We can't simultaneously claim "there is no knowledge of knowing" and "knowledge is a relation between subject and object" because the former disallows the latter. In fact, the former is self-undermining all on its own. — Theorem

Let's see what Schopenhauer has to say about this issue. These passages are taken straight from his Fourfold Root.

“All knowledge presupposes Subject and Object. Even self-consciousness therefore is not absolutely simple, but, like our consciousness of all other things (i.e., the faculty of perception), it is subdivided into that which is known and that which knows. Now, that which is known manifests itself absolutely and exclusively as Will.” (166)

“The Subject accordingly knows itself exclusively as willing, but not as knowing. For the I which represents, never can itself become representation or Object, since it conditions all representations as their necessary correlate; rather may the following beautiful passage from the Sacred Upanishads be applied to it: That which sees all is not to be seen; that which hears all is not to be heard; that which knows all this not to be known; that which discerns all is not to be discerned. Beyond it, seeing, and knowing, and hearing, and discerning, there is nothing.” (167)

There can therefore be no knowledge of knowing, because this would imply separation of the Subject from knowing, while it nevertheless knew that knowing—which is impossible." (167)

My answer to the objection, "I not only know, but know also that I know," would be, "Your knowing that you know only differs in words from your knowing. 'I know that I know' means nothing more than 'I know,' and this again, unless it is further determined, means nothing more than 'ego.' If your knowing and your knowing that you know are two different things, just try to separate them, and first to know without knowing that you know, then to know that you know without this knowledge being at the same time knowing." No doubt, by leaving all special knowing out of the question, we may at last arrive at the proposition "I know"—the last abstraction we are able to make; but this proposition is identical with "Objects exist for me," and this again is identical with "I am Subject," in which nothing more is contained than in the bare word "I"." (167)

We experience "Subjectivity" as a kind of locus of felt, qualitative "intensity" as it were; and this Subjectival intensity cannot be "known" Objectively or exhaustively articulated in a way that does justice to what it is like to be a Subject.

Could the Subject know "knowing" as such without an Object that is not itself something other than the act of knowing "knowing?" Surely it could not. To visualize the concept "knowing" is not the same as knowing "knowing." When the Subject knows an Object, the Subject is itself the knowing knower. This is no different from asking the question, "Can running run?"

Schopenhauer defends a similar position to this in his essay, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason:

"Consequently there is no knowledge of knowing, since this would require that the Subject separated itself from knowing and yet knew that knowing; and this is impossible." (pg. 208)

Edit: Perhaps the phrase "point-of-view" might help clear things up (note: I am not using "point--of-view" in a spatiotemporal sense). A Subject cannot make its "point of view" an Object-for-itself that simultaneously preserves both the Subject's "point-of-view" and the Subject's "point-of-view" as its own Object.

It's not "perceived" because the Subject is not perceived by any sensory modality. When I use the term "feeling," I mean something much more subliminal than an emotion, a discomfort, or any kind of proprioception. The Subject is felt as repelling its Object, or as being in opposition to it. The Subject is felt as that which determines its Object's perspectival character, gestalt form, and aesthetic qualities.

Yeah, I see what you're saying, but if there is an aspect of the subject that cannot become an object-for-a-subject, this would imply we could never know it. — Theorem

The Subject is felt, it is not known as one of the Objects present to-and-for-itself.

The model you have laid out in your argument implies that the claims in your argument (including the conclusion) can never qualify as knowledge. — Theorem

Actually in the argument I give at the beginning, I am speaking of exhaustive explanations as opposed to something as general as "knowledge."

Wouldn’t it have to exhaust something, in order to circumvent such infinite regress illusions as the dreaded homunculus argument? — Mww

In the context of what we are dealing with here, I don't think the fact that we cannot in principle make the Subject an Object for-itself (while retaining its Subjective character) threatens us with an infinite chain of homunculi. The grounding of the "Self" in the "Subject" saves us from the vicious regress that would ensue if someone were to ask, "What is my Self?" and the interlocutor replies, "Your Self is your mind?" or "Your Self is your body."

I agree with you here. The represented "I" that we "know" in "Self-consciousness" (pardon the expression) is not the "concrete" knowing Subject, rather it is an abstraction that does not exhaust the "transcendental" character of the Subject. This is why The Subject cannot be given an exhaustive Objective description in exclusively Objective terms.

The "Objectified Subject" is not The Subject, rather it is "Subject'" (which is not identical to the Subject doing the knowing). It is purely an Object of consciousness. If relations always have at least two terms, and knowledge is a relation, then all "knowledge" relations have at least two terms. One term alone cannot enter into or constitute a relation.

Edit: Here is a link to the diagram (the image wasn't popping up in the previous comment)
Diagram

I would argue that it is not self-undermining. When I speak of my "I", I am unable to ostensively point to it or describe it as I would an Object. Whatever I know as an Object can describe in Objective terms that distinguishes my "Self" from what I am describing. The Subject as Subject cannot be described in Objective terms because that which would be described is going to be an abstraction (such as an Object of thought or reflection) in the Subject's consciousness. Here is a diagram that might make things more clear:

Well that's a petty dismissal. Nowhere in any of my posts have I mentioned god or arguments for god. Also, regarding the bivalent equivalence and identical equality issue, I think your reading too much into the use of "if and only if." Surely we would agree that X can be given an exhaustive description exclusively in terms of Y iff all aspects of X satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for an exhaustive description exclusively in terms of Y.

If we restrict the meaning of "self-knowledge" to the Subject making itself an Object of knowledge while retaining its "Subject-hood," then yes, "self-knowledge" would be impossible in principle. The reason for this is that the Subject is unable to make itself an Object for-itself while retaining its Subjectival character without positing a new Subject to apprehend this newly posited Object, and this new Subject would be the one doing the "knowing." I don't think we need to limit that ancient maxim to something as confined and restricted to something as technical as the Subject-Object dichotomy.

Why haven’t u considered the subjective aspect of consciousness originating from the objective one, thus rephrasing the first premise roughly:
A phenomenon can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all its aspects can be related to an Object(s)-for-a-Subject. — Vanbrainstorm

This is a very interesting idea, and I have spent a great deal of time thinking about whether or not such an explanation can do justice to the whole and its manifold aspects. If Q originates from P, then Q could be given a "reductive" explanation that exhaustively explains every aspect of Q exclusively in terms of P. Your rephrasing of the first premise seems to permit Q's "relation" to P as the necessary and sufficient condition for an exhaustive explanation of Q exclusively in terms of P. I don't think that merely "relation" simpliciter warrants such a conclusion. Take, for example, John and Mary, a husband and a wife respectively. The John and Mary enter into an internal relation (i.e. that of matrimony) and this would mean that John is the husband of Mary, and Mary is a wife of John. If John were to die, John's death would change Mary's relationship to John (because of the internal relation). Mary would become a widow. The relation is symmetrical and effects both terms that have entered into the relation. Going back to your rephrasing to the first premise, I would have to disagree that a mere "relation" satisfies the conditions necessary for an exhaustive explanation of Q that is exclusively in terms of P. Tornadoes and Hurricanes are both weather phenomena (and thus are related to one another by virtue of both being weather phenomena), yet no one would say that you could exhaustively explain hurricanes exclusively in terms of tornadoes. This is why I think there is a significant difference between my first premise and your rewriting of it.

My first premise:

P1) A phenomenon can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all its aspects can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject. — PessimisticIdealism

Your rewriting of it:

A phenomenon can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all its aspects can be related to an Object(s)-for-a-Subject. — Vanbrainstorm

If the Subjective aspect of consciousness is reducible to the Objective aspect of consciousness, then the Subjective aspect of consciousness could be given an Objective description that exhausts the Subjective aspect's subjectival character. If you can exhaustively explain Q exclusively in terms of P, that implies you can exhaustively describe Q exclusively in terms of P. In fact, an explanation of anything would presuppose a description of what is to be explained. If Q cannot be exhaustively described exclusively in terms of P, then Q is not identical to P, because P can be exhaustively described exclusively in terms of P. Before going further into this, I'll wait for your response.

I can't tell what you are trying to get at here.

Your objection seems to rest on a misunderstanding of what is meant by "Subject" and "Object." All "Knowledge" is a relationship between a knowing "Subject" and a known "Object." Whatever is an "Object" is merely something that is either known or knowable by a "Subject." If something is an "Objective" state, then it can become an Object-for-a-Subject in principle. The "in principle" is very important. All of our knowledge about a physical state is by virtue of a relation between the physical state (which is the "Object") and a knower (i.e. a "Subject").

I'd love to see you guys tear his "treatise" to pieces with facts and logic, epic style.

Of course we are responsible for our actions; however, he's saying that we own actions in the same way that we can own a table or a chair. He claims that actions can be bought and sold as "services," despite the fact that in the business world, "services" are not owned by anyone--they are simply performed. He reifies "actions" and thus ends up making a categorical error. Actions and objects occupy distinct ontological classes.

Ancap_Society claims to have discovered an "apodictic proof" of self-ownership. His writing is mostly incoherent; however, I'll copy and paste several important ideas that are central to his entire pseudo-philosophy.

"Action Ownership: The Scientific Proof
Many have challenged my postulation and conclusion that actions are necessarily owned. A number of attacks have been directed at the assertion; so this essay is entirely necessary to reveal further and scrutinize the rationale in the goal of ascertaining an apodictic statement on the nature of action.
First we must define our terms.
Entities: That which exists within space-time, following the requirements of dimensional consequences that can be perceptually detected.
Action: An event in time and space with dimensional characteristics that are perceivable.
Ownership: The demonstrated nature of ultimately exclusive power over and dimensional responsibility for an entity.
Event: An interaction between entities that is perceivable.
Both events and actions can be described as a number of energy state changes for objects."

"How does an individual human necessarily “own” their individual action?
When a conscious agent perpetrates an event they do so based on some conditional preference. This conditional preference can be anything from blinking to flirting with a prospective sexual partner. These events are physically observable insofar that one can perceive their existence and describe their distinct dimensional consequences."

"In conclusion, the events perpetrated by conscious entities can themselves be described as independently existing phenomena that possess the descriptive qualifier of “Ownership” as the individual body reveals autonomy in its discernment of preferential events and its perpetration of them. Therefore, actions which are events which have observable physical properties that are perpetrated by conscious agents based on conditional preferences have an agent of which expresses exclusive power over and responsibility for the events dimensional consequences. Actions are entities with discernible and observable space-time characteristics and thusly do exist as a phenomena and therefore can be owned.

Entities in my discernment of epistemology and oncology are that which exist within space time; actions or events to some cannot be entities due to their intangible nature. This premise of my critics suffers when scientific analysis is employed. Events are merely fast state changing entities relative to conscious observers and objects are slow state changing entities relative to conscious observers making them existing phenomena which can necessarily be owned by autonomous and conscious agent based on sole perpetration/creation. This is true as the agent of perpetration is completely incremental to the fast state change of energy known as action."

Anticipated rebuttal: “Events occur, entities exist.” The error in this attempted epistemological discernment is the failure to realize that in order for an event to occur there must be entities of interaction present. We do not perceive a rolling shutter gap between the position of a hand in the action of waving, rather we perceive a motion that required the transfer of physical energy in a system that has dimensional consequences and limitations to get hand through subsequent position to its planned position by the operator of the hand. Electro chemical impulses in the arm, spinal cord and brain are the physical phenomena responsible for the occurrence of such an event and are thusly the physical entities the occurrence of an event require, making the event an entity subsequently. In conversation one would not say the stabbing of Caesar exists, it makes convoluted communication, rather they would say it occurred; this is the limitation of the modes of language. The stabbing was an existing entity in a certain state that possessed distinct physical elements of action wherein impulses occur in the brain and spinal cord to make the knife enter the said victim. The event is perceptually present and therefore exists as an entity in changing states. We say occurrence or has occurred because it makes sense to describe an event with such languages for we are referring to a set of actions. The physical nature in both its execution and dependence cannot be denied, this does not mean you can hold an action but rather it can be produced and observed and is therefore an entity reliant interaction. All entities in interactions must subject onto each other a force in order for the occurrence to be qualified as an interaction. Subject A stabbing subject B is by all logic and science an event of physical phenomena. Interactions can be measured, they possess distinct physical qualities and are therefore entities reliant on two or more bodies interacting.

Anticipated rebuttal: “Fast state relationships vs slow change objects.”
There is a special pleading fallacy committed by the critiques of my theory of action ownership, wherein one claims that an object that they can touch can be owned and the event of moving one’s arm cannot be. This is a failure to recognize that the particular energy conversion demonstrated in an action is merely the entities path, just as the object has dimensional consequences subject too and contingent upon space-time so to do the chemical electrical, relationship between that of the spinal cord and that of the moving arm. When one moves their arm from position A to position B they move through subsequent positions based on the movement upward(In this particular case) and flow of energy is directed by the autonomous agent. This energy movement is occurring in what I refer to as a fast state change. This energies direction and form are being directed in a relationship which is relative to conscious observers as “Fast.” The matter in the situation of the arms movement is converted to another form wherein it is not necessarily realized that the energy has shifted. An observer wouldn't call this relationship an object and they’d be correct in that it is not necessarily an object; it is however the objects path based on its nature as a particular object.

One claims that the tangibility of the apple makes it an existing entity and the intangibility of the action makes it a non-existing phenomena; this is based solely on tangibility and disregards entirely that the action is necessarily an event of the objects nature existing contingent of the object itself. The action can be observed and measured just as the apple can, but one is applying existence to the apple based on its perceptually slower transfer of energy into a state change compared to the actions relatively faster energy state change. This is a special pleading fallacy as one is saying based on the tangibility of apple that it exists over the action which necessarily has dimensional consequences and can be perceived just as the apple can be. We don’t need to touch Jupiter to know its there, just as we do not need to touch gravity waves to know that they’re there, we can detect them just as we can detect action/events.

The Grant Exclusion Principle: Based on the Pauli Exclusion Principle a principle of quantum mechanics that generally states that a fermion in a given state “excludes other fermions of the exact same type from that exact state (ex: if electron A is in the exact state of A within a given system then electron A* is "excluded" from that exact state A). The dependent variables of actions are the objects that are involved in the interactions the energy that is transferred between the objects in the interaction, the space in which the interaction occurs and the time over which it occurs; thus actions while enduring some of the same spatiotemporal degrees as objects, actions have more degrees of freedom then objects do. Action in the GEP(Grant Exclusion Principle) follow the same nature and reasoning of the Pauli Exclusion Principle; as actions can possess similar energy transfers and even identical spatiotemporality, two or more actions cannot possess all of these variables with identical magnitudes, simultaneously. Thus, given some action for these variables, other actions are excluded from the exact same state of variables.

I'll provide an overview of several of my arguments in the next comment.

That a proposition isn't certain is not a reason to assume its negation. — Sophisticat

I’m not assuming its negation, rather I am saying it’s a meaningless proposition.

“Are you asking how do we know things independent of knowing? That would be a silly question.” — Harry Hindu

It is indeed an absurd question; however, the question is simply a response the absurd statement “knowing makes no difference to what is known.” In order for the realist’s claim to have any meaning, he must know that which he defines as unknown. In other words, he claims to have knowledge about that which he cannot—by his own definition—have knowledge about. He can’t support his claim by relying on his experience of “knowing x” because said experience would fall under the condition of “x being known;” it is impossible for him to prove that “knowing makes no difference to what is known” unless he takes it as gratuitous. With the development of quantum mechanics, we know that observation or measurement does in fact alter the being of an object—take Schrödinger’s Cat as an example. Therefore, if the realist takes “the being of X is independent of its being known” or “knowing makes no difference to what is known” as simply a “given” on faith. With that being said, the realist’s position is undermined by groundbreaking discoveries in the field of quantum mechanics which subsequently serve as evidence that go against the realist’s assertion that “knowing makes no difference to what is known.”

Whoops, I apologize. That was meant for @Wayfarer.

Well, unfortunately, you are interpreting the standard realist position wrongly.


You are exactly right, @Wayfarer.

What kind of realist are you then?

P1) That which lies within my consciousness is what I have immediate certainty of. (i.e. I am certain that what is presented in my consciousness is present in my consciousness—a tautology, but nevertheless certain).
P2) The foundation of a philosophical system should be based on that which is self-evident or most certain, in order to ensure the stability of the system as it grows in size. If we start from uncertain premises, we cannot be certain as to the system’s structural soundness.
C1) Therefore, that which lies within consciousness is an appropriate starting point for philosophical inquiry.
P3) It is neither self-evident nor certain that “the being of X is independent of its being known.”
C2) Therefore, philosophy should not begin with the assumption that “the being of X is independent of its being known.”

So my only disagreement is with your final conclusion. I think realism is the operating assumption for everyday communication and the growth of knowledge (and is therefore tenable) but is not, itself, something that is known to be true. — Andrew M

I should probably alter the conclusion to say something along the lines of: “The realist position is not self-evident because it is a synthetic proposition that requires experiential evidence that the realist cannot hope to provide without contradicting himself. Therefore, the realist must base this “axiom” on his faith in the continuity of nature alone.”

I basically agree. Practicality and efficiency render skepticism unhelpful in terms of getting on with our daily lives; however, this wouldn't by any means render the initial argument null and void.

It's like saying: "in order to know that I can't see the back of this screen, I must know that I'm not looking at the back of this screen. But I can only know that if I know what it looks like. Therefore, I must be able to see the back of this screen in order to say that I can't see it." — StreetlightX

I don’t think your argument is synonymous with the original argument I present. I’ll put your argument in premise form:

P1) In order to know whether or not I can see the back of this screen, I must know that I'm not looking at the back of this screen.
P2) I can only know whether or not I’m looking at the back of this screen” if I know what the back of the screen looks like.
C) Therefore, I must be able to see the back of this screen in order to say that I can't see it.

I think this can be refuted in a way that my first argument cannot be (Or at least I don't think this particular refutation would apply to the argument I have given. I could very well be wrong; however, the only counterargument I've seen is simply to assign the realist position as a self-evident axiom). Let me know if I have created a straw man out of your argument:

P1) The phone is a three-dimensional object.
P2) The side of a phone that has a screen is the “front.”
P3) If an object has a “front,” it is entailed that the object also has a “back.”
P4) “Front” and “back” are meaningless concepts if they are isolated from one another; this is evidenced by the fact that the terms are correlatives. We also see this with terms like “up” and “down,” “near” and “far,” and “left” and “right.” (The former term is meaningless without reference to the latter term, and the latter term is meaningless without reference to the former term).
P5) If I identify an object as having a “front,” I simultaneously assign a “back” to that object.
P6) I know that I am seeing the “front” of the phone because (i) I have identified the “front” of the phone as being the side of the phone with the screen and (ii) I am currently perceiving a screen, so I must be perceiving the“front” of the phone.”
P7) I know that I am not looking at the“back” of the phone, because I am looking at a screen.
P8) The side of a phone with a screen is the“front” of the phone.
C) Therefore, I know that I am looking at the “front” of the phone and not the “back” of the phone.

Right, and that axiom must be taken as a “given.” However, I wouldn’t say that giving the realist position the status of axiom renders it “off limits” to the skeptic who is unconvinced of its supposed “self-evidence.”