No, it is not necessarily false, it is contingently false--it is contradicted by experience, not logic. That is what makes it inductive, rather than deductive. — aletheist

Deduction is the explication of what would follow necessarily from that hypothesis if it were true. — aletheist

If some swans are black, the explication that necessarily follows is that the hypothesis "all swans are white" is false. So we falsify the hypothesis with deduction as you've defined it.

Otherwise, in general, all deductions must contain some experience since it checks for possible contradictions between premises that are built from experience.

I get how each step of the example is categorized in the type of reasoning as you have defined them, but I still don't understand the distinction between induction and deduction in the example, as explained below.

We go looking for more swans and see a black one, so our hypothesis is falsified. — aletheist

Yes. As the original hypothesis is in contradiction with the new data, then it is necessarily false. So this is deduction.

If we were never to see a black swan, then the hypothesis would not be falsified, but that does not warrant certainty that it is true since we only ever observe a finite sample of swans. — aletheist

As the original hypothesis is not in contradiction with the new data, then it is not necessarily false. This is also deduction.

Hello.
Could you give a specific example of your general description?
I fail to see why the verification of the hypothesis by experiments should not simply fall under deduction.

E.g. we observe 100 swans and all are white; so we hypothesize that all swans that exist are white. Then we test this by looking for more swans, and find one that is black. As "all swans are white" contradicts with "one swan is not white", we reject the original hypothesis. This rejection is based on deduction.

Hello.
I agree with your view on abduction.
Could you give a specific example of induction? I suspect any instance would fall under either abduction in the sense of IBE, or deduction.

Why would a rational person who made the rational decision in that scenario the first time not make it the second? — Kenosha Kid

The key is the word "rational". If a person chooses the path of reason 100% of the time, then you are correct that any change in decision, even freely chosen, must come from a change in the situation. But the real impact of free will comes before that; when it comes to choosing between the path of reason and the path of the appetite (when the two are conflicting).

You asked me what I think: either I am not capable to understand those super-complex explanations, or those super-complicated explanations are simply long complicated senseless phrases that are intended to make ordinary people like me that ''scientists know the truth, but it's complicated'' when in fact there is only the impotence of the materialistic view of the reality. — Eugen

I'm with you on that one. "Knowledge" is "justified true belief". I don't think someone truly knows what they are talking about if they cannot justify with simple explanations, even if these simple explanations are a summary of the real thing only.

For me and my situation to be absolutely identical would be equivalent to reversing time back to the start of the situation and replaying. I think almost all of us would expect the situation to play out in exactly the same way and, because of that, almost all of us are determinists deep down. — Kenosha Kid

I agree that if revisiting a past event as a spectator, we would expect the exact same outcome for that event every time; but note that this expectation is also compatible with free will as I define it: In the original event, the person freely chooses to act in a particular way, and upon revisiting that event, we see a replay of that same act being freely chosen.

Interesting theory. But I wonder if it merely pushes the problem one more step, instead of explaining it. A condition to accept a property as being physical is that it must be observable by physical instruments (I think). Physical instruments have not observed such a property in particles; and so even if particles had such a property, it still would not be correct to call it "physical". Note that when it comes to our own consciousness, although we can observe our own individually, it is not observed by physical instruments either.

What do you think?

What I am getting out of your claim is that the will has the possibility of choosing; but also does not because it will always choose the same decision for a given set of information it receives. If on the other hand, for a given set of information, the will can choose between two decisions, then it can choose between two decisions.

Hello.

Maybe everything is determined goes for every structure before reaching the biological state. — Eugen

Are you saying that things are determined prior to the biological state, and then not necessarily determined after that? But then if not for an additional non-physical thing like the soul, how can things go from being determined to non-determined?

There are people who argue against LFW on the basis that there can only be determined and random things — InPitzotl

It's a matter of definitions. If randomness was defined as "not determined" or "Cause A does not always give Effect B", then there would only be 2 categories. But this definition is incorrect, because it is possible for a Cause A to not always give Effect B, and yet not have randomness. On the other hand, the definiton "Cause A does not always give Effect B, and there is no agency" seems correct. In that case, what remains is the category "Cause A does not always give Effect B, and there is an agency", and this definition fits for Free Will. I could be wrong if the definition of either of the three terms, Determinism, Randomness, Free Will, is incorrect.

The "more general" things are still theories before they are tested (and accepted). String Theory's a prime example. — InPitzotl

Sure, we can come up with a theory first, and proceed to hypothesis testing to validate the theory second; so long as some hypothesis testing is applicable to the theory. My guess is that hypothesis testing applies to String Theory, even if not at the present time. And of course, no theory should be accepted before testing and validation (unless a theory has to be provisionally accepted for some practical reason).

...if it were distinct "I"'s after the split, would that be critically damaging, or just interesting? — InPitzotl

At first glance, critically damaging. And interesting.

instead, we'll look at entropy. Entropy actually increases in time. But that means that effects can indeed be greater than the cause, even in a closed system. — InPitzotl

Indeed, entropy increases. But as previously mentioned, things can change into different things if both supervene on a same basic thing. E.g. squares can change into circles in a closed system, thereby resulting in more circles in the effect; but both squares and circles supervene on the arrangement of matter. Similarly for entropy, which can be roughly defined as (1) unavailable energy, or (2) disordered matter. For (1), energy was already present, and turned from available to unavailable, and both supervene on general energy; in (2), matter was already present and turned from ordered to disordered, and both supervene on arrangement of matter.

Therefore, I'm using LEM to show that my color list is complete. — InPitzotl

The LEM is used to come up with the list in the first place. As per the LEM, all things can be categorized either in category A or not-A; and that list is exhaustive. But we could also continue as so: All things within category not-A can be further categorized in category B or not-B; etc. This is how I came up here with an exhaustive list for determined, random, and free will, based on their definitions.

Theories tend to have many hypotheses incorporated into them.[...] The supported hypothesis is now one of the (thousands of) hypotheses supporting natural selection and evolution. — Paul Lucas PhD, quora

If theories are supported by hypotheses, and hypotheses are supported by testing, then theories are supported by testing.

Alien hand syndrome (AHS) is not split personality. — InPitzotl

I don't see how AHS entails split soul. AHS just shows that some of our bodily acts are not voluntary; but this is obviously true: e.g. acts from our digestive system and heart are never voluntary.

The less your souls have to do with subjective experiences and phenomena like making apparent free will choices as it relates to situations like AHS, the more it sounds like it's more about preserving a belief than being correct. — InPitzotl

In the religious view, the soul is the "I" where resides the subjective experiences of the senses or "first-person point of view", consciousness, thinking, feelings, etc. To relate it to the "split-brain video", it is possibly the same "I" that experiences both the theistic and atheistic views, and the "I" simply forgets one event when the other side of the brain is activated, sort of like how a drunk was conscious the night before but forgets the events the next morning.

Of course, factors like the circumstance, our appetite, and our reason, all influence the will towards a decision; but they cannot compel the will to the decision if the will is truly free. Worst case, they can compel the body to one path, like forcing someone at gunpoint to do something, but in this case, it would be literally against their will.

"Free Will: The will has the ability to choose between multiple effects."

Reason allows to determine which outcome is best, but free will allows to choose between our voice of reason and other voices like the appetite. And we observe that we in fact don't always choose the voice of reason. E.g. sometimes my reason tells me not to drink too much because I will pay for it tomorrow, and yet I can and have decided in the past to continue drinking; which resulted in a painful yet unsurprising hangover.

Go back to that CoE thing. You said according to PoSR energy cannot increase. Energy, it turns out, does indeed increase. — InPitzotl

As previously stated, energy in a simple closed system with nothing else cannot increase. But a change to the system can serve to explain the change in the results without violation of the PoSR.

Why? — InPitzotl

A Little Bang has insufficient causal power on its own to explain a Big Bang. This would be creating something out of nothing.

So here's the big question... why can't all three be physical? — InPitzotl

You have not answered my question about how you define the term "physical"; so I'll stick to my definition: "matter, energy and things associated with these, like forces, geometry, etc". Taken individually, like an individual atom, matter and energy behave in a way that is either deterministic or random. You can rearrange matter and energy to produce a human body, but cannot rearrange either matter, energy, or their behavior to produce free will.

It can't be used for the latter. I can't say that because I can only think of four colors, therefore there are only four colors due to the LEM. — InPitzotl

How does your example of colors rely on the LEM? You can however categorize all things into red things and non-red things, and this is exhaustive.

FYI, a hypothesis and a theory are different kinds of things. — InPitzotl

Theories are built from hypothesis testing. From this link: "The scientific method involves the proposal and testing of hypotheses, [...] if it fulfills the necessary criteria (see above), then the explanation becomes a theory."

...so there's your answer... science isn't distinct from philosophy... it's intermingled with it. — InPitzotl

No sir. In the pre-modern times, philosophy meant "search for truth" and included all fields of study to that end. In the modern times, fields of study have been separated into "science" which means "search for truths that are empirically verifiable", and "philosophy" which means "search for truths that are not empirically (ie only rationally) verifiable". Physics fits in science, metaphysics fits in philosophy.

it would appear people are splittable into pieces (link: youtube, Ramachandran) (at least two). — InPitzotl

Split personality does not entail split soul. If one side of the brain holds a memory that the other side does not, then this could be sufficient to explain a change in behaviour.

How we choose depends on the circumstances (what are my values, am I starving, is there bread, will anyone know, etc), i.e. is deterministic. — Kenosha Kid

But if all the circumstances are deterministic, including our values, then why claim that we have free will at all?

Regarding the Slot Machine Theory in general. Not gonna lie, I still don't see your view on it being unfalsifiable; but it's not that important because it is merely an example to illustrate a point. Your point, as I understand it, is that the PoSR is (1) too generic to be falsifiable, and (2) not substantial enough to make an impact on our reasoning. Is that it?

If so, I respond that (1) It is indeed hard to falsify, due to my claim that it is a first principle, which means it cannot be judged by appealing to any prior principles; very much like the LNC. But also like the LNC, it can be posited from induction and the criteria for self-evidence. (2) it does impact our reasoning in hypothesis testing. E.g. "What caused the Big Bang? Maybe a Little Bang?" This hypothesis would be automatically rejected on the grounds that it does not sufficiently explain the phenomena.

Random things and deterministic things are physical, but free will being neither random nor deterministic is non-physical. We have free will. Therefore we have a non-physical component, which we shall call a soul. Is that the form of argument you wish to present? — InPitzotl

Close. The first premise should be changed to "All physical things are either deterministic or random". We can defend this claim either by observations, or by appealing to the Law of Excluded Middle, as previously described here in the last paragraph.

there's no real lemon test I can put to this. — InPitzotl

Are you a proponent of Scientism? The PoSR is a principle of metaphysics which transcends science. Again, the scientific method does not judge the PoSR, it's the opposite way around due to abductive reasoning. Analogically, how can we test the LNC?

At the theoretical phases it simply should be coherent; it helps if it's "aesthetic" in some way. At some point down the road hopefully it'll be verifiable somehow, but the guy making the theory can still publish papers on it and discuss it even if he has no idea how to verify it. — InPitzotl

From this page: "For a hypothesis to be a scientific hypothesis, the scientific method requires that one can test it." The criteria is not how it can be verified, but if it can be verified in principle. This is why claims like the ones about the existence of God (as a non-physical being, not the greek gods) are judged to be non-scientific.

how would you distinguish natural sciences from natural philosophy? — InPitzotl

I'm fairly sure the two names are interchangeable, where the former is the modern name of the latter. But this is not the case for the terms "science" and "philosophy" in general (except for proponents of scientism). E.g. Ethics and epistemology are not part of science but of philosophy.

What I am asking is what the soul actually does for you, that you think being physical kills... with a side question of, why does it kill it? — InPitzotl

Physical things can be destroyed, in the sense of spatially split in pieces. Non-physical things, having no spatial properties, cannot be spatially split. E.g. we can split a red object into two, but not the concept of "red".

Also, by the way you use the word "physical", it sounds like for you there is no difference between the terms "physical" and "reality". What, in theory, would constitute a non-physical thing for you?

Sorry, I'm a bit late in responding to these posts. I'll get to them tomorrow.

The question of whether this is deterministic is the question of how I choose.[...] — Kenosha Kid

I agree that if humans were always willing to obey their voice of reason, then they would act in a determined way, called Intellectual Determinism, and all errors would merely be honest rational errors. But that is not the case.

Typically, the free will chooses between two conflicting values, where one value is driven by the "appetite" (ie our desire for pleasure and undesire for pain) on one hand, and another value is driven by reason on the other hand (such as health, moral duty, etc). This image comes to mind, where the dark angel is the appetite, and the white angel is the reason.

In general, can you define your acronyms before using them? I take it SMT means Slot Machine Theory.

You forget that SMT says machines can change types. — InPitzotl

But all 3 types are expected to pay off soon; so if you test them repeatedly and they don't pay off soon, then the theory has been falsified. Also you can still dismantle one of each type to check the mechanism. Also the theory concludes that you should play regardless of the type, even though you said the theory is a sure fire way to go broke; so the theory will be falsified simply by applying it. Finally, even if a theory is empirically unfalsifiable, it can still be rationally rejected as unreasonable. That's why we have such principles as Parsimony (Occam's Razor).

Have you never heard of TRNG's? How about Geiger Counters? Or interference patterns or breaking of them? Or challenge yourself at the most basic of levels... how do you think us classical level beings ever managed to develop a theory of quantum mechanics in the first place if quantum mechanical effects always fade before reaching our scale? — InPitzotl

Alright. It appears that if QI exists, then randomness can carry all the way to the classical scale. So my new argument is flawed.

For fun, I could revamp it as so (needs polishing but you get the overall idea):
Causally speaking, everything that is physical is either determined or random. Acts from agents with free will are neither determined nor random. Therefore agents with free will are not physical.

No, they're called laws because they summarize the data in predictable terms. Hooke's law, for example, is known not to be universal... it fails once your spring exceeds its elastic limit. — InPitzotl

Alright.

What does greater mean in terms of your new definition of sufficient? — InPitzotl

I have already answered this general question here. What specific questions do you have, starting from there?

Theoretical physics is a branch of physics that employs mathematical models and abstractions of physical objects and systems to rationalize, explain and predict natural phenomena. — Wikipedia

That's right, theoretical physics may differ from experimental physics in the amount of mathematics it uses. But the model output must still be empirically verifiable. From the same page (underlines added): "A physical theory is a model of physical events. It is judged by the extent to which its predictions agree with empirical observations. The quality of a physical theory is also judged on its ability to make new predictions which can be verified by new observations."

MWI's you're-splitting-into-countless-versions-of-yourself-that-you-aren't-aware-of is actually part of a respectable theory. — InPitzotl

Is it not empirically verifiable, at least in principle? Side note: I suspect the MWI came about due to our desire to satisfy the PoSR; because if not for that, then why don't scientists just accept QI and be done with it?

Also my points on the brain-in-a-vat and dream still stand. Metaphysics is beyond science. But what about you? How do you make the distinction between fields of science vs philosophy?

Why is it important to you that we have souls at all? — InPitzotl

For me? Religious reasons. But this should not count for or against any of the arguments brought forth previously.

I'm not fully understanding your point. That said, given the first definition of free will you wrote, do you still think that it is compatible with determinism?

Hello.

[...] however early evidence points in one of two directions, both of which are deterministic. — Kenosha Kid

Sounds good to me.

P2 seems to me the faulty one, for reasons Forest has already covered. There is nothing in the definition of free will inconsistent with determinism. Your defense iirc was that you believe free will to be non-deterministic in nature, making the argument circular. — Kenosha Kid

I forget the reasons brought forth by Forest; but aren't free will and determinism contradictory by definition?
Determinism: Given Cause A, Effect B always follows.
Free Will: The will has the ability to choose between multiple effects.

The slot machine theory isn't false; it's vacuously true. [...] You will go flat broke using your slot machine theory before proving it untrue, because fundamentally it's irrefutable, because it doesn't actually say anything. — InPitzotl

I think the theory is false. It seems to commit the Gambler's fallacy. You can also disprove it statistically by playing it a large amount of time, or better yet, dismantle it to know its mechanism.

But there are mathematical conjectures that are true that we simply haven't proven yet; likewise, there are mathematical conjectures that are true but unprovable. [...] there are propositions about the world that are true that have yet to be justified. And there's no guarantee that a true proposition about the world can be justified. — InPitzotl

Sure; if we don't know if a claim is true, then we likely also don't know why it is true. But how does that go against the PoSR? The PoSR just states, in the case of epistemology, that if we claim to know that a claim is true, then the explanation must be sufficient.

If QI were a thing, then certain classes TRNG's are truly random, and they produce random effects on classical scales. — InPitzotl

That doesn't sound right. At the classical scale, we have the laws of physics, and they are called laws because they are universal. So even if there is randomness at the quantum scale, it fades away before reaching the classical scale. This is possible due to such things as the Central Limit Theorem and Law of Large Numbers.

PoSR is the principle that for all things there is a sufficient cause where sufficient refers to the fact that the cause cannot be "greater" than the effect, but we still have no functional definition of greater — InPitzotl

I started explaining "greater" here, then I forgot where we ended up. Do you have specific questions in mind?

Sure, you can test a theory empirically, but that's part of the problem with your definition... because you can also test a theory theoretically (non-empirically)... this is, for example, a large part of what theoretical physics does. It seems you want to describe the limits of science, but to do that properly in a proof, you cannot be lazy here. — InPitzotl

I think "theoretical physics" is more in regards to how the theories came about, not in regards to whether the theory can be empirically verified or not. E.g. the theory of relativity is part of theoretical physics, but can be and has been empirically verified. Now the reason I define "science" as "the search for truths that are empirically verifiable" is to contrast it with "philosophy" which I define as "search for truths that are not empirically (so rationally) verifiable", and which exists separate from science. That's the reason why such fields as ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and even "philosophy of science" are not part of science.

...we need not refer to 17th century thought experiments here. [...] — InPitzotl

Sorry, I can't let this one go. Along the same line as the brain-in-vat, there is always the logical possibility that your entire conscious life experience is nothing but a dream. And this would include everything you know about science. Thus the "science as you know it" could not counter this (but philosophy can).

What do you lose should the soul be physical? — InPitzotl

What do you lose should a triangle have four sides, or a rock be made out of plastic? Concepts come before the words that refer to them; and these have essential properties.

If the will is not free from influence, then it makes no sense whatsoever to call it "free". — creativesoul

They are not incompatible. Picture the good and bad angels on each side of a person's shoulders like here. There are two influences, and the will can pick a side. This is of course not an argument in defence of free will, but it shows it is possible to be both influenced and free.

The closest thing we could possibly have to free will is for us to carefully pick the right kind of influences. — creativesoul

How can we pick anything if the will is not free?

Even in the cases where the individual is knowingly, intentionally, and deliberately breaking the rules, they do so because they think it's the best thing to do at that time, based upon whatever they are thinking at that time. — creativesoul

You have heard of "willpower"? Take a 5km jog. All the runners on that jog know rationally that the short-term pain felt will result in long-term health benefits, and that they will not get injured from it. Yet some runners finish it, and some quit before finishing. Those who finished have applied more willpower than those who quit.

Hello.
I think you are referring to "Intellectual Determinism", which holds that the human will necessarily acts on the mind's judgment that something is better. This is true in the case when our reason is not in conflict with our "appetite", which is our desire for pleasure and undesire for pain. But in a case when our reason conflicts with our appetite, then we can make the free choice to obey our reason or our appetite. The fact is that not all mistakes are honest mistakes, where a dishonest mistake is when we decide to act a certain way despite "knowing better".

Your PoSR analog does not apply to math. — InPitzotl

I don't understand your objection. Mathematical claims demand sufficient explanations like any other claims. Explanations don't always need to be proofs to be sufficient, though proofs are of course always sufficient.

You're proposing a rule (PoSR) that you propose scientists rely on that rules out randomness. So what's interesting isn't that scientists don't universally accept QI, but that scientists do not universally reject it. — InPitzotl

[...] If it had to do with PoSR, per your (as yet incomplete) definition, QI would be ruled out already. — InPitzotl

Empirical sciences don't deal with metaphysics which is the science of reality. So when scientists say "nothing causes this event", it implies that "nothing in the empirical domain causes the event"; and they could be right about that. Empirical sciences have no say with what is real and what is not. For example, everything we observe, including the stuff QI deals with, could be caused in reality by a "brain-in-a-vat" situation. Thus even though the QI stuff would really be caused by the vat, scientists could still truthfully say that "nothing (in the empirical domain) causes the event".

We can empirically verify the theory, but applying the theory is not an empirical verification. — InPitzotl

So what? If we can empirically verify the theory, then it falls under empirical sciences.

Here's a bad theory about slot machines. — InPitzotl

I think your point is that the PoSR is not the only principle needed to find truth? Sure. Neither is the LNC. It doesn't mean they are false. Note also that if your theory about slot machines did not sufficiently explain the data observed, say, "they never hit", then this theory would automatically be rejected for it fails to sufficiently explain what we observe.

There are a lot more conditions required on the range of HVT — InPitzotl

That doesn't matter. So long as those variables have a location property, then they are physical.

Your proof has a flaw in it... if QI is a thing, you aesthetically want to call it physical, and therefore random things are physical. Covering up this flaw with reasoning such as "well it might be okay because that only applies when" is antithetical to the purpose of claiming that you have a proof of souls. — InPitzotl

I don't get your refutation of my new argument. Whether QI deals with physical things or not is irrelevant, since my argument only applies to things in the non-quantum scale.

I understand that... but the question is what is wrong with a physical soul... are you saying that the problem is that tradition says it's not physical? — InPitzotl

The property of being non-physical is essential to the concept of the soul. So if you find a new physical thing, you are free to call it whatever you want, including "soul", but it would merely be a homonym.

Mathematics includes many fields, not just equations with equals signs on them. But provability is not just an analog of justification, but an example of it. And it was justification that you claimed appeals to PoSR. — InPitzotl

Sure, provability is an example of justification; but not the only one. And one field of mathematics that is relevant to causality is statistics, which uses probability as a justification. In fact, most scientific hypotheses are validated with a probability (such as rejecting the null hypothesis), not a certainty.

The scientific community has no consensus on whether quantum indeterminacy is a thing or not. So if there's a PoSR that science relies on that does rule this out, somebody forgot to inform scientists about it. — InPitzotl

If there were any meat to it, and any actual scientific consensus (such as the one you pretend to appeal to), then the scientific community would rule out quantum indeterminacy based on such principles. — InPitzotl

My understanding is that the reason why the QI theory is not universally accepted, and deemed incomplete by some, is precisely because the theory fails to satisfy our demand for a sufficient explanation. E.g. "God does not play dice", etc.

I drop a rubber ball in a dark room. [...] — InPitzotl

A requirement for empirical science is that the hypothesis brought forth must be empirically verifiable. Your hypothesis falls under this science because we can empirically verify it by turning on the light, or by using a night-vision camera, etc. On the other hand, if the hypothesis was not empirically verifiable, e.g. illusion caused by brain-in-a-vat, then it would not be considered scientific, but philosophical.

I can infer that the ball is falling, bouncing, and going back up; each time, it's losing energy to heat and sound, causing it not to return to the original height, causing it to fall back down faster. — InPitzotl

Let's examine this line of reasoning some more. You are here making an inference to the best explanation, aka abduction, which brings forth the simplest hypothesis that sufficiently explains all the data. This is correct scientific reasoning founded on the PoSR. If on the other hand, we dropped the PoSR and allowed the possibility that nothing causes the phenomenon observed, then this "no cause" hypothesis would be the simplest and thus most reasonable one to begin with; which would be absurd.

and just flirting with the fallacy fallacy — InPitzotl

To clarify, I am not claiming we should believe that non-physical things exist until given a reason to believe otherwise. But likewise, we shouldn't believe they don't exist as default. And if we remain agnostic on non-physical things but allow the possibility for their existence, then the absence of a physical cause in an event is not an effective argument against the PoSR.

Bell's Theorem is a no-go theorem that rules out HVT's. — InPitzotl

Based on what I've read, the HVT is in reference to local hidden variables, which implies entities with a location property. And all entities that have a location property are physical, because physical properties such as location don't apply to non-physical entities.

Another similar reason is that measuring instruments, equipped with physical sensors, can only detect physical properties.

Pardon me, but out of curiosity, why exactly do you need the soul to be non-physical in the first place? What's wrong with a physical soul? — InPitzotl

Traditionally, what is referred to as the "soul" is that non-physical entity that survives the body after death. It is immortal because the passage of death is a physical event. If one were to prove the existence of a new physical thing and call it a soul, it would not match with what is traditionally referred to as the soul.

Hello.
An opinion does not count as an argument or a refutation.

Mathematical conjectures are not judged based on the probability that they are true; they are judged based on whether they can be proven or disproven. — InPitzotl

Pure mathematics is in the domain of identity, not causality. E.g. 2+2=4 means that 2+2 is identical to 4, not that 2+2 causes 4. PoSR is in the domain of causality. Regardless, why bring up maths?

But if you're appealing to induction, then induction is in play; in that case, we can appeal to quantum indeterminacy as a reason to doubt PoSR. — InPitzotl

So, come on, give me something meaningful enough to do the job you want to do; something that doesn't sound like special pleading. — InPitzotl

As previously stated, the PoSR is part of reasoning (at least abductive) which is part of the scientific method which is used for that QI theory. You cannot remove the PoSR from scientific topics. It would be like showing through science that some facts about reality are contradictory, thereby concluding that the LNC sometimes fails, and this would be acceptable because the LNC was also obtained through induction. We judge scientific theories based on their agreement with principles of reason, and not the opposite way around.

The conservation of energy thing plain fails — InPitzotl

You misunderstand. My position is in defence of the PoSR, not the laws of thermodynamics. So this time-translation-asymmetry thing is what explains an exception in the law of thermodynamics. Great. It's a blow for the laws of thermo, but it perfectly agrees with the PoSR. Your example would only go against the PoSR if it wasn't explained by something like the time-translation-asymmetry.

PoSR by this theory is meaningless, and lacks the ability to rule out randomness. — InPitzotl

No. PoSR states that all changes have a sufficient cause. Randomness means that nothing causes the change between scenarios 1 and 2, where in scenario 1, Cause A results in Effect B, and in scenario 2, Cause A results in Effect C. Randomness fails the PoSR.

the whole point of PoSR was to rule out randomness so you could use this proof of souls. — InPitzotl

Let's get one thing out of the way. The whole objection about those quantum theories doesn't actually harm the original argument in the OP. All I need to do is to revamp it a bit as per below. This is to clarify that my position on the PoSR is not driven by my position on the soul.

Premise P1: Everything in the non-quantum scale that is physical is determined, as per the laws of physics.
Premise P2: Free Will enables some of our acts to be freely chosen, thereby making them not fully determined in the non-quantum scale.
Conclusion C: The part of us that possesses free will is not physical.

The word "empirical" refers to something you actually observe though; so phrases like ruling out empirical causes literally mean that you're ruling out causes that you observe, which is kind of nonsensical. — InPitzotl

It means that science cannot rule out non-empirical causes.

And now we're full circle? The photon goes left because it has a soul, free will, and objective values? — InPitzotl

I would say another non-physical cause; but yes. But now are you claiming that you know for a fact that non-physical things don't exist? Because it seems this would be needed to invalidate the PoSR.

I'm saying that just using a justification for a belief (O⊢P) does not require an appeal to PoSR (∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P). — InPitzotl

Can you find an example of a claim that is widely accepted as true and also has no justification for it? If not, then it is an indication of the universal appeal to the PoSR.

Not in the realm of mathematics; proof is generally the level we're looking for. What weaker sufficient reason would you apply to mathematics? — InPitzotl

Probability. Reasonableness is equivalent to probability in mathematics without being quantitative. Note however, that the PoSR applies first and foremost to causality, and secondarily to knowledge, as an extension.

Could you explain that a bit more? — InPitzotl

Take the LNC as a first principle for example. It cannot be proven to be true, for a logical proof presupposes the LNC. But through induction, by observing that there exist no contradictory facts, and that we cannot even imagine contradictory images, then it is reasonable to believe the LNC to be true, both as an epistemic and a metaphysical principle.

But this is your burden... to show randomness is impossible. Quantum Indeterminacy comes from application of Born Rule, which is the rule that you apply when you get classical states from the wavefunction collapsing. If greater doesn't apply here, then there's no argument against randomness in this. — InPitzotl

There is a misunderstanding somewhere here. I thought you were just asking if along with being greater, the cause can sometimes just be equal, and I meant to say that it can; that it just cannot be less. If that's not what you meant, then what was your original objection?

Dark energy introduces a time translation asymmetry, and dominates the universe at cosmic scales. — InPitzotl

I wish laws would stop being broken. :shade:
This should still be okay with the PoSR. This "time translation asymmetry" as you say could provide a sufficient cause for the added energy to a system. There is also the possibility of turning mass into energy with relativity if I understand it correctly.

what is this supposed to mean?: "may demonstrate there are no additional empirical causes" — InPitzotl

That science may be able to show in some cases that it has accounted for all the causes that science can account for: observable, detectable causes. E.g. there may exist things which are typically judged to be non-physical such as the soul, free will, and objective values. As non-physical things, they might fall outside the realm of empirical sciences, and are part of the realm of philosophy (which nowadays means "non-empirical or rational sciences"). As possibly real things, they would be part of the causal chain of events alongside with physical things.

P=an english speaker is engaging me in a conversation. O=this thread. O⊢P. — InPitzotl

So this translates to "this thread is a proof that an engligh speaker is engaging me in a conversation". So far so good; no conflict with the PoSR that I see. But then what is your point?

In terms of math, when you say "X can be justified" appeals to your phrasing of the PoSR, given "proof"=sufficient reason, then you're literally saying that "O⊢P" appeals to "∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P", which is ridiculous on the face of it. — InPitzotl

First, bear with me when using symbolic logic, because I am not familiar with these.
Now the term "proof" is too strict. A reason that yields reasonableness instead of certainty is also acceptable for the PoSR. Of course, first principles cannot be proven to be true, by definition, but sufficient reasons nevertheless are given to make them reasonable, such as induction.

I don't get where "greater" comes in though. Wavefunction collapse causes the photon to go left. Okay, and? — InPitzotl

"Greater" may not always apply, as per your example. But it does in some cases: If a shelf can support a 10 kg weight but can also support more, then the being that is the cause has greater power (supporting power) than the effect (the supporting of the 10 kg weight).

But that conflicts with the fact that the total amount of energy in the universe is increasing (due to dark energy). — InPitzotl

Dark Energy... sounds ominous. I don't know what that is, but doesn't it conflict with the first law of thermodynamics, that the total energy of an isolated system is constant; energy can be transformed from one form to another but can be neither created nor destroyed?

Being able to demonstrate that there are no HVT's is strikingly different than merely not seeing an apparent sufficient cause. — InPitzotl

The domain of the empirical sciences (what we refer to as science for short) is limited to the empirical. But reality is not necessarily limited to the empirical. So while science may demonstrate there are no additional empirical causes, it cannot make claims about possible non-empirical causes.

That does not imply∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P; all it implies is that we don't commit to P until we find an O such that O⊢P (with a much weaker sense of ⊢... an outright falsifiable sense... since we're dealing with induction most of the time). — InPitzotl

But we don't commit to P, precisely because there is an insufficient explanation to claim that P is true.

Reason doesn't rely on PoSR. — InPitzotl

It sure does. The three types of reasoning are deductive, inductive, and abductive. Abductive is "inference to the best explanation"; and this implies a sufficient explanation.

And what does greater mean? Surely snowflakes can cause avalanches, and hurricanes can result from a butterfly flapping its wings. Is a rock greater than a stick? Is elasticity greater than magnetism? Are you just saying that if something requires x amount of energy then you need at least x amount of energy? — InPitzotl

Greater in terms of "causal power" or "ability". This is still quite generic, so I'll give examples.
Indeed if talking about energy events, then the energy from the effect cannot be greater than the energy from the causes. If reality is nothing but physical, which can be reduced or supervened by matter, energy, and arrangement of matter, then the effect cannot be greater in amount of matter/energy than the causes. If on the other hand a property cannot be reduced to anything simpler, let's assume free will for example, then the cause of free will must also possess free will.

A closed system with nothing but one snowflake cannot cause an avalanche, or with nothing but a butterfly cannot cause a hurricane. Now an effect cannot be greater than the sum of its causes. In a system that is highly unstable, a single snowflake may be sufficient to cause an avalanche. Finally, if a rock has more matter than the stick, then we could carve a stick out of the rock.

that has to be the thing you use to rule out Born Rule application of wave function collapse, because that's precisely what you're ruling out when you rule out the randomness Banno was talking about. — InPitzotl

I assume "randomness" here means that sometimes we observe event A and sometimes event B, with no apparent causes to explain that change. So if every change requires a sufficient cause, this type of randomness indeed cannot exist.

even if you ruled this out, the theory Banno described would do perfectly well as a physical theory... it just wouldn't apply to our world — InPitzotl

If the possible worlds only retain logic, then indeed randomness is possible in other worlds; but if they retain both logic and causality, then randomness is not possible. I'd say both should be retained because possible worlds are thought experiments, and both LNC and PoSR are laws of thought (as further explained below).

do you mean that PoSR "is known to be true without justification"? — InPitzotl

This one. The PoSR cannot be founded on anything else because nothing is below a first principle; but we can explain how it came about: The purpose of reason is to find truth, and we observe that when we reason about a topic, we always demand an explanation that is sufficient to defend the claim, and we reject the claim when the explanation is found to be insufficient (ie failing to fulfill the burden of proof). Thus inductively, the PoSR is the generalization of this observation. I'm pretty sure the LNC came about in a similar way, for it cannot be demonstrated either. Leibniz says the LNC and the PoSR are the two pillars of our reasoning about reality, where the former is for identity, and the latter for causality.

Well, what about my reasonable doubt... the possibility that WFC is real? — InPitzotl

The scientific method is based on reason, which uses both the LNC and the PoSR. E.g. "Assume a claim is false until given a sufficient reason to be true", or Occam's Razor which is "pick the simplest hypothesis that explains all the data", etc. So a scientific claim which refutes either the LNC or the PoSR would be sawing off the branch it is sitting on. That said, the WFC may be compatible with the PoSR if we posit non-observable causes. I just don't know enough about that theory.

It's not even related to the that claim [...] — InPitzotl

I'm not sure what your point is in this last paragraph.

Thanks! Will check it out.

Sufficient has meant that since before you started your post. — InPitzotl

Not in the context of the PoSR; which is what matters for this post. To confirm, in the statement about the PoSR "For every event E, if E occurs, then there is a sufficient explanation for why E occurs", "sufficient" means that the effect cannot be greater than its causes. And it is in that sense that I use the term "sufficient" for this post.

I'm the one doubing the PoSR is self evident. — InPitzotl

I'll try one more time, but I'm running out of ways to explain the same thing. To demonstrate that a claim is self-evident is not the same as to demonstrate that a self-evident claim is true. The latter is a fallacy; the former is not. My aim is to show that the PoSR is self-evident, not that it is necessarily true.

Replace PoSR with LNC in your above statement, and similarly, I could show the LNC is self-evident, but not necessarily true. A denier of the LNC cannot be persuaded to be wrong with arguments that presuppose the LNC. As it is with the LNC, so it is with the PoSR.

It was justified but it was never sound.[...] — InPitzotl

Sounds like we are in agreement here. Let's close this topic.

How [am I appealing to the PoSR]? — InPitzotl

By saying that "Quantum Indeterminism itself is even a thing because it can be justified", it is appealing to the PoSR in the form of "For every proposition P, if P is true, then there is a sufficient explanation for why P is true." So QI theory is believed to be true because there is a sufficient explanation in support of it. Likewise, if there was not a sufficient explanation in support of it, then QI would not be believed to be true.

It's trivially false that I cannot imagine something I don't perceive. — InPitzotl

That's not quite what I meant, but that's okay because I have changed my mind on this. We can after all imagine an event without imagining a cause for that event. That's fine; it just means that the PoSR is not derived from logical necessity (which is what we'd expect from a self-evident principle).

Wrong; I conclude PoSR isn't necessarily true. [...] — InPitzotl

It is indeed not "necessarily true" in the sense that it is not derived from logical necessity, as per above, but I clam it is nevertheless true for all cases, similar to how logic cannot itself be derived from logical necessity, and yet is believed to be true for all cases.

my definition was: "Self evident means something that does not need to be demonstrated." — InPitzotl

But if a claim does not need to but can be demonstrated, then it means it could be demonstrated without begging the question, which the statement in the wiki disallows. Or leaving the wiki aside, we agreed we could also call a self-evident claim a "first principle". But we demonstrate a claim by appealing to a principle prior to that claim, which cannot exist for first principles, by definition.

that doesn't quite fit, because far from being ignorant of begging the question, you're literally embracing it. — InPitzotl

?? My point is the same as that of the wiki, namely that any attempt to demonstrate a self-evident claim to be true would be committing the fallacy of begging the question.

No, because we believe Newtonian mechanics was justified pre-Einstein, yet we don't believe it's sound. And belief that an argument is sound is not the same thing as an argument being sound. — InPitzotl

It was justified. It no longer is. Similarly, we believed it was sound, we no longer do.

In the current knowledge base of physics, best I understand, randomness cannot be refuted given the currently available set of evidence, nor can determinism be refuted given the currently available set of evidence. So neither conclusion is a rational error. — InPitzotl

But randomness and determinism are contradictory, aren't they? If so, then how can the currently available set of data lead to two contradictory conclusions?

Not being able to prove massless cows are eating massless grass in the center of the sun doesn't make it self evident. You can't prove something is self evident by begging the question. And you can't prove it by begging the question and appealing to popularity. — InPitzotl

Why do you say the "massless cows" claim cannot be demonstrated true or false without begging the question? And why do you say the claim is popularly believed?

But using the fact that something begs the question to "prove" that something is self evident is a fallacy. — InPitzotl

Why is that a fallacy? Also I suspect you do not understand the statement in the Wiki link, because it supports my claim.

There is no smallest positive rational number because, if there were, then it could be divided by two to get a smaller one.

The Wiki states the reductio ad absurdum "attempts to establish a claim by showing that the opposite scenario would lead to absurdity or contradiction." Your example is an example of contradiction, not absurdity. Admittedly, I did not know we would also call it "reductio as absurdum" in that case. Anyways, back to the self-evident criteria, I mean it to say "absurd", not "contradiction". And "absurd" means "away from common sense".

(1), you're confusing justification with proof; I don't hold PoSR to be self evident; and you're trying to prove PoSR anyway. — InPitzotl

A proof is a justification that gives certainty. And I honestly don't understand the rest of your claim.

Quantum Indeterminism itself is even a thing because it can be justified. — InPitzotl

You seem to appeal to the PoSR to support these theories, and then conclude that the PoSR is false. Is this not like sawing off the branch you are sitting on? I offer a better explanation that preserves the PoSR all the way through: these theories don't exclude the possibility of a non-physical cause.

I can think of the word "random" — InPitzotl

We can imagine the literal word "random" made of letters, we cannot imagine randomness; because we have never perceived randomness, and we cannot imagine something we have not perceived, inasmuch as a blind man born blind cannot imagine a colour. At best, we can imagine "unpredictability". Similarly, it is useful to talk about "infinity" in math, but we cannot imagine it.

If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the subsequent occurrence of y. — Causality

Interesting. I did not know that was what "sufficient cause" means. Alright.
But... that is not what "sufficient" means in the PoSR. The PoSR states: "For every event E, if E occurs, then there is a sufficient explanation for why E occurs." This should be interpreted as "the cause has enough 'power' to produce the effect", or "an effect cannot be greater than its causes". For example, if a lightbulb is on, then there must exist a power source sufficiently large to light it up. That power source of course could also be used for other things.

Nice try, but the definition I use aligns well with the definition given by your source, and poorly with your linked to "common" definition. And your definition-by-literal definition doesn't seem to fit at all. — InPitzotl

From the same link: "In informal speech, self-evident often merely means obvious, but the epistemological definition is more strict." And also "A logical argument for a self-evident conclusion would demonstrate only an ignorance of the purpose of persuasively arguing for the conclusion based on one or more premises that differ from it (see [...] begging the question)."

It invalidates this point: [...] — InPitzotl

It does not. We believe a claim was justified because we believe the argument was sound. One cannot say that a claim was justified even though the argument was not sound. Hopefully that helps with your Newton objection too.

But that's superfluous, since all "adequate" means is enough to convince you. — InPitzotl

Inadequate in this context means "no rational error"; that is, the argument cannot be refuted given the currently available set of evidence. Note that it could be refuted at a later date, once further evidence is available. This is what happened with Newton and Einstein. Note also that a flawless argument can still fail to convince some people; but that doesn't make the justification itself "inadequate".

how is committing three fallacies to argue that a thing is self-evident going to help in your goal to convince the LNC denier that he shouldn't deny the LNC? — InPitzotl

We are definitely not on the same page; because my point is that not being able to prove the LNC is part of what makes the LNC self-evident.

Begging the question, appeal to personal incredulity ("I see no better way to..."), appeal to popularity. — InPitzotl

Begging the question: Showing that one cannot avoid begging the question to demonstrate self-evidence is not a fallacy.
"I see no better way ...": Do you see a better way to dismiss the opposite of a first principle like the LNC? If not, then it stands that my way is the best one available. No fallacies there either.
Appeal to popularity: See the explanation below regarding reductio ad absurdum.

No, just dealing with question begging separately. The appeal to popularity doesn't help; miasma theory, phlogiston, vitalism, spontaneous generation, all were popularly believed. — InPitzotl

That's the problem. Your counter-examples fail to deal with criteria (1) and (2) at the same time. Dealing with criteria (1) or (2) separately is ... insufficient. :wink:

But reductio ad absurdum? That can actually be a valid argumentation technique. — InPitzotl

You seem to fail to realize that a reductio ad absurdum is effective only when most of the population believes the alternative claim is absurd. In other words, reductio ad absurdum and appeal to popularity are both sides of the same coin.

Do you think you can attempt a reductio on PoSR (without meaninglessly just "opining" the absurdity)? — InPitzotl

Sure thing; although note that it is not much different than my first attempt.
A claim is self-evident if (1) it cannot be evidenced by anything else, and (2) choosing the contradictory claim is absurd. PoSR: (1) To justify it is to provide a sufficient reason to believe in it. (2) Its contradictory (ie "not everything must have a reason or a cause") is absurd, because it invalidates the demand to justify any claims ever. E.g. the soul exists. Much shorter OP.

All humans are capable of reasoning about conflicting information without concluding that 2=5. — InPitzotl

If that's all you mean by paraconsistent logic, then it does not conflict with classical logic, and so we are done with this topic I suppose.

you can prove self evident things — InPitzotl

Correction: I can prove claims to be self-evident, not self-evident claims to be true. By definition, self-evident claims cannot be proven.

Because there's no inconsistency in a model including it. — InPitzotl

What kind of model do you speak of? A computer model? But generating truly random numbers from computers is not possible. A model in your mind? But none of your thoughts are random or uncaused. There is a difference between the perception of randomness (ie we lack information to predict an effect) and real randomness.

Can you point to, or write, a philosophical paper that adequately justifies the belief that wavefunction collapse is unreal? — InPitzotl

So, if you're serious, do that... and derive that wavefunction collapse is unreal. — InPitzotl

Are you saying that the wavefunction thing and the PoSR are incompatible? If so, I would just say that the wavefunction may be real, but that it has a cause, even if that cause may not be observable.

If you ate a bowl of cereal this morning, that's sufficient to say that you had breakfast this morning (but not necessary; eating pancakes this morning would also be having breakfast this morning) — InPitzotl

I agree with you on the definitions of sufficient and necessary in logic. But I see 2 errors. First, as per the original link you sent, "This article is about the formal terminology in logic. For causal meanings of the terms, see Causality." and free will is about causality, not identity (logic). Second, if we must stretch the example to speak about cause and effect, then what causes you to eat cereals is the intent to have breakfast. So "intending to have breakfast" is the cause, and "eating cereals" is the effect. And like you said, the cause can also have the effect of "eating pancakes". So the PoSR does not remove the possibility of many options.


Side note: the posts are getting long. Good to consider dropping a few side topics to better focus on the main ones? We'll call it a draw on the topics we drop haha.

definition of self-evident — InPitzotl

You are using the common use definition as opposed to the philosophical definition. Better reference is here. But this doesn't matter. Let's use the term "First Principle" or "Axiom" if it makes things clearer.

true belief may not even be necessary for justification. If I understand Newtonian physics, and if Newton’s arguments seem right to me, and if all contemporary physicists testify that Newtonian physics is true, it is plausible to think that my belief that it is true is justified, even if Einstein will eventually show that Newton and I are wrong. We can imagine this was the situation of many physicists in the late 1700s. — Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

This does not invalidate my point that justification means "showing a claim to be right". Before Einstein, that belief was justified because Newton's demonstrations were believed to be right. Once Newton's demonstrations were no longer believed to be right after Einstein, then we would no longer have a justification for them. To loop back, you cannot have an "inadequate justification".

No method is better than a bad one. — InPitzotl

The method is not "bad" but "weak-yet-valid". In a situation where we cannot remain agnostic, then it is more reasonable to side with the popular belief than against it. So a weak-yet-valid method is better than no method.

Might I suggest it more rational to give up your view that winning debates is a metric of truth than it is to embrace logical fallacies as a method of winning debates? — InPitzotl

I give you an equally non-rational and rhetorical response: I suspect you deny the PoSR, and the effectiveness of debates, and the criteria for first principles because believing in the soul is an inconvenience. :halo:

it would have to be true for X=an invisible massless cow is eating invisible massless grass in the middle of the sun. — InPitzotl

You forget that "self-evidence" (or first principle if you will) has 2 criteria. (1) cannot be evidenced by anything else, and (2) is the popular belief, or its opposite is absurd. You are missing criteria (2).

Second, I didn't justify the LNC being "true"; in fact, I explicitly pointed out a case where it wasn't "true" (paraconsistent logic). — InPitzotl

Your argument is valid IF paraconsistent logic is true, that is, we observe that some objects behave in a way that does not follow classical logic but paraconsistent logic. Otherwise, this paraconsistent logic is merely a thought experiment.

Third, it's not my rule that I should be able to prove things are self-evident; it's your rule. — InPitzotl

It is indeed my position, that I have defended with an argument, and it stands until the argument is refuted.

Any referential claim (by which I mean something about the properties of or behaviors of an object to which you refer) requires justification — InPitzotl

Is this different from the PoSR?

By that criteria, both LNC and PoSR are not self-evident, because you commit three logical fallacies when debating a hypothetical denier of both. [...] — InPitzotl

What three logical fallacies?

If random mechanics were possible, that would suffice to refute necessity. Random mechanics is possible. Therefore PoSR isn't necessarily true. — InPitzotl

Why do you claim random mechanics is possible?

that would suffice to refute necessity [...] O/c, this is insufficient to disprove PoSR — InPitzotl

Do you not see yourself appealing to the PoSR every time we enquire about what is true?

But because it doesn't necessarily cause accidents every time, that reason is not sufficient to cause an accident. — InPitzotl

Are you perhaps conflating the terms "sufficient" with "necessary"? Otherwise, what is the difference between the two terms for you?

Self evident means something that does not need to be demonstrated. — InPitzotl

But everything needs to be demonstrated ... as per that one principle called PoSR :joke:.
But if you are serious with that claim, then how do we determine what needs and does not need to be demonstrated?

So it's inadequate. But it's a justification. — InPitzotl

A justification is defined as "showing a claim to be right" (source). So it cannot be inadequate.

"If a million people believe a foolish thing, it is still a foolish thing." Ambrose Bierce. — InPitzotl

True, but I see no better way to pick one first principle (or axiom) vs its opposite. E.g. some people may not believe in the LNC, and be very consistent in their beliefs (ie they contradict themselves), and I see no way to refute them other than to show it's a very unpopular belief.

I have no particular opinions on PoSR, except that you're flat wrong about it not needing justification. — InPitzotl

I have provided a justification for the PoSR, namely, that it is a self-evident principle.
Also, you are appealing to the PoSR for demanding a reason to justify it. From this link, "The principle of sufficient reason states that everything must have a reason or a cause."

But you're the one bringing up proving that LNC is true, not me. For me, it's enough that it's useful. — InPitzotl

Recall that you denied that "the LNC is self-evident because it cannot be evidenced by anything else", by attempting to justify it in another way. Since this has not been accomplished, my position on the matter stands, namely that the LNC is self-evident, in a similar manner as it is for the PoSR.

(d) one need not appeal to PoSR to justify it. — InPitzotl

You may give it a try. Just remember that "The principle of sufficient reason states that everything must have a reason or a cause", and to justify is to give a good reason.

IOW, all of your claims of PoSR being self evident are trivially refuted by the mere possibility of considering random mechanics. — InPitzotl

What is this random mechanics, and what's your justification to claim it exists?

Again, it's really, really simple. It boils down to a single question... how many things can your free will decision possibly result in? If you say one, it's a sufficient reason for that thing, but you can't prove we have a soul. If you say more than one, it's not a sufficient reason for whatever happens, and you can't say it follows PoSR. — InPitzotl

As per underlined, why is that the case? I suspect you have a wrong grasp of the term "sufficiency". Just because A is sufficient to cause B, it does not follow that A will necessarily cause B every time.

Yeah that's indeed what I thought you meant. I'm just being nit-picky.
For general info though, "truth" is "conformance to reality", where as "real" means "exists outside the mind (contrasted with imaginary)". As such, all perceptions, insofar that we experience them, are real. And if the info they provide conforms to reality, then the perceptions are true, and false otherwise.

To be technical, all perceptions are real; it is a matter of finding if they are true or false.