Really, I have my very own version of the absurdity of life? What's yours then? — TheMadFool

At least it does not coincide with Camus'. As I said, the absurd is above all a feeling. I sometimes feel like Camus. But not always. I'm not sure about your idea of absurd.

I wonder how general the idea of Camusian absurdity is. Does it encompass all desires? — TheMadFool

No. He only refers to those problems that are pressing for the human being in general and each one in particular.The fact of not hitting a pool or finding that there are no tickets for the theatre does not cause the absurdity that Camus spoke of.

Well, you do read your Bible. But in reading your Bible so closely you collide with the fact that you are not reading the Bible at all. You're reading a translation. And that is the problem. — tim wood

Even if you are reading the original Greek, you must be an expert in the popular Greek of the time (Koine) to understand certain passages that translators interpret in different ways. That is, even if you are an expert in the language of the Gospels, you must be confronted with different versions in different manuscripts and other experts who translate the same passage in different ways. Sometimes these are important for understanding the message.

The least you can think of is that God chose a very strange way to publish His message. It is as if I were writing this in Aramaic. I think you would have every right to protest or doubt my honesty or intelligence. Since none of them can be doubted in the case of God, all that remains is to manifest, once again, that the Lord's designs are absolutely inscrutable. And to move on to another subject that is intelligible.

Of course, a believer will tell us that he solves the riddle with faith, but he can only explain the solution to those who have the same faith. My option continues to be to greet the believer attentively and move on to another subject. As long as the belief in the believer does not attack me in any way, of course.

Our faith in Christ was/is/probably will be based on a certain set of miracles Christ performed — TheMadFool

I find it not so hard to understand the difference between in and of. There is the faith OF Christ as possessed and revealed by him culminating in his Resurrection and the faith IN Christ which Paul internalized — Tliusin

I agree.
The epistles attributed to Paul never or hardly ever mention any miracle. At least, they do not mention the spectacular miracles of which the Gospels are full. Paul's faith seems to be centered on a personal call from the Christ. And that is enough to believe the absurdities of a religion that reason rejects, according him. Therefore, there seems to be a faith based on an overabundance of miracles and a faith based on inner persuasion. Are they the same faith? That would have to be discussed, but it does not seem to be the issue now. They are the same in that they are beliefs inspired by anti-reason.

Therefore, my definition is clear in the traditional philosophical sense: a belief that is unjustified or even contrary to reason.
To say that faith is trust in something is confusing, because no one would call trust in natural laws 'faith'. Unless it is said metaphorically, by partial similarity.

Thanks for the clarification although the meaninglessness of Sisyphus' task seems to be the condition that the rock rolls down on every occasion - the futility of his effort is what Sisyphus' meaningless existence is about, no? — TheMadFool

As for the absurdity of life, it only is so if one seeks some kind of higher purpose understood in the sense of being a significant part of, having a role in, something "bigger" than yourself. — TheMadFool

You are giving your own version of the absurd. This is not Camus' idea. For Camus the absurd is a feeling that emerges when man notices the unsolvable contradiction between his desires and reality. This is not something he can resolve by avoiding the contradiction. The contradiction is. For example: Camus was seriously ill since his adolescence. This was a constant threat until his death and prevented him from doing what he loved most in his life: playing football. Death itself is a sign of the common absurdity. Everyone will be immortal. Everyone knows that he will die. Other contradictions between desires and the real world are less dramatic but are constantly present in human life. These are what we can call irremediable frustrations. When this affects essential levels in important psychological and moral fields, we are faced with absurdity.

It is the rock that everyone carries with them. If the rock goes up and down it is not because you feel absurd in a psychological sense. It is the symbol of a real situation that you cannot change in the essential.

I'm only drawing your attention to the possible fact that what you see as faith-based beliefs may not actually be that - they could simply be habits learned through repetition in — TheMadFool

In your example faith (belief without justification) is caused (motivation) by habit. In this example habit is the cause, faith is the effect.

What prevents you or me or anyone from assuming things, anything at all - propositions, theories, whatnot? — TheMadFool

Does consistency in itself justify, is it a measure of, truth? — TheMadFool

Can I not choose i.e. assume one of them to be true even though I have absolutely no rationale to do so? — TheMadFool

What exactly is your point? — TheMadFool

Nothing prevents you from having a hypothesis if you do not take it as a certainty. Hypotheses must be tested, assumptions must be justified. Meanwhile, a hypothesis only delimits the field of possibilities. Only experience can turn a hypothesis into law, an assumption into knowledge. A hypothesis can be evaluated when experience has not yet come to its aid or when experience gives the same support to the opposite hypothesis. Here coherence plays a fundamental role. An inconsistent hypothesis is immediately discarded. Empirical confirmation is not necessary under these conditions. Ockham's razor is one criterion among others in the contrast phase of the opposite hypothesis. It is not a criterion of truth in itself. I agree with you. In reality there is no single criterion of truth. Scientists play with different supports for one or another hypothesis. Hypotheses are rarely definitive. This introduces some degree of intuition into science and this is what makes science interesting for many of them.

What I say about the hypothesis is also valid for common assumptions at a lower level of exigency. In my opinion, common knowledge is an imperfect variant of scientific knowledge. Therefore, an assumption may obtain some rational or non-rational justification. In the first case it is knowledge. In the second case it is faith or something similar.

Science and common knowledge do not produce any absolute certainty, although some legal propositions are so obvious that they can be considered absolutely certain for practical purposes. Faith is not knowledge. No certainty can be drawn from faith.

This is what I mean when I speak of reasonable principles.

I don't know how to respond to this or if I can whether it'll be good enough to lessen our burden. — TheMadFool

Sisyphus' rock doesn't symbolize for Camus a particular burden that you can avoid. It is the absurdity of life itself. The only way to get rid of the rock is to commit suicide. This is what Camus discusses in his book.

It looks like it's not true that the various categories you mentioned above actually believe in the thing they're supposed to — TheMadFool

I have no reason to think that, generally speaking, those who believe in a violent or compassionate god have other different reasons than their belief in that god. Another thing is that you think their beliefs are confusing or that they are at odds with the idea of a god that you believe in. But that is another matter. We are now discussing what is the base of those beliefs that you can think are confusing or wrong. Or not.

What prevents them from spilling over into other domains like life and living it? — TheMadFool

I don't know if I understood the question correctly. 'Spill over` puzzles me a little (damn phrasal verbs!). Can you change the verb? Do you mean 'apply to'? My answer follows this idea:

Natural sciences are not governed by 'axioms' because these are immovable principles, apart from the use of mathematics as an axiomatic-deductive system that applies to experience, which has the last word. That is why the theory of relativity or quantum mechanics has superseded or modified the principles of Newtonian physics. An axiom, on the contrary, is never touched. If in physics it happens like this, in our daily life, that we have principles less supported by evidence than in natural science, it is not and should not be an untouchable principle either. That is what a true believer is not willing to touch: the commandments of his god, faith in his god or the image of his god. If he does so, all his beliefs will collapse and that is not easy to bear.

Last I heard there's no end insofar as "to question our principles" is concerned. Munchhausen trilemma? — TheMadFool

The Munchausen trilemma disappears if we stop looking for absolute principles and look for reasonable principles.

faith isn't all that popular. — TheMadFool

Except among Episcopalians, Papists, Muslims, Hindus, Shintoists, animists, Scientologists and a long etcetera that adds up to a few billion human beings. If we add those who have faith in Hitler, Trump, Bolsonaro, Putin and other lesser fools, we are a handful of 'foolish' rationalists (be worth the paradox).
I think that the Age of Enlightenment is still to come... if climate change lets it. Which I doubt, to my regret.

Axioms, by definition, lack reasons for belief. — TheMadFool

Of course. That is why axioms are only valid in formal sciences. In our knowledge of facts, scientific or vulgar, rationalism demands us to question our principles. This is one reason why there are only a handful of people who try to be a coherent rationalist. It is more comforting to have a a digestive wisdom that promises us eternal happiness than to be a materialist who claims that after death there is nothing but death. As Dostoevsky said, if someone shows me that God does not exist I will continue to believe that Christ was God.
This is the faith of the submissive and Paul of Tarsus. The only ones who will go to heaven along with the jihadists and other religious serial killers.

This is one of the reasons/motives.

Meaningless only in the sense that one wasn't conferred to you by, you know, a "higher power" whatever that means to you. — TheMadFool

When he wrote The Myth of Sisyphus Camus believed that life had no meaning, neither objective nor subjective. Not only that, but the human being lived in contradiction with the world (that is the absurd). This is the image of Sisyphus, condemned to the eternal exhausting and useless work of climbing a rock that falls as soon as it reaches the top. Both in The Stranger and in Caligula he tries to illustrate this idea and the result is an impression of permanent anguish. Camus' claim that this situation can produce some kind of happiness is unconvincing. He himself tried to counteract it in later works, but at the end of his life it reappeared in his diaries and in some stories in Exile and the Kingdom. It doesn't seem that he got rid of it completely.

In my opinion, the image of Sisyphus' absurd work is disturbing and difficult to erase. Because I don't think any happiness can be drawn from it. At some point in our lives one feels like a little Sisyphus. And then, what do you do?

I did not know that about Dostoevsky — The Questioning Bookworm

What do you think of someone that writes things like these? :

On the contrary, everyone knew that in his pious heart the liberating Tsar was making common cause with his people. Everyone waited with emotion and hope that the tsar would express his will, that his voice would be heard, while we, retired to our corners, rejoiced that the great Russian people had justified their immense and eternal hope that they had placed in him. (Diary of a Writer, 1877)

The virtue of the Russian woman is submission to her husband at all costs. (Diary of a Writer, August 1880).

If someone could prove to me that Christ is out of the truth, and if the truth really excluded Christ, I would prefer to stay with Christ and not with the truth. (Letter to Mrs. Fonvizina, 20 Feb. 1854).

But the Jews refused the correction and remained in all their former narrowness and inflexibility, and therefore instead of pan- humanness have turned into the enemies of humanity. (Letter to Yulia Abaza, June 1880)

Ah, Dostoevsky, my favorite. I agree with your insights here on both of these philosophers. — The Questioning Bookworm

I am not sure that we agree on Dostoevsky's assessment. As a novelist he is an undoubted genius. As a thinker, he became fanatized because of his traumatic experience in Siberia. He is a classic case of Stockholm syndrome. His chauvinism, tsarism, anti-Semitism and anti-liberalism are easy to criticize. It is often said that they have no consequences in his writings. I don't think so. If we lose sight of the fact that Dostoevsky was an irrational Slavophile fundamentalist, we lose sight of half of what he wrote.

The same thing happens if we leave aside Camus' anti-communist colonialism.

I think we have to be consistent and recognise that literary admiration doesn't have to imply ideological admiration. Both Dostoevsky and Camus were contradictory characters, tormented by lights and shadows. More the first than the second, of course.

Why is it "because" in both cases? I — TheMadFool

The word 'reason' means two different things:
a) The cause or motive for something to have happened.
b) The ability to reach valid conclusions according to the facts and logic.

That is why I can say without redundancy that the reason for having done something (in the first sense) is reason (in the second sense). In the same way I can say without contradiction that the reason for doing something is not reasonable. It would be clearer if we talk about motives and rational arguments.

There is a difference. In your example: a biological impulse (thirst) can lead me to drink water that reason advises me not to drink because it is contaminated. This is not an unusual example. Men often do things under biological or emotional impulses that reason advises against.

I am not discussing logic or epistemology, but the psychological impact of reason as motivation versus other reasons. That is, not about whether someone is right or wrong in his or her thinking, but about the 'cause' of what he or she thinks.

You seem to mix both aspects of the issue (reasons and arguments) in your last paragraph. If a certain question is undecidable for logical reasons, the logical position is to refrain from all judgement, i.e. scepticism. Preference would be a subjective matter in the same way that someone may prefer red to blue. But the subjective choice to believe or not to believe in gods has objective consequences. And these consequences must be discussed rationally.

By the way, I don't believe that there is no rational evidence about gods’ existence. I think there are rational arguments against the existence of gods that justify disbelief.

Rationality consists in being open to the possibility of evidence against our belief.

What are these? — TheMadFool

Rational: you decide to buy in a shop because it sells the same products at a better price than another.

Biological: You drink water because you are thirsty.

I guess it's things like that. It is not that emotions do not play a role in all (or almost all) motives, but sometimes we choose against them because we have other kinds of motives that weigh more. Like the one I just put above.

It might be totally reasonable to assume, on faith, certain truths and, theories — TheMadFool

If one belief is more reasonable than another, it ceases to be faith by definition. Faith consists in believing for the sake of it, even in what is absurd, as Paul of Tarsus said --he should know what he was talking about.

You mean that there are rational arguments for believing in God. For example, when Pascal uses the argument of the bet, his belief in God is no longer due to his faith and becomes an attempt at proof. Badly founded, in my opinion, but I don't want to discuss this now, because it would take us off topic.

Every position, whether it is "religious, political, philosophical" or otherwise, begins and relies on some founding axiom or inherent principle, whether or not one wishes to use the word "faith" or otherwise". — IvoryBlackBishop

Common humans in common situations do not use axiomatic belief systems. Therefore, I assume that your mention of "axioms" is merely metaphorical. I suppose every human believes in some things without strict evidence of them. If this is what you mean, I would agree with you.

But not all beliefs ("axioms") have the same degree of evidence. If we abandon the criterion of black or white evidence, we can recognize some strong and justified beliefs against others that are not justified.

For example, I cannot personally present any evidence for the curvature of the Erth (my mathematical and physical knowledge are limited) but I believe that my belief in what physicists say is justified in front of the defenders of the flat Earth. Is it not?

Faith (I mean believing by faith) is a typical unjustified belief. It is not sustained by any rational indication but only by emotional desire. It is not the same as any other belief.

Isn't that a tautology? — TheMadFool

I don't think so. Psychologists also talk about rational or biological motivation.

I'm more inclined to think faith is a mode of belief acquisition but it's no secret that it has emotional underpinnings. — TheMadFool

Faith is the motive for believing in a god. They believe that a god exists because of their faith. Since it is not a rational or biological motivation, I believe it is an emotional motivation to believe.

No one, including philosophers and other breeds of thinkers from the world of science and other fields, will ever undertake anything worthwhile if fae doesn't have a stake in it whatever that may be. — TheMadFool

What does "fae" mean? Fairy?

If I can translate this in my own way - with or without fairies - I would say that men would do nothing - knowledge included - without emotional motivation. Faith is a kind of emotional motivation. But motivation is not knowledge. You can believe in many things, but none of them is knowledge if you cannot justify it sufficiently.

But then why did you refer to Pyrrho as a "joke"? To my knowledge, Pyrrho is all about uncertainty, expressible mathematically as confidence levels regarding the conclusions of arguments with values less than 100%. — TheMadFool

What is known about Pyrrhon is basically through Diogenes Laertius, who doesn't mention mathematics at all, much less the mathematical probabilities of truth - this is a concept that comes much later than Pyrrhon. If you read what Laertius says (the ninth book of the Lives of Illustrious Philosophers) you will realise that he is full of "striking" anecdotes that present him as a character of integrity, but rather as an extravagant one. That is why I said that it is like a "joke" among philosophers.
As Theodosius (quoted by Laercio) says in his time, nothing is known about Pyrrhon's "disposition", so Pyrrhonians should be called "pyrrhonist-like".

Are you absolutely certain? Between 0% and 100%, what is the level of your certainty in the statement you just made? — TheMadFool

Agreed but is there a kind of justification that guarantees with absolute certainty the truth of anything, anything at all? — TheMadFool

There is no absolute certainty outside the formal sciences.
In any case, my certainty about almost everything is not quantifiable. I am not speaking in mathematical terms.

I suspect this thread is what happens when one's diet is solely tertiary texts. — Banno

Do you have a first-hand interpretation or do you talk for talking's sake?

The statement is not hidden (in Foucault's sense) — Number2018

For example, in "The will to power," the discursive formation of various verbal performances of ''sexuality'' is not hidden nor visible. — Number2018

Indeed, Foucault gives a very particular meaning to "visible" and "hidden". I don't think your interpretation makes much sense. Rather, you have to read this:

Although the statement cannot be hidden, it is not visible either; it is
not presented to the perception as the manifest bearer of its limits and
characteristics. It requires a certain change of viewpoint and attitude to be
recognized and examined in itself Perhaps it is like the over-familiar that
constantly eludes one; those familiar transparencies, which, although they
conceal nothing in their density, are nevertheless not entirely clear. The
enunciative level emerges in its very proximity. (AoK:110)

That is to say, we must not believe that the meaning of a discourse is something evident in the explicit sense of it, nor hidden in the sense of its secondary meanings, whether of a social or psychic order. There is not a reason to find it in class ideology -Marxism- or in the libido and its symbolism -psychoanalysis. The meaning of discourse, however, is hidden, in the common sense of the word, because it is so manifest -in the common sense of the word- that it is so visible that we do not see it. We need to adopt Foucault's (post?) structuralist method that reveals a system behind the words to recognize it. It would be enough to change our perspective to say "Come on! It was this and not that!" Too simplistic an explanation in my opinion. When we see what we didn't see because it was too familiar, we intuitively go for it. This is not the case with Foucaulian theory, which seems and is quite debatable.

The primary criterion for the existence of ‘the statement in itself” is the manifestation of its repetition, or, more precisely, its inherent variation. — Number2018

Does Foucault succeed in avoiding a pure metaphysical founding of the statement existence? — Number2018

And how his method is different from an empirical contextual analysis? — Number2018

I believe that Foucault is going directly to a post-structuralist and clearly metaphysical concept of structure ("system"). This is partly due to his gratuitous elimination of the role of the subject in the creation of discourse. This makes discourse an entity that directs me like a talking automaton, due to structural laws that do not seem to have their justification in the empirical, but in a very diffuse concept. It is enough to see the way in which he dissociates the discursive structure from the semantic and contextual content in the first text I have placed above.

He compels us to question language, in the “dimension” that gives it; turn one's attention to the “moment” that determines its unique and limited existence.To replace more or less precise concepts such as reference, meaning or truth with other nebulous ones such as moment, solidification or direction is to take us to the terrain of the typical confusion of post-rationalist metaphysics that is so comfortable in post-modernism.

The postulation of a "knowledge" prior to humanity in the amoebas and DNA already goes directly to mysticism. But I don't have time now to talk about this. I would like to do so.

I am abolishing all interiority in that exterior that is so indifferent to my life, and so neutral, that it makes no distinction between my life and my death — Number2018

It is disclosed, and found out under the chosen phrases and prepositions, behind their ''natural'' meaning and logic. Therefore, the 'initial' meaning becomes transformed. — Number2018

Are these quotes from Focuault or your interpretation?

I suppose if one factors in Pyrrhonism, every belief is faith-based in way or another. The only difference then between faith-based beliefs and justified beliefs is in spirit and not in letter, if that makes any sense? — TheMadFool

First of all: no one really believes in Pyrrhonism. Pyrrho is a character of philosophical joke or a way of putting sticks in the wheel of absolute rationalism. It should not affect anyone with common sense (even if they are rationalists).

That said, even if we admit that the basis of all knowledge is in some kind of belief, not all beliefs have the same kind or degree of justification. Belief in the flat Earth is less justified than belief in the law of gravity. This is due to a unanimously accepted criterion: that empirical evidence carries weight in justifying a belief.

The problem with justifying a belief lies in the ability to rely on beliefs that meet certain requirements. We call these beliefs 'knowledge'. I do not believe that belief in God is counted among them. In any case, not if it is based on "faith" .

I think that in order to know where Foucault is going the following two texts are interesting:

Another reason: the 'signifying' structure of language (Iangage) always
refers back to something else; objects are designated by it; meaning is in­
tended by it; the subject is referred back to it by a number of signs even if
he is not himself present in them. Language always seems to be inhabited
by the other, the elsewhere, the distant; it is hollowed by absence. Is it not
the locus in which something other than itself appears, does not its own
existence seem to be dissipated in this function? But if one wishes to des­
cribe the enunciative level, one must consider that existence itself;
question language, not in the direction to which it refers, but in the
dimension that gives it; ignore its power to designate, to name, to show, to
reveal, to be the place of meaning or truth, and, instead, turn one's
attention to the moment - which is at once solidified, caught up in the
play of the 'signifier' and the 'signified' - that determines its unique and
limited existence. In the examination of language, one must suspend, not
only the point of view of the 'signified' (we are used to this by now), but
also that of the 'signifier', and so reveal the fact that, here and there, in
relation to possible domains of objects and subjects, in relation to other
possible formulations and re-uses, there is language. (AoK:111)

A system must be understood as a set of relationships that are maintained and transformed independently of the things that link them together. It has been shown, for example, that Roman, Scandinavian and Celtic myths make very different gods and heroes appear, but that the organisation that links them, their hierarchies, their rivalries, their betrayals, their contracts, their adventures obeyed (in cultures that ignored each other) a single system. Recent discoveries in prehistoric times also show that a systematic organisation presides over the arrangement of the figures drawn on the walls of the caves. In biology, it is known that in the chromosomal material are encoded, as a coded message, all the genetic indications that will allow the development of the future being. Lacan's importance lies in the fact that he showed that it is the structures, the language system itself - and not the subject - that speak through the discourse of the patient and the symptoms of his neurosis. Before any human existence, before any human thought, there would already be a knowledge, a system that we rediscovered (Michel Foucault. Interview with Madeleine Chapsal : La Quinzaine littéraire, No. 5, 16 May 1966, pp. 14-15) Translation is mine.

I would like to comment on them if you find them interesting as well.

This 'means’ that we should avoid doing this: for Foucault, there is no ‘natural context’ that could ‘throw light on to statement’s meaning.’ — Number2018

This seems to contradict this:

Lastly, what we have called 'discursive practice' can now be defined
more precisely. (...)it is a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined
in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given
social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of
operation of the enunciative function. (AoK, III, 3: 117)

“Determined in time and space” in “a given period” and for “social, economic”, etc. "area", is what is usually understand as context.
Is it a real contradiction in Foucault or in your interpretation?

the statement is neither visible nor hidden. — Number2018

The paragraph you quote (AoK:108-9) only says that a statement is not an isolate linguistic fact with an "autonomous" existence. That it is "neither visible nor hidden" is a paradox that needs to be explained or it will remain confuse. In common language hidden and visible are an exclusive alternative.
As Foucault himself says, it is a "difficult to sustain" thesis. And so much so. I don't think it is possible unless it is specified that the statement is not visible in one sense and hidden in another.
In fact, Foucault recognizes that a statement can have different -even antagonistic- meanings. Are they not the "hidden" part of an apparent statement? No, according Foucault, because the statement is the same "in itself". In itself? What is the "itself" of a statement?

"It is the modality of existence of the verbal performance as it has taken place". (Ibid: 110).

I confess this definition is not evident in two senses:

First: What means the modality of existence of a statement which is independent of its different possible meanings?
Second: If this modality is not hidden, how is it not visible?

Maybe you can explain this.

I think that your answer doesn't match my question.
See this:

Generally speaking, one can say that a sentence or a
proposition - even when isolated, even divorced from the natural context
that could throw light on to its meaning, even freed or cut off from all the
elements to which, implicitly or not, it refers - always remains a sentence
or a proposition and can always be recognized as such .
On the other hand, the enunciative function - and this shows that it is
not simply a construction of previously existing elements - cannot
operate on a sentence or proposition in isolation. It is not enough to say a
sentence, it is not even enough to say it in a particular relation to a field of
objects or in a particular relation to a subject, for a statement to exist: it
must be related to a whole adjacent field . (AoK: 97)

Warn this: even when isolated, even divorced from the natural context that could throw light on to its meaning (!)

Here there is an implicit recognition (?) that context (could?) change the meaning of a statement. How can it be said that a statement can be recognized without an external context?

I have the impression that the same context of Foucault's oeuvre (sorry!) guided his speech. His confrontation with Marxism led him to reject the identification of the subject of the statement as psychologically (author) and socially (class) conditioned. Therefore, the discourse appears as a (relatively) autonomous entity. I say "relatively" because in some accidental statements these extralinguistic contexts appear as submarines and reflect an ambiguous and untenable position.


Moreover, in his historical writings - which I know better - these contexts, emphatically rejected on a theoretical level, emerge with force. For example, the discourse of the human sciences is reviewed in Discipline and Punish in the context of the struggle against marginalized groups in modernity. Without social marginality and power strategies linked to productivity, this scientific discourse would have a different enunciative sense. And these are relevant contexts.

In fact, Foucault does not reject contextual analysis. He only defends his concept of enunciative discourse as a prior analysis. A totally philosophical position. Very debatable.

a primordial generative function that does not depend on external factors. — Number2018

Domain of material objects possessing a certain number of observable physical properties, a domain of fictitious objects , a domain of spatial and geographical localizations, a domain of symbolic appartenances and secret kinships;e a domain of objects that exist at the same moment and on the same time-scale as the statement is formulated, a domain of objects that belongs to a quite different present -
that indicated and constituted by the statement itself, laws of possibility, rules of existence.

These are Foucault's exact expressions in The Archaeology of Knowledge which constitute the domain of the enunciative value. Do they not refer to the context of the enunciation? Space, time, location are not external factors?

The concept of the generative function of language does not appear in The Archaeology of Knowledge,. Are you not applying alien concepts in your interpretation of Foucault? What do you mean with "generative function"?

It was not just about the contextuality of meaning. — Number2018

There is no statement that does not presuppose others; there is no statement that is not surrounded by a field of coexistences, effects of series and succession, a
distribution of functions and roles. — Number2018

I would say that these words of Foucault are equivalent to what is called in common language "context", both intralinguistic and extralinguistic. See below.

There is no mention of Austin in The Archaeology of Knowledge. You will refer to another book.

I have fouund a mention in La verdad y las formas jurídicas (Barcelona, 1984, p. 154), a book I know a little better, in which he mentions Wittgenstein and Austin:

What seems to me a little limited in the analysis of Strawson, Searle, etc. [Wittgenstein, Austin], is that they are strategy analyses of a discourse that is made around a cup of tea, in an Oxford salon, which are interesting strategy games, but which seem to me to be profoundly limited. The problem would be if you can't study strategy in a more real context, within practices that are different from salon conversations. Personal translation from the Spanish edition.

I would point out two things:
On the one hand, Foucault himself uses the word context to refer to the "field" of statements that forms a discourse. We are indeed talking about a problem of context.
Secondly, the difference between his theory and that of "Anglo-Saxon philosophers" does not seem to be one of theoretical principles, but rather of the backgrounds to which they apply, according Foucault himself. For my part, it seems to me that reducing Wittgenstein's context to the realm of "salon discussions" is a frivolity. Wittgenstein's writings on aesthetics and ethics, to cite one example, are something else.

There is a certain proximity in more than one point between Foucault's initial statements and some of the Wittgenstein's anthropological statements, which allows for a reading in which Wittgenstein's positions on life forms as the basis from which language acquires meaning and Foucault's theory are approached.

In fact, the differences between Searle and Foucault became narrower during the course of the epistolary exchange that both maintained. Finally, Foucault acknowledges : "As for the analysis of the acts of speech, I totally agree with your precisions. I was wrong to say that statements were not acts of speech, but in saying this I wanted to underline the fact that I consider them from a different angle than yours". (Letter from Foucault to Searle, 15 May 1979). Quoted by Maite Larrauri: Verdad y racionalidad en Michel Foucault, doctoral thesis, Universitat de València, Academic Year 1989-1990, p. 35

NOTE: I apologize for using Spanish bibliography. It is the one I usually use.

They do not determine a structure or a system; any rule applied is primarily determined by a current enunciative context and, simultaneously, changes this context. — Number2018

That is what I had more or less understood. I don't know much about structuralism, except Barthes (a little) and Althusser (less). I don't think they are closed to the consideration of how a linguistic system varies with context.
Certainly not Wittgenstein. See how in the second Wittgenstein words are defined by their use and this is inserted in a context of both linguistic and non-linguistic activities. Nor is it possible to speak of a single context since language comprises a multiplicity of functions.

It would have been nice if Foucault had mentioned the author or authors he was targeting with his criticism. But it is somewhat rare for famous philosophers to critically mention contemporary authors. They probably expose themselves to the discovery that they have not been seriously read them. This is often the case.

If Foucault's criticism refers only to the contextuality of meaning, it seems to me that it is not very original. I suspect that there is something else.

One can see in any case that the description of this enunciative level
can be performed neither by a formal analysis, nor by a semantic investiga­-
tion, nor by verification, but by the analysis of the relations between the
statement and the spaces of differentiation , in which the statement itself
reveals the differences. (Wittgenstein, Ibid, p. 92)

My mistake; this excerpt is by Foucault.

Are you referring to German conservatism before Nazism or the current conservative revolution?

In any case, although some concepts such as destiny, anti-scientism or authenticity may be related to Nazi, pre-Nazi and post-Nazi conservatism, Being and Time eludes these political questions raised in other later writings, such as the Rectoral speech.

Although the 1914 Black Notebooks already include some anti-Semitic paragraphs, it would be very difficult to see them reflected in Being and Time.

:roll: — Banno

:roll:??

It seems to me post modernism wants to root language and knowledge in biology and culture, which might put too much pressure on Wittgenstein's position for it to hold. — Gregory

In Wittgenstein's idea, the "analytical" philosopher is not concerned with language for its own sake, but with the epistemic values to which its uses point. Consequently, the role of grammatical systems is to manifest the multifaceted life and/or cultural perspectives that the human world allows us. In Wittgenstein there is a "metaphysical" background that is reflected in his diaries and conversations more conspicuously than in the Investigations or the Tractatus.

It seems to me post modernism wants to root language and knowledge in biology and culture, which might put too much pressure on Wittgenstein's position for it to hold. — Gregory

Foucault's opposition to analytical philosophy seems to be based on the fact that the analysis of language leaves out linguistic functions that are not restricted to the semantic meaning of a statement. This is something that no one, not even the analytical philosophers, denies. The problem is to specify what these "domains" are that "correlate" with the statement. Here is a list:

Domain of material objects possessing a certain number of observable physical properties, a domain of fictitious objects , a domain of spatial and geographical localizations, a domain of symbolic appurtenances and secret kinships; a domain of objects that exist at the same moment and on the same time-scale as the statement is formulated, a domain of objects that belongs to a quite different present -that indicated and constituted by the statement itself, laws of possibility, rules of existence.

The referential of the statement forms the place, the condition, the field of emergence, the authority to differentiate between individuals or objects, states of things and relations that are brought into play by the statement itself; it defines the possibilities of appearance and delimitation of that which gives meaning to the sentence, a value as truth to the proposition. It is this group that characterizes the enunciative level of the formulation. (Foucault: Ibid, p. 91)

I honestly see nothing that an analytical philosopher cannot accept in principle within the concept of meaning as use of language. What Foucault mentions are only some not strictly referential uses of language. Or I have not fully understood the scope of his proposal and someone can explain it to me better.

That's like being against motherhood. No one actually believes it, it's what folk say to get attention. — Banno

No one believes in analytical philosophy? Many philosophers believe in it or go on the same way.

Is he talking about Wittgenstein? I think so. — Pneumenon

Yes. In reality he is against all analytical philosophy and similar.

But to understand Foucault, if such a thing is possible, we should go to p. 90 ff. of The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York, Pantheon Books, 1972) where he explains his peculiar conception of "statement".
However, I doubt that it can be understood because he resorts to markedly metaphorical expressions that he does not explain ("field of emergence", "spaces of differentiation"...).

One can see in any case that the description of this enunciative level
can be performed neither by a formal analysis, nor by a semantic investiga­-
tion, nor by verification, but by the analysis of the relations between the
statement and the spaces of differentiation , in which the statement itself
reveals the differences. (Wittgenstein, Ibid, p. 92)

Perhaps someone can explain this Foucaulian entanglement. I would appreciate it.

What do you think? Is his sceptical argument valid? And is it sound? — Humelover

The way you explain it seems pretty confusing. The best thing is to go to Hume himself in his "Abstract", where he talks about himself in the third person. Hume states that there are three sources of knowledge: experience ("impressions"), relationships between concepts ("ideas") and
habits (cause, substance, principle of uniformity from the past, necessity…)

“The first proposition he [Hume] advances is that all our ideas,
or weak perceptions, are derivedfrom our impressions, or strong perceptions, and that we
can never think of anythingwhich we have not seen without us, or felt in our own minds.
This proposition seems tobe equivalent to that which Mr. Locke has taken such pains to
establish, viz. that no ideasare innate”. (Cursive by Hume)

“By all that has been said the reader will easily perceive that the philosophy contained in
this book is very sceptical, and tends to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow
limits of human understanding. Almost all reasoning is there reduced to experience; and
the belief, which attends experience, is explained to be nothing but a peculiar sentiment,
or lively conception produced by habit. Nor is this all; when we believe anything of exter
nal existence, or suppose an object to exist a moment after it is no longer perceived, this
belief is nothing but a sentiment of the same kind. Our author insists upon several other
sceptical topics; and upon the whole concludes that we assent to our faculties, and employ
our reason, only because we cannot help it. Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrho-
nian, were not nature too strong for it”. — Hume's Abstract, #6 y #27

If all knowledge comes from impressions, what are the relationships between ideas and habits?
The former only give coherence to our thinking. They indicate that something is greater or lesser that other or that you cannot affirm one thing and its opposite without contradicting yourself. They are merely formal.
The latter are not knowledge, strictly speaking, but mere habits, psychological habits, which come essentially from seeing the same impression constantly repeated. But they say nothing about reality.

Of course, all our knowledge of nature is based on these habits. We (almost) cannot think of a single natural law without the concept of cause, which is the one to which Hume devotes most time. But Hume seems to reduce them to nothing, pure belief.

Hume himself admits that his theory would be as sceptical as Pyrrho of Elis, the model of all scepticism, if it were not for the fact that nature comes to the rescue of knowledge. How?

Because when you have a rational and universally shared belief it would be absurd to do without it. This is a very simple principle, but it seems to be quite solid. At heart, all science is based on it. And it is the only way to bring down the solid edifice of pyrrhonean scepticism. In my opinion.

- Seeing that we are probably at the beginning of this capitalist expansion, where do you believe it is heading in the future (near or distance)?

- Do you view it as inevitable or is it something that is possible correctable (provided it actually needs correction)? — Mayor of Simpleton

You ask too much to my prediction skills. Santiago Niño-Becerra, a Spanish economist who appears a lot in the media, sets the climax in 2065. I find that suspiciously accurate. The end of capitalism seems to be a true trend, but trends change unexpectedly in history.

“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past". I subscribe to this idea. But I believe that, from what I have seen, the conditions are much stricter than an anarchist soul would like. The problem is to specify them. History is not an exact science. And I am not even a historian.

If this were indeed the case, why would such a notion of 'earned/deserved' not bleed over to health issues... making illness also earned/deserved? — Mayor of Simpleton

A sick person is only worth when he produces profits for the health industry. In the medieval cities there were mortuaries ("atriums") where the terminally ill were deposited and left to die. (This is not mentioned in Wikipedia ). Old people homes have become "atriums" to eternity now. Arguing with people who deny that "uneconomic" measures are the solution to the coronavirus pandemic, I have heard more than once: "But they don't die from the coronavirus, but because they were sick". In other words, a double reason to let them die: they were old and they were sick.
But don't doubt that if a laboratory discovers a vaccine it will sell it to us at three times its real price. Then the coronavirus patients will be valuable.

I also believe that business has been actively marketing nostalgia. — Mayor of Simpleton

Business sells us dreams: nostalgia, triumph (sexual and economic), security, feeling of power... And it actively associates them with brands. Now, football teams, T-shirts, food are not football teams, T-shirts or food, they are BRANDS. And there are a lot of fans who are able to spend their money and energy to buy an all-terrain vehicle, a mobile phone or trainers that they don't need. And if you tell him that he is making a fool of himself, he will hate you for the rest of his life, because he doesn't buy things anymore, but BRANDS. Heard over the loudspeaker of a supermarket: "If you like brands, we have..." Read in Murakami's novels: all the characters can be identified by the brands of clothes they wear, the car they drive...
We are at the beginning of the end of capitalism and the dawn of the corporate system. Which will be worse. I am afraid.

examples like: Mouvement des gilets jaunes - 'yellow vests' - — Mayor of Simpleton

The "gillets jaunes" are not very important. They are the classic outbreaks of social dissatisfaction that can only be expressed by irrational and ephemeral violence. Before they were "anarchists", "Black Block", etc. I think we should look more at the dominant trends that have nothing "left" about them. They are essentially conformists. And I say this with regret because we need a more consistent rebellion.

I always wished to categorize myself as being somewhat apolitical, but that sort of position seems no longer and option. — Mayor of Simpleton

The "gillets jaunes" are not very important. They are the classic outbreaks of social dissatisfaction that can only be expressed by irrational and ephemeral violence. Before they were "anarchists", "Black Block", etc. Scarecrows. I think we should look more at the dominant trends that have nothing "left" about them. They are essentially conformists. And I say this with regret because we need a more consistent rebellion.

Go ahead, old man! The world if yours!”
— Babbit — Mayor of Simpleton

It seems to me that Sinclair Lewis was a better social critic than a novelist, but that also has its merit. (I found the dissection of deep America in Main Street very impressive). I haven't read Babbit, but it will have to be done, I suppose.

What was my contribution and value to the greater good of humanity?' — Mayor of Simpleton

Producing things that are now worth money, a mercantilist would say. What could we say against such an implacable logic?

Funny thing here is that we totally agree, yet differ in many aspects. Quite curious... — Mayor of Simpleton

Well, then we don't agree on everything. Fortunately.