as of the cup, not as constituting it.

A dog following the sent of a hare along a path, which divides:

At Cambridge in 1615, the claim that dogs use logic was defended by John Preston (1587–1628) of Queens’ College. “He instanced in a hound who hath the major proposition in his mind, namely, The hare is gone either this way or that way; smells out the minor with his nose, namely, She is not gone this way; and follows the conclusion, Ergo this way, with open mouth.”1 The inference which the dog is purported to have followed is disjunctive syllogism, which we might abbreviate as “P or Q, not-P, therefore Q.” — ANDREW ABERDEIN

A good read.

Oh, Kripke. Curious. It's what we do?

The Law of excluded middle is not a rule? I don't follow.

Does a language begin to exist as a consequence of biological evolution?

Strange, to think of laws of logic as discoveries or the results of evolution.

What, then, to make of Paraconsistent Logic? Devolution?

metaphysics based on transcendental deduction — J

Indeed, but of course transcendental arguments are fragile. X is a necessary condition for Y; Y is the case; hence, X is the case. That first assumption is an easy target.

This is what happens when you get your education from "TicTok". They think the world is flat, like a screen.

The new Plato's Cave?

Cheers. Again, if you haven't understood the argument so far, there's not a lot of point in continuing.

Check-out ↪Banno's description of Metaphysics above. He implies that you can avoid the circularity of conflicting opinions by having your opinions given to you by a higher authority. — Gnomon

No, he doesn't.

Was that fact mistaken? — Benj96

Yep.

Again, as per my previous example, not all facts are scientific. If you base your epistemology purely on science, you will only have accounted for a part of the story.

I agree with Dewey's characterization here. — Pantagruel

I'm a bit surprised to see you rejecting realism, but Dewey is the more coherent of the pragmatists. He had the decency, in his mature thinking, to pretty much drop talk of "truth", replacing it with "assertion".

Your definition of Metaphysics in terms of military-style top-down order-by-fiat... — Gnomon

Where did that come from?

The clowns have certainly taken over this thread.

Come on Banno, speak!! — Astrophel

Well, that's a first.

If you haven't been able to follow the thread so far, there's not much point in continuing.

Wittgenstein in para 293 of Philosophical Investigations makes a strong case that we can speak about things-in-themselves. — RussellA

forfucksake. :roll:

Where were we?

You'd kindly listed some of the argument so far.

1. New scientific discoveries nullify transcendental idealism;
2. It is awkward to speak about things-in-themselves;
3. Things-in-themselves don’t matter if we can know nothing about them;
4. Two worlds argument; (which was after my post you are responding to here); and
5. 180 proof’s argument (which was also after this post). — Bob Ross

To be sure, (1) was that we understand vastly more of what lies behind our perceptions than in the science that Kant had access to, well over two hundred years ago. "Awkward" in (2) was used somewhat sardonically; "impossible" would presumably be more accurate. (3) was not just that they don't matter, as that they are irrelevant. That the two worlds argument is so central to Kantian Exegesis demonstrate an at least apparent incoherence. And @180 Proof's argument - which one?

Should we get back to the topic at hand?

Mentally we have, or for now have, a "frame" and we put all our sensations on this 2d frame in order to organize it. — Gregory

Again, why 2d?

Look, someone told you long ago not to read certain philosophy, and they were wrong. — Astrophel

No. I read certain philosophy, and found it was wrong. There's a tad too much presumption in your prognosis. And very little of any substance to your replies.

I don't think that the future state of the universe is trivially, mechanistically computable from the past. — Pantagruel

Nor do I, nor is that sentence strictly analytic - It's not true at the moment, for instance. The point being that there is considerable variation in the statements which are true, and Quantum Mechanics might not be a good area to choose as archetypal.

Consensus counts perhaps towards belief, rather than truth.

↪Banno No doubt, consensus is complex and not simple. :up: — Pantagruel

...and still not enough. A statements is not true if and only if there is a consensus that it is true.

, , if you restrict yourself to Physics, you will be misled. That you are now reading this sentence is true. Now it isn't. :wink: That's not physics.