He is persona non grata in disability circles. — Banno

Yep! This is not one of them.

Singer mucked his credentials with some rubbish about disability. — Banno

I read that book (Practical Ethics). It's really not that bad. In fact the discussion uses very similar premises to the abortion argument. I found his treatment of disability actually really nuanced and profound. eg the first few pages of that book are an impassioned defence of welfare programs for the disabled and something close to a social model of disability! But that's for another thread.

Do you mean cultural relativists, postmodernists, etc.? People who think that objectivity and merit are tools of the cis white patriarchy? — fishfry

For me it's a particular set of cultural theory tropes. They're generally working in paradigms like "subtle realism", "new materialism" or the less nebulous actor network theory these days. I can't name any contemporary academic names, a couple of friends' colleagues in academia are full of that stuff, and a few old friends (grad students at the time) and their supervisors bought into that hook line and sinker.

Singer's argument for abortion being permissible is very clear cut. So long as a being has no preferences, a being who has preferences regarding the first being has their preferences take precedence arbitrarily. A woman who thus prefers to abort therefore does nothing wrong, so long as the being does not have preferences.

You will generally get people behaving as if the conceived entity has preferences, but for a long time - even after it starts looking like a human - it has no preferences. So treat it how you like.

I'd go further and claim that abortion should be sufficiently accepted and available that we see it as equivalent to the morning after pill. So long as the being has no preferences, who cares? Whatever emotional discomfort is associated with that thesis can't be distinguished from social pressure, disgust and tradition.

You could argue against the conditional statement:

so long as a being has no preferences, a being who has preferences regarding the first being has their preferences take precedence in all circumstances

But you'd be left having to argue why it's still permissible to "mistreat" rocks and plants.

You could argue that the being has preferences - but that's just false for the vast majority of time the abortion is legislated for. All of this is especially tenuous if you eat meat - what, so it's okay to kill something to eat but not to painlessly avoid diminishing a woman's pain?

All of this is ultimately about legislation and what is permissible to do, the emotional reactions of people - especially people who feel the need to have abortions, or feel strongly about the issue - should be listened to. But not at the expense of sound moral principles, scientific facts and humane laws.

The latter is what you risk when you give the moral disgust response against abortion the same level of respect as a reasoned policy. If you are listening to a friend, fine, public airing of that disgust response in a legislative context harms women's reproductive autonomy.

And I don't deny the objective component of science. iow could anyone? — fishfry

You cease believing in objective properties, that's one of the steps to the conclusion.

I resemble that remark? — fishfry

You don't. If I read your remark out of context, and didn't know your post history, I could read it that way. But I know you didn't mean it like that.

I don't think you are making your point. — fishfry

Och, I've made it. I imagine you've never had the pleasure of interacting with these people, so you're able to do the sensible thing and see "science is done by people, how could it not be a social process?" as completely separate from "2+2=4 isn't demonstrably true". Unfortunately it is often held that the fact that some practice is socially or discursively mediated undermines any truth claim in the practice. If that seems totally absurd, yes it is, but it is the attitude your comment resembles and @ssu reacted to.

I'm not imputing that set of beliefs to you. Just highlighting what that phrase could suggest if you read it from a certain angle. But I don't think that is an angle you wanted to suggest, or did suggest.

@fishfry

The annoying bit isn't recognising that stuff is discursively mediated, the annoying bit is saying that because it's discursively mediated it isn't true, or accurate, or real or whatever. The book about heroin I read made the point about medicine and ontology thusly: "there is no ontological distinction between discourse and reality" - IE, what we say about things and things.

Whereas there is such a distinction for maths objects. You can say that 2+2=5, but it isn't.

I once audited a class with an infuriating social anthropology lecturer who wrote 2+2<4 on the board. But hid he fact he was adding the left two numbers as noise sources in decibels and treating the right as a natural number. That was him, by his reckoning, demonstrating the above point. That 2+2 doesn't have to equal 4.

If you've not interacted with these people I envy you.

Is this not perfectly true? — fishfry

It's sort of true. The move also denies that eg 2+2=4 is true. It's just valid as a statement of mathematics. The medical equivalent I saw was that... I think it was heroin wasn't addictive, it was addictive in the context of current medical theory.

Who is doing these terrible things with an anodyne statement like, "Math is what mathematicians do?" And what are they doing?" — fishfry

Writing papers in social science. Though I've not seen the specific attitude for maths, I've seen the attitude recently for medicine. Medicine is what medical doctors do, thus making it a principally discursive phenomenon. About words rather than bodies.

If you go looking you can find papers on boolean logic being a colonialist abstraction. I just don't want to go searching for this brainrot again.

For that reason we invent a term, I call it fundamental reality. It is about the things we don't understand. It is perfectly fine to have a term for the collection of things we have no name for, that happens all the time. Just like "future". We can say a few things in general about fundamental reality, in the same way we can have predictions about the future. Still, both the future and fundamental reality are fundamentally unknowable. (that is the only thing these two terms have in common, it is not a full analogy) — Carlo Roosen

That's the contradiction though.

There are two ways in which we could fail to understand something like fundamental reality, the first of which is the unknown which we could come to know, the second of which is the unknown which we could not come to know. The first unknown is like the future, like what will happen tomorrow. The second unknown is like... nothing clearly statable - it's the sound of one hand clapping.

The following two are aligned with the unknown which we could come to know.

At any given time of day, the next instant is not apprehended, and in that regard the next instant could be construed as fundamentally unknowable. Even though every particular instant could be known, just not now.

Contrast that to something commonplace which we interact with and judge. We know what it is and how it works, but only approximately. Our perceptions and judgements interface imperfectly with the nature of the thing, and it is full of hidden mysteries. That object, that register of reality, is fundamentally unknowable in the sense of being inexhaustible by representation. But not beyond representation's reach.

The last three are aligned with the unknown which we could not come to know.

Contrast that to something beyond the observable universe. We know that exists, but we can't ever observe it, so it's impossible to know about it with sensors and perceptions in the same way as we would the observable universe. That construes the non-observable universe as fundamentally unknowable in one sense of knowledge, but its properties can be inferred - grasped only rationally. This unknowability marks a practical exterior to one type representation, but not a theoretical impasse to all representation.

Contrast that again to the idea that no matter what you say, it will be about something we've perceived, judged, interpreted and so on. That's the noumenon in the negative sense that you were told about previously. It marks a fundamentally unknowable exterior without giving it any positive determination. In that regard "judgements" of such an entity are not contradictions in terms, since whenever they are articulated they are secretly determinations of the aggregate of our perceptions, judgements, interpretations and so on. That exterior is... unpredicable, but extant. Only its existence is entailed by the adequacy of any of our representations, but none of its content is.

Finally contrast that again to the uninterpreted reality that exists prior to all conceptions of it, a substantive which is unintelligible. Formless, unpredicable, but structured. The true alien nature of reality in which we're all hopelessly subsumed. That kind of fundamental reality is unknowable in virtue of the failure of all of our representations to grasp it, even as it effects our minds and bodies. It is the register of Lovecraftian horror. Of the cut between the soul and materiality, that which demarcates the concept of the mind from the body without demarcating the body from the mind. An analogue of it is something like radiation post Chernobyl, an incomprehensible reality that nevertheless saturates us and determines our lives - evinced through cancer and nonsensical death. It is the idea that we already live among the "things in themselves" and their unintelligible structures and causal whimsies.

An agglomeration of all these concepts is self contradictory. While the body - the content - of any "fundamental reality" is indeterminate in at least one sense, the concepts that vouchsafe that indeterminability can contradict each other and thus require separate accounts or contextualising factors.

I don't think that is true. Fundamental reality is a concept to point to the fact that the real nature of things cannot be understood conceptually. We have words for all kind of things that we do not know, I mentioned them earlier "surprize", "future", "unknown" or "black swan", (the latter referring not to a rare animal but a special concept for an unlikely event). So it is perfectly fine to talk about fundamental reality. — Carlo Roosen

You've ended up understanding things with concepts which you've prior stipulated as being unable to understand with concepts. That is the rub. It's a contradiction, but it's a contradiction which results from your ideas rather than criticisms of them. Generally that means there's a problem with your ideas rather than the criticisms.

You can sustain an opposition by making certain moves, eg by putting the intelligible and the unintelligible in a dialectical relation, but you've not done that.

According to him the real thing we cannot understand — Carlo Roosen

Sort of. Expecting to understand the thing in itself is like expecting to be able to bake a unicycle. Personally I don't enjoy Kant's phenomenon/noumenon/thing-in-itself distinction that much, but I don't want to see it misrepresented.

I propose different terms, but they mean the same. — Carlo Roosen

The same as which though? The Kant one or the more generic representation vocabulary?

The duck only exists in fundamental reality in the sense that it gives the confirmation when you know where to look. — Carlo Roosen

That's another ambiguity though. The things in themselves do indeed exist independently of conception and judgement, and it's precisely that independence which renders them unintelligible. So your fundamental reality's existence concept is kind of the same as the conceptual reality one - which means the entities in both are of the same type, no?

why not both? — Carlo Roosen

Roughly - because the first entails that the judgement only applies to perceptions, whereas the second entails that judgement also applies to the things in themselves.

Alright. Which do you mean? Do you mean that

Ducks, in the sense of independently existing objects, aren't even "available" (scare quote) for us to call them "duck" though. in Kant though! What counts as a duck is a judgement of our perception. That's a very imprecise and inaccurate way of putting it, it's just supposed to connote that there's no "duck in itself" in Kant. — fdrake

reflects the dichotomy between fundamental reality and conceptual reality, or that

Whereas our percept of a duck can be thought of as a representation of the duck-in-itself (the duck), we might even see how long its wings are. — fdrake

reflects it?

What I am referring to, and that is what I believe Kant is referring to as well, is that when we look at a duck and call it a "duck", we have never captured its reality. — Carlo Roosen

Ducks, in the sense of independently existing objects, aren't even "available" (scare quote) for us to call them "duck" though. in Kant though! What counts as a duck is a judgement of our perception. That's a very imprecise and inaccurate way of putting it, it's just supposed to connote that there's no "duck in itself" in Kant.

Whereas our percept of a duck can be thought of as a representation of the duck-in-itself (the duck), we might even see how long its wings are.

Not a problem but I can't follow you. — Carlo Roosen

Alright. What are you struggling to understand in my post, and I'll do my best to rephrase it.

While I believe I do understand what Kant is saying, when I read it I say "yes, yes" every sentence. — Carlo Roosen

Like , I also noticed that the phenomenon/noumenon or phenomenon/thing in itself distinction is misused in your post. If you're using the more common distinction between a representation (like a painting of a duck) and represented (like a duck), your post makes more sense on those terms.

It seems to me you are addressing the problem solely through reasoning. — Carlo Roosen

I'm responding to the relations of concepts in your post by analysing them, yes. Is this a problem?

The philosophical question I am struggling with is this: I believe the conceptual reality of this AI will be completely different from ours. Is there something we can say about it? Maybe it will be closer to fundamental reality? What do you think? — Carlo Roosen

How would you tell if one conceptual reality is different from another in the first place? You seem to allow it to admit of degrees ("completely"), so similar conceptual realities ought be able to be distinguished.

Emanuel Kant's Transcendental Idealism is the view that we can never know reality directly (the noumenon), we only know how it appears to us (the phenomenon). Kant made this distinction based on observation, I believe. You cannot invent such a theory out of thin air. Yet many people have wandered off in imagination, offering all kinds of abstract ideas to explain this theory. — Carlo Roosen

It's Immanuel.

I will try to bring this topic back to something everyone can validate on his/her own. I will use the terms fundamental reality and conceptual reality, simply because I get confused by Kant's terms.

I appreciate the attempt to make Kant's terms clearer. Though I think you're dealing with the more general dichotomy between representation (conceptual reality) and represented (fundamental reality). Rather than the one between phenomenon (conceptual reality, representation) and thing-in-itself or noumenon. The distinction in Kant, or pair of distinctions - between phenomenon and noumenon, or phenomenon and things-in-themselves, doesn't neatly map onto the concept of representation and represented. The things-in-themselves are alien to any conceptual apparatus or system of perception, whereas the represented can be more or less adequately grasped by a representation.

***
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You will agree that our conceptual detection system is at work and recognizes this as a pattern forming the letter E. Eat two cookies and now it looks like this:

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Our conceptual detection system does not wonder where the E has gone. It is now simply the letter F. Next you eat all cookies except the last one. All the letters are gone, only a single cookie is left. No big deal.

*

You will likely agree that the E and F were created in your mind, as a part of your conceptual reality. Fundamental reality provided all the input for that abstraction, no misunderstanding about that. But it is the mind that recognizes the input as patterns and gives it these labels E and F.

The driving force of this paragraph is the phrase "created in your mind", which you could read substantially or relationally. Substantially, insofar as a representation (item of conceptual reality) is part of your mind while perciving the cookie configurations, or relationally insofar as the perception of the configuration results in classifying the configuration as a given letter. NB that someone who had no concept of the letters E or F would be able to see the relative positions and numbers of cookies, and you were also able to bring about a change in the represented (cookie placement) in order to elicit an expected change in our aggregate representations (letter classification). The significance of this is that you've used a representation to elicit an expected change in the un-represented by using a concept - which would be very odd if the represented is somehow beyond relation to conceptualisation as a process.

Also notice that during the time you were looking at the E and F, the concept “cookies” was most likely at the background of your mind, although you did perceive them perfectly well. Another sign that perception and concept are not the same thing.

"background of your mind" is also allegorical. You seem to be equating that with a degree of cognitive awareness of the label of the percept - being cognisant of the fact that if I see that configuration, I may assert "that configuration is E". Whereas the latter step of assertion is potentiated but not required by the classification. That matter since you would need to establish that concepts did not saturate both steps. As far as I know concepts do saturate both steps, and they do for Kant as well as contemporary accounts of perception.

Now take the remaining cookie and look at it. In the hierarchy of concepts we go one level deeper, so to speak. Look at the single cookie. For some reason it is more difficult to say that the cookie is a pattern detected in your mind by your conceptual detection system. It is a cookie, that is how it feels.

The level of description that you applied to the cookie configurations is not the level of description you would apply to the single cookie - since the cookie configuration concept requires relations between distinct cookies, and there is one. You can take a different concept - say "marks on page", "distribution of pixels" - and describe the cookie in those terms. Those concepts do not have a hierarchical dependence, since both letter cookie configurations and single cookie configurations can be described in terms of the properties of marks on a page - when one judges markings on a page, one does not need to judge letters and vice versa.

I believe there is actually no difference between the patterns E and F and a cookie. Just like the two letters, the cookie is something our brain recognizes as a separate object, searches the appropriate label for and finds the word “cookie”. All the information is out there, the recognition and labeling is only in our minds.

One type of information is out there - the spatial properties of the page marks. Whatever goes into recognising the marks as E or as F, or indeed as a letter, is a relationship between the marks and the perceiver's learning. It need not be in the page or the perceiver's mind, it can be interpreted as an element of the relation between them.

Everything that can be said about this cookie, its taste and its color, finds its origin in the reality outside, the fundamental reality. It is inside the mind where the recognition and the labeling happens, which is the conceptual reality.


You can go down more and more levels, until you are at the particle level. Do all the particles in the universe then form this "fundamental reality"? I don't think so. Observe what happens in your mind. Just like "Letters E and F" and "cookies", you now have a label "all the particles in the universe", defined by your current perspective of reality. Still just a concept in your mind, no different than the letters or the cookies.

This hasn't distinguished the fundamental reality from the lower levels of the conceptual hierarchy you stipulated - is fundamental reality at the bottom? If it's like the thing in itself, that fundamental level is unconceptualisable, so how could some concept be closer to it?

Many philosophers have been struggling with this, but this is really all there is to it, I believe. — Carlo Roosen

One reason philosophers struggle with this is that it's incredibly hard to make an account of it, given all the stuff that's going on, the biases involved in introspection, and pinning down the meaning of concepts. To be frank, the imprecisions in your key terms and relations "created in your mind", "object", "hierarchy", "conceptual", "fundamental" are what's doing the work in appearing to solve the problem. Your account is evocative but its imprecisions leave fatal gaps that ensnare it in the problems you've sought to escape.

Which isn't a bad thing, you're just among the bad company of fellow travellers.

Bah. It borrows your intentions.

The primary difference, as I see it, is that if someone uses a shite source but puts it in their own words, the person's spent a shitload of time doing something which will get easily rebuked, which incentivises engagement and reflection. You can even refute the source. In contrast chatbot output doesn't provide the source for its musings (unless you're asking it to find quotes or whatevs), and you can use it to generate screeds of quite on topic but shallow text at little time cost to its users.

Judicious use of chatbots is good. As far as I see it, you're defending responsible use of them. That's fine. Unfortunately there are plenty of instances, even on this forum, where people have not been responsible with their use. In my book I'm putting this ruling under "I'm sorry this is why we can't have unrestricted access to nice things".

If people used it like you and Pierre did exclusively, there would be little need for the ruling. And perhaps in the future people will. With the kind of use you both put it to, it does produce posts which are at least indistinguishable from human generated creativity, and perhaps are even better than what you would produce without the assistance. That's true for me in my professional life as well.

tldr: you cannot trust the generic end user to use it responsibly. I wish this were not true, but it is.

That's a good clarification. I'll add it.

Yes, but I'm certain you won't like it. :lol:

I've read a bunch of Thinking and Being now, and I'm getting the impression it was written in an alternate timeline. It seems to be responding to problems that don't exist yet but always have. I'm getting the sneaking suspicion it will be discovered in 20 years and form part of an obscure alternate continuity going from Parmenides to Aristotle to Husserl and Frege to Wittgenstein.

It's like someone forked the repository of philosophical knowledge just after the publication of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, then merged in secondary literature in that heritage up to 2019. The set of problems and style of analysis is so obscure, but also so natural and pervasive. It looks at philosophy from an odd angle. But that makes philosophy appear as if looking at a circle from a side - a tiny strip in a space of possibilities.

I have tried a couple of times to present aspects of Kimhi's beef with the hole left by the neglect of the judgement stroke in logic in a new post. To portray the foreclosed future the abandonment of that problematic left. But I failed. I might try again once I've read more of the book.

Do you actually use LLMs to solve problems, answer questions, o — T Clark

I use it for programming. It's also okay-ish at regurgitating commonly known things which are everywhere on the internet. I use it to come up with questions sometimes for my students. And worked solutions for those questions. I'll not use it for anything I can't verify.

Edit: I've occasionally used it as a barometer for an opinion. It's pretty good at coming up with banal counterarguments to things you say, "lowest common denominator" responses. You can get it to generate alternatives like that, and it'll make ok guesses at what people will actually say in knee jerk response.

Do I interpret it correctly that we can use ChatGPT in arguments as long as we mark it as a ChatGPT reference? Like, supporting reasoning, but not as a factual source? — Christoffer

Consult with it, then write your own post. You can use it to help you write the post. You need to check what it's saying if it comes up with citations or references or whatever. You need to check what it says in the source, too. Do NOT trust its word on anything.

Behave Socratically toward it. Ask it questions. Challenge it. Ask for clarification. If you must use it for content, make your post the result of a conversation with it, and put in information you know is right.

Seed it with your own perspective etc etc.

Don't just put what someone says on the forum into it and get it to write your response. That's the kind of stuff which will eventually make us have to enforce a no-tolerance policy on it.

Thinking and Being is hard to quote from in a self contained manner, Jesus Christ.

I encourage users to flag explicit or seeming uses of chatGPT or other bots that they see. They may turn out to be fine, it just makes it easier to keep track of how it's getting used.

I amended the site guidelines with these clarifying remarks.

@Pierre-Normand - I see you use it a lot, I just wanted to tag you in thread to make sure you're aware of the ruling. While personally I think your use of it is about as good as can be hoped, it's just something to keep an eye on.

It repeats common misconceptions and flubs details constantly. It's especially bad at sourcing. It is also far too agreeable. You can easily talk it into contradicting itself, and it will do so with the air of academic aplomb regardless of what it says.

Not using it judiciously is as dangerous for someone's sense of reality as taking Reddit or Twitter posts at their word. Perhaps more so, as chatGPT is treated as an authoritative source. It should be thought of as closer to Professor Reddit, unless you keep it on a tight, tight leash.

Some clarifying remarks:

• Using it as a writing assistant is fine, using its largely unguided output as your entire post is not fine.
• Using it as a source suggester is fine, using it as a source is not fine.
• Talking about and analysing its output is fine, using it uncritically and without context is not fine.
• Do use it to simplify the language in your pre-written OP, don't use it to write an OP in response to a lazy question. eg posting the output of "Write me a forum post comparing determinism to libertarianism as viewpoints on free will" will be frowned on, but "please simplify the language I just used in writing my essay comparing libertarianism and free will" and working that output into your post is fine.

The intent of the rule is to stop people from using it to spread misinformation and from generating reams of undigested content. The intent is not to stop people from using it as a tool for enhancing creativity, for editing and standardisation of prose, or for using what it suggests when you have verified it before posting.

@keystone

As of a recent amendment to site guidelines, using ChatGPT as an academic source is grounds for a warning. You're not being warned for it now, I just thought I'd bring it to your attention, so that you can avoid doing it again.

@Srap Tasmaner

This is a related analogy, but is not exactly what is going on in the thread. Kimhi's forces aren't quite illocutionary forces, we're not talking about speech act theory, by my reckoning we're closer to talking about logic - like a natural language Conceptual Notation but written in natural language. A formal kinematics of thought in its relation to the world. Treat this as an invitation to engage with the thread topic on its own terms. I also don't know precisely what the forces are, I'm just opening another door for them.

I think the muddle between force in thread and illocutionary forces comes down to never seeing a free floating proposition out in the wild. The proposition is largely a philosophical construct you get from distilling sentences down to what makes them true or false. You then call this the propositional content of the sentence. You take inspiration from declarative sentences and apply it to non-declarative uses of language.

To do that distillation in the latter case, you first neglect the use case. You find the content first. You then "analyse" the use back in by notionally associating some force to the propositional content. And finally present an IRL speech act as a pair {illocutionary force, propositional content}, and that's the end of the analysis. Finally the couple {illocutionary force, propositional content} is notionally equated to the analysed speech act, and they're treated as equivalent.

If you want to use this style of analysis, and see the thread through its terms entirely, you're going to remain confused. Since traditionally if you write down an argument like "if p then q, p, therefore q", you're definitely not thought of asserting p in the first conditional, and you're almost certainly not thought of asserting p in the quoted argument. You can look at logic as a flow control system for propositional content to other propositional content, and never have to care about force at all when you're just shunting about the symbols.

Except it behaves like a model and a guide for IRL reasoning, argument and thought, and when you write down logical operations (and syllogisms) on propositional symbols, they mimic assertions, rejections, stipulations etc. Even ones you make in your own head. Which is a bit odd when you think about it, since you're supposed to be dealing with things that have no forces... but there they are in the logic.

You could also notice that when you're playing around with propositions in logic, no one needs to actually assert them or reject them for the logic to work. So you end up with a system of symbols that apes and embodies speech acts of assertion and rejection, with formal connection rules that ape conclusion and consequences and inference, that allegedly has nothing to do with the forces associated with conclusion, inference, affirmation, rejection and so on. Which itself suggests that notionally manipulating these things behaves like a real argument, no? Forces and all? Right down to the level of the propositional symbol?

That should really give us some pause about the adequacy of the distillation procedure. Our real life use cases bled through into how we interpret the complexes and single propositions in the logic. They're also designed to guide and reflect how we think.

Consider:
p=>q,
~q
------
~p

vs

Alice) "We're getting cheese at the shop!"
Bob) "We're not going shopping"
Alice)"Then we won't get cheese"

You can maybe imagine the translation exercise between the latter and the former as two way. The assertions in the latter map onto the propositions in the former. Even introducing p=>q or p onto a line plays into that - you introduce a p, you stipulate it somehow, you assert it.

I see you already made roughly the same point as I did here with less words.

Only as an abstract object, immanent in an actual use. What I think so far. — Srap Tasmaner

@Banno @Pierre-Normand

I was thinking (surprise). This is about how to ground force "in" the territory of a proposition understood as a set of equivalent truth conditions.

It seems generally comfortable, hereabouts, to conceive of propositions as that which is shared between the expressions _snow is white_ and _schnee ist weiß_. One way of fleshing out what is shared is that both expressions have the same truth conditions. Moreover, that both predicates "is white" and "ist weiß" have the same extensions and that "snow" and "schnee" can be used to denote precisely the same entities and type of entity.

What makes the first paragraph an account of what is shared between the expressions? The account finds that every relevant facet of one expression would apply to the other, it does this by grasping a facet and comparing it to some idealised use case. When assaying the two expressions for their content, no one cares that plenty of humans exist now who believe snow is white but not that schnee ist weiß, in virtue of not speaking enough German - this is allegedly ephemeral, and so it is abstracted. I think it makes sense to call this discrepancy ephemeral because what one speaker would do with the expression "snow is white" is (purportedly) exactly what they would do with the expression "schnee ist weiß".

But you can note that they share other things - when someone judges that snow is white, they would also judge that schnee ist weiß. When someone would reject that snow is white, they would also reject that schnee ist weiß.

I need to take a step back into the characterisation I gave of an extensional account.

A) An extensional analysis of rejection regarding a statement p( x ) must rely on the following claim: asserting the statement ¬p( x ) is equivalent to rejecting p( x ).
B) The equivalence in ( A ) requires that an asserter of p( x ) would commit themselves to all and only the same claims that a rejecter of ~p( x ) would.

Asserting and rejection in the above claim are in fact placeholders. A and B can be modified to refer to an arbitrary pair of relations to p(x), R and S. Each of them need a mapping that applies to p( x ) so that being in relation R to s(p( x )) is equivalent to being in relation S to r(p( x )). That criterion takes a predication, and says that being in relation R to it is equivalent to being in some relation S to some mapping of it.

Previously:
R=affirmation
r=identity
S=rejection
s=negation

A) An extensional analysis of R regarding a statement p( x ) must rely on the following claim: being in relation R to statement r(p( x )) is equivalent to being in relation S to s(p( x )).
B) The equivalence in ( A ) requires that being in relation R to s(p( x )) would commit someone to all and only the same claims that being in relation S to r(p( x )) would.

With that generalisation, ( B ) spells out the equivalence in terms of "commitment to the same claims" under some transformation of the judged statement. However, recall this paragraph in this post:

But you can note that they share other things - when someone judges that snow is white, they would also judge that schnee ist weiß. When someone would reject that snow is white, they would also reject that schnee ist weiß.

The normative machinery in ( B ), "commitment to the same claims", also applies to the judgements regarding snow being white and schnee being weiß - acceptance, affirmation, rejection, rebuking... . Ergo, the same machinery that sets up a criterion for extensional equivalence can also be used to set up a criterion of equivalence that assesses whether two expressions would commit you to the same judgements.

NB, the machinery which allowed us to assay the sentences and refine them into their propositional content with the extensional criterion is also allowing us to assay the sentences and refine them into a flavour of content which includes judgements. I think this heterogenous, but still orderly, collection are the forces we're speaking about. They're baked into the expression like the truth condition is alleged to be.

Whereas the illocutionary force concept is not baked into the commonalities between sentences whose factual content is equivalent. It operates on sentences with a given factual content. Forces seem aligned with the conditions that allow us to grasp an expression's content - content as affirmation, content as rejection. Illocutionary forces are means of operating on an expression's content, content as factual, rejection as practical.

Another aspect of this, which I've thought through far less, is the connection to "being" as Kimhi would have it. But I have an inkling of a way in. If propositional content has a privileged relationship with what is the case - that is, what is - then force would be aligned with what is using the same machinery as above. There is a duality in the illocutionary force concept - content as factual, act as practical - which the force concept avoids. Nowhere near comfortable enough with the thread's material to make that connection well yet though.

Consider a direction like "Don't forget to put your tools away after". The tools that are already where they should be can't be put away, so the intention is to pick out whichever tools are out at the time you're carrying out the directive. That can also be expressed as a conditional --- something like, "For all members of your tools, if it's out then put it away." The variable is singular now, but it's still not going to be bound until run-time, and then a number of times, also not known until run-time. Same thing. — Srap Tasmaner

That's damn cool.

In this case, however, unlike the pin-angels case, it is unclear that there is a common content expressible as (some) linguistic form p that is asserted in one case and presented for the sake of rejection in the other. — Pierre-Normand

So, in this case, my suggestion isn't a specific application of Martin's proposal. I'm rather attending to the function in this specific language game where the denial is meant, not to present the content of a thought for the sake of rejection (for whatever reason), but rather to deny that the putative thought being expressed is a thought at all (and hence deny it having so much as a content). — Pierre-Normand

To be clear - are you saying that there is common content between the assertion and rejection but that this common content is inexpressible as (some) linguistic form p, or are you saying that there is no common content between the assertion and rejection which could have been expressed in any linguistic form whatsoever, in virtue of there being no common content between the assertion and the rejection?

I suppose strictly speaking you are expressing uncertainty regarding one of the above claims, rather than committing yourself strongly to either.

What would it be? While I may understand what it is that someone who falls under the illusion that there is an apple on the table means, in denying the truth of his claim on the ground that there isn't an apple for them to refer to, I can't express this denial as "~p" (i.e. "It is not the case that this apple is on the table"). So, in this case, my suggestion isn't a specific application of Martin's proposal. I'm rather attending to the function in this specific language game where the denial is meant, not to present the content of a thought for the sake of rejection (for whatever reason), but rather to deny that the putative thought being expressed is a thought at all (and hence deny it having so much as a content). My denial rather consists in presenting the overarching "act" of the asserter as a failure to actualise their general capacity to refer demonstratively to specific apples for the purpose of communicating their locations.

Am I right in thinking that you are construing that in order for an expressive thingybob containing a singular term expressing a de re sense to count as a thought, the singular term expressing a de re sense must be a successful act of reference to the entity associated with the de re sense - in this case the apple? And you are rejecting the claim "this apple is on the table" distally because there isn't an apple on the table but proximately because the singular term with the de re sense doesn't successfully refer as it is desired to, since there is no apple on the table?

Can we think of an example where no amount of precision can create a genuine synonymy between, say, two mistakes? If the precision is only about the object of the mistakes, then yes, I think so. Here's one that occurs to me offhand as a candidate: Jack misidentifies a note in music as a G# (it's really a G natural), Jill misidentifies it as an Ab. As you may know, G# and Ab refer to the same note, under different music-theoretic circumstances, rather like Morning Star and Evening Star. So have Jack and Jill made the "same mistake"? Arguably, no amount of precisifying about the note itself is going to resolve this, since Jack and Jill are making their respective mistakes for different reasons. But then again, they're hearing the exact same tone and being wrong about it with the same result. I want to say it's two different mistakes. This is perhaps a cousin of the "carrying the 1" example. — J

Lemme see if I get this right. Trying to pick it apart to understand it.

The note is G.
Jack identifies it as G#
Jill identifies it as Ab.
G# and Ab are the same frequency.
Since G# and Ab are the same frequency, they're extensionally equivalent in terms of sound frequencies.
The note will be identified mistakenly when and only when it is not heard as G.

The thing that would let you see Jack and Jill's mistake as the same is the final principle there, right - the fact that the note will be identified mistakenly when and only when it is not heard as G.

I think there's a way of mucking with it. I'm not sure why I'm mucking with it at this point though. If Jack always identified every enharmonic equivalent in the sharp form, and Jill always identified every enharmonic equivalent as the flat form, the means by which they make the mistake would be a little different. Even if they choose the same wrong note. I think this is similar to the way I muddied the waters before with Bob's criticism of Alice's snark related beliefs - focus on the agent involved's expression rather than the claim.

Either Kimhi is underselling the rigidity with which Frege's system excludes psychology, or what he Kimhi means by 'psychology' might not be what people think. — Srap Tasmaner

I just think we should quit throwing around 'proposition' and 'judgment' and 'inference' in ways that allow people to give those words their preferred reading. Frege is a Laws of Thought guy. I don't think you get to tweak his position by pulling in a little "social context" here and there, for example. — Srap Tasmaner

That makes sense. Martins argument references (what seems) a fairly static typology from Kimhi. This is Kimhi quoted in Martins:

An assertoric gesture is analogous to a mimetic gesture that displays an act without being it. […] A mimetic gesture can be performed as basis for another act, as when we threaten someone by tracing a finger slowly across our neck. Similarly, an assertoric gesture occurs as a basis for the display of another repeatable, for example, p in not-p. An assertoric gesture is an occurrence of a repeatable – a propositional sign – that can occur either as a gesture or as a self-identifying display

I get the impression that two things are at play, related to your following remark:

And where's Kimhi? There's something about bringing psychology and logic back together, so he's messing about with the core of Frege's worldview, his platonist anti-psychologism. Does he bring them back together by ditching the platonism? That's not the impression I've gotten but I don't think I've stumbled on him addressing it either way. — Srap Tasmaner

The first thing at play: the role "the laws of thought" in Frege plays, Kimhi keeps an analogue of it, but they're less ironclad logical laws and more tight constraints on thought sequences/acts of thinking. I don't know what their nature is, or how they work, but Kimhi seems to want to notice expansive regularities in them. That might operate by positing a Platonic Realm Of Thought Laws (tm) which doesn't resemble Frege's, or it could be something far woolier. My intuition is that it's woolier, based on the second thing at play.

The second thing at play: dispositions, interpretations, acts of judgement also seem to be within the scope of Kimhi's "laws of thought" analogue concept, but they're... somehow external to a context of pure abstraction. They picture something like events - judgements, logical moves, presentations, mimicry. They're don't seem to quite be speech acts, as they're not necessarily enacted "outside the head", but they have a kinematic and dramatic air to them. As in "if you think this, then you must judge that", as if entertaining a proposition, grasping a proposition, presenting a propositional form all do something in a nascent quasi-mental, quasi-logical regime of expression.

What I'm imagining is at stake in Kimhi's assault on Frege is whether you can cleave off the bit Frege did from the "laws of thought" Kimhi is concerned with without mutilating them. Hence what look like bits of textual analysis on the logic symbols and rules Frege uses, but not following the rules Frege's stipulated.

I'm thus inclined to think some of this ambiguity regarding force, expression, and how it relates to Frege is coming from Kimhi (and Martin's) critique of Frege allegedly severing something from this nascent woolier collection of coordinating regularities in thought and expression. So the words are a bit wooly because Frege's allegedly made a model of something wooly that has no wool in it, and our fellow travellers are seeking and analysing the wool.

. You both seemed happy to pick and choose which things get Forms and which don't, but I think you'll be stuck with a Form for "disappointment with the last season of Game of Thrones". — Srap Tasmaner

What have I said which has given you the impression that I like the forms? I don't mean that in an accusing or rebuking manner, I legitimately don't understand how I've committed myself to that.

My impression of the thread's argument is that:

Every proposition has a bunch of gubbins associated with it. Some of those gubbins can be treated as separable from the proposition's nature, some of them can't. Frege's allegedly arguing that whatever the judgement stroke represents can be separated from the content of a proposition that a judgement stroke is applied to. Kimhi's arguing that whatever the judgement stroke is supposed to represent, it cannot be separated.

There's then a lot of quibbling about the type of gubbins that everyone involved is talking about, and whether that's an adequate representation of Frege. A subset of the gubbins quibbles are as follows:

1 ) Whether the flavour of force Kimhi's talking about is related to illocutionary force.
1.1) Is that illocutionary force something... mental? Does it mean that you have to grasp "the assertoricity of the proposition" in order to comprehend it at all? Does it make sense to call such a mental thingybob part of a speech act at all?
2 ) Whether the flavour of force Kimhi's talking about is related to Frege's judgement stroke.
2.1) Kimhi's force seems... mental, and not reflected in propositional form. Whatever it is is to be found when examining expressing a proposition. Namely, as a part of what it would mean to be in a state of expressing that proposition and none other.

We probably have to agree that there's some proposition flavour thing in an assertion or a rejection to get going, even if we end up saying the proposition flavour thing is inextricable from some of its associated gubbins. I think that equating the proposition flavour thing and its inextricably associated gubbins with the composite of its logical form, the judgement stroke, and an extensional interpretation of its contained terms is what's at stake. So we've repeatedly embarked on a voyage of gubbins demarcation, often by example.

So I'd situate my remark above in 2.1, specifically talking about "what it would mean to be in a state of expressing that proposition and none other", where a state of expressing a proposition was a rejection or assertion of a claim.

If it turned out that the propositional doo-dad in the rejection of a claim and the assertion of a claim didn't work the same in both cases, then it'd be an example of some of the gubbins associated with expression intermingling what can be thought of as the proposition and how it is expressed/presented/display/considered/grasped/entertained.

I've not read the Kimhi in the OP, I've just read the Martins paper and a fair chunk of the thesis @Leontiskos linked earlier.

But it's about judgment. Kimhi wants to show there is no "logical gap" between P and "We who think P are right — Srap Tasmaner

Could you give me some more words on that please, or a link to where you've previously spelled it out?