It seems to me that scientific practice rarely requires meditation upon the fundamental nature of nature; it's contextualised and regionalised. So in that regard, any conception of nature as its own thing (in toto or in itself) does not seem to be a requirement of doing science. — fdrake
I agree -- but no one is arguing that.
I guess that leaves questions of transcendental priority; can someone conceive of any particular predictive understanding of nature without using something like phusis? If it's a ground for science, it's not going to be a ground of scientific practice, it'll be a ground in terms of conceptual/logical priority. — fdrake
Maybe. But perhaps not even that. It's not that scientists have to even understanding their sense of "being" (as nature) or even question it, it's that it permeates everything they do as a background premise. How do we know it's a background premise? Because whenever they speak of the "universe," or the "physical," of laws of nature, forces of nature, "matter" (atoms and molecules), etc., there is embedded a very
definite understanding of being in general (nature), of human being (the rational animal, or in current formulation the "primate with language"), of subjects and objects, of "bodies" and "objects" (beings), of "mind and matter," and so on. Whether they're Christian or Muslim or Hindu or atheist or part of "scientism," scientists are human beings who have to operate with some kind of picture of the world. No person is without philosophy or religion, in this sense. So it doesn't matter if they can articulate it, question it, or even know it -- just as many "Christians" walk around never questioning their specific meaning of "God." But it does seem that one they do articulate it, or are questioned about it, "nature" or the "physical" is usually what vocalized at some point.
Thus it's worth asking about this word and its origin (in
phusis).
So it seems to me if the analysis of phusis takes a central place in science, it only does so as a transcendental ground, and needs only behave that way given the stipulations of interpreting it that way. Maybe Deleuzians would put difference at the center, maybe Schopenhaurians would put will there. — fdrake
I don't know what the last examples have to do with. Put "difference" and "will" at the center of what? Phusis?
Regardless, I wasn't advocating putting phusis as the "central place in science," I'm saying it is a basis for science if and only if it bears some connection to the current ontology of science (which I contend is a naturalism or physicalism). Just the uncontroversial etymology of the words "nature" and "physics" will immediately show you there is.
So then we ask, "What was
phusis to the Greeks?" Turns out, something very different than what we mean. In Heidegger, the emphasis has become more and more about "substance," about
presence. Science turns out to be one iteration of the metaphysics of presence since the Greek inception of philosophy.