That doesn't mean that we have something like a blueprint of how exactly intentional content works yet. But of course, stances that posit intentional content as something nonphysical don't have anything like a blueprint of how exactly it works yet, either. So if not having a blueprint were a sufficient reason for you to reject a stance, you certainly couldn't embrace dualism.

That is very valid and something I hadn't thought of when trying to think of how physicalists would overcome it. Thank you for the rest of your answer as well :)

And thanks to everyone who has replied, sorry I didn't reply to a lot of you after the first few posts, but you've all managed to help explain how physicalists would respond to intentional content which is what I needed to know.

Someone on reddit also linked me to a short paper which aims to dispell the, what the author calls, 'psychological, ontological and logical' myths of intentionality as well. I mean I'm sure most of you will probably not learn a lot from it as you all seem pretty intelligent people already, but here it is if you want to read: http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/FILES/3M.pdf

Yes, we want physicalism to provide an explanation of qualia, but why don't we demand explanations from the other metaphysical positions?

Oh I accept that other metaphysical positions have problems with it also, I'm just really interested in physicalism here and how it overcomes it haha. I'm not trying to be biased!

According to physics, a computer can do everything a human can - i.e. it can have identical intentional or other mental states. We simply don't know how to program them yet!

But I can't help but feel while this computer could seemingly do such a thing, it would not actually be acting in the same way (e.g. a computer could not imagine a blue circle).

As for animals, I'm not certain - I've never really consciously thought about it. I would think some higher-level species would be capable of intentionality, yes.

Yes imagining something would be the best example for this situation I feel.

Do you know of any reasoning as to why some reject intentionality? And if so, how do they then explain what we call 'intentional states & concepts'.

I think intentionality can be exhibited by mindless objects: robots, computer programs, animals. This in a way solves the problem of intentionality at a stroke. The big problem remains however - that of the quale of intentionality.

Yeah this is where I accept the arguments/merits of physicalism, as it can give reasonable explanations up until the 'quale of intentionality' which is where I struggle to see how it's overcome.

And you could ask that question of a program or a dog. With enough technical ability, you could interrogate the hardware of each. With dogs, you can even get a rough idea what they are dreaming about simply by watching them.

But wouldn't one here re-enforce the notion of privileged access? I agree that e.g. we can figure out what a dog might be dreaming about, but for the most part we have no idea what it's actually thinking of and no amount of inspection from neuroscience could ever reveal the intentional content - only the intentional state? Likewise a computer surely does not have intentional content since it cannot make use of intentional states (think/hope/believe) - it only runs based on input & outputs like functionalists say.

Do you think the human genome is "about" anything? — tom

I'm interested to know where you go with this point :p No I don't since it is not part of intentionality.

In this case I am referring to the term 'intentionality' in this philosophical sense:

"the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs"

And intentional content to be:

"the about-ness of something/the answer to the question 'what are you thinking of/about'?"

As opposed to, what I think you're trying to infer, the intention/aim/plan to do X, Y, Z :)

Sure :)

So if we took the example of the box being 2 x 2 cm, it is an inexistant object which I am capable of thinking of/imagining, but since inexistant objects (and intentional content itself) are not in the 'physical realm', how would a physicalist account of the mind actually explain this?

I struggle to see how one could locate a specific intentional content of 'a 2 x 2cm box' via behaviour, a function, or even neuroscience (more importantly how one could possibly deny it). Wouldn't the physicalist have to concede that a physical intentional state (e.g. thinking) gives rise to something non-physical (e.g. the 2x2cm box).